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The Author has produced it with considerable effort. He does not want the information contained herein to be used by any other individual and/or business entity for the purpose of gaining profit.

However, the Author wishes to share the information contained herein with the Marines of H/3/1 and their families. He therefore authorizes the Marines of H/3/1 and their immediate families to copy information from this document for their own personal, nonprofit use.

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FORWARD

This document provides details of the activities in which Marines of H/3/1 were involved during the Company's tour in Korea. H/3/1 first arrived in Korea as part of the amphibious landing force that landed at Inchon on September 15, 1950. The Company left Korea in March 1955 when it returned to Camp Pendleton.

Some parts of this document are incomplete due to the lack of available time and/or material available for research. The incomplete sections will be updated in subsequent revisions. Until such time, notes and bits of known information are included in the document for future reference.

Daily activities (working parties, guard duty, mess duty, training, patrols, etc.) usually performed by Marines in a rifle company are not included in this document unless the specific dates are known or the information is needed to clarify other details.


He had often thought about the times when he was in H/3/1 but had almost no contact with other H/3/1 Marines. He was delighted to hear about the H/3/1 reunion organization and anxious to become an active member.

He remembers many occurrences that happened during his tour. Some are remembered very clearly, some less precise, and others barely. Unfortunately, too many details have been forgotten. He often thought he would like to know more about what happened elsewhere but never had the means to obtain the information. The opportunity presented itself at the Nashville Reunion in 1995.

Ed Skokowski, H/3/1's Historian, had been collecting available information that he brings to the reunions for review by the members. Paul realized that this was no small task and offered to document some of the experiences of H/3/1 Marines.

He agreed to provide some effort to produce this document. The effort he agreed to provide was to document the history of H/3/1 as it was provided to him by members of H/3/1. Because of the lack of input, he later extended this scope to include reviewing books on the Korean War to better identify the activities in which H/3/1 was involved. Other historical occurrences are also included in this document to give a better understanding of the events surrounding H/3/1's history and the Korean War.

Inaccuracies or lack of details in this document are due to the lack of information provided to the Author. This document provides the details of the historical events that are known. For this document to be more accurate and complete, those who lived the history of H/3/1 are requested to provide the details. In this way, they can take their place in H/3/1's history and share their experiences with readers of this historical document.
PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT

This document is being developed on computer and is available in digital form on floppy disk and in hard copy. It will not be published in the traditional (hardback or paperback book) sense because the book will change as additional information becomes available. Also, the high cost of producing the very small number of copies would be excessive.

If a computer is not available and hard copies are desired, they can be produced on printers from the computerized digital information.

This document provides a chronological history of happenings in How Company, Third Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division, (H/3/1) while in Korea from the time they landed, September 15, 1950, until the time the Company returned to the U.S.A., MM/DD/1955.

It is a compilation of information provided to the Author by members of H/3/1, other interested persons, and other sources that have documented the activities in which H/3/1 was involved. At the initial writing of this document, most of the information documented herein was from the latter source. When H/3/1 Marines have an opportunity to review this document and provide more specific details, this document will be updated to provide a more complete and accurate account of H/3/1's history.

In some cases, personal interviews and/or documentation have yielded varying details about specific occurrences. Where differences have been reported, the events documented herein represent the Author's opinion as derived from all available sources. Information provided to the Author that is believable is assumed to be correct until conflicting information surfaces. As later discoveries are found about the history, the original text will be updated to reflect the latest available information. Occurrences that are unbelievable in the Author's opinion are not repeated herein.

It also includes events that occurred in other units to provide a better perspective of the overall situation at particular times. In many cases, where the specific activities of H/3/1 are unknown, the actions of 3/1, the 1st Marines, or larger units are documented. As additional information becomes available, H/3/1's activities will be incorporated to give more specific details.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The history of H/3/1 could not have been told without the many unselfish persons who shared their stories, experiences, and feelings.

The Author would like to thank each and every one who participated in the development of this book, but can't. There are too many to identify and it is not proper to acknowledge one's contribution more than others. All are to be commended for their contributions no matter how large or small. Just as H/3/1 succeeded in achieving its goals in Korea with the help of individuals in the unit who worked as a team to accomplish their missions, this book has evolved from the same type of teamwork dedication. The Author salutes all that served in H/3/1 and also thanks all who have contributed to the development of this document. Through the sharing efforts of the men in H/3/1, this document will continue to grow and become more accurate to benefit the readers.

Thanks also to those who have documented the activities in which H/3/1 was involved. This includes entities such as the company clerks who wrote the unit diaries, the commanders who submitted reports, the authors who wrote about the many interesting histories and stories, and the historical societies who, even today, are holding and sharing their historical data bases. The Author especially thanks the Marines of H/3/1 who have shared their experiences. Without your help this history of H/3/1 would have been less complete. Thanks also to those who have contributed valued source material in the form of books and other documents for the author's review and extraction of pertinent information.
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This chapter is incomplete and will be completed later. Until such time, notes are included herein for the readers review and comment and for future reference.

H/3/1 was activated on August 4, 1950. The only time H/3/1 existed was during the Korean War. It was deactivated right after returning to the USA in April/May 1955 and when it was reactivated for the Viet Nam War, and later battles, it was part of the 2nd Battalion, (H/2/1). It is not know the designation of How Company during WW II.

The memorial roll of H/3/1 is made up of 116 names. One hundred and two (102) were members of H/3/1 at the time they were KIA. Nine (9) were attached from different units (W/3/1, H&S/3/1, artillery, etc). Five (5) were transferred from H/3/1 to different units where they were KIA or DOW.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER IS TO GIVE THE READER AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE EVENTS THAT LEAD TO THE WAR AND COUNTRIES/UNITS INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT,

1. WHEN, HOW, AND WHY THE KOREAN WAR STARTED

2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WAR BEFORE THE MARINES LANDED AT PUSON

3. H/3/1's MAJOR BATTLES AND OTHER SIGNIFICANT ACTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/15-16/50</td>
<td>Inchon Invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/17-24/50</td>
<td>Battle for Yongdung Po</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/25-28/50</td>
<td>Battle for Inchon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Mar.</td>
<td>Hills 132 &amp; 133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/28/50</td>
<td>Majon-ni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/28-29/50</td>
<td>Hagaru (Chosin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/23-4/51</td>
<td>Hill 902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/2/51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/15/53-3/31/53</td>
<td>Hedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/53-3/53</td>
<td>Bunker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/53-5/53</td>
<td>Hill 229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/24-27/53</td>
<td>Hills 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/27/1953</td>
<td>end of Police Action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. UNITS THAT FOUGHT IN KOREA

The units listed below account for 96% of the Americans killed by Hostile action in Korea. Wounded in action include only those casualties hospitalized

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USA UNITS</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd Infantry Division</td>
<td>7,092</td>
<td>16,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Marine Division</td>
<td>4,004</td>
<td>25,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Infantry Division</td>
<td>3,905</td>
<td>10,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Cavalry Division</td>
<td>3,811</td>
<td>2,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Infantry Division</td>
<td>3,735</td>
<td>7,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Infantry Division</td>
<td>3,048</td>
<td>10,186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Units in Korea

#### 3rd Infantry Division
- KIAs: 2,160
- WIAs: 7,939

#### Far East Air Force/5th Air Force
- KIAs: 1,200
- WIAs: 368

#### 5th Regimental Combat Team
- KIAs: 867
- WIAs: 3,188

#### 45th Infantry Division
- KIAs: 834
- WIAs: 3,170

#### Naval Forces Far East/7th Fleet
- KIAs: 458
- WIAs: 1,576

#### 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team
- KIAs: 376
- WIAs: 1,457

#### 40th Infantry Division
- KIAs: 258
- WIAs: 174

---

**TOTAL KIAs AND WIAs KNOWN IN UNITS**

- KIAs: 32,190
- WIAs: 92,492

The above list is incomplete and will be updated as additional information becomes available.

The VFW Magazine states that, "By the end of the war, 1,587,040 U. S. Military Personnel had served on the Korean Peninsula. U. S. ground troop strength peaked at 302,483. American battle casualties total 33,629 KIAs; 103,284 WIAs; and 7,140 POWs.

### Foreign Units Who Fought in the Korean War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>UNIT TYPE</th>
<th>DATE ARRIVED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>one infantry battalion</td>
<td>1/31/51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td>one infantry Bde</td>
<td>11/7/50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>one field Artillery reg.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>one armored Reg.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLUMBIA</td>
<td>one infantry battalion</td>
<td>6/15/51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENMARK</td>
<td>Medical team &amp; Hospital ship</td>
<td>3/7/51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>one infantry battalion</td>
<td>5/7/51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>one infantry battalion</td>
<td>11/29/51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREECE</td>
<td>one infantry battalion</td>
<td>12/9/50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIA</td>
<td>field ambulance</td>
<td>11/20/50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(served w/Commonwealth Division)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>one Red Cross Hospital</td>
<td>11/16/51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUXEMBOURG</td>
<td>one infantry platoon</td>
<td>1/31/51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETHERLANDS</td>
<td>one infantry battalion</td>
<td>11/23/50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW ZEALAND</td>
<td>one Field Artillery Reg.</td>
<td>12/31/50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>support units</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORWAY</td>
<td>one mobile surgical hospital</td>
<td>6/22/51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILIPPINES</td>
<td>one infantry battalion</td>
<td>9/19/50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>one field hospital</td>
<td>9/28/50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THAILAND</td>
<td>one infantry battalion</td>
<td>11/7/50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>one infantry brigade</td>
<td>10/7/50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM</td>
<td>two Composite inf. Bde's</td>
<td>8/28/50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>supporting units</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRALIA</td>
<td>two infantry Bns</td>
<td>9/28/50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The British Commonwealth Division (in Feb. 1953) consisted of:
- Black Watch Regiment
- Prince Pat Regiment
- Australian Regiment

### ROK Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>PLACES/BATTLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Others

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>PLACES/BATTLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Enemy Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NORTH KOREAN UNITS</th>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>PLACES/BATTLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
CHINESE UNITS

A Chinese Field Army normally consists of three Peoples Liberation Armies (PLAs) which consists of three divisions each. Each Division included 10,000 Chinese. Each of the Chinese PLA that entered crossed the Yalu were reinforced with an extra division. By the end of November China had 380,000 men in Korea. A Chinese enlisted man's pay in 1950 was 5.41 per month. Besides these divisions, the Chinese Revolutionary Committee also recruited 500,000 coolies to provide logistics support to their armies. The support provided by the coolies was mostly provided by carrying supplies on their backs.

When the Chinese crossed the Yalu they had about a three or four day supply of food with them. This food was an emergency supply to be eaten only when other food provided by the division was not available. Riflemen were also given about 80 rounds of ammunition. They were told not to steal/confiscate from the North Korean Civilians but many did. This was one of the reasons for the many refugees. They just couldn't survive.

Starting on Oct. 14, 1950 the following PLAs crossed the Yalu at Andong, Manchuria.

38th PLA
39th PLA - crossed at Andong on Oct. 22, 1950
116th Division - commanded by Maj. Gen. Wang Yang
347th Regiment
40th PLA

In late October the following PLAs crossed the Yalu at Sakchu, Manchuria. Sakchu is about 20KM north of Andong, Manchuria.

50th PLA
66th PLA

Starting on Nov. 5, 1950 the 9th Field Field Group, commanded by Song Shilun, started crossing the Yalu at Manpojin and Singalpajin, Manchuria. These cities are about 160 KM east of Andong, Manchuria. The 9th Field Army Group consisted of the following PLA. Each of the PLAs were reinforced by one division from the 30th PLA. The ninth field was to be part of the invasion force that was to invade Taiwan until the 7th Fleet intervened.

9th FIELD ARMY GROUP
20th People’s Liberation Army

58th Division First in action at Hagaru on 28 Nov.
172nd Regiment badly cut up in attacks on Hagaru
173rd Regiment
174th Regiment
59th Division In contact with the 7th Marines;
175th Regiment helped 60th Division block the MSR
southeast of Yudam-ni on 23 Nov. Later
176th Regiment defended the Toktong Pass.
177th Regiment
60th Division In contact with the 7th Marines; surrounded Koto-ri;
178th Regiment southeast of Yudam-ni on Nov. 25th; attacked 1/1 coming
from Chinhung-ni to support the withdrawal; Also
defended blown bridge at Funchilin Pass

179th Regiment Later moved to Funchilin Pass area.
180th Regiment
89th Division attacked the 5th & 7th Marines at Yudam-ni
26th People’s Liberation Army

76th Division First contacts east of Hagaru on Dec. 5th;
Surrounded Hagaru
226th Regiment Suffered heavy loss around Koto-ri.
227th Regiment
228th Regiment

77th Division  First contacts at Hagaru on Dec 5th; Surrounded Koto-ri
229th Regiment
230th Regiment
231st Regiment

78th Division  Not reported in contact. May not have reached the area in time for combat.
232nd Regiment
233rd Regiment

88th Division  Not reported in contact. May not have reached the area in time for combat.
263rd Regiment
264th Regiment
265th Regiment

27th People’s Liberation Army
79th Division  Attacked the 5th and 7th Marines at Yudam-ni on 27 Nov.
235th Regiment
2nd Co., 1st Bn Attacked hill 1282;
(only 6 of the hundred plus were not killed)
3rd Co., 1st Bn Attacked hill 1282
(only 12 of the 116 were not killed)

236th Regiment
237th Regiment

80th Division  Attacked the 7th Infantry Division
(Task Force Faith on East Side of reservoir)
238th Regiment
units east of the Chosin Reservoir on
239th Regiment
240th Regiment

81st Division  No report of contact until 13 Dec. May have been in Yudam-ni area.
241st Regiment
242nd Regiment
243rd Regiment

90th Division  No contact reported. May have been in reserve near Hagaru.
268th Regiment
269th Regiment
270th Regiment

42nd People’s Liberation Army
124th Division  In action against the 7th Marines south
124th Division  This Division attacked the 7th Marine Regiment on the night of Nov. 2-3, 1950. They sustained enough
casualties to render the Division ineffective for several months
370th Regiment of Sudong on 2 Nov. Badly cut up in
371st Regiment actions of 3-6 Nov.
372nd Regiment

125th Division  Not in contact. Probably to west of
373rd Regiment 124th Division.

126th Division  Screened Chinese retreat to Hagaru.
376th Regiment
377th Regiment
378th Regiment

??  Division number unknown
The 1st Marine Division that fought in Korea originated with the First Provisional Marine Brigade that fought so valiantly in the Pusan Perimeter. After the Brigade left the Pusan Perimeter in September 1950, the 1st Marine Regiment joined them and together they made the Inchon invasion. Shortly thereafter, the 7th Marine Regiment arrived in time to participate in the last part of the battle for Seoul.

Brig. General Edward A. Craig commanded the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. He formed the Brigade in Camp Pendleton starting on July 7, 1950 and then sent it to Korea aboard ships. The Brigade was essentially Gen. Craig's Headquarters Group and the 5th Marine Regiment, Commanded by Lt. Col. Raymond L. Murray, and augmented by a number of attached units.

The 5th Marine Regiment consisted of three battalions, each of which had two rifle companies (the battalions were one rifle company under strength), a Weapons Company, and a Headquarters and Service Company. It was not until the Brigade was ready to leave Pusan that the battalions got the third rifle companies (C, F, & I Companies) in the three battalions.

Other units that were attached to the Brigade included a Division Signal, Motor Transport, Medical Shore Party, Engineering, Ordinance, and Tank Battalions. Detachments were also added from Service Battalion, Combat Service Group, Reconnaissance, and Military Police Companies. Three batteries from the 11th Marines and the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion were attached. Three fighter Squadrons from the 1st Marine air wing were also attached.

The Brigade left San Diego aboard ships while Gen. Craig flew to Japan to coordinate with Gen. MacArthur. He was at Pusan when the Brigade landed on Aug. 2, 1950. When the Brigade landed they consisted of about 4,800 Officers and enlisted men of which approximately 2,600 were infantry personnel.

The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade distinguished itself in several battles in the defense of the Pusan Perimeter. Most notably were the first and second battles of Naktong and Obing-ni. It is estimated that their casualties (KIA & WIA's) were less than 1,000 while they inflicted about 10,000 casualties on the North Korean Army they encountered.

Major General Edward N. Almond, Gen. MacArthur's Chief of Staff, was deeply involved in the planning of the invasion of Korea at Inchon, code named Chromate. When the plans were executed, he became the Commander of X Corps (pronounced "Tenth" Corps) which consisted of the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Army Division which was commanded by Gen. Dave Barr. The Marines were to take the beachhead, Inchon, and Seoul (about 30 miles inland). After securing these areas, the Marines were to turn control over to the 7th Army Division and withdraw.

Major General Oliver P. Smith, who was to command the 1st Marine Division, had been in Japan coordinating with Gen. MacArthur and his staff for the Amphibious landing at Inchon. Just before the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade left Pusan they were reorganized into Division units. The invasion force consisted of the 5th Marine Regiment coming from Pusan and the 1st Marine Regiment coming from Camp Pendleton, via Kobe Japan. Their ships rendezvoused at sea south of the Korean Peninsula and proceeded as a single invasion force that had never worked together before.

The 1st Marine Regiment of the 1st Marine Division evolved from the Sixth Marines, 2nd Marine Division (1/6) that was stationed at Camp Lejeune, NC. 1/6 moved by rail from Camp Lejeune to Camp Pendleton. The 1st Marines came into existence and B/1/6 was redesignated How Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (H/3/1) on Aug. 4, 1950. Reservists at Camp Pendleton for summer training were activated and used to fill in the ranks bringing the units up to strength.

Jack Dedrick recalls that on July 25, 1950 he was assigned to an advanced detail that escorted a sixty-six-car freight train carrying vehicles and supplies from Lejeune to Pendleton. The freight train included a pullman car at the end of the train for the Marines. An Aug. 3rd unit diary entry shows when they arrived at Camp Pendleton. There were eleven Marines and a Lieutenant in charge (name unknown). They were:
IN KOREA

PFC Harvey F. Abrams       PFC William Coleman
Cpl Jonathan F. Dedrick    Cpl John B. Drawdy Jr.
PFC George J. Elsasser III PFC Paul Estes
PFC Joseph K. Florence     PFC Richard M. Golden
PFC Aubrey L. Kennedy      SSgt Robert L. Marler
PFC Commodore C. McNeil Jr.

(NOTE: An Aug. 3rd unit diary entry shows that Paul Estes did not join the others at Camp Pendleton)

There were two flatbed cars with jeeps in front of the Pullman car. The Marines were armed and when the train stopped, two men ran forward to the engine, two men ran to the middle of the train, and two stayed at the end. When the train was moving they would sit in the jeeps and enjoy the scenery.

The only trouble they had was in Texarkana, TX. When they slowly entered a train yard where there was a long bend in the track, two men were spotted riding atop a tank. The railroad police were notified and Marines ran forward to apprehend the violators. The violators jumped off the train and started to run. Shots were fired over their heads (perhaps by the Lt. in Charge) and they stopped. It was discovered they were just two hobos and the police took them away.

The Marines got their food by wiring ahead to Hardy Houses for hot meals and would pick up the food when they arrived. This was apparently a lot better food than was served to the troops that were traveling on the troop train.

Others on the advanced detail, TSgt Roger W. Barnes, TSgt. Bert L. Elliott, Sgt. James O. MacDonald, and Sgt. Gerald C. Parker were authorized to make the trip POV. According to an Aug. 2nd Unit Diary entry they were joined to the unit but TSgt Elliott’s name doesn’t appear on H/3/1's 8/8/50 monthly personnel roster.

Cpl Jack Dedrick lucked out again when H/3/1 boarded the U.S.S. Buckner. He and three other guys were assigned to a stateroom on the main deck for the entire cruise.

PFC John Corzan was a short-timer teaching at the Machinegun school at Camp Lejeune, NC. He was also in B/1/6, which became H/3/1 and was transported by troop train from Camp Lejeune to Camp Pendleton. There wasn't a Pullman car in his troop train and they didn't have the luxury of Dedrick's bunch. At Camp Pendleton, John remembers mixing some reserves in with the regulars to fill out the units.

Just before leaving San Diego, John and three others took a little unauthorized liberty. Instead of going to the bars across the street where the MP's would pick them up, they visited the downtown bar establishments of San Diego. Time slipped by and they arrived back at their ship at the 32nd Street Navy Yard docks just as the gang plank was being pulled up. The gangplank was lowered again and John came that close to missing a troop movement.

John's tardiness did not go unnoticed. As punishment, he was put on mess duty during the voyage. John was assigned to the butcher shop and his job was a delight. He was fed well, had plenty of time off, and did little work. One time he made some sandwiches and took them and some Dixie Cups to the on-deck movie. They were such a hit that he sold out with a nice profit.

They embarked aboard the USS General Simon B. Buckner (AP 123) on Aug. 15th at San Diego, Calif. and set sail therefrom on Aug. 16, 1950. Under the command of Col. Lewis B. Puller, they arrived at Kobe, Japan on Sept. 2nd. While in Japan, five hundred seventeen-year-old Marines were transferred out of the 1st Marines, to comply with an administrative order which did not allow Marines under 18 years of age to enter a combat zone. During the shuffle of personnel, PFC Commodore McNeil became squad leader of the 3rd Squad 1st Platoon when his squad leader was transferred (perhaps to W/3/1). During the peak of a typhoon they unloaded mixed-type shipping and combat loaded it into assault-type shipping for the Inchon invasion. LSTs had to be ready to sail for the target area by Sept. 10th and transports by the 12th. H/3/1 embarked aboard an LST that was part of Task Force 92.11 at Kobe, Japan on Sept. 5th and sailed on Sept. 10th just prior to a second typhoon's arrival.

Jack Dedrick remembers H/3/1 being at Otsu, outside Kobe, Japan. It was a vacant Army Post. The troops that had previously been stationed there were probably those that had been sent to Korea earlier. H/3/1 did a lot of hiking to get into shape to include
many forced marches through the villages on both sides of the road. There always seemed to be a Japanese Papasan with a honey bucket (or wagons) up ahead leaving a trail of his odors.

3/1 embarked five LSTs at Kobe, Japan on Sep. 9, 1950 and sail on Sep. 10, 1950 for their destination, the landing at Inchon, Korea. The Battalion's Special action report documented that the five ships ranged from poor to excellent. At the worst the accommodations were barely livable and the ship was scarcely seaworthy, having just been reclaimed from salvage prior to being loaded out. Plans were made for the transfer to other ships if required. Luckily, this was not necessary. The LST that H/3/1 sailed on was one that the U. S. had been turned over to Japan after WW II. Dedrick remembers it as a real rust bucket. He thought they had put them on this ship so that they would be eager to get off at Inchon. Sounds like they had the worst.

Unit Commanders were twice briefed aboard ship at Kobe Japan with the limited amount of intelligence available and the night before the landing H/3/1 had a briefing of their mission. Dedrick's second machinegun section was attached to the 2nd Platoon that was commanded by 2nd Lt. Ronald A. Mason. The platoon was to pass through the Company line and take the high ground on Hill 233 so the NKPA would not have an advantage when the Regiment made moved from the beachhead toward Seoul. They were told to secure their equipment so it would make as little noise as possible.

There were some card games that night and there were some big winners. This was typical aboard ship. Everyone who gambled would do so until they were broke except for the few who had all of everybody's money. This night the big winners were Richard Garza and Ben Boyer.

The initial phase of the Inchon invasion was to be made by Gen. Craig (who had become the Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Marine Division) and the 1st Bn., 5th Regiment (infantry units from the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade) at high tide on the morning of September 15, 1950. They landed at Green Beach on Wolmi-do, an island just outside Inchon Harbor that commanded the area.

The rest of the 5th Marines and the 1st Marine Regiment (Commanded by Col. Chesty Puller) followed this invasion at high tide on the afternoon of September 15th. Most of H/3/1 Marines were previously at Camp Lejeune in the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. When they left Camp Lejeune and arrived at Camp Pendleton, they were redesignated H/3/1.

The 1st and 2nd Bn., 5th Mar. landed at Red Beach, on the west side of Inchon, while the 1st Mar. landed at Blue Beach just south of Inchon. 3/1 was assigned the area known as Blue Beach 2.

The 7th Marine Regiment (Commanded by Col. Homer Litzenberg) was enroute to Korea aboard ships. This regiment was hastily formed out of Marine Regulars stationed throughout the world, and civilians in the organized reserve units. 1/7 and 2/7 were made up of 50% combat-ready reserves coming from the United States. They left the U.S.A. about the first of September. A battalion of the 6th Marines, 2nd Division was serving aboard ships with the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. They were redesignated 3/7 and dispatched from Crete to Kobe, Japan via the Suez Canal and Indian Ocean. These two groups, the 7th Marines, arrived in Kobe, Japan about September 15, 1950. Some quick reshuffling was done to scatter Marine Reserves throughout the three battalions. Leaving Kobe about September 17, they arrive at Inchon on September 21st, a week after the initial invasion. These mostly unseasoned troops arrived in time to participate with the rest of the 1st Marine Division in the last part of the battle for Seoul.

GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF A MARINE INFANTRY DIVISION

1 Marine Division
3 Infantry Regiments
3 Infantry Battalions
1 Headquarters and Service Company
   Administrative
   Intelligence

13
Logistics

Communications (wire and radio)

1 Mortar Section (81mm mortars)

3 Sections
1st & 2nd Squad in 1st Section
3rd & 4th Squad in 2nd Section
5th & 6th squad in 3rd Section

19 men per squad and 8 men per section

1 section leader
1 gunner per squad
1 assistant gunner per squad
6 ammo bearers per squad

3 Rifle Companies Each rifle Company consisted of:

Company Commander (Capt.)
Company First Sergeant
Company Gunnery Sergeant
Administrative Clerk
Supply Sergeant

1 60mm Mortar Section (19 men) (actual numbers of squads and personnel vary depending on the number of personnel and equipment available)

1 Officer Section leader (3 60mm mortars)
1 section sergeant
3 Squads (6 men/squad
1 squad leader
1 gunner
1 Assistant gunner
3 ammunition bearers

3 (rifle) platoons (about 44 men)

1 Officer Platoon Leader
1 Platoon Sergeant
1 Right Guide
1 Platoon runners
3 squads (13 men)

1 Squad Leader
3 fire teams (4 men)
1 fire team leader
1 BAR man
1 Assistant BAR man
1 rifleman

1 Machine Gun Platoon (6 light machine guns)

1 Officer Platoon Leader
1 Platoon Sergeant
1 Platoon Guide
1 Platoon Runner

3 machine gun sections
1 Section Sergeant
2 machine gun squads/section
1 Squad Leader
1 Gunner
1 Assistant Gunner
2 Ammo Bearers

1 Weapons Company

Anti tank section (3/5 rocket, demolitions, and flame thrower)

81mm Mortars section

Heavy machine guns section
IN KOREA

(NOTE: In the field infantry companies are reinforced by Weapons Company and H&S company personnel. The infantry units are also reinforced by other elements of the Division that are not infantry related (e.g., artillery FOs, aviation liaison units, engineers, etc.)
The first combat H/3/1 saw was at the Inchon Landing on September 15, 1950. Little is known of what specific actions in which H/3/1 was involved but there is some knowledge of the actions in which the regiment and individual battalions were involved. What is known is herein documented with the intent of expanding upon the details, as they become known.

Gen. MacArthur had picked this invasion site because of its close proximity to the South Korean Capital of Seoul. He also wanted to sever the North Korean Army's Main Supply Route (MSR) to the southern tip of Korea. This North Korean MSR also went through Soul.

The invasion site was not the most ideal area because of the mud flats and high barrier walls on the beach. Gen. MacArthur took the risk of making this invasion against many objections. As it turned out, the risk was justified and the invasion a success.

Any invasion is complicated and has its share of confusion. It is extremely difficult to coordinate between ships, small boats, and ground forces, not to mention the coordination between echelons of command and all of the various units. This invasion force, which consisted of 260 ships, 70,000 men, many small boats, units of the Marine Corps, Army, Korean Marine Corps, and Korean Army, was no exception.

Several aspects added to the confusion factor for this particular invasion. Many of the men involved had been civilian employees only a few weeks earlier and had very little amphibious and other military training. The 7th Marine Regiment had never worked as a unit because they were formed from several different units that had met at sea. They had no experience in coordinating with each other. Logistics was extremely difficult with the strain of unloading and then reloading in Kobe during a typhoon on a short time schedule with little information on the requirements of the invasion force. Considering these circumstances, the landing was made with minimal difficulty and, due to the coolness of the commanders, was deemed to be an absolute success.

An understanding of the terrain features of the beach around Inchon is needed to give a better perspective of the circumstances that prevailed. The tide at Inchon was highest during the month on September 15th. This was one of the prime considerations when picking a date for the invasion. There was a difference of 37 feet between high and low tides. During low tide the shoreline would extend out to sea as much as two miles in what can be best described as a mud flat. Nothing short of a turtle could move in the mud flats let alone an invasion fleet. At high tide the water was well up the sea walls. Other pertinent data include; sunset was at 1842; civil twilight was at 1909; and high tied was at 1919. After consideration of these and other facts it was decided that H-hour would be at 1700.

Not only was this natural barrier a consideration but Blue Beach 2 was not the typical beach as one might expect. It had a concrete reinforced, fifteen foot high sea wall with very little actual beach. Most of the landings had to be made with the use of ladders and cargo nets to climb over the sea wall to enter the beachhead. Little was known of Blue Beach 3, to the north of Blue Beach 2, so plans were made to explore this area for use as the possible landing of 1/1 which was the Regimental Reserve Battalion.

Thus, because of the thirty one foot tide exposing extensive mud flats at low tide, the double problem of sailing over the mudflat at high tied and scaling the seawall existed. The ominous problem regarding the practicability of accomplishing these tasks was to be determined by the level of the tide when the LVTs hit the beach. Conversely, the later H-hour was delayed, the less daylight there would be available for accomplishment of the initial objectives on the regimental line and the fewer waves that would get ashore due to the ebbing tide.

From available intelligence it was predicted that the mud flat would not be useable for either wheeled or towed vehicles and could be used by troops only with great difficulty. The situation required a fair level of tide at the time of landing in order to assure a bare minimum of flexibility to LVTs. To insure all possible aid in support of the
landing, the following precautions were taken.

(a) inclusion of scaling ladders in the assault wave LVTs,
(b) inclusion of landing nets and equipment for their attachment to the seawall to insure the rapid landing of subsequent waves,
(c) inclusion of a detachment from 1st Engineer Battalion with the assault wave to rig the landing nets at the seawall, and
(d) inclusion of twelve foot wide by 2 inch thick planks in LVTs to aid the movement of troops across mud flats in the event that the LVTs became bogged down in the mud.
Before the landing, perhaps on this day, H/3/1 was aboard an LST. 1st Sgt. Cabe approached Capt. Corley (some time referred to as "Skipper") and advised him that the troops would like a devotional service. Capt. Corley said, "Fine, whose going to do it." MSgt Cabe said, "Skipper, guess you are." Capt. Corley agreed and said to have the men assemble on the bow of the ship in an hour.

When Capt. Corley arrived there were about 400 men, all of which stood. Capt. Corley said, "Remain standing and bow your heads". He then read a prayer, as a Protestant, from a small New Testament book he carried in his dungaree pocket. Then he asked them to be seated on the deck. He said, "Hopefully you will accept my prayer, if you are Protestant. If you are Catholic, I hope you will also accept the prayer I read. I know there are several Jewish fellows out there. You're on your own because I don't have a clue about what to do for you." This remark brought much laughter from the crowd. After this Capt. Corley gave a short talk but the prayer bit described above stole the show. All seemed a bit more relaxed after the crude service.

Capt. Corley apparently wasn't well versed in how to present such a service to a mixed religious group but he did his best. This type of thing is not in the average Marine Officer's qualifications package. All seemed to realize this and respect him for the effort. He must have done a fine job.

This day is the first day Marines of H/3/1 saw action. A complete roster of all of H/3/1 that went ashore is not available but it is thought that the Marines listed in Appendix B, "MEN OF H/3/1 during 8/10/50-9/30/50", is a fairly accurate list. The list consists of Marines who were in H/3/1 on Aug. 10, 1950, shortly before they sailed from the U.S.A. It also includes others who were known to have been in H/3/1 during the indicated period. A few Marines on the list may have been seventeen year old Marines who were transferred out of the unit before they left Japan. Others may have also been transferred to other units (e.g., to Weapons Company/3/1).

Wolmi-do Island was connected to Inchon by a man-made road/causeway. It commanded the Inchon harbor. The 5th Marines invaded it at high tide in the morning. This was necessary to eliminate the North Korean units occupying the island. The Island was well defended but extensive shelling and bombing of the Wolmi-do softened it sufficiently. The 5th Marines had little trouble securing this first objective in the morning of September 15th.

The Plan was now being put into effect. The 1st Marines were to be the right regiment (to the right of the 5th Marines) attacking south of the city of Inchon to secure the area to the south of Inchon. 3/1 was to be the Battalion on the right flank of the Regiment and 2/1 was to be on the Regimental left flank. 1/1 was to follow up the two leading battalions. H/3/1 was to be on the extreme right flank of the attacking force and would turn to the right after hitting the beach to secure the high ground to the south (Hill 94, 180, and 233 were among these hills). This area is called the Munhang Peninsula.

H/3/1 was given plastic bags to put their valuables (wallet, matches, cigarettes, etc.) in before they left the ship. Jack Dedrick remembers the bombardment and air strikes of Wolmi-do and the mainland. The LST rocket launchers gave additional light to the day and the destroyer's five-inch guns thundered as H/3/1 Marines went down the ramp to load aboard their LVTs. They started to rendezvous with other LVTs when their engine conked out and left them adrift for quite a while. They drifted into the side of a destroyer that was in the middle of a fire mission. Somebody used a bullhorn to tell them to, "Get the Hell out of there.", as if they had a choice. Residue was falling on them not to mention being in front of the big gun's thunderous roar. They finally got their engine started, rejoined the group, and headed for shore.

To Jack it was like a John Wayne movie with the blue water, burning fires on the shore, and those little blips in the water. Jack asked what they were and someone replied, "Their shooting at you, you shit bird."

H/3/1 Marines were in LSTs waiting to unload. The 1st Marines assignment was to cut off the road to Inchon leaving the NKPA garrison with the grim alternatives of flight, capitulation, or strangulation. They had to wait until Wolmi-Do was secured and then until
1700 for the next high tide to make their assault. About 1730, in LVTs, they assaulted a narrow beachhead identified as Blue Beach. Blue Beach was subdivided into two parts, Blue Beach One on the left was assaulted by 2/1 and Blue Beach Two on the right was assaulted by 3/1. The two beachheads were divided by what was thought to be a road as shown on maps but it turned out to be a drainage channel. The Blue Beaches were just south of Inchon and about in the middle of a peninsula where Inchon was located.

The LVTs were owned and operated by the Army. Their crews were inexperienced and they had no permanently installed radios or compasses. They were to be lead by Navy guide boats but heavy clouds, fog, and smoke had concentrated on the approaches to the beach and the visibility was poor, perhaps 200 yards. From three miles out at sea, these obstacles made it difficult to find Blue Beach Two.

While the first wave of LVTs was assembling, circling, and waiting orders to head for the beach, they were fired upon by mortars and had to disburse. When they finally headed for the beach, which was over three miles away, the ride took about 45 minutes. When they hit the beach, some of the units were not next to each other as planned. This caused no great problem but was a small confusion factor that was easily overcome by reassembling.

Nine LVTs brought the first wave ashore at Blue Beach One at 1730, on schedule. They carried part of Lt. Col. Alan Sutter's 2nd Battalion. Upon their landing they discovered what they thought was a road separating Blue Beaches One and Two was actually a drainage ditch that divided the Regiment's landing force. Fortunately, there was no enemy fire until the assault forces moved a couple hundred yards inland.

The third Battalion Commanded by Lt. Col. Thomas Ridge came ashore at Blue Beach 2 in the second wave. Incoming machinegun and mortar fire made apparent the enemy's presence. The sea wall was not much of an obstacle in most places. Although it was apparently fifteen feet above ground level, it was only about 3-4 feet above the top of the landing craft. 3/1 met scattered small arms fire from a few snipers in front of them. A few of the boats in this wave were stuck in the mud flats about 300 yards off shore. The men waded ashore but lost some of their gear to the mud.

The third wave had little trouble getting ashore on Blue Beach One. However, succeeding waves didn't appear right away. They were lost in the darkness, fog, and swift currents. Wave commanders, amtrack officers, and infantry leaders gave orders to head toward the shore on their own initiative. They went in waves and fragments of waves that lead to an overwhelming success despite the obstacles.

The 1st Battalion, in LCVPs, had been directed to follow a search light beam from the ship to the beach. However, the searchlight moved to the wall of the tidal basin. After initially landing there, the Marines reboarded their landing craft and moved over to Blue Beach One.

While 1/1 was reorganizing at Blue Beach, the shore party was blowing holes in the sea wall to get vehicles ashore. 1/1 took its only casualties during these explosions. Huge chunks of concrete were thrown around during these explosions. No one was killed but a couple of Marines were hurt and one had to be evacuated. The Chaplain also lost his communications set to this flying debris.

They had brought several aluminum ladders to use in scaling the sea wall. Many ladders bent and buckled under the strain. Col. Fuller had foreseen this possibility and brought along cargo nets to use in scaling the sea wall.

Jack Dedrick, with the 2nd Platoon, was in front of his LVT, left (port) side. His face was pretty close to the wall when they hit and he could see sparks from a mortar round or something. He jumped back in the LVT and Gus Geissinger hollered, "Get out of here." Jack jumped up again and didn't even touch the wall when he jumped over it. He dropped in the first shell hole he could find and started looking for his guys. He heard somebody holler, "I'm hit!" Somebody told him it was the photographer and that was probably why the 5th Marines got all the publicity. The 2nd Platoon eventually assembled and started for their objective, Hill 233.

John Corzan also remembers the landing very well. He too was a machinegun bearer that was attached to the 1st Platoon. SSgt Edward Hanrahan told the 1st Platoon Sqt that he was going to be the first one out. John and Ed didn't get along very will and it was no surprise to John that he would be given this distinction. When the landing craft hit the
sea wall, John fell between the sea wall and the landing craft. Looking back he saw the landing craft coming toward him again. There he was about to be squashed between the sea wall and the landing craft. He grabbed the cargo net and made it over the sea wall just in time.

After scaling the sea wall, elements of 3/1 moved inland under moderate small arms fire. Most of the small arms fire was coming from machineguns in a tower that was about 500 yards inland. After that machinegun was silenced, units began to move out from the beach. They fanned out along a north-south road that went toward the city of Inchon.

The 1st Platoon hadn't been landed where planned and needed direction. SSgt Hanrahan sent PFC Corzan to find out where Hill 94 was from some other Marines down the road. Corzan saw a guy with a map and said, "Hey Sarg where is hill 94?" The aging stocky figure pointed to a hill on the right and Corzan left. After taking a few steps Corzan realized that he had just demoted Col. Chesty Puller to a Sergeant.

H/3/1's 1st Platoon passed seaward of I/3/1 at 2030 and pressed a night attack against a company of North Koreans on Hill 94. After a token resistance, the enemy abandoned their well-prepared entrenchment, leaving thirty dead or wounded NKPA.

H/3/1's 3rd Platoon covered the low ground between G/3/1 and I/3/1 and then set up a blocking position.

At 2330 H/3/1's 2nd platoon passed through I/3/1 and headed toward the summit of Hill 233, some 2000 yard away. It was pitch black and the terrain was rough with no roads or trails they were authorized to follow. Actually there was a trail on the ridge but they were told to stay off the skyline. The footing was "for the birds" and men were falling continuously. Their presence was no surprise to any would-be enemy. After setting out on schedule, the small unit covered about half of its rugged journey when they reached Hill 180, an intermediate height. With the night gone and his troops wearied by climbing, Lt. Mason radioed for permission to halt and his request was granted. The only casualty they had was Ben Boyer. He lost his plastic bag that contained his wallet and the money he had won playing poker. The 2nd Platoon saw no action this first night.

The remainder of H/3/1 was in Battalion reserve. They found and secured the assembly area about 2100.

W/3/1 minus its machine gun and Anti-Tank Assault Platoons (which were augmented by section to the rifle companies) secured the selected mortar positions and established its firing battery and Fire Direction Center (FDC) about 1930. Supporting fires during the first night were limited to illumination fired by the Battalion's supporting destroyer. No 81mm mortars were fired and support from 4.2 mortars and artillery were neither available nor needed. The Battalion covering a front of 4,000 yards plus, was considerably over-extended but was at no time threatened by serious enemy counter action.

There was a lot of activity during the night within the secured beachhead. Much of this activity involved units which had landed some distance from their parent units. Most had found their parent units by dawn. A couple of the units proceeded further inland than their scheduled objectives but with no serious consequences and the benefit of more land gained.

The 1st Marines controlled the area from the Inchon-Seoul highway south and the 5th Marines were passing through Inchon. The first night passed here in a light rainstorm. It was a slow, steady, miserable, cold rain.

H/3/1 had two WIA casualties this first day. One was a Marine from the Mortar Section who had a bullet pass through both cheeks. The identity of the other Marine is unknown. Casualties for 3/1 during the landing and first night ashore were 4 KIA and 15 WIA.

The first day of fighting resulted in 196 casualties for the Division (20 KIA, 1 DOW, 1 MIA, and 174 WIA).

The 3/1 unit diary #1050 for this days shows that PFC Tommy N. Lilly, Sgt. Cecil Parks, PFC Lawrence Struwe, and Cpl Harry A. Thornton were WIA and evacuated to the Beach Hospital on this day.
On day two H/3/1 was in Battalion reserve and G/3/1 and I/3/1 were the assault companies. The broad front was covered with the Battalion moving partially on foot and partially on LVTs. Initially there was no resistance. Toward late afternoon the advance continued against light sniper fire. At 1700 the Battalion was relieved of responsibility for the Division's right flank by the Division Reconnaissance Company. The Battalion reverting to Regimental reserve, moved to an assembly area at TA 9646 G.

About 0200 the silence was broken by one sharp burst of machinegun fire. At dawn it was learned that a H/3/1 Marine had killed a North Korean Officer. Capt. Corley asked the Marine how he knew the man he saw was a North Korean before he shot. The man said he "just knew".

Shortly, a 2nd Lt. (the S-2) arrived and wanted the North Korean's pistol "for evaluation purposes". Capt. Corley refused and told the Lt., "Only if I'm ordered by the BN CO, will I release the pistol. The Marine who shot the KN deserves the pistol." Capt. Corley reasoned that the war had been going on for 3 months and if the UN didn't have a Russian-made pistol, we are in bad shape. The Marine kept the pistol for several months and then, voluntarily gave it to Capt. Corley.

The 5th Marines joined up with the 1st Marines early in the morning and then continued the attack east. The Seoul-Inchon highway was the approximate centerline between the 1st and 5th Marines.

At 0730 H/3/1's 2nd Platoon moved forward and succeeded in outposting Hills 180 and 233 without incident.

At dawn elements of 2/1 occupied a hill south of the Inchon-Seoul road and near the village of Kansong-ni. They were about three miles east of Inchon. They had a clear view of corsairs from the carrier Sicily attacking six T34 North Korean tanks, other vehicles, and NKPA troops.

On the first pass a tank was hit with Napalm. A rocket blew up the second one and five-hundred-pound bombs fell disabling a third and causing the crew to abandon the tank. The remaining tanks rushed for cover in a nearby village. One corsair and pilot, Capt. William F. Simpson, were lost in this battle. The pilots continued to attack the tanks with napalm setting the village afire and further concealing the tanks.

Later in the day, elements of the 5th Marines came upon three T34 tanks that had survived the attack. Two Marine Pershing tanks managed to subdue two of them and the third retreated back up the road toward Seoul.

About this date PFC John Corzan and Pvt John R. Goggin were moving along the road. Goggin had broken his glasses with one lens missing and the other one cracked. Goggin pointed out some gooks in a valley and asked if he could shoot at them. Corzan said, "go to it." When Goggin shot, from behind Corzan, he hit the power lines overhead. (Was all that elevation necessary?)

H/3/1 was among the 1st Marines who were busy mopping the southern half of the Munhang Peninsula and moving into the Namdong Peninsula. This mopping up was primarily to make certain that no major enemy force was hidden in positions from which they could make a flanking attack on the supply lines to the interior. As stated above, at about 1700 3/1 was relieved from protecting the southern flank and moved into position behind 1/1 and 2/1 just south of the Inchon-Seoul highway and southeast of Kansong-ni.

It was about this day that Cpl Dedrick and his machinegun crew set up on the corner of a rice paddy. They didn't get there until after dark and didn't have a chance to get a good look at the area. They were probably on a fifty percent alert when Lawrence D. Johnson said he saw movement in a corn field ahead of them. Cpl Dedrick got up to look around and didn't see anything. He told Johnny not to fire the machinegun, and give away their position unless absolutely necessary. He told Johnson to use his side arm instead.

Sure enough Johnson used the .38 he had brought from home when he heard noises near him. He said he thought there were four or five of them, on of which was wounded and moaned throughout the night. At daybreak they found three or four dead bodies that had no weapons. Somebody though they were South Koreans escaping from the NKPA. They thought they were probably allowed to escape so they would run at the Marines, to cause them to
fire and give away their positions.

The element of surprise was a key factor in making the invasion a success. Another factor was that most of the North Korean Army was involved in the siege of Pusan and they were expecting help for the Communist Chinese Forces (CCF). But now, the North Koreans were beginning to recover and get their troops into the fight for Seoul.

On the second day of the assault there were twenty-six Marine casualties (2 KIA, 1 DOW, 1 MIA, and 22 WIA). On the other side of the tab, in the first two days of the invasion the Marines had captured 300 POWs, and caused an estimated 1,350 casualties to the defending North Koreans.

On the 2nd Day 3/1 had 7 WIA. They also had caused and estimated 15-16 enemy KIA, an estimated 100 enemy POWS (five of which were wounded).

Unit diary shows SSgt Charles D. Foster and PFC Joseph "Joe" J. Zubeck was returned to duty (???? before being WIA on Sept. 18th).
SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1950

In the morning, elements of the Army's 7th Army Division came ashore at Inchon. They would take over the task of protecting the Marine Corps right flank and hold the area south of the 1st Marines. They would also get into the last phase of the attack (later) on Seoul when they came into the city from the south.

The overall picture was that the 7th Marines, when they arrived, would come around the 5th Marine to the north. They were to stop any North Korean forces that might come from the north. The 5th would take the hills northwest of Seoul and enter the city from that direction. The 1st would make a frontal attack from the west and southeast. The 7th Army would cut off any resistance from the south.

During the day, Gen. MacArthur visited the 1st Marines CP on the south side of the Inchon-Seoul road. He came to give Gen. Chesty Puller a Silver Star but had forgotten to bring the medal with him. He had Gen. Whitney to make a note of it.

Ascom City was secured early in the morning and the 5th Marines started their turn north toward Kimpo Air Field, their next main objective. The 1st Marines straddled the Ascom City-Seoul road and headed toward Seoul. 2/1 was on the left of the road and G/3/1 lead an armored column down the road in an attempt to pierce the screen of resistance near Mahang-ri. H/3/1 and I/3/1 were close behind. The obstacles on the way to Seoul were the high ground and cities on the road to Seoul (Mahong-ri, Sosa, and Yongdung Po). Mahang-ri and Sosa were small villages on the road, while Yongdung Po was a major city on the West Side of the Han River, across from Seoul.

After leaving Ascom City early in the morning the 1st Marines (G/3/1) met their first resistance just west of Mahang-ri, a roadblock with enemy tanks and troops. They outflanked the roadblock and killed twenty of the North Koreans. Our M-26 tank crew spotted an 85-mm gun protruding from a thatched hut and destroyed the camouflaged T-34 tank before it could fire a shot.

They were running into heavy resistance both on the road and in the hills east of Ascom City. They were using tanks and artillery to make a somewhat slower than anticipated advance. There were dozens of clashes that delayed their advance. This was undoubtedly a test by the North Koreans of the strength of the advancing Marine force. It was also a delaying action for their preparation of the defense of Yongdung-Po and Seoul. Four Enemy tanks were destroyed during the fighting.

Mahang-ri was secured by 1600. Small bands of enemy that survived were seen darting eastward to take up new positions along the highway. Meanwhile, North Korean soldiers were pouring into the village of Sosa, another three miles down the road.

Later in the afternoon, they ran into a well-defended enemy position on a ridge that ran across the road between Mahang-ri and Sosa. This was part of a regiment of the North Korean Army's 18th Division. The NKPAs 18th Division had been ordered to retake Inchon. The North Koreans counter attacked but the 1st Marines held their ground after some hair-raising close calls. Supported by corsairs, tanks, artillery, and mortars, they took the ridgeline and enjoyed a "turkey shoot" as the North Koreans pulled out toward Sosa. The assault force consolidated their position on the ridgeline and dug in for the night after a full day of fighting.

The 1st Marines had gained 4800 yard despite repeated clashes along the way. 2/1 had one KIA and twenty-one WIA while G/3/1 suffered six WIA. Enemy losses were two hundred fifty KIA and wounded and 70 POW. Total casualties for the Division during the day were seventy-six (6 KIAs, and 70 WIAs). Enemy losses were estimated at three hundred fifty casualties and four hundred POWs.

The night of 17-18 September passed quietly for the 1st Marines while Sosa and Hill 123 were being softened up for the next day's assault.

This day’s unit diary shows PFC Claude J. Rix was WIA.
IN KOREA

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1950

Early in the morning naval gunfire was called in to support the advance on Sosa. The H. M. S. Kenya, commanded by Capt. P. W. Brock, RN, provided the support with 300 six-inch shells.

During the morning, two Marines were killed and three wounded. The casualties were probably by our own short rounds but it is not known who fired them. These casualties were from 2/1.

Shortly after first light E/2/1 attacked along the left of the highway while D/2/1 attacked along the right. 3/1 boarded a column of LVTs, DUKWs, and Jeeps to rumble down the highway through 2/1s assault companies on the flanks. In striking contrast to the previous day's advance, there was little opposition. The Marines brushed aside light opposition, including an antitank roadblock at the outskirts of Sosa. There was sporadic resistance during the battle for Sosa and it was captured by noon. It seems the North Koreans who had put up the stiff resistance had withdrawn during the night leaving only small elements to delay the 1st Marines advance. After passing through Sosa, 3/1 deployed to the area of Hill 123, the Battalion's objective, about a mile northwest of Sosa. The Battalion was not directly tied in with any other battalion so a 360 degree defense was established.

About this date the 3rd Platoon had found a safe. Lt. Goss decided to open it up. In the process of shooting off the lock a ricochet hit him in the knee or foot. He was evacuated and returned a short time later.

The North Koreans gave a preview of a changing picture about 1415 when the first shells of a mortar barrage crashed into H/3/1's positions on Hill 123. During the next hour, 120-mm explosions accurately moved back and forth along the ridge causing 30 casualties.

Cpl Jack Dedrick had dropped his pack, and moved down the hill a little ways to pick a spot where they would dig in their gun position. When he started up the hill to pick up his pack, a 120mm mortar landed close enough to picking him up and slamming him down. The 2nd Platoon Corpsman, Gil Heyblom, looked him over and found shrapnel in his back. Gil sent Jack to the Aid Station to get it removed.

PFC Darrel Victor Jepperson, a gunner in the Machine Gun Platoon, was also wounded with shrapnel in the head and leg. He was evacuated to the field hospital where they cut his clothes off to locate his injuries. After spending three days in the hospital they returned him to the Company. He had no clothes so he found some dungarees in a garbage bucket where they threw the dungarees they took off the casualties. There were no socks to be found so when he returned to the Company he was sockless.

Others that were wounded this day included:

- PFC Eddie Guter, Jack Dedrick's gunner, was hit in the ankle pretty bad.
- PFC William "Piggy" C. Yeatman also had some shrapnel in his body.
- PFC Gerald P. Marks' jaw was pretty well shattered.
- PFC William C. Tisen was wounded in the face and head from mortar fire. His wound was severe enough to cause loss of eye sight in both eyes. PFC Grady Stancel was standing within two hundred yards when he saw William get hit.
- PFC Duane Trowbridge received wounds in the right knee and left leg from mortar fire. He too was evacuated to the Hospital where he stayed until his return on Sept. 23rd.
- PFC Joseph Francis Henderson was WIA.

Cpl Manford F. Langley had shrapnel in his right shoulder.

Cpl Manford F. Langley, the squad leader of the 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon received a Bronze Star for his action while helping PFC Joseph Francis Henderson get down the hill and back to the aid station.

Marks had a bandage tied around his head and his rosary beads in his hand. They put Guter on a stretcher and Dedrick and Yeatman carried him down the hill to the Aid Station. Marks went along holding on to Dedrick's jacket with his other hand. Several times during the trip a 120 mortar landed near them and they hit the deck until it seemed clear.

When they got to the Aid Station they flew Guter and Marks to the hospital by helicopter. Dedrick and Yeatman had to wait for ground transportation. When they got to
the hospital, a corpsman who was telling them where to go said, "If they ask you if you want to be taken care of right away so you can get back to your outfit, tell them no or they'll think your psycho."

There were so many casualties at the hospital that waiting to get treated was like standing in a chow line. They kept Jack Dedrick, Piggy Yeatman, and Duane Trowbridge for a few days. They gave Jack a pencil and paper and told them to write home to tell them they were okay. While at the hospital, Jack saw and spoke with Lt. Goss.

PFC John Corzan who was a machine gunner with the 1st Platoon also recalls the action that took place on Hill 123 (Shrapnel Hill). John's account of the action is as follows.

They were going up Hill 123, "Shrapnel Hill". The ground was almost solid rock and enemy 120mm mortars were landing in the area. Although they didn't know it at the time, the 120s were shooting from the basement, through the open roof of a Korean house. Although the ground was mostly rock, John quickly dug a hole to get cover from the incoming 120s. John heard an in-coming mortar and ducked. It landed behind him and a Marine was hit. It was Tyson and John describes the wound by saying, "His eyes were blown out." John called for a Corpsman while Jerry Plunkett and another Marine picked up Tyson. When John turned and started to move out, there was a Marine from the 1st Platoon lying on the ground face up, looking at John. He was dead.

Jack Dedrick reported that PFC Edward J. Guter, PFC Gerald P. Marks, PFC William C Yeatman, and he were WIA on this date. John Corzan reported Tyson as WIA. The name of the KIA that John saw is not known. Thus far there has not been a H/3/1 recorded as being KIA this date.

PFC Robert L. Dunkin was WIA with wounds to the head. He was sent back to the aid station which was on the beach head and then returned to the Company about three days later.

Cpl Manford Langley was WIA (shrapnel in right shoulder) while helping a wounded Marine, PFC Joseph Henderson, get off the hill. Manford was evacuated to the hospital for a few days.

The Battalion suffered 1 KIA, 2 DOW, and 38 WIA on this date. During this day's fighting the Division suffered one hundred two casualties (7 KIA, 3 DOW, and 92 WIA). Enemy losses were estimated at 450 casualties and 197 POWs.

The unit diary for this date shows the following were WIA and evacuated to the Battalion Aid station.

- PFC Edward E. Blackburn
- PFC Robert L. Dunkin
- PFC Edward J. Guter
- PFC Ivan C. Jackson
- Cpl Manford F. Langley
- PFC Claburn L. Minchew
- PFC Leslie A. Northway
- PFC Nathaniel "Chick" Slone
- PFC Duane D. Trowbridge
- Sgt Jonathan "Jack" F. Dedrick
- SSgt Charles D. Foster
- PFC Joseph Francis Henderson
- PFC Darrel Victor Jepperson
- PFC Gerald P. Marks
- PFC William S. Newman
- PFC George H. Siegert
- PFC William C. Tisen Jr.
- PFC Joseph "Joe" J. Zubeck
It was estimated that 20,000 troops defended the Seoul-Yongdung Po area. Within a week they would have another 20,000. This made the odds about 50,000 U.S. Troops (1st Marine Division and the 7th Army Division) attacking about 40,000 North Korean who had the advantage of being dug in defensive positions.

Yongdung Po, just west of the Han River and Seoul, was surrounded by a natural moat, the Kalchon River on the north and West Side, a wide rice paddy on the west, and by high ridges on the southeast.

3/1 jumped off from Hill 123 to the northwest with H/3/1 and I/3/1 in the assault. The Battalion's mission was to clear a rambling ridge complex that extended more than three miles before stopping short of Hill 118 which was being assaulted by 1/5. The Battalion’s final objective was the terminal height, Lookout Hill, facing western Yongdung Po which could be seen across the wide bottomland of the Kalchon River.

Corpsman Melvin McNea received the Bronze Star for his action on this day. His citation reads as follows:

“For heroic achievement as a Corpsman serving with at Marine Infantry Company, attached to the First Marine Division, during operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea on 19 September 1950. Observing a wounded Marine lying in a fire swept field while his unit was pinned down by intense enemy small arms and machine gun fire, McNEA voluntarily dashed over the open area, dragged the wounded man to cover, administered first aid and supervised his evacuation to the rear. By his daring initiative, outstanding courage and staunch devotion to duty in the face of grave danger, McNEA upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.” Combat “V” is authorized.

H/3/1 had just finished taking their objective when the enemy began to hit them with an intense barrage of mortar fire. Capt. Corley requested permission to advance through and beyond the barrage. Battalion denied the request and told them to hold their present position. Aircraft and artillery were called and they plastered the area in front of H/3/1. H/3/1 used this time to dig their foxholes deeper to get added protection from the incoming barrage. In a very short period H/3/1 had casualties from the fire but it was now over. Friendly air support and artillery had knocked out the enemy mortars. 2/1 was on the Battalion’s right, although not in direct contact and was hit hard by a counterattack during the night (see 20 September activities). Third Battalion was not directly involved except to relay communications to Regiment.

About this date Lt. Goss was hit by shrapnel in the helmet. The shrapnel penetrated the helmet and slightly wounded him in the head. This wound may have occurred during the above-described barrage. He had been in the Hospital and may have returned about this date.

Considering the formidable cross-compartment approach, the assault companies lead by S-3 Major Joseph D. Trompeter, made good progress against enemy resistance described as "light but stubborn." The Marines combed the vertical wilderness and seized Lookout Hill late in the evening. The only H/3/1 Marine KIA this date was PFC Alex D. James. He was from Marion, SC and is buried there. The attack was almost too successful, for the Battalion was now out on a limb. The closest friendly forces were on Hill 118, several hundred yards to the north, and along the Inchon-Seoul Highway, about a mile to the south.

On this day PFC Richard Garza was in action for which he received the Bronze Star Medal with Combat “V”. His citation reads as follows:

“For heroic achievement while serving as a Rifleman of Company H, Third Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against enemy aggressor forces near Yongdong-po, Korea on 19 September 1950. With his platoon pinned down by heavy enemy fire while attacking a numerically superior hostile force, Private First Class Garza bravely volunteered to carry out a hazardous patrol and gain contact with his company. Boldly exposing himself to intense hostile automatic weapons and small-arms fire, he advanced through enemy infested terrain, contacted the remainder of the company and gave them vital information as to the strength and disposition of the opposing forces. By his daring initiative, he served to inspire all who observed him and contributed materially to the security of his platoon, His marked courage, aggressive fighting spirit and loyal
devotion to duty reflect the highest credit upon Private First Class Garza and the United States Naval Service."

3/1 held this position throughout the 19th and the next day while the rest of the battalion was consolidating the positions. Meanwhile 2/1's armored was encountering mine fields and heavy resistance while proceeding along the Inchon-Seoul Highway.

PFC Claude J. Rix returned (was WIA on 9/17/50) and was assigned to W/3/1 Heavy Machine Guns. While in W/3/1 he was continuously attached to H/3/1.

PFC John W. Bergen was WIA and returned to duty.

PFC Nathaniel "Chick" Slone also returned to the Company (was WIA on 9/18/50).

Cpl Kenneth C. Daley was sick and evacuated to the Division Hospital.

During this day's fighting the Division suffered seventy-two casualties (10 KIA, 1 DOW, and 61 WIA). Two of the KIAs and 15 of the WIAs were from 3/1. Enemy losses this day were estimated at 600 casualties and 126 POWs.
The enemy attempted to begin a counterattack. At about 0400 a convoy of trucks, five enemy T-34 tanks, and a battalion-sized unit of North Korean infantry moved westward along the Inchon-Seoul Highway. The Second Battalion, 1st Marines had moved up the road to a point about 2 miles west of Yongdung Po. D/2/1 and F/2/1 were on high ground on the south side of the road covering the area to the south until elements of the Army's 32nd Infantry could be brought up to the front. The 32nd Infantry of the Army's 7th Division was taking over the responsibility for the Divisions right flank. E/2/1 was set up on high ground north of the road just a little to the rear. This was an ideal situation for an Ambush.

For reasons unknown (perhaps poor tactics or inexperience) there was an ammunition truck leading the enemy tanks and infantry battalion. The Marines waited until the tanks came abreast of E/2/1 before attacking. The ensuing battle lasted until daybreak. The leading ammunition truck was destroyed leaving huge fireballs and pyrotechnics. PFC Walter Carlton Monegan Jr. of F/2/1 destroyed two of the T-34 with a 3.5 rocket launcher (bazooka), and killed the occupants as they disembarked. HE was attacking a third tank when he was killed by small arms fire (perhaps from a machine gun). Walter received the Medal of Honor for his heroic actions. One T-34 was captured intact with its crew. The burning tanks and other vehicles along with 300 dead enemy bodies, their weapons, and equipment littered the road, ditches, and surrounding area at daybreak.

After this battle, E/2/1 continued their attack and fought the North Koreans all the way to the Kalchon River. At noon they dug in on a piece of high ground overlooking the Kalchon River and bridge. They were about two thousand yards from Yongdung Po. Gen. MacArthur visited them late in the afternoon.

The enemy was sending reinforcements to Yongdung Po's western edge to fortify their positions. Allied air, artillery, and mortars were used to disrupt this effort. Chesty Puller, after receiving approval from Gen. Almond (X Corps Commander), ordered Napalm to be dropped on Yongdung Po to burn the city and evict the allied forces. The enemy was also using heavy mortars and artillery barrages to stop the advancing 1st Marine Regiment.

The 1st Marines spent the day in a series of heavy battles, along a four-mile front, inching their way into Yongdung Po.

1/1, on the left front of the 1st Marines near the river, were busy retaking two strategic hills (Hill 80 and 85) which had been abandoned the night before by 1/5 and reoccupied by the North Koreans.

3/1, in the center of the regiment, held Lookout Hill and consolidated positions in the area. They were considered the Reserve Battalion for the Regiment.

2/1, on the regiment's right flank, continued their advance near the main road. Some of this combat is documented above with E/2/1's actions.

PFC John W. Omer returned to the H/3/1 (unknown if he was WIA, sick, or ???).

The following were WIA on Sept. 18, 1950 and returned to duty on this date:

- PFC Edward E. Blackburn
- Sgt Jonathan "Jack" F. Dedrick
- PFC Ivan C. Jackson
- PFC Darrel Victor Jepperson
- Cpl Manford F. Langley
- PFC Edward E. Blackburn returned to duty from being WIA on 9/18/50.

During this day the Division suffered one hundred forty seven casualties (24 KIA, 1 DOW, 3 MIA, and 119 WIA). 3/1 had no casualties this date. Enemy losses this day were estimated at 600 casualties and 326 POWs.
Jack Dedrick, who was WIA on Sept. 18th probably returned to duty this day.

The battles were fierce and the 1st Marines were having a hard time advancing. The enemy had well-fortified positions and the natural barriers were on their side.

1/1 attempted to assault the city on the southwestern front but, for the most part, was stopped by the Kalchon River and the dikes across the river. A/1/1 did manage to get into Yongdung Po as noted below.

2/1 managed to capture a bridge and advanced about two thousand yards. They were receiving heavy fire from their right flank where there was a hole between them and the Army's 32nd Infantry Division. They attempted to advance forward and also take the strongly defended higher ground on their right. 2/1 had eighty-five casualties during the day and withdrew from the right hand position at dusk since the enemy still had control of the higher ground. They dug in where they were instead of moving back to go into reserve.

Partially because of 2/1's crippling losses, at 1530 3/1 was committed to the relief. G/3/1 was on the left and I/3/1 was on the left with H/3/1 in reserve. They swung into action from Lookout Hill to flank the enemy dike positions facing D/2/1 from the eastern tributary of the Kalchon River. Crossing the Kalchon against light resistance, 3/1 ran into serious resistance at the fortified levees fronting southwestern Yongdung Po.

After machineguns of 3/1 got the best of a battery of Communist automatic weapons, G/3/1 and I/3/1 attacked astride the stream branch. Progress was slow, but at a cost of eleven KIA and eighteen WIA, the Marines rolled up the heavily defended dike and reached the bridge at the entrance to the city. Darkness fell with 3/1/1 entrenched to the north of 2/1/1, both units along the north side of the Inchon-Seoul Highway.

A/1/1, commanded by Capt. Barrow, was on Hill 118 on the right flank of 1/1 about a mile from Yongdung Po. He was ordered to make an advance through the quieter northwest section of Yongdung Po between the battles ranging to the north and west of the city. Much to his surprise he was able to advance all the way across the Kalchon River and hundreds of yards into the city without encountering any enemy. They were all so busy with the other battles they had left this area undefended.

They advanced inside the city all the way to the Seoul-Inchon highway without being seen. There they saw a column of troops advancing toward the western front where 3/1 was fighting. They ambushed the column and it was completely destroyed without a single A/1/1 casualty. A/1/1 also destroyed a large ammunition dump. With the company beginning to receive fire from all directions, the surrounded unit set up a perimeter defense along the dikes on the eastern edge of the city and dug in for the night.

At one point, the Enemy was regrouping behind some buildings for an assault. The Marines could hear this but didn't know what they were saying. A Marine moved to the end of the line and slithered forward until he could see a man standing on a small rostrum talking to his troops. The Marine shot him and returned to his lines. Capt. Barrow asked what happened and the reply came back, "The man had just talked himself to death".

Not long after dark infantry and five enemy tanks repeatedly attacked them. They managed to get one of the tanks and damage two others with 3.5-inch rockets before the tanks withdrew. Then about 2100 they were attacked five times on their north at the end of the dike. They threw them back five times with relative ease. There was only scattered fighting along the line the rest of the night. At dawn there were two hundred seventy-five dead North Koreans and fifty abandoned automatic weapons around their perimeter.

During this day's fighting the Division suffered two Hundred thirty one casualties (30 KIA, 3 DOW, and 198 WIA). 3/1 suffered 11 KIAs and 18 WIAs. Enemy losses this day were estimated at 1350 casualties and 355 POWs.

The following were WIA and evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. at Inchon on this date.

- 2nd Lt. Harvey Ashley Goss
- PFC Milo L. Gasper
- Sgt Johnie M. Hudson
- Clarence "Steph" Stephan
- PFC James R. Vermillion
- PFC John W. Omer

In Korea

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1950

2nd Lt. Harvey Ashley Goss
PFC Milo L. Gasper
Sgt Johnie M. Hudson
Clarence "Steph" Stephan
PFC James R. Vermillion
PFC John W. Omer was sick and evacuated to the 1st Marine Division in Inchon.
PFC Lawrence "Scotty" T. Struwe returned to the Company from the Hospital.
IN KOREA

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1950

The North Koreans abandoned the city before daybreak after failure during the night to drive A/1/1 from its advanced position. They had left behind much of their armament, equipment, and supplies.

Following an artillery preparation, 3/1 continued the attack 0630 against negligible resistance and converged on the isolated unit, A/1/1. The enemy was gone except for the hundreds of dead that littered the city and limited sniper resistance. Continuing the advance, the 1st Marines surged eastward beyond Yongdung Po, then spent the remainder of the day reorganizing and patrolling. H/3/1, in reserve, was shifted to the right to protect the exposed flank. The attack was stopped at the next objective to allow units on each flank to close up. At 2130 a combat patrol was dispatched, probably by H/3/1, to cover the gap between the Battalion and the army units to the right. They had faced the 87th Regiment, 9th Division, and elements of the North Korean 18th Division, which had been defending Yongdung Po.

While on a high hill at Yongdung Po, perhaps on this date, H/3/1 received their first beer ration (2 cans per man). 1st Sgt. Cabe really made out. Most of the Marines who didn't want their ration (including Capt. Corley) gave it to him.

During this day's fighting the Division suffered one hundred sixty five casualties (27 KIA, 3 DOW, and 135 WIA). No casualties were reported by 3/1. Enemy losses this day were estimated at 1200 casualties and 395 POWs.

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1950

PFC Duane Trowbridge returned to the Company from the hospital where he had been recuperating from his wounds on Sept. 18th.

The 1st Marines moved almost unopposed to the bank of the Han River. 3/1 seized their ultimate objective, Hill 108, which dominated the battered bridges across the Han. The Battalion consolidated their position until nightfall.

About this date H/3/1's 3rd Platoon was assigned a combat/reconnaissance patrol. The Platoon Leader was instructed repeatedly not to go beyond a stream that was shown on the map. The XO, Lt. Mitchell said, "If you had repeated those instructions, "Don't go past the stream." one more time I was going to throw up. Sure enough, the 3rd Platoon did go past the indicated steam. Several men were wounded and equipment was left behind. The Platoon returned and H/3/1 retrieved the equipment. A Korean had told the 3rd Platoon that there were 400 North Koreans in 6 caves (or 600 North Koreans in 4 caves). The 3rd Platoon leader thought it would look good for the platoon and H/3/1 if they could capture them. When Capt. Corley heard this he said, "You only had about 50 men. What are you trying to do, Win the War?" Capt. Corley went to Battalion to put the 3rd Platoon Leader on report. Battalion said, "We don't know weather to commend him for his initiative or reprimand him for disobeying orders". No action was taken.

From this position Jack Dedrick could see North Koreans getting water on the other side of the river. They were probably about one thousand yards away. Dick Wolfcale, the company sniper, had a Springfield rifle with a scope. He took some shots and Jack remembers the Koreans looking up in wonder. From their expressions, he could imagine they were asking, "What the hell was that?".

Jack also remembers that about this time they also found a brewery that had not yet been destroyed. He says he will say no more about that subject.

Gen. Almond told Gen. Smith to attack Seoul on the North with the 5th Marines and on the west with the 1st Marines. Gen. Smith refused this plan and said he wanted to join the 1st and 5th Marines for a coordinated attack. Gen. Almond told Gen. Smith that if he persisted and did not take Seoul by the 25th, he would call in part to the 7th Army Infantry Division to attack Seoul from the south.

During this day's fighting the Division suffered one hundred forty three casualties (19 KIA, 7 DOW, and 117 WIA). Casualties in 3/1 were 1 KIA and 7 WIA. Enemy losses this day were estimated at 900 casualties and 169 POWs.

Pvt Ovie O. Tracy returned to the Company from the Hospital.
SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1950

The first Marine Regiment crossed the Han River and entered the outskirts of Seoul. 1/1 was first to cross in the morning, and 2/1 crossed in the afternoon. After crossing, 1/1 headed south for their objective, Hill 79, and 2/1 followed behind in reserve. While passing Hill 105-S, 1/1 and 2/1 had casualties from the heights of Hill 105-S. By afternoon Hill 79, the 1st Marines 1st objective, was taken and the Stars and Strips were hoisted upon it.

At 1515 3/1 was relieved by the Division of its mission of defending Hill 108, south of the wrecked Han bridges, and reverted to the Regimental control for a river crossing which they completed at 2000. On the north bank 2/1 was thought to have pulled the last fangs out of enemy resistance on Hill 105-S (at TA 1557) until 3/1 came under fire from hidden enemy components. Since the heights dominated the new Regimental CP, 1/3/1 was given the mission to outpost the height (TA 1757). G/3/1 and H/3/1 went into an assembly area near the crossing site for the night.

Not-with-standing Capt. Corley's warnings, Lt. Clyde Eyer, H/3/1's 1st Platoon leader, had a desire to lead his men. That's where he was when a bullet passed through his left shoulder, lungs, and right side. He was evacuated and survived to retire from the Marine Corps as a Lt. Col. Sgt. Ed. Hanrahan, the Platoon Sgt, took over the job of Platoon leader, probably until Lt. Barret took over the job on the 7th of November.

Jack Dedrick remembers the night movement. He also remembers digging in that night. They were in a graveyard. It wasn't very long before they moved to another site.

During this day's fighting the Division suffered two hundred eighty nine casualties (68 KIA, 4 DOW, and 217 WIA). The Battalion reported 1 KIA and 2 WIA. Enemy losses this day were estimated at 950 casualties and 67 POWs.

The following returned from the Hospital:

2nd Lt. Harvey Ashley Goss               PFC Alfred Jachimowicz
PFC Duane D. Trowbridge                 PFC William S. Newman
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1950

At 0700 the 1st Marine Division launched the final phase of its attack on Seoul. The 1st Marines, with the 2nd KMC Battalion attached, was to seize the part of Seoul within its zone of action and Objective Able. Objective Able consisted of the high ground beyond the northeastern outskirts and about six miles from the jump-off point. The zone of action ranged from about a mile to a mile and a half wide through the heart of Seoul with South Mountain on the right and Ducksoo Palace on the left. Mopping-up operations were assigned to the KMC, who would revert to their own regimental control after accomplishing the objective.

In preparation for the attack 3/1 moved forward before daybreak in a column of companies. H/3/1 moved out at 0430 through a big archway or gate. Passing eastward through 2/1, they began a sharp wheel to the NNE to change the Regimental direction of attack from eastward to northward toward the heart of the city. It was necessary to jump off without tank support because a firefight had delayed the assigned armor. The designated line of departure for 3/1 was north of the railroad tracks (TA1856-1956). 1/1 moved to the right flank of 3/1. The attack was oriented in a north-south direction on a boulevard with G/3/1 astride the street and H/3/1 to their right.

Capt. Corley recalls that Seoul was at one time a picturesque city with approximately 1.5 million people. It had modern structures, streetcars, and the oriental touch. The common, seemingly illiterate natives, all seemed to be busy. Capt. Corley never did find out what made them appear so busy. He felt sorry for them because they probably didn't know what was going to happen to them.

Dedrick, who was running with his squad up the right side of the street, learned to watch his step, but not until after he ran into a "Honey Bucket" (shit collector).

There was a road junction shortly after the line of departure and G/3/1 was on H/3/1's left. G/3/1 moved up the boulevard seizing the barricade (TA 1956 0) at 1230 and a second (TA 1957 N) at 1300.

Armored units joined 3/1 shortly after 1205, withdrew to the rear at 1315, and returned at 1345. The Battalion continued a fighting advance up both sides of the north-south boulevard through the heart of the city. Successive roadblocks consisting of earth-filled rice bags were stubbornly defended by enemy infantry supported by NKPA automatic, anti-tank, and mortar fire from the rooftops. Enemy mines knocked out two of the M-26 tanks but the Marines pressed forward methodically, inch by inch. By evening 3/1 had penetrated about 2,000 yards into the city occupying positions astride the streetcar line and the western slopes of Hill 97.

Jack Dedrick was instrumental in taking the city. He received a Letter of Commendation from Gen. O. P. Smith for his actions. His citation reads as follows:

"For excellent service in the line of his profession while serving with a Marine infantry company during operations against the enemy in KOREA on 25 September 1950. During an attack by his company through the streets of Seoul, KOREA, Corporal DEDRICK, serving as a machine gun squad leader, displayed great skill, courage and confidence in the performance of his duties. Observing that two enemy machine guns positioned behind a road block and delivering fire on his company positions, he, without regard for his own personal safety, repeatedly exposed himself to the enemy fire as he directed and controlled his machine gun's accurate and effective fire thereby neutralizing the road block. His actions materially aided his company in flanking the enemy position and destroying it. Corporal DEDRICK's display of initiative and conduct throughout was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Ssgt Edward Hanrahan had been acting as the 1st Platoon Commander since about Sept. 16th. He received the Bronze Star, with Combat "V" for his actions during this day. He award reads as follows:

"For heroic achievement while serving as a Platoon Sergeant of Company H, Third Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea on 25 September 1950. Unhesitatingly assumed command of his platoon after the commander was killed during a fierce attack, Staff Sergeant Hanrahan skillfully reorganized the depleted unit, supervised and evacuation of casualties and,
repeatedly exposed himself to intense hostile fire, courageously led the remainder of the platoon in a continuation of the attack. By his inspiring devotion to duty in the face of grave danger, Staff Sergeant Hanrahan contributed materially to the successful completion of his company's mission and thereby upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

H/3/1 went from house to house, street to street, and through fabricated blockades to clear the area. Clarence Corley recalls that he had a 3.5 Rocket team to blast through roadblocks. Col. Puller directed them to go through walls in the houses rather than test the snipers in the streets. He estimated this saved him 1,000 casualties. At each barricade they had to annihilate the enemy, reorganize, evacuate casualties, and wearily go on to the next barricade. During this process, they found still-warm bodies of women and children, hostages who were massacred by the North Korean Secret Police.

G/3/1 was not moving forward as fast as H/3/1 and a huge gap developed between the companies. By 1515 H/3/1 reached phase line (TA 2058 ITP) but had lost both radio and physical contact with its flank and rear. The gap became so large that G/3/1 thought H/3/1 was the retreating enemy. G/3/1 called 81mm mortars on what they thought was the retreating enemy and H/3/1 was the recipient of white phosphorus mortar shells. Capt. Corley recalls that the G/3/1 CO was disciplined and sent back to the states to instruct in the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico. Jack Dedrick remembers those 81mm mortars that were walked up the middle of the road. Jimmy Gullage got a piece of shrapnel across the bridge of his nose during this shelling.

H/3/1 was the only unit to reach their objective this day. They were 800 yards in front of friendly forces. Battalion was aware of H/3/1's advanced position. Things were going pretty well until about 1400 when H/3/1's radio failed to function. Jack Dedrick remembers the communication problem. About this time, he run into two roadblocks, one to his front and one to his left. The one to his front was not manned but the one to his left was. He set up his machinegun and neutralized it.

H/3/1 began receiving fire from the front. A while later H/3/1's machineguns were firing to the rear. Capt. Corley looked to the left and could see NKPA troops. He looked to the right and saw enemy on the ridgeline. There they were with the enemy all around them and no communications. To make matters worse, our aircraft and artillery started hitting targets behind H/3/1. H/3/1's casualty count was beginning to rise and Capt. Corley realized they had to move from this valley. He was just about to give the order to head for a small hill and dig in when the radioman got the radio working again. He advised Battalion of the situation and they told Corley to withdraw to the Battalion's lines. It was now about 1530. H/3/1 picked up their dead, wounded, and 12 POWs and started advancing to the rear. They overcame the enemy and returned to join the Battalion. They were credited with 100 enemy KIAs.

1st Lt. Grady Mitchell, H/3/1's Executive Officer, was instrumental in assisting Capt. Corley reorganize and advance to the rear. For his actions he received a Letter of Commendation with Combat "V". His citation reads as follows;

"For excellent service in the line of his profession while serving with a Marine infantry company during operations against the enemy in KOREA on 25 September 1950. While his company was surrounded by enemy, First Lieutenant MITCHELL, serving as executive officer, displayed great skill, courage and confidence as he reconnoitered the area on the right front of his company positions and gained valuable information concerning the enemy disposition. Regardless of danger or personal fatigue he assisted the company commander in directing effective protective fire to the rear, observed and adjusted accurate 60mm mortar fire on enemy positions. His actions were an inspiration to all who observed him and materially aided his company in successfully repulsing an attempted enemy counterattack. First Lieutenant MITCHELL'S conduct throughout was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Air support, 4.2 mortars, and artillery were requested several times but were rarely available. Tanks and organic 61mm and 81mm mortars were employed to the maximum but were insufficient to neutralize a strongly emplaced enemy. At 1800 it was decided to withdraw G/3/1 and H/3/1 to a more defensible position and to tie in with the 1st Battalion on the right. Particular emphasis was paid to the development of a road block in the vicinity of
the second barricade. G/3/1 occupied the small hill (probably one of the hills of Hill 105N) just to the left of this position. I/3/1 supported by heavy machine guns occupied high ground to the right (probably Hill 79 or 97). H/3/1 was withdrawn, reorganized, and filled the center of the Battalion's position. The road block was strongly manned with heavy machine guns, a section of 75mm recoilless guns, rocket launchers, and two rifle squads. Just to the rear of the road block was the Battalion's 81mm mortar platoon. The Battalion CP was located 600 yards to the rear in the red brick, Seoul prison.

That night Jack Dedrick dug into the side of a hill. The night was a sight he will never forget. The city was ablaze and it was so light that you could read a newspaper. There was quite a bit of action out in front of Jack but it was quiet in his area. During the fighting for the western part of Seoul, the 1st Marines lost four ambulances. They also had four ambulance drivers and seven Corpsmen KIA.

Meanwhile, 1/1 was continuing the attack through the high ground (probably Hill 79, 97, or 82) on 3/1's right flank. 2/1 was in reserve and protecting the right and rear flank.

Air reconnaissance had reported columns of enemy leaving the city late in the afternoon. This was the ruminants (about 5,000 troops) of the NKPA 18th Division that had faced the first Marines at Yongdung-Po the previous few days. Gen. Almond, X Corps Commander, thinking this was a rout of the enemy and that the battle had been won, ordered the 1st Marine Division to attack immediately and completely annihilate the fleeing enemy. However, the North Korean Commander had other ideas. He ordered a reinforce Battalion to strike at the 3/1 positions and a reinforced company to attack the 3/5 sector.

Coordination was made between regiments and battalions. 3/1 was to begin their attack at 0145 after a fifteen-minute artillery preparation.

PFC Richard Castillo Garza, 1083630/0300, was KIA by sniper fire. He was born in Corpus Christi, TX and is buried there. PFC Joseph Francis Henderson is also listed as KIA this date. He may have been in W/3/1 and attached to H/3/1 at the time of his death.

During this day's fighting William "Bill" Lohdamm was WIA in Seoul. He was hit in the collarbone while cleaning out snipers. Bill was evacuated to Yokosuka, Otsu Ambulatory Hospital, in Japan and then eventually to the U.S.A. As stated earlier, Jimmy Gullage was also WIA.

PFC Raymond T. Lester was also WIA with a rifle bullet which caused severe enough injury for him to be evacuated to the hospital. He would return to the Company in late (about Christmas time) December.

The Division suffered two hundred seventy six casualties (33 KIA, 4 DOW, 1 MIA, and 238 WIA). 3/1's casualties were 15 KIA, 77 WIA and 1 MIA friendly casualties. The Battalion was responsible for an estimated 250 KIA and 35 enemy POWs. Enemy losses this day were estimated at 1,750 casualties and 142 POWs.

The following were WIA and evacuated to the Division Hospital in Inchon.

2nd Lt. Clyde Eyer James E. Gullage
PFC Marvin Robert "Bob" Hand PFC Robert N. Ingalls
PFC Robert B. Kusky PFC Raymond (Ray) T. Lester
Cpl William "Bill" A. Lohdamm PFC Richard E. McLain
PFC Norman E. Moore PFC Claude J. Rix
PFC Michael Tortorella Cpl George B. Urban
Cpl John F. Walker PFC Richard C. Williams

MSgt Elmer Dixon was WIA and returned to duty.

PFC George H. Siegert was sick and evacuated to Division Hospital in Inchon. He returned to duty the same day.

Harvey Williams returned to duty.
Shortly before midnight Battalion was ordered to send a patrol forward and to the left to make contact with 3/5.

The attack scheduled by the 1st Marines was rescheduled for 0200 to allow more time to repeat the preparatory fires and await the results from a reconnaissance patrol. The patrol, commanded by Cpl. Charles E. Collins, consisted of eight Marines and three natives. At 0130, the patrol encountered a large enemy force making a counterattack. Some members of the patrol managed to return at 0153 and gave the alarm that 3/1 was about to be heavily attacked. This came just before the scheduled jump-off time. The Division's attack scheduled for 0200 was postponed until 3/1 could deal with the large-scale enemy counterattack. The word was late getting down to the company levels. H/3/1 and I/3/1 were already 100 yards into the attack when the brunt of the NKPA counter attack hit. The two companies were ordered to return to the original battalion position to aid in the defense.

The enemy's counterattack consisted of 1st Battalion, 25th independent Regiment, (750-1000 men) reinforced with 10 T-34-85 tanks and 15 vehicle-drawn artillery pieces. The enemy attack reached its height at 0250, thereafter it subsided until the last enemy gun was silenced about 0530-0630.

All types of fire, including five battalions of artillery, were brought down on the enemy in what was probably the greatest concentration of fire power in the entire operation. High angle artillery and 81mm mortars almost literally blasted the attacking column out of existence, and the enemy infantry action was negligible afterwards. G/3/1 took out the first of two tanks that appeared. At 0315 the 11th Marines informed Col. Puller that they must cease firing or risk burning out the tubes of the Howitzers. During the comparative lull, the T-34 tanks continued to attack at intervals until daybreak, and the last tanks were destroyed at 0630. Cpl. Collins returned safely at 0400 after having been given up for dead. Exposed to friendly as well as enemy fire all night, he had made his way back through enemy-held areas disguised in Korean civilian garments.

PFC Erdman Bob Blythe was instrumental in thwarting the enemy counter attack. He was awarded the Commendation Medal with Combat "V" for actions as follows:

"For excellent service in the line of his profession while serving with a Marine weapons company during operations against the enemy in KOREA on 26 September 1950. While his squad was assigned the mission of defending a sector of a road block. Private First Class BLYTHE, serving as a heavy machine gun crewman, displayed great skill, courage and confidence. While an enemy counterattack was in progress, regardless of danger or personal fatigue, he exposed himself to point blank enemy fire as he manned his machine gun and fired such effective fire that an enemy tank was prevented from advancing in the support of the counterattack. His action materially assisted in the subsequent destruction of the tank and the successful repulsing of the enemy counterattack. Private First Class BLYTHE's conduct throughout was in keeping with the highest tradition of the United States Naval Service."

Enemy losses were indicated to be about 450 casualties and material losses of 4 tanks, 1-76mm self-propelled gun, 1-75mm AA gun, 3-122mm howitzers, 5-37mm AT guns, 4-45mm AT guns, about 25 AT rifles, and many small arms and machine guns. Two companies with the use of artillery and without the use of tanks had destroyed a reinforced battalion.

On this morning it may have occurred to some of the Marines that yesterday's announcement by X Corps of the capture of Seoul was a bit premature. The lines of the Division remained where they were the night before, with the only difference that hundreds of enemy dead gave testimony to the busy night and the prematureness of the announcement.

In the morning 2/1 moved out of reserve to relieve and pass through 3/1 on the streetcar line and continued the attack northward. 3/1 was left to reorganize, resupply, and count their blessings in reserve. They assembled in the area of the Seoul Prison.

Capt. Corley was called to the Battalion CP to meet and be interviewed by "Maggie Higgins", a War Correspondent. With regard to the action described on Sept. 25th, she wanted to know how if felt to be surrounded. Capt. Corley replied, "Not good." She asked how H/3/1 was so far ahead of the other units. Capt. Corley said, "We just kept attacking..."
On the right, 1/1 attacked through the area bombarded for the last 18 hours and occupied the railroad station. The previous eighteen hours of shelling had softened the resistance but there was still a battle to be fought. A/1/1 eventually took the railroad station after the enemy retreated down the streets to their barricades. After occupying the railroad station a unit (possibly from 2/1) moved through A/1/1 to continue the attack through the city.

At the end of this day's fighting, about half of the city had been taken. The 5th Marines were on the 1st Marines left flank in the northernmost part of the city and 2/1 on the right. The 7th Marines were just catching up to the Division and entering the battle for the first time. They were to attack the city from the northeast and pinch out the 5th Marines about 1200 yards beyond the Government Palace. They were then to join in the attack abreast the 1st Marines and advance toward the northeast. However, they were held up by stiff resistance and could make no headway.

The 1st Marines managed to advance about 1200 yards through the city. They had also made patrol contact with the 5th Marines on the left to close the precarious gap that had existed between them. They also made similar contacts with the 32nd Regiment of the Army's 7th Division who had a rough day of fighting to the right on South Hill (or Mountain).

During this day's fighting the Division suffered two hundred three casualties (29 KIA, 7 DOW, and 167 WIA). Casualties in 3/1 were 2 KIA and 40 WIA. Enemy losses this day were estimated at 950 casualties and 407 POWs. Those credited to 3/1 are about 400 casualties and 100 POWs.

PFC Alfred Jachimowicz was WIA and evacuated to the Division Hospital in Inchon. He was shot in the stomach and would be returning to the USA. This did not prevent him from staying in the Marine Corps and retiring as a 1st sgt.

The following were also WIA on this date and returned to duty.
- PFC Robert E. Geib
- PFC John H. Osborne
- Sgt George H. Caldwell
- PFC James A. Fox
- Sgt James D. Phillips
- Cpl Calvin E. Riley

The below were evacuated via air to Japan.
- Sgt George H. Caldwell
- 2nd Lt. Clyde Eyer
- PFC James A. Fox
- James E. Gullage
- Sgt Johnie M. Hudson
- PFC Robert N. Ingalls
- Cpl William "Bill" A. Lohdamm
- PFC Norman E. Moore
- Sgt James D. Phillips
- PFC Samuel L. Prouse
- Cpl George B. Urban
- PFC Charles H. Warden
- PFC James E. Young
- PFC James R. Vermillion was evacuated to Yokuska, Japan on 9/25/50.

The following were sick and evacuated to the Division Hospital in Inchon.
- PFC Lawrence "Larry" F. O’Shea
- PFC John W. Omer
- PFC James "Jim" H. Thornton
- PFC Charles R. Upton
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1950

The battle for Seoul continued with resistance dwindling throughout the day. The battle for Seoul had just about been won. The battle of the barricades was continuing but the enemy's resistance was less. An E/2/1 Marine was killed by a sniper while raising the American flag over the American Embassy at about 1600. 3/5 also raised an American flag over Government House at about 1500. The planned linkup with the 7th Marines did not materialize so the 1st Marines had to go it alone. At about 1630, organized enemy resistance collapsed. There was still a lot of cleanup to do (snipers and bypassed pockets of resistance) but the battle for Seoul was over.

3/1 was in reserve most of the day and probably saw little action. 1/1 and 2/1 marched rapidly through deadly sniper fire to the eastern part of the town, where they dug in for the night.

During this day's fighting the Division suffered one hundred eighty nine casualties (33 KIA, 3 DOW, and 153 WIA). Enemy losses this day were estimated at 1252 casualties and 139 POWs.

The following returned to the Company.

PFC Robert L. Dunkin
PFC Robert L. Dunkin

PFC William C. Tisen Jr. was further evacuated to Japan.

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1950

Although 1/1 had to contend with mines, they and 2/1 swept through the Northeast corner of Seoul against only light resistance to complete the occupation of Seoul. By evening they had taken Hills 132 and 133 at the northeast edge of Seoul, dominating the Seoul-Uijongbu highway. 3/1 remained in an assembly area in the rear and continued mopping up along with the 2nd KMC Battalion. They had the additional task of helping guard the streets of Seoul while Gen. Douglas MacArthur was present for the liberation ceremonies.

A mile farther north, the enemy held the 7th Marines in check a short distance from their objective (Hill 224), the key terrain feature on the west side of the highway.

The 7th Army also participated in the fight for soul in the southern part. They also fought several battles south and southwest of Seoul. The battle for Inchon, Yongdung Po, Seoul, and the surrounding area resulted in the following casualties:

During this day's fighting the Division suffered forty-three casualties (8 KIA, 4 DOW, and 31 WIA). Casualties in 3/1 were one WIA. Enemy losses this day were estimated at 332 casualties and 206 POWs.
The ceremony to formally return the city to the South Korean President, Syngman Rhee, was originally planned by Gen. Almond, X Corps Commander for the September 25th. This would have been exactly three months after the launching of the NKPA offensive on South Korea. The enemy however was not co-operative with respect to this date. On the morning of the 29th, three NKPA counterattacks were repulsed on the outskirts of the city. Repulsing the two pre-dawn counterattacks on 2/1 were auspicious beginnings for the day of the liberation exercise.

At dawn, in preparation for the liberation ceremony, Marine guards were unobtrusively stationed along the route of approach from the new floating bridge to the Government Palace. This duty fell chiefly on 3/1. Two H/3/1 Platoons were on hills overlooking the ceremony while Lt. Snelling and other H/3/1 Marines were guarding near the ceremony. The remainder of the Battalion was posted along the Ma Po Boulevard from the Han River bridge to the governmental area for protection of the OinC and UN party. Elements of the 5th Marines were responsible for the security of the western part of the city.

The ceremony involved all available prominent persons from the Army, Marine Corps, and many dignitaries. Gen. MacArthur formally returned the capital city, Seoul, to South Korean President, Syngman Rhee. During the ceremony artillery could be heard from outside the city. Concussion from the blasts caused panes of glass from the Palace dome in which the ceremonies were held to fall on/near the participants. Noise from rifle shots punctuated the talks. Grim Marines of Col. Puller's 3/1 guarded the seated audience.

Secured from this detail at 1500, the Battalion returned to the outskirts of the city (TA 2560). G/3/1 was detached and sent back for the local security of the Palace grounds. I/3/1 found an estimated 250 men, women, and children brutally executed by North Koreans within their assigned area.

Although more hard fighting lay ahead in the Inchon-Seoul operation, X Corps alerted its major units to the possibility of a new amphibious landing on the east coast of Korea. Marine Division Operation Orders issued at 2000 provided for the securing of the captured city my means of:

1. a continuation of the attack to the east;
2. the conduct of reconnaissance in force to the north and northwest;
3. the relief of elements of the 7th Infantry Division north of the Han River;
4. the seizure of prescribed blocking positions.

The Division's plan of maneuver called for the three Marine rifle regiments to take blocking positions forming a rough semi-circle defending Seoul from three sides, i.e., the 5th Marines to the northwest, the 7th Marines to the North, and the 1st Marines to the northeast.

During this day's fighting the Division suffered sixty-nine casualties (19 KIA, 1 DOW, and 49 WIA). There were no combat casualties in 3/1 this day. Enemy losses this day were estimated at 102 casualties and 507 POWs (15 POWs by 3/1).

Division Operations Orders issued at 1500 this date ordered the 1st Marines to protect the right flank of the Division and be prepared to assemble in Division Reserve by battalion for a motor lift. Blocking positions consisted of high ground from two to five miles northeast of Seoul.

The 1st Marines found little difficulty in carrying out all missions assigned by the Division. In fact, the Regiment had only a few minor patrol actions after taking blocking positions northeast of Seoul.

The brunt of the battle the next few days would be done by the 7th Marines who were reinforced to take the city of Uijongbu.

During this day's fighting the Division suffered sixty-one casualties (11 KIA, 2 DOW, and 48 WIA). Enemy losses this day were estimated at 305 casualties and 328 POWs (25 of these POWs were taken by 3/1).
IN KOREA

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1950

The Battalion came from Division Reserve and was ordered to move to occupy, organize, and defend Division Objectives 3 and 4 and to conduct active patrolling. The Battalion moved by foot to its new position. Four patrols were sent out this night and made contact with a 5-man enemy patrol.

During this day's fighting the Division suffered nineteen casualties (2 KIA, 1 DOW, and 16 WIA). 3/1 had no casualties. Enemy losses this day were estimated at 75 casualties and 124 POWs (Two POWs were taken by 3/1).

MONDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1950

Organization of Division objectives 3 and 4 including a road block on the Pyongyang-Seoul highway continued.

During this day's fighting the Division suffered ninety-seven casualties (15 KIA, 1 DOW, and 81 WIA). Casualties for 3/1 were 2 WIA. Enemy losses this day were estimated at 75 casualties and 124 POWs (2 POWs taken by 3/1).

PFC Donald "Donny" Richard Colgett was sick and evacuated.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1950

SSGT. Bruce Corson and CPL. Clyde Keel received the Bronze star for actions on this date. The following is shown in the action report: H/3/1's reinforced platoon that was on patrol met determined resistance in the Hills at TA 2357. The patrol was successfully extricated and withdrawn after suffering eight casualties, all from well aimed small arms fire. Enemy strength was estimated to be 50-100 with 7-8 automatic weapons.

SSgt Corson's Bronze Star, with Combat "V" award reads:
"For heroic achievements while serving as Machine-Gun Section Leader of Company H, Third Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division, in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea on 3 October 1950. Ambushed by a barrage of accurate and intense hostile small-arms fire while on combat patrol whose missions was to seal four enemy caves, Staff Sergeant Corson organized and led an evacuation team of two men through the hostile fire in an attempt to evacuate the casualties. By his prompt and courageous actions, he successfully assisted in removing all the wounded Marines to the rear where medical attention could be administered much earlier than would otherwise have been possible. By his outstanding courage, daring initiative and selfless devotion to duty in rendering aid to others at the risk of his own life. Staff Sergeant Corson upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Cpl Keel's citations reads as follows;
"For heroic achievement in connection with operations against the enemy while serving with a Marine infantry company in KOREA on 3 October 1950. While on a combat patrol whose mission was to seal four caves, the point was ambushed and suffered seven casualties. Sergeant Keel, acting as a squad leader, was ordered to move his squad to the high ground on the right flank in an attempt to regain the fire superiority and interdict any enemy attempting to place flanking fire on the column. Observing the casualties being evacuated and his patrol withdrawing to more favorable positions, he courageously exposed himself to the enemy fire in order to move among his men to direct and control their effective fire. His actions were an inspiration to all members of his patrol and materially aided in allowing the casualties to be evacuated. Sergeant Keel's display of initiative and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service." Sergeant Keel is authorized to wear the Combat "V".

General Cates, Commandant of the Marine Corps visited the front and witnessed the climax of the battle. He, and his party, inspected the 1st and 5th Marine positions by helicopter. His party also took a jeep tour along the road to Uijongbu to watch the 7th Marines slug their way forward into the battered town.

During this day's fighting the Division suffered thirty-eight casualties (2 KIA, 1 DOW, and 35 WIA). Casualties in H/3/1 were 8 WIA. Enemy losses this day were estimated at
IN KOREA

H/3/1 MARINES

800 casualties and 103 POWs.

The following were WIA and evacuated to Division Hospital.

PFC Richard J. Johnson  PFC Jack "Gunman" M. Miles
Gary "Robbie" C. Robinson  Sgt Roy (Ray) A. Schultz
2nd Lt. Harvey Ashley Goss and PFC Donald "Donny" Richard Colgett returned to duty.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1950

A strong combat patrol from H/3/1, a reinforced platoon with air, artillery, and mortar support, was sent out to clear the pocket of resistance encountered yesterday. The enemy was found to have withdrawn. Six reconnaissance patrols were dispatched from the Battalion during the day made no contact with the enemy. The Battalion was alerted to move. No casualties were incurred in the Battalion during the day.

During this day's fighting the Division suffered three casualties (0 KIA, 0 DOW, and 3 WIA). Enemy losses this day were estimated at 0 casualties and 118 POWs.

PFC James W. Bailey and Cpl Harry A. Thornton returned to duty.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1950

The Battalion continued patrolling with negative results.

Division orders provided a schedule for elements of the 1st Marine Division to assemble in staging areas. The first Marine Regiment was to stage prior to darkness on 6 October.

The following were sick and evacuated to Division Hospital.

PFC Grady F. Stancel  Pvt Ovie O. Tracy
PFC Duane D. Trowbridge
The following were returned to duty.

PFC Richard J. Johnson  PFC John W. Omer
PFC Lawrence "Larry" F. O'Shea
During this day's fighting the Division suffered five casualties (1 KIA, 1 DOW, and 3 WIA). Enemy losses this day were estimated at 0 casualties and 57 POWs.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1950

The Battalion vacated at 1330 and the Battalion arrived at the iron foundry assembly area (TA 9050 H) in Inchon at 1600. A warning order was received to prepare to load and board landing ships for a projected operation.

During this day's fighting the Division suffered zero casualties (0 KIA, 0 DOW, and 0 WIA). Enemy losses this day were estimated at 0 casualties and 144 POWs.
IN KOREA

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1950

The Battalion’s day was devoted to administrative details. Troops turned in their ammunition and equipment shortages were inventoried. The Bivouac area was adequate but very dirty. Planning for the future employment of the Battalion continued.

At 1200 the Inchon-Seoul Operation passed into history when the last troops of the 7th Marines were relieved in the Uijongby area by other elements of the Eighth Army. The remainder of the 1st Marines were relieved of their blocking mission on the high ground to the north of Seoul and moved to Ascom City to prepare for the assault of Wonsan.
IN KOREA

SOME STATISTICS ABOUT THE INCHON-SEOUL OPERATION

Below, as nearly as can be determined, is the final troop list of the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) for the Inchon landing. The list is correct as to the units included but it is difficult to reconcile the totals given for units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters Battalion</td>
<td>916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Service Battalion</td>
<td>873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Signal Battalion</td>
<td>652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Motor Transport Battalion</td>
<td>686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Medical Battalion</td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Amphibious Truck Company</td>
<td>244</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Ordinance Battalion</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Shore Party Battalion</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Engineer Battalion</td>
<td>1,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Tank Battalion</td>
<td>811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Marine Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>2,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Marine Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>3,850</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Marine Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>3,611</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th Marine Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion</td>
<td>868</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Combat Service Group</td>
<td>1,291</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th Motor Transport Battalion</td>
<td>430</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Detachment</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMO-6 (Marine Observation Type Aircraft Squadron)</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Marine Corps and Navy................................ 19,494

Korean Marine Corps Regiment................................ 2,786

Company A, 56th Amphibious tractor Battalion, USA......... 151
Headquarters Detachment, USA................................ 38
Signal Detachment, USA...................................... 37
96th FA Battalion, USA...................................... 388
2nd Engineer Special Bridge, USA............................ 952
73rd Engineer Bn, USA........................................ 724
50th Engineer Portable Construction Company, USA......... 214
65th Ordnance Ammunition Company, USA...................... 256

Total U. S. Army............................................. 2,760

Grand Total................................................ 25,040

The following did not participate in the Inchon Landing.

7th Marine Regimental Combat Team.......................... 5,383
Admin. Center, 1st Armored Amphib, 17 year olds, casualties. 1,344
IN KOREA

ENEMY UNITS DURING THE INCHON-SEOUL CAMPAIGN

The enemy's method of operation, except for a brief determined stand near and in Seoul, consisted of moderate to strong delaying actions. The first reaction following the initial disorganization at Inchon was an attempt to contain our advance until such time as sufficient reinforcements could arrive to warrant initiating a counteroffensive. In view of the scarcity of reinforcements and our own rapid advance, this never materialized.

The order of battle of the units opposing the advance of the Division from the time of landing at Inchon until the capture of Uijongbu, north of Seoul, is given below.

Perhaps in the future a history from some of these units can add to the text of this document.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>POWs</th>
<th>AREA EMPLOYED</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>226th Marine Regiment</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>Inchon</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In the Inchon area prior to the landing. Newly conscripted and poorly trained.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>918th (Coast) Art. Reg. elm.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Inchon</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In the Inchon area prior to the landing. Eight 76mm guns. Wiped out or scattered by naval and air bombardment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Division</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>Kimpo Airfield</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>When our troops approached the airfield area part of the personnel from this unit withdrew across the Han River.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42nd Mech. (Tank) Reg.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Between Inchon and Seoul</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arrived in Seoul from Sinuiju early Sept. 18th. T-34 tanks.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107th Security Regiment</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>Kimpo Airfield</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In Kimpo area when we landed. A quasi-military organization.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehab. Bn. (Sp. Culture Bn.)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>West of Yongdung Po</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>This unit was organized on 19 Sept. and contained NK prisoners serving sentence in Seoul. Officers were also former prisoners. Most were serving sentence for desertion.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Regt, 9th Rifle Division</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Yongdung Po</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Remainder of the Division on the southern front.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>4,000-5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arrived from Chorwon on 20 Sept. An excellent unit which opposed the 5th Marines on the western approaches to Seoul.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Rifle Division</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>Seoul and Yongdung Po</td>
<td>8,000-10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arrived from Chorwon in mid Aug. Known as the Seoul Defense Division. It was the only unit of division strength in the area.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### IN KOREA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>POWs</th>
<th>AREA EMPLOYED</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>43rd Tank Regiment</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrived from Wonsan 23 Sept. had 10-15 T-34 Tanks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th AA Regiment</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Seoul when we landed. 37mm, 85mm, and 12.7mm AT guns.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th Inf. Reg., 42nd Division</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrived from Wonsan after 17 Sept. Was opposite the 5th Marines but withdrew from Seoul almost intact.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78th Inf. Regiment</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrived from Sariwon on 20 Sept. Opposed the 5th and 1st Marines. Put up stubborn defense and suffered heavy losses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>513th Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrived from Chorwon on 23 Sept. had 1-76mm and 5-45mm guns. Most of the regiment served as infantry.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Railroad Regiment</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Seoul when we landed. Its mission was to maintain security of the railroad lines and keep them operational. It participated in the defense of Seoul.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st Rif.Div/or Seoul City Reg</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>3,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Seoul when we landed. Formed as division on 20 Sept. by an Amalgamation of units in Seoul. Participated in the defense of Seoul and delayed our advance north to Uijongbu.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36th Bn. 111th Security Reg.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Seoul when we landed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Reg, 17th Rifle Div. (Rein)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Seoul-Uijongbu</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawn from the southern front after the landing at Inchon.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th Ind. Regiment</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Uijongbu</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrived from Hamhung on 30 Sept. Used as a cover force for the withdrawal through Uijongbu.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>Suyuhyon</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrived from Kumchon on 1 Oct. Withdrew in the face of the advance of the 5th marines to Suyuhyon, 17 miles northwest of Seoul.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Enemy Strength 44,380
IN KOREA

ENEMY LOSSES DURING THE FIGHTING
-------------------------------------

13,666 enemy troops casualties
6,492 enemy POWs
50 enemy tanks destroyed
23 120-MM enemy mortars captured
19 45-MM enemy anti tank guns destroyed
Many other machineguns and smaller weapons captured

UN LOSSES DURING THE FIGHTING
-------------------------------

2,029 Marines WIA
415 Marines KIA/DOW
6 Marine MIA
409 7th Infantry WIA
106 7th Infantry KIA
57 7th Infantry MIA
166 of the 7th Infantry casualties were ROK integrated into the Division

H/3/1's LOSSES DURING THE FIGHTING
-----------------------------------

The H/3/1 KIA roster shows three KIAs:
PFC Richard Castillo Garza 1083630 500925 Corpus Christi, TX
PFC Joseph Francis Henderson 661549 500925
PFC Alex D. James 643503 500919 Marion, SC

Capt. Corley says he recalls they had several WIAs, especially on Sept. 25th during the first day's attack on Seoul.
CHAPTER 4

OPERATION YO-YO

THURSDAY - THURSDAY OCTOBER 5-12, 1950

Marines began withdrawing from their positions. They moved by truck to an assembly area at Inchon where some were issued cold-weather gear. Thereafter they boarded ship for the trip to Wanson harbor. The Battalion boarded five LSTs. H/3/1 may, or may not, have received cold weather gear on this time. If they did, it may have been a partial issue. It is known that they were given lectures and issued cold weather gear in November after leaving Majon-ni.

As H/3/1 was being transported by truck convoy back to Inchon, they passed over a pontoon bridge that had been built by the Army Engineers across the Han River. Army sentries were posted at very 2nd pontoon. The Army was yelling, "OK girls, you can go home now." Some of the men were giving it back to them by saying, "If you idiots had done your job, we wouldn't be here in the first place." A H/3/1 Marine threw a hand grenade, with no fuse or powder. The Army personnel jumped in the water to get away from the expected blast. An Army Lt. Col. was one who took a dive. About an hour later this Lt. Col. came to the Battalion CP, mad as a hornet and still wet. He had gotten the number of the truck from which the grenade was thrown. Capt. Corley was called to Battalion. He had seen the grenade in the air but truthfully didn't know who had thrown it (nor did he care). Battalion told the Army Lt. Col. they would check into the event. They never found out who threw the grenade. Capt. Corley found out who threw the grenade at the 1994 reunion in Arlington, VA. It didn't surprise Capt. Corley to find out it was a Marine who was a "playful type" member of the 1st Platoon.

Jack Dedrick remembers the dud grenade incident. He also remembers that they had time to take a shower and get their dungarees washed at Inchon. Do you remember Ben Boyer who was the big winner aboard ship and who lost his plastic bag the night of the landing? Well, he got permission to retrace the route he took on Sept. 15th and look for his bag. His luck was still with him. He found his bag untouched. Jack says they boarded another "rust bucket" when they left Inchon.

The below list of casualties is provided to give readers a feeling for the number of casualties that can occur without an enemy.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1950

Cpl John F. Walker was dropped from the Company.

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 21 non-battle casualties.

MONDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1950

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 12 non-battle casualties.
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1950

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

Mortar Plt. Gus Marcotte (joined)
MG Plt. Donald "Don" E. Guard (joined)
2nd Plt. Frank J. Estrada (joined)
3rd Plt. Gary "Robbie" Robinson (left)

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 11 non-battle casualties.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1950

The following Marines received their Purple Heart Medal.

2nd Lt. Harvey Ashley Goss             PFC Edward E. Blackburn
Sgt Jonathan "Jack" F. Dedrick        MSgt Elmer Dixon
PFC Ivan C. Jackson                    Cpl Manford F. Langley
PFC Claburn L. Minchew                 PFC George H. Siegert
PFC Nathaniel "Chick" Slone            PFC Lawrence "Scotty" T. Struwe

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 35 non-battle casualties.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1950

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 23 non-battle casualties.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1950

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 5 non-battle casualties.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1950

H/3/1 embarked aboard an LST at Inchon that was part of Task Group 90.
1st Lt. Horace L. Johnson joined the Company from the 1st Replacement Draft.
The CCF, "People’s Liberation Army", started crossing the Yalu at Andong, Manchuria.
The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 5 non-battle casualties.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1950

The Company sailed out of Inchon harbor aboard their LST.
PFC Loyd C. Walley was dropped from the Company.
The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 4 non-battle casualties.

MONDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1950

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 3 non-battle casualties.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1950

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 5 non-battle casualties.
There was an exercise called Operation Yo-Yo, that started this date and lasted until October 25th then the 1st Marine Division landed at Wonsan harbor.

The Wonsan channel was heavily laden with mines. Ships transporting the Marines were ordered to sail up and down the East Coast of Korea until minesweepers cleared the way for the landing. Food supplies ran short on some of the ships and the some troops had to eat sandwiches three times a day. This sailing up and down the coast to await the mine clearing process is what the Marines dubbed, "Operation Yo-Yo".

John Corzan remembers no hot food on his ship, a LST. Plans had been made for them to eat C-rations for the short time they were to be aboard ship. The voyage lasted longer than anticipated but they had plenty of C-rations aboard.

During operation Yo-Yo while the Marines were waiting to land, the North Koreans were fleeing to the north and ROK units moved through Wansan. Even Bob Hope and his USO show had beaten the Marines to Wansan. The Army even added another verse to the Marine Corps Hymn but the Marines didn't want to hear it. The Marines took a verbal beating when they finally landed.

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 2 non-battle casualties.

PFC John Corzan had many differences with SSgt Hanrahan, the 1st Platoon Sgt./leader. About this date he requested and got a transfer to the 3rd Machinegun Squad, which was attached to the 3rd Platoon. PFC Edward E. Blackburn, John's old buddy, was his new Gunner and John was the assistant gunner.

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 1 non-battle casualties.

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 4 non-battle casualties.

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 1 non-battle casualties.

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 2 non-battle casualties.

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 1 non-battle casualties.

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 5 non-battle casualties.
IN KOREA

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1950

The 1st Marine Division finally made their unheroic landed at Wanson Harbor on this date. They were aboard twenty-one transports and fifteen LSTs in a convoy of seventy-two ships.
CHAPTER 5

OPERATIONS IN THE WANSON AREA

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1950

The 1st Marine Division began making their anticlimactic administrative landing at Wonsan. Since the approaches had not yet been declared clear until late afternoon, the main ship-to-shore movement was delayed until the next day.

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties on this day of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 12 non-battle casualties.
Col. "Chesty" Puller was waiting for his regiment at Wonsan. 3/1 and 1/1 started off-loading/landing at 0900. Troops from 7/1 went ashore at Blue Beach at 1300. The city was occupied by ROK troops that had pushed northward overland. Wanson was a city of about 90,000 where most lived in crowded, one-story buildings.

The Company disembarked from the LSTs in a column of companies over beach Blue 2. Orders were received over the Regimental Tactical Net to move directly into an assembly area in the rear of the beach and await further instructions. When directed, immediate plans were made for the march to the new assembly area, a distance of approximately 7½ miles. The Battalion closed on this assembly area at 1600 and set up a perimeter defense for the night.

In general, operations during the coming period were characteristic of a small, modern force operating in foreign and primitive territory against a numerically superior, poorly organized and equipped, demoralized semi-guerilla force.

The atmosphere was good because rumors had it that the war was about over. However, this atmosphere was broken when two Marines, likely from 3/1, gathering firewood on the beach were blown to pieces by a booby trap. These were the only two casualties during the Wanson landing. These two casualties do not show up on the casualty roster for October 26th. It probably happened late in the night and is reflected on the October 27th casualty list.

A H/3/1 Marine fell overboard while landing at Wanson. He was rescued and was the "joke" of H/3/1 for a while. Jack Dedrick was Bob Hope, Jerry Calona, and Marilyn Maxwell waving at them from a distance. Jack said, "It's a good thing we were at a distance so they couldn't hear what they were being called". Jack heard rumors such as, "We'd be back in the States by Christmas; They were going to go to a place called Viet Nam to aid the French; They were going to Hawaii; etc."

About this date 1st Lt. Horace Johnson relieved 1st Lt. Grady Mitchell as XO of H/3/1. It is assumed that Grady again became the 1st Platoon Leader.

While the Marines were landing at Wonsan, the Chinese started coming across the Yalu. There were already many in North Korea but they had not been involved in large battles. There was to be 30 divisions, about 300,000 Chinese, that would enter North Korea from Manchuria with another 14 divisions, about 140,000, left behind in Manchuria as reserves. This was attested to by the fact that they would soon disintegrate the 6th ROK Division and collapses the rest of the ROK II Corps on the eighth Army's right flank in western Korea. At this time the Eighth Army was manning the line in central and western Korea and X Corps was moving up the East Coast.

X Corps consisted primarily of the First Marines and the 7th Army Division. The initial mission of the 1st Marines was to relieve elements of the ROK Army's I Corps in the Wonsan-Kojo-Majon-ni area, patrol the roads, and destroy the enemy. Another, later mission, was to seize the Chosin Reservoir and then proceed to the Yalu. The 7th Army Division was to secure the Fusen Reservoir, east of the Chosin Reservoir, and then proceed to the Yalu. Both reservoirs were fifty to eighty miles inland. The Marines landed at Wonsan and the 7th Division landed at Iwon, about one hundred miles farther north up the East Coast of Korea.

Upon landing, Lt. Col. Jack Hawkins, CO of 1/1, was ordered to go by train to the town of Kojo, relieve ROK troops there, and guard a supply dump (that no longer existed). Kojo was a small fishing village about forty miles south of Wanson. This was thought to be a relatively easy assignment.

By 1700, 3/1 was in bivouac for the night and 1/1 was well on their way to Wanson. This was thought to be relatively easy assignment.

By 1700, 3/1 was in bivouac for the night and 1/1 was well on their way to Wanson. This was thought to be relatively easy assignment.

This was also a special day for Col. Puller, CO 1st Marines. He received a message from Gen. Smith that he had been selected for promotion to Brigadier General.

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties on this day of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 43 non-battle casualties.
Information about H/3/1’s move was received. Immediately plans were made within the Battalion to strike camp and begin loading supplies at 0500 on the 28th. Plans were also made to conduct training in the field, especially field firing of all weapons. The remainder of the Battalion’s supplies were unloaded and brought to the assembly area.

1/1 occupied positions around the town of Kojo. During the night they were hit by between 1,000 and 3,000 NK. They sustained about 20 to 23 KIA, about 44 WIA and about 4 MIA. Enemy losses, besides the 83 POWs, were estimated at 250 KIA and an unknown number of WIA on the basis of 165 bodies found by Marine Patrols.

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties on this day of 22 KIA, 0 DOW, 4 MIA, 44 WIA, and 54 non-battle casualties.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1950

Upon request for reinforcements from 1/1, Col. Puller ordered 2/1 to Kojo, but little further action occurred in the Kojo area.

The vehicles for loading supplies arrived as scheduled and the 3/1 was prepared to move at daylight. The Battalion was held up, however, until approximately 1000 awaiting the arrival of transportation for personnel. Loading was completed and the movement to Majon-ni started at 1015.

The movement to Majon-ni, about 25 miles to the west, was accomplished by moving the Battalion in two march units at time intervals of ten minutes. The first march unit closed on Majon-ni at 1400 and the second march unit closed Majon-ni at approximately 1630. At 1400, when the first march unit arrived, the ROK battalion being relieved appeared to be in a very disorganized state, small groups of ROKs being engaged in indiscriminately executing suspected North Korean guerillas. Immediately upon reaching Majon-ni the ROK unit there was relieved and a perimeter defense was set up including three road blocks, one on each side of the roads leading into Majon-ni. The defense generally following the trace of the first ridge lines surrounding the village. The road blocks were each manned by a section of heavy machine guns and an anti-tank assault platoon. The three roads from Majon-ni led to Wonsan, Seoul, and Pyongyang. The north road block on the road to Pyongyang was designated at Item Road Block, the south road block was designated as How Road block, and the east road block was designated as George Road Block. During the movement to Majon-ni there was no enemy action encountered.

The Majon-ni area was in a y-shaped mountain valley, encircled by peaks and crossed by two swift, clear streams. It looked like it might have been taken from a scene in the Alps. This impression was borne out by the village of Majon-ni, which nestled close to the earth, as seen from afar, with the tranquill, untroubled appearance of a Swiss hamlet.

On closer inspection, however, such first impression could only prove to be illusory. The most prominent building in the Korean village was a new schoolhouse with an onion-shaped dome of Russian architecture. An incongruous and pretentious structure for such a small peasant community, it had been erected not as much for instruction of children as the indoctrination of adults in Communist principles.

Majon-ni had been for five years, a hotbed of forced culture in doctrines of the Communist Puppet State. It was set up in northern Korea after World War II by occupation forces of Soviet Russia. It was here that 3/1 relieved elements of the 26th ROK Regiment at 1600 enabling those ROK troops to return to Wonsan in the vehicles which had brought 3/1.

3/1 had been assigned the mission of "setting up a defensive position at Majon-ni, destroying enemy forces, and denying them the use of this road net." In addition, the unit was "to patrol roads to the north, south, and west and keep the roads open between Majon-ni and Wonsan."

The last directive was soon modified by oral instructions relieving 3/1 from the responsibility of keeping open the Wonsan-Majon-ni road. The reason for the change was apparent when the troops of 3/1 covered the 28-mile route by motor lift in two echelons on the afternoon of the 28th. After leaving the seaport and alluvial plain, the shelf-like
road twists precariously through a 3000-foot pass. This stretch abounds in hairpin turns and deep gorges that are ideal for setting a tactical trap, and the route was soon to be known to 3/1 as Ambush Alley. Although traversable by tanks, it offered too much danger from roadblocks and landslides to permit the dispatch of the iron elephants.

The strategic importance of the Majon-ni area derived from its position at the headwaters of the Imjin River and the junction of roads leading east to Wonsan, south to Seoul, and west to Pyongyang. These roads were traveled extensively by NKPA troops escaping northward in civilian clothes after the collapse of the North Korean military effort in the south.

It was natural that the 1st Marine Division, with a zone of more than 15,000 square miles to control, should be ordered to occupy such an important road junction and potential assembly area as Majon-ni. Thus, Col. Thomas L. Ridge's reinforced battalion was sent as a blocking and screening force.

In addition to H&S, Weapons, and the three rifle companies, the organization consisted of D Battery of 2/11; the 3rd Platoon of C Co., 1st Eng. Bn.; and attachments from ANGLICO; 1st Sig. Bn.; D Co., 1st Medical Bn.; and H&S Co., 1st Marines.

After a survey of the terrain, the Battalion Commander and his S-3, Major Joseph D. Trompeter, decided that the commanding ground was too far from the village and too rugged for company outposts. The logical solution seemed to be a battalion perimeter combined with daytime company Ops and vigorous patrolling of the three main roads. In order to tie all units in a perimeter 3770 yards in circumference, it was necessary to create provisional platoons from H&S, artillery, and engineer troops as could be spared from their regular duties. Even so, the defense was spread thin in places. H/3/1 was set up across a ridge with a roadblock on the road to Seoul. This was on the southwestern perimeter.

The schoolhouse was the obvious place for the Battalion CP. Communications within the perimeter was by telephone, with wires laid from the CP to the artillery and mortar positions as well as Company and Platoon Cps. Radio communication was established with the Regiment and Division, but due to the terrain, remained irregular at best.

A hasty OY airstrip was developed on the southeast side of the perimeter and artillery was emplaced to cover the circumference of the perimeter with special attention on the three main roads.

Roadblocks were established for protection and as ports of entry where all Korean transients were searched for weapons. After being searched they were processed through a Civil Affairs Section and then let go or retained for further questioning. Many were retained as POWs. Some of the prisoners were admittedly NKPA veterans, weary of the war, and ready to give up voluntarily.

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties on this day of 1 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 3 WIA, and 68 non-battle casualties.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1950

The first full day's operation of interrogating transients resulted in 24 prisoners being taken. This was only a trickle as compared to the torrent that would follow until an average daily rate of 82 was maintained during the seventeen-day operation at Majon-ni.

Each rifle company was given a mission of sending out daily motorized and/or foot patrols while manning, as required, company operations. H/3/1 was assigned the road to Seoul. Patrols reported negative results during the first four days. Air support also helped reconnoiter the area.

Two motorized patrols were sent out and air support was on station. I/3/1's objective was north to TA 3735V. H/3/1's mission was to move south to TA 361K. Patrols found small stockpiles of ammunition and small bridges destroyed. In the afternoon I/3/1 extended its patrol on foot to TA 3530K. H/3/1's motorized patrol extended its radius to TA341?J.

A motorized supply convoy arrived from Wonsan. This was to be the last supply convoy what would come through unmolested by NK guerrillas.

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties on this day of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 115 non-battle casualties.
MONDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1950

Foot patrols were sent out at 0745 by H/3/1 and I/3/1 to the south and north respectively. Mist and light rain limited visibility. The patrols returned having made no contact. Patrolling was repeated in the afternoon. As the weather cleared, air came on station and dropped surrender pamphlets. A system of harassing and interdiction fires with artillery and 81mm mortars was started.

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties on this day of 1 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 5 WIA, and 52 non-battle casualties.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1950

Each of the rifle companies established outposts to their front. Morning and afternoon patrolling continued with air on station. Negative results were reported. Artillery continued to register all sides. Harassing and interdiction fires were continued.

ROK divisions on the right flank of the 1st Cavalry and the right flank of the Eighth Army are being routed by CCF forces in western Korea.

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties on this day of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 36 non-battle casualties.
Routine patrolling continued with no enemy contact reported. The tempo of Harassing an interdiction fires were increased. The use of OY for spotting artillery greatly added to the effectiveness of these fires.

Lt. Col. Ridge requested a practice airdrop, which went off satisfactorily. This method of supply would later prove to be vital for 3/1.

Capt. Corley, H/3/1's CO talked to the Bn. S-3, Maj. Trompeter, and advised him that they were tempting fate by going out on patrol every day, at the same time, with the same number of Marines, on the same road. Corley suggested they vary the procedure. The S-3 refused and said that, although Corley was right, he needed to know about the enemy in all directions at the latest possible time in order to plan the night's defenses. Corley agrees that they both were right.

The 8th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry was badly beaten by Chinese Forces at Unsan in Western Korea. The 3rd Battalion of the 8th Regiment was surrounded and lost.

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties on this day of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 36 non-battle casualties.

During the morning hours a supply convoy from Wonsan was attacked seven miles west of Wonsan and forced to turn back. This area of the Wonsan-Majon-ni road became known as Ambush Alley. Personnel losses in the ambush were nine killed and fifteen wounded.

Lt. Col. Ridge called for an airdrop of supplies. Gasoline, rations, grenades, and artillery, mortar and machinegun ammunition to a total of more than 21 tons were packaged at Wonsan airfield. Delivery was made with 152 parachutes into the Majon-ni perimeter. Less breakage than usual resulted.

Good relations with Korean locals resulted in a warning of an impending attack by organized NKPA troops. POW interrogations and reports by civilians identified the enemy unit as the 15th NKPA Division, including the 45th, 48th, and 50th Regiments, commanded by Maj. Gen. Pak Sun Chol. Following the NKPA collapse, the Division had been able to maintain its organization while infiltrating northward from the Pusan Perimeter and raiding the villages for food. Their mission was reported to be the occupation and control of the upper Imjin valley as a base of guerilla operations, with the Majon-ni road junction being designated one of their main objectives. The enemy strength was estimated to be 11,000 but that figure, like most oriental estimates of numbers, had to be taken with the traditional grain of salt.

At any rate, the Marines had no further doubt on this morning that a resolute enemy skilled at guerrilla tactics opposed them. H/3/1 was assigned to patrol along the southern road to Seoul at 1000. The patrol was lead by 2nd Lt. Harvey A. Goss, 3rd Platoon Leader. He was reinforced with 81mm mortars, light machineguns, artillery FO team, and FAC. An observation Plan was supposed to be overhead for support but didn't make the trip. The unit moved through the southern roadblock and took the winding, mountain-walled road toward the village of Tonyon-ni. To the east lay another valley and the village of Kumdong. The patrol continued south with the Imjin River to the right of the road and a sheer wall of rocks and boulders rising to three thousand feet on the right. As the small force left the valley of Kumdong, a narrow gorge developed with the mountain of Maam-San rising sharply on the left. They apparently went beyond the village of Yohae-ni and crossed the Imjin River a few hundred yards south of the village. The Imjin River flowed parallel and to the left of the road. (Jack Dedrick remembers the river being to the left of the road at the ambush site.)

The point vehicles entered the gorge, which was slightly more than two miles in length. It was not until the main body was in the defile that the well-concealed enemy opened fire from the high ground to the right and left of the road.

The Marines dismounted from their vehicles and hastily took positions along the riverbank. It soon became evident the enemy had fire superiority as well as occupying positions which were virtually unassailable. To complicate the situation further, the
gorge was so narrow the vehicles could not be turned around to make a withdrawal. PFC Donald Hoffstetter, a jeep driver in the motor section, managed to get his vehicle turned around. The Marines got off only the message, "We've been hit, send help, send help" before the radio was hit. Casualties were mounting. 2nd Lt. Kenneth Bott, the W/3/1 81mm Mortar Platoon Leader, was with the patrol. He was in a jeep near the end of the convoy when the ambush took place. A Marine named Hoffstetter was his jeep driver. He dismounted and went up to where Lt Goss was positioned and asked about the situation. Radio communication were nonexistant or inoperable, probably because of the surrounding hills. It was decided that he should go for help. He returned to his jeep near the end of the convoy, found his jeep driver and the two ran the gauntlet of fire to get help.

Lt. Bott reported the situation to Battalion. By the time Lt. Bott returned to the Battalion perimeter area, the relief force of H/3/1's remaining two platoons, reinforced with 81mm more mortars, was mounted on artillery prime movers and ready to move out. Artillery had swung their tubes around and was waiting fire missions orders. Bott and Hoffstetter guided the reinforcements back to the battle area. Upon his return Lt. Bott began directing fire Mortar fire when he was wounded in the Knee. He was evacuated by ambulance jeep back to Battalion and then further evacuated via an FO plane. At some time during the action his jeep driver, Hoffstetter, was apparently also wounded.

The 3/1 CP was delayed in summoning air support because of difficulties in radio transmission. This break in communications alarmed 1st Lt. Lawrence Simmons, acting SAC. He convinced the pilot of an OY plane to fly him over the ambush site. From this vantage point Simmons had a good view of the situation and the progress of Corley's reinforcements.

The enemy fire superiority and positions prevented the Marines from more than holding and waiting. Capt. Corley, at the head of the relieving force, was faced with the problem of directing his supporting fire in such a manner that it would not endanger his gorge-bound friendly unit. He set his heavy machineguns up so they fired parallel to the road. In this manner he pinned the enemy down on the west side of the road while a platoon began an enveloping maneuver. They had to scale Maam-san on the opposite side of the gorge to make the maneuver.

The 81mm mortars were set up just off the road and began pounding the NK cliff positions. PFC Richard Mead Golden from Winchester, MA, a one-man task force climbed with a 94-pound heavy machinegun to heights where he could fire down on the enemy. Marine Corsairs arrived on station, somewhat tardily because of the poor radio communications, and the remnants of the enemy disappeared into the hills. Suddenly the enemy gave up the fight, withdrew hurriedly into the hills and the patrol was relieved.

During the fighting Corpsman HM3 C. B. Stacy was WIA and died of these wounds on the same day. Corpsman HN Harry James Harper was attend to an injured Marine and died from a wounded in his side. A truck driver that was most likely a H/3/1 Marine or a H&S/3/1 Marine died during the action.

Nine Marines and Corpsmen were killed and sixteen wounded in this short bitter fight.

The Nine KIAs were:
Cpl Edward J. Bucherich, 458888/0311, from Madison, IL
PFC Eugene Richard Forsgren, 622330, from Portland, OR (WIA/DOW)
Cpl Sam Questell Miller, 668919 Machinegun Platoon from Albuquerque, NM
Lt. Richard Smith, 031103, an artillery forward observer
HM3 C. B. Stacy, 9964549, died attend to a patient
PFC Leonard F. Thompson, 662298, from Cleveland, OH.
PFC George Walter Busch (Bush), 1082385/0311, from Duryea, PA
HN Harry James Harper, 2543089, from Riverside, NJ
HM3 C. B. Stacy, 9964549, from Dallas, TX

The Battalion reported 16 KIA and 26 WIA this date. There was no other significant action reported by the Battalion so the number of friendly casualties in this ambush is likely more than stated above. Another KIA reported by Battalion was Cpl Veloy Gene Humphrey. It is unknown which unit Veloy was in but possibly/probably he was in this ambushed group.

Sgt Clyde Keel was instrumental in evacuating casualties and received a Letter of Commendations for his efforts in this action. His citation reads as follows:
"for excellent service in the line of his profession while serving with a Marine Infantry company during operation in Korea on 2 November 1950. When a motorized patrol of which he was a member, had been ambushed by a numerically superior enemy force, Sergeant Keel, acting as a squad leader displayed great skill, courage and confidence in the performance of his duties. Observing a casualty lying in an exposed enemy fire swept position he left his covered position and ran to assist the casualty in reaching cover. Realizing that a truck was being utilized to move the casualties to the rear, he moved among the wounded Marines and helped them in getting to and loading them aboard the truck. On one occasion he repeatedly exposed himself to the enemy fire as he advanced to the head of the convoy and drove an abandoned jeep to a protected position. His action were an inspiration to all who observed him and contributed materially to the speedy evacuation of wounded Marines. Sergeant KEEL's conduct throughout was in keeping with the highest tradition of the United States Naval Service."

By the time the wounded were evacuated from the ambush area and attended to, it was nearly dark. One wounded Marine died during the night. Navy Lt. R. J. Fleischaker, the Battalion Medical Officer, made the decision that one of the wounded would have to be evacuated immediately to the hospital ship Consolation in Wonsan Harbor if he was to live. The request was made by radio. As difficult as it was to find the small airstrip at Majon-ni at night and land, that pilot succeeded. An hour after he left Wonsan, the pilot was back with the wounded Marine. Forty-five minutes later the Marine was on the operating table on the U.S.S. Consolation. The next day others were evacuated in three helicopters--much to the astonishment of the natives. When H/3/1 returned to the Battalion the returned with all their men, arms, vehicles, and equipment. Nothing was left behind at the ambush site.

Fleischaker and his assistant also treated Korean civilians on occasion, and the saving of a village boy's life by an emergency appendectomy did much to gain the good will of the community.

PFC John Corzan received his first personal award, a Letter of Accommodation, for his performance during this action. Following is his account of the action in which he was involved.

PFC John Corzan and machinegun SSgt Bruce Haines Corson were with the 3rd Platoon when they were ambushed. They were in a ditch with a truck driver named Busch who had an M-1. Busch moved behind a tree and was shot. It appeared to Corzan that Busch was dead but he's not sure. Corson and Corzan's T/O weapon was a .45 pistol so Corson took Busch's M-1 rifle. (The Bush referred to is PFC George Walter Bush who is listed as being in 3/1. He was with H/3/1 on Aug. 10, 1950 before the left Camp Pendleton and may have remained with the Company of he may have also been transferred to Battalion and been attached to the H/3/1 for this patrol.)

They could see some gooks in a cornfield that was on the other side of a stream that was about 50 feet in front of them. Corn stocks were tied together like you traditionally see about Halloween here in the U.S.A. One young gook ran up, saluted another, and then disappeared into a pile of corn stocks. Apparently the corn stockpile was concealing an entrance to an underground tunnel.

Corzan told Corson, "This guy must be an officer because he had been saluted." Corson didn't have a good view of him from his vantage point so he asked Corzan if he had a shot at him. Corzon said, "Yeh, I can get him here." Corson set the M-1 windage and elevation and then gave the M-1 to Corzan. By this time, the gook had moved out of Corzan's view so he returned the rifle Corson.

They could hear firing and recognized it to be from heavy machineguns. Corzan saw H/3/1's relief units about 3,000 yards away. They were unaware of the gooks that were in front of Corzan's group and were firing into the hills where there was no apparently target. Corson said, "Somebody should tell them where the gooks are." When Corzan volunteered to go and tell them, Corson sent him on his way.

Corzan began running in the general direction of the relief unit. He didn't know whether to run zigzag or straight ahead as he ran through the rice paddies which were below the road level. He opted for the straight line, hopping it would get him there faster.

As he neared H/3/1, he saw some guys lying in a ditch. He started shaking some of
the guys but they were all dead. He ran toward another bunch but a Marine told Corzan that they too were all dead. Corzan asked where the CP was and the Marine pointed across the road. Corzan ran across the road and finally arrived at the CP. Capt. Corley, Lt. Mason, and the Platoon Leader (Lt. Edward W. Snelling) were there. Gasping for breath, Corzan told them were the gooks were and then helped mortars zero in on the enemy.

SSgt. Corson submitted the recommendation for Corzan's citation and it was approved.

Capt. Corley believes there were 14 KIA and 8 WIA in this action but they are not listed on H/3/1's KIA list. The Battalion recorded there were 16 KIAs and 26 WIAs on this date. There are five on H/3/1's KIA list.

At Sudong a major battle was taking place. The 7th Marines were attacked by the CCF 124th Division. This is what was termed to be the 1st Phase of the CCF attack. The battle lasted through the night and into the next day. Although the 7th Marines were overrun, they remained organized and either held their positions or counterattacked to take their positions back.

PFC Eugene Richard Fosgren, 622330, was KIA on this date. Eugene was from Portland, OR and is buried there.

Sgt Samuel Questell Miller, 668919, was also KIA on this day. Samuel was from Albuquerque, NM and is buried in Knoxville, TN.

PFC Leonard F. Thompson, 662298/0311, was also KIA on this date. Leonard was from Cleveland, OH and is buried there. A record shows that Leonard was in HQ/1 at the time of his death.

HM3 C. B. Stacy was also KIA on this date. He was WIA while attending his wounded comrades and died of the wounds.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 22 KIA, 2 DOW, 0 MIA, 67 WIA, and 64 non-battle casualties.
Another supply convoy was ambushed between Wonsan and Majon-ni on this date. Each of 3/1’s rifle companies dispatched foot patrols to reconnoiter the high ground to their respective fronts. No contact was reported. Extensive night harassment fires were delivered on surrounding villages.

About this date, Lt. Harvey Goss was relieved as H/3/1’s 3rd Plt. Leader. He became a part of the H/3/1 Headquarters Staff. The 3rd Platoon Sgt., Ssgt. Peda, became the 3rd Plt. Leader.

The 7th Marines cleared out the Chinese that were within their Sudong Regimental area, took care of their wounded, and resupplied the men. The 7th Marines had decimated the CCF 124th Division while sustaining sixty-one dead and 283 wounded of their own. (These casualty numbers do not match with the Division’s daily casualty count because they come from separate sources. It is most likely that the Division’s daily casualty count is the most accurate. However, both sets of figures are provided here for the reader.) The CCF, based upon what they had learned from this battle, decided that during their 2nd phase attack, (see 11/25/50) their first priority would be to annihilate this tough outfit (the 1st Marine Division).

The 1st Marine Division sustained 22 KIA, 3 DOW, 1 MIA, 162 WIA, and 93 non-battle casualties.

7th Marines left Sudong and headed for Koto-ri on their way to Hagaru. They met some limited resistance.

G/3/1 and I/3/1 reconnaissance patrols reported negative contact. H/3/1’s outpost was forced in by the approach of a NG force from the South. The force was scattered by 81mm and 105 fire. One Marine was WIA.

The enemy had closed the road between Wonsan and Majon-ni for some time. 3/1 was in need of supplies and Col. Puller considered it so necessary to push a truck convoy through to Majon-ni that he reinforced and assigned A/1/1, commanded by Capt. Barrow, as guard. Thirty-four supply vehicles were in the column, which left Wonsan at 1430. The convoy was ambushed at the fifth crater roadblock, eight miles from Wonsan. Because of darkness and lack of air support, they were forced to return to Wonsan with 8 wounded and sixteen men injured by an overturned truck.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 17 KIA, 4 DOW, 0 MIA, 84 WIA, and 126 non-battle casualties.

Capt. Barrow led another convoy that left at 0830. With yesterday's knowledge of where to expect an ambush, they caught 70 guerrillas eating and ambushed the ambushers. They killed 51 and captured three without a single casualty. Thereafter, they proceeded to Majon-ni and arrived in the early afternoon without incident. A/1/1 was put under operational control of 3/1 for the night to reinforce the perimeter for an expected attack at 0130 on Nov. 6th as reported by CIC. A/1/1 filled in a portion of the south perimeter defense.

These reinforcements enabled the 3/1 Exec., Maj. Myers to lead a strong reinforced patrol consisting of G/3/1 and I/3/1. Their object was to break up a reported enemy build-up of 2,000 to 3,000 men about six miles northwest of Majon-ni on the Pyongyang road. Nothing more formidable was encountered than a few guerrillas firing long-range, but Maj. Myers brought back 81 willing prisoners.

Meanwhile, the 7th Marines got to Chinhung-ni on the way to Koto-ri. They met some resistance on the way. The 7th Marines Regimental CP was established there.

Gen. MacArthur requested, and received, permission from the Joint Chief of Staff to bomb bridges crossing the Yalu to stop the stream of Chinese supplies.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 1 KIA, 1 DOW, 0 MIA, 23 WIA, and 94 non-battle casualties.
IN KOREA

casualties.
A motorized patrol consisting of G and I companies reinforced with elements of W/3/1 was sent on regimental order to TA 3437 on the Pyongyang road where a large group of Nks were reported assembled. The patrol mad no contact with the enemy but did take 81 voluntary POWs. H/3/1 patrolling to the south, contacted a small group of North Koreans and shot one. Natives warned that Majon-ni was to be attacked at 0100. Two 3/1 Marines were WIA on this date.

A/1/1 began their return trip to Wonsan later in the morning with 619 prisoners who had accumulated in the crowded Majon-ni stockade. The prisoners were packed into open trucks covered with tarpaulins. This precaution was taken in order not to advertise the nature of the cargo while passing through Ambush Alley, since it might be embarrassing if the guerrillas attempted to liberate prisoners who outnumbered their keepers three to one.

At about this same time, Col. Puller ordered 2/1 to proceed VIA the Majon-ni road to Munchon-ni. Their mission was to block enemy movement along the trails leading north and to screen civilians. The hamlet of Munchon-ni squatted near the top of the highest pass along Ambush Alley. Only enough trucks were available for E/1/1 to depart Wanson at 0830.

Four miles short of the Munchon-ni about two hundred enemy soldiers attacked the motorized column. After scrambling out of their trucks, E/2/1 took the enemy position at a cost of 8 KIA and 38 WIA. Six of the truck drivers were also wounded. There were 61 enemy dead left behind and it was estimated that about that many more were wounded. At 1615 the remainder of 2/1 arrived on the scene from Wonsan just as A/1/1 and its prisoners appeared from the opposite direction. A/1/1 brought some of E/1/1's wounded back to Wonsan with the additional POWs without further interference. 2/1/1 proceeded to Munchon-ni as originally planned.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 5 KIA, 1 DOW, 0 MIA, 38 WIA, and 87 non-battle casualties.
As expected by the CIC report, at 0130 trip flares and exploding booby traps were the preludes to the first NKPA probing attacks on the perimeter of 3/1. CIC had correctly identified the enemy as the 45th Regiment of the 15th NKPA Division. This action was in on the southern perimeter where A/1/1 was manning the line. The action also spilled over into G/3/1’s right flank. The assailants showed no disposition to close, and the assault turned into a desultory firefight. At 0500, with fog reducing visibility almost to zero, the enemy could be heard but not seen in his assault on the Battalion OP.

Also, at 0510 the Battalion OP on the western perimeter, manned by an artillery FO team and an 81mm observer, and wireman requested illumination. Enemy approaching the OP could be heard but not seen. At 0525 the personnel manning the OP withdrew, having expended their ammunition. The enemy occupied the OP and at 0545 81mm mortar fire was brought to bear on them. This was followed at 0600 by direct artillery fire including time fire. By 0630 the enemy was definitely withdrawing. Shortly thereafter Capt. Thomas E. McCarthy, 2nd Lts Charles Mattox, and Charles R. Stiles with an assortment of H&S Company personnel recaptured the position soon after the fog lifted. Air came on station about 0745. All supporting weapons continued to fire at retreating targets. The Battalion had 2 WIsAs. Night firing missions carried out throughout the night.

When the NKPA first attacked, Capt. Corley leaped for his foxhole. At least he thought it was his. It was much deeper than his. When he finally hit bottom he felt a sharp pain in his back. The next morning he could hardly walk. He went to the Battalion Aid Station for treatment (a rub down). The Doctor told him he was eligible for a Purple Heart because his injury resulted from enemy action. He respectfully declined and said, "If I gets one, it will be a real one". That ended the conversation.

According to dated maps, another supply convoy was ambushed in Ambush Alley on this date. It appears that this ambush could have been the action described for November 6th.

About this date, replacements came to bring companies up to strength. It was probably about this time that Lt. Roscoe L. Barrett became H/3/1's 1st Platoon Leader. Prior to this time Lt. Mitchell or SSgt Ed Hanrahan (the Platoon Sgt) had probably been acting as Platoon Leader. Possibly it was at this time that Mitchell moved to the Battalion S-3 Office.

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

**MG Plt.**
- John "Frog" Frohliger (joined)
- Marvin "Goose" Gandy Jr. (joined)
- Stanley "Gunny" Grooms (joined)
- Thomas "Tom" J. Grote (joined)
- Frederick "Fred" Merritt (joined)

(Fred Merritt was also in the 3rd Platoon but it is not known when he moved between the two platoons.)

**1st Plt. Ldr**
- Lt. Roscoe L. Barrett

**1st Plt. 2nd Sqd**
- Glenn Kinkel (joined)

**1st Plt.**
- Wilmer "Dinkey" Morgani (joined)

**3rd Plt. 3rd Sqd**
- James Jim Bowen (joined)

**3rd Plt.**
- Sidney "Sid" Eugene Escher Jr. (joined)
- Clifford "Cliff" Antes (joined)

The 1st Marine Division sustained 15 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 60 WIA, and 51 non-battle casualties.
At 0100 3/1 was alerted for an attack which failed to materialize. At 0500 all outposts were manned and reconnaissance patrols were sent out. I/3/1’s patrol directed the shelling of a village with good results.

An OP manned by two squads of Lt. Ronald A. Mason’s 2nd Platoon of H/3/1 was threatened with encirclement when a North Korean force estimated at 250 men worked around to the rear. The other two Platoons of H/3/1, reinforced with heavy machine guns and a platoon from I/3/1 were sent out from the perimeter. Artillery and mortars helped to scatter the enemy in confusion with an estimated 40 percent (100) losses. Marine casualties were one KIA and ten wounded. The only 1st Mar. Div. KIA on this day was PFC Lowell Thomas Wolfe who was in H/3/1’s 2nd Platoon during this action. Jack Dedrick recalls that Lowell was manning a forward observation post at the time of his death. Jack remembers Lowell's stories about Jesse James, the person whom he claimed to be his grandfather. Lowell would read letters from home that talked about Jesse. Jack still remembers Lowell's stories and wonders if Lowell was telling the truth or just a great storyteller. Commodore “Mike” McNeil also was in the group of men who went out to get Lowell Wolf.

About this date Pvt John R. Goggin was transferred out of H/3/1. Regulations required Marines to be 18 years old to be in a combat zone and Goggin was only 17. John took a lot of kidding from his buddies about the war stories he would be telling his friends at home. After all, he had been with H/3/1 from the Inchon landing right through the liberation of Seoul.

Probably on this date TSgt Andrew Peda was WIA with wounds in the stomach. PFC Albin A. Dlabaj saw TSgt Peda shot through the abdomen, up near the stomach on the right side, and the bullet passed through his body. He was evacuated and never returned to the Company. Andrew, who was from NY died in 1994. His death was reported by JM. Andrew, who was afraid of flying, was to be evacuated on a spotter plane which was at the short airstrip at Majon-ni. Pvt John R. Goggin was also to be transported out of Majon-ni on this same plane. John Corzan was kidding Peda that he wouldn't even make it off the airstrip before they crashed. Sure enough, the plane crashed before it got off the airstrip. The crash was minor and no one was injured.

SSgt. Malone(y) probably became the 3rd Plt. Sgt. about this date to replace SSgt. Peda. Also, about this date Lt. Wendell Endsley became the third Platoon Commander. He relieved SSgt Peda who was probably acting as the 3rd Platoon Leader.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 1 KIA, 2 DOW, 0 MIA, 17 WIA, and 50 non-battle casualties.

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1950

Within the Battalion, normal outposting and patrolling were conducted without incident. Night and day harassing and interdiction fires were executed.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 2 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 7 WIA, and 50 non-battle casualties.
IN KOREA

CHAPTER 6

THE CHOSIN RESERVOIR

NOTE: An interesting presentation was given regarding "The Chinese Failure at Chosin". The article is included in Appendix K to provide an understanding of the objectives and actions of the Chinese.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1950

Battalion conducted routine outposting and patrolling without incident. A reinforced rifle platoon was sent to 2/1 to escort a TD-18. During the afternoon an OY spotted an estimated 300 enemy troops about four miles south of Majon-ni. Under direction of Aerial observers, howitzers broke up this concentration. A convoy of supplies and the 3rd KMC Bn arrived from Wonsan to reinforce 3/1. The 3rd KMC Bn. was assigned the sector in the perimeter, which A/1/1 had vacated. The Battalion continued night firing missions on targets surrounding the area.

7th Marines move into Koto-ri with no resistance. The temperature was said to be twenty-five degrees below zero.

After the failed evacuation VIA spotter plane, SSgt. Andrew Peda and Pvt John R. Goggin returned with a convoy. As stated before, the precise date of the crashed plane incident is not known. If the occurrence happened on the 8th, they probably returned with this convoy that had brought the supplies and 3rd KMC Battalion. John Corzan reported that they saw some action in this convoy during the return trip but they came through okay.

The celebration of the 175th birthday of the Marine Corps was not neglected at Majon-ni. Somehow the cooks managed to bake a prodigious cake, with thinly spread jam serving as frosting. All hands were rotated, a few at a time, to their respective CPs to receive a slice.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 3 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 20 WIA, and 57 non-battle casualties.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1950

At 0900 the supply convoy departed for Wonsan. Routine patrolling continued throughout the day. Extensive harassing fires were delivered on reported enemy concentration areas.

The CIC team warned that another attack on the perimeter by the 45th NKPA Regiment would take place on the night of 11-12 November. As a prelude, Gen. Pak made an effort to terrorize inhabitants who had kept 3/1 informed of his plans and movements. Some villagers took this threat seriously enough to prepare for a hurried leaving, but the Civil Affairs section put a curfew into effect and reassured them of their safety.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 8 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 16 WIA, and 48 non-battle casualties.
H/3/1 MARINES

IN KOREA

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1950

After such a menacing build-up, the second attack on the perimeter fizzled out like a damp firecracker. A few probing jabs, beginning at 0130, were followed by a weak main assault on the KMC front, which was easily repulsed. The enemy tried again to overrun the OP and H/3/1's left front but gave up the attempt after stumbling into a field of "Bouncing Betty" mines. At 0600 the last action of the Majon-ni operation came to an end as the North Koreans withdrew. In addition to routine reconnaissance patrols by 3/1, the KMC battalion sent a company strength patrol to the south. This patrol contacted and engaged the enemy with support of artillery and mortars. KMC casualties were 4 WIA. The Battalion also had 2 KIAs and 2 WIAs.

This was the final appearance of the 15th NKPA Division, which apparently abandoned Majon-ni as an objective and transferred its guerrilla operations southward along the Imjin Valley.

Another ambush of a supply convoy was recorded on this date. This convoy was an Army column, which included thirty-four Marine supply vehicles that had left Wonsan at 1030. After the ambush, they were again delayed until repairs could be made to the road and a bridge that had been blow up. They set up a perimeter for the night and proceeded the next morning.

Jack Dedrick doesn't remember having hot chow during his Majon-ni, until now. The Army unit coming to relieve 3/1 sent a field kitchen in advance of their troops to feed them hot chow. He remembers the overpowering smell of hot food cooking on a cold November morning. H/3/1 let about fifty percent, including Jack, of their men go down to see if they could get fed. The Mess Sgt. said, "This food is for Army personnel". They finally persuaded the Mess Sgt. to feed them.

John Corzan and Jack Dedrick both recall the Machine Gun Platoon Sergeant, SSgt. Bruce Haines Corson, and PFC Richard Mead Golden going down in front of their positions to reset trip lines. Golden was in the process of relieving himself when another person with a machete accidentally hit one of the lines and exploded a device. This resulted in the death of SSgt. Corson and PFC Golden, both of the Machinegun Platoon. The person with the machete was injured but did not die. H/3/1 had the only two death recorded in the 1st Mar. Div. on this date.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 2 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 4 WIA, and 40 non-battle casualties.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1950

No patrols were dispatched but outposts were manned. A KMC patrol combed the south for about 2,000 yards. At 2040 the KMC battalion repulsed a probing effort to their front.

The relief of 3/1 and the KMC BN at Majon-ni began in the afternoon as elements of the 1st BN, 15th (probably Regiment), U. S. 3rd Infantry Division, arrived at 1530 to take over the perimeter. This was the convoy that had been ambushed the previous day in Ambush Alley. Both Marines and Army personnel shared foxholes on this night.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 7 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 9 WIA, and 63 non-battle casualties.
The 7th Marines left Koto-ri for Hagaru-ri.
The 5th Marines moved into Koto-ri.
After being relieved by the 1st battalion, 15th Infantry Division, 3/1 departed on trucks at 1015 for the Wonsan area. The move was made with the convoy broken into three march units and was uneventful. The first convoy arrived at 1500 and the third march unit closed the 1st Marines CP area at Wanson at sundown.

A total of 1395 prisoners had been taken during their 17 days at Majon-ni. Large portions of them were voluntary POWs. More then 4,000 Koran transients were screened. Enemy battle casualties were estimated at 525 KIA and an unknown number wounded. 3/1's losses for the period numbered 16 KIA, 4 DOW, and 45 WIA. Non-battle casualties were remarkably low, probably due to strict enforcement of sanitary and health regulations.
The vulnerability of a tenuous MSR must also be taken into account, and casualties of 9 KIA and 81 WIA or injured were incurred by Marines escorting convoys through Ambush Alley.

About this date, all three battalions of the 1st Regiment were returned to the Wonsan area and the 1st Regiment was intact again. They were preparing to be transported by rail to Hamhung and fall in behind the 7th and 5th Regiments and advance, via Hamhung, toward the Chosin Reservoir.

The MSR between Hungnam to Yudam-ni was 78 miles long. A further breakdown of distances follows: from the seaport of Hungnam to Hamhung is eight miles; from Hamhung to Ori-ri is eight miles; from Ori-ri to Majon-dong is fourteen miles; from Majon-dong to Sudong is six miles; from Sudong to Chinhung-ni is six miles; from Chinhung-ni to Koto-ri is ten miles; from Koto-ri to Hagaru is eleven miles; and from Hagaru to Yudam-ni is fourteen miles. The road was dirt/gravel, narrow, and winding with cliffs on one side and sheer drops on the other. At times it would seem to go straight up and then straight down. It went from the low country on the coast to the high mountainous plateau where the Chosin was located. Some of the terrain near Hagaru is over a mile high. Nights got as cold as about twenty-five degrees below zero.
The Changjin River was the river that was dammed to become to Changjin Reservoir. This is the reservoir that is known as the Chosin Reservoir by Marines who served there.

3/1 was delayed in the Wonsan area several days waiting for rail transportation to Chigyong 70 miles further north.
About this date H/3/1 was issued cold weather gear. They received two pair of ski socks, parkas, cold weather boots, winter caps, and fur-lined gloves. The also got wool and down liners for their sleeping bags. They were given lectures on how to wear the clothing, particularly the boots and socks.

From the briefings they received they were of the opinion the war effort was going reasonably well "up north".
The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 66 non-battle casualties.

The Battalion received orders to move to Chigyong (about 6 miles SW of Hamhung and about 12 miles west of Hungnam) on Nov. 16th. One Company was to move by motor convoy at 0700. The remainder of the Battalion was to move via rail at 0800.
In compliance with Corps directives, Division assigned the task of seizing Huksu-ri to the 1st Marines on this date.
The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 1 WIA, and 172 non-battle casualties.
IN KOREA

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1950

The Battalion moved all but one rifle company to Chigyong. When they arrived in the assembly area they set up a perimeter defense. One of the Battalion’s rifle platoons was sent to the Chigyong railroad station to guard supplies.

The 7th Marines entered Hagaru-ri. The temperature there was 21 degrees below zero.

About this date, Marine engineers began building an airstrip at Hagaru-ri.

PFCs Joseph Boudreau, Ronald B. Bennett, and Cpl Alvin J. Robey were dropped from the Company on this date. PFC Ronald Bennett and Alvin Robey apparently returned to the Company.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 1 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 2 WIA, and 136 non-battle casualties.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1950

Some 3/1 elements moved by rail and motor from the Wonsan area to Chigyong. They were the last of the 1st Marines to be moved out of the Wonsan area. On this day they continued to improve defensive positions and erected tents as protection against the cold.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 2 WIA, and 77 non-battle casualties.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1950

Although the advance westward to Huksu-ri remained the mission of the 1st Marines, the shortage of motor transport slowed the movement from Wonsan to Chigyong. The last elements had not arrived yet so Division requested relief from the Huksu-ri objective. Corps compiled and assigned the mission to the 26th ROK Regiment with the understanding that the objective would be turned over to the 1st Marines at a later date. The Battalion send one rifle company to Hamhung for duty with X Corps. Planning continued for patrolling of the area to the north, west and south.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 79 non-battle casualties.

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1950

The Battalion sent two platoon-sized patrols out at 0730 to the high ground to the west and southwest. Both returned at 1500 with no contact reported. With tents erected, the effects of the cold on troop was negligible.

A unit diary entry for this day shows the following Marines had their MOSs changed from 0300 to 0311.

PFC Edward J. Bohnas      PFC Roger A. C?t? (No other rec. of this guy)
Sgt. Frank G. Estrada    PFC John G. Gonzales

During the Morning hours the ROK unit left Chigyong to take Huksu-ri.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 1 WIA, and 58 non-battle casualties.

MONDAY NOVEMBER 20, 1950

Two reinforced platoon patrols were dispatched to the north and northwest and to the south and southwest. No contact was reported.

Verbal notification was received that Huksu-ri was placed within the boundary of the 3rd Army Division and the 1st Marines were relieved of all Huksu-ri responsibility.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 46 non-battle casualties.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1950
Normal patrols were sent out by the Battalion with no contact reported. X Corps orders confirmed that Huksu-ri was now in the 3rd Army sector. Sgt Edward Kelley and PFC Donald Goddard were dropped from the company on this date. The 1st Marine Division sustained 4 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 5 WIA, and 63 non-battle casualties.

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1950

The Battalion sent out two patrols who reported no contact. The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 65 non-battle casualties.

THURSDAY NOVEMBER 23, 1950 (THANKSGIVING DAY)

Division orders issued at 0800 directed the 1st Marines to relieve elements of the 7th Marines in the vicinity of Hagaru and Koto-ri and protect the Division MSR that ran from Hagaru to Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni. The Battalion sent no patrols out. They began planning for the move to Hagaru-ri. Where it was possible, Marines had a good Thanksgiving Day dinner. The menu for the entire 1st Marine Division was:

- SHRIMP COCKTAIL
- STUFFED OLIVES
- SWEET PICKLES
- ROAST YOUNG TOM TURKEY
- CRANBERRY SAUCE
- SAGE DRESSING
- GIBLET GRAVY
- GREEN PEAS
- BUTTERED CORN
- MASHED POTATOES
- CANDIED SWEET POTATOES
- BREAD
- BUTTER
- FRUIT SALAD WITH SALAD DRESSING
- FRUIT CAKE
- PUMPKIN PIE
- MINCEMEAT PIE
- COFFEE
- HARD CANDIES
- SALTED NUTS
- APPLIES
- ORANGES
- CIGARETTES
- CIGARS

However, some units, such as 1/7, didn't get the meal before it froze. H/3/1 Marines were given a copy of the menu and told to mail it home so their folks could see how well they were being treated.

H/3/1 had not yet left the assembly area on Thanksgiving Day. They had been issued a Mobile Galley that came with Meredith, a tall lanky cook from Texas, who really did a fine job of cooking, especially the noon meal this day. Actually there was too much food. Meredith asked Capt. Corley if there was anything he could prepare for the Captain since Corley would eat last, he asked Meredith to save him a dill pickle. When Corley came through the line about 1400, he was given a gallon jar of dill pickles. About 1500 someone called Capt. Corley to ask when the evening meal would begin. Corley couldn't believe this because everyone had just eaten and was still full. Leftovers were served later. Also the 3rd Battalion organized a "Turkey Shoot". Capt. Corley spoke with the H/3/1 entrant and asked that he win for H/3/1. He did win and received a bottle of "spirits" which he shared. Capt. Corley made no effort to stop the mini celebration. A little relaxation was deserved for the winner. All agreed as they had a sip or two.

It was learned that the 17th Infantry Regiment of the 7th Army Division had gone all the way up to the Yalu without seeing a single Chinese soldier.

In accordance with orders form X Corps, 1/5 of the 5th Marines started up the East Side of the Chosin Reservoir. 3/5 was still at Chinhung-ni guarding the Division's supplies and MSR. 2/5 still was at Koto-ri guarding that location and the MSR.

Gen. Smith, CG of the 1st Marine Division, had many differences with Gen. Almond and here was another straw on the pile of differences between them. Gen. Smith did not like the idea of dividing his regiments to the point where they could not protect each other's
flanks as was the case here with the Chosin Reservoir between 1/5 and 1/7. He again complained as best a subordinate could to Gen. Almond and eventually persisted in getting his units joined back together (see 26 November).

Also, Gen. Smith did not share General MacArthur's optimism with regard to the, "insignificant number of Chinese" in Korea. While Gen. MacArthur was saying we were in full control, Gen. Smith was getting reports from civilians and captured Chinese of the many Chinese that were in the Chosin Reservoir area. Gen. Almond was urging Gen. Smith to proceed with all possible haste to the Yalu. Fortunately, Gen. Smith had the foresight to find excuses to delay his advances and assemble his Division or the story of the Chosin may have had a different ending.

When the 1st Marines moved away from the coast, the terrain became continually higher. They were taking the same path that the 7th and then the 5th Marines had taken the previous two weeks. The higher they went the colder it got. There were many days the temperature was as much as twenty-five degrees below zero.

Only by using vehicles of the 11th Marines was it possible to move 1/1 to Chinhung-ni to relieved 3/5 that was guarding the Division's supplies. Chinhung-ni was 43 miles from Hungnam on the coast. Chinhung-ni consisted of a wide spot in the valley with a railroad and stream passing through. It was located about ten miles south of Koto-ri. There was a small, 30' X 20' X 7' high railroad station. There were also a few civilian mud homes with rice-straw roofs.

Engineers at Hagaru were continuing to build an airstrip that would be capable of landing C-47 aircraft. Hagaru was also becoming a main supply point for the 1st Marine Division and a central point from which the 11th Marines could provide artillery support to the three Regiments. There was also a smaller airstrip built at Koto-ri. It was only big enough to handle OY planes.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 1 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 3 WIA, and 58 non-battle casualties.
Battalion sent out two patrols which reported no contacts. During the 24th and 25th 2/1 and HQ, 1st Marines relieved 2/5 at Koto-ri. Battalion received Operations Order 15-50 dated Nov. 23, 1950 from CO, 1st Marines directing movement to Hagaru, relief of 7th Marine units, and defense of Hagaru. Preliminary planning for the movement had begun yesterday and were continuing to include:

1. The Battalion was to move to Hagaru-ri via motor convoy in three serials.
2. Each motor serial was to contain one rifle company, reinforced, and elements of H&S Company.
3. It was planned for all three serials to move on the same day depending upon availability of motor transportation and the Battalion's commitments for protection of the Regimental Supply Dump.
4. Transportation requirements were determined by carefully estimating the amount of material it was felt necessary for the Battalion and each company to have available upon reaching Hagaru-ri.
5. An advanced detail consisting of representatives of the Battalion and each company was sent to Hagaru-ri to establish liaison with units to be relieved, and to prepare for the arrival of the unit.
6. The Battalion sent a reconnaissance party to cover the planned route of march. There was no special training or rehearsals conducted in preparation for carrying out the assigned mission. 3/1 had just successfully completed a similar mission while at Majon-ni, and it was believed that experience gained there was sufficient for this movement.

The men of 1/7 had moved into at Yudam-ni and belatedly celebrated Thanksgiving with a full, hot turkey dinner. This was the last full meal they would receive for 17 days. 3/5 moved north from Chinghung-ni during the day. By this date the Chinese had moved 30 divisions south of the Yalu. Seventeen were in the 8th Army sector and 12 were in the Chosin Reservoir area. An additional fourteen CCF divisions were also in reserve north of the Yalu.

Sgt Ronald E. Long was dropped from the company.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 3 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 8 WIA, and 51 non-battle casualties.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1950

The Battalion sent out patrols that reported no contacts. Advanced elements of 3/1 departed toward Hagaru.

Although it was not apparent in the Marines sector, the CCF had begun their Second Phase Offensive. The Commander of the three CCF Armies (9 divisions) facing the Marines was intent on annihilating this tough 1st Marine Division because of the results of their encounter with the 7th Marines on the night of November 3rd.

Gen. Smith's concerns about his Division's integrity were observed by Gen. Almonds and the 5th Marines were allowed to come around the reservoir to join up with the 7th Marines on the west side. A couple of reinforced battalions of the 31st and 32nd regiments, 7th Army relieved the 5th Marines on the East Side of the Chosin Reservoir. These Army units (about 3500 men), within the next four days, would sustain extreme casualties and only a few hundred disorganized stragglers that would find their way back through enemy lines to relative safety at Hagaru.

PFC Clifford C. Ralph was dropped from the Company.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 8 WIA, and 55 non-battle casualties.
Still unaware of the impending Chinese attack, Division ordered the 5th Marines to pass through the 7th Marines at Yudam-ni and advance westward to close the distance between them and the 8th Army (who was no longer there). The ROK II Corps on the right flank of the 8th Army had disintegrated in the face of a powerful Chinese force in central Korea. Apparently this information was not being passed down to the 1st Marine Division from the higher echelon. The ROK II Corp was about 40-70 miles west or southwest of the 1st Marine Division when they were attacked.

Civilian refugees passing through the checkpoint at Chinghung-ni reported seeing many Chinese about five miles to the south and southwest. Three enemy captured by 1/7 confirmed there were several CCF Divisions and said they were surrounding the 1st Marine Division to cut them off.

On this date 3/1's task organization consisted of:
3/1 less G/3/1
Detachment of Anglico, 1st Signal Bn.
Liaison team and FO party from 2/11
D/2/11
Detachment of D Company, 1st Medical Battalion
Detachment of H&S Company, 1st Marines
2nd Section, 75mm recoilless Gun platoon, AT Company, 1st Marines

The movement plans for the day called for 3/1 to begin striking camp at Chigyong at 0700. Four hours were sufficient for the Battalion to strike camp and load vehicles with the necessary supplies. The Battalion was to commence movement to Hagaru at 1100, in threeserials, ten minutes apart. Each serial was to consist of a reinforced rifle company and elements of H&S company. At 0700 vehicles were available for each company to load tents, stoves, and cold weather equipment.

Of the eighty seven vehicles requested to move the Battalion, only fifty nine were available. Because of the lack of sufficient transportation, it was necessary to overload vehicles and vary the loading plan. The first serial did not depart until 1130. The second serial, with still more transportation problems, did not depart until 1230 instead of following the first serial at the planned ten minute interval. Once under way the movement was uneventful so far as enemy action was concerned. There was considerable delay encountered because of breakdowns and waiting for clearance on the one-way road between Chinghung-ni and Koto-ri. The first serial with I/3/1 reached Hagaru at 1700. The second serial with H/3/1 had, in addition to delays mentioned above, to travel at a speed of the attached artillery battery and closed Hagaru at 2000. The third serial consisting of G/3/1 reinforced and elements of H&S/3/1 did not depart because of the lack of transportation. They would remain at Chigyong guarding the regimental supply dump until Nov. 28th.

During the trip the vehicles carrying H/3/1's mobile Kitchen developed wheel trouble and had to be left behind. It was to be brought up later. Jack Dedrick remembers this as being the 2nd coldest day of his life. The combination of the wind passing through the back of the truck and the extreme cold temperature made it almost unbearable. When the trucks stopped at Hagaru, it actually felt warmer even thought it was well below zero. Upon arriving at Hagaru-ri, H/3/1 and I/3/1 were to replace D/2/7 and E/2/7. However, they had left Hagaru-ri earlier in the day for Yudam-ni. Because of their late arrival, and other factors, it was too dark to deploy the 1st Marines to adequately defend the entire perimeter. Effective preliminary liaison by the advanced party having been established with 2/7, it was possible to assign the two companies of 3/1 to defensive positions vacated by D/2/7 and E/2/7 whom they were relieving. A section of heavy machine guns and an antitank assault section that were attached to H/3/1 and I/3/1 were also placed on the perimeter. The 3/1 CP was established in the vicinity of TA 7051A3. This was across the road from the 2/7 CP. W/3/1, primarily company headquarters and two sections of the 81mm Mortar Platoon, was located in the area adjacent to the 2/7 CP and the W/3/1 installations.

The Parka-clad H/3/1 Marines climbing down stiffly from their trucks and had their first sight of a panorama which reminded one officer of the old photographs of the goldrush mining camp in the Klondike. Tents, huts, and supply dumps were scattered in a
seemingly haphazard fashion about a frozen plain crossed by a frozen river. Hagaru was bordered on three sides by low hills rising to steep heights on the eastern outskirts. Although many of the buildings had survived the bombings, the battered town at the foot to the ice-locked Chosin Reservoir was not a spectacle calculated to raise spirits of newcomers.

There were no tents for H/3/1 this night. They slept on the open ground and some had the luxury of putting straw under their sleeping bags.

By this time Hagaru-ni had thousands of supply men, engineers, and other elements necessary for an advanced base. The growing base was, for all practical purposes, undefended by infantry troops skilled in defensive tactics.

PFC Robert E. Geib was sick or WIA this date and evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital.

PFC Richard E. McLain was dropped from the Company.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 2 KIA, 0 DOW, 1 MIA, 5 WIA, and 68 non-battle casualties.
H/3/1 was defending the southern sector of the Hagaru perimeter and they went on a 25% alert and set up a couple of pyramidal tents and literally filled them with people. They were told there were no enemy in the area and they could light fires to heat their C-rations. The cold was devastating but there was little firewood available. They were also told they could start digging positions in the morning.

F/2/7, the last rifle company organic to 2/7 departed for the north. They would get as far as Toktong Pass where they heroically held the pass until seventh and fifth Marines could pass through on their retreat from Yudamni.

At Hagaru-ri, it became apparent that there needed to be an organized defense force established. Lt. Col. Tom Ridge, 3/1 CO, contacted Col. Bowser, Div. G-3, concerning this matter. They both knew the best man for the job was Lt. Col. Ridge and it is no surprise that he was put in charge of organizing the defense. Ridge also suggested that G/3/1 and other combat units on their way up the MSR be given top priority for transportation to Hagaru-ni. With the given intelligence reports of Chinese in the area, there was a need for many more men to defend the growing base. The perimeter of the base had already grown to four miles. Lt. Col. Ridge's appointment came just ten minutes before a Chinese 76-mm gun fired into Ridge's CP, killing the battalion logistics officer and wounding the Weapons Company Supply Sergeant.

Lt. Col. Ridge spent the afternoon coordinating with unit commanders around the base. He inventoried units to determine which were available for the perimeter's defense. H/3/1 and I/3/1 would defend the most likely areas of attack on the perimeter. The rest of the perimeter was to be defended with small platoon/company sized units drafted from supporting elements. After Division concurred with this plan, specific support units were given sectors to guard, and defend in case of attack.

H/3/1 and I/3/1 occupied about the same defensive positions 2/7 had defended before they left. H/3/1 was on the left covering the southern perimeter and I/3/1 was tied in on the right covering the southwestern part of the perimeter. These were considered to be the most vulnerable sectors of the base. The two companies were spread very thin over their 2300-yard front (380 yards per platoon). D/2/11 was tied in on the left of H/3/1 covering the low lands in front of them. When G/3/1 eventually arrived on the evening of the 29th, they were to be sent to defend another vulnerable part of the base near a major supply dump, East Hill.

Keith Davis, of the 3rd Platoon, recalls that the land was flat. Behind the Company about 1,000 yards was the airstrip. To the left was a view of the famous East Hill. Directly in front, several thousand yard, was a high mountain range that extended to the right as far as the eye could see. Upon a mountain top stood a Cross that was large enough to be seen with the naked eye. It warmed Keith to see this religious symbol since he was a firm believer in prayer and daily reading of the New Testament he carried in his dungaree jacket pocket. Some kidded Keith for his god-fearing Christian beliefs because it didn't seem to fit the macho ideas of some Marines. Were these some of who would be cussing and then praying in the up coming action. Some never could see the cross on the mountain but Keith looked upon it as his personal assurance of safety. It didn't matter that others couldn't see the cross and kidded him about it. Keith knew it was there and knew its significance.

There was growing concern about people that had left Koto-ri, eleven miles to the south of Hagaru-ni, and had not shown up at Hagaru-ni. Also, people who departed Hagaru-ni to the north and south were running into enemy fire and roadblocks.

Concurrent with the above-described actions, H/3/1 and I/3/1 spent most of the day reinforcing their defensive positions. Several reels of barbed wire arrived (with no stakes). Capt. Corley called the S-4 to request picks and long handled shovels to help break the frozen ground. Metal stakes for stringing double apron barbed wire were also requested. He was told there were none available. He also again asked for demolitions to break the frozen ground, but again the reply came back, "None are available." Even his request for dozers to break the ground was denied. They did manage to obtain lumber to reinforce their tents. These "thawing" tents were put near the front and to be used on a
rotating basis to allow troops to get some warmth. Lt. Snelling and SSgt. Marler had their 60mm Mortar Section busy as beavers setting in their primary and supplemental positions. Lt. Betts and TSgt. Grooms were busy working with their .30 caliber machineguns. Every fifth or tenth round was a tracer in their ammo belts. The 81mm and artillery FOs were registering their weapons. The Company CP group was laying out their area and the wiremen were laying communications lines.

There was a native house not far from Cpl Jack Dedrick, a machinegunner who was setting up with the 2nd Platoon. They asked the Papa-san for some tools to dig with. He not only had tools but also helped to break through the frozen ground, tunnel under, and break through the icy crest by jumping on the top. Papa-san said he was a deserted NKPA who had been a machinegunner at Seoul. They gave him and his family some rations (chicken and vegetables which nobody liked) and kicked them out of their house. They didn't want an enemy sympathizer in their midst. The Koreans heated their house by building fires in tunnels under the floor of their houses. The house was too hot. The temperature differential was too great to go into the house and then come out in the cold.

They had received a huge supply of rations that they stored in the pyramidal tent on the right. They were anticipating the arrival of their portable galley. They had heard that the 5th and 7th Marines were heavily engaged at Yudam-ni, north of Hagaru. Demolitions were heard in the I/3/1 area. Capt. Fisher had obtained some and was using explosives to loosen the frozen ground so foxholes could be dug. H/3/1 had no such luck in obtaining explosives.

Capt. Corley was busy getting briefed at Battalion. H/3/1 had received pot Bellied stoves and were trying to get them working in the tents. The H/3/1 indoor CP was in one of three pyramidal tents, the one on the left. This was where Corley, Johnson, Betts, Snelling, and Goss slept. 1st Sgt. Cabe, Kirby, Groom, PFC Wooley, and Cpl Black slept in the middle tent. The outdoor (combat) CP was on a Korean grave (a mound) behind them and forward of the 60mm mortars. They discovered that the .30 caliber machineguns wouldn't fire too consistently because of the extreme cold. Engineers were busy building the airstrip that ended behind H/3/1's section of the perimeter.

Rumors were still floating around that the 1st Marine Division would be home for Christmas. Scuttlebutt was that the 1st Marine Division had reserved 18,000 seats in the Rose Bowl. They were to be pinched out by the 8th Army up near the Yalu River. Mail hadn't caught up yet and some were impatient. Lt. Goss, the former 3rd Platoon leader, who had been wounded two times, was assigned to the Company CP group awaiting orders. Capt. Corley recalls that he was a young hard charging Marine and an excellent shot. Capt. Corley never understood why he was left behind. Perhaps things were just happening too fast. Capt. Corley also recalls that they had three TSgt's in H/3/1; an old timer, Kirby; one from WVA, Grooms, (a reservist who sure could tell funny stories); and an excitable young man named Barnes who handled supplies at Hagaru (and was apparently wounded).

Except for the cold weather, morale was high. The day, and night passed with no activity. Supporting fires were provided by D/11 through the day.

The following supporting units were attached to H/3/1.

One section AT Assault Platoon.
One section HMG (4 guns rather than 2) from W/3/1.
One section of .50 Caliber MG.
An artillery FO party from D/11 (Lt. Brobst in charge).
An 81mm Mortar FO from W/3/1 (Sgt Wesner in charge).
About 12 litter Bearers from H&S/3/1.
Seven Corpsmen.

One driver with a jeep and trailer from H&S/3/1 (Cpl Black was the driver. Later in his Marine Corps Career Cpl Black became Sgt. Maj. of the Marine Corps).

Any lingering doubts as to the extent of the Chinese attack on the MSR were dispelled by reports from OY and H03S-1 Pilots of VMO-6. They disclosed that defended enemy roadblocks had isolated the 1st Marine Division's units at Yudam-ni, Fox Hill, Hagaru, and Koto-ri. The Chinese had managed to surround the strung-out units of the Division into four isolated segments. CCF columns were also penetrating as far south as the Chinhung-ni area where 1/1 was located.
Twelve CCF Divisions now surrounded the 1st Division. A CCF Division's strength was normally about 10,000 men but they were only at about 80% strength. This gave them about 100,000 Chinese to surrounded the 1st Marine Division (about 20,000 men) with the intent of destroying them.

Early in the morning, the 5th and 7th Marines were in the village of Yudam-ni, and the near-by, surrounding hills. Before they were aware of the critical situation, at daybreak, the 5th Marines was ordered to advance to the west, toward what was thought to be the eastern elements of the 8th Army forty to seventy miles away. They were not aware that the CCF's Second Phase Offensive had already put the whole 8th Army in retreat during the previous two days. There were no allied forces to the west!

The 5th and 7th Marines also began feeling the force of the CCF's Second Phase Offensive in the hills surrounding Yudam-ni. This was the farthest north the Marines had penetrated in the Chosin area. The Chinese masses were becoming apparent at about the same time the 5th was moving out on their westward trek toward the absent 8th Army. As the 5th Marines began moving out early in the morning, extremely strong CCF forces attacked them before the had gone more than about a mile. They stopped their westward movement, managed to return to Yudam-ni, secured the perimeter, and prepared defensive positions for the night.

Now the 5th and 7th Marines were at Yudam-ni and isolated from F/2/7 that had taken up defensive position at Toktong Pass seven miles to the south on Fox Hill. They were also isolated from the Division, which was fourteen miles to the south at Hagaru. Hagaru, defended by only two rifle companies, H/3/1 and I/3/1, was surrounded and isolated from Koto-ri, eleven miles to the south.

During the night, the 5th and 7th were severely tested by the enemy on all fronts. This resulted in a great many casualties and jeopardized the ability of the 5th and 7th Marines to defend themselves.

The enemy was not only the Chinese but also the weather. The ground was frozen more than a foot deep, which made digging extremely difficult. Intrenching tools were of little use. They barely made a chip in the icy ground. Water was always a problem. With frozen water trailers, the men could not wash and mess gear and other equipment could not be cleaned. Frozen lubricating oil on weapons caused failures to feed and fire. Propellants would not burn properly and some artillery shells landed short. Marine T/E clothing was designed for temperatures down to zero degrees but temperatures were reaching twenty five degrees, or more, below zero. Activity caused perspiration of feet in shoes, which froze when men were idle. Because of these type of environmental hazards, men could not eat properly. This reduced their resistance and made them less able to cope. It is no wonder that so many of our casualties were from this other enemy, the weather.

Keith Davis, at Hagaru, recalls that orders were given to put out fires at dusk. It was a very cold night.

PFC Milo Gasper and PFC Michael Tortorella were dropped from H/3/1 on this date.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 37 KIA, 1 DOW, 17 MIA, 186 WIA, and 96 non-battle casualties. The unit diary shows that H/3/1 had seven Marines and two corpsmen WIA's on this date.
Division engineers had been working day and night behind H/3/1's position to extend the airstrip so that C130 aircraft could land. Supplying the Division by parachute was inadequate and cargo planes were badly needed to bring in supplies and evacuate the dead and wounded. Engineers continued working on the airstrip this night with a higher state of alert.

Sunrise was most welcome. It allowed for fires to be lit to warm the Marines and to heat up the C-rations. Scuttlebut was the theme of the day. Various stories were discussed regarding the 5th and 7th Marines plus the heavy fighting on East Hill. At 0600 H/3/1's 3rd Platoon was alerted to go to the assistance of F/2/7 seven miles to the WNW at Toktong Pass.

No hot chow was available so they had C-rations for breakfast before going on patrol. The 3rd Platoon was told that Headquarters Section would dig their foxholes. John Corzan heard Lt. Endsley say that some 7th Marines were trapped and they were going to get them out. John Corzan recalls that at 0700 H/3/1's 3rd Platoon, reinforced by two tanks, started on a motorized patrol to open the road to F/2/7, seven miles to the north. There was a tank in front and a tank in the rear but John doesn't remember there being a third tank. The slow-moving tanks dictated the speed of the convoy. They passed an Army unit with their jeering remarks but the patrol never got out of Hagaru. Keith Davis also recalls mustering in front of the Company CP and prepare to go on patrol on the road toward Toktong Pass and Yudam-ni. At 0830 the mission was cancelled. Keith learned (scuttlebutt) that another platoon took over the mission and was badly shot up. PFC Prescott Howland write home that, "Detachments were sent out to give them (5th & 7th Marines) a hand."

The other platoon that Keith heard about was part of W/2/7 that was still at Hagaru. They attempted to join up with F/2/7 near Toktong Pass, about five miles north of Hagaru, but at 0945 they were in contact with the enemy at coordinates TA 4872I. At 1315 they were ordered to withdraw, which they did with fire assistance from 3/1. The company extricated itself and by 1522 all elements were back within Hagaru's perimeter. Even heavily reinforced, they couldn't make it to Toktong Pass because of the heavy Chinese resistance. F/2/7 had set up defensive positions at the top of the pass. They didn't know it but this was where they were to make their heroic stand for the about ten days.

At 0900 a I/3/1 sent a reinforced platoon patrol to the south west road in the direction of Hongmun-ni. At 1020 this patrol locate about 150 enemy troops a coordinates TA4970 ABC, called for artillery, and dispersed the group. At 1140 the patrol again made contact at coordinates TA 4869 I. After a fire fight, the enemy withdrew and the patrol was recalled at 1215.

Also at 0900 the H/3/1 patrol (the 3rd Platoon reinforced) that originally started north was sent south on the road to Koto-ri. They were to assist the force that was to leave Koto-ri for Hagaru.

At 1058 Division ordered Col. Puller to push a force up the MSR from Koto-ri to make contact with the 3rd Platoon's tank patrol that was coming down from Hagaru. The force left Koto-ri at 1330 and had little success. After getting only about a mile north of Koto-ri's perimeter, they were forced to turn back because of the approaching darkness and stiff enemy resistance.

H/3/1's reinforced 3rd Platoon patrol was having no better luck. At 1245, just two miles (Howland wrote a quarter of a mile) from Hagaru, the 3rd Platoon patrol was forced to climb down from their vehicles and engage in a hot firefight with the enemy who were firing from houses on a hill on the left side of the road. Sgt Harold Cuttler, the 3rd squad leader of the 3rd Platoon recalls seeing a jeep on the road that may have been damaged by a mine. PFC Corzan recalls putting his machinegun in action and firing as many as ten belts of ammunition. PFC Prescott Howland also wrote in his letter that he had six mortar ammo bearers with him and the ammo didn't last that long. He said it was Hell. They had contacted an enemy of unknown strength at coordinates TA 5368B. They reported several road blocks and estimated the enemy force to be 50. An OY pilot dropped a message warning that 250 Chinese were moving up on the flanks of the patrol and preparing to attack. At 1530 the patrol was ordered to disengage and return to Hagaru. Five Marines were wounded in the
short fight but they also took their share of CCF (about 50). Cpl Louis Charles Maid was the only fatal casualty during the engagement. Ssgt. Malone, the 3rd Platoon Sgt., was shot in the hands. Notwithstanding these wounds, he was instrumental in helping Lt. Endsley to withdraw the patrol. Trucks made u-turns and riflemen loaded up. Pfc Corzan stayed with his machinegun crew and boarded the last truck. He recalls seeing one Marine behind him who had still not boarded a truck. He attempted to climb upon one of the tanks that was bringing up the rear but fell. The tank drove right over him. After passing over the Marine, the tank stopped to pick him up. John doesn't know who the Marine was but apparently he wasn't hurt. The Marines managed to disengage with the aid of mortar and artillery fires from Hagaru and returned to the perimeter at 1600.

Keith Davis generally remembers the same thing but differs in the particulars as follows:

Keith remembers being told that the Chinese had several road blocks between Hagaru and Koto-ri. The nearest one was not far away and was manned by what was thought to be about ten Chinese. Keith recalls that the 3rd Platoon mustered in front of the Company CP. Three Marine tanks, a machine gun section, and some of the mortar section joined them. Keith remembers wondering why it would take a reinforced Platoon to go after just ten Chinese. Did somebody know something more than Keith? They loaded up in 6-bys and went on their way.

They were only on the road about 15 minutes when the convoy stopped and they dismounted. The Marines proceeded on foot disbursed in single file on each side of the road. After proceeding a short distance, perhaps a hundred yards, an observation plane came in low. At first Keith thought it was one of those hot-rod pilots showing off. They continued to advance down the road and the pilot was tipping his wings on his next flyby. With no danger apparent, they continued down the road. The pilot was so desperate that he wrote a message, put it in his boon-docker, and threw it out on his next pass. The warning got through and the pilot flew off with his cold foot. Keith recalls that they returned to the Company about an hour before dark. Several other Marines remembered this pilot giving his warning.

Cpl Vollo received the Silver Star citation for his action on this day. The first part of the citation is apparently for his action during this patrol and the latter part of the citation is for his action on this night. His citation reads as follows;

"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity while serving as a 60-mm, Squad Leader in Company H, Third Battalion First Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea on 28 November 1950. When the rifle Platoon to which he was attached was pinned down by enemy small arms, machine-gun and mortar fire while crossing an open, flat area in an attack against a well-entrenched enemy force holding the high ground near Hagaru-ri, Corporal Vollo voluntarily exposed himself to the heavy hostile fire to direct and control effective mortar fire on enemy positions, whereby greatly aiding the platoon advancing across the open terrain. Observing that the platoon corpsman was injured, he made numerous trips across the fires-wept area and carried wounded Marines back to the injured corpsman for medical attention. During a nighttime penetration of some of his company's positions by hostile elements, he directed and controlled accurate and effective fire upon enemy until his supply of ammunition was exhausted. Ignoring the precariousness of his position, he immediately manned a machine gun and, from an unprotected area, inflicted casualties on the enemy until fatally wounded. By his outstanding courage, daring initiative and steadfast devotion to duty, Corporal Vollo contributed materially to the success of his platoon's mission, thereby upholding the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country."

The Battalion reported that there was one KIA and five WIA during this patrol. There were nine H/3/1 Marines who were listed as WIA and evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital this day. Most were probably WIA during the above action. Their names are:

Cpl Homer W. Brantley
PFC Clifford P. Carter
Cpl John P. Laybourn
PFC Richard T. Oksanen

PFC Eugene F. Breen
Cpl Gene R. Cook
Ssgt Thomas J. Malone
HM3 Ronald C. Coppins
HN Billy J. Marks

H/3/1 continued to improve their positions. Capt. Corley again requested picks, long handled shovels, and metal stakes but got none. The CP group attempted to improve the 3rd Platoon's positions but about all that was accomplished was to build the foxholes up, with large rocks rather than dig down. The 1st and 2nd Platoons and the Mortar Section made considerable progress and their defensive positions were good. The enemy apparently observed this weakness because it was the 3rd Platoon's sector where they would hit later this night.

A CCF soldier was scouting the lines in front of the 2nd Platoon when PFC Dick Wolfcale shot him. Jack Dedrick often wonders what would have changed if that guy had gotten back to report his findings. The CCF might have attacked in the 2nd Platoon's area if they thought the defense there was also weak.

About 1500 operational control for the defense of Hagaru passed to 3/1. At sunset Col. Ridge's coordination of the defense of Hagaru resulted in the following organizations being responsible for the indicated sectors of the four-mile perimeter.

W/2/7 the north road to Yudam-ni
H&S/3/1 west of W/2/7. 2-3 hundred yard of flat, open field that crossed the northern end of the airstrip
I/3/1 extended the line several hundred yards westward along the forward slopes of the Nose of a hill to an old monastery (that was used a the company CP) where the line turned south, crossing over the nose and covering the road to the southwest. One platoon of I/3/1 was to the left (east) of this road
H/3/1 tied in with I/3/1 and occupied a line which ran almost due east-west for about 800 yards. This line crossed virtually flat terrain and passed the southern tip of the airstrip.
D/2/11 This artillery battery was on H/3/1's left flank along
D/1st Eng Bn was on D/2/11's left flank and ran along the west bank of a river.
W/3/1 covered the south road block to Koto-ri

The Hill mass just east of Hagaru, East Hill, had until this time been outposted by elements of the 7th Marines' Anti-tank Company and the 1st Regulating Detachment. It had been intended to occupy this hill with G/3/1 whose arrival had been delayed at Koto-ri. With the disintegration of Task Force Faith to the northeast and the growing indications of an enemy attack, it became increasingly necessary to occupy the hill in strength.

At about 1700 three otherwise uncommitted units became available to the defense. One was a detachment of about platoon strength of the 4th Signal Battalion (Army), X Corps. This was augmented by W/3/1 personnel and used to occupy the nose extending from the South road block to the East Hill proper. The other units were D/10th Engineers And elements of X Corps, and was assigned the defense of the Hill itself. As both of these units were service troops and as each unit had a high percentage of ROKs, their combat potential was dubious. Each unit was assigned a Marine Officer and radio operator to assist in their tactical employment.

1st Svc Bn reinforced by the 7th Marines AT Company was to the left of D/10th Engineers. Their line extended from the north nose of East Hill across the road (leading north to Sinhung-ni) down to the river
H/3/11 was on the left of 1st Service Battalion
Reg. Det. 1st Service Battalion
1st Mtr Tr BN 1st Motor Transport Battalion was on H/3/11's left flank
TARCON-2 (or MATACS-2) a detachment of TARCON two was on 1st Motor's left flank
Div. HQ BN The Division H&S Battalion had are covered the area between TARCON-2 and W/2/7 mentioned above

The Marines at Hagaru knew the Chinese would attack, the only question was when and where. CIC had answered the question by reporting that the Chinese were planning to attack the southern perimeter and would probably hit about 2100 with full force. H/3/1 was also told 100 horsemen and 1,000 Chinese infantry would attack them.

At approximately 1500 a Battalion conference was held at the 3/1 CP. The most important information received was from the S-2 Officer, Lt. Carey, who stated what was
reported by CIC, that 3/1 could expect a coordinated enemy attack at 2100. Furthermore, from all indications, other units of the 1st Marine Division were also being attacked.

Capt. Corley returned to H/3/1 and called the Platoon Leaders, Artillery FO, and 1st Sgt. Cabe for a conference. They discussed the forthcoming attack. Thereafter, they left to insure there was sufficient ammunition. They spent the rest of the day working on positions. By this time the 60mm, 81mm, and artillery units had been given H/3/1’s coordinates and plotted their positions to provide defensive fires.

H/3/1 and I/3/1, after tasting the Chinese fire during the earlier patrols, needed no motivation to spend this day improving defensive positions. Wiremen laid communications wire to connect the platoons and other elements with the CP. However, the lines were laid in a "T" rather than a circular loop that would have yielded parallel lines of communications. This loop method was a little elaborate and not the usual method of connecting company elements in those days. As it turned out, the first Chinese incoming artillery/mortars cut the lines. If they had been laid in a loop, there would have been a parallel path of communications that may have functioned longer. Runners became the only means of communications with the platoons.

Their fronts bristled with concertina and other wire (without metal stakes to hold the wire up), trip flares, booby traps, and five-gallon cans of gasoline rigged with thermite grenades for illumination. The ground in front had been mined and tanks from a provisional platoon were stationed on the flanks of H/3/1 and I/3/1.

Radio nets connected H/3/1 with Battalion. The Battalion net was sporadic and finally died during the night. The Artillery FO had a radio that could be used to contact Battalion in an emergency. However, this radio functioned with limited success. Status reports and requests for reinforcements had to be sent to Battalion by runners. H/3/1’s XO, Lt. Johnson, was used as a runner between the Company and Battalion at least two times during the night to relay messages and coordinate maneuvers.

G/3/1 arrived at Koto-ri during the evening, but were halted there because of the blocked MSR to the north. The British 41st Commandos: Company B, 31st Infantry; and other various units that arrived about the same time joined them.

PFC Edward J. Guter was dropped from the Company.

H/3/1 was set up with 2nd Lt. Wendell Endsley's 3rd Platoon in the middle, 1st Lt. Roscoe L. Barrett's 1st Platoon on the right, and Lt. Ronald Mason's 2nd Platoon on the left. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Squads of 1st Lt. Harrison "Red" F. Betts' Machine Gun Platoon were attached to the attached to the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd rifle platoons respectively. W/3/1 personnel (heavy machine guns and AT personnel were also attached to the Company. Troops test-fired automatic weapons periodically to insure their weapons functional in the sub zero cold weather. They continued to improved their fighting holes until just before dark when they were fed in shifts by another mobile kitchen H/3/1 had acquired. H/3/1 then went on a fifty percent alert (one in two was awake and on watch). Men were scheduled for rotation through the warming tents were they could get warm coffee and a cigarette. Men were told to remain fully clothed in anticipation of an attack. Phone checks were made every fifteen to thirty minutes to insure alertness. Watches were rotated at the CP. It snowed off and on all day and the ground was white. The barbwire (with no stakes) was covered with snow as were the trip flares. The eerie silence of the night prevailed. At 2130, the expected time of attack, 3/1 went on one hundred percent alert.

1st Lt. Barrett Jr. who had taken command of the 1st Platoon only three weeks earlier was in a small tent just behind the line. He had planned his CP's defensive position, a small depression about twenty yards farther back. He had slipped his .45 in his parka pocket and lay down to get a few minutes of rest. Snow had covered everything and it was still falling heavy enough to further reduce visibility.

Just prior to darkness Capt. Corley walked his lines. The 2nd Platoon was on the Company left, the 3rd Platoon was in the center, and the 1st Platoon was on the right. The third squad may have been the left squad of the 3rd Platoon. The men's reaction to the reports of being attacked by 100 cavalrymen and 1000 Chinese infantry were varied. There were jokes about the horsemen; there was fear; there was indifference; and there was even excitement. One Marine, perhaps PFC Keith (or Sidney) Davis, was supposed to be an ex-jockey that talked rough and acted the same. He couldn't wait for the horses to come.
Capt. Corley recalls that he had 2 BARs, a M-1, and a stack of hand grenades. Later, when they got on the ship, he gave Capt. Corley a hand full of teeth that weren't his. Probably this man was one of the best-liked men in the Company, always jovial and friendly.

Capt. Corley had recently completed discussing the 3rd Platoon's patrol activity for the day with Lt. Endsley (who had previously given his patrol report the Battalion S-3). Without any warning whatsoever, an incoming white phosphorus mortar exploded and the air became filled with incoming enemy fire. At first Capt. Corley thought it was "ours". Then a few minutes later small arms fire was heard.

Keith Davis remembers that initial white phosphorus mortar landed in, or near, a foxhole about 25 yards from him. He saw a Marine stand up and then drop, apparently dead.

The Chinese had approached within hand grenade range (about 30 yards) under the cover of scorching white phosphorus mortars/artillery without even being noticed. They didn't have white uniforms and one would think they would have been seen. The Chinese attacked the center of H/3/1, in the area of the 3rd Platoon and the left flank of the 1st Platoon.

It was about 2230 when three blasts of a CCF whistle signaled the beginning of the attack. Soon trip flares and exploding booby traps revealed the approach of probing patrols composed of five to ten men. H/3/1 reported the probing attacks to 3/1. The main CCF attack followed shortly afterwards. Both H/3/1 and I/3/1 were being hit by assault waves closing in to grenade-throwing distance. All of a sudden the Chinese were there, right in front of them. The Chinese were yelling and with bugles, whistles, and grenades, they came in mass. In general, confusion reigned supreme.

PFC Grady Stancel and PFC Commodor McNeil were together near the left flank of the first Platoon when Commodor was the first in the area to see the Chinese coming. Grady still remembers the keen sense of sight that Commodore had. A short time later, while standing only six feet from Grady, McNeil received severe shrapnel wounds in his back and shoulders from a mortar round. PFC Bernard T. Turner was also in the area at the time. Grady and another Marine carried him back. His wounds were severe enough that he would be evacuated and eventually dropped from the Company on Dec. 7th, never to return to the Company.

It was also about 2230 when Lt. Endsley called for pre-arranged artillery and mortar concentrations. He continued to direct the mortar and artillery fire and moved from position to position deploying his troops in the face of enemy mortar, machine gun, and small arms fire until his death. Snelling's mortars replied. Lt. Endsley apparently died immediately after this request. Capt. Corley then called 1st Platoon, Lt. Barrett, to see if they were being hit too. Barrett replied that his left flank was being hit but everything was under control. Lt. Mason called to report his 2nd Platoon was not being attacked. At this time the Company wire net went out and, except for runners, Capt. Corley was unable to contact the platoons. Both of H/3/1's wiremen died in their efforts to repair the lines. The wire net to Battalion was also out so Capt. Corley reported the status to Battalion VIA radio on runner.

Lt Endsley received the Silver Star medal for his actions on this night. His citation reads:

"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity as a platoon Leader in Company H. Third Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea on 28-29 November 1950. When his company was attacked by a strong hostile force in the vicinity of Hagaru-ri, Second Lieutenant Endsley repeatedly exposed himself to heavy enemy small-arms, machine-gun and mortar fire to direct the fire of his platoon. Faced with a numerically superior hostile force which was penetrating the right flank of his platoon's position, he immediately requested and received supporting mortar fire which appreciably retarded the enemy's infiltration. Fatally wounded while moving from position to position to redeploy his platoon and to adjust close-range mortar fire on the enemy, Second Lieutenant Endsley by his courageous actions, inspired others of his group to heroic endeavor toward repulsing the hostile attack. His outstanding leadership, fortitude and initiative were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

As stated earlier, Cpl Vollo received the Silver Star Medal for his actions on this day. The first part of the citation is apparently applicable to his actions during the
morning patrol and the latter part of the citation is applicable this night action. His citation reads as follows:

"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity while serving as a 60-mm, Squad Leader in Company H, Third Battalion First Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea on 28 November 1950. When the rifle Platoon to which he was attached was pinned down by enemy small arms, machine-gun and mortar fire while crossing an open, flat area in an attack against a well-entrenched enemy force holding the high ground near Hagaru-ri, Corporal Vollo voluntarily exposed himself to the heavy hostile fire to direct and control effective mortar fire on enemy positions, whereby greatly aiding the platoon advancing across the open terrain. Observing that the platoon corpsman was injured, he made numerous trips across the fires-wept area and carried wounded Marines back to the injured corpsman for medical attention. During a nighttime penetration of some of his company's positions by hostile elements, he directed and controlled accurate and effective fire upon enemy until his supply of ammunition was exhausted. Ignoring the precariousness of his position, he immediately manned a machine gun and, from an unprotected area, inflicted casualties on the enemy until fatally wounded. By his outstanding courage, daring initiative and steadfast devotion to duty, Corporal Vollo contributed materially to the success of his platoon's mission, thereby upholding the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country."

William "Bill" Bodaford remembers this night. He was with his partner, PFC Theodore VanArsdale, on point when they came. He recalls the heavy snow made it difficult to see. He couldn't tell if they were friend or foe until their Chinese chatter gave them away. That's when Bill and Theodore threw their grenades and called for mortar and machinegun fire. During the fight Bill was wounded by mortar fire in both legs and the head. His M1 was in pieces and he was unable to stand so he just played dead for two hours. He then pulled himself near a tent and lay flat on his back in a crop row. VanArsdale was with him for a while until he went for help. Bill remembers that VanArsdale went toward a mound and called for help. After about two more hours, Bill pulled himself to the mound with his elbows. He remembers seeing three bodies, one of which was still alive. In his dazed condition he tried to cover him to keep him warm and tell him to hold on until daylight. The next sound Bill heard was a Marine voice. The Marine was looking for WIA's. They were out of stretchers so they put Bill on a blanket to evacuate him. As he went by the person, whom he had tried to cover, he saw it wasn't VanArsdale. It was a Chinese soldier! Later he saw VanArsdale with a can of pineapple in his hand. He shared it with Bill. Theodore had found refuge in a machinegun bunker and couldn't get back to Bill. Bill was evacuated to Japan.

The Chinese were attacking along the entire south and southeastern front of Hagaru. They hit hardest against H/3/1's 3rd Platoon and the left front (3rd squad) of the 1st Platoon. The mines and barbed wire in front of the foxholes slowed but didn't stop the enemy. When the Chinese manpower ran short, they threw fresh troops into the fight. The resolute enemy had penetrated the right side of the 3rd Platoon by 2315. Soon thereafter, a second attack came through the left part of the 1st Platoon and wiped out two foxholes there. Lt. Barrett had a non-disabling minor wound, some WP in the neck. An author, probably Martin Russ, interviewed Lt Roscoe Barrett who gave an account of part of the action in which he was involved at Hagaru. Lt Battett told Russ how he engaged an enemy soldier who had "...paused to throw a grenade into a tent. He was carrying a Thompson submachine gun. I froze up as he turned and started to walk toward me. When he was about 15 feet away I got my wits about me and fired my carbine at him on full automatic, but it jammed after one round. I had fired at exactly the moment he fired at me, and fortunately he was a lousy shot. He bent over, either from pain or to clear his weapon, I couldn't tell which. I walked over and put a bullet through his head with my .45."

PFC Charles Monroe, also in the 1st Platoon, was blown from his hole by a hostile grenade and briefly knocked unconscious by the shock. Charles quickly recovered and repeatedly refused evacuation and medical attention. He retrieved his BAR, delivered accurate and effective fire from an exposed position even though his squad was pinned down by heavy enemy opposition. Dazed and bleeding he continued to pour fire into the enemy
ranks until he lost consciousness. He personally accounted for eleven of the enemy KIAs. His heroic actions is credited for stopping the enemy's penetration in his sector and inspiring the other members of his squad. Charles received the Navy Cross for his actions on this night.

Not only was the 3rd Platoon Leader, Lt. Endsley, dead but there were many other casualties. Calls for Corpsmen were heard many times from all directions. Capt. Corley scrambled his headquarters group and moved to their combat CP area (the mound over a Korean gravesite) behind their CP tent.

It was apparent from the first artillery shelling that the enemy was aware of the positions held by Lt. Edward Snelling's Mortar Section. Despite the savage fire pouring into his unit, Lt. Snelling continued to direct the fire of his mortar weapons in support of H/3/1's hard pressed riflemen until the Command Post personnel could organize an effective defense. Observing that his mortar section was drawing accurate enemy mortar and artillery fire, Lt. Snelling, Assisted by Sgt. Nicholas Federspiel, moved his mortar to their alternate position and continued to fire. By doing this he saved the mortar sections from continued intense, accurate enemy mortar fire. During the night they fired all of their ammunition, over twelve hundred 60mm mortars. They had previously experienced difficulty with the 60mm illumination due to the extreme cold and this night was no exception. The 81mm mortar's illumination was working well but everyone wanted it, therefore, H/3/1 didn't received as much as they needed. Although repeatedly exposed to hostile fire, he crossed and re-crossed two open fields to aid the Company Commander, Capt. Corley, in placing reinforcements.

PFC Prescott Howland wrote home his recollections of the action in a letter he sent home. The letter was published in the Rockland, MA newspaper on Dec. 29th. He said, "Almost before we were able to man out guns, we were told the enemy had overrun and broken through the front lines. Heaven know they didn’t have to tell us, for we knew it wasn’t Uncle Sammy throwing those grenades at us. You’ve got to be pretty close to throw hand grenades. Nobody had showered us with mortar fire since Seoul, but we were getting back, three to one, and we were really throwing them out. When we could get no more mortar ammo we formed a defense line behind the company command post. We didn’t have to wait long for them to get there, but the time they did, we were ready for them. Company Headquarters and a mortar section. That is all we thought there was left. In the bravery of a few and the blood of many, we held out until the morning of the 29th, when we retook our positions in true “John Wayne” style, recklessly charging to help our wounded buddies on the front lines. Our death rate was high but the Chinese commies fared a lot worse than us. The ground was littered with their dead."

The enemy was staggered by the full power of Marine infantry and supporting arms. Although snowflakes had reduced the already low visibility, fields of fire had been carefully charted and artillery and mortar concentrations skillfully registered. Still, the Chinese kept coming in spite of their heavy losses.

During the night, H/3/1's radio was operating only sporadically. The same was true of the 81mm and artillery FO's radios. There was a period of about an hour and a half when all communication to Battalion and D/2/11 was lost. Runners were used during this period.

Cpl Jack Dedrick's machinegun was set up near the right side of the 2nd Platoon's front. There was a dike, like Koreans erect between rice paddies, separating the 2nd platoon from the 3rd Platoon. When Jack realized what was happening he got out of his hole and went to the dike. Fire and periodic flares lit everything. He told his machinegun crew to set up their machinegun on the dike to cover the 2nd Platoon's right flank. He didn't fire because he had no good target and he would have been firing through any would-be surviving 3rd Platoon Marines and into the 1st Platoon. He left to tell the platoon leader, Lt. Mason, what he had done. A Marine that was crouched down behind the dike about 20-30 yards away hollered at Jack and asked where he was going. The Marine didn't have a weapon and started wandering around. He said he had lost his glasses and didn't know where he was. Jack walked him to a tent where some guys were sick, opened the flap, and said, "Make room for one more". Jack found Lt. Mason, the 2nd Platoon Sgt., SSgt Harold "Gus" Geissinger, and another guy who was with them. Both Gus and the other guy were awaiting transfer out of the combat zone because they had been wounded twice with over 24 hours
hospitalization. Jack told Lt. Mason what he had done and Lt. Mason concurred. He told Jack to, "Stop wandering around and get back to his position".

PFC Kenneth Vankurin was in W/3/1's heavy machineguns and attached to H/3/1. He wrote Jack Dedrick after the cease fire and said that he was one of those who had been overrun this night. He said he played dead when a Chinese soldier rolled him over. He told Jack that he promised God that if he would spare his life that night, he would serve him. Jack has lost contact with Kenneth but believes he is a Missionary in the South Pacific. Since the above writing, Kenneth has joined the H/3/1 reunion group and he fulfilled his promise to God. He had been a missionary traveling to foreign countries for much of his life.

The 1st and 3rd platoon held their positions except for the last few defensive positions on the 1st Platoon's left flank. Many were dead in the 3rd Platoon area, many more were wounded, and others were buttoned up waiting for targets to appear. Keith Davis and some others from the 3rd Platoon had withdrawn to a frozen creek bed about 100 yards to the rear of his original position. The sound of rifle fire was becoming less and less. Firing from the 1st Platoon's sector also died down. The 2nd Platoon had few visible targets and fired little for fear of firing on friendly troops. Finally, only sporadic firing was heard throughout H/3/1.

Before the battle started, PFC Robert Derby had told John Corzan that he would take the first watch. Corzan was in the warming tent, about 100 feet behind the lines, when the Chinese hit. Someone woke John up and said, "Their coming".

Corzan put on his shoes and Parka and ran out of the tent and passed others with funny looking uniforms, running in the other direction. They were Chinese! PFC James Daniel Puckett came out of the warming tent right behind Corzan. A Chinese soldier fired and hit Puckett. Corzan went back to him but it was too late, James was dead. Corzan covered up Puckett and jumped into a hole with Sgt. Gerald Parker, SSgt. Andrew Peda, and Sgt Nicholas Federspiel. They were on the way back to the CP.

The 3rd Platoon's machineguns were quiet at this time. The Sergeants went in the direction of the CP and Corzan moved forward to his machinegun position that was in the center of the 3rd Platoon. There was supposed to be two machinegun ammo bearers to the right and two on the left of his machinegun. The two on the right weren't there. Farther to the right was Cpl. James Ernest Thrash's machinegun. They hadn't been on the patrol that morning so they had time to dig a hole for their gun. Although Corzan didn't know at this time, Thrash and his assistant gunner were dead, or dying of wounds.

Waves of Chinese were preceded by concentrations of heavy mortar fire on the center and right of H/3/1's position. The enemy attack on H/3/1's 3rd Platoon had penetrated as far back as the company CP by 0300. A scene of pandemonium ensued. The sounds of Chinese trumpets and whistles added to the confusion. It became difficult to tell friend from foe. "In the early part of the fight Tracers were so thick," recalled Sgt. Keith E. Davis, "They lit up the darkness like a Christmas tree."

Corzan's gun was in the open. Time had not permitted them to dig a hole. His gunner, PFC Robert Karl Derby, was dead. PFC Allan McCabe, a heavy Machine Gunner that was attached to H/3/1 much of the time, recalls that Robert was hit in the face with automatic weapon fire to the extent that he was about unrecognizable. To the left, in the meager shelter of a lean-to, was PFC William J. Barrett, PFC Edward E. Blackburn, PFC Alfred B. Mattingly, and another Marine (name unknown) who had just joined H/3/1. Corzan set up his machinegun atop Derby. Corzan fired his gun as long as he could. It quit two or three times (carboned up and wouldn't feed) before it finally stopped. He had plenty of ammo, perhaps 30 boxes, but no machinegun.

There was a heavy MG positioned between the 2nd and 3rd Platoon that was firing down a draw in front of the 3rd Platoon. The draw was only about 50 feet in front of PFC William J. Barrett, PFC Edward E. Blackburn, PFC John Corzan, PFC Alfred B. Mattingly, and another Marine. Corzan had his .45 with 3 magazines (21 Rounds) but wasn't close enough to get a good target in the dark. Corzan thought they were all alone and surrounded.

While Corzan was putting his machinegun back together, he looked up to see a Chinese soldier coming at him. Corzan got to his knees and tried to fire a carbine but it failed to fire. John pulled out his .45 at the last moment and shot the Chinese in the shoulder.
The .45 round had hit with such a force that it spun the Chinese completely around before he dropped dead. John says the bullet had completely taken off his arm at the shoulder. John removed the grenade that was in the Chinese's hand. By this time, there were no Chinese to the front, they had over run his position and were now behind him.

H/3/1 was running low on ammo so they sent the jeep driver, Cpl Henry Black and PFC Ralph Fouts for ammo. The jeep was near the company CP tent where the Chinese were pillaging the stores. Black and Fouts got through the Chinese to get the jeep. They went to the central supply dump, got the ammo (probably mortars, 30 caliber ammo, and ???), and returned. In the darkness and confusion of battle, the driver of the vehicle overshot his mark and drove into enemy held territory. The driver had to abandoned the jeep under fire.

A little later, fearlessly traversing the snowy unprotected area, Lt. Snelling reached the jeep and trailer and drove it back to the mortar section. He again spotted accurate fire on the enemy until that ammunition was depleted. Lt Snelling received the Navy Cross for his actions on this night. Cpl Black and PFC Fouts both received the Silver Star Medal.

Back near the Company CP area the Machine Gun Platoon Leader, 1st Lt. Harrison Betts, and his platoon Sgt., TSgt. Barnes, had some men unloading ammunition from a jeep trailer when the Chinese struck. Capt. Corley told him to assemble as many men as he could, deploy them to the right of the CP, and move forward to try to contain the Chinese's advance. Capt. Corley and five enlisted men provided cover while Lt. Betts moved out from the CP area. Betts and a few others moved out from the CP, one at a time, to a native hut to the right front of the CP. They deployed in a line along the rear of the line of huts, but at this time the enemy had started another attack pointed toward the 1st Platoon's left flank and the 3rd Platoons right flank. Seeing that he was vastly outnumbered, Betts decided to wait and use his men as a last ditch defense. The Chinese completely surrounded the huts, portable galley, and rations tent and did not see Betts and his men. Betts' men remained in their position (behind or in the native hut) for the remainder of the night. Conflicting information has been reported about the number of casualties in Betts's group. One report says he had one minor casualty that didn't require attention and another said every one of his men was wounded. One thing that is known for sure is that PFC Ralph Dean Fouts was WIA this night and evacuated to the Hospital on Dec. 4th. Lt Betts was awarded the Navy Cross for his actions this night. The citation gives additional details this part of the night's action as follows:

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Harrison F. Betts (0-45714), First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps (Reserve), for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy of the United Nations while serving as a Machine Gun Platoon Commander in Company H, Third Battalion, First Marines, FIRST Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against enemy aggressor forces at Hagaru-ri, Korea, on 28 and 29 November, 1950. With the company command post suffering heavy casualties following attack and penetration by an enemy force of estimated regiment strength, First Lieutenant Betts daringly exposed himself to the intense fire to lead a hastily organized platoon of reinforcements through darkness and snow in an attempt to seal a gap in the line. Undaunted when white phosphorous bomb explosions exposed his unit to fierce and concentrated enemy fire, resulting in severe casualties among his men, he gallantly pushed forward with but eight surviving Marines, seven of whom were wounded, and reached an abandoned house. Completely ignoring his own safety, First Lieutenant Betts dragged the men into the building, administered first aid, and immediately took measures to protect them by moving about outside the house and killing any of the enemy who attempted to enter. Single-handedly, he kept vigil for over three hours and personally accounted for eleven enemy dead, including a machine-gunner and his assistant who were attempting to set up their gun and fire on his position. By his fortitude and superb tactical ability, he was directly responsible for saving the lives of the wounded men and denying the position to the enemy, thereby contributing materially to the ultimate success of his company. His valiant fighting spirit, inspiring leadership and selfless devotion to duty reflect the highest credit upon First Lieutenant Betts and the United States Naval Service.

Some of the 2nd platoon fired across the 3rd Platoon's position at the ensuing Chinese. Other units were also providing support fire. Tracers were flying in all
direction chasing the Chinese in front of, in, and behind H/3/1. Some Chinese even reached the unfinished airstrip where engineers were working under floodlights. They halted their construction machines and grabbed weapons to join in the fight. Some had to play dead to save themselves.

All that stood between the Chinese and the rear was Capt. Corley's CP. Lt. Barrett, observing the Company CP from his 1st Platoon's position, could see Chinese everywhere. H/3/1's Mortar Section's primary position was also in the area and had been overrun. Fortunately Lt. Snelling had moved his mortar crews to their alternate positions. Capt. Corley was holding the mound on which he had placed his CP. Lt. Harvey A. Goss, who had previously been the 3rd Platoon leader, was a member of the H/3/1 CP awaiting transfer with no particular duties. He was with the CP group.

The Chinese seemed to be everywhere in the H/3/1 area. "It is my personal opinion," commented Capt. Corley, "that if the enemy had decided to effect a major breakthrough at this time, they would have experienced practically no difficulty. However, they seemed content to wander in and around the 3rd Platoon, galley, and hut areas." The Chinese, in short, demonstrated that they knew better how to create a penetration than to exploit one. Once inside H/3/1's lines, they disintegrated into looting groups of purposeless tactical fragments.

Back in the 3rd Platoon's area, Corzan was trying desperately to find a weapon. He crawled around and found a BAR man and rifleman in a hole. They were crouched down because Corzan and other machinegunners from the 2nd platoon were firing over their heads at the Chinese. Corzan asked if they had any grenades. They gave him one.

Corzan crawled to the right in the direction of the other machinegun. Ten feet to the left of the gun position he could see three people standing. He asked if they were Marines. They didn't answer so Corzan lobbed his grenade overhead while lying on the ground. The grenade landed only 15 feet in front of Corzan, far short of its mark, and sprayed him with dirt. The grenade didn't hit the Chinese but it did manage to scare them away.

About this time, six Chinese tried to set up a machinegun behind the 1st Platoon to fire on them. Lt. Barrett fired at the nearest Chinese but his carbine only fired one round which wounded the Chinese soldier. The Chinese returned fire with his weapons but it was ineffective. Then Lt. Barrett shot him with his .45. A grenade finished him and two other Chinese that had joined in the fight. A grenade hit Barrett in the head but he was able to flip it over a small dike with his right hand before it exploded. Barrett was hit in the arm by a piece of shrapnel that didn't cause too much damage. By this time, PFC Edward T. Nelson had seen the action and had turned his machinegun around to kill the remaining Chinese.

Some of the firing from Nelson's machinegun went in the direction of H/3/1's CP. They responded with a .50 caliber machinegun thinking the 1st platoon CP had been overrun and that they were firing at Chinese.

It was just before midnight when the enemy effected their penetration in the right side of the 3rd Platoon's and the extreme left side of the 1st Platoon's defensive zones. Lt. Johnson had been directing the evacuation of wounded. Capt. Corley sent him to Battalion to get reinforcements. Lt. Johnson went to Battalion and returned to report, "They are on their way". Lt. Johnson was awarded the Navy Cross for his actions this night. The reinforcements never arrived. Apparently they were approaching H/3/1 from behind 1/3/1 and got caught up in 1/3/1's fight.

After waiting a lengthy time, Lt. Johnson was sent to Battalion again for reinforcements. The Battalion CP advised Capt. Corley by radio that reinforcements were on the way. At the same time 3/1's CO, Lt. Col. Ridge, sent Lt. Mitchell and 50 Marines (X Corps signalmen and engineers), that had been hastily gathered to help with the emergency. Thomas Doherty, a radioman from 1st Signal Battalion, was one of these troops. The horror of this one night of combat would haunt him for the rest of his life. Everyone in the fight was a hero this night and it was heroes such as this that helped save the day for the Company. 1st Lt. Mitchell had served as H/3/1's 1st Platoon Leader and Executive Officer before being drafted a few days earlier as the Assistant Battalion Operations Officer. Lt. Barrett, H/3/1's 1st Platoon Leader, saw Lt. Mitchell's group coming through a hostile
area. Before he could give warning, a Chinese machinegun fired. Lt. Mitchell was killed instantly and the 1st Platoon's Sgt., Edward Hanrahan, was hit by the Machinegun fire in the chest, stomach and arm. Lt. Mitchell was awarded the Silver Star for his actions this night. They were near Lt. Barrett when this happened. Apparently Lt. Mitchell and the 1st Platoon Sgt., Sgt. Hanrahan, were in or near the same foxhole with PFC Robert L. Dunkin. Lt. Barrett helped Sgt. Hanrahan into a hole but it was not enough to save his life. He died soon after. Lt. Johnson met the Battalion reserve, as such it could be called, and guided them into the H/3/1 area. Lt. Johnson reported that Lt. Mitchell, who had been in charge of the reinforcements, had been killed along with Sgt. Hanrahan. The reinforcements were deployed in a shallow ditch and instructed not to fire and not to move until ordered. Col. Ridge, later would write in his Special Action Report that, "...These reserves were of dubious value; service troops should not, perhaps, be expected to be able to execute a night counterattack."

Lt Mitchell received the Silver Star Medal for his actions on this night. His citation reads as follows:

"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity as a Platoon Leader, while attached to Headquarters and Service Company, Third Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against enemy aggressor forces in the vicinity of Hagaru-ri, Korea, on the night of 28-29 November 1950. When an infantry company’s position was overrun by an enemy force estimated to be of regimental strength, First Lieutenant Mitchell lead a group of reinforcements on a mission to locate the company’s position and to assist in reestablishing its defense line. Subjected to heavy enemy small-arms, machine-gun and mortar fire in the complete darkness and with no means of contacting the rifle company, he left the reinforcements in covered position and proceeded alone to find the exact location of the company. Despite the extreme danger of his mission he discovered the rifle company’s position and revealed the location of the reinforcements before he was fatally wounded while returning to his group. By his courageous actions, he served to inspire all member of his unit and contributed materially to the successful reestablishment of the company’s original defense line. His outstanding leadership, fortitude and daring initiative reflect the highest credit upon First Lieutenant Mitchell and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country."

PFC Dunkin also was hit with a WP mortar shrapnel during the action. Apparently he was not wounded but had to remove his cloths because they were burning from the phosphorus.

PFC Raymond E. Dolan was among the reinforcements that arrived from H&S Company at Battalion. He received the Bronze Star with Combat "V" for his actions on this night. His award reads as follows:

"For heroic achievements while serving with Headquarters and Service Company, Third Battalion, First marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea on 28-29 November 1950. After volunteering to join a group of Marines whose mission was to reinforce a friendly platoon that had been overrun by the enemy. Corporal Dolan moved forward through heavy hostile small-arms, machine-gun and mortar fire to reach the advanced elements of the platoon. Immediately taken up the most dangerous post in the defense perimeter, he held his position with aggressive determination until he was fatally wounded by hostile fire. By his courageous actions, he contributed materially to the successful repulsion of the enemy attack. His outstanding fortitude, daring initiative and aggressive fighting spirit reflected the highest credit upon Corporal Dolan and were in keeping with the highest tradition of the United States Naval Service, He gallantly gave his life for his country."

The following were evacuated to 1st Marine Division Hospital on this date. Jack Dedrick reported that the unit diary entry 1163 shows they went to the hospital on this date but

Cpl Homer W. Brantley            PFC Eugene F. Breen
PFC Clifford P. Carter           Cpl Gene R. Cook
Cpl John Laybourn                Sgt Marcel A. Maloney
PFC Richard T. Oksanen           HM3 Ronald C. Coppins
HN Billy J. Marks
Sgt. Tucker who was in the 1st Platoon had somehow managed to get to the Company CP area. Capt. Corley formulated a counter attack plan. This was at risk to those who might have been able to button-up when overrun, but it had to be done. He called 1st Sgt. Cabe, and told him they were going to counter attack. MSgt Cabe wanted to wait until day light but Capt. Corley said it would be just as dark for the Chinese as it was for them. MSgt Cabe agreed. Capt. Corley first sent Lt. Johnson as a runner to the 2nd Platoon and told them to change their direction of fire. Lt. Johnson did this and returned. Capt. Corley told Sgt. Tucker to take some of the men and attack on the right and Lt. Johnson to take some of the men and attack on the left. He then told Lt. Snelling to go back and fire all the mortars he had and then bring all of his men up to join him in the middle.

Capt. Corley gave a spirited speech to the men. When he had his men "Charged up", at about 0430, he gave the word to proceed with the attack. The fired-up group shouted and hollered as they advancing forward, firing at the enemy. As Capt. Corley was passing through the CP area he fell. He thought he had slipped in the snow. Then he felt a wet substance on his arm and he knew he had been hit. At first he thought it was shrapnel but later, aboard ship, found out that it was a bullet. When the doctors removed the bullet about a month later, he quipped, "I hope its a Chinese bullet". It was. The attack took the confused Chinese by surprise and the fighting was brief. When they got about 100 yards from the enemy some Chinese fought and died but most ran. They advanced several hundred yards and regained their original position and pursued the enemy by fire. At approximately 0610 H/3/1 had their position back. Capt. Corley used the Artillery FO's radio to inform Battalion that they had counterattacked and regained their position.

Corzan remembers looking back toward the Company CP and seeing a wall of silhouettes coming toward him. They didn't fire at the silhouettes because they didn't know who they were. The Silhouettes turned out to be Lt. Horace Johnson and the reserve counterattacking force. One of the Marines shot at Corzan. Corzan called back and the fire stopped.

Lt. Goss had been with the CP group throughout the night. Capt. Corley doesn't remember seeing him after the counterattack began. Sgt Harold Cutler remembers that he was standing next to Lt. Goss behind a Korean house when he was KIA from a head wound. Cutler had been hit in the head with a concussion Grenade that blew his helmet off and knocked him unconscious for a short time. A short time after H/3/1 regained their position Capt. Corley and others were gathered around one of the huts. Someone said, "Lt. Goss has been killed." He was laying only 12 feet away from Capt. Corley, covered with snow. There were several dead Chinese lying around him.

PFC John Corzan said they counted 271 Chinese in front of, in, and behind Corzan's machinegun position in the morning.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 95 KIA, 3 DOW, 43 MIA, 539 WIA, and 259 non-battle casualties.

Dog Company, 1st Engineers was working on the airstrip behind 1/3 when the attack started. They organized a team of heavy equipment operators and effectively swept through their area to clear Chinese that had penetrated that far. They had some wounded but were successful. Thereafter, they continued construction on the needed airstrip.

During the night it was hard to tell friend from foe because, at times the Chinese were as thick as the Marines. Early in the morning, the hole in H/3/1's front had been plugged and the Chinese behind the line were eliminated. Lt. Barrett could see Lt. Johnson active in the purge. About this time Lt. Barrett was able to identify himself as friendly and got the machinegun near the Company CP to stop firing at his position. Fighting continued in front of H/3/1 throughout the night until dawn when the Chinese discontinued their attack. Fortunately, the men of H/3/1 used good fire discipline and only shot when they had a target because the men had very little ammunition and grenades left when the battle was over. When Lt. Barrett saw Capt. Corley and Lt. Johnson, they emotionally greeted each other with hugs. At 0650 H/3/1 reported their MLR was restored.

Cpl Dedrick remembers seeing Capt. Corley in the morning and telling him he had better get to sick bay with his wounded arm. He also remembers talking to Lt. Barrett.

PFC Allan McCabe was a W/3/1 heavy machine gunner who had been attached to H/3/1 on
several occasions. He was severely wounded in the leg/ankle area with a grenade during this fighting. Being unable to move around, his legs and feet became frozen before they could evacuate him. He was evacuated from Hagaru and eventually to USA.

While H/3/1's position was secure, the same could not be said about the East Hill area. East Hill had been attacked at 0200 and a platoon from Service Battalion was overrun. At 0325 the Marine Officer with D, 10th Engineers reported a gap to his left from TA 5271M to 5271B. The gap could not be closed and H/3/1 was ordered to close the gap with direct fire. At 0400 the Marine with Company D tried to curve his unit to the left to cover the flank. Soon thereafter he died and the situation in that sector disintegrated badly with virtually the entire company removing itself from the hill. At 0530 the situation was critical. A reinforced group of service troops was formed under the Battalion Executive Officer to restore the position. After fighting all day, they couldn't entirely close the gap so at 1700 they were told to dig in on the reverse slope.

After things calmed down in the morning, Capt. Corley went to Sickbay to have them check his wounded arm. He was embarrassed because Sickbay was "loaded" with wounded. The doctor gave him a shot of morphine and tagged him. Capt. Corley stopped at Battalion and they were in a congratulatory mood. When the 3/1 CO suggested that Capt. Corley stay at Battalion, Capt. Corley declined thinking it was safer in his own company area. Then the morphine took over. Capt. Corley was "way out" for a couple hours. When he went back to his company area, H/3/1's Marines were happy to have him back.

When Lt. Barrett could take count, he had four KIAs and 15 WIAs, many of which were also suffering from the freezing weather. In front of 1st Platoon there were 104 dead Chinese and many drag marks where others had been dragged away. It has been said that H/3/1 had 15 KIA and 4 other KIA from attaching units. There were numerous Chinese dead in the Company CP area. Four of the dead Chinese had to be dragged from the entrance to the Company CP. The Company's tents and equipment were riddled with holes. The riddled water tank was still full of frozen water. After things settled down Lt. Barrett told Capt. Corley that "He was not a young as many of the others and he didn't think he could take this every night."

HQMC shows Cpl Andrew Vollo was awarded the Silver Star Medal for his actions (apparently on this date) however, they have no record of his citation.

The list of H/3/1's KIAs on the night of 28-29 Nov. includes:

- PFC James Elmer Beville
- PFC Robert Karl Derby
- Cpl Raymond Edmund Dolan (H&S/3/1 attached to H/3/1 when KIA)
- 2nd Lt. Wendall Charles Endsley (3rd Platoon Leader)
- Cpl Vance N. Frazier
- 2nd Lt. Harvey Goss (who had been the 3rd Platoon Leader until a few days before when Endsley took command)
- 1st Lt. Grady Purden Mitchell (H/3/1 officer until three weeks before when he became Assistant Battalion Operation Officer)
- PFC James Daniel Puckett
- Sgt William A. Schnader, Jr. from Baltimore, MD
- PFC Atlea Bryn Trainer in Mortars from Covington, VA
- Cpl Andrew Vollo from Jersey City, NJ in the 3rd Platoon.

The following Marines were apparently wounded on this date and died shortly thereafter.

- PFC Donald Ray Collier
- Sgt. Edward Hanrahan (1st Platoon) (UD 1163)
- PFC Fletcher Marion Hutchins (UD 1163)
- Cpl Louis Charles Maid (WIA during the daytime patrol) (UD 1163)
- Cpl James Thrash (MG) from Texas City, TX (UD 1163)
Following is a list of some of the WIAs on the night of Nov. 28-9 that were evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital on Nov 29th:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TSgt Roger W. Barnes</td>
<td>William &quot;Bill&quot; Bodaford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC Denver Henry Boling</td>
<td>James &quot;Jim&quot; C. L. Bowen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Ray Collier</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC Jimmie S. Collins</td>
<td>Capt. Clarence E. Corley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC James Kenneth Doran</td>
<td>PFC Ralph Dean Fouts</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFC John Frohlighter</td>
<td>PFC Vincent Gatto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC Donald E. Guard</td>
<td>PFC Manford F. Langley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James E. Gullage (DOW 12/5/50)</td>
<td>PFC Glenn E. Jones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HM3 John M. Mackay</td>
<td>Sgt Marcel A. Maloney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HM# Nelvin Gerald McNea</td>
<td>PFC Commodore McNeil</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFC Frederick &quot;Fred&quot; Merritt</td>
<td>PFC Claburn Minchew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC Charles H. Monroe Jr.</td>
<td>PFC Kenneth J. Odell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sgt Gerald C. Parker</td>
<td>PFC Joseph W. E. Pratte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC Andrew J. Scott</td>
<td>PFC Nethaniel M. Slone</td>
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<td>PFC Irvin R. Stephens</td>
<td>PFC John A. Watkinson</td>
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<td>PFC Charles L. Watson</td>
<td>HN Benjamin Weir Jr.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFC Bradley Williamson</td>
<td>Cpl Richard Wyscarver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC Denver H. Boling</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

PFC Denver H. Boling was WIA and returned to duty.

The following were sick and evacuated to the Div. Hospital:

- PFC Gus Marcotte
- PFC Alfred B. Mattingly
- PFC Theodore VanArsdale (apparently lost at least his finger to frost bite)

Capt. Corley says H/3/1 had 16 KIAs but only 15 are known and listed above. Perhaps the 16th Marine he is referring to is James Gullage who was WIA that night and died of wounds on Dec. 5, 1950. He also reported that H/3/1 also had 39 WIA this night. He said these numbers do not include attached units. They counted 219 Chinese KIA in and in front of H/3/1's position. There were an undetermined number of wounded Chinese, some of whom left blood trails in the snow in front of H/3/1's position.

The Chinese had found and attacked in the weakest part of H/3/1's defense. The 3rd Platoon lost one day's preparation because they were on patrol. They had less time to dig in and, as a result, were least prepared. Many of their defenses were above ground while the other platoons were better dug in.

Interestingly enough, on this morning Battalion showed up with a truckload of picks and shovels. Funny how there were none available to fill Corley's requests of the previous two days when they were so critically needed.

If KIAs were the measure, this H/3/1 battle was the hardest fight during their stay in Korea. They had 15-16 KIA's during this battle.

Corzan took his machinegun to the armory. Souvenirs were plentiful for those looking. Chinese bodies were searched for military documents and then stacked in the H/3/1 area. It was an awesome sight to see hundreds of bodies in a pile.

A tank and another .50 caliber machinegun were sent to help bolster the defense in the H/3/1 area. A platoon of the British Marines was also sent to fill the empty foxholes. Capt. Corley recalls they were well trained and disciplined. Their officer was extremely courteous and firm with his men. H/3/1 received replacements from engineers to fill in their depleted ranks.

East Hill had also been heavily attacked during the night. Corsairs began bombing East Hill on the northeastern perimeter of Hagaru about 0930. One plane was hit by ground fire during the action. The plane was trailing smoke, out of control, and had to ditch. The pilot made a pancake landing in the nearest available flat area and slid out of control to a stop in front of H/3/1's lines. The pilot disengaged his restraining harness, slid open his plexiglas canopy, and scrambled to the ground. He sprinted to safety as the Marines of H/3/1 cheered. The aircraft was later destroyed by friendly fire that set the aircraft ablaze.

The situation at Hagaru was critical with so few men available to defend the base. The CO of the 1st Marines, Col. Puller who was at Koto-ri, was ordered to send as many available men as could be spared to open the eleven miles of MSR between Koto-ri and
H/3/1 MARINES

IN KOREA

Hagaru, or at least get through to reinforce Hagaru. Lt. Col. Drysdale of the 41st British Commandos was put in charge of what was known as Task Force Drysdale. The task force consisted of the British Commandos, G/3/1, Co. B, 31st Infantry, and various other units. Parts of Co. B and D, 1st Tank BN arrived late at Koto-ri but soon enough to join the column.

Task Force Drysdale with about 922 men, 29 tanks, and 141 vehicles moved north from Koto-ri. They had to fight for every mile. About half way through they realized their losses were great and requested permission to return to Koto-ri. Division told them to continue at all costs because of the manpower needed to defend Hagaru. Also, it might have been just as easy to continue since they were already half way and were having serious problems in the middle and rear of the column. The Chinese had attacked and captured many of those in the center of the column.

The first elements of Task Force Drysdale broke through to Hagaru about 1915. Of the approximately 922 men who started, about 300 infantry and a tank company of 100 men made it to Hagaru. About 300 made it back Koto-ri. The rest were KIA or captured. Records show that among those listed above there were 162 KIA or MIA and 159 WIA.

Even though G/3/1 sustained many casualties, they were immediately sent to East Hill where they were needed so badly. The arrival of G/3/1 and the 41st British Royal Commandos who made it through were helpful in stabilizing the defense of the perimeter of Hagaru. Some of these British Commandos spent this night in H/3/1's foxholes.

Throughout the day there were strong attack indications from the southwest. At 1330 an air strike hit Hongmun-ni and reported excellent results. This was followed by artillery and mortars. At 2225 enemy heavy mortars and artillery began falling in on Hagaru. White phosphorus fell in front of H/3/1 and I/3/1 and a green flare was seen, but the attack did not materialize, having apparently been aborted by the air, artillery and mortar countermeasures.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 60 KIA, 14 DOW, 42 MIA, 396 WIA, and 105 non-battle casualties.
About this day Capt. Corley saw Capt. Carl Sitter, G/3/1's CO. Capt. Corley said, "I heard your were dead." Capt. Sitter said, "I heard you were dead too." They congratulated each.

H/3/1 and I/3/1 had been able to make vast improvements in their defensive positions. Fifty-caliber machineguns had been emplaced, additional concertina wire spread, and trip flares and booby traps were set. Sandbagged foxholes and weapons pits gave maximum protection. Tanks were supporting them and 60 and 81 millimeter mortars had registered the entire area.

At 1700 the forward echelon of the 31st RCT arrived from the ill-fated Task Force Faith to the northeast. At 1830 the tank company from the same 31st RCT arrived.

I/3/1 heard three distant bugle calls to the west at 2015. This was followed at 2030 by a green flare and by 2330 small groups of Chinese were probing I/3/1's front. About 2230 a Chinese 76mm round came right through the flimsy walls of H/3/1's CP and exploded among the battalion's 81mm mortars to the rear. By 2335 this had grown into a general attack on I/3/1 on the western part of Hagaru's defense. At 2355 the enemy began probing the northeast portion of the perimeter and this in short order became an attack in force. H/3/1's line was also being hit with light infantry attacks about this time. Enemy WP and HE rounds continued to fall heavily. Our 105s couldn't silence the enemy guns, perhaps because they were too deep in defilade. The Battalion's 81mm mortars were called into the battle. They apparently did the job because the incoming rounds stopped. Chinese attacking the line also withdrew about the same time the incoming stopped. POW testimony revealed that there was a bigger attack planned but supporting fires broke the attacking force up before it could get organized.

Cpl Jack Dedrick remembers that about this date he became sick and went to sick bay. They gave him a shot in the arm and Jack returned to H/3/1. He was still sick but he would be okay.

About this date PFC Sid Escher was sharing a fox hole with PFC Fred Acquavita. Both were in the 3rd Squad, 3rd Platoon.

Sgt. David L. Davidson and Sgt Harold W. Cutler were sick and evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital.

PFC James W. Bailey was WIA on this date and evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital. While H/3/1 had it relatively easy this day, there was still a lot of Marines giving their lives to sustain the Division’s integrity. Without their sacrifices, many more would have been lost.

G/3/1 had spent the day trying to retake East Hill. They managed to get to the crest but were unable to completely push the Chinese off the hill. The retaking of part of East Hill helped to reduce fire from there on the Division’s camps.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 27 KIA, 6 DOW, 6 MIA, 183 WIA, and 102 non-battle casualties.
The Army's Task force Faith was disintegrating. Only about one third of the more than twenty five hundred men in this unit would eventually find their way back through enemy lines to the safety of Hagaru. This was the same Army unit that replaced the 5th Marines on the East Side of the Chosin Reservoir so they could join with the 7th Marines. They had sustained extreme casualties with about one third of the personnel in their units KIA, about one third MIA or POWs, and about one third of their personnel were able to straggle through enemy lines to get back to Hagaru.

After a lull the enemy attack against the northeast was resumed at 0110 in great force. The enemy reached the gap to G/3/1's left and this gap was taken under direct fire by H/3/11. Some Chinese reached the Service Battalion CP area and were engaged by the 7th Marine AT company tanks. By 0225 G/3/1's left Platoon was in serious trouble and "C" troops of the 41st Commando was dispatched to secure their flank. Mortar/artillery incoming was received during the night. Outgoing mortars and artillery kept the Chinese sufficiently off balance that they could not attack H/3/1. At 0330 the south road successfully repulsed an attack and the west and northeast sectors continued to be engaged. By 0500 enemy action was reduced to sporadic small arms fire and by 0800 G/3/1 had regained their MLR.

Bean fields at Hagaru were frozen to a depth of eighteen inches. The engineers had been scraping it level to build the runway that could be used to bring in supplies and take out wounded. The runway was finally developed enough to land C130 transport planes. The fourth plane in was overloaded with ammo and its landing gear collapsed on the rough, not-to-level runway. Severely wounded litter patients could now be evacuated.

Supplies arriving by transport and airdrop were the only supplies getting into Hagaru. The Cargo Command did a fantastic job of meeting the Division's needs. Most of the supplies had to arrive VIA parachute before the airstrip was finished.

It was probably on this day that Capt. Corley saw three of those stragglers approaching H/3/1 from their front near the mountains. He kept them under observation thinking they may be Chinese. As they came closer he noted they were wearing U.S. Army uniforms. Waving wildly they finally arrived and were told how to get through the lines of booby traps and mines. One was a Army Lt. who had been shot in the leg. They had been told to get to the rear as best they could when their unit disintegrated. They were sent to 3/1 for further disposition.

At about 1930 two hundred sixty Army survivors from Task Force Faith came through the lines. Others were also stragglng through the line. Most were the walking wounded, frostbite, and exposure cases whom the Chinese didn't want to bother with as POWs. They had been wondering through the woods toward Hagaru since the Chinese had essentially wiped out their unit east of the reservoir. There was no disgrace in their loss. They were only two reinforced battalions against a CCF Division and it is a wonder that any survived the onslaught. With only the clothing on their back, they had fought a loosing battle with the enemy and the cold. Most had frozen limbs and few had weapons.

The daylight hours were spent improving the defenses including AP mines and booby traps on all fronts. Enemy could be seen digging on all fronts in small numbers. All observed or reported targets were hit with air, artillery and mortars with good results. At 2100 two night heckler VF(N)s reported on station with reliefs continuing to be available throughout the night.

Cpl Thomas Leslie McGinnis died of wounds he received on Nov. 29, 1950.

HM3 Jeffery L. Cogborn and PFC Charles E. McCoy were two H/3/1 WIA's on this date and they were evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital.

Cpl Fred S. Ruge was sick and evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital this date.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 27 KIA, 14 DOW, 6 MIA, 111 WIA, and 134 non-battle casualties.
Dawn was a welcome site. Clear weather enabled the corsairs to show. Like magic, when air support was available, the Chinese would disappear. This wasn't true this morning. There was an abundance of targets for the corsairs. The corsairs were told that rather than take the targets of opportunity to get those Chinese who were closer to the perimeter. The whole perimeter of Hagaru had been hit hard in many places the previous night and in the early morning. There were many casualties but Hagaru was still secure. Long-range sniping by Chinese continued throughout the day but they were mostly ineffective because of the extreme range.

It was probably on this Sunday that the Chaplain called to invite H/3/1 to church services. Capt. Corley said, "Chaplain, I'd be delighted to attend services but we are on 100% alert. Why don't you come here?" The Chaplain said, "Good idea. I should have thought of that." He came and gave communion to those wanting it. Jack Dedrick recalls that he is one who received communion.

During the day W/3/1 manning the south road block exchanged positions with W/2/7 personnel occupying the north road block.

About this date the Army dropped food and supplies. Some missed the perimeter and landed in no man's land in front of H/3/1. A couple of hours later, a real fat Army Major came to the H/3/1 CP and ordered Capt. Corley to send H/3/1 Marines several hundred yard in front, and to the left, to pick up his parachutes and supplies. Capt. Corley refused saying they were his and he should get them himself. The Major put Capt. Corley on report. Battalion told Capt. Corley to "work it out with the Major". They compromised and sent some H/3/1 Marines and some Army personnel. No enemy action resulted. H/3/1 used the parachutes to line their foxholes and to keep warm. Not all of the material found its way into Army hands and H/3/1 wound up with plenty of rations as well as the parachutes.

The scuttlebut was that the 5th and 7th Marines were returning to Hagaru from Yudam-ni. Many thought they were coming back to help defend the Hagaru Base but, as the day wore on, they began to get a better understanding of the situation. They soon realized the 5th and 7th had also been hit very hard and, if they could fight their way back, would not be much help until they could recuperate from their ordeal. After seeing what had happened to Task Force Faith, Marines at Hagaru were on pins and needles wondering if the 5th and 7th would make it back to Hagaru.

The cold was taking its toll of H/3/1. So many were going to sick bay that the corpsmen and doctors were overwhelmed. H/3/1 did what they could for the sick and wounded in the company area.

Jack Dedrick reported that Cpl David L. Murphy, 506593/0300, was KIA on this date. David was from Santa Barbara, CA and is buried there. A record shows that David was in L/4/11 when he died. Perhaps he was transferred there before he died.

H/3/1's unit diary shows that William T. Williams was WIA this date and evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital.

SSgt Thomas J. Malone and HM Ronald C. Coppins who were WIA on Nov. 28, 1950 were evacuated to a Hospital in Japan.

PFC Kenneth J. Odell, PFC Bradley Williamson, PFC Joseph W. Pratte and HN William F. Webb, who were WIA and evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital on Nov. 29th, were evacuated to a hospital in Japan and dropped from the company.

Cpl Homer Brantley, who was WIA and evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital on Nov. 28th, was further evacuated to a hospital in Japan and dropped from the Company Rolls this date.

Cpl Fred S. Ruge, who was sick and evacuated to the hospital on Dec. 1st, was dropped from the Company.

Cpl Gene Cook, PFC James R. Samples, and PFC William F. Webb were dropped from the Company.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 55 KIA, 2 DOW, 33 MIA, 231 WIA, and 180 non-battle casualties.
SUNDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1950

Although the spirit of the troops was high, there was much apprehension about what the Chinese had in store for them in the coming nights. Although it was not apparent at the time, the worst was over. It was even too early for intelligence to evaluate the damage that had been done to the Chinese. They were having a very high combat casualty rate and the weather was responsible for more than half of their casualties.

The Chinese had thrown their best against the best and the Chinese had lost. Although the Marine loss was great, the Chinese losses were much greater. Before they started attacking on November 27th, they had traveled from Manchuria by night, taking cover during the day in caves and native huts to remain hidden from our observation aircraft. This is why our higher echelons were having a hard time believing the Chinese were out there in such high numbers. They couldn't believe that so many could hide from aerial reconnaissance. Now that they were attacking, the Marine guns were taking their toll. There was little cover near the action and the aircraft's napalm, rockets, guns, and bombs were having no trouble finding targets. Col. Chesty was right when he said, "We're surrounded. Good, now we have them where we can kill them."

The other enemy of the Marines, the cold, was also the enemy of the Chinese, but even worse of an enemy to them. The average Chinese soldier had left the Yalu with only a about four days of food rations and 80 rounds of ammunition. Some had nothing better than canvas tennis-type shoes with leather soles to cover their feet, and nothing better than the Marines had to cover the rest of their body. Their logistics was seriously hampered by the Air Forces bombing of their supply lines. They did not have conveniences the Marines had such as warming tents, defensive positions, air support, etc. Look at the number of weather casualties the Marines had you can imagine how many Chinese noncombat casualties were caused by weather.

Notwithstanding these facts, there was still a formidable force with tens of thousands out there that would inflict many casualties on the Marines before it was over. They were still the aggressor and attacking in force. They could afford to do this with their superior number of troops. Not only could they, but they must because here was a single Marine Division that was withstanding the best of the Mao's ten Divisions. The Chinese superior officers had to win this battle or loose great face. The Chinese soldier had to win this battle just get out of the cold before the freezing temperature claimed him.

The troops in H/3/1, on the other side of the wire, were not privy to the plight of the Chinese. Most of all, survival was on their mind. No matter what the condition of the Chinese, they were still coming and they were still a threat. When it gets down to the man in the trench in the heat of battle, it usually comes down to a, "him or me," attitude. There's no question about the choice.

Snow was falling during the hours before daylight and greatly reduced visibility. During the day Navy planes were on station seeking out the Chinese. Mortars and artillery were also joining in the bombardment. Whenever Chinese were seen, something lethal went their way. Things were looking a little better for H/3/1 today. G/3/1 was able to advance 25-50 yards during the night by infiltration.

At 1300 air, artillery, and mortars combined to reduce enemy concentrations. At 1600 all air craft were shifted to support the 5th and 7th Marine column's return to Hagaru. They were only a couple of miles away but they were still meeting heavy resistance. The vehicles in the convoy were being shot up as Chinese were attacking the convoy from the hills. At 1700 a tank-infantry relief unit was sent from Hagaru to help the 5th and 7th get through. They returned after meeting impassable resistance. The Chinese were trying their best to keep the 5th and 7th Marines from uniting with the Division. They knew the Marines fighting ability would increase if the Division could unite their forces.

The 5th and 7th finally broke through. They started coming through the north roadblock into Hagaru just before 1950. They continued arriving through the night and the next day.

SSgt Thomas J. Malone (the 3rd Plt. Sgt.), CPL John P. Laybourn, and PFC Richard T. Oksanen, who were WIA on Dec. 28th and evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital, were dropped
from the company.  

PFC Glenn E. Jones, PFC Vincent S. Gatto, and PFC Nathaniel M. Slone, who were WIA on Nov. 29th, were evacuated to a hospital in Japan. PFC Nathaniel Slone was dropped from the company. PFC Vincent Gatto was also dropped from the company but returned after his hospitalization.

William Bodaford, who had been WIA and evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital on Nov. 29th, was further evacuated to Japan and dropped from H/3/1.

CPL Andrew J. Scott and PFC Ralph Dean Fouts, who had been WIA and evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital on Nov. 29th, was dropped from the company.

PFC Arthur M. Davidson who, who was sick and evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital on Nov. 30th, was dropped from the company.

PFC William T. Williams, who was WIA on Dec. 2nd and evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital, was dropped from the company.

PFC William Barrett, PFC Charles R. Upton, and PFC William M. Pitts were dropped from the company.

The following were evacuated to Japan.

- PFC James W. Bailey (WIA on 11/30/50 and dropped from the Company)
- PFC Nathaniel "Chick" Slone (WIA 11/20/50 and dropped from the Company)
- PFC Vincent S. Gatto (WIA 11/29/50 and dropped from the Company)
- PFC Glenn E. Jones (WIA 11/29/50 and dropped from Company)

The 1st Marine Division sustained 16 KIA, 1 DOW, 6 MIA, 194 WIA, and 196 non-battle casualties.
At 0030 I/3/1 engaged the Chinese to their front with 60 and 81mm mortars. Some enemy WP was received. At 0700 air came on station. First priority was given to the rear of the 5th and 7th Marines column closing in on the perimeter.

Marguerite "Maggie" Higgins, correspondent of the New York Tribune, flew into Hagaru with a planeload of correspondents. The 5th and 7th Marines were already streaming back from Yudam-ni. Maggie wrote that, "They were frozen, exhausted, and had "the dazed air of men who have accepted death and then found themselves alive after all." A Life magazine photographer, David Douglas Duncan, found a Marine patiently hacking a breakfast of beans from a frozen can. The beans were encased in ice crystals and more crystals had formed on the man’s beard. He asked the Marine, "If I were God and could give you anything you wanted, what would you ask for?" The Marine said, "Gimme tomorrow." and went on hacking at the beans.

About this time, Maj. Gen. Smith was holding a news conference. When asked if he was retreating, he said in effect these words, "You can't retreat when you are surrounded. All you can do it attack in the desired direction." Gen. Smith was a religious person that would not think of swearing, to include the word "Hell". The press apparently added the word "Hell" and publicized the phrase "RETREAT HELL, WERE ONLY ATTACKING IN ANOTHER DIRECTION".

The leadership of the 1st Marine Division had confidence of their ability to march back to the coast. When offered by Gen. Almonds to evacuate those that could be evacuated by air from Hagaru, Gen. Smith was very offended. He told Gen. Almonds in no uncertain term that the 1st Marine Division needed no such help and that his Division was very capable of getting to the sea. He also told Gen. Almonds, "We will be taking all of our equipment with us and leaving nothing of value for the Chinese."

At 1400 a patrol of 41st Commandos with tanks was sent to retrieve field pieces stranded some three thousand yards up the north road. At 1530 the patrol reached its objective, found four guns destroyed and the remainder impossible to move. These were also destroyed and the patrol returned.

At 2000 small fire fights developed on the northeast, south, and west fronts.

The following Marines were evacuated to Japan this day:

- PFC Clifford P. Carter who was WIA on Nov. 28, 1950.
- HM3 Jeffery L. Cogborn who was WIA on Dec. 1, 1950.
- PFC Ralph Dean Fouts who was WIA on Nov. 29, 1950.
- PFC Charles E. McCoy who was WIA on Dec. 1, 1950.
- HN Benjamin Weir Jr. who was WIA on Nov. 29, 1950.
- PFC Clifford P. Carter, PFC Collins, Cpl Manford F. Langley, PFC Claburn L. Minchew, PFC Charles H. Monroe and HM3 Jeffery L Cogborn were dropped from the Company. Monroe, Cogborn, and Langley had been WIA on Nov. 29th and evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital.
- Cpl Charles E. McCoy (who was WIA on Dec. 1st was also dropped from the Company.
- PFC John W. Omer and Pvt James F. Solomon were also dropped from the Company.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 10 KIA, 6 DOW, 4 MIA, 202 WIA, and 582 non-battle casualties.
Probing action by the Chinese on the west front was detected and broken up at 0100. Air came on station at 0600 giving particular attention to the MSR north and south of Hagaru.

There had been few major attacks on Hagaru's perimeter during the last five days but intelligence was reporting that this was just the calm before the storm. At 1200 the 5th Marines relieved 3/1 of the command responsibility for the defense of Hagaru but 3/1 still had their sector to defend in the south. G/3/1 was relieved on East Hill and assigned the north sector formerly occupied by H&S Company. The half of the perimeter extending clockwise from G/3/1's new right flank was occupied by the three companies of the 5th Marines.

Plans were being made for the Division's march from Hagaru to Koto-ri. It was really more of an attack more than a march. They had to attack the hills on both flanks of the road and maintain flanking guards to allow the column to proceed down the MSR to Koto-ri. This was a lot of territory for the depleted fighting units and the Chinese were numerous. Now the glove was on the other hand, the Marines were forced to do the less desirable, attack instead of defend.

Those that had the chance to visit the 5th and 7th Marine areas were surprised at what they saw. Lt. Barrett was one of these visitors. The 5th and 7th had a very rough time for the last 9 days, all were exhausted and their appearance told the story of what they had been through. They hadn't had a hot meal for more than a week. They had about 1600 wounded and frozen casualties. Some were still waiting at the aid station. Most soon got back their spirits and, as much as they regretted the thought, made ready for the next attack to the south toward freedom. They knew this trip was necessary.

In some cases supply units were overloaded with supplies that they were not going to be able to consume or take with them when they left. Unit's requests for supplies were quickly filled to deplete the stock. For example, there was an abundant supply of field shoes that would have to be burned if not distributed to individuals. On the other hand some needed supplies, such as the picks ad shovels mentioned earlier, were just not available.

On this day Cpl James E. Gullage Jr. died of wound he received on the night of 28-9 at Hagaru. James was from Cambridge, MA and is buried there.

The following Marines were evacuated to Japan.

- PFC Jimmie S. Collins who was WIA on Nov. 29, 1950.
- PFC Claburn Minchew who was WIA on Nov. 29, 1950.
- PFC Charles H. Monroe Jr. who was WIA on Nov. 29, 1950.
- Cpl Richard Wyscarver who was WIA on Nov. 29, 1950.
- Cpl Paul R. Staley was dropped from the Company.
- Pvt Irvin R. Stephens, who was WIA and evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital on Nov. 29th, was dropped from the Company.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 2 KIA, 7 DOW, 2 MIA, 81 WIA, and 469 non-battle casualties.
The point (7th Regiment) of the 1st Mar. Div. column started passing through the southern roadblock and leaving Hagaru at 0600. They attacked the hills on both sides of the road to Koto-ri then put out flank guards to protect the column. This was the beginning of the eleven-mile attack to the south, to Koto-ri. It was expected that 3/1, which was attached to the 5th Marines, would bring up the rear and clear Hagaru about nightfall. About 1800 3/1 was formed up and elements of H&S Company and W/3/1 were placed in the column.

Ten thousand Marines and more than one thousand vehicles were on their way out. Coming up the whole length of the MSR was only a one-day trip only a two weeks earlier. This attack back down the MSR would take thirty-eight hours just to make the eleven-mile return trip to Koto-ri. Riding space was short and some of the dead were tied to vehicle fenders and hoods to transport them back.

Jack Dedrick remembers the sight. He also remembers the young Marine lying with a puppy's head sticking out of his parka. They were both dead. He says Dick Wolfcale also remembers seeing this.

During the past several days the Division had been supplied by air and the returning flights had evacuated more than 4,000 casualties.

PFC James "Jim" C. L. Bowen who had been WIA on Nov. 29th was evacuated to a hospital in Japan.

PFC Eugene Breen, who was WIA and evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital on Nov. 28th, was dropped from the Company rolls on this date.

PFC Jack Bowen was also dropped from the company on this date but apparently returned to H/3/1.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 32 KIA, 4 DOW, 7 MIA, 218 WIA, and 262 non-battle casualties.
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By midnight the clog of traffic had not cleared and the head of the 3/1 column was no further than the west end of the bridge in Hagaru. The 5th Marines' northeastern sectors were heavily attacked and G/3/1 and H/3/1 partially engaged. This necessitated a redeployment of 3/1's 81mm mortars and heavy machine guns and reestablishment of the Battalion CP without wire communications. The attack broke off before dawn and with daylight 3/1 was able to form up and march out of town unimpeded.

The leading element (2/7) arrived at Koto-ri in the morning while the last elements of the Division was still leaving Hagaru. It had not been an easy trip. A lot of hard fighting had been done along the way not only by the 7th but also by many other elements. There were many casualties when the units arrived at Koto-ri.

Thick fog and snow suddenly masked the Plateau and the ring of jagged peaks around Koto-ri. Air support could not get through to support the growing number of Marines in the hundreds of tents in the overcrowded campsite. Chinese artillery could have caused huge number of casualties but their heavily bombed, horse-drawn guns were still bogged down up near the Yalu.

The crude runway that had been built at Koto-ri had been improved barely enough to accommodate transports. The more seriously wounded were flown out of that small airstrip at Koto-ri. Other seriously sick (frozen limbs from the cold, pneumonia, intestinal cases from poor diet, frozen C rations, and eating snow, etc.) were also evacuated.

Maggie Higgins had not been permitted to accompany the Division on the road from Hagaru. It was considered too dangerous for a woman. Instead, as soon as the weather cleared, she flew to Koto-ri aboard one of the three Marine fighter-bombers detailed to evacuate casualties. One plane blew a tire on landing. Another upturned on the inadequate runway. The third managed to fly out nearly 100 men.

As the rear of the 1st Mar. Div. column left Hagaru during the morning, H/3/1 was near the end of the column, just in front of the rear guard, 2/5, and the British Commandos. Only the engineers that were blowing and burning the ammunition and supply dumps were farther behind. They burned the Korean village of Hagaru-ri and blew up the bridges. Nothing was being left for the Chinese. What had grown to be the busy base of Hagaru was now once again just a littered, icy tundra. As Keith Davis walked out of Hagaru and across the bridge over the Changjin River, that white cross he had been seeing on the mountain disappeared/faded from view.

North Korean civilians were trailing the Division trying to get to safety. Right behind the civilians, and in some cases, intermingled within them, was the Chinese. They came out of the hills like ants from an anthill. Most were trying to salvage what they could from the ruminants of the destroyed base. Tanks bringing up the rear of the 1st Division column were having a field day killing Chinese. They were covering for the demolition team that had just ignited the fuses to blow up the ammunition dumps and were catching up to the column. The last of the rear guard sped down the MSR to catch up with the rest of the column as enormous explosions consumed the ammunition dumps.

The men of H/3/1 thought the worst was over. They were under the impression that when they got to Koto-ri, their plight would end. They were not aware that the Chinese had also cut the road between Koto-ri and Chinhung-ri.

Some of H/3/1's Mortar Platoon had the luxury of riding. PFC Anthony "Tony" Carl Belpulsi was one who had a chance to ride all or part of the way. He fell asleep in the back of a 6X6 and woke to a startling sight. There were tanks approaching them from the rear. Fortunately they turned out to be friendly.

There were dead Chinese all over as they traveled down the MRS. Some of the dead on the road had been run over by the column's vehicles and had the appearance of frozen, flattened gingerbread men.

There were also live Chinese POWs along the road with their hands tied. They had been captured, questioned, and then released. Some of them had frozen feet bursting through their sneakers. Many were released to let the Chinese take care of their frozen comrades. There was mixed emotions about them. Some wanted to show compassion and others could only look at them in the light of the WIA and KIAs they had caused.
It was an eerie feeling for H/3/1 Marines as they walked along side of vehicles that were laden down with dead and wounded. They passed the mobile kitchen they had to leave behind on the road because of wheel trouble. They also saw what was left of the British Marines who didn't make it through with Task Force Drysdale. They really didn't look dead, but as if they were waiting orders in their tanks and vehicles. Supplies were scattered everywhere. The shot-up and ransacked trucks from Task Force Drysdale that didn't make it up this road a week earlier lined the road. They were a testament to the many skirmishes that took place on that day.

The three hundred men who made it through, going north, were shocked to see what had happened to those that didn't and realized how luck they were. About twenty two of the British Commandos that had been taken prisoner by the Chinese during that night were found and freed from their captors during this return attack southward.

The following account of the 1st Marines entering Koto-ri was documented in the book, "Retreat, Hell", and provides a very good account of their arrival and the situation.

Men stumbled in the paddies and ditches. They couldn't see but a few feet in any direction.
"You felt like a slave-driver moving among your men, kicking the ones who wouldn't move, snapping a them, irritated because you didn't know why you were stopping," Barret (H/3/1's 1st Platoon Leader) said.

Then the Company Commander (H/3/1 CO, Capt. Corley) called the platoon leaders together.
"We learned we were just short of the roadblock that marked the entrance to the perimeter to Koto-ri," Barrett explained.
But why had they stopped.
Why the company formation.
"Why, by God, just like in the movies. We were the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, some of 'Chesty's boys' and we were going to march into Koto, the Regimental CP, as a battalion - and not as a bunch of stragglers," Barrett was told.
"They had to have a goddamn battalion formation," Barret said.
"At first we were so mad we could have cried," Barrett said.
"Then, as we moved out of the paddy, a tired, dirty, cold, miserably hungry, motley assortment of men, the whole thing seemed sort of ridiculous and we forgot our anger."

As they marched past the guards at the roadblock and down the center of Koto-ri, past the regimental CP, slipping and falling on the ice, with the voices of the NCOs snarling out of he dark, "Keep it closed up," previous feelings were replaced by great pride.
"I was damn proud to be part of it," Barrett said.

Once inside the perimeter they stopped in a courtyard are made by the positioning of tents. An Officer from regiment told them where to go.
"You can put ten men in there," the officer said. "There're only fifteen in there now."

The tent he pointed to normally slept six to eight.

Men were shoved, pushed, jam-packed into tents until it was no longer possible to get in the door. Only then was one considered to be full. When tent space ran out, men were given parachutes and told to wrap themselves in them and sleep on the ground.

Regardless of where they were, in a tent or on the the ground, no one had any trouble going to sleep that night. For the first time in weeks they were able to take off their shoes and sleep without the worry of someone sticking a bayonet in them.

Someone else was manning the perimeter tonight.

Once Barrett's men had bedded down, he started looking for a place to sleep.

He poked his head in one tent, saw a small spot he thought he could fit into, and crawled in. It was tight. But he move some C-ration, put a machine gun outside, used another ration box as a pillow, then crawled into his bag an slept like a baby.

The rear guard and the engineers had all crossed the roadblock into Koto-ri by 2100. It had taken 38 hours for the entire Division to get Hagaru to Koto-ri. The Battalion was billeted in the area with 2/1 and other 1st Marine troops. Most of the men, who were lucky enough to find an opening in the crowded tents, fell asleep immediately. This was the
first full night's sleep H/3/1 had in about ten days. Reluctantly it was decided to bury some of the dead. Explosives were used to dig mass graves in the frozen ground. The bodies were wrapped in ponchos. The two main graves contained more than 100 bodies were marked by red and white survey poles. Map references were recorded for future reference. A chaplain recited the 23rd Psalm to a small group of reporters and officers as the wind reduced the volume.

Jack Dedrick remembers arriving at Koto-ri. It was dark and the warming tents were piled full of sleeping bodies. Every flap he opened was full. Someone told him where there were some used parachutes. He got one and draped it over a table. He wondered how the table had gotten out in the middle of nowhere. It was nice and cozy under the table and he had no trouble falling asleep. That is until thunderous explosions suddenly woke them. He woke with a jolt and hit his head on the table. He didn't know he had picked a place that was only fifty yards from an artillery battery that had a fire mission. He went back to sleep. Later he found out that the table he was under is where doctors put wounded Marines to examine them.

It was probably about this date that PFC Darrel Victor Jepperson, a gunner in the Machine Gun Platoon, sprained his knee while walking south. He was put on a truck and rode shotgun for the cargo of dead and wounded Marines who were aboard the truck. They learned that the Division was going to continue their attack down the MSR. H/3/1 was told that they did such a good job on the trip from Hagaru-ri that they were also going to be the rear guard on the trip from Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni.

It was here at Koto-ri where Col. Lewis Puller earned his fifth Navy Cross Medal. This is a record unmatched by any other Marine.

PFC Albin A. Dlabaj who had severe frost bite was tagged and scheduled to be evacuated out of Koto-ri on a flight but, after hearing a pep-talk from Chesty Puller, he removed his tag and rejoined the 3rd Platoon to come out with the Company.

At 1815 Division released the Operation Order for the continued southern attack. The first elements would resume the advance from Koto-ri at first light in the morning.

PFC James Bowen and Cpl Commodore C. McNeil, who were wounded on Nov. 29th and evacuated to the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital, were dropped from the company on this date.

PFC Edward K. Howington was dropped from the company on this date.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 51 KIA, 16 DOW, 0 MIA, 288 WIA, and 304 non-battle casualties.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1950

Leading elements of the 1st Mar. Div.'s column started the ten-mile advance to Chinhung-ni about 0700. With the addition of the 2/1 Marines who were at Koto-re, their number had grown from the 10,000 that had left Hagaru to over 14,000 men. Visibility was down to less than fifty yards because of a heavy snowstorm. This would mean no air cover. The 5th and 7th Marines were in the front with specific objectives on the hills on each side of the road. 3/1 units who had been at Hagaru, joined by 2/1 which had been holding the perimeter at Koto-ri was to be the rear guard. The other battalion, 1/1, which had been at Chinhung-ni defending that area, was also assigned an objective. They were to come up the MSR from the south and assault Hill 1081, a very important commanding terrain feature that the Chinese were using to block the Division's withdrawal.

The Chinese had destroyed a bridge on the road back to Chinhung-ni at a place called Funchilin Pass. And were defending the area. Careful plans had been made on how to cope with this problem which would stop all rolling stock of the Division. Huge pieces of bridge material were dropped at Koto-ri by parachute. They were used by engineers to fabricate a temporary span after the pass was recaptured.

Division had ordered that 2/1 and 3/1 be the rear guard. 3/1 was to protect Koto-ri until the Division train cleared, whereupon they were to relieve the 5th and 7th Marines on hills they were holding on both sides of the MSR. As the rear guard, 3/1 fought-off several small probing CCF attacks while waiting for the Division to leave Koto-ri. Air reconnaissance reported thousands of Chinese coming up the broad valley to the Southwest as the rear guard left Koto-ri. They were on their way to scavenge what they could from the
ruminants of the now-blown base at Koto-ri.

Some of the Chinese that were to defend the MSR were found frozen to death. Many others were found in varying states between lethargy and the frozen death. Chinese POWs had told stories of how they would run during the night, trying to get ahead of the 1st Marine Division. Then they would wait for the Marines to arrive to attack them. While waiting, the perspiration from the running quickly froze their limbs. Especially, the Chinese-issued tennis shoe was no match for the cold.

Jack Dedrick remembers stopping at a stream by the road to fill his canteen with water. He saw what appeared to be champagne bottles in holes in the ice. They had silver tops and blue on the bottoms. He reached down to pick one up and realized they were dud mortar rounds.

Jack also remembers passing a food dump they were about to blow up. He grabbed a case of food and carried it on his shoulder. When he opened it up, he found had been caring a case of apricots.

PFC Theodore VanArsdale, who was sick in the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital since Nov. 29th and was evacuated to a hospital in Japan on Dec. 9th, was dropped from the company. PFC Charles R. Weber was also dropped from the Company.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 29 KIA, 8 DOW, 4 MIA, 127 WIA, and 170 non-battle casualties.

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1950

It was probably early on this date that PFC Darrel Victor Jepperson, a gunner in the Machine Gun Platoon, who had badly sprained his knee while walking south was flown out of Koto-ri on a small aircraft. He would spend the next 7 months in a hospital with his leg injury and never return to the Company.

Hill 1328 had been taken by 2/7 on December 7th and was being held to protect the west flank of the MSR. 3/1 moved out of Koto-ri and relieved 2/7 about sunset. 1/3/1 occupied objective "B", G/3/1 occupied objective "A", and H/3/1 took over F/2/7's position on the nose running down from "A". Battalion and W/3/1 was on the MSR. The 1st and 2nd platoons of H/3/1 were in the hills protecting the right rear flank of the 1st Mar. Div. column on the MSR. Lt. Barrett, 1st platoon commander, became ill and went down to the road. Ron Mason, 2nd platoon commander, took over both platoons in his absence. Their position in the rear of the Division's column saw no serious action.

Sid Escher remembers that about this date one of the other Marines in his platoon had to enter a cave to check it out. He came out with three Chinese soldiers that were so frozen they could hardly walk.

Jack Dedrick remembers going up a big hill such as this. Remember when he arrived at Hagaru he had said that trip was the second coldest he has ever been. Well, after climbing this hill, he didn't care if he lived or died. The wind was blowing the snow in a blizzard and this was the surely coldest he has ever been. They could see some CCF way below them walking around. It was as if they didn't care if they lived or died either. Guys would shoot at them and it didn't seem to phase them.

About this time, Cpl. Bill Wyda, a H/3/1 machinegunner was at the head of Funchilin Pass. Bill was firing at a Chinese soldier several hundred yards away in the valley. The Chinese soldier apparently didn't even know he was being shot at. At least, if he did, it didn't seem to bother him. Bill was a very good marksman but because of the extreme distance, high wind, and poor visibility he just couldn't hit the target. He used up his first belt of .30 Ammo (250 rounds) and was on his second belt before he hit the mark. The man staggered for a minute and then hobbled out of sight. When he finally hit the Chinese soldier, his squad cheered his success.

There was an exchange of fire with a Chinese patrol after this incident. Shortly thereafter Wyda and his squad were ordered down to the MSR to join the column.

About this time Lt. Barrett had only twenty-two men left in his first platoon. They were huddled near some tanks trying to get some of the engine's warmth.

PFC Gus Marcotte who had been sick in the 1st Mar. Div. Hospital since Nov. 29th returned to duty.
SUNDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1950

Shortly after midnight G/3/1's position was hit by about a battalion of Chinese. The contact continued intermittently until dawn. Enemy casualties were estimated at 50 KIA and 250 WIA.

At 0200, elements at the head of the 1st Mar. Div.'s column started entering Chinhung-ni. The column was so long that the last elements of the column hadn't even left Koto-ri until this afternoon.

Tents were set up and straw was available for most of the men when they arrived at Chinhung-ni. Some had been on their feet for well over a day and were very tired. Although it was still cold, it wasn't as cold at this lower elevation as they had been used to up on the high plateau. Many could barely make it to the tents before they fell asleep. For the first time in a long time they could feel a little warmer and some degree of safety. Although they now would feel very uncomfortable sleeping on the ground in very cold weather, they slept in what was relative comfort for them.

At 0730 H/3/1, reinforced with a section from the AT assault team, 81mm mortars, and heavy machine guns displaced forward to objective "C". Throughout the day, H/3/1 was threatened by a force of battalion size to the west but air and mortars prevented them from closing.

All day traffic proceeded slowly along the MSR. At sunset the Battalion train formed up and the Battalion prepared to move out as rear guard. However, the column did not begin to move until 2100 and did not reach "C" until midnight. The column was twice fired on between "A" and "C" but no casualties were received.

PFC Theodore VanArsdale who was sick and went to the hospital on Nov. 29, 1950 was evacuated to Japan this date.

Sgt Robert Crews, Pvt Richard "Hoot" W. Gibson, and PFC John Lewis Jr. were dropped from the Company.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 7 KIA, 5 DOW, 8 MIA, 45 WIA, and 266 non-battle casualties.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1950

The walk down the pass from "C" proceeded without incident and the the Battalion reached Chinghung-ni at 0730. After a brief reorganization the march continued toward Hamhung. Some 1st Marines were being transported from Chinhung-ni when the CCF attacked the vehicles at a traffic turnaround outside Sudong. The enemy was eliminated but eight KIAs and twenty-one WIAs resulted from this action. The 1st Mar. Div. was transported by truck from Chinhung-ni to a camp area at Chigyong.

Most of the Marines had been transported the forty-three miles to the port of Hungnam by 2100. They were bivouacked at Yonpo airfield where they had all the luxuries of drinking water, tents, stoves, and galleys with hot food. They were within the cover of the 3rd and 7th Army Divisions who had been covering their withdraw from Chinhung-ni. Their biggest activity was to get prepared to go aboard ship.

Lt Ron Mason received the Bronze Star this date. It was probably for actions during the fight for Seoul.

PFC Ivan C. Jackson was dropped from the company on this date.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 9 KIA, 4 DOW, 3 MIA, 38 WIA, and 308 non-battle casualties.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1950
PFC William S. Newman, Cpl Richard Wyscarver, PFC James R. Vermillion, PFC William C. Yeatman and PFC Donald Scott were dropped from the company.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 2 DOW, 4 MIA, 3 WIA, and 123 non-battle casualties.

PFC Fred M. McCorkle was dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1950

3/1 broke camp and proceeded via trucks to Hamhung at 1300. They arrived at the loading area in Hungnam at 1500 and started loading LSU's and other landing craft at 2000. H/3/1 loaded boarded ship through an entrance in the middle USS General E. T. Collins. Three men were assigned to a bunk to sleep in shifts. Capt. Corley was in the Wardroom right after boarding ship and the tables were covered with white tablecloths. He looked at his hands on the white tablecloth and didn't think he had ever seen so much filth. He must have been a sight. They were served Spanish rice for dinner.

PFC Raymond T. Lester, who had been WIA on Sept. 25th in Seoul, returned to the Company.

It was necessary to get as many aboard as possible and some ships were overloaded. Some Marines had to sleep on the open deck because there was no space below. Some only received one meal a day for the short trip because ships either ran short of food or didn't have the capacity to feed so many. One ship, the USS RANDALL, which had a troop capacity of 2,500, was loaded with 4,200 passengers, some of which were the 5th Marines.

After the Division was loading aboard troop transports and LSTs, they would be transported to Pusan in South Korea. It took about three days for the Division to load aboard ship and then about two days of sailing to get to Masan.

Jack Dedrick buddied up with Sgt Bobby Richardson and they got in the crew's quarters. They were allowed to bunk under a table. They did manage to get a shower (no clean clothes). They ate canned mincemeat they had brought aboard with them until they could stand no more. Chow lines were endless so Jack and others volunteered to wash trays in the mess hall. They would wash a few trays and then go to the head of the line. It was lamb stew, worse than the mincemeat.

Cpl William R. Quinn and PFC George H. Sieger were dropped from the Company.

Gen. Smith attended burial services in Hungnam for the last of the Marine dead brought down from Chinhung-ni and then boarded the USS Bayfield for his trip to South Korea with the Division. The 1st Mar. Div. with 22,215 men was part of the 105,000 troops, 17,500 vehicles, 350,000 measured tons of cargo, and 91,000 refugees that were transported out of Hungnam by 109 ships.

Between October 26th, when the Marines landed at Wonsan, and December 15th, the Marines suffered 4,418 battle casualties. There were 604 KIA, 114 who DOW, 192 MIA, and 3,508 WIA. There were also 7,313 non-battle casualties, most of which were frostbit and indigestion cases. 3/1's casualties were 443, thirty six percent of the initial strength of the Battalion. This included 33 KIA, 270 WIA, 25 MIA, 10 DOW, and 105 sick that were evacuated. 3/1 received 50 replacements during the period.

Enemy losses were estimated at a total of 37,500. There were 15,000 KIA and 7,500 WIA by Marine ground forces plus 10,000 KIA, and 5,000 WIA by Marine air units. The book "Enter the Dragon" shows that the Chinese admit 40,000 had died in this campaign. The difference in the number of Chinese dead claimed by Marines and the 40,000 were thought to have died as a result of freezing, starvation, etc. An oddly shaped building in Chinhung-ni that was once a church had been converted to a Chinese Hospital. In late December there was an extremely large number of amputations being performed to remove gangrenous, frostbitten limbs at this facility.

North Korean forces encountered during operations in the Wonsan and the Chosen areas were fragments and stragglers from many NKPA Divisions. The only organized elements were chiefly from the 2nd, 5th, and 15th Divisions.

Chinese POWs reported that they were given eight pounds of rice and 80 rounds of ammunition when they crossed the Yalu. The Companies were reinforced with 60 and 82mm
mortars and light and heavy machineguns. Equipment used by the enemy was of no standard type. A great many were equipped with Mauser 7.7mm rifles of German, Czech, and Chinese manufacture. The squad leaders were equipped with Thompson sub-machineguns, .45 Cal. or other sub-machineguns of American and British manufacture. A large number of troops were equipped with U.S. carbines and US M-1 rifles. A few of the officers carried Chinese manufactured Mauser 7.62 pistols. The enemy had several Johnson light machineguns and Browning .30 cal. light machineguns. His mortars were the standard American 60mm and 81mm (and/or 82mm) with a few 50mm M1938. They were found to have American equipment including intrenching tools, canteens, toilet articles, and cigarettes. Almost all soldiers had items of equipment made in Shanghai. A great many carried benzedrine pills and opium. Each soldier had a complete set of toilet articles. Their uniforms were of the quilted, olive drab type with blouse and trousers. Shoes were made with a canvas top and leather soles. Some of the POWs taken in the last few days had hob-nailed, half leather shoes. No steel helmets were found. The head gear consisted of a cap with fur lined ear flaps. Many had no gloves. A few bodies observed in the rear of the assault troops were dressed entirely in black. These may have been platoon leaders but more likely were security troops of commissars. Individual soldiers did not carry first aid packets. Each soldier had four to six concussion hand grenades. Prior to combat all rank insignia was apparently removed except for a few officers who did not remove the red piping on their uniforms.

Chinese forces encountered during operations in the Wonsan and Chosin areas included the below indicated elements which were part of the Chinese Ninth Army Group. They were designated to invading Taiwan until those plans were scrubbed because of interference by the 7th fleet.

20th Army

58th Division

172nd Regiment - First in action at Hagaru on 28 Nov.
attacked Hagaru, POWs reported 90% casualties
estimated 3,300 casualties

173rd Regiment - attacked Hagaru, POWs reported 50% casualties
estimated 1,750 casualties

174th Regiment - attacked Hagaru, POWs reported 50% casualties
estimated 1,750 casualties

59th Division

175th Regiment - In contact with the 7th Marines
southwest of Yudam-ni on 23 Nov. Later

176th Regiment - attacked Toktong Pass and Hagaru
POWs reported 50% casualties (estimated 1,750 casualties)

60th Division

177th Regiment - In contact with the 7th Marines

26th Army

76th Division

226th Regiment - First contacts east of Hagaru on 5 Dec.
Suffered heavy loss around Koto-ri.

227th Regiment

228th Regiment

77th Division

229th Regiment

230th Regiment

231st Regiment

78th Division

232nd Regiment - Not reported in contact. May not have reached the area in time for combat.

233rd Regiment

234th Regiment

88th Division

263rd Regiment - Not reported in contact. May not have reached the area in time for combat.

264th Regiment

265th Regiment
IN KOREA

27th Army

79th Division
   235th Regiment
   236th Regiment
   237th Regiment
   Attacked Yudam-ni on 27 Nov.

80th Division
   238th Regiment
   239th Regiment
   240th Regiment
   Attacked the 7th Infantry Division units east of the Chosin Reservoir on 27 Nov.

81st Division
   241st Regiment
   242nd Regiment
   243rd Regiment
   No report of contact until 13 Dec. May have been in Yudam-ni area.

90th Division
   268th Regiment
   269th Regiment
   270th Regiment
   No contact reported. May have been in reserve near Hagaru.

42nd Army

124th Division
   370th Regiment
   371st Regiment
   372nd Regiment
   In action against the 7th Marines south of Sudong on 2 Nov. Badly cut up in actions of 3-6 Nov.

125th Division
   373rd Regiment
   374th Regiment
   375th Regiment
   Not in contact. Probably to west of 124th Division.

126th Division
   376th Regiment
   377th Regiment
   378th Regiment
   Screened Chinese retreat to Hagaru. Never heavily engaged.

The 1st Marine Division sustained casualties on this day of 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 1 WIA, and 52 non-battle casualties.
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1950

About this day PFC Sidney Escher was on a working party to load items aboard ship. He remembers loading busted-up stoves and bent stove pipes among the other things that he thought would be better off thrown away.

The Battalion completed loading aboard ship at 0300 and sailed for Pusan.

While aboard ship, Capt. Corley noticed Gen. "Chesty" Puller pacing up and down in the Wardroom with his hands behind his back and a pipe in his mouth. He kept repeating over and over, "I'm ashamed to call myself an American. We could have held until Spring." He was not speaking to anyone in particular, just aloud to himself.

PFC Richard Delatorre and PFC Innocence Hernandez were dropped from the Company.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 103 non-battle casualties.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1950

The ships carrying the Battalion arrived at Pusan at 1330 and waited aboard ship for transportation to Mason.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 1 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 34 non-battle casualties.
The Company debarked and transportation was waiting to take 3/1 on the forty five-mile trip to Masan. H/3/1 was transported by train, right behind the coal car. Most of the rest of the Division made the trip VIA truck. Mason is where the Division recuperated and rebuilt units. There they pitched tents on the outskirts of the city in the same bean patch the Marine Brigade had used when it arrived five months earlier to help defend the Pusan Perimeter in July 1950.

It was here that the 1st Mar. Div. was allowed to refit and get back up to strength before seeing action again. Maj. Gen. Smith, CO of 1st Mar. Div. saw to it that they would not go back as part of with X Corps while Gen. Almonds commanded it. The 1st Mar. Div. would be a part of IX Corps when they next saw action.

Those that had survived the Chosin were the old salts when replacements arrived. The stories the new members herd were at first almost unbelievable. Then, when they came to realize the truth of the matter, a fear came over them because they realized they may soon see some of the same type of action.

Another luxury they had was to read newspapers and hear radio reports of what had happened in Korea and what else was happening around the world. This is the first time many had a realization of what they had gone through and the where the UN forces stood. The news wasn't good. The Eighth Army was withdrawing under the pressure of the Chinese. One even wondered if they would be driven out of Korea.

Some wrote home and some couldn't. These young men, some of which only a few months ago were attending reserve meetings, were different now. They were only a few months older but had seen a part of life that few will share or be able to understand. They were hardened by their experiences and some would never be able to return to their naive, youthful, livelihood. They were better off than some of their buddies who didn't make it through the experience so well, or at all.

At 1800 the 1st Mar. Div. opened the Division CP at Mason.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 90 non-battle casualties.

H/3/1 was one of the units in/near Mason getting resupplied, replacements, and training.

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

1st Plt. Sgt. Jack Seeler (joined)
1st Plt. 3rd Sqd James "Jim" Gillispie (joined)
2nd Plt. 2nd Sqd Joseph "Joe" Pratte (left)

The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 282 non-battle casualties.

A shower was one of the first things erected. It was made of six 50-gallon oil drums on a seven-foot high stand. The water was heated on nearby oil heaters and a bucket brigade filled the drums when pumps and a stream were not available to get the water by automation. Often the rivers/streams were covered with ice on cold winter days and the shower utility operator would have to break through the ice to put his hoses into the water. In the more advanced rear areas the shower was even enclosed in a tent. Wooden pallets and similar devices were used to keep the cleaning area above the muddy ground. Sometimes they would even have clean dungarees. The dirty dungarees were turned in to be cleaned and used for future groups taking a shower. This was appreciated by the Marines but too often the correct sized were not available and it was a choice between wearing the dirty dungarees or looking like a Charlie Chaplin character.

It sure felt good to get clean, deloused, and loosened up. Some even got a little liberty. Some drank saki and Korean gin tainted with turpentine, which caused them to go
blind for a while. Some bought fresh eggs to cook on the stove in the tent whenever they got hungry. Others did the many things that today would seem crude or unordinary.

There were many replacements that filled the ranks during the next two weeks. Some who had been wounded were also returning.

The 1st Mar. Div. received a dispatch that it had been placed under the operational control of 8th Army at 2240. This was one of many organizational reassignments the Division would receive during the next month. This was partly due to the death of Gen. Walker, CG of 8th Army, in a jeep accident and the assumption of command of Gen. Mathew Ridgway. Also during this period, the UN forces in Korea were unstable and still giving ground to Chinese advances. Until Chinese advances could be contained, it was unsure how the 1st Mar. Div. could be used. Also during this period, there was a desire that the 1st Mar. Div. not be committed to combat again until the could be resupplied with equipment and get enough replacements to bring them up to TE and strength. The resupply and replacements were delayed because of the massive logistics problem the UN was having meeting the needs of other UN forces.

The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 282 non-battle casualties.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1950

H/3/1 was in/near Mason getting resupplied, replacements, and training.
The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 202 non-battle casualties.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1950

H/3/1 was still in/near Mason getting resupplied, replacements, and training.
The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 151 non-battle casualties.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1950

H/3/1 was in/near Mason getting resupplied, replacements, and training.
About this date Jack Dedrick was promoted to Sgt. He was standing in the chow line on night and Lt. Johnson came over and gave him the paper and congratulated him.
The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 1 WIA, and 111 non-battle casualties.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1950

H/3/1 was in/near Mason getting resupplied, replacements, and training.
PFC Bobby G. Carr received a Bronze Star this date. It was probably for actions about the time of Seoul.
Cpl Abbate was dropped from the company.
The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 0 WIA, and 68 non-battle casualties.

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1950

H/3/1 was in/near Mason getting resupplied, replacements, and training.
Sgt Jack Dedrick received a Letter of Commendation (with Combat V) this date. It was for actions on September 25, 1950. The medal was pinned upon him by no Gen. Chesty Puller.
Gen. Walker, CG, 8th Army, was killed in a jeep accident.
The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 3 WIA, and 79 non-battle casualties.

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1950

111
H/3/1 was in/near Mason getting regrouped, resupplied, replacements, and training.  
Sgt Benny J. Heinze Jr. and Sgt Clyde W. Keel (transferred to I/3/1) and PFC Jonathan 
H. Lawhon were dropped from the company.  
The 1st Marine Division sustained 0 KIA, 0 DOW, 0 MIA, 10 WIA, and 42 non-battle 
casualties.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 25, 1950

Marines had a good menu to select from. It was almost the same as they had on 
Thanksgiving Day except they were able to enjoy this meal much more than the one they had 
in the Frozen Chosen. The 1st Marine Division's menu was shrimp cocktail, stuffed olives, 
sweet pickles, roasted young tom turkey, cranberry sauce, glazed sweet potatoes, whipped 
potatoes, giblet dressing, brown gravy, green beans, creamed corn, bread, butter, coleslaw 
fruit cake, minced pie, coffee, hard candies, mixed nuts, fruit salad, cigarettes and 
cigars.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1950

Cpl Donald A. Gervin and Cpl Gordon C. Gervin were dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1950

H/3/1 was in/near Mason getting resupplied, replacements, and training.  
Cpl William Kirkpatrick, Cpl Carroll W. Koch, Cpl William R. McDonald, and Sgt. James 
C. McHugh were dropped from the company.

A EUSAK dispatch was received directing that the 1st Mar. Div. be detached from 8th 
Army and reassigned to the Operational control of X Corps.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1950

Cpl Guillermo Gonzalez was dropped from the company on this date.

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1950

SSgt Harold Geissinger, Sgt. Charles E. McDonald, Sgt Gaco, and Cpl Hyacinthe Pouliot 
were dropped from the company on this date.  Sgt Charles E. McDonald apparently returned 
because he again appears on the Jan. 1951 monthly personnel roster.

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1950

The 1st Mar. Div. was alerted for two missions within an hour. At 1425 it was 
detached from X Corps, after only four days, and once more assigned to the operational 
control of 8th Army. The Marines were directed to resume their former mission of training, 
reorganizing, and replacing equipment so they could be employed either to block enemy 
penetrations along the Ulchin-Yongju-Yechon axis, or to take over a sector along the Main 
Line of Resistance (MLR).

Forty minutes later another EUSAK dispatch alerted the Division to move to the 
Pohang-Andong area, were it would be in position to block any CCF penetration. This 
warning order came as no surprise, since X Corps had already contemplated such employment 
for Gen. Smith's troops. In fact, General Craig and Deputy Chief of Staff Col. Edward W. 
Snedeker had left Mason that very morning to select assembly areas and command posts. 

Conflicting information is documented in different books and even within the same 
book about when the 1st Mar. Div. actually made the move from Mason.

One story has it that, "The 1st Mar. Div. loaded aboard trucks and headed north 
toward Uisong. One thing is for sure, their mission was to destroy the North Korean 10th 
Division, which had infiltrated and been operating as small guerilla units behind the UN
lines in the Pohang-Andong area. This would require many patrols ranging from fire team to company size. This was good combat training for the many new recruits that had been added to the ranks. Late in the afternoon the 1st Mar. Div. bivouacked about twenty five miles south of Uisong."

It is no surprise that there was confusion. A new CCF offensive, which was to penetrate south of Seoul with Pusan its intended objective, began after dark. At a time such as this, Marines can expect the word to change several times until decisions and orders from higher echelons are filtered down to the lower levels where they are emplimented.

Another version of how the 1st Mar. Div. got to the Pohang area is told in the details given for 8-10 January.

MONDAY, JANUARY 1, 1951

The Chinese began a major offensive with the object of retaking Seoul and concluding with the capture of Pusan. The CCF attack made a major break through UN lines. As a result of this impact it was necessary for several more allied withdrawals to realign the UN forces.

About this date the 3rd special replacement draft arrived in January 1951, between the 3rd and 4th replacement drafts. They flew to Korea from Travis AFB with stops in Hawaii, Johnson Island, Kwadjalein, Japan, and Pusan, Korea. Some (perhaps most) came by Lockheed Constellations and Douglas Skymasters (C-54) and some (including PFC Don Myers) traveled by lumbering Martin Mariner Flying Boat.

PFC Don Meyers and PFC William "Bill" O'Daniel were in this draft.
PFC Joseph Caruso, PFC John Gonzales, and Pvt Billy E. Shelby were dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 3, 1951

About this date Marines from the 4th Replacement Draft arrived at H/3/1. PFC James "Jim" Gillispie was in this group.

Cpl Burl W. Waits also probably arrived with this draft. As a Marine guard at Barbers Point Naval Air Station he had followed the activities in Korea with interest. Beautiful beaches and hula dancers tended to relieve his concern until he received orders to report for duty in South Korea. After two years in the tropics it was rather cold to Burl. A few days later it was even colder in his makeshift tent. Normally a Corporal would lead a fire team. Burl was assigned a rifleman position because other Corporals were already assigned as fire team leaders. That was OK with him. Two years of guard duty in Hawaii was not exactly the training needed to start a "kill or be killed" leadership role.

THURSDAY, JANUARY 4, 1951

Cpl Manford F. Langley was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, JANUARY 5, 1951

PFC Ron Whitacre joined H/3/1 on this date or Jan. 6th. He had come with the 4th replacement draft but they had kept him in Pusan for a few extra days on working parties.

MONDAY, JANUARY 8, 1951

The second version of how the 1st Mar. Div. got to the Pohang-Andong area has it that there was a conference between Generals Ridgway and Smith on the 8th of January. Shortly after that conference it was decided the 1st Mar. Div would move to the Pohang-Kyongju-Yongchon area some 60 miles northeast of Mason. Their mission was to take responsibility for protection of the MSR between Andong and Kyongju and prevent hostile penetration in force south of the Andong-Yongdok road.
Sgt Mike Snyder was dropped from the Company but he returned because he is listed on the Mar. monthly personnel roster.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 9, 1951

The second version also states that, "To make it official, at 1115 on Jan. 9th, an 8th Army dispatch ordered the 1st Mar. Div. to move without delay to the Pohang area and remaining under EUSAK control with the following missions: (a) Prevent enemy penetrations in force south of Andong-Yongdok road and (b) Protect the MSR connecting Pohang, Kyongju, Yongchon, Uihung, and Uisong.

At 1600, Division issued orders for the 1st Marine Regiment to move by motor to Yongchon and to protect the MSR, Yongchon-Uisong inclusive, from positions in the vicinity of Yongchon and Uihung.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 10, 1951

At 0545 the first serial of the 1st Marines departed by motor for the Pohang-Andong area.

At 1300 Division issued orders for the remainder of the Division's movement by road and water from Mason to the objective area.

When H/3/1 arrived at Andong, a bunch of Marines were trying to carry a squad tent up the hill where it was to be erected. One admits that it probably looked like a scene from a Three Stooges movie. An old Korean Popasan came up with his a-frame and, you guessed it. After they managed to get the tent loaded on his a-frame, the Korean got to his feet, tested his balance, and up the hill he went.

The main activities of the 1st Mar. Div. for the following weeks would be fighting Guerrilla and eliminating their activities in the area.

MONDAY, JANUARY 15, 1951

LSTs 898 and 914 sailed for the Andong area with elements of the Tank, Ordinance, Engineer, and Service Battalions.

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

1st Plt. 2nd Sqd  Charles Chuck Lyman (joined)
1st Plt. 2nd Sqd  Donald "Don" Myers (joined)
1st Plt. Wilmer "Dinkey" Morgani (left)

By this date relative quiet prevailed along the entire front. The Chinese had shot their bolt. As in the scenario of most of their attacks, they would attack, throwing all they had into the fight, which was little in the way of supplies. When the attack had penetrated as far as supplies of ammunition and manpower would allow, they would stop to consolidate their positions and await resupply and reinforcement. This was not an easy task since the UN's air superiority would not allow large CCF columns of supplies and troops to pass without heavy losses.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 16, 1951

The new Division CP opened at Sinhung, about five miles southeast of Pohang at 1600. The following Marines were dropped from the Company. Because there were so many, perhaps they were being rotated back to the USA.

SSgt Michael Marich  Pvt Charles Ryan

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 1951

All motor and water lifts of the 1st Mar. Div.'s move to the Pohang area were completed on this date.

THURSDAY, JANUARY 18, 1951
On this date Division Orders assigned a three-fold mission; (1) the protection of the Pohang-Kyongju-Andong MSR; (2) the securing of Andong and the two airstrips in the vicinity; and (3) the prevention of hostile penetration in force to the south of the Andong-Yongdok road. In accordance with this order, the 1st Marines were assigned an area about 10 miles wide astride the Uisong-Andong road, including both Uisong and Andong.

A 3/1 patrol flushed out an undetermined number of NK troops east of Andong. The NK took to their heels so earnestly that the Marines barely managed to catch 3 POWs after a long chase. The POWs identified themselves as being a part of the 27th Regiment, 10th NKPA Infantry Division. Two other regiments, the 25th and 29th, were also in the general area performing guerilla operations.

FRIDAY, JANUARY 19, 1951

PFC Roger A. Cote, PFC Edward J. Kulha, PFC Wilmer J. Morgani, PFC Lawrence (Larry) F. O’Shea were dropped from the company.

MONDAY, JANUARY 22, 1951

Cpl Edward J. McKinzie was dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1951

About this date H/3/1 was assigned to protect and maintain a large valley outside of Andong. The valley was about two or three miles long and about three quarters mile wide. The valley was parallel to a river with hills on both sides. To Keith Davis the area looked like a large rice paddy with water dikes five to six feet high also running parallel with the river’s edge. Keith’s Platoon, the 3rd Platoon, area of responsibility ended at the river’s edge. Thus the 3rd Platoon had to cover the Company’s entire right flank. Along the Company front there were trip flares, bouncing bettys, and 55 gallon drums of gasoline rigged with trip devices.

Once they arrived and began to dig in a flight of boxcars came in low and began to drop supplies. Keith heard the roar of engines and looked up to see hundreds of parachutes filling the air. The drop was directly on the 3rd Platoon area and all had to run helter/skelter to avoid being hit by pallets weighing tons. Marines that can dodge bullets managed to dodge the parachutes with no injuries.

THURSDAY, JANUARY 25, 1951

Col. Puller was relieved as CO 1st Marines and replace by Col. Francis M. McAlister

FRIDAY, JANUARY 26, 1951

CGMP John G. Gonzales was dropped from the Company. (What is the rank of CGMP?).

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31, 1951

About this date the Company got a good scare. It was well after dark and the Company was on a fifty percent alert. A civilian prison was about three quarters of a mile in front of the Company. A commotion broke out at the prison. Then flares in front of H/3/1 started illuminating, gasoline drums exploded, and the whole line was lit up. Everyone went on one hundred percent alert. Capt. Corley and his runner started running down the line to survey the situation. When he got the 3rd Platoon he told PFC Keith Davis, who was now the 3rd Platoon runner, to go with him. They stopped at every hole and the Skipper shared encouraging words with the troops. Finally they arrived at the last hole, the most vital position on the line. Within the foxhole were two Marines who were both asleep. Capt. Corley told Davis to wake them up. The first Marine that was awakened said the other
guy was supposed to be on watch. Capt. Corley pulled his .45 and cocked the hammer to indicate he was going to shoot the Marine. A nervous PFC Davis, trying to find something to cool down the situation, told the Skipper that he wasn’t worth it and it would be a waste of gun powder. The Skipper then the Marine taken back to the CP and tied him to the center pole in a tent for the rest of the night.

Keith says the scuttlebut came back that the Marine came back on line with another company while awaiting court martial. The company was attacked and he became some sort of hero. The court martial was dropped and he was awarded the Silver Star.

Clyde W. Keel, who was transferred from H/3/1 to I/3/1 on Dec. 24th was promoted to Sgt.

PFC Alfred Zajchowski was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1951

On this date Carl "Red" Duvall joined the 60mm Mortar Section and Eb Revsbeck became the 3rd Squad Leader of the 1st Platoon. Eb was also the Supply Sgt. but it is not known when he changed positions in the company.

Sgt Milford L. Finnerty and Sgt Jack Johnson were dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1951

About this date "Chesty" Puller was promoted to Brigadier General. He assumed duties as the Assistant Division Commander (ADC) of the 1st Mar. Div.

During the first few days of February there was a brief flurry of activity before NKPA guerrilla resistance breathed its last gasps. Reports that remnants of the NKPA 25th and 27th Regiments were in flight toward the zone of the 5th Marines led to a concentration for a knockout blow, but the enemy stole away to the north in the vicinity of Topyong-dong. There he discovered that he had jumped from the frying pan into the fire. 2/1 and 3/1 closed in from one side while the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the KMC Regiment blocked roads in the vicinity of Samgo-ri and Paekcha-dong. Only a wild flight in small groups saved the guerrillas from annihilation.

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1951

Cpl Edward J. Mitchell was dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1951

PFC James G. Bonabhan was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1951

About this date, Division organized a draft for return to the United States. Five officers and six hundred men had already been selected on the basis of combat time, wounds received, and length of service. Maj. Gen. Craig, ADC, was one of those going home and was given a farewell dinner. He had also just received his second star (Lt. Gen.).

By this date a Marine (name unknown) replacement had arrived at H/3/1. He said he was an orphan and that he had just married an orphan before they called him to duty. H/3/1 was defending a hill where they had dug foxholes. The Company's front was so great that every other foxhole was manned by one Marine. They were on a fifty-percent alert that night and had no enemy contact. At about 0200, when this Marine had the mid-watch to the right of the CP, there was an explosion but no action followed.

Sgt. Jack Dedrick's tent flap opened and three guys came in asking for a corpsman and a flashlight. Somebody turned on a flashlight and the kid stuck out a bloody stump. He told a story that wasn't believed.

When Capt. Corley received the report that shrapnel from an enemy grenade had hit a Marine he ordered 100% alert and proceeded to investigate. The Corpsman was with the
IN KOREA

Marine and an ambulance was standing by at Battalion. The Marine said a grenade was thrown in his hole and he was in the process of throwing it out when it detonated. No one else in the area heard or saw anything. The moon was bright and visibility in all direction was good. The next day, Capt. Corley went to a U.S. Army Hospital to visit the Marine. He had lost his right hand.

The consensus of opinion of H/3/1 Marines was that he had pulled a pin on a grenade and blown off his hand to get home to his wife. PFC Ron Whitacre and some others think the grenade might have accidentally gotten caught in his glove. At least that’s what they told the investigators.

An investigation determined and proved only one thing; that he had lost his hand. The Battalion XO called Capt. Corley after reviewing his rather lengthy report and told Capt. Corley that he was inclined to say the incident occurred due to the Marine's misconduct. Capt. Corley said, "no one else was hurt and it could have happened as the Marine related. Anyway, even if it was self-inflicted he was already punished enough. He lost one of his hands." The XO said he would think about it some more.

Milo Sillman who was WIA on Mar. 2, 1951 wound up in the hospital with this same Marine. Milo can't remember his name either but he became buddies with him and they went on liberty together. Milo found out that he never was married.

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1951

The Chinese started another major attacked, this time on the central front.

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1951

A EUSAK warning order alerted the 1st Mar. Div. to be prepared to move to Chungju, in the area of the IX Corps front were the heaviest CCF attacks were taking place. They were to participate in Operation Killer.

PFC Richard H. Goss and Cpl Richard L. Sorensen were dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1951

Orders arrived from the 8th Army initiated the movements described yesterday. The 1st Mar. Div was to remain under EUSAK operational control but would be passed to IX Corps control at a future date.

PFC Marvin R. Hand was dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1951

In accordance with orders received from 8th Army on Feb 13th, Division issued orders to subordinate units.

11t Horace Johnson (probably transferred to G/3/1 where he became CO on Jan. 19th) was dropped from the Company on this date.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1951

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

1st Plt. Bzks     Eugene "Cowboy" Davis (Joined)
           (Did H/3/1 have a bazooka sect? at this time or was Eugene assigned from Weapons Company?)
1st Plt. 1st Sqd  John Clinton (joined)
1st Plt.          Joseph (Joe) Endisch (joined)
2nd Plt.          Earl Danny Daniels (joined)
3rd Plt.          Harold Kraft (joined)

(Robert Bob Muir from heavy machine guns in W/3/1 also left H/3/1 about this date.) (transferred to G/3/1 about this date)

All Marine missions in the guerilla hunt had been successfully accomplished and the
2nd ROK Division relieved the 1st Mar. Division. There were 120 counted enemy dead and 184 prisoners. Only estimates are available for the wounded, but there is no doubt that the total NKPA casualties were crippling. At any rate, the NKPA 10th Division was destroyed as a fighting force without accomplishing any of its objectives. Marine casualties during the "Guerilla Operations", from Jan. 18th to Feb. 15th were 19 KIA, 7 DOW, 10 MIA, and 148 WIA and 1751 of a non-battle classification, Largely frostbite cases soon restored to duty.

Movement by rail and road commenced on this date in accordance with Division's orders issued on Feb. 14th. The 1st Marines, with the 7th Motor Transport Bn. attached, lead the motor march.

A CCF counterattacked was going full blast along the central front. Driving southeast from the IX Corps area to the X Corps front, the Chinese cut off and surrounded the 23rd Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Infantry Division. They held out until rescued by a tank column.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1951

Capt. Corley received a letter from a Marine's wife about this date. She was concerned because she hadn't received a letter from her husband in over 6 weeks. While making rounds that day, Capt. Corley sat on the edge of the Marine's foxhole and asked if everything was okay; did he receive letters from his wife; did he have any problems; etc.? The Marine said he was fine and everything was okay. Capt. Corley said, "That's fine, except that you have forgotten how to write, I guess. I would suggest you take a minute or two and write a letter home. In fact, I want you to write at least one letter a week to your wife, and I'll know if you don't. Any Questions?" The Marine said, "No Sir." The problem was apparently solved because Capt. Corley never heard from the wife again.


Sgt Clyde W. Keel, a H/3/1 Marine who was transferred to I/3/1 on Dec. 24th, rotated back to the U.S.A.

The following Marines were dropped from the Company. Because there were so many, perhaps they were being rotated back to the USA.

TSgt Roger W. Barnes       PFC John Corzan
Cpl Stanley Kohler         PFC Edward T. Nelson
PFC Robert L. Quick        PFC George W. Sagle

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1951

Horace Johnson, H/3/1's XO was transferred/became G/3/1's CO on this date from. The 1st Mar. Div. was detached from X Corps and placed under the operational control of General Moore's IX Corps. The 24th Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 6th ROK Division, and the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade were other major units making up IX Corps.

When getting ready to jump off on Operation KILLER they cooked steaks at the mess hall in the morning. Everyone got in line as many times as you wanted. After chow they had a briefing on the situation. During the briefing a young Marine pulled out his .45 and shot himself in the hand. Sgt. Jack Dedrick is of the opinion that he had just had enough and couldn't take any more. Sgt. Dedrick liked the guy and felt sorry for him. He said they wanted to give him a Purple Heart but the guy refused.

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1951

This was D-Day for the new operation. At 0800 the 1st and 5th Marines jumped off on Operation KILLER. 3/1, with Division Recon Company and C/Engineers attached, passed through elements of the 2nd Infantry Division. Their first objective was to seize the ridgeline about three and a half miles south of the high ground dominating the village of Hoengsong. The 1st Marines only encountered a few rounds of scattered rifle fire. Thawing snow, rain, mud, and slush were the worst enemy on this first day.

The Marines objective was believed to be defended by the 196th Infantry Division of
the 66th CCF Army and known elements of the 39th and 40th CCF Armies. Ahead of the Marines lay some uninviting terrain. Swift streams laced Rocky Heights and narrow valleys, the largest being the River Son, running from northeast to southwest through a defile cutting across the western part of the Division sector. Bordering this twisting stream was the Wonju-Hoengsong "highway"—a poor dirt road even by Korean standards. PFC William M. Edwards was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1951

The second day of Operation KILLER also saw light resistance with more long-distance small arms fire than was received the first day but no close contacts with the retreating enemy.

Cpl Burl Waits had been promoted to fire team leader and then to Squad Leader in the 3rd Squad, 3rd Platoon. It was midday and his squad had been moving fast up another hill. He had just motioned the fire team on his right to move up when he heard what he thought was a shot. As it turned out, one of the guys had set off a mine. The calf of Burl's left leg felt numb. Blood was running through the three layers of clothing and into his boot so he yelled for the corpsman. He could move his leg and toes in the bloody boot so he didn't think the wound would be too serious. Was it really one of those happy (non-severe) wounds that earned a trip to Japan? He wiped an annoying warmth on the back of his neck and his hand came back coated with blood. Now he was really beginning to get shook. One can live without legs but necks are a necessity. Two corpsman came to his rescue just about as he was to pass out. They stopped the flow of blood from the neck and cut through the three layers of clothing on his leg. After the bare left leg was bound with field bandages, it too stopped bleeding. The morphine began to kick in and things started getting a little hazy. Burl was put on a stretcher and taken down the hill. He and his stretcher were strapped to a tank for transport back to a field hospital. He remembers grinning at the tank commander and feeling as if they were floating across water barriers. This was the only time Burl was high on drugs.

The field hospital was not as glamorous as shown in the TV series MASH. They cleaned Burl up, somewhat, remember he had been fighting for several days, no shower, no shave, several layers of clothing. The only thing that had been changed was socks. H/3/1 Marines always kept a fresh pair of socks next to their body because wet feet freeze easily. Some of his thoughts during this period include:

"Next day I'm feeling good, By the time I get back from Japan it will be spring and we will not need the plastic explosive to break the permafrost to dig us a hole for the night. But alas, it was not to be, Fewer casualties came in and there was no need to send anyone not seriously wounded to Japan."

PFC Carmel F. Gillman was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1951

Burl Waits was feeling good. He was thinking, "By the time I get back from Japan it will be spring and we won't need the plastic explosive to break the permafrost to dig a hole for the night." But alas, it was not to be, Fewer casualties came in and there was no need to send anyone not seriously wounded to Japan. He would just have to wait out his recuperation in the field hospital.

1/1 and 2/1 advancing abreast had a fight while going up against two hills of a ridge just south of the first phase objectives.

When H/3/1's CO or 1st Sergeant noticed any replacement who seemed nervous or tense, they would keep him with the Company CP group until they became adjusted. A Marine from Bayonne, NJ was one that typified one of the "Dead End" kids. He somehow kept a cigarette on his lips that would flip up and down as he talked. He used quite a bit of strong language (Didn't we all?). H/3/1 received a probing attack the day he arrived. 1st Sgt. Cabe told him to get behind a large boulder and stay there. The Marine didn't like that so MSgt. Cabe raised his voice (as any 1st Sgt. would) to emphasize his desires. After the
IN KOREA

attack, they went to get the Marine. He wasn't there. Someone said they had seen him
heading for the rear.

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1951

Gen. Moore, IX Corps CG, had died of a heart attack shortly after a Helicopter
accident. He was replace by Gen. Smith. This is one of the few times in history that a
Marine General Commanded a Corps which included Army units.

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1951

EUSAK issued orders that the second phase of Operation KILLER would commence on March
1st. The second phase called for 3/1 to take Hill 321.
From newly won positions in the high ground south of Hoengsong, the Marines could
look across the soggy plain to their Phase II objective, the hills to the north of the
battered town. Hoengsong occupied a valley at the confluence of two rain-swollen streams.
This triangular area of low, flat ground lay between the Marine units and the hills that
must be taken in the final phase of Operation KILLER. The 1st and 7th Marines were up
front, with the 5th Marines in reserve.
The scheme of maneuver called for 3/1 to sideslip into the zone of 3/7, in order to
be in position for the advance across the Hoengsong plain. This required a crossing of the
Som River and a combined assault with 3/7 on the high ground along the West Bank.
The problem with crossing the river was that it was 200 feet wide and chest deep at
the most likely crossing site. Without engineers available, this problem had to be solved.
A text book solution, "Swiss Bent Bridge," was hastily fabricated by W/3/1.

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1951 WEDNESDAY

Before dark two spans, one 120 foot long and another 60 foot long, were linked by a
sandbar in mid steam of the Som River. It wasn't a great bridge but it would get the
Marines across the River.

THURSDAY, MARCH 1,, 1951

The improvised bridge stood up well this morning when the battalion crossed to the
West Bank. 3/1 was behind 3/7 during the bridge crossing. After crossing the bridge 3/7
gained the first 1,000 yards under cover of a vigorous artillery preparation and belated
air strikes. Then 3/1 passed through with an attack at 0800. The enemy apparently put up
a hard fight only when he could not withdraw in time to avoid the conflict. 3/1 joined up
with 2/1 in the afternoon and dug in for the night to the left of Hill 208.

FRIDAY, MARCH 2, 1951 FRIDAY

The 2nd Platoon Leader, Lt. Ron Mason, was scheduled to take an aviation aptitude
test this morning but never got the opportunity.
One of the objectives for the day was to take Hill 303 north of Hoengsong. Sgt. Jack
Dedrick, a machine gunner with the 2nd Platoon, had just waded across a river that may have
been the Imjin or Som River. They were still on Operation KILLER and operating near
Hoensong. Then all Hell let loose when they were ambushed. A kid in Jack's squad was hit
and then PFC Donald Colgett was hit. Jack ran for the Corpsman, Melvin McNea, who attended
to the two Marines. He told Jack that there wasn't much hope for Colgett. Jack grabbed
his hand and said, "Donny don't be afraid. I'm with you. Open your eyes and look at me.
Damnit listen to me." Jack said a prayer and some stretcher-bearers came from no where.
Jack said, "Get him back here where the corpsman can help him". It was too late for
medical help. Donny was gone. Jack collected himself and caught up with the rest of the
Platoon to find out that Lt. Mason, the Platoon Leader, had also been WIA.
PFC Eng courageously performed his duties and earned a Bronze Star for his actions
before he was KIA during the assault on Hill 303. His citation reads as follows.

“For heroic achievement in connection with operations against the enemy while serving with a Marine rifle company in KOREA on 2 March 1951. Private First Class ENG displayed outstanding courage and initiative in the performance of his duties as an ammunition carrier. During the company’s assault on hill 303 north of Hoengsong, he repeatedly exposed himself to heavy small arms and machine gun fire to bring ammunition to the forward guns of his machine gun section. When the gunner and assistant gunner were wounded, he immediately manned the gun and delivered accurate and effective fire in support of the assaulting elements until he was mortally wounded, gallantly giving his life for his country. Private First Class Eng’s courageous actions were in inspiration to all the members of the company, and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the united States Naval Service.”

Combat "V" authorized.

PFC Ron Whitacre was with Lt. Mason when the machine gun blew out a section of Mason's leg bone. Then Jack saw McNea get hit and die soon after. Jack checked his ammo and didn't have much left. He reported this to his Platoon Sergeant, TSgt. Grooms, who told him to see if he could find some ammo. While Jack was gone TSgt. Grooms had gone to help a person who had been wounded. When Jack got back he found that TSgt. Grooms had also received a wound that would result in lose of an eye. Jack's other machine gun squad had also been shot up pretty bad.

Lt. Ron Mason’s wounds were severe enough to keep him from taking the aviation aptitude test and later qualifying him for the aviation program. PFC Ron Whitacre was watching while Corpsman McNea was working on Mason. Ron Whitacre heard a groan and McNea keeled over. He had been fatally shot in the back while working on Lt. Mason.

PFC Jackie Cromer, also of the 2nd Platoon, remembers some action from this day. They had come across a valley, waded through a stream, and were moving up a hill that had caused them to be a little winded from the climb. His squad Leader, a Sgt., was about fifteen feet ahead of Jackie when he turned to wave the squad to move up the hill. As he turned to give the motion, he was hit with machine gun bullets; one bullet hit his pack and cut the strap to cause the pack to fall from his back; one went through his canteen; one hit his helmet and went around this helmet; and one went through the fat of his leg. The Squad leader fell backwards and Jackie Cromer grabbed him. The Sgt lifted his leg for Jackie to inspect. Jackie cut open his pants leg to find that there was a small hole on one side and the other side was mushroomed out where the bullet had exit. Just as Jackie was beginning to apply a bandage, a Corpsman arrived to take over.

After the enemy was dispatched, they moved about one hundred yards to the top of the next ridge when they realized some of the Marines had left their packs on the last ridge. Jackie Cromer went back to get the packs. Jack picked up his pack and another. When he returned over the ridge the platoon had gone and he had lost sight of them. He continued over the ridge to find they had gone down the side of the ridge and were going up the next ridge through some trees where Jackie soon lost sight of the Platoon. A mortar landed about twenty feet from Jackie to throw dirt in his face while he was trying to catch up with the Platoon. Sporadic incoming mortars were still falling when he caught up with the Platoon.

PFC Keith Davis, with the 3rd Platoon, also remembers this day:

It was early morning when the 3rd Platoon received orders to jump off at 0800. They moved from the staging area on the banks of a river. They moved into the hills with the 3rd Platoon on line.

The mission, as Keith recalls, was to take a series of hills, then set up a defense and await orders for the next day. At 0800 they moved progressively up the slopes of the first hill. The 155s had lifted their fire and everything was normal with light resistance. Continuing on to the second hill was the same as the first. Then the stumbling block came on the 3rd hill. Here the enemy was entrenched at the crest of the hill shooting directly down at the 3rd Platoon to pin them down. The other platoons were advancing as planned on their objectives and the 3rd Platoon was being left behind. The 3rd Platoon Leader, Lt. Vic O'Hanesian told Keith to make contact with the flanking platoons and tell them to hold up until the 3rd Platoon could continue.
By this time the Sun was out and its warmth was most welcome by all. This was the first time Keith had felt thawed out since the Chosin. Keith was huddled behind a small embankment where small arms fire had him pinned down. He distinctly remembers laying on his back with his weapon cradled in his arms, looking up at the beautiful sky and warm sun thinking aloud, "Lord, this is a beautiful day to die!"

Complying with his orders, Keith left to look for the other parts of the Company. Snooping the best he could, he searched and searched the right flank for the Company with no luck. They were moving faster than expected and the "hard luck 3rd" (as Capt. Corley referred to them) was still pinned down. In the process of looking for the Company, Keith became lost and ended up on the same hill the 3rd Platoon was attacking. He saw an enemy soldier with an automatic weapon with a barrel over 6 feet long firing at the 3rd Platoon. Keith dispatched about six rounds to put him out of action permanently. Keith returned to the 3rd Platoon just in time to participate in Lt. O'Hanesian's charge up the hill. When they reached the top, they were in hand-to-hand combat with an enemy platoon until the enemy broke contact and retreated.

The backside of the hill broke off into two ridges or spurs. Lt. O'Hanesian and Davis took one squad on the left ridge and another squad took the right ridge while the remaining squad took the gullies in between. Things were going pretty well with the Chinese on the run and the 3rd Platoon in hot pursuit. As Lt. O'Hanesian and Keith started moving down the ridge a Chinese soldier from the Gullies who they thought was dead jumped up with his burp gun and fired. Keith heard many rounds whizzing by him and one of them hit him in the right hand. The impact was so great it picked up his 175 pound carcass and tossed it on the other side of the ridge.

O'Hanesian was also hit in the ankle by the same blast but not enough to disable him. He ran to Keith's side of the ridge to find him with his hand dangling from his arm and twisted back to his elbow. He was bleeding profusely. A Corpsman was right behind the Lt. He fabricated a tourniquet, gave morphine, and tagged Keith. Two Marines escorted Keith back to safety at the top of the hill. Capt. Corley and 1st Sgt Cabe were there to look Keith over and told the two Marines to continue to escort him back to the medical evacuation area on the river bank before he bled to death. At the evacuation area they pulled another wounded Marine from the helicopter to make room for Keith. Keith was on one of those long trips home that so many Marines took (field hospital, hospital in Korea, hospital in Japan, and then to the USA). At the Field Hospital in Korea he saw Lt. O'Hanesian who was there for just a short while to get his ankle fixed before returning to the line.

The following eight H/3/1's Marines and a Corpsman died during this day's fighting.

PFC Edward J. Bohnas from Portland, OR
PFC Donald Richard Colgett, a machinegunner from CA (WIA/DOW in the abdomen)
PFC Daniel J. Eng, 1st Plt., from Midland, SD
PFC William Kenneth Erdman, 3rd Plt., from Walla Walla, WA (HQMC is showing William was in 1st Mar, 1st Mar. Div at the time of his death.)
HM3 Melvin Gerald McNea, 2nd Plt., from Bottineau, ND
PFC Joe E. Neely, 3rd Plt., from Pelzar, SC
PFC Brian F. Sheppard from Staten Island, NY
Cpl Howard K. Walling from Omaha, NE
PFC Harvey Francis Wellman, 2nd Plt., from Passaic (or Newark), NJ

A list of the known WIA's include:
PFC Keith E. Davis (3rd Sqd, 3rd Plt) (burp bun - lost a hand - evac)
PFC Marvin "Goose" Gandy 1st Section, Machine Gun Platoon
TSgt Stanley Grooms, MG Plt., (evac. Lost an Eye)
Lt. Ron Mason, 2nd Plt., (leg wound - Evac. - did not return to the Company)
2nd Lt. Victor "Vic" O'Hanesian (3rd Plt Ldr) burp gun in ankle - not evac
PFC Milo H. Sillman, MG Plt., (evac. lost an eye)

The following were dropped from the Company.
PFC Edward J. Bohnas  PFC Donald Richard Colgett  PFC Daniel J. Eng
PFC William Kenneth Erdman  HN Melvin G. McNea  PFC Joe E. Neely
PFC Brian F. Sheppard  Cpl Howard D. Walling  PFC Harvey F. Wellman
At daybreak the men of 3/1 looked to the north and could see their final objectives, Hill 321. The five-volume set, "U.S. Marines Operations in Korea," says that the terrain gave 3/1 more trouble than the enemy when they were taking Hill 321 where the CCF troops had supposedly already begun their withdrawal. However, records show that; PFC Denver Henry Boling; and Cpl. William Clark Jewell, Jr. in the 3rd Platoon from Bellville, MI were listed as KIA. PFC Albin A. Dlabaj, a member of Jewell's fire team, recalls that Jewell was shot with a rifle bullet (possibly in the face) while assaulting Hill 321. If these were casualties from battle, the terrain must have really been Hell.

Cpl William Jewell received the Bronze Star Medal (with Combat "V") for his actions on this date. His award gives good details of the action that happened this date. His award reads;

"with numerically superior enemy forces his platoon was pinned down by accurate enemy fire. In the absence of the squad leader, who was evacuating a seriously wounded Marine to the battalion aid station, he with complete disregard for his own personal safety, assumed command of the squad and led the men in an assault against the enemy forces. Though exposed to direct enemy small arms, mortar and machine gun fire, he fearlessly led the squad and directed their fire against the enemy until he was mortally wounded and gallantly gave his life for his country. His timely actions and coolness under fire served as an inspiration to all who observed him and materially contributed to the success achieved by his company."

Cpl James "Jim" J. Molnar was also one of the WIA on this day. He had told PFC Joseph "Joe" J. Zubeck that, if he gets killed, "Joe" could have his Smith and Weston K38 combat master piece pistol that he had brought to Korea with him. Shrapnel broke his right arm this day and he was treated by Corpsman HN Gilbert "Doc Gil" Heyblom. The doc patched him up, gave him a shot of morphine and sent him with the other walking-wounded back to the aid station. He didn't give his pistol to Joe Zubeck because he thought he would be able to keep it. When he arrived at the aid station, they didn't know he had been given a shot of morphine so they gave him another one. After being evacuated back to a medical company, they gave him another shot of morphine and then he really was on cloud nine.

Cpl Durward F. Alexander was WIA this date.

PFC Duane Trowbridge was also WIA in the head. He was evacuated to an Army Hospital by Helicopter.

The 1st Marines reached the mopping-up stage, while the 7th Marines prepared to go up against an unexpected last-ditch stand of the enemy on Hills 536 and 333 to the left of 3/1. Operation KILLER ended at nightfall on this day though mopping up continued through the following day. Total Marine casualties for the 8 days of fighting were 395 with 48 KIA, 2 MIA, and 345 WIA. Enemy losses amounted to 274 counted dead and 48 prisoners. It is certain however, that the actual enemy KIA and WIA figures were much higher, since the withdrawing Communists buried some of their dead and took their wounded with them.

Any evaluation of this limited objective operation must credit the allies with achieving its main purpose of keeping the Communists off balance while they were striving desperately to make ready for another great offensive. This explains why the enemy, as a whole, put up a half-hearted resistance. He preferred to withdraw whenever possible and fight another day.


PFC Keith E. Davis, TSgt Stanley V. Grooms (who was WIA on Mar. 2nd), and PFC Ray E. Smith were dropped from the Company.
MONDAY, MARCH 5, 1951

The following Marines were dropped from the Company:

2nd Lt. Ron Mason (who was WIA on Mar. 2nd)
PFC Anthony Belpulsi
Edward E. Blackburn
Cpl Joseph Bulman
PFC Keith E. Davis
PFC Guadalupe Esparza
John H. Fincher Jr.
Cpl Marlin S. Johnson
PFC Samuel B. Whitesell

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 7, 1951

The jump-off of Operation RIPPER was scheduled to begin at 0800. It is no secret that Gen. Ridgway was disappointed in the numbers of enemy soldiers put out of action during Operation KILLER. The primary purpose of RIPPER was to inflict as many Communist casualties as possible, and by means of constant pressure, to keep the enemy off balance in his buildup for a new offensive. A secondary purpose was to outflank Seoul and the area between that city and the Imjin River, thus compelling the enemy to choose between default or defense on unfavorable terms.

The morning dawn was cold and clear with snow falling in the afternoon. The Hoengsong-Hongchon road, winding through Kunsamma Pass, paralleled the boundary between the two Marine assault regiments, the 7th Marines on the left and the 1st Marines on the right. They jumped off to attack in line abreast, employing all three battalions when the broken terrain permitted, while the 5th Marines continued its patrolling activities in the Hoengsong area as Division Reserve.

Sgt Harold Cutler, the 3rd squad leader of the 3rd Platoon was walking behind a tank and talking on the phone during the action. The tank ran over a machine gun bunker. Harold had no advanced warning and didn’t see the bunker until he fell into it. He injured his knee although he didn’t notice it immediately. Later, the knee locked up and periodically gave him problems.

The two Marine assault regiments met light resistance on D-Day. Both took their objective with little trouble except for scattered bursts of machinegun fire. The Division's total casualties for the day were seven men wounded.

THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 1951

Resistance stiffened without becoming serious during the day. Company A of 1st Tank Battalion supported 3/1 which received heavy CCF mortar and small-arms fire. Well-placed rounds by the 11th Marines silenced the enemy in this quarter, and both battalions of the 1st Marines reached their assigned positions by nightfall.

The advance this second day gave added proof that the enemy was up to his old trick of putting up a limited defense while pulling back before the Marines could come to grips. Log bunkers were ideal for the CCF delaying tactics. Each was a little fortress that might enable a squad to stand off a company while larger CCF units withdrew.

PFC Milo “Mike” H. Sillman (who was WIA on Mar. 2nd) was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, MARCH 9, 1951

The Marine advance came to a halt to wait for Army units to catch up on the right. While 2/1 took blocking positions, the 1st and 7th Marines sent out patrols on both flanks in an effort to regain lateral contact with allied units.

About this date Cpl Burl Waits got leave from the hospital to visit the H/3/1 and the
3rd Platoon. He was still limping but his neck had healed. He would be returned back to the unit soon. They had left the shrapnel in his leg as they often do when removing it could cause more problems than just leaving it.

SATURDAY, MARCH 10, 1951

1st Mar. Div. operations were limited to patrolling. A good deal of activity took place in the rear as Marine service units moved up to Hoengsong.

PFC Robert E. Geib, PFC Joseph P. McKenna, PFC Harry F. Orlick, and HN Gilbert C. Heyblom were dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, MARCH 11, 1951

Division Reconnaissance Co., reinforced by a platoon of tanks resumed the advance after 3/1 relieved 2/1. Although the enemy withdrew from most of his positions without putting up much resistance, a patrol of G/3/1 had a hot firefight on Hill 549.

MONDAY, MARCH 12, 1951

The 3rd Platoon, reinforced with a tanks and artillery FO, was on a Combat patrol near Hoensong. PFC Sidney "Sid" Escher was in the fire team that was on point near the top of a ridge when they were hit. When someone yelled, "grenades" and burp gun fire started coming Sid jumped over the side of the ridge and into a hole/depression to take cover. Something caught his attention in his peripheral vision and about that time he felt a sharp pain in his groin as if his testicles were twisted and suddenly became sick to the stomach. Somebody told Sid, "Your hit in the legs. Try to get out of the line of fire." Sid turned around and rolled down the hill a little farther. Soon Pat Patterson (don't know if this is Corpsman Raymond Patterson or Cpl Drewery Patterson) and Cod Holeman came to take care of Sid. Sid had a hard time hanging on while one of them carried him piggy back down to the bottom of the hill. He was trying to fight the shock to remain conscience. At the bottom of the hill they put him on a tank to transport him to the rear. While on the tank he could hear the small arms fire ricocheting off the tank. When they got back a little farther he was transferred to an ambulance for further transfer to a Field Hospital. In the ambulance they began cutting his clothing off to check the extent of his injuries. Both legs were wounded.

An artillery radioman that was attached to H/3/1 was also wounded in this action.

It is interesting to note the several parts of his trip that eventually got him to the hospital ship. Soon after getting to the Field Hospital the sent him to an airfield where he remained for four or five days until the snow stopped and planes could land to evacuate him further. This is where his legs began to get gangrenous. Eventually a plane arrived to take him to another landing strip where he went, via ambulance, to a train that was transporting several patients. The train took him to a place near Pusan where he was again transported via ambulance to the USS Repose. The lifted him aboard the Repose by a crane and he was soon in the operating room.

Chinese resistance continued to be light through the 14th as the two Marine Regiments occupied rather than seized ground.

Operation RIPPER was in progress and H/3/1 was still operating near Hoensong.

PFC Roy Gomez who had only joined the Company a few days earlier was fatally wounded by a grenade. He was from Houston, TX and is buried there.

PFC Fred J. Acquavita, PFC Jimmy E. Burwell, PFC Roy Gomez, Jerome M. Plunkett, Sgt. Forrest L. Smith, and George E. Watson were dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, MARCH 13, 1951

The first thing they tell you in the basic training is to stay off the sky line. PFC Raymond T. Lester was told to dig a fox hole (where else?) on a sky line and, sure enough, the basic instructors knew what they were talking about because he took a slug through his
cigarette lighter and into an artery in his leg. This was eventually corrected with surgery in Memphis Naval Hospital.

Cpl Lowell R. Riffey went on a patrol this night.
Cpl Raymond T. Lester was dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 1951

Cpl Lowell R. Riffey wrote home that they moved about eight miles into Hongchong and set up for the night.

By this date all units were dug in along Phase Line Albany. With scarcely a pause on Phase Line Albany, the second phase of Operation RIPPER began on this day with a drive toward Phase Line Buffal. It was hoped that the 1st Mar. Div., on the right and the 1st Cav. on the left, could manage a pincher movement to trap enemy troops in the vicinity of Chongchon. The plan also called for an airdrop by the 187th Airborne. However, the enemy withdrew soon enough to prevent entrapment.

The 1st Marines reached an intermediate objective (Phase Line Baker) by the end of the day virtually unopposed. Flash floods churning roads into hub-deep mud were the greatest enemy. ROK National Guard troops brought supplies to the front VIA A-frames on their backs. Several hundred porters were attached to each regiment during Operation RIPPER.

While ascending a hill the third Platoon's third squad leader, Sgt William "Bill" Cutler's, knee gave out on him. In action previous to this day he had been walking behind a tank using the telephone when he fell in to a hole and injured his knee. He was sent to a hospital and then released when they thought his knee was sufficiently healed. This time it was really out of whack. His knee injury put him in the hospital again and he was never to return to H/3/1. After getting out of the hospital he was stationed at an airfield where there was an ammo dump.

PFC Newman C. Elwell reported that he was WIA (machine gun slugs in the leg and thigh) on this date.

PFC Raymond T. Lester, Sgt Harold W. Cutler, PFC George J. Elsasser, Sgt Marcel A. Maloney, PFC Duane D. Trowbridge, Cpl Lewis W. Wilkinson, and Cpl Lonnie R. Wood were dropped from the company.

THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 1951

About this date the 6th draft arrived. The following Marines joined, or left, the indicated units in H/3/1.

MG. Plt. Ldr.     Morris Sam McGee (joined)
MG. Plt.          John Corzan (rotated to USA)
MG. Plt.          Stanley "Gunny" Grooms (left)
1st Plt. Corpsman Raymond "Doc" Patterson (joined)
1st Plt. 1st Sqd  Norman Mother Hensley (joined)
1st Plt. 2nd Sqd  Walt Dick Benson (joined)
1st Plt. 2nd Sqd  Thomas "Tom" Hackett (joined)
1st Plt. 2nd Sqd  Donald "Don" Myers (left)
1st Plt. 3rd Sqd  Francis "Frank" Leon (joined)
1st Plt.          Jerome Jerry Plunkett (left)
1st Plt.          John "Jack" Sheard (joined)
2nd Plt Ldr       2nd Lt. Ron Mason (rotated to USA)
2nd Plt Ldr       Joseph "Joe" Reed (joined)
2nd Plt.          Joseph Al Bulman (left)
2nd Plt.          John "Kiwi" Kwiecien (left)
2nd Plt.          George Rich (Skip) Richardson (left)
2nd Plt.          Richard "Dick" Wolfcale (left)
3rd Plt. 1st Sqd  James "Jim" E. Jarrett (joined)
3rd Plt. 3rd Sqd. James "Jim" Day (joined)
Capt. Corley recalls two other incidents involving replacements that happened during the March or April time frame.

(1) One was assigned to Capt. Corley as a runner. He had one year of college and was very intelligent. One day shortly after he had been assigned he said, "Captain, may I ask a stupid question?" Capt. Corley said, "No question is stupid if it is asked in good faith." The Marine said, "We're in a perimeter so, if we get attacked, which way do I fire?" Capt. Corley said, "The next time we get attacked, no matter how busy I am, ask me the question again." They had an attack that night and Capt. Corley remembered him and his question. He called to the Marine and said, "Now do you know which direction to fire?". He said, "Yes Sir." Capt. Corley told the Marine to crank off a couple of rounds just to get a feel of it. He did.

(2) Capt. Corley always spoke privately to each new replacement. This time they had arrived after dark and Capt. Corley had a coleman lantern in a tent near his foxhole. This Sgt. came in with .30 caliber ammo all over him; a clip between each cartridge belt pouch, field jacket pockets loaded, clips attacked to each pocket on his field jacket, and a bandolier around his neck. Capt. Corley asked if he had ever been in combat. The Marine responded with a, "No Sir, but I can't wait." After talking a bit the Marine left and Capt. Corley told MSgt. Cabe that the guy that just left will probably get the Medal of Honor or he won't last 5 minutes. The next day incoming mortars produced a small, about 1/8-inch, niche in the Marine's thumb. He had to be sent to Battalion and they never saw him again.

The 1st ROK Division retook Seoul without a fight. This was the fourth time Seoul had changed hands in nine months.

A count of the UN ground and support forces in and around Korea at this time was 494,000. The Communists had 504,000 troops in Korea plus whatever might have been the strength of the eight additionally reported armies and the rear service elements. In addition, large CCF Reserves were available just over the border in Manchuria.

The 1st Marines were meeting opposition, which indicated that the enemy might be planning to make a stand on the high ground east and north of Hongchon. Patrols were sent. Cpl Harry R. Jacobsen received a Letter of Commendation for his "Outstanding Courage, Skill, and Aggressiveness" during the this action. His citation reads as follows:

"For excellent service in the line of his profession while serving with a Marine rifle platoon during operations against the enemy in KOREA on 15 March 1951. Corporal JACOBSEN, serving as a fire team leader, displayed outstanding courage skill and aggressiveness during a sharp patrol action between the company and a strong enemy force occupying heavily entrenched and well camouflaged positions on the ridge, which offered it superior visibility and maximum employment of its firepower. The leading elements of the company became pinned down, withering enemy fire coming from all directions. Directly to the front was an enemy bunker which was offering the company particularly heavy resistance. Without regard for his own personal safety, he immediately deployed his fire team to positions from which the could set up an effective base of fire, while he moved forward and approached the bunker from its blind side, and hurled a grenade through its firing aperture. His quick and decisive actions resulted in the killing of the bunker's occupants, serving as an inspiration to all who observed him. Corporal JACOBSEN's conduct throughout was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Commendation Ribbon with Combat "V" Authorized.

Cpl Lowell R. Riffey wrote home to say: "We started out again. The lieutenant read his map wrong and we got in the wrong spot to make our assault on the hill that was to be taken. Shortly after noon we were in a position that he thought would do some good. All this time we had not made contact with the enemy. Just about the time we were in position we ran into them. All I can say is the Lord was sure with us that day. We did not keep
the hill that night. We got up the hill we were to take but we were so scattered out we could not have held it that night had there been a counter attack, so we dropped back across the valley to high ground.

PFC Fermon Lindsey also saw some action this day for which he received the Bronze Star, with Combat "V". His citation reads as follows:

"For heroic achievement ... serving as an assistant gunner of a rocket launcher, attached to and infantry platoon, displayed outstanding skill, courage and confidence in the performance of his duties. On one occasion while assaulting strong, well-entrenched enemy positions in the vicinity of Hoengsong, Korea, his platoon was pinned down by accurate fire from a concealed enemy mortar position. Though subjected to direct enemy small arms, mortar, and machine gun fire, he fearlessly moved to an exposed position in order to assist the rocket launcher gunner in locating and destroying the enemy mortar emplacement. With complete disregard for his own personal safety he remained in the the exposed position assisting the rocket launcher gunner until the enemy mortar emplacement as completely neutralized. His initiative and aggressive actions enabled his platoon to continue their assault, thereby setting an example for all who serve with him ..."

FRIDAY, MARCH 16, 1951

In his letter home Cpl Lowell R. Riffey continued, "... and they returned this morning and took the same ground without any resistance, of which we were all thankful."

The 1st Marines prepared to resume the attack early in the morning. However, the enemy had pulled out from Hill 428 during the night and patrols advanced more than 300 yards without making contact.

SATURDAY, MARCH 17, 1951

Cpl Lowell R. Riffey continued in his letter to say, "The Battalion went into reserve (either this day or later in the day yesterday). It sure is good to stop and get a little rest, I must say. They did not hold reveille on us this morning and it was 9:15 when I got up and 10:30 by the time I got through with chow."

IX Corps orders were received that directed the 1st Mar. Div. to continue the attack from Line Baker to Line Buffalo about five miles to the north. Division moved out with the 1st Marines in the Division's right front.

TUESDAY, MARCH 20, 1951

On this date Capt. Clarence E. Corley Jr. was dropped from the Company. He was replaced by as CO by 1st William J. Allert. Capt. Corley had lost his voice and was near Pneumonia. Battalion ordered him to recover at the BN Aid Station. About this time Capt. Corley was relieved as CO of H/3/1 and assumed command of H&S/3/1. A buck Sgt. had been assigned as acting Sgt. Major. Capt. Corley talked to the Battalion XO and requested that MSgt. Cabe be transferred to H&S to act as Battalion Sgt. Major. The XO granted the request and MSgt Cabe probably became Battalion Sgt. Maj. About May 30th when he was dropped from H/3/1. Although it is not known for sure, 1st Lt Allert may have been employed as a media man (newsmen, radioman, etc.???) in civilian life and may have been from the San Antonio, TX area.

At first MSgt. Cabe was not too happy about the transfer. Capt. Corley said he was tired and assumed Cabe was too. They rode everywhere and Cabe was pretty content. Cabe's rotation orders to the U.S.A. arrived before Capt. Corley's. The day he was leaving Cabe said, "Skipper, this ain't right. You should go before me." Capt. Corley said he would be leaving in a week or two and might even see him on the West Coast. Cabe stated taking off a G.I. watch that Capt. Corley had given him (along with other officers) at the Inchon landing. Capt. Corley said, "Cabe, you've had it so long, keep it. As you know, we are in a combat accountability system so you lost the watch somewhere. It was an emotional farewell.
Again the enemy chose withdrawal to resistance. The Buffalo Line was reached on this day after encountering only sniper fire and a few scattered mortar rounds. The final objective on the Buffalo Line, Hill 330, was taken at 1315 after F/2/1 had been pinned down for a while. 2/1 had overrun the enemy’s main line of resistance without a casualty.

The attack continued on this day as the 1st Mar. Div. jumped off from Line Buffalo toward the Cairo Line another five miles to the north.

The Chinese had a bead on Sgt. Jack Dedrick (2nd Squad, Machine Gun Platoon, attached to the 2nd Platoon) who was partly hidden by a tree and down off the ridgeline. The tree blocked most of the burst but one hit him in the leg just below the knee. It felt like somebody had hit him with a barrel slat. He was afraid to look. He said to Johnny Johnson (Probably PFC Richard J. Johnson) who was just a little below him, “Am I hit?” Johnny replied, “I don’t see anything”. Jack pulled up his pant leg and Johnny said, “Oh yeah, your bleeding”. Jack said he was very lucky that he didn’t have his leg planted when the bullet hit. The force of the bullet flipped his leg up behind him and, if he had his leg planted, it probably would have shattered his knee. As it was he had severe damage to his leg muscles and nerves just below the knee that would keep him in the hospital for the next month or two. Jack swapped his carbine with Leroy Ferkel who had an M1 so that he could have an automatic weapon. Jack wouldn’t let them take him down on a stretcher because he was afraid they would drop him and add to his injuries (He remembered carrying Eddy Guter down Hill 123 (Shrapnel Hill) with Piggy Yeatman and they dropped him a few times when they heard incoming mortar explosions. During his evacuation he saw Lt. Horace Johnson and PFC Joseph Eugene Caruso, two G/3/1 Marines. Joseph and Jack had both dated the same girl. Joseph had been in H/3/1 until Jan. 1, 1951. Joe’s home town was near Jack’s and Jack offered to contact anyone for Joe since he was obviously going home first. Jack did not return to H/3/1.

Aboard the hospital ship, Repose, Jack saw one of the CA reservists (name unknown), a friend of Donald Colgett. He was always complaining about his stomach pains when he got into certain positions. Some had thought he was faking the pain and shirking his duty. They found a needle-sized piece of shrapnel in his intestine and this was the cause of his pain.

A Marine Order authorized any Marine who had been WIA two times and twenty-four hours in a hospital to be removed from the combat zone. Jack now qualified and, when he got out of the hospital, put in his letter of request.

Cpl James Doran, who was in the 3rd Squad, 2nd Platoon, received (posthumously-KIA on Hill 902 on 4/23/08) the Commendation Medal with Combat “V” for his actions during this day. The award details some of his action during the day’s fighting in which the 2nd Platoon was involved. The award reads as follows:

"For excellent service in the line of his profession while serving with a Marine infantry company during operations in KOREA on 22 March 1951. Corporal DORAN, serving as a rifle-man in an infantry platoon, displayed great skill, courage and confidence in the performance of his duties. When his platoon was pinned down by fire from well entrenched and camouflaged enemy forces, he voluntarily went approximately 25 yards forward of his platoon to try to locate the enemy positions. Being unable to locate the positions, he stood up in an exposed area in order to draw enemy fire and thereby locate their positions. His actions contributed materially to the neutralizing of the enemy positions and to the successful advance of his platoon on its objective and set an example for all who observed him. Corporal Doran's conduct throughout was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

PFC Robert L. Kelsch and PFC Milo L. Gasper were dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, MARCH 23, 1951

PFC Donald A. Antes and PFC Sidney Escher were dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, MARCH 24, 1951
The 1st and 5th Marines had reached Line Cairo by this date having met comparatively light opposition from NKPA troops who had relieved the 66th and 39th CCF Armies. Apparently the enemy was using North Koreans as expendable, delaying elements while massing in the rear for an offensive that could be expected at any time. A smoke screen, produced by burning green wood from burning forests, shrouded the front in an almost constant haze.

Although the objectives of Operation RIPPER had been reached, Gen. Ridgway planned to continue the UN offensive for the purpose of keeping the enemy off balance. The 8th Army had been attacking with few and brief pauses for regrouping every since 21 February, and the CG wished to maintain the momentum.

SUNDAY, MARCH 25, 1951

PFC John W. Bergen, PFC J. D. Caldwell, PFC Felix V. Eppinette, PFC William E. Gotcher, Cpl John P. Laybourn, Cpl Andrew J. Scott, Cpl Jerry Williams, and PFC Joseph J. Zubeck were dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, MARCH 26, 1951

IX Corps ordered an Advance of The 1st Mar. Div. to a new Line Cairo this day. It was simply a northeast extension of the old line to the boundary between IX and X Corps. The movement involved the 1st Marines and the KMC Regiment moving up to a new line. This was done on schedule without opposition.

1st Lt. Roscoe Barrett and 2nd Lt. Edward Snelling were dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 1951

Eighth Army units had made average gains of about 35 miles during the last three weeks while driving nearly to the 38th parallel. On this day, Gen. Ridgway published the plan for Operation RUGGED. It was a continuation of the offensive, with Line Kansas as the new objective. The movement started with the 1st Marines being relieved by X Corps elements.

FRIDAY, MARCH 30, 1951

Sgt. Bobbie Richardson and PFC Thomas Fitzgerald were dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, APRIL 1, 1951

IX Corps informed 1st Mar. Div. of sweeping changes in their plans. Instead of being relieved as ordered on the 29th, the 1st Mar. Div. was ordered to continue forward with two infantry regiments plus the KMCs. Its new mission called for a relief of the 1st Cavalry Division north of Chunchon. This modification gave the 1st Mar. Div. responsibility for nearly 20 miles of front.

James "Jim" Jarrett wrote a letter home and identified the Marines in his squad this day. They were:

3rd Plt. 1st Sqd. Fire Team Leader  Cpl Harry "Jake" Jacobsen
3rd Plt. 1st Sqd. BAR man  PFC William F. Herzog
3rd Plt. 1st Sqd. Asst. BAR man  PFC Danny D. Rent
3rd Plt. 1st Sqd. Rifleman  PFC Richard L. Kidd
3rd Plt. 1st Sqd. Fire Team Leader  Cpl Loyd T. Bright
3rd Plt. 1st Sqd. BAR man  PFC Robert O. Adams
3rd Plt. 1st Sqd. Asst. BAR man  PFC Jim E. Jarrett
3rd Plt. 1st Sqd. Rifleman  Cpl Lyle Holland

MONDAY, APRIL 2, 1951
IX Corps instructed the 1st Marines to go into Division Reserve near Hongchon. PFC Robert L. Dunkin, PFC Ivan C. Jackson, PFC Lawrence T. Struwe, Cpl Thomas E. Thompson, PFC Richard C. Williams, and PFC Bradley Williamson were dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 4, 1951

About this date the 7th Marines crossed the 38th parallel going north again.

THURSDAY, APRIL 5, 1951

PFC William S. Clark was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, APRIL 7, 1951

PFC Robert N. Ingalls, PFC Richard J. Jackson, PFC Jack M. Miles, Cpl Harry A. Thornton, PFC Bernard T. Turner, and PFC John A. Watkinson were dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, April 8, 1951

Sgt James M. Martin, Sgt. Gerald C. Parker, and Cpl Marion S. Skinner were dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, APRIL 9, 1951

HN Ray D. Brickey and HN Billy J. Marks were dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, APRIL 10, 1951

The 1st Mar. Div. was poised on the Line Kansas for a drive to Line Quantico. An IX Corps directive put the operation on hold and for ten days the Marine activities were limited to patrolling and preparation of defensive works.

Cpl Durward Alexander was dropped from the Company and transferred to the 1st Prov. Casual Co.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 1951


PFC Glenn E. Kempf was dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, APRIL 15, 1951

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

H/3/1 Wireman Gilberto "Chico" Ramirez (joined)
H/3/1 60 MM Ldr Lt. Harold "Hal" Arutunian (joined)
60 MM mortars Adrian Lash L'Heureux (joined)
1st Plt. 2nd Sqd Ray Savell (joined)
1st Plt. 2nd Sqd Edward "Ski" Skokowski (joined)
2nd Plt. Jonathan "Jack" Bedrick (left)

(Jack was probably previously in the MG platoon and the 2nd platoon. It is not known when he moved between positions.

Cpl Robert E. Shelton was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, APRIL 21, 1951

Prisoner interrogation had revealed that the CCF was to begin a large-scale offensive
on April 22nd. Nevertheless, at 0700 the 1st Mar. Div. resumed the attack toward line Quantico with the KMC and 5th and 7th Marines in front. The 1st Marines were in reserve. Negligible resistance awaited the Marines and other IX Corps troops during advances of 5,000 to 9,000 yards. An ominous quiet hung over the front as green wood smoke from burning forests limited visibility to a few hundred yards. The enemy was using this tactic as a screening device.

The 6th ROK Division, on the 1st Marine Division's left, had lost touch opening a gap of 2,500 yards.

SUNDAY APRIL 22, 1951

Marine aircraft were on station when the 1st Marine Division resumed their forward movement at 0830. A CCF POW taken that afternoon confirmed previous POW statements that the 22nd was the opening day of the CCF's Fifth Phase Offensive. The front was quiet, however, as the three Marine infantry regiments advanced almost at will.

For weeks the Communist forces might have been compared to an antagonist, backtracking to get set for taking aim with a shotgun. During this night, the enemy pulled the trigger. Fortunately, the men in the hole had a two-hour notice that they were coming.

It was on the left of the 1st Marine Division that the situation first became critical. The 6th ROK Division never succeeded in closing the gap and restoring contact with the 1st Marine Division. But this failure was trivial as compared to the collapse of the entire 6th ROK Division an hour before midnight, leaving a gap wide enough for a major breakthrough.

The Chinese took advantage and started a large-scale attack at about 2000, attacking 1/1 on Horseshoe Ridge, a few miles north of the 38th parallel. The battle for Horseshoe Ridge raged throughout the night.
The 1st Marines was in Division Reserve and the 3rd Battalion was in Regimental reserve in bivouac just outside of Chonchon. This is about as far in reserve, and as safe, as a Marine can get. The Battalion had been following a training schedule to improve their combat efficiency. They also had integrated replacements into their ranks. PFC Jackie Cromer remembers they were in a rice paddy having an inspection when the word came to move out.

Early in the morning, shortly after midnight, the Division took prompt measures to cope with the emergency. They directed the 1st Marines and Division Recon Company to come immediately out of reserve, stop ROK stragglers, and setup defensive positions to protect the Division's left flank.

The entire left flank of the 1st Mar. Div. lay exposed to Chinese who had poured into the gap left open by disintegration of the 6th ROK Division. IX Corp's Orders called for the ROKs to reassemble on the Kansas line, but most of them straggled from 10 to 14 miles behind the positions they held prior to the CCF attack.

During the early morning hours 3/1 boarded trucks and was convoyed to the village of Todun-ni on the West Bank of the Pukhan River. They off-loaded trucks to proceed to their assigned position which was Hill 902, a 3,000-foot height that dominating the terrain ahead of them. The Chinese were also interested in this piece of real estate since it overlooked the river crossing use by the 1st Mar. Div. Pressure to beat the Communists to the crest mounted as NCOs urged the men to their utmost efforts over steep uphill trails.

3/1 won the race. Once in position, however, it was evident to Lt. Col. Banning that the three ridgelines leading up to the hill mass would have to be defended. This necessity imposed a triangular formation, and he placed Capt. Horace L. Johnston's G/3/1 at the apex, with 1st Lt. William J. Allert's H/3/1 on the left, and 1st Lt. William Swanson's I/3/1 on the right. The heavy machineguns of Maj. Edwin A. Simmons' Weapons Company were distributed among the rifle companies and 81mm mortars placed only 10 to 20 yards behind front lines. 3/1 dug in as best they could, but the position was too rocky to permit much excavation.

James "Jim" E. Jarrett, now from Cosby, MO, has written his recollections of April 23-24 1950. His recollections supplement an account of the action on Hill 902 documented by the CO of W/3/1 at the time, Maj. Edwin Simmons. Edward Simmons retired from the Marine Corps as a General. The following is what is known about H/3/1's actions on Hill 902. It is a compilation of the above two mentioned authors and information obtained from many other sources including personal interviews.

It was the latter part of April 1951, Jim Jarrett was serving as a rifleman, with H/3/1's 1st Squad, 3rd Platoon. They had fought their way up through central Korea, from Hoengsong to Chunchon during operation Ripper.

Most of their operations had been probing patrols. They would move out from their main line of defense until they hit the enemy, inflict as many casualties as possible, and then pull back to friendly lines. These were usually platoon or company sized patrols, which resulted in some hot fire-fights. The Chinese had been continuing a gradual withdrawal to the north, fighting delaying actions along the way.

On April 11th President Harry S. Truman announced he was relieving General Douglas MacArthur as Allied Commander of all forces in Asia, and was replacing him with Gen. Matthew Ridgway. This was a major news event for most of the world, but was scarcely mentioned by "Gyrenes" in the foxholes. Their main concern, was whether or not they would cross the 38th Parallel when they came to it. They were getting all kinds of information from the "official scuttlebutt" (gossip). One of the stories going around was that the 1st Mar. Div. was to be relieved when they reached the 38th parallel and returned to the States. The scuttlebutt had not always been too reliable, but once in a while it would turn out to be correct.

They lived from day to day. Anything that would shorten their time in combat would increase chances of making it home alive. Jim and his buddies had no clear cut goals as to what would constitute a victory and put an end to the war. Therefore, the scuttlebutt about the 38th Parallel lifted morale for the moment.
The 1st Marines had been in reserve for a few days. On this day they were located about five miles south of the 38th Parallel near the bombed out city of Chunchon. Jim recalls that there was scarcely a building left standing in Chunchon. Jackie Cromer also recalls that there were no building but only bomb craters and the resulting devastation. He also recalls that there had been about three large bunker containing 30 to 90 Chinese each that had been hit by bombs and virtually all were killed by the concussion.

During the morning Jim and his buddies received word through the scuttlebutt that thousands of Chinese were massing just north of the 38th Parallel. The scuttlebutt said they had orders to destroy the 1st Mar. Div. and that 3/1 would soon be moving up to the front lines. There was an unusual amount of activity in the area and Jim had the uneasy feeling that combat troops gets just before jumping off on the assault. In a short while the scuttlebutt was confirmed. Word was passed down through the chain of command that the Chinese had launched their Spring Offensive. The 6th ROK Division had collapsed and was in full retreat. The 1st Mar. Div.'s left flank was dangerously exposed. Jim's orders were to stand by to move out on a half-hour notice.

It's at times like this that one pauses for a moment and realize that you, or some of your buddies, will be missing around the campfire tomorrow. Many lives, both here and at home, will be changed forever.

The 2nd Platoon was in the process of having a rifle inspection when the word came to move out. By 1030, William "Cod" Holemon, the 3rd Platoon Sergeant, ordered his platoon to saddle up and move out. They marched route step in platoon formation for a short distance. Then boarded a convoy of waiting trucks and headed north, up the MSR.

This "Highway", like all others in Korea, was nothing more than a dirt/gravel road. Troops of the 6th ROK Division and civilian refugees were straggling down the road in the opposite direction. They were trying to get from harm's way and as far from the Chinese as possible. This was a bitter thing to witness. The U.S. had supplied these troops with all their equipment, weapons, ammunition, food, and clothing. Then U.S. troops were sent to the other side of the world to live in the hills like animals and to kill or be killed. All this for the purpose of "helping" liberate the South Korean homeland from North Korea, the aggressor that had overrun them. And now, here they were, running like frightened rabbits in the opposite direction, while H/3/1 was moving into the eye of the storm to do some more bleeding and dying for them. This wasn't exactly a morale builder and it made our boys ask themselves, "What in hell are we doing in this predicament?" However, Jim and the other Marines were only peons. For $58.00 a month they weren't being paid to think about such weighty matters. The big salaried, educated, politicians back in the States were doing all the heavy thinking for them. Oh, how they would loved to have went down the road with those ROKs, but they knew there was only one way they could go.

Army units and some ROK (Republic of Korea) were moving north along with H/3/1. Artillery units were also on the move. Trucks, Jeeps, and high brass were everywhere. As they got closer to the front it was obvious that something big was going on.

The Company Gunny Sgt, GySgt Robert "Gunny" "Bob" Marler, was riding in the same truck at the Army artillery FO. As they rode further and further up the road, the artillery FO continually expressed his concerns to Gunny Marler that they might be getting out of range of his artillery.

After riding for about an hour the Company arrived at the Pukhan River. They rolled across the Mojin bridge, across the 38th Parallel, and entered Communist North Korea. This time the scuttlebutt was wrong. So much for going stateside after crossing the 38th Parallel. Their morale dropped about ten points.

A few minutes later their convoy arrived near the village of Todun-ni where they disembarked from the trucks. As they were assembling next to the road, Jim noticed his buddy, William "Herk" F. Herzog, a fellow squad member from Jim's hometown of St. Joseph, MO. Herk seemed to be concentrating on the ROKs as they passed by on their trek to the south. Herk had an old BAR that had seen better days. He told Jim of a plan that had hatched in his fertile mind as he watched the ROKs walking down the road. It was a simple plan. Herk intended to scan the column, select the best-looking BAR in the outfit, and "take it away from the damn gook." Jim reasoned with him that it would probably be expedient to trade in his old BAR, and possibly prevent a firefight before they reached the
enemy. Herk agreed to try the barter method, with the stipulation that, "The damn gook had better want to trade or he wouldn't be needing a weapon, or anything else for that matter."

Shortly after making this profound statement, Herk spotted a beautiful shiny weapon. Herk immediately confronted the ROK soldier. Holding out his worn BAR out in an offering he said, "chang-ee chang-ee". The ROK soldier smiled broadly, bowed politely, and without hesitation made the trade. A day or two later, in the midst of a firefight, Herk learned that he had gotten the short end of the trade when the shiny "new" weapon jammed. This could have cost him his life. Fortunately Herk had his own personal back-up weapon. An automatic pistol he had purchased back in the States. But, at this moment, he and his assistant BAR-man, Richard Kidd, were admiring their "new" BAR and congratulating themselves on their good fortune. They formed in a column with the Battalion and moved off the road and onto a trail that followed a stream.

The word was soon passed that the 3,000-foot mountain that loomed up ahead was Hill 902. The military significance of this hill was that whoever controlled it dominated the Mojin bridge approaches and the Mojin bridge was the funnel through which the entire 1st Marine Division must withdraw. They were told it was their objective as well as the enemies, and the Chinese were closer to it. They also knew without being told that to be dug in on the high ground could mean their very survival in the coming battle.

The name "Korea" was derived during the Koryo Kingdom, meaning, "high and lovely land." The monster they were preparing to climb was definitely high, but at the moment, it didn't seem very lovely. The Marines immediately started to pick'um up and lay'um down.

It was a warm afternoon and men of the 3rd Platoon were loaded down with everything they owned, field packs, sleeping bags, ponchos, intrenching tool, weapons, their usual two hand grenades, one waist cartridge belt, and two shoulder bandoliers of ammunition. Their advance was relatively easy going until they reached an old abandoned gold mine. From that point on it became a real test of physical endurance. Many of the men had to carry mortar and rocket ammunition in addition to their own equipment. Walking/climbing was the only way to get up the mountain. The valley below was the fresh green of spring and ahead loomed Hill 902 with dark green trees and bare rock.

H/3/1 was the first Company in the Battalion to arrive at the base of the hill and climb the mountain. The passed an Army self-propelled artillery section as the started their climb.

PFC Al Ryan (Kear), a mortar man, recalls the Mortar Section was moving out to go up the hill. He was with PFC William K. Kaleo who had arrived with Al on the 7th draft. William had injured his knee and was having a hard time keeping up with the Mortar Section. He gave Al Ryan (Kear) his M1 and told him he would catch up.

The Company Gunny, who always brings up the rear of a column during the march, was in position to work with the stragglers. Gunny Marler came upon PFC William Kaleo, a Hawaiian of small stature, who was having a hard time keeping up with his bad knee. William assured the Gunny that he was ok and would eventually catch up. Gunny Marler told him to stay on the trail and ask where How Company was when he got to the top of the hill. The Gunny continued up the hill feeling sure that Kaleo would be catch up.

As Gunny Marler went further up the hill, he met up with the Battalion Commander, Col Banning, and the Army artillery FO with which he had shared the ride earlier. The FO was telling Col. Banning about his concerns of being out of range of his artillery. Col. Banning said that they had to have the artillery support. He told the FO to have the artillery shoot one round to see where it landed. This was done but nothing was heard. Col. Banning told the FO to have them shoot a salvo to see if the could detect the impact location. The bursts were heard shortly thereafter a few hundred yards down the hill behind them. Gunny Marler remember thinking that the rounds landed about where he had passed Kaleo. Later, when I/3/1 came up the hill behind H/3/1, they found PFC William Kaleo who had died of shrapnel wounds.

Hill 902 is shaped like a wishbone with the double prongs (ridges) pointing back, in the direction of the Marines. The ridge where the prongs joined was pointing away from them, in the direction of the enemy. The top was nearly solid rock and rose high into a clear blue sky. The ridge that extended away from the juncture of the wishbone, toward the enemy, was 110 meter higher than the two ridges running back in the direction of the
Marines. That far ridge reached a height of 1012 meters. The Military identify Hills by their height in meters. Thus Hill 902 was 902 meters high.

Jim Jarrett and five others were sent as a flank guard up the left side of the ridge the Battalion was climbing. 3/1 always had flank patrols out on both flanks of the main column when they were moving up. The ridge was very steep and climbing was time consuming but they pushed on. At one point Jim looked up the ridge that loomed above and to his left. He froze in place and warned the others. They did the same. There was a column of troops moving along the ridge and they appeared to have stopped and were looking down in Jim's direction. Jim's flank patrol was out in the open with no cover near by. He knew if the enemy above started firing, they wouldn't have a chance. Fortunately, the Column of troops above started moving out again. The Marines in the flank patrol still don't know who those troops were. Their still thanking their lucky stars they didn't start firing on them.

Much of the time the terrain was so steep that they actually had to climb the ridge using their hands. Jim's leg muscles were aching, back-straps were cutting into his shoulders, and the sweat stung his eyes as it dripped from under the steel helmet. They gasped for air and had to stop several times to catch their breath.

Burl Waits recalls that even before the sun went down they could hear shooting and explosions farther up the hill. He thinks it was probably the lead units of 3/1 routing out the Chinese forward observers for what turned out to be a lot of Chinese living their last days on this earth. At the time it was enough to know the bullets were not close. The climb consumed the Marines. Out of breath, and bone tired, they were prodded to keep moving up the hill.

It was late in the evening and very dark when Jarrett's flank patrol reached the summit. The Battalion was already dug in and waiting for the attack as they stumbled along the ridge looking for H/3/1's 3rd Platoon. Because of the fast pace up the hill, the stronger forged ahead and some lagged behind. This caused intermingling of personnel in different squads and Platoons. They were directed by men in G/3/1 to continue down the ridge to the left. A couple of the men in the flank patrol were concerned that they would not be dug in when the Chinese hit and decided to dig in with G/3/1. Jim continued on until he reached the juncture of H/3/1 and G/3/1. Jim dug in there with Cpl Lowell Holland, a soft spoken, likeable fellow from Big Springs, TX. Richard "Dick" Kidd recalls that he dug in with Herk. They always dug in with two men to a foxhole and usually ran four-hour shifts with one awake at all times. This is what is called fifty percent alert. A full night of uninterrupted sleep was uncommon.

It was dark when Burl Waits' squad finally stopped to dig their holes. The weather was good and the ground was no longer frozen. War sounds were intensifying up the ridge in front of them. Flares and an occasional tracer bullet added stress. Wounded marines being carried off the hill behind them made them nervous. Before they could get a good hole dug, they received orders to move up a few yards. They occupied and improved holes started by someone else. It was planned that one would watch while the other slept (fifty percent alert). Good theory, but no one really slept on this the longest night of their young life.

The Battalion's hasty defense was organized with three companies on line; G/3/1 straddled the rock peak of Hill 902 with an outpost out in the direction of the 1012 meter peak, there was a saddle that was about 15 yards wide that the Chinese would have to come through; H/3/1 was on G/3/1's left extending down the southeast ridge toward the Wojin bridge; and I/3/1 was on the right flank along the nose the Battalion had just climbed. W/3/1's heavy machineguns had been attached to George and Item Companies and 81mm mortars were a very short distance (10-20 yards) behind the rifle companies. The Battalion CP was located on the reverse slope just behind the juncture of G/3/1 and H/3/1. Slightly further back was the Battalion Aid Station. The Battalion had made it into position only about 20 minutes before the Chinese got there.

The Battalion was in a precarious situation. They had been in reserve and the Battalion's Forward Artillery Observer (FO) had been pulled away on another mission. Close air support was out of the question this late in the day. Naval gunfire was a hundred miles away. The 81mm mortar crews only had the rounds they could carry on their backs. If
it came to a fight, it would be with machineguns, rifles, and grenades against whatever the Chinese had.

Supply jeeps could get as far as the gold mine. To improve their situation, they were beginning to haul machinegun and mortar ammunition on the backs of Marines from there. At 2200 an artillery liaison and three FOs arrived. They were made up of casuals and spare parts but they did have a radio and were able to do some shooting for the Battalion. The Liaison Officer was Capt. Raymond G. Eibel, an Army field-artillery officer. Two of the FOs were also Army Officers. The third one was a Marine Lieutenant.

The ridge was solid rock covered thinly with soil. Jim Jarrett had just completed digging-in shortly before midnight when word was passed down the line to go to one hundred percent alert. This was a signal given when they were in imminent danger of being attacked. There was some sporadic fire on the point of the wishbone out in front of G/3/1 where an outpost was located. Shortly thereafter, all hell broke loose with machineguns, rifle fire, hand grenade explosions, and the heaviest mortar and artillery barrage Jim had encountered since his arrival in the "Land of the morning calm." It seemed as though the mountaintop was being blown away. Shells were raining down with earth shaking explosions that lit up the sky. Screams of agony and calls for Corpsman could be heard throughout the night. It seemed as though it would never end. It was a glimpse into hell. G/3/1 was being hit by a Chinese regiment and repelled it with the help of H/3/1 and I/3/1, which fired across it's flanks and sent reinforcements.

PFC James "Jim" Day was also arriving at the Company's position about this time.

On this day Cpl Durward F. Alexander died of wounds he received on Mar. 3rd. (His death may have been on Apr. 4th.)
By midnight the Chinese had overran the outpost in front of G/3/1. TSgt. Harold E. Wilson, second in command of G/3/1's center platoon was in the apex of the attack. Crawling from foxhole to foxhole, he was hit almost immediately in the right arm. His arm useless, a second bullet caught him in the leg. With his line being chipped to bits by the meat-grinding attack he fed in his support squad, getting hit again in the left shoulder and forehead. A platoon from H/3/1 was hurriedly shifted to bolster his position. While guiding them into his line, a mortar blast knocked him down and shrapnel fragments cut his cheek. There were many other heroic deeds that were also performed this night.

Elsewhere, men were fighting as bravely, if not as spectacularly as Harold Wilson. G/3/1 straddling the rock pinnacle felt the worst of the attack with waves breaking and cutting off to the left and right against H/3/1 and I/3/1. PFC Ron Whitacre was in a rain of enemy hand grenades. He threw back three but couldn’t get to the 4th one in time. It exploded and left him with severe wounds to the left knee, and right hip and arm. After this, all Ron could do was wait and hope for the best. It was a long night for him.

Burl Waits recalls that the sounds of rifle fire were continuous. Chinese troops continued to advance over the bodies of their dead comrades who tried earlier. Many hand grenades were used by the marines. The Chinese must have really wanted Hill 902 bad. Minutes seem like hours for the Marines. Burl tried to think about home or his girl, but the mind always returned to, “What if I die this night. I really don’t want to die.” By dawn his squad had moved several times and enemy fire was continuous. Foxholes were never deep enough for comfort. Burl was thinking that soon the Chinese will start digging in for the day and maybe, just maybe, someone with some authority will let us get the hell off this hill.”

PFC Jim Day remembers a runner looking for grenades for the Machine Gun Platoon Leader, Lt. Harry Schanning, who had taken over a machine gun alone and was under fire. Day crawled to Lt Schanning and gave him his only grenade. Day then rolled to the right and crawled another twenty feet to the right on the bottom level of a crossing pipe line. He didn’t know where the nearest friendly troops were on his right. From 0200 until shortly before daybreak he spent the night there shooting short bursts of about 3 rounds. At daybreak four jet planes went over the right hand ridge of Hill 902 (probably where I/3/1 was) and sprayed the enemy with rockets and machine guns. A short time later H/3/1’s CO, Lt. Allert, two squads, and a corpsman passed Jim. The Corpsman noticed Jim’s hands were burned. He dumped some powder on Jim’s hands and put a card in his pocket telling him to report to the Battalion Aid Station when the chance permits.

Lt Harry Schanning had left the machine gun and was headed toward Jim Day when he was hit. Jim went to him and it appeared that he was paralyzed from the waist down. The Lt. told Jim to go back to his position. At the time, they could only guess at the enemy's strength. They thought conservatively it was a regiment and later identification of the dead indicated it was the 360th Regiment of the 120th Division, 40th CCF Army Corps. Attacks on 3/1 continued throughout the night. At daybreak close air support of Marine aircraft prevented further CCF efforts, though dug-in CCF groups remained within machinegun range.

At first light TSgt Wilson and his platoon leader braved intense fire as they moved out along the forward ridge to recover the bodies of four brave young Marines who manned the outpost. Only after this did TSgt Wilson allow himself to be taken to the rear. Harold received the Medal of Honor for his actions this night.

As dawn broke in the eastern sky, some lived to fight another day, some didn't. Although badly battered and worn, 3/1 doggedly clung to the mountaintop. The enemy had underestimated the Marines tenacity and had paid a high price in their loosing effort. By dawn the enemy had had enough and began to break off, retreating to a covered position. Jim and Lyle continued to receive fire from a machinegun the Chinese had set up on the ridge near that outpost location. H/3/1's mortars, which were located on the reverse slope, started firing a pattern down the ridge and the machinegun went up in a puff of black smoke from a direct hit.

Now came the problem for 3/1 to let loose of the tiger's tail. Corps orders were
received in the morning for all units of the Division to pull back to the Kansas Line. The withdrawal was made under fire and the cover of support from the air and ground units.

Jim Jarrett recalls that at about 0830 word was passed down the line to start pulling off the hill. The most important task, as always, was to get the dead and wounded out. It was always a comfort to know that when you went into battle with Marines, you would not be left behind if you were hit. The old Marine Corps motto, "We take care of our own", was more than just a words.

Jim Day recalls walking beside Lt. Channing who was being carried off the hill by two captured Chinese POWs. PFC Frank Esposito had a rifle pointed at the backs of the Chinese. Two others were on stretchers also. Jim Day thinks they might have been PFC Frederick "Fred" Merritt and a Marine named Gunn.

About this time they got to Ron Whitacre. He was carried back to the aid station and soon put on a truck for transport back to the field medical hospital. When he arrived they knew he would be a long-term case so they flew him to Pusan where he was put aboard the Hospital Ship, USS Repose. The Repose eventually took him to Japan. His knee never did heal enough to enable him to get into combat so they made him a supply man and he was stationed at Otsu, Japan for the next year.

Removing the dead and wounded proved to be a very formidable task. The walking wounded stumbled behind H/3/1 back down the southeast ridge toward Mojin bridge, taking care to stay on the reverse slope and off the exposed crest. They had about one hundred casualties and not nearly enough stretchers were available. They used all sorts of makeshift litters fashioned from poles, rifles, blankets, sleeping bags, ponchos, and anything else they could find. Bodies were tied to stretchers with communications wire to keep from losing them down the mountainside. Every able-bodied man "turned to" for the effort. Jim and Lyle Holland went to work near the summit. They would work their way down a couple hundred feet, pass the stretcher on to the next team, and return for another. The incline was so steep at points that it took four men to handle a stretcher. They crawled, holding the litter with one hand and a piece of brush or rock with the other. They tried to handle the dead, as well as the wounded, as gently as possible but found this extremely difficult. You never get used to seeing the pale, lifeless bodies of your fellow Marines. It's an image that remains with you forever. The battle had also been very costly to the Marines. Many fine, brave, young men had spent their final night on earth, ten thousand miles from home, on a that rocky mountain top known only as Hill 902.

After the last casualties were removed, Jim and Holland moved along the reverse slope to a point that was directly in line with their foxhole on the forward slope. Their plan was to go over the ridge, get their weapons and packs, and return to the reverse slope without becoming a casualty. They made a running dive for their foxhole as the bullets whined past their heads. They quickly gathering up our gear while lying as flat as possible. The bullets continued to kick up dirt and rocks around the foxhole. It was only about ten yards to the reverse slope and relative safety but it seemed more like a mile. Jim told Holland, "it's now or never, lets go for it." Jim didn't realize they could move so quickly, considering how they had spent the last twenty-four hours. They dove through a hail of bullets and over the ridge, thankful for small favors.

In 1951, US armed forces were converting their air weapons. Marines saw a few jets, but most air support was provided by older propeller-driven planes left over from the WW II. Several times Marines had witnessed the destructive power of Marine fighter pilots. Machine guns, bombs and Napalm spelled death for any enemy troops caught in the open.

About 0900 Burl Waits was a mile down hill from where his squad had spent the night. As he looking up and down the ridge he could see a steady stream of humans. From the air they must have look the same as Chinese. The Chinese were following close behind so someone called for air support. Support airplanes are controlled by ground observers with radio equipment. The way the support planes work was that one plane would drop a marker bomb to identify the target so the other planes would know where to drop their bomb loads.

At first Burl was glad to see the four Marines planes that buzzed them. He thought they were going for the Chinese up the hill. Suddenly the scene change from joy to panic. The lead plane headed straight for him. The marker bomb landed 25 yards away. They hit the dirt as some fragments buzzed by. The Observer yelled something into his radio that
resembled, "You bastards are hitting Marines". Looking up Burl could see the other three planes lining up for the kill. As they came closer he could see the openings from which machine guns bullets would soon start exiting. He also saw bombs under the wings and he remembers hoping they weren’t napalm bombs. A few seconds later he could see the pilot as he dipped his wings as if to say, “Hello boys.”

The canteen of water Jim and others had started with the previous day had long since ran dry. There just wasn't enough water to last though the strenuous climb and long night. Jim can't recall ever having been so thirsty.

The strategy of the War it seems was not to occupy territory but to inflict casualties. Therefore, it was to the Marines advantage to fall back, regroup, dig in on the high ground, and let the Chinese come. The heavy machineguns and artillery covered the rear and kept the Chinese at bay as Jim and the rest of the Marines continued their withdrawal.

Kear also remembers the thirst and seeing the stream below for which they were headed. He also remembers that during his trip down the hill some Corsairs staffed them and they had to dive into a C-ration pit for cover.

It was a tough, hot trip back down the mountain. The Chinese tried to follow up their attack as the Marines withdrew. Our Heavy and light machineguns gave good cover and made the Chinese pay the price. However, the Chinese continued to snipe at the Marines as they struggled with casualties and equipment. Help from a 1st Marine sister battalion was sent to relieve them as they got farther down the mountain, and none too soon. Everyone had just about went their limit, at least, so they thought.

As Jim was coming down the trail, he saw someone up ahead that looked very familiar. As he got closer, sure enough, it was John "Jack" Kennedy. Jack was with G/3/1 and they had been hit hardest during the night, suffering heavy casualties. Jack also told Jim that he had run into Logan Beggs, another buddy of theirs from St. Joseph, MO. Logan had shared a drink from his canteen with Jack a short time before this meeting. Jim was very glad to see Jack and to know he and Logan had made it safely off the hill. Jim and Jack said their good-byes and went their separate ways. Little did Jim realize that it would be many years before their paths would cross again, under a shade tree, on Jim's farm near Cosby, MO.

It had been about three hours since Jim and Lyle started down the mountain. The terrain leveled off and Jim finally reached the bottom. They came to a stream they had crossed the previous day. Without hesitation, they plunged into the knee-deep water and ignored all the purification rules they had been taught. They drank their fill and then refilled their canteens. Bullets from a distant sniper plopped harmlessly in the stream beside them as they continued to splash around in the cool refreshing water.

PFC James Day also remembers this stream. He had a high fever by this time and was anxious to fill his canteen.

While 3/1 was holding off the Chinese on Hill 902, another battalion from the 1st Marine Regiment (probably 2/1) had been setting up to the rear, probably on the Kansas Line. They were probably the ones who were assisting 3/1 to get their casualties off the hill and gave them covering fire during their withdrawal. Although Jim didn't know at the time, they were headed for their next position that was a knob about one thousand meters east of Hill 439. Hill 439 was on the Battalion's left flank.

Vehicles began to arrive. As they came through the water they were ordered to load up immediately. Jim was certainly not accustomed to taxi service such as this. It would be his first ride in a jeep since joining the Corps and he should have been suspicious. The jeeps were so laden with men that the only part of the jeep showing was the wheels. Not everyone had this luxury. Dick Kidd was taxied in a truck. As usual, Jim received no information about what was going on or where he was headed.

After riding a short distance, Jim Jarrett arrived at the foot of a small hill where two tents were set up. This turned out to be the Battalion CP. Its occupants were the Battalion CO, Lt. Col. Virgil Banning; the XO, Major Reginald Myers; the S-3, Maj. Joseph Trompeter; Col. McAlister; and their staff.

Meanwhile, back at the 1st Marine Division CP, a simple ceremony was held in the afternoon for the relief of Maj. Gen. Smith by Maj. Gen. Gerald C. Thomas who was to be the new CG, 1st Marine Division. Gen. Smith had been the CG since the Division landed at
In Korea

Inchon in Sept 1950 and was being rotated back to the states.

Each fire team (four men) was issued a small loaf of un-sliced bread, this was considered a special treat. They rarely got back to Battalion and considered it practically stateside. That in itself should have run up the red flag but Jim and his platoon remained full of optimism. They had visions of crapping out, munching on bread, and perhaps even building a fire to heat a can of beans and franks (Jim's favorite C-ration). Jim had taken a shower, while in reserve, before jumping off for Hill 902. Regiment had set up showers by a river near H/3/1. This gave Jim the chance to get his first bath since arriving in Korea. Jim also got his first change of socks in nearly two months. They all had "body bugs" and dysentery most of the time. The Corpsman seemed always to be out of bug powder and diarrhea stopper. Jim remembers one fellow who installed a vent in the seat of his utility trousers, with his bayonet. When they were on the move it was hard to keep pace while continually dropping your pants. Nearly everyone had grease, blood, and certain amounts of excrement caked in their clothes. Their living conditions were extremely poor, but food and ammunition supplies were adequate. When they jumped off on the assault, they were issued two hand grenades, and three bandoliers of ammunition. Food supplies (C-rations) always managed to keep up with them, but clothing and bathing facilities were not available. Water was a precious commodity. Supplies were delivered by vehicle to the foot of hills. They took turns going down the mountainside to lug the five-gallon cans of water, boxes of C-rations, and ammunition back to the top where they were dug in.

It had been thirty-two hours since Jim had slept. Not to mention climbing a three thousand foot mountain on one pint of water and no food since the previous day. They were hot, tired, and dragging their butts. Needless to say, no one was in a very good mood. Occasionally there would be arguments and tempers would flare, but they got along remarkable well considering the living conditions. It seemed at times the smallest provocation would set someone off, almost to the point of violence but it didn't last long. By the same token, even something as insignificant as a piece of bread could lift the spirit and calm the person. The anger was soon forgotten.

PFC James Day remembers seeing the Command Post and lots of camouflaged men in the brush. He said he needed ammo but they only had food to offer. He said "to hell with the C ration, we need ammunition.

Major Tromp needed a platoon to occupy a knob that was about one thousand meters east of Hill 439. H/3/1's 1st platoon who had been on the left flank on Hill 902 had seen less fighting and were still fairly intact. Lt. George S. Sulliman was a recent replacement without too much combat experience as the Platoon Leader. He was sent with his Platoon to organize the knob on the Battalion's left flank. Heavy machineguns had been left on this knob for the incoming 3/1 defending unit. Although the 1st Platoon was initially sent, Marines from the 2nd and 3rd Platoon would also be casualties on this hill. It is likely that the platoons were intermingled in this fight.

Jim Jarrett started up the little hill with visions of crapping out, munching on bread, and building a fire to heat C-rations. However, today's menu would feature disappointment. They had advanced a short distance in the early afternoon. Much to their surprise they started receiving sniper fire from the top of the hill. They had mistakenly thought they were miles from the enemy. As it turned out, that was the reason for the taxi service. Apparently they had been in another race with the enemy, and this one had ended in a draw.

Lt. Sulliman had apparently gone up the hill to look over the positions when he saw the enemy. He came back down the hill to get help. PFC Jackie Cromer remembers being with about six other Marines, getting a box of chow from a jeep. He also thought there was no enemy in the area. He saw a Lt. (probably Sulliman) about 40 yards away come running down the hill hollering for reinforcements. They dropped everything and ran up the hill.

The enemy fire had started with sniper fire and soon turned into burp gun fire. They quickly dove for cover in trenches that had been dug by the enemy when they had occupied this real estate sometime in the past.

Jackie Cromer recalls there being a tremendous amount of incoming fire and being in a trench. When an enemy grenade landed in the trench they would roll out of the trench, let
the grenade explode, and then roll back into the trench. There were several (perhaps 8-10) that landed in the trench line.

SSgt. "Cod" Holemon, an old retread (WW II veteran) shouted, "Get the hell out of those trenches and get your asses up that hill. There are gooks everywhere." The 3rd Platoon never argued with Holmon. He had told them earlier that he personally would shoot anyone on the spot that did not move up when told. The 3rd Platoon had no reason to doubt him.

They were ordered to fix bayonets and charge up the hill. They arrived near the top of the hill at about the same time as a large force of Chinese and came eyeball to eyeball with them. The Marines were strung out in a skirmish line along the hillside but were caught in a hail of cross fire from machineguns, rifles, burp guns, hand grenades, and mortar fire.

Lt. Sulliman took over one of the heavy machineguns when both its gunners were hit. He told PFC James Day to go around the corner of the trench and get six boxes of ammo. When James Day returned he found Lt. Sulliman had been shot in the forehead between the eyes. He probably died instantly. James Day recalls an explosion beside him and he was paralyzed. Today he is a quadriplegic from these wounds. Lt Sulliman received the Navy Cross for his actions during this battle. The citation reads:

"The President of the United States takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross (Posthumously) to George Simon Sulliman (0-49450), First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps (Reserve), for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy of the United Nations while serving as a Platoon Leader of Company H, Third Battalion, First Marines, FIRST Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against enemy aggressor forces near Map'yong-ni, Korea, on 24 April 1951. Observing approximately one hundred twenty-five of the enemy charging toward his position on his battalion's exposed left flank as his company was reorganizing to occupy new defense positions near Hill 435, First Lieutenant Sulliman quickly shouted a warning and rallied the extremely limited friendly troops available into position to attack. Almost instantly the fanatical force approached to within twenty-five yards of the exposed flank, attacking with automatic weapons, mortars and devastating hand grenade barrages as First Lieutenant Sulliman crawled from position to position, controlling his men, pointing out targets and shouting words of encouragement, instilling in his men the will and determination to hold at all costs. When a heavy machine gun jammed and failed to fire at the height of the furious battle as the attackers advanced to within feet of the area, he ordered fixed bayonets, then charged toward the forward slope of the hill where the heavy gun was located and leaped into the exposed emplacement, manning the gun himself when the gunner was struck by enemy fire and seriously wounded. Fending off the attackers and attempting to clear the gun as the enemy advanced almost to the muzzle of the weapon, he was desperately trying to put the gun into action when he himself was fatally wounded. First Lieutenant Sulliman's indomitable courage, brilliant and forceful leadership and great personal valor maintained against tremendous odds, served as the driving force which spirited his men to fight a brief but fierce battle which ultimately ended in victory, and his fortitude and devotion to duty sustain and enhance the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country."

The situation was critical. The air was alive with bullets and flying shrapnel was cutting through the air from the exploding hand grenades and mortar shells. Calls for Corpsman, ammo, and help from the wounded and dying could be heard on the hillside. There was that smell of burned powder in the air. These are things you never forget. They are the sounds and the smells of battle. It cannot be described in words or pictures but must be experienced to fully grasp the chaotic horror, and inhumanity of war.

To Jim Jarrett's left, Cpl Harry R. "Jake" Jacobsen of Rock Island IL, was calling for more hand grenades. Jake was a fire-team leader and well known in the 3rd Platoon as a grenade thrower. It was his weapon of choice in a firefight. He had distinguished himself using hand grenades during a patrol they had been on and was recommended for a citation. Jake was a very brave Marine and would have made a good platoon leader.

Jim Jarrett had two grenades in his field jacket pocket. He gave Jake one and then crawled to within about twenty yards of the top of the hill. The Chinese were exchanging
fire with them from the crest of the hill and on both flanks. Jim expected the Chinese to overrun their position at any moment. Much later Jim learned that it was at this time that Herk's BAR quit working. It couldn't have come at a worse time. Herk and Kidd were on Jake's left, and around the side of the hill, Jim's fire-team was to the right of Jake and his fire-team. Things were looking bad.

Suddenly Jim's M-1 rifle jammed, and he started jerking frantically on the bolt, trying to clear it. John Wayne movies aside, the bayonet is a very poor weapon to bring to a gunfight. Especially if your enemy brings full automatics. It's a terrifying feeling to have your weapon jam in the midst of a firefight. This wasn't the first time this had happened to Jim. It happened once before on a patrol when they were about three miles out in enemy territory, and in a hot firefight. Like most of their equipment, it was left over from WW II and pretty well used up.

Jim crawled to his left in search of another weapon. A man was laying face down, with his rifle beside him. Jim grabbed it, and saw it was riddled with shrapnel, and covered with blood, He immediately determined that it was inoperable. It was at that moment, that Jim had a sinking feeling in the pit of his stomach. When Jim saw the K-BAR dagger he realized that it was his old buddy and fellow squad member, Jake Jacobsen. Jim realized Jake would not be going home. Cpl Harry R. Jacobsen received the Bronze Star with Combat "V": (posthumously) for "Heroic achievement" in connection with operations against the enemy while serving with H/3/1 on this day. His citation reads:

"For heroic achievement in connection with operations against the enemy while serving with a Marine infantry Battalion in KOREA on 24 April 1951, Corporal JACOBSEN, serving as a fire team leader was organizing his assigned defensive sector when the unit came under intense and concentrated enemy mortar, hand grenade, and small arms fire. Although his position offered little cover, he coolly deployed his unit to meet the attack directing its fire in such a manner that heavy casualties were inflicted upon the enemy. From his exposed position he continued to give encouragement to his men until he was mortally wounded by enemy fire, gallantly giving his life for his country. His valiant actions were an inspiration to all members of his fire team, and enabled them to hold their positions against repeated enemy attacks. Corporal JACOBSEN’s initiative and courageous leadership were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

About this time Cpl Lowell Holland felt the wrath of the enemy when a shell exploded and wounded him in the front of the body. Jim Jarrett was nearby. The injuries he sustained from this shell would leave him blind for the rest of his long and fruitful life. PFC Albin A. Dlabaj and PFC Ovie O. Tracy walked/carried him back to an area where he could have his wounds treated.

The last thing Jim remembers after seeing Jake was a blinding flash and a terrific blast from a hand grenade. He had the sensation of floating though the air with a loud ringing in his ears. He vaguely recalls his Platoon Leader, Lt. Vic O'Hanesian, administering first aid to him. Later at the bottom of the hill, two Navy Corpsmen gave Jim blood plasma and an I. V. Jim recalls that the bags were hanging from a rifle that was stuck in the ground by its bayonet.

Jim later recalls being on a trailer behind a jeep ambulance. He also remembers lying in a tent at a field hospital. There was a Korean lying next to him that had been badly burned by napalm. The Korean had died during the night. Jackie Cromer recalls that the action was intense but only lasted about 30 minutes. By this time the Chinese had all been killed or withdrew.

PFC Albin A. Dlabaj was also WIA with shrapnel during this action. He remembers being with Sulliman and remembers that it was a bullet between the eyes that killed him (although he believes they were in a trench line instead of Sulliman manning a machine gun when he was killed)

Early the next morning they were taking down the tents and moving the hospital further to the rear. Jim Jarrett was loaded aboard a DC-3 ambulance plane and flown out. Throughout the night of 24-25 April the enemy probed lines, seeking in vain for a weak spot where a penetration could be made. It was already evident that the breakthrough in this area had given the Communists only a short-lived advantage.

A list of H/3/1's KIAs this date include:
PFC Joseph Eugene Caruso, from Marblehead, MA (in G/3/1) Joseph, who had been in H/3/1's 2nd Platoon and was transferred to G/3/1 about Jan. 1st.

Cpl James Kenneth Doran, from Madison, WI, of the 2nd Platoon. Alvin Robey reported that he helped carry James off Hill 902. He said both of his legs were blown off and they applied tourniquets to stop the bleeding.

Cpl Harry R. Jacobsen, from Rock Island, IL, of the 3rd Squad, 3rd Platoon
PFC William K. Kaleo of Oahu, Honolulu, HI
PFC Edward James Lanahan from Albany, NY, of the 2nd Platoon
2nd Lt. George Simon Sulliman, from New Britain CT, of the 1st Platoon
PFC Elmer Carlton Turner, Jr. from Roanoke, VA

There is some question about whether James Doran was in the Company at the time of his death. Records show he was dropped from the Company on Apr. 2nd. He may have returned or been attached to H/3/1 on this date. However Alvin Robey remembers helping carry James off Hill 902 so he must have been in H/3/1 at the time of his death.

PFC Jim Jarrett was also WIA and evacuated this date.

PFC Jerry T. Jolly was also WIA with shrapnel wounds in the back from mortar fire.

Sgt Charles E. McDonald of the 2nd Platoon was also WIA and evacuated.

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.

1st. George S. Sulliman            Cpl Harry R. Jacobsen
PFC William K. Kaleo              PFC Edward J. Lanahan
PFC Elmer C. Turner

During the next two months the 1st Marines were in heavy combat. Their casualties during this period would surpass the KIA and WIA during the Chosin Campaign.
Although it wasn't apparent early in the morning, the Chinese offensive was over. They tried again and again to breach H/3/1's positions during the night but each effort grew more and more feeble. The 1st Marines had succeeded in taking the blunt of the Chinese offensive on Hill 902 and Horseshoe Ridge to enable the Division, and other UN forces, to withdraw to more concentrated positions.

Early in the afternoon, a 3/1 patrol had advanced only 200 yards along a ridgeline when it was compelled to withdraw after running into concentrated mortar and machinegun fire. Sporadic mortar rounds continued. A direct hit was scored on the Bn. CP, wounding Col. McAlister, Lt. Col. Banning (1st Marines CO), Maj. Reginald R. Meyers (1st Marines XO), and Maj. Joseph D. Trompeter (1st Marines S-3). Maj. Trompeter assumed duties as CO and Maj. Edwin H. Simmons became XO of the 1st Marines.

This action is reported as happening on the 25th in a volume of the Marine Corps Operations in Korea. However, Jim Jarrett says the Battalion CP was hit with mortar fire on April 24th. One or the other is correct.

Losses of 18 KIA and 82 WIA for 24-25 April brought the casualties of the 1st Marines to nearly 300 during the past 48 hours.

The night of 25-26 April passed in comparative quiet for the 1st Mar. Div. A few CCF probing attacks and an occasional mortar round were the extent of the enemy's activity. All Marine units had now reached the modified Line Kansas but Gen. Van Fleet desired further withdrawals because the enemy had cut a lateral road.

THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 1951

Maj. Edwin H. Simmons became 1st Marines XO to replace Maj. Myers.

IX Corps, this day directed that the 1st Marine Division move back to Chunchon where it would defend along the south bank of the Soyang River until service units could move out their large supply dumps.

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.

- PFC Glenn D. Davis
- Cpl Lowell E. Holland
- PFC Arthur T. Keenan Jr.
- PFC Robert L. McCauley
- PFC Elmore G. Smith

FRIDAY, APRIL 27, 1951

PFC Howard E. Kimberlin was dropped from the Company.
The 1st Marines went into Division Reserve north and west of Hongchon and near Yangdogwon-ni about this date and remained there until May 4th. The 1st Marines had many losses but had been instrumental in stopping the initial thrust of the enemy's fifth phase Offensive which had been a serious defeat for the Chinese. Although they penetrated about 10-15 miles the enemy's losses were estimated to be in the 70,000 to 100,000 range. As the Marines dug in on the No Name Line they were fully aware that the Chinese still had 17 fresh divisions for the second round which could come at any time.

In a reshuffling of units the 1st Marine Division was placed for the third time in eight months under the operational control of X Corps, Commanded by Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond. The Division was to occupy the western sector of X Corps after its boundary with IX Corps had been shifted about 12 miles to the west.

An atmosphere of watchful waiting prevailed during the next two weeks as Marines on the No Name Line improved their defensive positions and patrolled to maintain contact with the enemy. Eighth Army evolved the "patrol base" concept to deal with an enemy retiring beyond artillery range. The bases were part of a screen, called the OutPost Line of Resistance (OPLR), established in front of the MLR. Their mission was to maintain contact with the enemy by means of patrols, give warning of an impending attack, and delay its progress as much as possible.

Cpl Burl Waits was writing an 8-page letter home that described his activities in the last week. He referred to is experiences as "One week of Hell". The substance of that letter are included in this document.

The 8th replacement draft which had arrived at Pusan aboard APA Pickaway flew in an R-5D to Hongchon and landed on a dirt air strip about this date. Thereafter they traveled a short distance to 3rd Battalion and H/3/1 which was a couple miles northwest of Chongchon. Cpl William "Bill" D. Lohan was in this group of replacements. And was assigned as the 1st Fire Team Leader, 2nd Squad, 2nd Platoon.

Bill Lohan was a valuable asset to be added to the Company and no doubt well qualified as a fire team leader. He had been trained in the new 3.6 inch Bazooka, Flame Throwers and Demolitions; Learned infantry trade as a BARman in 2nd Platoon, 3rd Squad Baker Company, 5th Marines on Guam in 1948; When the Corps reorganized Battalion T/O's in late 1949 became Squad Leader in the Corps 1st 75mm Recoilless Rifle Platoon which formed on Guam shortly before the 1st Brigades return to the States in Feb of 1950 where the Recoiless Rifle Platoon became a member of Heavy Weapons Company billeted in Camp Pendleton's 15 Area along with 4 deuce Mortars.

About this date the 3rd Machine Section split a tree log that was about 8 inches in diameter. On the flat, smooth surface in the middle of the half-log they burned into the wood the names of all in the 3rd Squad. Thereafter, where ever they went, the took the inscribed log with them.

Cpl Harold F. Payne was dropped from the Company.
During the month of May, the 1st Mar. Div. spent most of its time preparing for a massive Chinese offensive that never materialized. By April 26th the first phase of their Spring Offensive had run out of steam, and the Chinese had all but broken contact with the 1st Mar. Div. By this time the action had shifted to the area above Seoul. May Day (May 1st) is a Communist day of celebration and it appeared that the enemy was trying to capture the South Korean capital to coincide with the May Day celebrations throughout the world. They attempted during the last few days of April but were soundly beaten by the UN forces.

For the first two weeks of May the 1st Mar. Div. worked on preparing defensive positions for the expected attack. Eighth Army intelligence had detected a movement of enemy troops from the western Area (Seoul) to the east. The assumption was that the Chinese were going to take on the Marines again, but, instead 125,000 Chinese troops on May 16th attacked the east coast which was defended by ROK forces.

Specifically, 3/1 had the mission of screening the Division rear by establishing roadblocks to apprehend all civilians, or counterattack any enemy penetration. Platoon sized outposts were established on the principal terrain features in the in the vicinity of each company and each company assigned a defensive sector surrounding the assembly area. Training was conducted to emphasize organization of the area for defense, camouflage, fields of fire, and coordination of final protective fires.

Cpl William "Bill" D. Lohan prepared a foxhole and an alternate foxhole. He also went with his squad leader, Cpl Robert Edward Price, forward of wire to retrieve several spools of barbed wire they had spotted about half way down the hillside in front of their position. They used wire to make tangle-foot (Pieces cut 5 to 8 feet long and randomly thrown forward of fighting holes). He learned how close he came to being killed this day when he was called upon to disarm a booby trap found hidden in a hole in a tree base. Upon returning to his position he discovered another about three feet from his position which he also disarmed.

2nd Lt. Harry F. Schanning and Sgt Jonathan “Jack” Dedrick were dropped from the Company. Jack Dedrick had been WIA on Mar. 22nd and had returned to the Company shortly before this date. Since he was WIA twice, he put in his letter and was transferred back to the USA.

A Marine was wounded while working on wire in front of his platoon's position which was to the immediate right of 2nd Platoon's positions. It is not apparent if the person was in the 1st or 3rd platoon. Perhaps it was one of the Marines who were dropped from the Company on this date.

SSgt Paul J. Barilla, PFC John H. Osborne, and Cpl Wilford A. Varner were dropped from the Company.

Cpl William "Bill" Lohan led his fire team on his first night patrol outside of wire. Their mission was to make contact with the unit on hill on our right flank. The patrol went well but upon return, the Company was on full alert. They had to remain outside the Company's perimeter wire for about an hour until cleared to enter the Company's perimeter.

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.
PFC George W. Hutton Jr. PFC Frederick Koblich
PFC Arnold Mangifesta PFC George Muldoon
PFC Richard T. Oksanen PFC Robert D. Rogers
PFC Robert H. Rothermel PFC James E. Young
FRIDAY, MAY 4, 1951

At 1345 verbal warning was received from Regimental Operations Officer that 3/1 was to be prepared to move at 1200 on May 5th to a new assembly area. Battalion issued a Frag Order at 2000 to accomplish the directed displacement.

SATURDAY, MAY 5, 1951

At 0830 the advanced party left to reconnoiter the new assembly area. At 1135 the Battalion entrucked and moved to the new area arriving at 1235.

Cpl Bill Lohan remembers this move. The new hill was higher than the one they had just left. He recalls that it was raining when they dug in. He also recalls being assigned to take a detail down to the road to bring up five-gallon water cans, C-rations, and PX ration Boxes. An 8" Howitzers unit was positioned at the base of the hill. Late in afternoon word was passed that anyone who wanted a hot meal should take their mess kits down to the road. It wasn't worth the effort. The meal may have been hot when packed to go forward but it sure was cold and soggy when served. It was still raining, and cold green beans, mutton, and mashed potatoes just didn't satisfying most appetites.

At 1800 telephone message from Regiment directed 3/1 to be prepared, on order, to attach one company to 1/1 with the mission of outposting Hill 257. Regimental Orders confirmed this and directed the company execute at 0800 on May 6th. H/3/1 was selected as the company and notified at 2300.

PFC James Hertz was dropped from the Company but would return.

SUNDAY, MAY 6, 1951

3/1 S-3 and H/3/1's CO departed at 0745 to make a reconnaissance of the position assigned to H/3/1. This was apparently on the No Name Line. By mutual agreement between 1/1 and 3/1, H/3/1 was reinforced with one section of heavy machineguns and one section of W/3/1's anti-tank assault platoon. H/3/1 (reinforced) departed the assembly area at 0805 and arrived at their assigned position at 0925. The immediately began to organize their defense.

MONDAY, MAY 7, 1951

After completing a morning inspection of H/3/1, the Battalion CO and S-3 decided to further reinforce the Company with one section of 81mm mortars. The mortars arrived to support H/3/1's position at 1130. Regimental Operations Officer gave a verbal warning to 3/1 that the rest of the Battalion might have a mission in the near future for assuming the defense of more ground in the vicinity of H/3/1.

TUESDAY, MAY 8, 1951


On this date the following were dropped from the Company.

1st William J. Allert          PFC Herbert R. Darsow
PFC Newman C. Elwell          Sgt Nicholas Federspiel
Cpl Alvin E. Fier             PFC William K. Hogan
PFC James E. Jarrett          PFC Ronald Kazmierski
PFC John T. Lewis             PFC Frank E. Leyva
PFC Tommy N. Lilly            Cpl Robert S. Maxwell
Sgt Charles E. McDonald       Sgt Burt H. Rickard
PFC Harold E. Singley         PFC Ronald D. Whitacre
PFC Herbert R. Darsow was perhaps WIA. He was back in the Company in June.
IN KOREA

WEDNESDAY, MAY 9, 1951

3/1 CO and S-3 made further reconnaissance of the area near H/3/1 in anticipation of receiving orders to move into the area. 1/3/1, reinforced by engineer personnel, also began construction of roads, trails, CPs, and supply points in the area.
PFC Donald L. Meyers was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, May 10, 1951

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.
Cpl Leroy R. Ferkel            SSgt Michael Marich
Sgt Ray G. Savell              PFC Frank Stone

FRIDAY, MAY 11, 1951

At 2235 the 1st Marines were committed to the No Name Line. 3/1 was assigned to the previously reconnoitered cite. 3/1 issued orders accordingly to become effective at 0800 May 12th.
Sgt Carl E. Zachary was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, MAY 12, 1951

H/3/1 returned to operational control of 3/1 at 1200. A squad of the 75mm Recoilless Gun Platoon, and one tank section arrived at 1630 to support 3/1.
Fortification of the Battalion area for defense continued for the next several days.
PFC Laurence A. Bishop and Cpl Elwood N. Sankey were dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, MAY 14, 1951

Fortification of 3/1's positions continued and two patrols were sent out. One squad sized patrol was to make contact with 3/7 which juncture was affected. The other, a fire team sized patrol, was to contact the 1st KMCs. They failed to make contact because the KMC patrol did not appear at the designated place.
TUESDAY, MAY 15, 1951

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

- 60mm Mortars Robert Rabbit Dunne (joined)
- 60mm Mortars Robert "Gunny" Marler (left)
- MG Plt. Ldr. 1st Lt. Harrison Betts (left)
- 1st Plt. 2nd Sqd Raymond "Ray" Woda (Joined)
- 1st Plt. Corpsman Raymond "Doc" Patterson (left)
- 1st Plt. Sgt. Jack Seeler (left)
- 3rd Plt. Sgt. William "Bill" "Cod" Holemon (rotated to USA)
- 3rd Plt. 2nd Sqd John Anthony Perugini (joined)


At approximately 0345 an unidentified aircraft dropped six small bombs or hand grenades on the Battalion position, but did not cause any casualties. The plane sounded like a propeller-driven plane.

During the day three patrols were sent out: one to contact 3/7 - again contact was made; one to contact the KMCs - again no contact; and one to patrol the MSR and the high ground to the east of the MSR.

Because of two incidents of mine explosions this day (2 died and 4 wounded), Regiment directed the discontinuance of safe lane clearing.

The following Marines were dropped from the Company:

- PFC Jack B. Cohen
- Cpl Bobby J. Fox
- PFC Richard G. Reid
- PFC Paul L. Scruggs
- PFC William H. Tefft
- PFC Albin A. Dlabaj
- Cpl Frank E. Maxcy Jr.
- PFC John s. Saliski
- PFC Quentin J. Solio

WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 1951

Improvement of positions continued with connecting trenches and trails to the reverse slopes. Two patrols were sent out to contact adjacent units: contact with 3/7 was made again but again no contact was made with the KMCs.

Large numbers of civilians began to show up. Traffic guards were established to keep them out of the Battalion area. About 100 were collected and sent to Regiment in trucks for screening and further disposition.

By dark, 52,000 sandbags and 364 reels of wire had been incorporated into the Battalion's defense.

THURSDAY, MAY 17, 1951

For the most part Marine positions were avoided by the Chinese during the first part of May. However, this day a CCF battalion, almost by accident, hit 3/7 and lost 112 counted dead, 82 POWs, and a large quantity of supplies. 3/7 had 7 KIAs and 19 WIAs in this fight. This fight took place about 3000-4000 yards in front of 3/1's position. Cpl William "Bill" Lohan and his fire team watched them mix it up. They could see the tracers flying about to their front. Bill thought the action took place near Chunchon.

Three patrols were sent out this day, one to contact the KMCs and two others to contact 3/7 and 2/7. All three patrols made contact.

Regiment directed 3/1 to move into Regimental Reserve after being relieved by 2/7.

PFC Frank E. Neill was dropped from the Company.
The 1st Marine Division, carrying out X Corps orders, began a maneuver designed to aid the U.S. Army's 2nd Infantry Division on the east by narrowing its front. The 7th Marines pulled back to No Name Line to relieve the 1st Marines, which sideslipped to the east to take over an area held by the Army's 9th Infantry Regiment. The 5th Marines then swung around from the Division's left flank to the extreme right and relieved the Army's 38th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division. This permitted the 2nd Division to face east and repulse attacks from that direction.

At 0800 2/7 began relieving 3/1 and at 1300 they accepted responsibility for the sector. 3/1 then began their move to an assembly area. The move was completed by 2030. The right flank of the Regiment, Hill 500, was secured by 1/3/1.

PFC Richard C. Davis was KIA on this date in the area of Hongchon, Korea from a missile wound to the head.

Col. Wilbert S. Brown assumed command of the 1st Marines from Col. McAlister. By noon the enemy's renewed Fifth Phase Offensive had lost most of its momentum as CCF supplies dwindled to a trickle along their tenuous line of communications. 3/1 began to improve its new positions with emphasis on overhead cover and concealment. 3/1 was also assigned the mission of reconnoitering Objective George for possible occupation. At 2230 Regiment ordered 3/1 to displace to Objective George. Accordingly, 3/1 immediately issued orders for the movement.

Cpl Robert O. Adams was dropped from the Company.

It grew more apparent that the second installment of the CCF's Fifth Phase Offensive had failed even more conclusively than the first. The enemy had made only a narrow penetration on the second front to show for their ruinous casualties. Worse yet, from the Chinese viewpoint, the UN Forces were in a position to retaliate before the attackers recovered their tactical balance. The 8th Army had come through with relatively light losses, and it was now about to seize the initiative.

By 0845 the advanced reconnaissance detail consisting of the S-3 and S-4 and all company commanders departed for Objective George. The main body, consisting of the rifle companies, departed shortly thereafter by foot and motor. Most of the positions were established by 1400, and the remainder for the day spent in consolidation.

PFC Leo V. Sears was dropped from the Company.

Regiment ordered 3/1 to continue consolidating their positions and improving the defensive perimeter despite exceptionally heavy rains.

Besides continuing defensive work, two squad sized patrols were sent out by I/3/1, one at 0900 and the other at 1800. They were to pass Hill 415. Neither contacted the enemy but discovered large caches of enemy ammunition.
IN KOREA

H/3/1 MARINES

WEDNESDAY, MAY 23, 1951

The 1st Mar. Div. was attacking to the north, headed for Yanggu, with the 1st Marines on the left front and the 5th on the right front. 3/1 was in Regimental Reserve. At this time they were just north of Hongchon headed for Yanggu.

3/1 became the Regimental mobile reserve and, for security, occupied the high ground in the vicinity of Hill 422. Four patrols were dispatched. Two were sent to contact the 32nd Infantry on Hill 750. Both arrived at their destination but failed to make contact. The third patrol searched the ridge south of the Battalion position and the fourth scouted Hill 705. Both of these patrols returned with negative contact.

Regiment assigned 3/1 the responsibility of the 1st Marines left flank. This was open in that the U. S. 32nd Infantry Regiment had failed to keep abreast of the 1st Marines' assaulting battalions.

PFC James L. Day was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, MAY 24, 1951

3/1 remained as the Mobile Reserve with 1/1 and 2/1 in front. The attack progressed favorably and 3/1 began displacing forward at 1000. The advance party selected a location for deployment. At 1230 the reconnaissance party received small arms fire from the northwest while observing from Hill 653. The open flank and the enemy's presence demanded a strong position on the left (west) of the 1st Marines zone. In occupying this position H/3/1 and I/3/1 necessarily extended across the Division and Corps boundaries, into the zone of the U. S. 32nd Infantry. at 1520 H/3/1 made physical contact with George Company, 32nd Infantry.

AT approximately 0630 elements of the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Infantry passed through H/3/1 and continued their attack against Hill 783. The 1st Marines had been relieved of the offensive. H/3/1 Marines enjoyed some Blatz beer. The two cans they received were stamped "complimentary". Cpl Bill Lohan, and some of the other Marines shared their issue with the passing Army infantry.

H/3/1 and I/3/1 were withdrawn from their positions and the Battalion, less G/3/1, remained in the valley in Mobile Reserve about five and one-half miles north of Sanggog-ri.

A verbal order from Regiment Operation Officer directed 3/1 move by foot, on 26 May, to a specified assembly area. This was the same assembly area occupied on the 19th. Regiment later confirmed the verbal order with a written order.

Sgt Bobby G. Gregory was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, MAY 26, 1951

1st Mar. Div. was to the right of Hwachon Reservoir, probably south of Yanggu. They had reached their objective, about two-thirds of the way to the Soyang River, by noon. The 1st Marines reverted to Division Reserve upon being relieved by the KMC.

About this time there was a Marine Officer named Steve Judson that was KIA in one of the 1st Marine rifle companies (which one?). 3/1 had moved into the assigned assembly area by 1100 and awaited further instructions. Orders were received from Regiment to move to a newly assigned assembly area on the 27th.

SUNDAY, MAY 27, 1951

By 1400 3/1 was in position. A hasty organization was made and the high ground north, east, and west of the assembly area was outposted. See the story "ONE-MAN PATROL" in Appendix I about a G/3/1 Marine's tale.

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC Edward Gillespie  PFC Aubrey L. Kennedy

PFC Edward Gillespie  PFC Aubrey L. Kennedy
MONDAY, MAY 28, 1951

A 2nd Squad, 2nd Platoon lead by Cpl Robert Price patrol departed at 0810. They patrolled the high ground north for about 1000 yards. They patrolled the high ground north for about a thousand yards. During their return they followed a road that was in a valley. While on this road their point man spotted a single Chinese soldier walking north along the road. They moved into the bushes beside the road and waited until he was abreast of their hiding spots. They stepped out and took him prisoner. The POW was turned over to the Battalion when the patrol returned.

Another patrol, a local security patrol, flushed 12 POWs from a draw to the immediate front of H/3/1's position.

About this date, finding another way to celebrate recent victories, the Commander of 3/1 sent a 2nd lieutenant, Harold Arutunian, on a desperate mission: find ice somewhere around Yanggu to cool the battalion’s beer ration. 2nd Lt. Arutunian’s patrol returned with the ice - confiscated from the body bags of an Army graves registration unit. The book that documented this said “stolen” but we all know Marines don’t steal.

TUESDAY, MAY 29, 1951

Three squad sized patrols were dispatched to comb the area 1000 yards to the north, east, and west of the assembly area. Two POWs were captured from a cave in front of the assembly area, who had been reported by local civilians. Regiment ordered 3/1 to be on the alert to move by truck to an area to be announced. At about 2000, 64 trucks arrived in 3/1's assembly area.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 30, 1951

Three squad sized security patrols were dispatched with the mission of searching out the ground in the vicinity of the new assembly area. Then at 1145, regiment verbally notified 3/1 to be on 30 minute stand-by to relieve elements of the 7th Marines. The patrols were recalled and at 1315 a telephone message from Regiment informed 3/1 that they had passed to operational control of the 1st Mar. Div. at 1300.

Many may not appreciate the effort it took to assemble 64 trucks at one point for a motor march. Roads were few, small, dirt, and used to supply and move all units in central Korea. A Marine Division did not have a great number of motor transport assets at that time and to bring 64 trucks to one location to move an entire battalion was quite an achievement. The motor march had to be given priority use of roads over other UN units and a strict time plan worked out. The motor

Entrucking of the 3/1 began at 1315, the advanced party left at 1330, while the remainder of 3/1 moved out at 1400. The Battalion's mission was to secure a pass. The first elements of 3/1 arrived at the new area at 1700 with the remaining elements slowly getting into position by 2400. At the end of the motor march H/3/1 dug shallow foxholes along a road in a valley by a stream. Another hot meal was offered that night, in the wet. They would remain in this locale until the morning of 2 June 1951.

This motor move was particularly difficult due to heavy rains, road washouts, temporary bridges, and one way control of the roads. The motor movement had to be planned and executed superbly and it was.

MSgt Elwood Cabe was dropped from the Company.
THURSDAY, MAY 31, 1951

The 1st Mar. Div. was still in the vicinity of Yanggu, east of the Hwachon Reservoir. They were soon to attack to the north heading toward the Punch Bowl. The Punch Bowl was a huge circular depression ranging about three to six miles wide that was circled by high hills. Their efforts in the next month would virtually eliminate the 6th North Korean Division.

Only from the air could the effects of the UN counterstroke of May and June 1951 be fully appreciated. It was more than just an enemy withdrawal; it was a flight of beaten troops under very little control in some instances. They were scourged with bullets, rockets, and napalm as planes swooped down upon them like hawks scattering chickens. And where it had been rare for a single Chinese soldier to surrender voluntarily, ruminants of platoons, companies, and even battalions were now giving up after throwing down their arms.

Communist casualties from 15 to 31 May were estimated by the 8th Army at 105,000. This figure included 17,000 counted dead and the unprecedented total of 10,000 prisoners, most of them Chinese taken during the last week of the month in frantic efforts to escape. Such results were a vast departure from past occasions when Mao Tse-tung's troops had preferred death to surrender.

It was the misfortune of the 1st Mar. Div. to have perhaps the least lucrative zone of action in all Korea for the peninsula-wide turkey shoot. A chaos of jagged peaks and dark, narrow valleys, the terrain alone was enough to limit an advance. Even so, the Marines inflicted 1,870 counted KIA communist casualties in May and captured 593, most of them during the last eight days of the month. In May the 1st Mar. Div. lost 75 KIA, 8 DOW and 731 WIA.

While 3/1 remained in position, a 3/1 patrol to Hill 874, which was directly in front of 3/1, discovered 15 enemy dead, supplies, and ammunition. They made no contact with the enemy. At roughly 1200, G/3/1 observed gun flashes from a Chinese battery. By counting the seconds between the flash and the landing of the shells, they were able to aid in the enemy battery's destruction.

In the afternoon a local security patrol to the front of the position captured three 120mm enemy mortars. At 2037, G/3/1 and I/3/1 was put under operational control of the 7th Marines and sent to the 7th Marines CP. H/3/1 and the rest of the Battalion remained to guard the pass.

During the period from May 27th through May 31st, 3/1 captured or recovered the following equipment and material from the enemy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 - 12.7mm HMG</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - HMG</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 - LMG</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 - Small MG</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 - BAR or equivalent</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Truck</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Field Range</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Typewriter</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - SCR 300</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - trailers</td>
<td>Chinese, Russian, and United</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - Tons of Rice</td>
<td>States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 2.36 Rocket Launcher</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FRIDAY, JUNE 1, 1951

About this date the 1st Mar. Div. had fought their way back to the 38th parallel and was heading north again.

Cpl William J. Randle was dropped from the Company.
H/3/1 MARINES

SATURDAY, JUNE 2, 1951

The 1st Marines were in the vicinity of Yang-gu on the eastern tip of the Hwachon reservoir and were going on the offensive again. This was a busy morning. Willie Peter (water proof) bags were passed out and troops were told to put anything they didn't want to carry in the Willie Peter bags (e.g., sleeping bags, field jackets, personal items, etc). They were given name tags to fill out for the bags and were told secure them to the bags and then stack them by the road. Shortly after this was done they saddled up and formed by the road. It is not known if George or Item Company led out but H/3/1 fell in behind the lead company. Cpl Bill Lohan remembers the Battalion Commander and his staff walking up the road before moving out in two columns behind them. After hiking for about an hour they came to a fork in the road where the Battalion followed the left fork. After another 15 minutes of walking, they came upon the head of the column hiking back down the middle of the road between the two columns. 3/1 had taken the wrong fork. Cpl Bill Lohan doesn't recall how long or how far they hiked but eventually they came to a point by a very high mountain where the column left the road to file up the hill. Bill Lohan recalls climbing for well over an hour before arriving at the crest where the platoons were dispersed along the military crest and told to dig in. Occasionally enemy mortar or artillery rounds exploded. The enemy rounds were apparently registering rounds (rounds fired to get the range of a particular target). H/3/1 went on a fifty percent alert.

The 1st Marines had moved into assembly areas and then pass through the 7th Marines to continue the attack. During a meeting at 0800, Lt. Col. Hire (3/1 CO), the S-3 officer, four Company Commanders, 3/1's Artillery Advisor, and others in the party received direct hits from a Communist artillery barrage. Some were killed and at least 32 others were wounded. So hard hit was the Battalion that its attack had to be postponed until June 3rd. Cpl Bill Lohan remembers sleeping in a tight sitting position at one end of his fox hole. About 2200 the platoon right guide came by alerting all that they were going to move out and to be quiet in their preparations. About 2230 they filed down the forward slope for several hundred meters to where the depleted ranks of the 7th Marines were dug in. H/3/1 took over their holes as occasional flares illuminated the valley to their front. Later during the night the enemy heavily mortared the Company on the right flank and also the positions Cpl Bill Lohan's platoon had dug on the crest of the hill and left just a few hours earlier.

PFC John S. Saliski, 11573376, from Staten Island, NY was KIA
In the early morning, around 0530, the 2nd Platoon Right Guide directed the 2nd Platoon to assemble with all their gear at the Platoon Leader's (2nd Lt. Joseph "Joe" Reed) foxhole. At the assembly point they were joined by a machine gun section. Lt. Reed told them they were going to take advantage of the morning's fog to cross the valley and that they would jump off shortly after 0600 in column. The valley was about 1200 meters wide and the Hwachon Reservoir was on their left flank. Once across the valley they moved in company column up the mountain on the northern side of the valley while tanks and other units moved into the valley.

The 1st Platoon was evidently in the lead followed by the 2nd and 3rd Platoons. PFC Jerry T. Jolly was in the first Platoon and recalls the following:

"I remembered crossing the valley that morning. We knew the enemy was just ahead of us up the hill. As we started our ascent I was thinking, "man they could be hiding in any of these bushes." When we got to the top of the hill we had to stop because of a pill box had us pinned down."

Cpl Vernon V. Duffy was a W/3/1 Marine that was attached to H/3/1 and usually billeted with the Mortar Section. He handled the 3/5 Rocket Launcher. When leading elements of the company were halted and pinned down by intense fire from enemy heavy machine guns in commanding position on high ground, Corporal Duffy's rocket squad was called upon to take the position under fire. Disregarding the withering fire which was sweeping the area, he crawled to an exposed point from which he could locate and estimate the distance to the enemy guns. As he rose to move to a better firing position, he was struck by a burst of enemy fire and fell mortally wounded, gallantly giving his life for his country. Vernon received the Bronze Star, with combat "V", for his actions during this battle.

About ten minutes into the 2nd Platoons climb they heard a single shot and soon the word was passed down the line "wounded coming down". In a few minutes a Marine holding a bloody bandage to his head came down the hill. He was probably a man from the 1st Platoon. When the wounded man moved onto a small plateau a bullet pierced his helmet creasing his head. The second platoon was hurried to a flat where the Company CO, 1st Lt. Daniel R. Evans, had set up his CP. It was a hot, clear day with no wind. They dropped packs at this place and were hurried up the hill toward the Plateau where the 2nd Platoon formed a firing line to the left of the 1st Platoon. The 3rd was held in reserve in the vicinity of the Company CP. The 3rd Squad of the 2nd Platoon formed a firing line to the second squads left rear in order to cover their left flank. The enemy had decided to make a stand at the plateau where their positions formed a half a horseshoe. The enemy positions were to the front of the 2nd Squad, 2nd Platoon.

The Companies 60mm mortars were called up. Cpl Bill Lohan also recalls the mortar men's difficulty with overhanging branches but they managed to get into firing position. A few minutes later word was passed that a 1st Platoon would assault the main Chinese position to the front while the 3rd Platoon laid down a base of fire for them. The first two squads from the 2nd Platoon also assaulted the hill with the 3rd squad of that platoon laying down a base of fire. They fixed bayonets and, on command, charged the enemy position which was about 75 yards away.

When the charge began, a radio man screamed "heads down Willie Peter, Willie Peter". As the ground erupted and the earth shook they wished their bodies straight down into the earth. The Battalion's 81 mm Mortars laid down a huge mortar barrage in front of the attacking Platoons on the Chinese on the plateau.

The 1st Platoon Leader, 2nd Lt. Morris Sam McGee, had started out as the Machine Gun Platoon Leader, and then was moved to the position of 1st Platoon Leader. While leading the 1st Platoon in this assault, Sam was WIA and evacuated. Lt. Joe Reed's 2nd Platoon continued the charge up the hill to take the enemy position.

PFC Jolly of the 1st Squad, 1st Platoon recalls the assault: "We used a bazooka to knock it out. After the pill box was taken we had a hand grenade contest between the North Koreans and the 1st Platoon. This is when PFC. Marvin L. Gordon lost both his legs. A grenade fell between his legs, I yelled, "grenade" and saw him having trouble trying to
pick it up. So I hit the ground and PFC Thomas N. Johnson turned his back to the grenade. It went off cutting off both of Gordon's legs below the knees and throwing Johnson into a tree unhurt. Jolly was not touched by the shrapnel. After putting Gordon on a stretcher so the corpsman could take him back down the hill, we went back to throwing grenades. I didn't like them picking up ours after we had thrown them, so I pulled the pin on one and counted to two and threw it. It went off just over the top of the knoll. A few minutes later we charged over the knoll and I found an officer with his head blown off. The grenade must have fallen between his head and the ground. A native American who was hit in the chest came back after this charge. He was hit on the right side. We called him Tonto. A few minutes later we were told to pull back. As we were pulling back an incoming mortar knocked four of us out. I only heard one person yelling that he had been hit in the foot. I was hit in the face, right shoulder, chest, and neck. My jugular vein had been cut. I remember landing on all fours and seeing blood shooting out of my neck. I yelled for corpsman, and this corpsman grabbed my neck. I looked up and said, "don't let go". He said he wouldn't. I remembered being put on a stretcher and carried down the hill to a jeep. Al Rayn (Kear) saw me at this time and thought I was dead because I was a white as a sheet and not moving. I had lost so much blood. At the aide station they had to put eight pints of blood in me to keep me alive. It took them some time finding where the blood was flowing from the chest wound. I lost my voice because the vocal card was damaged and the right arm was paralyzed. Later that night PFC Thomas N. Johnson broke and charged up a hill while all the mortar fire was coming in. He was sent the hospital in Yokosuka. I also met Tonto, Gordon, and Johnson there at Yokosuka Naval Hospital. I probably stayed in the hospital in Korea longer than the other two.

Gy/Sgt Marler also remembers Jerry Jolly's bush with death.

Bill Lohan also remembers a native American Marine being hit in the chest during this charge. He would later visit with him at the Naval Hospital in Yokosuka, Japan while sharing residence there. His BAR man was also gut shot and a grenade exploded on top his Assistant BAR man's helmet. Bill also recalls several other Marines being hit too.

At one point the 2nd Platoon was ordered to repulse an expected bayonet charge by the enemy to their front.

After taking the position, the 2nd Platoon Sgt., SSgt. Bob McCormick, told Bill Lohan that their right guide had been killed. While going one-on-one with an enemy soldier, another Chinese soldier hit him in the back with either an ax or a sword. SSgt. McCormick took an ammo count and learned that Bill Lohan had six rounds left and four of the BAR men had none. Others were also short and all grenades had been used. The men of the 2nd Platoon had started the day with each man carrying a full belt and two bandoleers plus four grenades apiece and a 60mm mortar round. The 2nd Platoon was directed to set up defensive positions and to hold the ground they had taken. Lt. Reed scavenged ammo from the wounded and dead and the Korean Service Corps brought up a small resupply. After they divided the ammo, each rifleman had about 20 rounds, BAR men had two magazines each, and each machine gun had about fifty rounds each. Late in the afternoon the enemy began dropping mortar rounds on the 2nd Platoon's position. Word came down that they were to pull back to the flat where they had dropped their packs. As Cpl Bill Lohan's began to move back, a mortar round exploded about ten feet to his left front slamming him to the ground with shrapnel in his left thigh and left arm. Several others became casualties from the same round. Bill regained use of the fingers on his left hand by mid July but would not experience feeling in that hand for another thirteen months.

Joe Reed reported that; 2nd Lt. Sam McGee, the 2nd Platoon Leader, was gravely wounded by a ricochet bullet during today's action. Shortly after Sam was hit, Dan Evans, the Skipper of H/3/1 and the Forward Air Controller was also wounded and evacuated. When Sam arrived at the aid station he was put in the 3rd Triage category and only when a corpsman heard him groan did anyone know he was still alive. Sam was from this day until he died in early 2005 a paraplegic. Not withstanding these difficulties he never lost his sense of humor or his will to live. Despite his handicap Sam earned a PhD in English and taught for a number of years at Monmouth College and Montclair State University, NJ where he was in charge of the English department. One of his proudest moments was to be on the dais next to General Ray Murray on the occasion of the dedication of the Korean War Memorial in
Ted Walters, a gunner, and Don Saunders, his assistant gunner, were in the 60mm Mortar Section that was supporting the assault. Carl Duvall was also there in the 60mm mortar crew. He remembers cutting and removing tree limbs to clear the path for the mortar rounds.

The following H/3/1 Marines were KIA this date:
- CPL Vernon Duffy (in Bazookas) from Glenwood Springs, CO
- PFC Daniel Ricci from Malden, MA
- PFC Lloyd Dawson Kaul from Omaha, NE
- PFC Richard W. Davis was sitting next to PFC Ricci when he was hit. He also had severe injuries that resulted in the loss of part of his foot.

The following were also WIA.
- PFC Carlo A. Gambino
- PFC Marvin L. Gordon

The following were dropped from the Company.
- PFC Lloyd D. Kaul
- PFC Daniel Ricci
IN KOREA

MONDAY, JUNE 4, 1951

1st Mar. Div. was fighting their way to the Punch Bowl area. This was called Operation Piledriver with the 1st Marines on the left front. During this, and perhaps the next day, Marines were consolidating positions and sending out reconnaissance patrols. The patrols were in preparation for an attack on the ridge just north of the Hwachon Reservoir. From this height the Communists were looking down the throats of the 1st Marines.

The 7th Marines came out of reserve to go on line to the right and the KMCs were in the middle.

About this date PFC Jack Cromer was sent to the Battalion Aid Station to get some medication for hook worms. The Doctor learned the Jack was also having chest pains so he sent him to the USS Haven for evaluation.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 6, 1951

This day, and the next two, 3/1 led the attack against moderate but gathering resistance. A gain of 1,500 yards was made on the right by 2/1. On the left 1/1 held fast as the 5th ROK Regiment, 7th ROK Division, X Corps, passed through on its way to a new zone of action to the west.

Burl Waits was in a shallow ditch attempting to take cover from an incoming artillery barrage when he was wounded in the left leg again by shrapnel. This was his second purple heart and bought him a return trip to the home. He spent the end of June and part of July touring Japan while waiting for his boring ride home.

PFC Albin A. Dlabaj also was WIA by a shrapnel during this day.

The following were dropped from the Company.

- Cpl Martin R. Frolo
- PFC Thomas N. Johnson
- PFC Fausting Prezioso
- 1st Lt. Charles R. Stiles
- PFC Vincent S. Gatto
- Cpl Alfred b. Mattingly
- Cpl Jimmie "Jim" Stewart
- PFC Robert S. Urban
H/3/1 MARINES

IN KOREA

THURSDAY, JUNE 7, 1951

PFC James R. McNeilly, 1106230, was KIA on this date while serving in the Machinegun Platoon or Rocket Section. A high velocity shell hit a tree above him and James died of Shrapnel wounds. James was from Greenback, TN and is buried in Maryville, TN.

Cpl William Quincy O'Daniel was WIA.

Maj. Ralph Rosacher became XO of the 1st Marines.

The following were dropped from the Company.

1st Lt. Daniel R. Evans (the CO)            Sgt John M. Fisher
Cpl Joseph K. Florence                      Cpl Carlo A. Gambino
Cpl William D. Lohan                        Cpl James R. McNeilly
Cpl William Quincy O'Daniel                  HN Davis L. Anderson

Cpl Lohan had been WIA and evacuated on June 3rd. He had been evacuated to the field hospital then the USS Haven, and then to Yokosuka Naval Hospital. When it was learned that he would not return, he was dropped from the Company on this date.

FRIDAY, JUNE 8, 1951

1st Lt. James L. Burnett became CO of H/3/1 on this date (or was it on 9/21/51?).

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC Richard W. Davis (WIA 6/3/51)            PFC Luther F. Manners
SSgt Earl W. Maxey

SATURDAY, JUNE 9, 1951

About this date PFC Jackie Cromer returned from the USS Haven to learn that PFC James McNeilly had died. Jackie went to see James' family when he got back to the States.

PFC Marvin L. Gordon was dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, JUNE 10, 1951

The 1st Marines had outfought and outgamed a very tough enemy. Never again was the NKPA resistance quite as determined. 3/1 led the other two Battalions during the next few days. There was plenty of fighting for all three, but the result was never in doubt. The Marines were winning.

PFC Jerry T. Jolly was severely wounded with shrapnel in the right side. Blood was gushing from the wound in his neck and he would have quickly bled to death had nothing been done. The Corpsman, Kurt Oberscheven, quickly grabbed Jerry and put enough pressure on the neck wound to reduce the flow of blood. The Corpsman stayed with Jerry, holding his neck all the way to the aid station where emergency medical care saved his life.

PFC Alan "Al" Ryan (AKA Alvin L. Kear) saw Jerry on the stretcher as thought he was a goner. fifty two years later he learned Jerry was alive and called to say, "What a great surprise to learn after all these years that you have survived your injuries in Korea. As I recall, your platoon had assaulted a machine gun emplacement and you were hit in the jugular vein. I last saw you about an hour or so later when we pulled off the hill. You were on a stretcher unconscious, on the back of a jeep. Your skin was white and you appeared almost lifeless. None of us felt you had a chance of surviving, so you can imagine my surprise to learn that you had made it. ... I'm looking forward to seeing you and many others at Branson (in 2003).

Semper Fi Jerry
Al Ryan (Kear)"

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.

Sgt Philip Bishop                        2nd Lt. Victor O'Hanesian
PFC Jerry T. Jolly                        TSgt Johnnie A. Kirby
Sgt John E. Clinton                       Sgt Alvin J. Robey
Sgt Joseph M. Smock

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TUESDAY, JUNE 12, 1951

PFC Charles A. Ellyson was dropped from the Company.
The company had taken a ridgeline from the enemy in the morning and they and they had zeroed in the ridgeline. Our guys were wandering around when a hail of incoming mortars came down. Lt Joe Reed was the 2nd Platoon Leader and Pfc Lorenzer Hutchinson was in the machine Gun Platoon. Lt. Joe Reed managed to get to a hole and Lorenzer almost made it when he took the brunt of a blast that hit him in the back. He was between Lt. Reed and the blast so Joe was saved from serious injury and he just wound up with "a few scratches". Lorenzer never knew what hit him. Joe pulled Lorenzer into the hole but nothing could be done for him. Lorenzer was from Jacksonville FL where he is buried.

PFC Ray Janca was KIA near the Punch Bowl Area during Operation Piledriver. He was from Luling, TX and is buried there.

Francis "Frank" Leon recalls that on his 22nd birthday, today, he was WIA by mortar fragments. He said that every member of his squad was hit and only 3 of the 12 in his squad returned to the line.

Cpl Eb Revsbeck was also WIA from mortar fire on this day. His award shows he was WIA at Honjon-ni, Korea.

The following were dropped from the Company.

Sgt James J. Duhe            Cpl Johnny D. Eiskina
PFC Frank A. Esposito       PFC Burton G. Fritz
Sgt Robert C. Hidalgo       PFC Lorenzer Hutchinson
PFC James R. Janca          Sgt Howard A. Kelly
Sgt Bernard J. Lilla

By late afternoon the 1st Marines were in position on the Brown Line. This was the unofficial name for the extension of the Kansas Line some 3,000 yards north. Col. W. S. Brown had requested this position when he realized that positions along the Kansas Line were completely dominated by the next ridge to the north.

The change made necessary a continued advance by the KMCs on the right to tie in with the 1st Marines. The so-called Brown Line was then officially designated the modified Kansas Line.

Col. W. S. Brown, CG, 1st Marines, wrote a letter which begins by saying: ... "The Regiment Commander wishes to express to all hands of the Regiment and attached and supporting elements, his boundless admiration and heartfelt congratulations for their conduct of the past two weeks." ...

PFC Jim Thornton remembers this day when they were in an area called Hanjon-no. Jim, the Company Runner, was billeted at Battalion. One of his duties was to bring mail to the Company. He had just made a mail run to the Company and had hitched a ride back to Battalion in a Red Cross jeep, when the jeep detonated a mine in the road. It caused severe injury to the driver and a Corpsman that was also in the jeep. Jim was thrown about 20 yards and suffered three broken ribs. He was evacuated to the hospital where he spent the next three days before returning to (probably light) duty.

Ted Walters was also wounded this day. He received a concussion and back injuries from a blast while at/near Hohon-ni.

PFC Michael "Mike" H. Gerrity was also wounded with shrapnel in the knee. The wound was not severe and he was not evacuated.

Cpl William Lewellyn Jones and PFC George E. Dempsey are listed as KIA this date. William was from South Orange, NJ and is buried in Union, NJ. George was from Dixon, IL and is buried there.

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC George E. Dempsey            Cpl William L. Jones
PFC Paul F. Keller              PFC Sam Martello Jr.
Cpl Herbert L. Maurer           PFC Robert G. Scherer
Sgt James L. Shaklee
FRIDAY, JUNE 15, 1951

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

H/3/1 CO          1st Lt. Herbert M. Anderson (joined)
81 MM mortars     Earl Darlington (left)

(Did H/3/1 have 81mm mortars at this time or was Earl attached from Weapons
Company?)

3rd Plt.          Jack "Gunman" Miles (left)
                  Robert "Bob" Reasoner (left)

The 1st Mar. Div. was on a ridge south of the Punch Bowl by this date. It is not
known where the 1st Marines were but the 5th Marines were on line with Bloody Ridge on
their left and Heartbreak Ridge on their right.

About this time Gen. Van Fleet, X Corps CG ordered the 1st Mar. Div. to assault the
northeast rim of the Punch Bowl. They had the advantage of catching the CCF in the process
of relieving units. They sustained many casualties when they took the northeast ridge but
inflicted a great many more on the CCF.

Herbert Anderson became CO of H/3/1.

PFC Allen H. MacQuarrie was dug in with PFC Norman "mother" Hensley at Honjon-ni,
early the Punchbowl when he was KIA from missiles from a mortar round that burst in a tree
above his foxhole. PFC Ivan F. Leech watched as stretcher bearers carried Allen back to
the aid station. Ivan remembers Allen as a quiet guy, helpful to those around him. At one
time Allen tried to find a pair of shoes to fit one of the guys in his squad who had the
wrong size. Allen would often sing a song called, "I hear the silver trumpet blow". Allen
was from Boston, MA, and is buried in Mattapan (in Boston), MA.

Capt. James B. Ord was relieved as the Company CO.

The following were dropped from the Company.

Cpl John Kornye Jr.                   PFC Allen H. MacQuarrie
Cpl Grady F. Stancel

SATURDAY, JUNE 16, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC Richard Hawkins                   Cpl Drewery Patterson

SUNDAY, JUNE 17, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC Robert W. Jones                    PFC Clarence Kamerman
PFC Calvin R. Merrell                  PFC Thomas M. Watkins
Cpl Rudolph "Pappy" V. Whitman         HM3 Donald R. Crelia
PFC Ira A. Settles

MONDAY, JUNE 18, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company.

2nd Lt. Morris S. McGee (was WIA and evacuated on June 3rd)
SSgt William "Cod" L. Holeman           Cpl Prescott Howland
Cpl Joseph S. Kelly                     PFC Francis S. Leon

TUESDAY, JUNE 19, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company.

Cpl Henry G. Earley                    Cpl Joseph "Joe" C. Endisch
PFC Raymond H. Kiernan                 PFC James B. King
SSgt James D. Phillips                 Sgt Lowell R. Riffey
Cpl Donald L. Saunders                 Cpl Burl W. Waits
Cpl Ted "Flat Face" Walters

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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 1951

Cpl Robert L. Engledow and HM3 John M. Mackay were dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 1951

The 1st Marines and KMCs extended their right and left flanks and pinched out the 7th Marines, which was being moved back into reserve.

This ended two months of continual hard fighting for the 1st Mar. Div. which had begun on 22 April with the great CCF offensive. Few and far between were the interludes of rest for the troops, which saw both defensive and offensive action. After stopping the enemy's two offensive drives, they launched a month-long counteroffensive that had the enemy hard pressed at times for survival, only the ruthless sacrifice of NKPA troops in defensive positions enabled the Chinese to recover from the blows dealt them in late May and early June.

The cost in Marine casualties had been high. Throughout the entire month the 1st Marines alone suffered 67 KIA and 1044 WIA, most of them being reported during the first 2 weeks. This was a higher total than the Regiment incurred during the Chosin Reservoir operation.

The following were dropped from the Company

Cpl Raymond A. Sebetto  
HN Harold K. Jack

FRIDAY, JUNE 22, 1951

All three regiments were directed to establish battalion-sized patrol bases on the Badger Line, one and one half to two and one half miles forward of their present positions. In the 1st Marines sector 3/7 was attached to the 1st Marines and ordered to relieve 3/1 on the left flank of the regiment. The purpose was to free 3/1 to move forward and establish a patrol base on Hill 761, about 1,000 yards forward of the MLR. Because of a mix up at higher (EUSAK & CORPS) levels, this patrolling action was canceled until the 26th.

Sgt Jack R. Perigo of the 3rd Platoon was wounded near Hanjon-ni and DOW on this date. Jack was from Chandler, IN and is buried in Boonville, IN. It is not known when Jack was wounded but he died in the 4th Field Hospital from complications of a blood clot.

The following were dropped from the Company.

Cpl Leslie A. Northway  
PFC Bob P. Turnham

SATURDAY, JUNE 23, 1951

The NKPA and CCF requested peace talks VIA a Soviet delegate to the UN. Their official proposal for truce talks was made in a New York radio announcement on this day. Most analysts think the peace proposal was because they were fought out and needed time to regroup and reorganize.

SUNDAY, JUNE 24, 1951

PFC Joseph Jeddery was wounded with shrapnel in the left hand. He had just left the fox hole of a new arrival (from Boston, MA) to the Company when a mortar fell in/near the new guys hole and wounded Joe. Joe thought the new guy was KIA but there were no KIAs on this date. Perhaps the new guy was very seriously wounded.

The following were dropped from the Company.

Cpl Richard C. Eklund  
PFC Gordon S. Sledge

PFC Louis E. Sledge (dropped in Feb. 1952 - is this a mistake?)

MONDAY, JUNE 25, 1951
IN KOREA

The Chinese Communist's proposal was officially acknowledged in a radio broadcast. UN officials immediately indicated their willingness to discuss preliminary terms. The outcome was an agreement that representatives of both sides agreed to meet on 7 July at Kaesong, which was located between the opposing lines in western Korea.

TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 1951

The war went on during the negotiations. But the tempo was much reduced as UN forces consolidated their gains, and the enemy appeared to be breaking off contact at every opportunity. Generally speaking, the 8th Army had shifted from the offensive to defensive. In keeping with this trend, the 1st Mar. Div. occupied the same positions for nearly three weeks after fighting its way to the Brown Line.

In compliance with orders, 3/1 moved out and established a patrol base on Hill 761. This position received such bombardment of large caliber mortar fire that Col. Brown pulled the battalion back to the MLR the following day.

The following were dropped from the Company.
Cpl Robert G. Wamsley            Rodolfo G. Reed

THURSDAY, JUNE 28, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company.
Cpl Paul Estes                    PFC Paul Fletcher
PFC Donald J. Jalufka             PFC Joseph C. Jones Jr.
Cpl Raymond Kaczynski             Cpl Robert W. Skinner

FRIDAY, JUNE 29, 1951

SSgt Jack R. Seeler was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, JUNE 30, 1951

During the month of June the 1st Marine Division's actions resulted in the virtual destruction of the Sixth North Korean Division. During the last two weeks of June and the first part of July the 1st Marines strengthened, consolidated, and patrolled their zone, a five-mile front line sector about five and one-half miles southwest of the Punchbowl.

SUNDAY, JULY 1, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company.
PFC James D. Gilmore              PFC Hubert F. Hurff
Cpl James W. Kelly

TUESDAY, JULY 3, 1951 TUESDAY

PFC Melvin A. Patureau was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY OR FRIDAY JULY 5, OR 6, 1951

The Company was manning the MLR.
PFC Arnold Mike Tinkey arrived at the Company from the 10th Replacement Draft to join PFC Donald Edward Smith's 1st fire team. Mike became a BAR-man. Mike made the trip from Pusan alone and, as far as he knows, was the only replacement from the 10th draft.
This was the scheduled date for truce talks to begin at Kaesong.

After daily therapy Cpl William "Bill" Lohan could lift the specified amount of weight with each finger and was transferred from the Yokosuka Naval Hospital to a casual company at Kyoto Japan. Recovering WIA's were issued rifles and 782 gear and subjected to two weeks of hikes and physical training and then returned to Korea as replacements. Bill was returned to Pusan as a replacement during the first week of July. From Pusan about eight replacements were flown forward, perhaps to Hongchon, and were trucked to Division Headquarters for reassignment. It was after 1800 when they arrived at Division, to late for evening chow. When a Clerk told them to just find someplace to crap out until morning, Cpl Lohan said "The hell with this, I know my unit, H-3-1". He took off looking for the Company's bivouac area. He hitched a ride on a 6x6 whose driver said he could get him close. He dropped Bill off at a crossroad and told him to take the right hand road and said he should come across How Company in a few miles. About 2230 Bill walked into the Company CP tent where he found his Platoon Sergeant, SSgt Robert A. McCormick, acting as Staff Duty NCO. McCormick surprised to see Cpl Lohan. Bill told SSgt McCormick he was reporting for duty. SSgt McCormick found Bill a place to drop his gear and to sleep for the night. Then next morning Bill was reassigned to the 2nd Platoon.

About this date the Company Commander, 1st Lt. Daniel R. Evans, sent for Cpl Lohan. It seems Division had him listed as being AWOL in a Combat Zone and had notified all units to be on the lookout for the fugitive. The CO also sent for SSgt. McCormick. He told McCormick to take Lohan to Battalion Headquarters where they were to report directly to the Battalion CO. At Battalion they were directed to the Battalion CO's tent where they found him eating breakfast with the Regimental Commander. The Battalion Commander asked Cpl Lohan why he went AWOL. Cpl Lohan told him he did not go AWOL, he simply reported back to his unit after being hospitalized. Cpl Lohan told him he didn't stay overnight at Division because of the callous manner in which he had been treated. Cpl Lohan told the Battalion CO it is impossible for him to be AWOL as he did check in at Division and never left the Division's area of responsibility. Both the Regimental and Battalion COs laughed at this. Cpl Lohan was asked by the Regimental CO if he knew the regiment would be going back on line soon to which Cpl Lohan answered "Yes". The Battalion CO then asked if he wanted to stay with H/3/1 to which Lohan answered "Yes." He then asked SSgt. McCormick if he wanted Lohan back to which Sgt. McCormick replied "Yes." The Regimental Commander then said "I will square this with Division, now get out of here my eggs are already cold." They were excused and returned to the Company.

PFC William C. Elliott was dropped from the Company.

About this date the Company went into reserve and stayed there until the September 12th. H/3/1's enemy now was the rain, flooding, and dysentery while training, schooling, and resting.

HN Kurt H. Oberscheven was dropped from the Company.
IN KOREA

THURSDAY, JULY 12, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company.

Cpl James C. L. Bowen  Cpl Cecil G. Bush
Sgt Lawrence T. Grant  TSgt Robert "Bob" L. Marler
Cpl Calvin Mitcheltree  PFC George D. Spring
Sgt John L. Tucker  PFC Dick W. Woolery

FRIDAY, JULY 13, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC Thomas F. Hackett  Cpl Peter J. Selewich

SUNDAY, JULY 15, 1951

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

60 mm Mortars  Marvin Popasan Rigel (joined)
60 mm Mortars  William "Big Bill" Taylor (joined)
MG Plt.  Paul Hawks (joined)
(Paul was also in 3rd Plt. It is not known when he moved between positions within the Company)

1st Plt. 1st Sqd  Russel Comanche Poulk (joined)
1st Plt. 2nd Sqd  David "Dave" Richardson (joined)
1st Plt. 2nd Sqd  Jerome Shoeless Schulist (joined)
1st Plt  PFC Duane "Tide" Tideback

Relief of the 1st Mar. Div. by the 2nd Infantry Division was accomplished on this date. The 1st Mar. Div. went into X Corps reserve. Although the fighting had not been sever for the other units of the 1st Mar. Div. during the first two weeks of July, the casualties (including KMC losses) were 55 KIA, 360 WIA, and 22 MIA.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 18, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company.

1st Lt. Lewis R. Beckett  Cpl Lawrence Johnson

THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1951

Lt. Col. Foster C. LaHue became CO of the 1st Marines.

FRIDAY, JULY 20, 1951

1st Lt. Thomas J. Holt was dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, JULY 22, 1951

Cpl Robert Edward Price was swimming during an organized recreational period. He dove in the river and struck his head on a rock to become one of H/3/1's non-battle casualties. Cpl. Price had been involved in heavy fighting during March and April and led his 2nd squad in the bayonet charge of June 3rd. He also remained in the thick of the fighting in battles near the Punch Bowl that lasted 17 days. It seems unfair that this hero should be dropped from the Company on this day for such a tragic accident.

Maj. Rodney V. Reighard became XO of the 1st Marines. Capt. Clarence Corley was rotated to the States about this date.
MONDAY, JULY 23, 1951

A 1st Mar. Div. Training Order covering the period from 23 July to 20 August provided for a stiff daily schedule of schooling in general and specialized military subjects. One of the training subjects was intensive training for an amphibious landing. Boat Teams were formed and boat signs made and they would gather in a field in groups simulating they were in LCVP's heading for the beach.

Body armor (flak jackets) were being tested about this time. As a result of this testing, large-scale production began that would put nearly all Marines in "flak jackets" by the spring of 1952.

Cpl Bill Lohan saw his only movie while with H-3-1. The name of the movie was, "The Thing", staring James Arness.

TUESDAY, JULY 24, 1951

Cpl Richard Hendrickson was dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 1951

PFC Donald F. Walsh was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, JULY 26, 1951

PFC Kenneth J. Fabian was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, JULY 27, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company.

Cpl Conway D. Wendland  HM3 Joseph D. Carroll

SUNDAY, JULY 29, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company.

Sgt Richard A. Deloreto  Sgt Donald A. Toups

TUESDAY, JULY 31, 1951

Cpl Richard "Dick" L. Kidd was dropped from the Company.

AUGUST ??

Sometime during the month of August Al Kear went on emergency leave to attend his mother's funeral.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 3, 1951

A memorial ceremony was held by the First Marine Division at Hongchon, Korea "in memory of those heroic Marines who gave their lives so that people might have an opportunity to enjoy freedom throughout the world." The memorial roll consisted of about 450 Marines.

SATURDAY, AUGUST 4, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC Harry F. Orlick  PFC Ernest "Ernie" "Steve" O. Severson
THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company.

Sgt Harvey F. Abrams
PFC William S. Clark
Cpl Richard R. Esau
Sgt James E. Gregg
PFC Harold G. Jonas
Cpl Burk H. Lindsay
Cpl Thomas D. Patrick
Cpl Robert E. Shelton
Cpl James "Jim" H. Thornton
Cpl Ronald L. Wilson

PFC Robert D. Bothe
Cpl Keith O. Dumond
Sgt Frank G. Estrada
Cpl Raymond L. Halliday
Cpl Charles L. Keyes
Sgt Charles E. McDonald
Cpl Joseph R. Perez Jr.
Cpl Charles L. Keyes
PFC William B. Viles

FRIDAY, AUGUST 10, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC William "BillyJoe" J. Condon
Cpl Calvin A. Robb
Cpl Ovie O. Tracy

SATURDAY, AUGUST 11, 1951

SSgt Robert A. McCormick was dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, AUGUST 12, 1951

PFC Charles H. Wittlin was dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, AUGUST 13, 1951

The Company continued to receive replacements without sustaining combat casualties while in reserve. To rectify this situation, an order from Division directed the transfer of all men with a Purple Heart to supporting units. Cpl Lohan was transferred to Able Company, 1st Amtracs where he became a charter member of Task Force Blaze, a 45 man unit equipped with half-tracks and armored cars. Their mission was to patrol between Kimpo Airfield and the tip of Kimpo Peninsula at night looking for infiltrating Chinese units. All that stood between Kimpo Airfield and the Chinese was about 200 Marines from 1st Armored Amtracs who were dug in at the tip of the Peninsula and Task Force Blaze. In case of an attack, they were to buy the Air Force time to evacuate its planes and personnel.

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC Ralph V. Bigletti
PFC George Collins
PFC Raymond H. Finkley
Cpl Jerry J. Jenson
PFC Donald E. Jones
PFC William L. Wallace (perhaps)

PFC Kenneth Christensen
PFC Earl "Danny" S. Daniels
PFC Maurice V. Defoer
PFC Dick C. Helser
Cpl Winnie N. Jackson
PFC Reginald W. Johnson
PFC Ronald Kazierski
Cpl Roger R. Reynolds Jr.
PFC John J. Scarpa Jr.
PFC Walter L. Wesley
PFC Isaac Valdez
IN KOREA

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 15, 1951

About this date the following Marines joined the indicated units in H/3/1.

H/3/1 wireman     Wallie "Red" Hansen (joined)
60 mm Mortars     Buddy "Bud" Scott (joined)
2nd Plt.          Jack Hook (Joined)
3rd Plt.          Burton "Bud" Schwartz (joined)

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1951

Cpl Clyde W. Keel, who had been a H/3/1 Marine that would return to Korea for a second tour, was reenlisting in the U.S.A.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 23, 1951

The Communists discontinued truce talks on this date claiming (probably a false claim) that UN planes had violated a neutrality of the Kaesong area. Apparently they had been given enough time to recuperate from their hard knocks in May and June and no longer needed this delaying action.

SUNDAY, AUGUST 26, 1951

The location of elements of the 1st Mar. Div. at this time were: 1st Marines were near Chogutan; 5th near Inje; 7th were near Hanggu; and 1st KMC were in Hangye. While the 5th was scheduled to prepare to move up south and west of the Punch Bowl, the 1st Marines were in reserve. The 1st Mar. Div. was back in battle again but it would have to fight its first battle against the rain and mud.

PFC William K. Hogan and PFC Harold Whiting were dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 28, 1951

PFC Jackie "Jack" C. Cromer was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 31, 1951

The mission of the 1st Marines on this date was to remain in the rear in the Hongchon area in X Corps reserve.

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1951

About this date the Company was scheduled to move out so tents were struck and preparations were made to move out. At the late minute the word was changed. The tents in which they were living were transported away so they set up their pup tent. They would be living in these pup tents for the next several days.

During the first ten days of September 3/1 was in bivouac about five miles north of Hongchon, conducting training exercises and motorized security patrols throughout the regimental sector of responsibility.

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1951

The Battalion observed holiday routine. At 0830 a squad sized motorized patrol departed to check the area. The patrol returned at 1130 reporting no activity.

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC Lawrence Pendergast          Cpl Andrew F. Hotaling
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 1951

From 0800 to 1235 the Battalion made a conditioning hike to the east. During the afternoon the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division and the Commanding General, FMF Pacific visited the Battalion and met with officers.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1951

Training activities for the day included company patrol and attack problems, which were completed during the morning. Plans were made for H/3/1 to conduct a problem on 5 September which would involve the unit in an enemy ambush while in route march.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1951

H/3/1 was involved in the ambush training problem for which they were scheduled. They were on an alternating schedule with other 3/1 companies for this ambush problem, visiting the Division Dental Clinic and other activities.

Cpl Samuel B. Whitesell was dropped from the Company.

The Battalion detached one officer and 65 enlisted Marines for rotation to the United States. This probably included the following Marines who were thought to have left H/3/1 in September.

H/3/1 Wireman     Gilberto "Chico" Ramirez (left)
MG Plt.           Kieth Dumond (left)
MG Plt.           Frederick Fred Merritt (left)
                   (Fred was also in the 3rd Platoon. It is not known when he moved between positions within the Company.)
1st Plt. Bzks.    Eugene "Cowboy" Davis (left)
                   (Did 1st Platoon have bazookas at this time or was Eugene attached from Weapons Company?)
2nd Plt.          William BillyJoe Condon (left)
2nd Plt.          Earl Danny Daniels (left)
2nd Plt.          Francis (Fortino) "Frank" J. Estrada (left)
2nd Plt.          James "Jim" Stewart (left)
2nd Plt.          Cpl Samuel B. Whitesell 663157/0311 (dropped 9/5/51)

The 12th Replacement Draft had arrived at Pusan. The men had marched from the ship, MC Meigs, to an assembly area outside the city where they were informed of the units to which they were assigned unit. Three officers and 94 enlisted men from that draft joined 3/1. This probably included the following Marines who were thought to have joined H/3/1 in September.

60mm Mortars      Cpl Buddy "Bud" Scott
60mm Mortars      Cpl Dennis Semrau
1st Plt Ldr       James "Jim" Hughes
2nd Plt. Corpsman C. Reed "Doc" Carpenter
2nd Plt. 3rd Sqd  Sanford "Sandy" Soufrine

Cpl Buddy Scott and Cpl Dennis Semrau had stayed at the tent camp outside Mason for an extra day. There was some mix-up when making assignments. Marines whose name started with "S" were not assigned to a unit. After this problem was resolved, they were trucked to an airstrip near Mason and then flown to the 1st Mar. Div. reserve area where they caught up with their replacement draft.

The 1st squad of the Mortar Section was missing two ammo bearers and the 3rd squad also needed one. None of the replacements assigned to H/3/1 had a mortar MOS so they asked for volunteers. Buddy Scott and Dennis Semrau raised their hands and became mortar men. Buddy was assigned to the 1st Squad and Dennis was assigned to the 3rd Squad.

1st Lt Harold "Hal" Arutunian was the Mortar Plt Leader. In Buddy Scott’s 1st section, PFC Gus C. E. Marcotte was the Squad leader, PFC Adrian "Lash" A. L’Heureux was the gunner, Cpl Leo Stroman was the assistant gunner, PFC Robert "Rabbit" W. Dunne was the
1st ammo bearer, and Cpl Buddy "Bud" Scott became the 2nd ammo bearer. The 1st squad was still short one man so there was no 3rd ammo bearer.

Sgt Carl "Zack" Ernest Zachary was transferred to the ammo dump.
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1951

Sgt Loren L. Reed, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} squad Leader of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Platoon, wrote home to tell his parents that he had been promoted to Sergeant yesterday and that it would raise his pay $30.00 per month. He also said the nights were cold and the days were hot.

A company-sized problem was scheduled for the afternoon.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1951

A scheduled Battalion-sized problem was executed and an inspection of the training program was made. The Regimental Executive Officer and S-3 witnessed the planned training exercises. Troops returned to their bivouac areas at 1230.

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1951

A squad sized motorized patrol departed at 0700 and returned at 1730 reporting no unusual activity. Training for the day consisted of personnel and weapons inspections conducted by company commanders.

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1951

Holiday routine occupied the day's scheduled activities and preparations were made to continue training on September 10th.

Division orders on this date call for the 1st Marines to be released from X Corps reserve near Hongchon. They were to be prepared to pass through the 7th Marines when they secured their objectives and then continue the attack to seize Objective Charlie, the ridge-line leading northwest from Hill 1052.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1951

Many of the activities documented in the following paragraphs, up until Sept. 21st, were revealed in a letter H/3/1's 3rd Platoon Leader, Lt. Harper, wrote to his father on September 24th. It was published by Life Magazine. Several other H/3/1 Marines, notably Mike Tinkey, have also provided information that adds to the details of the Company’s activities during this period.

H/3/1 boarded trucks and moved out at dawn to an assembly area about 40-50 miles to the northeast. They debarked from trucks at this new area that was a little north of the Punch Bowl.

SSgt James D. MacDonald, Sgt Fred E. Penney Jr, Sgt Mike Snyder, and William Wyda were dropped from the Company.
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1951

The men started receiving ammunition in mid-afternoon and by 1800 had moved out of the assembly area. They were going east of the Punchbowl to relieve the 7th Marines who had been on line. The Company was in the rear of the Battalion following G/3/1 and I/3/1. They followed the road for a distance then turned west to ford a river, then turned north again. Again the river was in their path and H/3/1 had to walk up the middle of the stream for about 200 yards. The September chill of the Korean River was noticeable.

The moon was up and there were enough scattered clouds for the engineers to supplement it with artificial moonlight, searchlights reflecting light off the clouds. With both the natural and artificial light, visibility was good enough to make out the white tapes marking their route which lay through an extensive mine field. By about 2200 the first stretchers and walking wounded began passing H/3/1 going the opposite direction. As each stretcher passed, they looked to see if the patient's face was covered or not. The first four or five passed before one went by that was covered from head to foot with a riddled poncho.

Throughout this day they could hear the continuous bombardment of the Chinese by artillery and planes. Late in the evening they were on a ridge about a mile behind the MLR. Sgt Loren Reed found time to write home to tell his parents they were moving up and wouldn't have time to write again until they "stopped pushing". He said that if he didn't get a chance to write for a while, not to worry, "he would be okay".
The column was moving very slowly by now with frequent stops. They were fully loaded with food and ammo, all of which makes a pack very heavy, especially at midnight. They learned later that they were moving into positions held by the 7th Marines who were east of the Punchbowl. As they passed through one of their mortar positions, they were somewhat shaken to see scores of figures lying on the ground. However, closer inspection revealed the movement, breathing, and tossing and rolling of live sleeping Marines. By the time they made it to the valley on the other side, dawn was beginning to break and they were nearing their assigned positions.

As they moved closer, 76mm shells began screaming in. The shells were hitting the ridge beyond the Marines as they crossed the last ridge between them and their positions. They went down into another valley and forded another stream to get to the base of yet another ridge.

It was now 0600 and fully daylight. They had been on the march for twelve hours and had covered about seven miles.

After a rest, Lt. Harper and his platoon moved up onto the ridge to replace the survivors of H/3/7 who had taken the ridge. The 7th Marines were bringing out about ten dead Marines as the 3rd Platoon moved up. As they passed they looked gaunt and dirty and all seemed to be staring. One was singing a crazy inappropriate love song as he moved along, lurching from one side of the trail to the other. Eighty men out of the 240 walked off that hill, which had not been held physically very strongly by the gooks. Enemy mortars and 76s had taken their toll.

The 3rd Platoon took over the living quarters that were in heavily bunkered positions at the top of the ridge. There were a number of Russian burp guns, piles of burp gun ammo, and two heavy maxim machineguns with wheeled mounts and protective armor shields. A burp gun is a Russian made, extremely fast firing, automatic weapon that makes a burrrrrp sound when fired. It is cheaply made and, with only five parts, is easily disassembled. One of the parts is a little black rubber pad which fits over the end of a long spring to help reduce the recoil. A 35-round magazine holds the .31 caliber (9.72mm) ammunition. In the but plate is an oil and thong compartment. There were also a number of rifles and a .50 caliber, antitank, shoulder-mounted rifle that was about 15 feet long.

They began occupying the positions as friendly artillery began working on Hill 1052 which looming up above them. G and I companies jumped off at 1300. Each moved up one of the ridges that led to Hill 1052. The 3rd Platoon selected positions that had been used successively by the gooks and 7th Marines. They prepared to move in for the night's activity. The 3rd Platoon Sgt. selected a smallish bunker for he and Lt. Harper. To lie down in the bunker they had to recline almost doubled up with their feet up in the air almost sticking out of the entrance.

Cpl Buddy Scott recalls that the Mortar Section set up for the night at the base of a Hill. Buddy thought this might be Hill 751. It was obvious the Chinese had previously occupied these positions. There were heavy machinegun bunkers with many rifle positions. One bunker contained large quantities of ammunition, rice-filled socks (that one could wear around the neck and under the arm like a bandolier), and Chinese concussion grenades. The concussion grenades were similar to the old WWII German potato-masher grenades. They had bamboo handles with a string hanging down. The string had a loop that the Chinese would pull to start the fuse and then throw the grenade. The large part of the grenade, at the top, was covered with lairs of paper and powder to provide the concussion blast.

About evening meal time, true to form, the Chinese fired a few 82mm-mortar rounds. One of these rounds burst about 25 yards from Lt. Harper and wounded the machinegun section leader. Subsequent rounds hit one of 3rd Platoon's squad leaders and a rifleman. About this time Lt. Harper began to realize the superficiality of fully 80 percent of all casualties. Small splinters of shrapnel hit them, but of course, they rate full medical attention. In fact, speaking from his own experience, to deny it to them would be criminal because once you are hit, all you can think about is getting the metal removed or taken care of in some way.

As night fell, they could hear light firing in addition to the friendly artillery.
support. The action picked up much more at midnight. The enemy held off their counter
attacks until the stroke of midnight. Then, preceded by the usual bugle call, they stormed
down the ridge to 1/3/1’s perimeter. This attack and four successive attacks, all
executed exactly on the hour, were beaten back with light losses to 1/3/1’s Marines.
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1951

The attack by the 1st Marines originally scheduled for 0500 had been changed to 0900. Reasons were; a shortage of ammunition, even with the many cargadors assigned to the regiment; lack of helicopters to evacuate the increasing number of casualties; and enemy interdictions on the roads adding to logistic problems.

This brought new and better helicopters into the war concept. Not too long after this date, better service was given wounded Marines that were to be evacuated.

On the Regiment's left, 3/1 could not make much progress toward their objective, Hill 751, while the enemy was still on Hill 749 (at coordinates 298457), 2/1's objective.

One account cites that 3/1's objective was Hill 751 (probably one of their initial objectives) while Lt. Harper identifies the main objective as Hill 1052. There were many Hills that were objectives at this time and it is likely that both Hills 751 and 1052 were prime objectives at different times. Other prominent hills in this area include Hill 847 and/or 854 (at coordinates 333482).

Hill 751 (at coordinates 263443) is a Hill that is on a ridge line, a series of higher hills, that leads to Hill 1052 (at coordinates 256464).

H/3/1 was relieved by G/3/1. As the Mortar Section was being relieved, Cpl Buddy Scott met three of his old high school buddies in G/3/1’s Mortar Section. He didn’t even know they were in Korea. They had a short ten minute reunion before Buddy had to move down the ridge and then up another.

Early in the afternoon, the 3rd Platoon was ordered to set up an outpost on a ridge to the rear of G/3/1. The purpose of the outpost was to prevent the enemy from attacking G/3/1’s rear. After a short hike, 3rd Platoon arrived at a place where the terrain features looked exactly like the features shown on the map. They had orders to put part of the platoon atop the lower part of the ridge and the rest of the men on the trail at the base of the ridge. Lt. Harper moved ahead of the platoon and up a trail leading to the top of the ridge. After going about fifty yards, Lt. Harper spotted a trip wire. It was a Russian, wire-stick-type, booby trap set in the middle of the trail. These gadgets resemble potato masher grenades, with a stake to fix them in the ground and a cast iron serrated body containing the explosive. Kick the trip wire and the explosion sprays shrapnel splinter everywhere.

It appeared that the approaches (the little ridges running up the slope) were mined. Lt. Harper thought of trying the draw where the run off and resultant rolling rocks may have cleared out the mines. By this time, four riflemen were with Lt. Harper and they began working up the draw. Not many feet further, the second man behind Lt. Harper, walking right in Lt. Harper's footprints, kicked one of the mine-wires. He got a piece of shrapnel in the back and the man in front of him was wounded lightly in the leg.

Mines like these are very mean. When one explodes it sounds like a mortar and the first instinct is to drop to the ground where one is apt to set off other mines. It turned out that only the base of the ridge was mined so the 3rd Platoon was able to install the prescribed outpost on top of the ridge. The other 3rd Platoon Marines set up at the base of the ridge for the evening as ordered. In the middle of the night, an infiltrator sneaked in and wounded two Marines in the legs with rifle fire.

Cpl Buddy Scott and PFC Robert Dunne were improving a bunker to sleep in when they were interrupted by additional orders. They and several other mortar men were ordered to the MLR for the night. H/3/1 was spread too thin and needed additional men to help man the front lines. Scott and Dunn volunteered to spend the night in a fighting hole on the front line. They didn’t know the Marines on either side and it was pretty lonely. With no grenades and only a limited amount of carbine ammo it is a lucky the Chinese didn’t attack them that night.

Throughout the night, 3/1 repulsed a series of counter-attacks by an estimated 300 enemy.

On this day H/3/1 Marines donated their food to H/3/7 who was out of food and unable to get supplies.
Although the 1st Marines had been the predominant force for about a day, relief of the 7th Marines by the 1st Marines was officially completed on the night of 13-14 September. By daybreak 3/1 and 1/1 had assumed responsibility for the zones of 3/7 and 1/7, which were on their way to Division Reserve. 2/1, in the center, could not complete the relief of 2/7 because of enemy contact and heavy NKPA mortar and 76mm fire.

The 1st Marines continued the attack at 0800. Both 3/1 and 2/1 inched their way forward against a heavy volume of well-aimed mortar, artillery, and automatic weapons fire. NKPA resistance persisted on the wooded northern slope of Hill 749, where hidden bunkers had to be knocked out one by one. It took constant slugging for 2/1 to advance 300 meters before dusk, enabling 3/1 to fight its way to the summit of Hill 751.

Meanwhile the 3rd Platoon evacuated last night's casualties and went to work improving positions. About this time, the Battalion 81mm Mortar Platoon moved up and informed the 3rd Platoon that they were in the wrong place. The 3rd Platoon then moved on up the valley to a position on the next ridge.

During this night an infiltrator wounded another of the 3rd Platoon Marines with a grenade. The machinegun section also picked up five prisoners in the valley just below to the ridge.

About this date PFC Carl Duplantis, a squad leader in the 3rd Machine Gun Section, and PFC Carl Kanouse, one of his squad were sharing fox holes.

About this date the 1st Mar. Div. was in a "nasty nine-day assault". Gains were made but nothing essential. There was comparative quiet as the 5th Marines moved up to assembly areas in preparation for passing through 3/1 on the 16th to continue the attack. 3/1 in turn would relieve 1/1 so they could pass through 2/1 and carry on the assault to complete the securing of Hill 749.

About noon 3/1 was pulled back into a reserve assembly area for a stay. 3rd Platoon's scuttlebutt said they would be back from one to thirty days. However, forty-five minutes later, they were on their way up to another ridge.

Before pulling out, some had a giddy sort of short reunion with Marines from G/3/1 and I/3/1. They found themselves mutually tickled, almost to tears, on meeting old friends. They exchanged jokes and close calls and laughed at everything that had happened. Then H/3/1 moved out again.

The ridge H/3/1 was to occupy had been completely devastated, blasted, scared, and shredded-by the 7th Marines' assault. The "hard headed 3rd Platoon Sgt." found a bunker for he and Lt. Harper that was out of this world. It was an eight-foot-under job that was dry, and clean with mats thoughtfully left by the enemy.

The following were dropped from the Company:

PFC Frank A. Esposito
Chester Willis

The comparative quiet of the previous day was broken one minute after midnight when the enemy launched a savage four-hour attack to drive 2/1 off Hill 749. During that night Cpl Joseph Vettori became the second Marine of 2/1 within a 48 hours period to win the Congressional Medal of Honor.

A combined assault by an estimated 150 enemy on 3/1 positions was also repulsed shortly after midnight. Later in the morning, three lesser efforts were also repulsed by 3/1. H/3/1 was in Battalion Reserve and probably not involved in this action. H/3/1 got the word that they were going to move on line this tonight.

Casualties of the 1st Mar. Div. during the four-day fight for Hills 749 and 751 were 90 KIA, 714 WIA, and 1 MIA. The 1st Marines suffered most of the casualties.

Enemy losses for the same period were 771 counted KIA (although more than twice that number were estimated KIA) and 81 POWs.
EUSAK directed the 1st Mar. Div. to organize and reconstruct defensive positions after relieving the 8th ROK Division on the right and taking over that sector. On the Corps boundary, elements of the 11th ROK Division, 1 ROK Corps, were to be relieved on Hill 854. This meant the addition of some 9,000 yards to the Marine front, making it a total of about 13 miles wide.

PFC George E. Saunders was dropped from the Company.

Division relayed EUSAK's orders of the 17th. It also called for such offensive actions as might be necessary to complete the securing of Hill 854, in the sector of the 8th ROK Division, if not in friendly hands at the time of relief. The 1st Marines were assigned Hill 854.

During the sideslip from Hill 751 to 854, mines claimed eleven casualties. This was because of incorrect mine maps that had been supplied by the ROKs.

PFC Herbert R. Darsow, a machine gunner, suffered a grazing head wound. His injuries were cared for at the aid station and, as Herbert put it, "because all Hell was breaking loose", he was returned to his unit.

3/1 was in the process of relieving two battalions of the 21st ROK Regiment. During this process H/3/1 returned to the reserve area in the morning where they had a hot meal and were allowed to sleep. They also had pay call.

Although the ROKs had taken Hill 854, they later lost the lower, southwest ridges to a counterattack and it remained occupied by the enemy. Plans were for H/3/1 to attack at 1530 on 20 September. The attack was to be supported by artillery and air strikes. Late on this evening/night the Company again moved out to get into position for their planned attack. The many moves, with intermittent combat in the last several days, was confusing to PFC Mike Tinkey as it must have been to others in the Company who were unaware of the overall picture.

Cpl Loren Dee Reed wrote his last letter home just before he went up "this hill". Although the letter Loren wrote no longer exists, the words that were written will forever linger in the mind of his girlfriend. The substance of the letter went like this:

...I love you now as I always have. Will you marry me when I get back? ...I must close now because I have to go help take this hill in a few minutes. I sure don't know why but I do know that when I get to the top I am going to yell to the world that I love you over and over again. I don't care who or how much they tease me. ...

Loren wouldn't live to receive the letter from Rosemary that said, "yes, I will marry you".

PFC Stanley R. Shaw Jr. and PFC Robert Schwendermann were dropped from the Company.
Again there is a little confusion between Hill numbers. Lt. Harper thought they were on Hill 847 but it actually turned out to be Hill 854. This is understandable because when you are in the heat of battle, who cares what the numbers are as long as everyone is looking at the same hill. Also, hills on a map sometimes have more than one elevation recorded for different peaks of the hill. Notwithstanding the above, some of the Marines who died on this and the next day were said to have been KIA on Hill 812 which was two miles west of the action on Hill 854.

Because of the very high casualties the Army’s 2nd Infantry Division was having taking Heartbreak Ridge, shifts were made to support that effort. As a result, the 1st Marine Division’s front was expanded from fifteen miles to a twenty mile front. The 1st Marine Regiment sector was east of the Soyang river to include Hill 854.

The Company moved out early, probably before dawn, and marched slowly all day. Each rifleman was heavily loaded with his own ammo and also carried a 60mm HE round of ammunition. It was very hot and Marines were sticky with perspiration. They followed a stream up the valley and some dunked in the water to get cool as they crossed the stream. Some even drank without using the purification pills. A few hundred yards up the stream they crossed the same stream again where they found ten dead Chinese lying in the water. Some who had drank from the water began throwing up.

The Company got to the top of 854 on schedule at about 1530. The 60mm mortar rounds were stockpiled in a heap behind the crest of the hill. The Mortar Section would use this ammunition in their three mortar tubes.

The plan called for a downhill attack from the peak of Hill 854 to assault the ridge to the southwest. The 2nd Platoon was the lead assault platoon and they were to be followed by the 3rd platoon who was near half strength. This reduction in strength was because the 3rd squad had been sent on a security detail and the Platoon also had some casualties who had been evacuated. They were to move from the top of the Hill 854, westward behind a ridgeline that would shield them from the main enemy force to the south on another ridge. Then, after some distance, turn south around the finger of the ridge to get behind the southwestern ridge they were attacking. From there they would continue the attack in a southern and southwestern direction to join up with I/3/1 who was to attack the same objective from the south. This was the plan of attack but there was a flaw in this plan. The planners didn’t know there were enemy in bunkers at the end of the ridge they were to move down.

The troops were about worn out from the long march to the top of 854. Capt. Anderson requested Battalion to delay the attack until the next morning when the men would be better prepared to face the enemy. Permission was denied. PFC Tinkey knew his second platoon was to be the lead platoon, but didn’t know when. The men in the platoon were beginning to worry about how late it was in the day. They knew it is not advantageous to begin an assault after dark when you are not as familiar with the terrain as the enemy.

Delays in the arrival of planes caused a postponement of the attack until 1720. Late in the afternoon the Mortar Section began firing on the enemy positions to be assaulted. Capt Anderson was acting as FO for the 60mm Mortar Section and PFC Robert R. Lewis, of the 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon, was with him in the same hole. Cpl Buddy Scott and two other mortar men were relaying his fire-direction messages from the top of the ridge down to the 60mm mortar gun pits that were about thirty five yards behind the ridgeline. Capt Anderson would look over the ridge, determine the direction of fire, and pass it down the relay line to the mortar sections. Cpl Scott was about the 3rd man in this relay chain. Capt Anderson was fatally wounded in the head as he peered over the ridge once too many times. Some witnessed the severe head wound that left the contents of his skull exposed. Ken Jaeger was also in the area when Capt. Anderson died. Capt. Anderson received the Silver Star Medal for his actions on this date. His citation reads as follows:

"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity as Commanding Officer of Company H, Third Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea on 21 September 1951. A skilled and courageous leader, Captain Anderson boldly led his company in an attack on strongly defended hostile positions and, in
order to direct personally the foremost units as the leading elements advanced, exposed himself to enemy observation to observe and direct the assault. Braving intense hostile automatic-weapons, small-arms and mortar fire while skillfully directing devastating fire on the enemy. He was hit and fell mortally wounded. His cool leadership, indomitable fighting spirit and staunch devotion to duty inspired his men to final success, thereby reflecting the highest credit upon Captain Anderson and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.”

Also, a sniper was holding off the Company's progress. Lt. Hal Arutunian took careful aim with his carbine but the enemy was too far away. After this experience Hal would carry an M1 rifle into battle.

At 1730 the 2nd Platoon jumped off with the half-strength 3rd Platoon close behind. Lt. Harper described the assault by saying, "You would have been proud to be a member of the same organization as those guys, with bayonets fixed and a strong storm of fire from their rifles, machineguns, and automatic rifles, rushed down the side of the ridge". They were whooping and shouting defiance and encouragement as the enemy in the nearest bunkers opened up with rifles, automatic rifles, and burp guns. Not only was the enemy holding up progress but, when they had advanced only fifty yards, one man was killed and another wounded by mine planted by the ROK.

PFC Mike Tinkey was near his Fire Team leader, PFC Donald Smith, as they jumped off on the right side of the ridge toward the enemy. This gave them cover from the Chinese on the ridge further to the left. They approached a bunker at the end of this ridge where Don sent Mike around one side while he went around the other side. Don was hit in the head and Mike crawled over to him to see if he could help. Mike called for the Corpsman although he doesn't remember hearing his voice. HM3 "Doc" Wallace Ralph Reuter, one of the 2nd Platoon Corpsmen, arrived and had tears in his eyes as he said there was nothing he could do for Don Smith. About this time, Mike Tinkey saw Doc get hit in the chest with a burst of burp gun slugs that caused him to fall over backwards. Mike saw an explosion just as Doc hit the ground. It is not known for sure if the explosion or the burp gun slugs ended Doc's life. His death could have been caused by a mine, a grenade, an enemy artillery/.76mm mortar round, or the burp gun slugs. Mike Tinkey doesn't remember there being other mines on the ridge so he tends to think it might have been a grenade or perhaps a .76mm round. The Korean stretcher-bearers who were supposed to follow up and evacuate casualties jumped into holes for shelter. They refused to function until routed out at bayonet point.

While this was going on, the enemy rolled out one of their .76mm recoilless rifles on a ridge about two miles to the west. From there they had a clear view of the attacking formation and the observers on top of Hill 854. When they opened up, they put rounds in the vicinity of the 2nd and 3rd Platoon. The 3rd Platoon suffered no loss from the first round even though they were completely exposed except for the concealment of a few trees. The enemy .76mm went to work on the people they could see near the top of the ridge. Shrapnel from one of these shots is what hit Capt. Anderson in the forehead. After another shot, an empty helmet went bounding down the hill. They had made a direct hit on the 3rd Platoon's 2nd squad leader who was moving down the slope to join the rest of the platoon. Two of his buddies formed a stretcher party to get him out. Both were hit by another round. Still another round wounded the 3rd Platoon's guide in the leg. The 2nd Platoon also had casualties from the .76. The .76 kept banging away for several minutes while our artillery was silent. After they finally stopped a friendly artillery concentration soon fell on the spot where the .76 gun had been. However, they were probably gone or under cover by this time.

The 2nd Platoon's initial advance carried about 125 yards from the jump-off point. They had the scant cover of the right ridgeline until they got to the end of the ridge where they ran into the bunker complex where PFC Donald Smith and Doc Reuter were KIA. The action at this ridge's point and the incoming .76s, mortars, and artillery stopped their progress. Some others of the 2nd Platoon may have made it over the ridge to attack the other (left) ridge line but they too were stopped.

SSgt. Custard came by yelling for everyone to get to the other side of the ridge (the left side of the right ridge, between the two ridges) as they were being torn up by mortars and .76's. That was the last time Cpl Tinkey, and perhaps anyone else, saw Sgt. Custard.
who became a KIA. Sgt Dyckman recalls that SSgt Custard went into a bunker complex and was (possibly captured and) killed. Four or five of those with Tinkey crossed the Ridge line where most of the 2nd platoon were located, and continued down the left side of the right ridge toward the point where a very large bunker was located. They were below the ridgeline about 50 feet. As far as Mike Tinkey could recall, they were receiving no fire from the ridge on the left. However, there were other bunkers on the ridges because they were being hit with concussion grenades that were rolling down the hillside onto the area where they were trying to advance.

As always seems to be the case in the heat of combat, the situation was very confusing for those involved. PFC Mike Tinkey doesn’t remember seeing any officers and Sgt. Custard, the 2nd Platoon Sgt. Cpl Tinkey recalls that no Squad leaders were near and things were disorganized.

There was an explosion (perhaps a .76 or concussion grenade) very close to Mike Tinkey and it knocked him down. He was lying on the ground and looked up toward the top of the ridge to see a couple of grenades bouncing down the hill toward him. One exploded near his spread out legs and he felt a pain much like a cigar burn on his inner thigh. He looked down and saw a little blood on his pants leg but it was not bad enough to cause any problems.

The situation was confused and as always in combat disorganized but somehow, probably with good old fashion Marine training and instinct, Marines of the 2nd Platoon formed a defensive line between the ridge they were advancing down and the ridge on their left. The enemy still occupied bunkers on the points of these ridges. The point on the right was at about the 2nd Platoon’s elevation and the one on the left somewhat lower. The 2nd Platoon was in a semi-circle between the two ridges. As Mike Tinkey recalls, they were about a quarter of the way down from the top of the main ridge where they began the attack. Mike and Ski were together and he estimates that there was about 50 feet to the Marines on each side. Their hole was almost in the middle of the platoon. They were able to scrounge a number of pouches of ammo for Mike’s BAR.

Mike Tinkey could see movement of the enemy to his front and they were concerned about a possible Chinese counter attack. The word was passed that they were cut off from the rest of the Company, and to dig in and prepare to spend the night. The 2nd Platoon had only the ammunition, food, and water they brought with them.

There was a lot of firing of mortars and artillery from both sides and Mike Tinkey could see Chinese starting their counter attack up the hill. There was a lot of yelling and bugle blasts. Enemy mortars and .76s were landing in the area of the 2nd Platoon. About this time a corsair flew by at a very low altitude and wiggled its wings. Everybody was yelling to put out their red and yellow marking flags, which was done. The Corsair then came back and dropped his napalm in front of the 2nd Platoon’s line. The drop was so close that the 2nd Platoon could feel the heat. They also felt the rush of air toward the napalm as it sucked the oxygen needed for the flames. It completely wiped out the Chinese who were moving up the hill toward their positions. Mike Tinkey believes that with out that drop, they could not have held the line all night. During the night there was sporadic shooting but no significant action. It was to be a sleepless night for the 2nd Platoon.

Lt. Harper also recalls an incident that almost crowned the initial setback with complete disaster during the late evening. Minutes after withdrawing to the protection of the ridge, the 1st and 3rd Platoons were trying to collect their wits when a corsair circled overhead. It came in on a low pass from the west. The Marines thought the corsair was circling to take a closer look but as the corsair came in they could see a napalm bomb still slung under the planes belly. They held their breath in disbelief as the pilot dropped the napalm bomb. It fell about 100 yards short of the Marines and burst with amazing flame and heat. This left everyone limp with fear. This napalm bomb landed on the western slope of Hill 854 whereas the napalm bombs mentioned by Tinkey, above, landed on the eastern/southeastern side of the mountain. Perhaps it could have even been the same plane dropping two different bombs.

In the midst of all the commotion, a wounded Marine ran past Lt. Harper. The Marine had been hit in the arm and blood spurting from the wound showered Lt. Harper. All of a
sudden Lt. Harper was the subject of unneeded medical attention. He finally convinced them that he wasn't injured.

The attack was called off at dusk so that the ROKs could remove the explosives they had planted. The sun had gone down by now. H/3/1 dug in where they were for the night and planed to renew the attack at dawn.

Several prisoners were taken during the day's action. Cpl Scott's 60mm Mortar Section took turns guarding three of the prisoners during the night. The prisoners were given a little food and cigarettes. They were then located in a large depression in the ground where they were guarded.

PFC Darrel B. Hirschbach, who was in the 2nd Platoon, was KIA this date. He was from Sioux City, NE and is buried there.

The following were dropped from the Company:

Cpl William Q. O'Daniel
PFC James J. Romeo
PFC George L. Sillaber

In the book, DRIVE NORTH, U. S. Marines at the Punch Bowl, the author said that Marines lost eleven men to uncharted South Korean minefields and fifty more casualties in the fighting. Lt. Col. LaHue's, 3/1 Commander, request for air strikes during the fighting were answered too late or not at all. This brought to a boiling point the 1st Marine Division's argument with superiors who had moved the 1st Marine Air Wing to the control of the Air Force.
In the early hours of the morning Corpsman HM3 "Doc" Cyril "Ciro" Reed Carpenter examined PFC Tinkey's thigh wound, put on some medication, and bandaged the wound. He said it wasn’t bad and not to worry about it until tomorrow. He also said it wouldn’t make any difference how bad it was, they couldn’t get the wounded across the main ridgeline without exposing them to fire.

Prisoners were escorted over the hill to the rear in the morning. 1st Lt. James L. Burnett assumed command of the Company after Capt. Anderson's death.

Things were calm during the morning with only sniping going on. The weather was clear, bright, and cool. It was kind of like football weather at its best. Fine weather for air support. H/3/1 had out distance their food supply and ammunition supplies were limited. They resupplied themselves with ammunition and grenades to knock out bunkers and ate available food. They then preparing for another assault that was now planned for about noon. The 3rd squad returned from security duty to bring the 3rd platoon's strength of about 30 men. This number probably included supporting machineguns. This was far short from the 45 men in a T/O rifle platoon (without supporting weapons) but it would have to do. Lt. Harper wasn't too optimistic about the success of the move, but move they must.

A further clarification of the battle site is needed to better understand the situation. The general direction of the Division's attack was to the north and the artillery was firing in that direction. However, H/3/1 had moved around behind the enemy and was actually attacking in a southerly direction and, in some cases, in a southeasterly direction. This meant that artillery support would be firing at a target that was in the direction of the H/3/1 but a little shorter range. The Battalion's 81mm mortars that were supporting H/3/1 were firing from the east and there too, any long rounds would be disastrous.

Air support had been requested for 0700 but it was 1040 before four Air Force F-51s arrived on station for the strike. An observation plane of VMO-6 and a forward air controller directed the strike. The planes made their runs from east to west in long flat passes with machineguns and rockets firing into the hillside. The Marines jumped for joy at the sight of something that helped insure their success, two superb napalm attacks. The first was on the east slope of the hill that they were to attack. This bomb run drenched about 50 enemy on the objective with two cans of napalm. This obviously completely neutralized that part of the objective. Seconds later another bomb run came in from the southeast and dropped a can of napalm on the other little knob at the end of the ridge. This instantly neutralized that part of the objective too. What made this even more spectacular is that the napalm landed only 75 yards in front of the assaulting platoon. The F-51s made a number of additional rocket and machinegun passes and then departed.

Then Mike Tinkey and the rest of the 2nd Platoon received the word that the rest of the Company was coming over the hill behind them and would pass through to assault the points of the ridges they were between. They were told to lay down a base of fire on the enemy positions on the ridges at the time of the attack.

Shortly after 1200 an artillery barrage began firing to further soften the area. This was accomplished with 155mm guns and they did a terrific job. They walked the bursts back and forth over the area. Keep in mind they were firing almost directly at the H/3/1 attackers but short of their position (no long rounds thank you). The artillery and mortar rounds were landing so close that shrapnel was even falling on Marine positions. The target was completely obscured by smoke and dust. An artillery dud ricocheted over the Marines with an amazing moaning noise. When artillery shifted its fire further out on the ridge, H/3/1 jumped off at about 1220 with the 1st Platoon. They were a fresh platoon that hadn’t been in yesterday's assault so they took the lead. They were followed by the 3rd Platoon.

Again the men moved out with war whoops, yells, shouts, and a storm of fire. They moved down the napalmed ridge without opposition, throwing grenades in bunkers along the way. On the napalmed ridge, the 1st Platoon set up a firing line and began raking the bunker village in front of them. Lt. Harper moved up and pecked over the top. He could see no return fire. They had completely pinned down any enemy that was left.
The assaulting Marines continued firing enthusiastically and there was little resistance. Hearing the grenades and firing, gooks began popping out of bunkers waving surrender pamphlets over their heads. This is not to say that the resistance still wasn’t stiff in some parts of the battle.

Cpl Mike Tinkey also remembers when the action started, it was like a movie, with everyone firing. We had artillery, mortars, and small arms fire. The Chinese were also firing and had .76s and mortar fire coming in our direction. The enemy could be seen leaving the bunkers and heading down to the valley. Cpl Tinkey kept firing his BAR in the direction of the bunkers on the left ridge. He was not in a position to see any movement from the bunkers on the right ridge, the area that had given them so much trouble the previous day. The barrel on his BAR was becoming very hot, but he was in a shooting mood and figured that until the rest of the company passed through, he would continue firing.

He had plenty of ammo. A .76 shell exploded right in front of his hole, blowing the BAR into the air. He and Ski thought it was a .76 because they heard the whistle as it came in. Mike thought the BAR was going to fall on him so he grabbed for it and got the barrel instead of the stock, burning his hand badly.

After the Company came through Cpl Tinkey was sent back down the hill to the evacuation point. While at the evacuation point he saw Lt. Harper and others who had been wounded and were waiting for evacuation. Cpl Tinkey was flown by helicopter to “C” Company, 1st Medical Battalion. It was almost dark when he arrived at the Hospital. Mike was very hungry and was given some split pea soup. It was green but he will always remember how good it tasted. This field hospital would be Mike’s home until the 17th of October.

Although Mike was wounded on the 20th, his Purple Heart Citation says the 21st. This is probably because that’s when he got to the Aid Station and the Hospital. This confusion about WIA and KIA dates probably also applies to others.

Cpl Buddy Scott and several other mortar men followed close behind the assaulting platoon. They were bringing up ammunition in litters and using the litters to carry the wounded back to the reverse slope. Scott remembers being in the area where Lt. Harper was about this time. One of the WIA’s that Scott helped carry back was a Marine whose right arm had been blown off. Scott helped load him aboard a helicopter for transport back to a field hospital. He still wonders if the guy survived.

Lt. Harper found a convenient shell hole on top of the ridge from which he could survey the situation while waiting for the assault Platoon Leader to decide what he was going to do. The 1st Platoon Leader moved one squad about 50 yards down the slope and promptly lost a man to sniper fire. He began calling for another air strike. While Lt. Harper was waiting for the 1st Platoon Leader, a bullet cracked into the dirt about ten feet in front causing him to recoil back into his hole. The 1st Platoon Leader then called for a white phosphorus grenade to mark their front for the observation plane circling overhead. Lt. Harper was on the flank and in a position to toss a grenade somewhere besides down the neck of the Marines in front. He ran out, threw the grenade, and got back in his hole to watch the white phosphorus smoke billow up. As he was observing in this easterly direction, a flash of sun on copper sparkled for a fraction of a second about 15 feet in front of him. Instantaneously, in a flash of the mind, he knew he had been had. He saw the bullet that hit him.

Friends pounced upon him and looted his maps and ammunition in a very methodical fashion. Heedless of further sniper fire, they carried him off on a stretcher. Lt. Harper did manage to retain his .45. The 3rd Platoon Sgt., noting the disgusting turn of events, immediately took command of the 3rd Platoon.

PFC James N. Broecker and PFC James J. Romeo had just rounded a corner and jumped in a hole when an enemy hand grenade caught them both. A very short time later (possibly about 30 seconds) a round (perhaps a recoilless rifle round) exploded killing Romeo and severely wounding Broecker. Although James Romeo is reported to have been KIA on the 22nd, it was this day that he was struck by the fatal round and possibly died instantly.

The Doc at the helicopter strip at the foot of the hill pulled a pair of forceps out of his breast pocket and neatly removed the bullet as Lt. Harper stood there. About an hour later, three more 3rd Platoon Marines, all wounded by the same sniper, came down.
They grinned sheepishly as did Lt. Harper. They were poking fun at each other for being so incompetent as to get hit. A small, two-basket helicopter came in and transported Lt. Harper in one of the outriggers. A guy who had received a minor wound on the first ridge and who had not been evacuated was put in the other. This time he had stepped on a land mine shortly after Lt. Harper had been wounded. The mine had blown off his left foot.

The flight to the Division's forward medical company was easy but chilly. Harper’s wound was cleaned, bandaged, and then he looked for some food. All he could find was apples but they put him to sleep and he had a good rest.

The last call for an air strike did not materialize. The assault continued with mortar and artillery support until 1745, when H/3/1 reported the ridge secured.

Late in the afternoon the Company moved off this ridge (possibly Hill 854) in a southwesterly direction to a new position. Cpl Scott remembers that many of the mortar men didn’t have the time or energy to set up. They had been supplying the assaulting platoons with ammunition and helping WIA’s. When released from these responsibilities, the fatigued Marines still had to get their mortar gear and catch up with the Company. When they caught up with the Company, they didn’t know where to set up so they just took a long break beside the trail. They were still there the next morning.

A large number of mines and booby traps were discovered within the Battalion sector. Most of these were U. S. Types which were placed by ROK troop with only a few enemy mines scattered in the central portion of the Battalion’s sector.

The Battalion’s casualties for yesterday and today were 9 KIA and 55 WIA. Seven of the KIAs were from H/3/1. Although some casualties were reported on the 21st, it is probable that some were WIA/KIA on the 20th. Their deaths may not have been reported until the next day; perhaps when hostilities were reduced and there was time to make such reports. Another possibility, is that when fatally hit, some cling to life for varying periods of time. H/3/1’s KIAs who are listed as died on Sept. 21st are listed below.

H/3/1 CO Capt. Herbert Anderson from Kingsburg, CA
H/3/1 2nd Plt SSgt. Donald McCrary Custard
H/3/1 2nd Plt 2nd Squad Leader Sgt Loren Dee Reed from Witchita, KS (died of wounds to the head received on Hill 812 (wrong should be Hill 854) near Hwang-gi)
H/3/1 2nd Plt HM3 Wallace Reuter from Detroit, MI (stepped on a land mine on Hill 812 near Hwang-gi)
H/3/1 2nd Plt PFC Donald Edward Smith (died on Hill 812 (wrong - should be Hill 854) near Hwang-gi)
H/3/1 3rd Plt PFC Donald Eugene Wanoreck from Austin, TX (died on Hill 812 (wrong should be Hill 854) near Hwang-gi)
Lt. Harper, Mike Tinkey, and several others, were also WIA during this period.

Enemy losses totaled 159 counted and another 150 estimated KIA, 225 estimated WIA, and 29 prisoners.

Joseph Jeddery reported that he, as a PFC, received the Silver Star for his actions on this date.

Dick Jobst, a 3rd section machine gunner attached to the 3rd Platoon, reported that he was WIA by a bullet that went into his helmet and wounded him in the head. He also reported that Joe Reed gave him a Bronze Star for his actions on this day.
At day break Scott and the other mortar men located their new positions and set up their mortars. This is where they would stay for several days.

The Navy Corpsmen and doctors are a hard-working, competent crew. They do a fine job. Lt Harper never forgets that forward medical company’s layout and experience. The seriously wounded, strong young men out of their minds with fear and pain.

The ambulance ride from the forward medical company was easy for Lt. Harper. He rode in front with the driver. As soon as he was admitted, the doctors took him under their wing and shared their quarters with him. Lt. Harper returned to H/3/1 a couple weeks later in early October.

Following is a list of H/3/1's KIAs reported this date;

PFC Gordon John Read of the 1st Platoon was KIA near Hwang-gi. He was from DeKalb, IL and is buried in Hampshire, IL.

PFC James J. Romeo of the 3rd Platoon was KIA on/near Hill 854 on the north rim of the Punch Bowl near Hwang-gi. Although his death is reported on this date, he probably did yesterday. He was from Troy, NY and is buried there.

PFC Felix Charles Stock of the 1st Platoon was hit in the stomach by a bullet from a sniper's rifle. Ken Jaeger went out to pull Felix from the line of fire.

On this day, or perhaps the 21st, a W/3/1 Marine who was always attached to H/3/1, Ken Jaeger, was carrying three 3.5mm rocket rounds when he came upon a corpsman who was very busy attending to WIAs. Ken recalls the corpsman's name was Jackie Thomas. Felix Stock, who was over the ridge where the North Koreans were strafing the area with machine gun fire, was calling for help and the corpsman wasn't available. Ken dropped his three rocket rounds and went over the ridge to bring Felix back. Felix had been hit in the stomach and his entrails were exposed. Ken remembers that while he was dragging Felix back, his entrails would get caught in the brush. He would untangle them to get him loose and lay them on his stomach to drag him a little farther. Ken got Felix back alive, picked up his three rounds, and continued in the fight. He later learned that Felix had died either later that day or the next day.

A large number of mines and booby traps were discovered within the Battalion sector. Most were U.S. types that were emplaced by ROK troops. Only a few enemy mines were scattered in the central portion of the sector.

The 1st Mar. Div. was on the right flank of X Corps at a location about ten miles west of Kansong on the East Coast of Korea. During the last days of September, 3/1 called for and received fire support from the battle ship New Jersey.

A new type of war was to begin. Similar to that of the 1st World War, this new type of war was to be fought mostly in the trenches. Patrols and outposts would become common. This is not to say that there were not a lot of men who were yet to die in the many minor assaults and defenses that would last almost another two years. Eventually the 1st Mar. Div.'s line would extend eastward to the Sea of Japan.

The following were dropped from the Company:

PFC Martin Huckaby
PFC Everett A. Mathews
PFC James R. White

The Company was apparently in the area of Hwang-gi when PFC Herbert R. Darsow felt an intense burning sensation in his stomach area. He was WIA (wounds lacerated his liver and caused other internal injuries). He was evacuated tot he field medical hospital by helicopter and then eventually to Japan and then to Okano Naval Hospital in Okland, CA.

The following were dropped from the Company:

PFC Frederick "Fred" Merritt
PFC Edward Saari
IN KOREA

H/3/1    MARINES
IN KOREA

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company:
PFC Robert R. Lewis      PFC Michael V. Smith Jr.
PFC James O. Withrow

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company:
PFC William K. Hogan       Cpl Bruce R. Eichorn
Sgt Harry R. Kebschull      PFC James H. Stewart
Cpl Arthur T. Yandle

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company:
Sgt Terry R. Dorn                  Cpl Eugene R. Helminick
PFC Larry T. Schultz 2nd Sqd      PFC Raymond “Ray” Woda

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1951

Cpl Carlo A. Gambino and PFC John L. Smith were dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1951

By the end of the month the MLR had been consolidated on a favorable front in the vicinity of Changhan-Sochon-ni.
The 1st Marine Division’s casualties were 2,416 (including 594 reported by the KMCs) for the month of September. They were the most suffered during any month so far with the exception of December 1950 and June 1951. NKPA losses for the month were 2,799 counted KIA and 557 POWs.
The following were dropped from the Company:
PFC Herbert R. Darsow        PFC Harry S. Pietrowicz
Sgt Ottis Rice              SSgt Michael L. Robatin

MONDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1951

Lt. John Harper, who was WIA on Sept. 21st and evacuated to a field hospital, returned to the Company. Upon his return or within a few days thereafter he relieved Lt. Harold “Hal” Arutunian as Platoon Leader of the 60mm Mortar Section. Lt. Arutunian was being transferred to 4.2mm Mortars.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company:
2nd Lt. Joseph D. Reed       Cpl L. P. B. Cathcart
PFC George J. Elsasser       Cpl Daniel A. Gomez
Sgt. Francis "Frank" J. Pagano Cpl George H. Vickery
PFC Charles R. Weber         Cpl William T. Williams
Sgt Carl “Zack” Ernest Zachary

Marines who are in combat units for long periods of time learn and perform necessary survival tasks. Some of these survival tasks evolve to habits as time passes. Many of these habits would be unfamiliar and unacceptable to those at home. The Marine Corps therefore found it necessary to provide an indoctrination course for those Marines returning to the U. S. A. On this date the below Bulletin was distributed to facilitate this purpose.
1. In compliance with current policies for rotation of the Armed Forces overseas, is directed that, in order to maintain a high standard of character of the U. S. Marines and to prevent dishonor to reflect on the uniform, all individuals eligible for return to the United States under current directives, will undergo an indoctrination course to relieve them of Barbarian customs prior to approval of his return.

2. The following points will be emphasized in this course:

(a) In America there is a remarkable number of beautiful girls. These young girls have not been liberated and many are gainfully employed as stenographers, sales girls, beauty operators, and welders. Contrary to current practices, they should not be approached with, "How much? You Speak". A better greeting is, "Isn't it a lovely day?" or "How are this fine morning?", then ask them, "How much?".

(b) In a motion picture theatre, seats are provided, helmets are not required. It is not considered good form to whistle at every female over 8 and under 80, as they appear on the screen. If vision is impaired by the person occupying the seat in front of you, there are usually other seats that can be occupied. DO NOT hit him across the back or the head and say, "Move your damn head, Mac, I can't see a F_____ thing."

(c) Whiskey, a common American drink, may be offered the Marine on occasions. It is considered a bad reflection on the uniform to snatch the bottle from the hostess and drain the bottle, cork and all.

(d) Americans have a strange taste for stimulants, the drinks common in this part of the world, such as Raisin Jack, Torpedo Juice and Five Ulcers (made with embalming alcohol and grapefruit juice), or Sake, and Cider, etc., are not ordinarily acceptable in civilian circles. These drinks should be served only to those who are definitely not within the inner circle of friends. A suitable use of such drinks is for serving to one's landlord to break and undesirable lease.

(e) In the event that the helmet is retained by the individual, he will refrain from using it as a chair, washbowl, foot bath, or bathtub. All of these devices are furnished in the average American home. It is not considered a good practice to squat "Gook" style in a corner in the event that there are no chairs available. The host will usually provide suitable seats.

(f) American dinners, in most cases consist of several items, each served in a separate dish. The common practice of mixing various items, such as corn beef and pudding, or lima beans and peaches to make it more palatable will be refrained from. In time, the "separate dish" system will become enjoyable.

(g) Belching or passing wind is strictly frowned upon when in company. If you should forget, however, and belch or pass wind in the presence of others, a proper remark is, "Excuse me." DO NOT SAY, "It must have been this lousy chow we have been getting lately.

(h) Upon retiring at night, one will find a pair of pajamas out on the bed. Pajamas are a two-piece sleeping garment which are donned after all clothes has been removed. The Marine confronted with these garments should assume an air of familiarity and act as though he were used to them. A casual remark such as, "My, what a delightful shade of blue." will
usually suffice. Under no circumstances say, "How in the Hell can I hit the sack in a gizmo like this."

(i) A guest in a private home is usually awakened in the morning by a light tapping on his door with an invitation to join the host at breakfast. It is proper to say, "I'll be there shortly." DO NOT SAY, "Blow it out your ass."

(j) A typical American breakfast consists of such strange foods as cantaloupes, fresh eggs, milk, ham, etc. These are highly palatable foods and though strange in appearance, extremely tasty. Butter, made from cream, is often served. If you wish to have some butter you turn to the person nearest it and say quietly, "Please pass the butter." YOU DO NOT SAY, "Throw me the God Damn grease."

(k) Upon leaving a friends' home after a visit, one may find his cap or hat misplaced. Frequently, it has been placed in a closet. One should turn to one's host and say, "I don't believe I have my hat. Could you help me find it?" DO NOT SAY, "Don't anyone leave this room, some S. O. B. swiped my Piss Cutter."

(l) Very natural urges are apt to occur when a crowd is present. If it is found necessary to defecate, one does not grab a shovel in one hand and a newspaper in the other and run for the garden. At least 90% of American homes have one room called the "Bathroom", a room that, in most cases contains a bathtub, wash basin, medicine cabinet, and a toilet. It is the latter that you will use in this case and it is not the custom in civilian life to refer to it as the "Head." Instructors will make sure that all personnel understand the operation of the toilet, particularly the operation of the lever or button that serves to prepare the device for re-use.

(m) Natural functions, of course, will continue. When it is necessary to urinate while in or about a public place, do not walk up to the nearest tree or automobile or the closest thing resembling a field sanitary tube or pipe (the latter may be a parking meter, speaking tube, or your uncle Jud wanting to shake hands). Toilets or rest rooms are provided in all public buildings for this purpose. Signs on some doors will read "LADIES", which literally means, "OFF LIMITS TO ALL TROOPS".

(n) There is no advantage to utilizing the contents of cesspools. Public Health Officials prohibit the use of human feces on edible crops. Korean veterans are advised against any activities in the Honey Dew market whatsoever.

(o) Since the beginning of this campaign, the use of the "A" frame has been exceedingly common. Upon joining a Rotation draft, give it to a buddy or break it up and make that last cup of "Black Death" (Soluble Coffee).

(p) Open season on un-occupied vehicles in the United States is strictly forbidden. These vehicles have many means of identification and civilian authorities frown upon this practice and have been known to "Look Up" offenders of civilian regulations.

(q) In the United States, coolies and mule trains are not common, but bearers identified by Red Caps will transport you gear from place to place for a nominal fee. Cigarettes, chocolate bars, and C-rations are not considered mediums of exchange. These porters, as they are called, will be summoned by pleasant words in English, not the Korean terms of "Ediwa, Bali, Bali," etc. These porters will be found at most Railroad Depots, Bus Stations, and Air Terminals.

(r) It should be made evident that the Marine does not overlook the value of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or the Coast Guard. He knows that they were organized and maintained to show by contrast the wisdom and courage of the "UNITED STATES MARINE".
3. It is desired that the necessary action be taken immediately to explain in detail the concepts and manner of implementation of the orientation program to all effected personnel.

4. The effectiveness of this orientation will depend to a large degree upon the attitudes and abilities of the person selected to present this program. Whenever possible, the personnel responsible for presenting the orientation program should have had some practical experience with the problems named herein.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL B. C. GATES

H. M. SILVERTHORPE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of affairs

Distribution "A"
O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L

JOHN A. ALRANIAN III
U. S. Marine Corps
Special Publication Officer
IN KOREA

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1951


The following were dropped from the Company:
1st Lt. James L. Burnett
Cpl Clifford H. Antes  Cpl Donald A. Antes

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company:
Cpl Pat W. Fedde  PFC Gerald G. Rouley

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1951

1st Lt. Donald C. Mack, 042403/0301 was dropped from the company.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company:
PFC James "Jim" N. Broecker  Cpl Ralph D. Rockwell
PFC Louis E. Weirton  PFC Joe R. Umbrell (WIA/evac 9/20/51)

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1951

2nd Lt. Harold "Hal" Arutunian and PFC John "Jack" E. Sheard were dropped from the Company.
The following Marines joined H/3/1.

1st Lt. Donald C. ?ack 042403/0301
1st Lt. Hugh D. Murphy 047910/0301
1st Lt. Francis White 045678/0301
PFC John H. Brown 1184883/3500
PFC Terry J. Do?ha 1051978/3000
SSgt. Clarence E. Dotson 835639/5841
Pvt Larry W. Durand 1172499/1800

1st Plt. 2nd Sqd
PFC James "Jim" L. Guyton 1193046/0333
PFC David "Red" F. Hunter 118474/0300
Pvt Robert F. Johanson 1039850/0311
PFC Edward P. Joy 645986/5841
PFC William A. Just 1194462/0331

1st Plt. 2nd Sqd
Keith was also a runner
PFC Charles Koehling 1198522/0331
PFC Robert D. Lockwood 1186570/0331
Pvt Kenneth S. Lo?(c)h 1160007/0300
Pvt Clarence K. McKenney (or McKinney) 1166721/1800

2nd Plt.
SSgt. Leroy H. Meisner 652821/0316

2nd Plt.
Cpl Salvatoro W. Mirabella 1150953/0311
Sgt Dean V. Mott 1073151/0311
SSgt Johnnie M. Neely 1021781/0311
PFC John J. Pachessa 1183082/0300
Cpl Thomas C. Proffitt Jr. 656414/0311
Pvt Orvill Robert Ralston Jr. 1181127/0300

2nd Plt.
Cpl Richard M. Rath 1113741/0311
PFC Paiscoll S. Renick 1151259/0300
Cpl Jackie R. Reynolds 1056909/0311
Cpl Donald C. Roberts 1084003/5831
Sgt Homer R. Rohde 601331/0311
Cpl Clemont J. Rowe Jr. 431852/5231
Sgt Billy F. Ryburn 633096/0337
PFC Aldolfo Sanchez Jr. 1166565/0300
Cpl James R. Savold 1136105/0311
PFC Harry M. Sergeant 1182905/0300
Cpl Donald J. Sherwood 1074402/0311
PFC Edward W. Simpson 1184255/0311
PFC Dale E. Slatters 1176204/3000
PFC Samuel S?e?k (?Shenck) Jr. 1198656/0311
PFC Sanford Soufrine 1186661/0311
PFC George ____ 1182181/0311

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC Howard E. Kimberlin Harry A. Miller
PFC Carroll A. Reed Cpl John "Frog" O. Frohliger
Col. Sidney S. Wade relieved Co. Thomas A. Wornham as Co of the 1st Marines.
H/3/1 MARINES

IN KOREA

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1951

The 7th Marines went out on a combat patrol (probing attack) to the front. Lt. Harper had a "50 yard line seat" of the action. Tanks set up a short distance in front of Lt. Harper's position to support the patrol. Enemy 76mm recoilless and 82mm mortar shell that were fired at our tanks were landing a short distance in front of Lt. Harper. The first round hit three Marines of H/3/1's 3rd Platoon. Another dud landed within four feet of Capt. Carr, the Company Commander. A dual between the Chinese 76's and our tank's 90mm guns took place. Meanwhile, the 7th Marine patrol made contact with a resolute enemy, and after a period of combat, broke contact and returned to our lines.

Our planes were dropping surrender leaflets loudspeakers were sending out loud propaganda messages.

H/3/1 had been picking up one or two enemy deserters a day but business was picking up. They took twenty-eight enemy deserters in just two nights.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1951

Lt. John W. Harper wrote a letter home to his father and revealed the following bits of information. This letter was apparently printed in Life Magazine about December 3, 1951.

John had been WIA (minor wounds) sometime before this date and had returned to H/3/1's Mortar Section probably about the first days of October 1951. His Platoon Sergeant had taken over the Platoon after Lt. Harper had been hit and carried it right on through to the conclusion of the assault and then set it up in a very good defensive position. He commended the Platoon Sgt. and recommended him for meritorious promotion to SSgt. even though he had only been a Sgt. for about five months.

He commented that sometime in the recent past, "The Indian boy named Yellowhead had conducted a wild one-man banzi charge during an assault, killing a number of gooks and collecting four or five prisoners." Chuck Lyman, the 1st Platoon Sgt., may have also been in this action because he recommended him for a Silver Star Medal but it was reduced to a Bronze Star Medal.

The former H/3/1 XO had been sent to Regiment after having spent four months on line.

The 1st Platoon Leader had been given emergency leave to go home.

Lt. Harper commented that the spirits of H/3/1 were high. He recognized this from the joking, zeal, and other activities of the Marines of H/3/1.

MONDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1951

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

MG. Plt. John "Frog" Frohliger (left)
3rd Plt. William "Cappy" Capella (joined)

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1951

PFC Howard Gerald Boling, 1123823, is listed as KIA on this date. Howard was in bazookas and was probably attached to H/3/1 from W/3/1.

The Machine Gun Platoon Leader, 2nd Lt. Henry M. Cohen was dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1951

PFC Mike Tinkey was released from the 1st Medical Battalion where he had been since Sept. 21st. He was sent to a Casual Company, a step on his way back to H/3/1.
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1951

PFC Noel A. Todd came down with a bad case of worms and appendicitis and was sent to the Hospital in Japan. When he was released from the hospital, he was offered a job in Japan handling personal effects. He did not return to the Company.

The following have been dropped from the Company:
Sgt James T. Johnson
Cpl Ivan F. Leech

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1951

PFC (or Cpl) Joseph Jeddery was WIA (his 2nd time, see 6/24/51) in the forearm. He recalls that he was attacking a position on a hill when an enemy soldier (Joe thought was 10-years old) shot him with a burp gun. Joe was evacuated and thinks he spent about fifteen days in the hospital.

PFC Mike Tinkey returned to the 2nd Platoon.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1951

The 2nd Platoon went on a patrol approximately one and a half miles in front of the line. Part of the Platoon had passed a bunker when they began receiving fire from the bunker. A machine gunner (name unknown), with just a grenade and his .45, assaulted the bunker killing 5 and taking 2 prisoners. He was recommended for the Silver Star. General Wahling (not sure the spelling is correct) congratulated the 2nd Platoon and called them Korea’s first Raiders.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1951

The Company was relieved and went into Regimental Reserve.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1951

Truce talks commenced again at Panmunjom. Panmunjom was literally a wide place in the road, a tiny hamlet located just north of the 38th Parallel between Munsan and Kaesong. About this date two huge Chinese Soldiers surrendered to H/3/1. Buddy Scott recalls that these were two of the biggest Chinese he had ever seen. The Chinese said they surrendered because winter was coming and feared they would get into the same life threatening situation they had encountered the previous winter. The previous winter they had been operating in the Chosen Reservoir area and almost froze to death. It seems the Chinese didn’t have uniforms big enough to fit these two Chinese “giants”.

PFC Robert F. Johanson was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1951

The 1st Platoon Leader, 1st Lt. Steven Marder was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1951

Msgt Walter J. Brogan was dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1951

Glen Skiver recalls that the 2nd Squad, 2nd Platoon was on an outpost between Oct. 28th and Nov. 2nd.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1951

PFC Roy B. Runyan was dropped from the Company.
Having learned the enemy's means of communications, 3/1 feigned preparations for an attack even to the extent of a brief artillery barrage. When the firing let up, the Marines sounded an NKPA bugle call as a signal for the enemy troops to rush out of bunkers and man their open trenches. This exposed them and they became the victims of intense Marine mortar and artillery fire which inflicted an estimated 47 KIA and 48 WIA casualties.

The month of October was relatively quiet on the front. Scout and sniper teams were employed throughout the period, with contacts few and far between. The mission of the Division remained essentially unchanged during the last half of the month. Foot patrols ranged farther into enemy territory and tank-infantry raids in company strength, supported by air and artillery, were launched at every opportunity.

Enemy forces facing the Marines at various times in October were believed to comprise the 2nd Division, II NKPA Corps, the 1st and 15th Divisions of III Corps, and the 19th Division of VI Corps. NKPA casualties during the month were announced by the 1st Mar. Div. as 709 counted and 2, 377 estimated KIA, 4,927 estimated WIA, and 571 POWs. The Marines (including the 1st KMC Regiment) suffered losses of 50 KIA, 2 MIA, and 323 WIA. Cpl James R. Savold was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1951

A memorial ceremony was held at 1500 for the Battalion's Marines who died between September 12th and October 24th 1951. It was "in memory of these heroic Marines, who made a supreme sacrifice that men throughout the world may have the opportunity to enjoy the dignity of living as free human beings." The names of those honored follow with an asterisk before H/3/1 Marines

* Herbert M. Anderson           * Donald M. Custard
Edward E. Eccleston           William M. Gaul
Richard E. Henderson           Lawrence J. Hengy
* Darrell B. Hirschbach         Robert W. Johnson
Jered Krohn                     James E. Lowe
Richard W. Marson              Donald E. McCarty
Richard E. McCume              Roy H. Ploeger, Jr.
* Gordon J. Read               * Loren D. Reed
Robert D. Redner               * Wallace Reuter
* James J. Romero               Walter L. Seivers
William J. Shauf               * Donald E. Smith
David F. Stapleton             * Felix C. Stock
Augustos E. Todd               * Donald E. Wanoreck

The front line strength of the opposing forces was nearly equal (195,000 for the UN, and 208,000 for the enemy). In reserve the Communists held their usual numerical advantage with nine CCF Armies totaling 235,000 men plus 138,600 in four NKPA Corps. All were readily available either as reinforcements or as assault troops for a large-scale offensive.

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC Lloyd M. Berry

PFC Charles J. Lerch

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1951

PFC Mike Tinkey wrote home that the first snow came.
Sgt Julius Vargo was dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1951

Corpsman HM2 Thomas D. Balentine was dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1951
IN KOREA

H/3/1 MARINES

PFC William R. Turney was dropped from the Company. The 14th Replacement Draft added 2,756 Marines to the 1st Mar. Div. Within a few hours 2,066 Marines of the 10th Rotation draft were detached and heading home. About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

60 mm Mortars     Norman Carlson (joined)
Mortars           Gus Marcotte (left)
MG. Plt.          Marvin "Goose" Gandy Jr. (left)
(Mandy was also in 1st Plt. but it is not known when he moved between positions within the company.)
MG. Plt.          John Kouts Koutsandreas (joined)
(Kouts was also in the 3rd Plt. but it is not known when he changed positions in the company.)
3rd Plt.          Clifford (Cliff) Antes (left)

PFC Adrian "Lash" A. L'Heureux became 1st Squad leader to replace Marcotte. Leo Stroman replaced Lash as gunner and Buddy Scott replaced Leo as assistant gunner.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1951

A man from each company in the Battalion was sent to Communication school to learn how to operate a radio. PFC Mike Tinkey volunteered to go from H/3/1. The course lasted a couple of days.

Mike learned a lesson about volunteering. He was not made a radioman. He was only taught how to operate radios. This he did when they went on patrol unless the patrol was from his (the 2nd) squad. When the patrol was from his squad he retained his normal position of fire team leader.

PFC Arthur R. Geyer was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1951

Division directed that all supporting arms and weapons commemorate the Marine Corps Birthday by firing a TOT on Hill 1052, the key enemy observation point overlooking the friendly sector. While the Cruiser USS Los Angeles contributed naval gunfire, the Commanding General of 1st MAW led an air strike of 83 Marine planes to blast the enemy strong point.

The performance was embellished when Marine tanks, mortars, and machineguns added their fire to the grand crescendo of exploding shells and bombs. The Communists were also bombarded with 50,000 leaflets inviting them to the Marine birthday dinner that evening. Twenty Korean Reds actually did surrender, though some doubt remained whether they responded to the invitation or the TOT. Gen. Van Fleet sent a message to all Marines in his command, congratulating them on "a job well done" in Korea.

The following wee dropped from the Company.

Sgt Richard J. Young       Corpman HM3 Jack R. Bower

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1951

The 5th Marines carried out its relief of the 1st Marines on the Minnesota Line and the 1st Marines went back in reserve. H/3/1 had been manning the MLR. A historical event took place during this move when an entire battalion (2/1) was relived by air from front line positions. The largest helicopter troop lift so far involved the transportation of nearly 2,000 combat-equipped men. The 1st Marines went into Division Reserve for 30 days. H/3/1 was moved to the Camp Tripoli complex near Mago-ri.

PFC Austin Z. Young Jr. was dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1951

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1951

A lot of training and conditioning hikes were on the schedule for H/3/1 while they were in Division reserve. Skeletons and remnants of the enemy were some of the sights they saw during their hikes.

Buddy Scott remembers one conditioning hike along a river. They saw two Army jeeps that had drown-out when trying to ford the river. The occupants were Army officer and the jeep drivers. Scott and other Marines of the Mortar Section threw rocks in the direction of the jeeps and barked at them like dogs. Capt. Ord stopped this by saying, "OK men, you've had your fun, now let's push them out." The Army officers waited in their jeeps until the Marines arrived. Capt. Ord told them to get out and help push or be left in the water. They got out and helped push.

PFC Donald Sparks was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, Nov. 16, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company.
PFC Glenn C. Kinkel            Sgt Robert G. Wamsley

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1951

Corpsman HM1 Francis S. Connery was dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company and may have been returning to the USA.
Cpl Walter "Dick" R. Benson      PFC John H. Brown
Cpl Leo Foley                    PFC James Hertz
Cpl Bobby L. Oakes               PFC Orville Robert Ralston Jr.
Sgt Cecil C. Zilch               PFC Wendall Brown
Cpl Norman L. Carlson (was dropped but not rotated to USA)

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1951

Sgt. Clifford Schoenung was dropped from the Company because he went to the hospital. He did not return to the Company. When he left the hospital he was given a position at regiment.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1951

PFC Joseph A. Jeddey Jr. was dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1951

PFC Glenn D. Davis was dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1951

1st Lt. John W. Harper was dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1951

Marines who had arrived in the 11th rotation draft were rotated to the U.S.A. Their rotation was hastened so the 2,406 Marines could be home before Christmas. The following were dropped from the Company.
IN KOREA

Sgt Robert "Bob" M. Bishop       Sgt Lloyd T. Bright
Sgt Leonard G. Hattig            Cpl Hector Fuentes
Cpl Marvin "Goose" Gandy         Cpl James S. Gillispie
Cpl Thomas J. Grote              Sgt Raymond J. Hollard
Cpl Jonathan H. Lawhon           Sgt Gus C. E. Marcotte
Cpl Jean C. Meyer                Sgt Raymond B. Raiser
Sgt Kenneth Richardson           MSgt Levi N. Foote
HN William R. Knowles

1st Lt Hugh D. Murphy (was transferred to W/3/1 on this date or 11/28/51)
James J. Hughes, Jr was transferred from 3/1/ to H/3/1 on this date.
Battalion transferred PFC Herbert Leslie Scholl from W/3/1 to H/3/1.

On this day EUSAK informed Division that:
The conference at Panmunjom had fixed a military Demarcation Line as a preliminary step to ending hostilities within 30 days.
Hostilities would continue until an armistice agreement was signed.
Units will (1) reduce operations to those which are essential to maintain positions...(2) prepare for offensive actions by conserving ammunition, maintaining combat effectiveness...(3) Prevent unnecessary casualties.

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1951

Glen Skiver recalls that the 2nd Squad, 2nd Platoon was on patrol this Thanksgiving Day and saw no action.
PFC Raymond Carlson 1185600/0334 was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1951

Total Marine casualties (including KMCs) during November were 34 KIA and 250 WIA. Enemy losses amounted to 408 counted and 1,728 estimated KIA, 2,235 estimated WIA, and 104 POWs.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 4th, 1951

Cpl Daniel C. Roberts was dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1951

The following were dropped from the Company.
PFC James W. Milks                Sgt Peter Sassok

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1951

PFC Jimmie "Jim" E. Stewart was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1951

HN Con?????? Lette?? was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1951

PFC Cyril M. Ryba was dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1951

The 1st Marines came out of Division Reserve to relieve the 7th Marines in the center of the Division's front. H/3/1 moved to Hill 812 where they would stay for about a month. Tanks were on the reverse slope and dug in on top or just over the forward slope of the
Then the tanks would fire, the enemy would respond and H/3/1 Marines in the area got their share of incoming.

The 15th Replacement Draft brought 2,316 Marines to Korea early in December and 1,932 Marines departed for the U.S.A. with the 12th Rotation Draft.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1951

PFC Juan B. Bonini and HM3 Joseph H. Glandoff was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1951

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

MG Plt. Thomas "Tom" J. Grote (left)
(Grote was also in the 1st Plt. but it is not known when he changed positions within the Company.)
MG Plt. Donald "Don" E. Guard (left)
(Guard was also in the 1st Plt. but it is not known when he changed positions within the Company)
1st Plt. 2nd Sqd Glenn Kinkel (left)
1st Plt. 3rd Sqd James "Jim" Gillispie (left)
Pvt Kenneth S. Losh (left)
PFC Harry M. Sergeant
HN Dale V. Hare

MONDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1951

Capt. Earl E. Carr was dropped from the Company and Capt. James B. Ord. Jr. became CO of H/3/1. He was the son-in-law of Marine Commandant, Lemuel Shepherd and you could always count on visits by Division brass anytime there was a lull in the action.

The following were dropped from the Company.
PFC Comer U. Sivley
PFC Henry J. Witt

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1951

Lists of POWs on both sides were exchanged. The American POWs list revealed only 61 Marines including 2 Navy Hospital Corpsmen.

Another incident occurred, perhaps about this date.
KSC laborers were used to bring supplies to the MLR. H/3/1’s Marines became familiar with the groups that included several young men about fourteen to sixteen years of age. Snow had fallen and the Marines often would have friendly snowball fights with them.

On one of these occasions, there were two older Koreans near the end of the KSC supply train. They also participated in the snowball fight. After the friendly snowball fight, the KSC train proceeded to the top of the hill and dropped off their supplies. However, instead of returning with the rest of the KSC workers, the two older Koreans ran through the concertina wire in front of the lines. They ran down the ridge on the forward slope and made good their escape. Buddy Scott learned later that they were either North Korean Guerillas or escaped prisoner trying get back north to friendly lines.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1951

PFC John J. Pachessa was dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1951

PFC John Toolen was setting up trip flares in front of his position. He was in front of the barbed wire doing this job when he stepped on a shoe mine and seriously injured his foot. He was flown back to a medical outfit via helicopter and was dropped from the
Company on Jan. 9th.
The following were dropped from the Company.

- Cpl Carl "Red" C. Duvall
- PFC John Anthony Perugini
- Sgt Eb W. Revsbeck

MONDAY, DECEMBER 25, 1951

Cpl Mike Tinkey wrote home that he had been promoted to Cpl with a date of rank of Nov. 23rd.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 25, 1951

A large snow storm left snow drifts from five to eight feet high. They missed Christmas dinner because no food could be delivered.

The Chinese had put up a sign that said "Death to the Marines on Christmas" but nothing happened to H/3/1. It was very quiet on the front because of all the snow and cold weather.

Doc Carpenter remembers an incident that occurred about this time. He and another Corpsman named Castro were on a fifty-percent watch. They were in an old machinegun bunker with their goodies (C-rations, candy, etc.) stored in the machinegun aperture. A noise awakened Carpenter while Castro was on watch. In his half sleep, he saw movement and thought the enemy had arrived. He fired his .45 and found that he had fired at huge rat the size of a small dog.

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1951

A dog came through the line and looked like a person crawling through the wire. The whole 2nd squad, 2nd Platoon fired, mostly out of boredom. The poor dog didn’t know what hit him.

The first company-sized raid of the new year was planned to be conducted by units of H/3/1 in the darkness of 1-2 January 1952. Capt. James B. Ord's H/3/1 was alerted on this day to prepare for a night raid with a mission of reconnaissance and capturing or destroying any enemy that might be encountered. On this afternoon Capt. Ord made a preliminary reconnaissance with 2nd Lt. Milo J. See and John E. Watson, commanding the 2nd and 3rd Platoons respectively. After the reconnaissance, in the evening, the CO held a briefing in the Company OP that was attended by the Sgts and squad leaders of the two platoons selected for the raid.

The following were dropped from the Company.

- Sgt Max. S. Gaco 611766/5841
- PFC John W. Roberts
- PFC Charles E. Weaver
- HM3 Gene H. Golightly

MONDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1951

Capt. James B. Ord, 2nd Lt. Milo J. See, and 2nd Lt. John E. Watson carried out a second reconnaissance forward of the MLR. They proceeding until running into enemy sniper fire and then called upon aerial reconnaissance for additional information. Three missions were flown by observation planes by Maj. Kenneth C. Smedley's VMO-6.

Not a single large-scale combat had been reported during December, yet 24 Marines were killed (including KMCs), 139 wounded, and 8 MIAs in patrol actions. NKPA losses for the month consisted of 246 counted KIA and 56 POWs.

1951 ended but Marines and 8th Army troops kept on fighting in accordance with the terms of a cease-fire (that was not really a cease-fire).

Sgt Charles "Chuck" V. Lyman was dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 1, 1952

There had been a severe snowstorm late in December and the Company was having trouble
getting supplies. The deep snow prevented them from getting the hot meal planned for them on this New Years Day.

Duck Line, a line of demarcation agreed to during armistice negotiations, and the assigned battalion sector limited the objective area. On a basis of these restrictions, as well as reconnaissance reports, Capt. Ord recommended an operational area for the patrol containing three objectives, each of which represented a point where the enemy was likely to be encountered. These objectives were approved by Lt. Col. Pratt, CO 1st Marines, and formed the basis of the Battalion Order.

The task organization of the raid included the 2nd and 3rd Platoons reinforced by the Machinegun Platoon minus, and a 60mm Mortar Section commanded by 2nd Lt. John D. Koutsandreas and Lt. James J. Hughes respectively. Another unit was also attached, the 1st Platoon of I/3/1, commanded by 2nd Lt. William Harper.

A forward air controller and a 2nd Platoon radioman, Cpl Arnold Mike Tinkey, accompanied the raiding party as well as artillery, 4.2, and 81mm mortar forward observers. An interpreter and the Assistant Battalion Surgeon were also in the party. HM3 Doc Carpenter was usually billeted with the 3rd Squad of the 2nd Platoon so he went along. Corpsmen had a policy that they would accompany all patrols of five men or larger. Wiremen had the assignment of laying the line.

1st lt. Francis E. White, H/3/1's XO, remained at the observation post with the tactical air-control party. They had an observation plane on alert at an airstrip in case the raiders ran into artillery or mortar fire.

The raiding party left in the evening from Hill 812, the jumping-off place for the column of files in ghostly white, hooded snowsuits. Boots were dark in contrast but the snow was deep enough to hide them. The drifts slowed the wiremen that had an infantry fire team protecting them at their work.

The first objective consisted of bunkers and suspected mortar positions that had been reported by tactical air observers as being recently occupied by the enemy. They were empty when the raiding party reached them, and the Marine column proceeded toward their second objective, an ambush site overlooking and commanding a crossing of the Soyang-gang River.

The selected area for the support group was located nearby. The machinegun section and riflemen took positions on a nose of a hill with the wiremen, radiomen Cpl Mike Tinkey, and Corpsman Doc Reed in the center. While they peeled off to their positions the raiding party, which included PFC Samuel Weir, continued toward the ambush site where it was planned to lie in wait for two (or more) hours for the enemy. A suspected mine field had to be crossed and Capt. Ord directed his men to advance in single file, stepping carefully in the footprints ahead. Cpl Mike Tinkey, the radioman was third in line. Twelve Marines passed stepped safely over a log toward the valley when the 13th man became the victim of a shoebox mine explosion. Corpsman Doc Carpenter found broken bones but none of the usual torn flesh and hemorrhaging, thanks to the new thermal boots issued during the winter of 1951-1952.

The temperature was zero with a sharp wind blowing. Some of the Marines had to shed clothing to keep the casualty warm during his forced immobility, and the raiding party commander broke radio silence to request permission from Capt. Ord, who was in the support group area, to pull back to that position and set up the ambush.

Capt. Ord granted permission after a radio consultation with the Battalion Commander at the H/3/1 Observation Post. The raiding party remained in ambush formation on Objective 2 for two hours without seeing or hearing an enemy. By that time the condition of the wounded Marine had deteriorated to such an extent that the Battalion gave permission to return to the MLR without proceeding to Objective 3.

Capt. Ord radioed the patrol to ask their position. It seems there was someone moving around the wire in front of the I/3/1's MLR. He wanted to allow the troops to throw some grenades. When the patrol assured the CO they were not the ones in the wire, Capt. Ord allowed defensive measures on the MLR.

Capt. Ord directed that the raiders split and take two routes in hope of capturing a prisoner, since a light enemy probing attack on the MLR had just been reported by I/3/1. Cpl Tinkey's group arrived near the MLR at 5am. On the way back, approximately 500 yards
in front of the line, they ran into a NKPA patrol coming back down the Hill. They were evidently the ones previously reported in the wire in front of the MLR. It was one of those situations where both were surprised to see the other group. As 3rd in line, Cpl Tinkey dove to the side and slid down an embankment. Somehow he had his pistol out and fired into the air while sliding. When Tinkey climbed back up, the two (or three) Chinese were captured. He was told he was the only one who even fired and they threw up their hands when he shot. Tinkey managed to get one of the “Burp Guns” but had to turn it in when they returned. It was never returned to Tinkey.

Doc Carpenter recalls this was the longest five hours of his life. He also recalls that several hundred yards before they got back to their own lines, the point man yelled "Oh Shit" and leveled his weapon. When Doc looked, there in front of the point man, two gooks were standing with their hand up. Doc and the other members of the party felt that the enemy was there to surrender. They were not there to attack because they offered no resistance and had surrender pamphlets on their person.

Raids of this sort may seem anticlimactic when compared to fights in the same area during the first three weeks of September but the Marines were showing adaptability in conforming to warfare of position that was contrary to all offensive training. Careful reconnaissance, detailed planning, and minimal risk—these were the elements of defensive tactics in which large forces had to contend themselves with small gains.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 2, 1952

A small landing pad had been leveled off near the Company CP area. Helicopters brought in the New Year's Day dinner. It was a day late but well appreciated.

The Chinese probed the Company’s lines almost every night. They would cut the wire in front of the Line and repair parties would go out the next day and repair the damage. During the repair, the Chinese often shell them but seldom got a hit.

Although by this time Cpl Tinkey was the 1st Fire team leader and Assistant Squad Leader, he went in front of the line almost every night. These were not big probing patrols but only to listening post in front of the line a few thousand feet. When and if the Chinese would pass the listening post he would call in mortars.

THURSDAY, JANUARY 3, 1952

1st Lt. Richard C. Perhamus was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, JANUARY 4, 1952


SATURDAY, JANUARY 5, 1952

PFC Michiel Trkulja Jr. was dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, JANUARY 7, 1952

MSgt William J. Kowall was dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 9, 1952

PFC John E. Tooien was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, JANUARY 10, 1952

The Company went into reserve behind G/3/1 and I/3/1. Even while in reserve they still had to send out patrols to insure the area was secure. It is not know if the patrols were behind or in front of the line.
IN KOREA

Cpl Mike Tinkey wrote home that he hadn’t taken his clothes off for over 30 days. He was really pleased with the new boots recently issued. They were called thermal boots but the Marines called them “Mickey Mouse Boots” because they looked like Mickey’s feet.

FRIDAY, JANUARY, 11, 1952


SUNDAY, JANUARY 13, 1953

A Marine in the 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon was accidentally shot while another Marine was cleaning his BAR.

PFC Herbert L. Scholl was dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 15, 1952

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60 mm Mortars</td>
<td>Carl &quot;Red&quot; Duvall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG. Plt.</td>
<td>Ronald (Smooth Bore) Leo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Plt. 2nd Sqd</td>
<td>Charles Chuck Lyman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Plt.</td>
<td>Eb Revsbeck</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Revsbeck was also H/3/1's Supply Sgt. but it is not known when he changed positions within the Company.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd Plt. Ldr</td>
<td>Joseph &quot;Joe&quot; Reed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Plt. 2nd Sqd</td>
<td>John Anthony Perugini</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SUNDAY, JANUARY 20, 1952

PFC Rodney W. Kumpey was dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, JANUARY 21, 1952

PFC Zigmunt Zaborowski was dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 22, 1952

PFC Elmore G. Smith was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, JANUARY 24, 1952

H/3/1 went back on line. This is probably when they were in a position that was west of Hill 812 at a place called "Luke the Gook Castle". The bunkers were much better in this area. Cpl Tinkey and a Corpsman (name unknown) shared a bunker. It had a stove and a phone so that the Corpsman could be quickly notified of any casualties. They also started receiving one hot meal a day along with their C-rations. The Machine gun section hooked a radio into the phone lines and Tinkey and the Corpsman had music all night long. They thought they were living in hog heaven.

After being relieved at Luke the Gook Castle, they returned to Camp Tripoli.

SUNDAY, JANUARY 27, 1952

Cpl Christian Frederick Hertel was KIA by a missile wound at/near Schuigi, Korea. He was from Hanstone, KS and is buried there.

MONDAY, JANUARY 28, 1952

2nd Lt. James J. Hughes was dropped from the Company.
The Marine's first 500 armored vests (flak jackets) arrived about this time. Doc Reed Carpenter recalls that when they first received the flak jacks they were unwelcome. He said the jackets irritated the underarms of Marines and they didn't appreciate the additional weight.

The flak Jacket (sometimes called armored vests) weigh about eight pounds and would soon be appreciated by Marines as one of their most valuable assets. It had a zipper in the front and had many plates of nylon plates that are about six inches square. The plates are encased in the nylon lining of the vest to provide as much flexibility as possible. The shoulders were protected by a more pliable spun glass padding.

Armored shorts were also made available but were used less. The shorts were valuable for protecting the lower torso if one were to step on a mine.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 29, 1952

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC Robert D. Cordova          PFC Michael H. Gerrity
PFC Henry I. Lewis              Cpl Peter J. Roberts
Cpl Edward "Ski" S. Skokowski   PFC Waldemar Vendshus

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1952

About this date the Division began an operation called "Clam up". It was designed to mislead the enemy and make them think the Division had abandoned their positions on line. No planes flew over, no artillery fired, and no one was allowed to leave their bunkers during daylight when they could be seen. It was hoped the enemy would probe the apparent vacant positions and be caught off guard. PFC John Lammers wrote home that, "The Captain offered a case of VO for the first Gook captured."

The following were dropped from the Company.

Sgt Benny B. Cole               Cpl Billy Reynolds
Cpl Thomas L. Wilson

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1952

PFC George E. Sprague, who was in the 2nd Platoon, was inside his bunker in a valley just below an enemy held position called "Luke the Gook's Castle". His Platoon Leader, 2nd Lt. Milo J. See, was standing outside the bunker when an enemy mortar round that was filled with white phosphorus exploded. Milo was wounded and was evacuated, never to return to the Company.

The following were dropped from the Company.

2nd Lt. Milo J. See             PFC Perry J. Donham

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1952

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC Bobby E. Stephens           HM3 Cyril R. Carpenter

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1952

Part of a draft that was rotating back to the USA boarded planes at K-50. These were the same planes that had just brought the part of the 17th replacement draft that had been airlifted to Korea. This airlift replacements that were arriving in Korea consisted of about 2 captains, a few first lieutenants, many first lieutenants, and about 25 specialized (radar, radio, etc) enlistment Marines.

The part of the 17th replacement draft that came by sea arrived a couple weeks later. 2nd Lt. George Gentry arrived at 3/1 as part of the 17th airlift replacement draft. He arrived too late for the evening meal (most line units only ate two meals a day) and was given cold rations and coffee which satisfied his hunger. He was billeted with the
Battalion Adjutant, 2nd Lt. Leonard Divilbus (a former Master Sergeant), for the night. As tired as he was, he had no trouble sleeping amidst the exciting roar of our outgoing artillery.

Lt. Curt Gager lead a small patrol to escort a tank in front of the Company’s lines to fire on the North Koreans. When the tank fired its 90 mm gun, the North Koreans replied with their own guns. Lt. Gager received a fragment in the thigh muscle from shrapnel. The wound was severe enough to require him to return to the Battalion Aid Station for treatment.

Cpl Willard E. Willis was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1952

Lt George Gentry was awakened by Lt. Divilbus’ hand on his shoulder when he told him, “I have some news for you. Your friend, Curt Gager, was wounded last night and is down at the mess tent waiting to see you.” George quickly got into his cold weather clothes and headed for the mess. Sure enough, there was Curt was drinking a cup of Coffee. His mustached, grinning face showed that he was not badly hurt. Shaking hands and backslapping caused others in the tent to wonder but they didn’t care.

They exchanged casual conversation about old times and Curt told George about the patrol as they ate. Companies on line ate C-ration s while those in the rear ate B-rations and better. Curt told George, “Get in H/3/1. The 2nd Platoon needs an officer.” Curt had to return to H/3/1 after the morning meal and George had an appointment with the other new arriving officers to meet the Battalion CO, (Col. Pratt) so their conversation was short. Lt. Gentry headed for the Battalion COs tent as Curt headed north in a jeep.

Lt. Divilbus had all the new lieutenants waiting to met Col. Pratt as a group. This was accomplished quickly and they were turned over to the XO, Major Robert Perkins (know as Ma Perkins). Each new lieutenant took turns to ask for a specific unit. When it came Lt. Gentry’s turn at 1030, he was greeted with an inquiry, “who do you know in How Company?” This stunned Gentry at first and he replied, “Lt. Gager.” This brought a laugh from the XO who said, “The Commandant’s son-in-law has asked for you by name for his company. Do you know Capt. Jimmy Ord of H/3/1?” “No sir” was the honest reply. Then the cloud cleared up. Gager had returned to tell Capt. Ord and Capt. Ord had made to call to Battalion requesting him. Fast work! The XO dismissed Gentry with no further comment but Lt. Divilbus told Gentry later that Company Commanders usually get that for which they ask.

The entire Division was in Operation “Clam-Up” so they would have to wait one more day before joining the Company. They turned in their M-1 rifles and drew M-1 carbines from the Battalion Armory. Lt. Gentry also had his personal colt automatic .45 pistol. He was going to H/3/1 along with other new replacements who were Jim Canelo, George Hubbard, and Dick Smith. Each Company rated seven officers and these four would help fill the voids of casualties and short timers.

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1952

On Feb 10th, at 1800 hours we started “Operation Clam-up”. Marines were to stay in their bunkers all-day and only go out at night, and then quietly. If they had to go to the “Head”, they had to use our C-ration cans and then dispose of them at night. The object was to make the Chinese think the line had been abandoned. Operation Clam-up lasted for five days, until February 15th at 1800 hours.

Lt. George Gentry and another rode north in the Battalion XOs Jeep. The other two new lieutenants rode in a second jeep. The sun was setting over snowy, cold mountains to the west. They sped up the valley floor to avoid drawing artillery or mortar fire from the North Koreans. The North Koreans were not fooled by Operation Clam-UP so they were back to business as usual. H/3/1 was located on Hill 749 across from “Luke the Gook’s Castle”. Hiking up the slippery slope was not easy in the thermal boots but they finally made it to the CP.

A huge bunker was well lit and warm coming in from the cold. Maj. Perkins talked to a tall, black haired Marine Captain for a few minutes and then departed for Battalion.
Capt. Ord was about six foot, three inches with a handlebar mustache that was his pride and joy. His grin and handshake were as big as he. He greeted each of the replacements in turn before making assignments. Curt Gager had the 1st Platoon and would keep it. Lt. Gentry was to take over the 2nd Platoon from TSgt Leroy Meisner. Lt. Canelo was to relieve 2nd Lt. Watson of the 3rd Platoon in a few days. Lt. Hubbard was to take over the Machine Gun Platoon and Dick Smith was to take over the Mortar from 2nd Lt. John Koutsandreas who had been commanding both units.

Sgt Meisner took Lt. Gentry to the 2nd Platoon CP where he met his right guide, SSgt "Roady" Rohde, two corpsmen, and two messengers. The CP bunker was on the reverse slope of Hill 749 and warmly heated by an oil stove that was also used to cook C-rations. Lt. Gentry spent the rest of the day learning the system used by the Company to keep everyone informed about the platoon’s sector on line. Lt. Gentry’s first night was quiet. He slept on a stretcher elevated between four barbwire stakes lashed together with communications wire (Rank has privilege (RHIP)).

PFC Robert J. Stanfield was dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1952

The sun was rising in the east when Lt. Gentry stepped out of his new CP bunker. He was going to meet the Marines in his platoon who were in bunkers along the forward slope of Hill 749. They were on the right flank of the Company and tied in with 2/1. A section of light machine guns attached to the platoon were dug in on each end of the Platoon’s sector. Moving down hill to the 1st squad was slippery but presented no problem. The next move was up the hill which they accomplished with ropes to pull them up through the snowy, slippery hillside. It was the 3rd squads bunker where Lt. Gentry first noticed the annoying sounds of bees. As Lt. Gentry began to question the presence of the bees, he noticed everyone was prone on the ground except him. He dropped down casually to find that he had committed another sin of being a new 2nd Lt. He thought, “Now the Platoon knew the dumbness of their new leader”. It would take several weeks to prove himself in their eyes. Not all took him for a fool but recognized the inexperience that nearly everyone faces in their first combat experiences.

About this date PFC Thomas "Tom" Walsh was WIA with shrapnel in the leg from a mortar round.

Cpl Clifford S. Petersson was about ten feet away from PFC Donald E. Whiteman's when he was fatally wounded by a mortar round. Clifford died shortly thereafter. He was from Litchfield, MN and is buried at Paynesville, IN.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1952

The next two weeks was a learning experience for Lt. Gentry. He had never had the lives of 50 Marines and corpsmen in his hands in peace time much less in combat. He resolved to make as few mistakes as possible. The next thing he had to learn was to be patient. He had to learn men’s names and faces quickly. He had two Smiths, a Sgt. Adams, and three PFC Adams, none related. He had seen that the men were fed and got their mail regularly and sent the sick ones back to Battalion for medical aid. In all this, he had to depend on a new TSgt whose job he had just taken.

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

3rd Plt. Richard "Dick" Jobst (left)
3rd Plt. Harold Kraft (left)

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1952

Samuel Smerek Jr. was dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1952

Pvt Adolfo Sanchez Jr. was dropped from the Company.
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1952

The 1st Marine Regiment was relieved by the 5th Marines and moved in Division Reserve in the vicinity of Imje.

Mike Tinkey wrote home that they had moved into reserve and that there were no problems during Operation Clam-up.

The following were dropped from the Company:

Cpl Carl R. Duplantis            Cpl William O. Entwisle
Sgt Fortine J. Estrada           Cpl Harry E. Faudree Jr.
Sgt James E. Finklea Jr.         PFC Richard H. Jobst
PFC Thomas N. Johnson            PFC Loren W. Shedd
PFC Melvin C. Spencer            Sgt Levi H. Whitlock

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1952

The following were dropped from the Company.

1st Lt. Frances E. White (XO)

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1952

The 17th replacement (sea movement) draft that had sailed to Korea aboard the USS Gen. William Weigel was arriving at Sucho-Ri, Korea. 3/1's replacements started arriving at Regiment and Battalion late in the evening.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1952

Lt. Gentry was glad to hear that they were being relieved by the 5th Marines. Capt Ord made it very clear that there were to be no foul-ups during the relief. The CO of H/3/5, who was relieving H/3/1, was 1st Lt. Lemuel Shepard III. He was the Commandant’s son and Capt. Ord’s brother-in-law. Gentry had spoken with him several times and slept in the stretcher next to him at the Division CP when they arrived on the 17th (airlift) draft. The relief went smoothly this night. They marched with full combat load back to a rear assembly where trucks moved them further to the rear to a new Camp Tripoli.

Cpl Raymond "Ray" Menard had arrived at Battalion with the 17th replacement draft last night and had been sent to W/3/1.

Cpl Elmore G. Smith was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1952

It was well after midnight when H/3/1 arrived at Camp Tripoli where tents were already erected. Lt Gentry saw that each squad of the 3rd Platoon was assigned to a tent before going to the Officer’s tent. He fell into his sleeping bag on a cot without even blowing up his air mattress. He was exhausted and quickly fell asleep. The pressure of the front line was behind him for the moment.

It was snowing the next morning at 0900 when Lt. Gentry made a check of the squad tents with his Platoon Sgt, SSgt Leroy Meisner. Discrepancies were noted (mainly patching of holes caused by sparks from the oil burning stoves) and action was planned to correct them. Lt. Gentry wandered back to his officer’s tent area to find their Korean house boy, Cho Jung. He, was busy sweeping and cleaning the wooden deck. He grinned, saluted, and continued with his work. Lt. Gager returned to announce showers and clean uniforms were available for officers at 1400. The other officers returned from their platoons and they discussed the arrival of the 17th replacement ship draft that had arrived in Korea. H/3/1 was due to receive a new XO when a few senior officers reported to the Division.

With the scuttlebut behind them, they made plans for the shower and the booze-run being planned by their close air support pilots. Both were regular Marines and went by the titles of “Willie Lump Lump” and “Coo Coo”. They were both captains and kept the ground...
officers in their place. It was at this time that Lt. Gentry learned that he had withheld too much from his pay for deposit in the Citizens National Bank in Baytown, TX and would only get $4.00 per pay period for the next few months.

The following were dropped from the Company.

Sgt Robert L. Gable
PFC Earl Warner Jr.

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1952

Cpl Raymond "Ray" Menard, who had arrived with the 17th replacement draft and spent a couple days with W/3/1, was transferred to H/3/1. He met the 1st Sgt, MSgt Henwood, and Company Gunny, MSgt Hudson, and then went to G/3/1 to visit a buddy. Ray had been assigned to the 2nd Platoon.

Here in reserve, movies were being shown at Battalion most nights.

The following were dropped from the Company.

Cpl John W. Alberts
Sgt Curtis E. Brown
HN Clayton E. Hjelt

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1952

Cpl Ray Menard got up at 0900, and had eggs for breakfast. He went to Mass at 1030 in the 1st battalion theater and then spent the rest of the day lounging and squaring away his gear.

About this date Capt. Coo Coo, the close air support pilot, returned from the Booze run. He had brought Lt. George Gentry a bottle of Old Forrester straight bourbon (cost = $1.50) from the wine mess in Atami Japan. George saved the bottle to carry back on line for after-patrol sessions with the troops.

The session that helped Lt. George Gentry accumulate some funds was Craps. Capt. Coo Coo explained the odds of the game and George. As instructed, George watched the roll of the dice for a few minutes before placing his first bet, $2.00. He won the bet and let it ride again as directed by Coo Coo. George took some of his winnings from time to time and had accumulated a small bankroll when it came his turn to roll the dice. He made two passes and then lost the dice. He knew it was time to quit so he left the table with $80 that had grown from his initial $2 bet.

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1952

Cpl Ray Menard was sent to the #7 outpost for 24 hours. There he had the 12-2 watch. The smoke in the tent was thick during the night.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1952

Cpl Ray Menard got up at 0700 and was relieved from the outpost at 0800. He returned to the H/3/1 area from the outpost at 0900 to attend classes in the morning. Later in the day he attended gun drill with the 1st Sergeant and TSgt Wolfe of the Mortar Platoon. At 2130 Ray moved out on a night problem.

H/3/1's new XO was to be 1st Lt. Anthony "Tony" Messina.

The following were dropped from the Company.

Sgt Henry A. Marquar Jr.
PFC Thomas R. Roche
Sgt Woodbury "Woody" Phillips

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1952

PX gear arrived at the Company in the afternoon. Cpl Menard received his first mail, four letters, and then had another night problem.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1952
All-day classes were on schedule for the 2nd Platoon. Cpl Menard received another four letters at mail call and then saw "My Favorite Spy" at the movies.

Mail call always seemed to uplift the spirits of the troops. It was held daily when possible but at times it may be several days before the mail can get to the troops. Everyone enjoyed getting things from home. Especially the packages which were usually shared with buddies. Marines wrote home when paper and pencil were available and the mood was right. In many cases there wasn't enough time, they were too tired, or just didn't feel like taking the time to write home. Loved ones at home also probably had their excuses. Everyone who knows a Marine should do all they can to help him while away from home and one of the best ways is to send him packages. Don't worry that the items sent aren't appropriate. If he doesn't like it, he can dispose of it to someone who needs the item, but most of all, you will have helped to lift his spirits at a time when he needs that most.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1952

The 2nd Platoon had squad firing problems all morning and afternoon.

PFC John Lammers wrote home that he returned from patrol this morning. The patrol was pretty quiet. They found fresh U.S. C-ration cans and camp sights where the NKPA had recently put out fires. They tracked them for about four miles but didn't catch up to them. The patrol burned some houses and shelters along the way. Two deer were seen but the patrol didn't shoot because they didn't want to reveal their position.

H/3/1 personnel killed three bears.

The movie that night was "B.A.R."

Marine casualties for February, the last full month in East Korea, were 23 KIA, 102 WIA, and 1 MIA, including the KMC Regiment. Enemy losses were reported as 174 counted and 381 estimated KIA, 606 WIA, and 63 POWs.

SATURDAY, MARCH 1, 1952

There was a Company inspection. After the inspection Cpl Ray Menard took a shower, wrote six letters home, and then watched "Detective Story" at the battalion outdoor movie.

SUNDAY, MARCH 2, 1952

Training was ongoing while in reserve to hone unit skills. They had night patrolling every other night in the surrounding hills. In the daytime live-ammoo attacks were run on fortified positions, first at the squad levels, then platoon level, and finally at the company level. Each day one of the three battalions would furnish a platoon patrol to hunt line-crossers or guerrillas between Camp Tripoli and the MLR.

About this date it again became H/3/1's turn to furnish a Patrol to hunt line-crossers and guerillas. The 3rd platoon got the job. Instead of a full platoon, Lt. Gentry took one squad, a corpsman, and a radio operator to cover the assigned grid square on the map. They departed about 0700, shortly after breakfast, by truck. The cold and snow was all around yet the sun shone brightly. Leaving the truck, whose driver said he would be back at 1600 to bring them back, they began to move toward hills where guerrillas were likely to hide.

Around noon the patrol took a break to eat C- rations and notify Battalion of negative contact with any enemy. Shortly after getting on the trail again, warm embers were found near a burned-out house. A closer inspection revealed foot prints leading up a near-by hill. Battalion was notified of the findings, the squad was deployed, and they proceed up the hill. The snow became progressively deeper until they reached the top of the hill. Atop the hill they could see for miles in all directions but no sight of any enemy. After making their report to Battalion, the patrol was instructed to return to the prearranged pick-up point. They did this as rapidly as possible. Moving through snow was not easy especially when being on alert for possible ambushes. The patrol arrived at the pick-up point on time and headed back to camp. They were tired and unsatisfied with their results.
After chow Cpl Ray Menard went to Mass at 1030. A USO troop show featuring Betty Hutton arrived and, Ray Menard wrote in his diary, that she ate chow with the troops in the Battalions mess hall. Men of the Company who saw her show were generally pleased with her performance. She and her USO troop were allowed to use the Officers mess as a party area for the senior officers. This was not appreciated by the Junior officers.

MONDAY, MARCH 3, 1952

The 2nd Platoon had been in the field all day. Their PX rations arrived at noon. The night was cold and windy as they went out again at 1800 for a night problem. The following were dropped from the Company:
- 2nd Lt. John E. Watson (to emergency leave - would return to Korea)
- HN James R. Mahoney Jr.
- HN Robert E. Miller

TUESDAY, MARCH 4, 1952

The NKPA stepped up their artillery shelling with 500 rounds this day. Cpl Menard made out an allotment for $80.00 and PFC Walter W. Palmer was dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 1952

The heavy shelling by the enemy yesterday lead to an H/3/1 alerted early in the morning. Troops made up their packs and stood by for further orders. When the enemy showed no increased sign of activity the alert was cancelled. "David and Bathsheba" played at the Battalion movie.
- 2nd Lt. John Koutsandreas was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 1952

Everyone in the Company received shots except for the 17th draft who had just had their shots aboard shop.

FRIDAY, MARCH 7, 1952

The Company went in the field for another problem on this cold, snowy day.
- PFC Milton Stamos was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, MARCH 8,

Cpl Ray Menard had duty on outpost #5 where he cleaned his BAR and .38 pistol. The Battalion had a parade in the afternoon and Ray had the 1700-1930 watch.

SUNDAY, MARCH 9, 1952

Cpl Menard showered, ate chow, and cleaned up his sea bag before going to chow at noon. PFC Arnold Mike Tinkey became the radioman.
- At 2220 the Company departed the battalion area for the G/3/7 sector of the MLR and came under their control at 2325.

MONDAY, MARCH 10, 1952

All patrols in the Battalion departed and returned to the MLR with negative results and negative enemy contact.
- The 2nd Platoon was snapping in down by the river. Their PX rations arrived about noon and this was pretty easy day for them. Cpl Menard send home some film he had taken.
- 2nd Lt. John E. Watson, the 3rd Platoon Leader went on emergency leave.
TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 1952

The 2nd Platoon fired their TO weapons at a range that was up the river. Riflemen fired 20 rounds. Cpl William H. White was dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 1952

The 2nd Platoon, and perhaps all of the Company, hiked over some hills to a class that was conducted at the tank battalion. The class was on the subject of tank-infantry tactics.

THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 1952

The 2nd Platoon, or all of the Company, returned to the tank battalion for a firing problem with the tanks.

The H/3/1 officers tent boy, Cho Jung, informed Lt. Gentry that the Marines were moving to the western part of Korea, north of the capitol, Seoul. Someone recalls that Pvt Herbert "Herb" B. Parry was the 1st Gunner, and PFC Raymond P. Ares was the 2nd Gunner of the 2nd Squad, 1st Section, Machine Gun Platoon while 9 miles north of Inje on this date.

Cpl Wilbur F. Keil was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, MARCH 14, 1952

Capt. Ord and the XO, Tony Messina broke the news on a "SECRET" move the Marines were making to the to the western part of Korea. An Army unit would arrive to replace the Marines. They were to be ready to move everything but the tents and other heavy equipment which would be left for the Army unit. Since the Division didn't have enough transportation to move the entire Division in a single move, Army motor transportation units would also be used during the move. The Army sent two drivers with each vehicle so only the COs and XOs rode in the front. Other officers and enlisted personnel rode in the rear of the trucks.

Cpl Menard received two more letters (the first that was addressed to How Company). He went to a USO show that provided relatively poor entertainment.

SATURDAY, MARCH 15, 1952

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

- MG Plt Ldr        John Kouts Koutsandreas (left)
- 1st Plt. 1st Sqd  Norman Mother Hensley (left)
- 1st Plt. 1st Sqd  Edward "Ski" Skokowski (left)
- 1st Plt. 2nd Sqd  Walt Dick Benson (left)
- 3rd Plt. Corpsman Bernard "Doc" Roux (joined)
- 3rd Plt.         Walter "Walt" Palmer (left)

(Palmer was also in 60mm Mortars but it is not known when he changed positions within the Company.)

3rd Plt.         Ernie Steve Severson (left)

About this date the 1st Mar. Div. was starting to make the big move with their 26,000 men from the east side of Korea to the west side of Korea near Panmunjom where the long, drawn-out peace talks were being held. The enemy they had been fighting from the Minnesota Line on the East Coast was the NKPA. The enemy they would be facing from the Jamestown Line on the West Coast was the CCF. The Jamestown Line consisted of thirty-two miles of heavily fortified trenches. In front of the trench-line were a series of outposts manned by as few as five people and as much as a rifle platoon. The outposts were as much as a half a mile in front of the trench-lines. There was apparently a regiment of South Korean...
Marines attached to the 1st Mar. Div. at this time.

Making a comparison between the CCF and NKPA it is reasonable to say that the CCF was more professionally trained while the NKPA was less organized. The CCF would take prisoners but the NKPA were more likely to kill their prisoners.

About this time the 1st Mar. Div. was issued flak jackets for the first time. This was another innovation that helped to save countless lives.

At 1000 the 2nd Platoon had a rifle inspection. After the inspection the troops began packing their gear to leave for the western movement.

SUNDAY, MARCH 16, 1952

The transport, General W. H. Gordon, anchored at Sokcho-ri with 1,309 Marines of the 18th replacement draft. The newly arrived Marines scarcely had time to drop their sea bags before they joined the movement to West Korea. The Gordon departed with 1238 Marines, homeward bound. The 2nd Logistics Command (Army) received a 1st Mar. Div. request to route the 19th replacement draft, due in April, to Inchon instead of Sokcho-ri.

The weather through the first part of March was spring-like and the Company trained during the day and watched movies at night. A very enjoyable break. The Company started preparing for the move to the West Coast.

Cpl Menard attended Mass at 1200 and was transferred from the 2nd Platoon to the Mortar Section.

The following were dropped from the Company.

Cpl James L. Denton     Cpl Norman D. Hensley
Sgt John J. Johnk       Cpl James H. Jones
Cpl Robert R. Jones     Cpl Harold Kraft
Cpl Danny V. Renteria   Cpl Charles O. Revels
Sgt Roy E. Self Jr.     Sgt John D. Trahan
PFC Donald C. Wilson    Sgt Milo Yellowhead

MONDAY, MARCH 17, 1952

The troops didn't do much of anything. They spent the day just waiting for the big western movement.

Cpl Robert H. Felter was dropped from the Company.
TUESDAY, MARCH 18, 1952

The Division's movement west began this day. Cpl Arnold "Mike" Tinkey was promoted to Sgt. He had been the temporary Squad Leader of the 2nd Squad, 2nd Platoon. With this promotion he became the full time squad leader. Cpl Raymond Menard who had just been transferred to the Mortar Section was also promoted to Sgt. PFC Gordon S. Sledge of the 2nd Platoon was promoted to Cpl. "Starlift" was playing at the movie.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19, 1952

The company got rid of their cots and were put on a fifteen minute stand-by to relieve the ROKs on their new western front.

THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 1952

Elements of the 1st Mar. Div. (KMC, 11th Marines, 1st Armored, etc) had been making the move from east to west Korea the previous few days. The 1st Marines, the 1st rifle regiment to move, received orders this date to proceed by motor march from the Division Reserve area at Camp Tripoli to the new Division area east of Munsan-ni. They were to man the Jamestown Line in this area.

The day began with bright sunshine. The Army unit to relieve the 1st Marine Division was in place to go forward with the 5th and 7th Marines waiting to leave later in the day. H/3/1's drivers seemed to be in a hurry when they started moving out at 0630. The roads were mainly gravel with many pot-holes from the snow and wet weather. A convoy speed of 25 MPH would have been appropriate on these roads.

H/3/1's convoy moved at about 35-40 MPH missing few bumps and holes. Since everyone had eaten a hearty breakfast before leaving only one other meal, C-rations, was to be eaten during the trip. That stop and one other to relieve excess accumulations were the only stops until they arrived at the disembarkation point at 1600. Tents were in position so assignments were easy and prompt. A field mess unit had been set up to serve B-rations before moving north the next day. All had a peaceful night's rest.

Corpsman HM2 Calvin T. Friesz was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, MARCH 21, 1952

H/3/1 had arrived at a tent camp in Western Korea that was near a river. Even though the weather was cold, some chose to swim in the river.

About this time Sgt Tinkey was sent to the Canadian Sector to learn about trails, mines and anything else they needed to know when they came on line

The Canadians also had an Outpost in front of Bronco. At one time Sgt Tinkey went out with the Canadian patrol at night, stayed all day, and returned the next night.

The Mortar Section had reveille at 0700 and then an inspection. Sgt Raymond Menard cut hair for seven guys and then attended Mass in the afternoon. The Company spent the day squaring away their gear for the move up to the MLR and writing letters.

SATURDAY, MARCH 22, 1952

The remained in the same area while the Army provided coffee and donuts. It rained
in the morning and, as it started to get colder, the rain changed to a heavy snow in the afternoon.

The following were dropped from the Company.

Cpl John J. Godfrey Jr.          PFC Donald L. Huot

SUNDAY, MARCH 23, 1952

The Company moved up to a second assembly area where they pitched shelters and left their sea bags for storage.

MONDAY, MARCH 24, 1952

The 1st Marines moved up to the MLR with 3/1 on the right front of the Division. They were replacing three ROK units divisions. The British 1st Commonwealth Division was to the right of H/3/1 and a Korean Marine Corps (KMC) brigade was covering the Division's left over to the sea of Japan. The Marines were being positioned north of Seoul to prevent a third drive by the communists to capture the Capital city. In 1950 and 1951 they had initiated an invasion through this sector to capture Seoul and were expected to try again. The CCF in front of the Marines did not interfere with the Marines during the relief of the ROK units.

The Company was manning the MLR behind two Hills, Bronco and Nelly, that were used as friendly outposts. Bronco was about 1100 yard to their front in No-Mans-Land. Nelly was about 400 yards to the right rear of Bronco in the general direction of the MLR.

Capt. Ord had obtained an additional 60mm mortar for the Mortar Section. This gave them four mortars for the three mortar squads so they formed a fourth squad. Two of the mortar squads, the 1st and 2nd, went with some troops to outpost Bronco and the others stayed on the MLR in the CP area with the remainder of the Company.

The ROK troops who were in this area when the snow was on the ground had laid quite a few bouncing-betty and other types of mines. A safe trail between the MLR and outpost Bronco was clearly marked. All were instructed where the safe lanes were located and told about the danger of mines. Some of the mortar men would periodically go to the MLR to get mail for the troops on Bronco. Along the way they noticed there were quite a few pheasants and other game birds in the area.

For the most part, Marines had been facing NKPA troops in eastern Korea and now they would be facing the Chinese. Directly beyond the 1st Marine Division sector, to the center and north, were two first-rate units of the CCF, the 65th and 63rd CCF Armies. Together, they totaled approximately 49,000 troops. Opposite the west and center of the Marine Division front was the 65th CCF Army, with elements for the 193rd Division across from the KMC regiment. Across from the Marine line in the center was the 195th Division of the 65th CCF Army, which had placed two regiments forward. North of 3/1, on the Division's right sector, was the 188th Division, 63rd CCF Army with two regiments forward. The estimated 15 infantry battalions facing the Marine Division were supported by 10 organic artillery battalions numbering between 106 and 240 guns, and varying in caliber from .75 to .155mm. In addition, intelligence reported that the 1st CCF Armored Division and an unidentified airborne brigade were located near the enemy operations.

Chinese infantry units were not only solidly entrenched across their front line opposite the 1st Mar. Div. but were also in depth. Their successive defensive lines protected by mine fields, wire, and other obstacles, were supported by artillery. There had been little action in recent months so they were sufficiently supplied to conduct continuous operations. Not only were enemy ground units well supplied, but the CCF soldiers were disciplined and well led. Their morale was officially evaluated as ranging from good to excellent. In all, the CCF was a determined adversary of considerable ability, with their greatest strength being in plentiful combat manpower.

The Company did not get a ground reconnaissance when they moved in place, only a map briefing. The 2nd Platoon was on the right flank of the Company, and the Division. It would soon be a show place to be visited by all senior officers. At 1000 the Company began its march north with platoons in column and the cold winds from the north were still
blowing. Thermal boots, long johns, parkas, and fur-lined caps were a necessity. Weapons were slung over shoulders to balance the packs that carried extra clothing and meals. It appeared to be all up hill. The trenches had been dug by Koreans and were not deep enough for Marines so major improvements would be required in the next few weeks.

The Mortar Section got to a supply point where they stayed until 2000. They arrived at their designated area at 2230.

Leading his 2nd Platoon to the right, Lt. Gentry contacted the South Korean officer who spoke no English. They used an interpreter who was not skilled in either language. Gentry's best help came from a four-man team of the Royal Canadian Regiment who had been liaison with the Koreans. They had a good relationship with the Korean Officer. Shortly after dark the Koreans began to move south (stealing H/3/1 blind). Hot coffee was provided by the Canadians to the CP and, after a tour of the lines, Lt. Gentry's consumed a can of c-rations. A phone watch was established in the CP to report to higher command and to receive lower unit reports. Lt Gentry decided to give his exhausted body a rest before inflating the air mattress. By midnight he was asleep in his sleeping bag, without his air mattress.

They were close to the area where the peace talks were being held and could see the lights at night. The set-up was such that there was an OPLR, outpost line of resistance in front of the MLR.

TUESDAY, MARCH 25, 1952

The 2nd Platoon runner awoke Lt. Gentry with a cup of coffee and a reminder that he was to be at the Company CP at 0700. After a quick sip of coffee and a shave he left for the CP with his runner at his side. He checked out platoon positions as he moved toward the CP. Reports of theft of personnel property were reported to him at each stop. Nothing valuable, just needed things. Capt. Ord was fit to be tied. He too was robbed of several items when the relief of the ROK troops took place.

With notebook in hand, Gentry recorded his orders for the next several days and weeks. Improvement of the trenches and bunkers were given high priority. Laying of barbed wire in front of the trenches was a second priority. They were alerted to be careful for the many mines that had been laid in front of their lines for the last two years. The location of the mines had not been plotted. The officer's Seventh Special Basic Class had already suffered their first death when Lt. Bill Horn was killed by mortar fire after only two weeks in country.

Lt. Gentry began the supervision of placing Machine Guns (they had four since they were the right flank unit) and locating sites for two .75 mm recoilless rifles attached to the platoon. The .75s were to be used to cover the valley floor to the front which was a possible enemy tank approach route. When all the attachments were counted his forty five man platoon had grown to eighty men. This included the squad of heavy machine guns from W/3/1. Since both he and his Platoon Sergeant, Sgt Meisner, were away most of the day, he depended upon his platoon CP personnel to enlarge the bunker and police the area. At 1600, when he returned, he found great progress had been made on improving the CP living conditions.

Sgt Raymond Menard, PFC Robert Callahan, and PFC Jan Eike started working on their bunker. They were running short of chow.

The initial enemy contact came from CCF supporting weapons. Late in the day, the front lines received 189 mortar and artillery shells that wounded 10 Marines. A 1st Marines man was also killed by sniper fire.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 26, 1952

Sgt Ray Menard and the Mortar Section continued to work on bunkers. The Canadians must have known the Company was short of chow because they brought over some eggs. Sgt Menard went back to the supply point to get ammo and chow for his section.

Another 1st Marines man was fatally wounded this day by sniper fire. During the remainder of March, the tempo of activity increased. Marines began regular patrol actions
to probe and ambush the enemy. The enemy also probed every night but the Company had so much wire in front that none make it through.

The next three weeks the Company would complete the main projects of trenches and bunkers and would begin laying the concertina wire that Capt. Ord preferred. Capt. Ord had been out to the Canadian outpost to the east where the tangle-foot wire was used. He decided that this protection was the best deterrent to infiltration. The Company would have no hot rations from the Company field mess until the concertina was laid across the entire front. Gentry thought the Company had lived on C-rations too long. He had weighed 205 when he left the east coast on March 18th and would weigh about 165 after sixty eight days on line eating C-rations most of the time.

THURSDAY, MARCH 27, 1952

A Canadian Lance Corporal was quick to tell Lt. Gentry that he was pleased with the improvements being made in the Marines sector. He said he never trusted the tenacity of the previous Korean occupants and had a “bug-out” plan ready to use in the event they couldn’t hold their position. A phone report from the Company CP gave Lt. Gentry the bad news that Tom Hodson of I/3/1 was KIA by a mine when he went to look at his positions. Lt. Gentry’s old Officer’s Basic Platoon had lost two Marines in less than two months. It made him vary wary of moving off the beaten paths.

Sgt Menard was making progress on his bunker. Today he got some logs for use in the construction. They now had life a little easier because the Korean Service Corps (KSC) (some called the ediwas) were now bringing supplies to the Company.

Sgt Lester R. Dyckman was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, MARCH 28, 1952

Sgt Menard finished his bunker with a stone wall.

SATURDAY, MARCH 29, 1952

The enemy facing the Battalion was identified as the 563rd and 564th Regiments, 188th Division, 63rd CCF (Chinese Communist Forces) Army. Between the period of 29 March and 3 April the above regiments were relieved by the 560th Regiment, 187th Division, 63rd CCF Army. The enemy during the period occupied a line running general northeast from coordinates 045079 to 087102.

Sgt Menard and bud (probably Cpl Buddy Scott) had the 0330 watch. After their watch they stayed up and made a fire place. After starting the last gun pit they started on a helicopter landing site.

On or shortly before this date Lt. Gen. Franklin J. Hart, Commander Marine Force Pacific presented a Purple Heart Award to PFC Robert L. Callahan while he as laying in a hospital bed in Yokosuka, Japan. The picture is shown in the May 29th edition of the Rockland Co. Messenger.

SUNDAY, MARCH 30, 1952

Sgt. Menard got up at 0900. After washing and eating he finished the helicopter landing site and then washed some clothes.

MONDAY, MARCH 31, 1952

Many Marines were asking relatives to send pen flashlights and several extra batteries. They were a handy thing to have. They gave enough light to be able to read letters from home and see a little at night. The didn't want the larger flash lights that were more bulk to carry in their packs and could illuminate a fighting hole too much for safety.

Sgt Menard got up late and worked on the wash stand. Later he wrote home and then
had the 1100-1300 watch.

Cpl John W. Roberts was dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, APRIL 1, 1952

During the month of April patrols were a continuing means of determining what was in front of the MLR an outposts. H/3/1 probably had at least one patrol each night. Unless otherwise stated, the patrols returned without any significant report.

During this period of time the 3/1 was defending the MLR sector from coordinates 094085 to coordinates 054054 and the OPLR from coordinates 085099 to coordinates 046086. H/3/1 was manning the Battalion's right flank with I/3/1 probably on their left and G/3/1 on I/3/1's left.

Sgt Menard got up later than usual. He washed, shaved a tried to square away things a little for the anticipated visit from a General (that never came). After reading his mail and writing responses, he filled the water crock.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 1952

The enemy made a probing attack late this date against 3/1. 3/1 reported frequent sightings of enemy groups working in and around their trenches.

Sgt. Menard made a door for his bunker.

THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 1952

At 2040 H/3/1 observed seven enemy moving at coordinates 079091 and nine enemy moving at coordinates 078098. 81mm mortars fired with an estimated nine enemy KIA.

The Mortar Section finished putting in the last gun pit.

FRIDAY, APRIL 4, 1952

Sgt Menard made 2 trips to the supply point to get barbed wire and Iron stakes. The Mortar Section was putting double apron barbed wire.

SATURDAY, APRIL 5, 1952

At 1205 H/3/1 observed ten enemy in the open at coordinates 074099. Artillery fired and an estimated three enemy were KIA.

At 1845 H/3/1 received sniper fire at coordinates 082095.

SUNDAY, APRIL 6, 1952

Sgt Albertus Thomas Kleintop Jr., Cpl Buddy "Bud" S. Scott, and Sgt Raymond Menard were going to return the to the MLR to go to Mass but there saw none today.

About five of the mortar men on OP Bronco decided to go to OP Nelly, a hill between OP Bronco and the MLR, to hunt pheasants. Sgt Menard was going but was in the process of writing a letter home and decided not to go. During th hunt Cpl Robert Runyon tripped a mine and received injuries over his entire body and resulted in the loss of one foot and serious injury to the other foot. Cpl Norman L. Carlson was also hit. Richie (possibly PFC Richard C. Brumback) returned to Bronco for stretchers. Other Mortar Section and 1st Platoon personnel were also hit with shrapnel, either from the same mine or another mine.

Sgt Albertus Thomas Kleintop and PFC Jan Robert Eike were two mortar men who were leading a KSC supply train from the MLR to OP Bronco when they heard the mines exploding. When they heard the commotion, they were apparently in a safe lane that had been cleared through the mine field. Both Marines and several KSC laborers left the safe lane and went into the minefield to offer assistance. Sgt Kleintop and another Marine, perhaps Eike, was carrying Runyon on a stretcher when Kleintop stepped on a mine. This resulted in Kleintop and Eike loosing their lives very soon after being wounded. Several of the KSC laborers
were also wounded. Cpl Willard Steel, Cpl Buddy Scott, Cpl Leo Stroman, and PFC Robert "Rabbit" Dunn also heard the mines exploding. They grabbed stretcher and went into the minefield to help bring out the wounded. Meanwhile Corpsman Alvin Joyner was being transported from the MLR by helicopter (his first helicopter ride) to attend to the wounded. Willard Steel had done much of the bandaging of the wounded before Joyner arrived. Norman Carlson was one of the Mortar Section Marines who had severe shrapnel wounds in the front part of his body. Leo Stroman, who was carrying another litter case, got shrapnel in his back side when another mine exploded behind him. Carlson was more severely wounded so they carried him to the Mortar Section CP at Bronco where he was evacuated by helicopter. There were about four helicopter flights that evacuated the casualties. Others were taken by stretcher through safe lanes back to the MLR. Jan Eike was from Elmira (or Pine City), NY where he is buried. Albertus Kleintop was from Allentown, PA where he is buried.

Sgt. Albertus Kleintop received the Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V" for his actions. The citation reads as follows:

“For heroic achievement while serving with Company H, Third Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), during operation against enemy aggressor forces in Korea on 6 April 1952. Observing two seriously wounded Marines lying in an exposed position in an uncharted mine field well in advance of the main line of resistance. Sergeant Kleintop unhesitatingly made his way across the deadly area in a brave attempt to aid and evacuate the stricken men. Instantly killed by a mine explosion while effecting the rescue, Sergeant Kleintop, by his marked courage, daring initiative and selfless efforts in behalf of his comrades, was greatly instrumental in saving the lives of the two wounded Marines and served to inspire all who observed him, thereby upholding the highest tradition of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.”

PFC James "Jim" Guyton, of the 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon, TSgt Paul Wolfe of the Mortar Section, PFC Robert L. Callahan of the Mortar Section, James "Jim" L. Guyton of the 2nd Squad, 1st Platoon, and perhaps as many as ten or twelve others (mostly from the Mortar Section and 1st Platoon) were wounded trying to get the wounded and killed out of the mine fields during the above described incident. Some of the wounded may have been KSC laborers. Jim Guyton spent the next five months in Yokosuka Naval Hospital recuperating. About all of the Mortar Section personnel involved were casualties except for Richie (possibly PFC Richard C. Brumback) who escaped uninjured.

Corpsman HM David L. Hearn came from the MLR to assist in aiding for the injured. The Battalion’s Historical Diary for this date show, at 1800 H/3/1 reported 2 friendly WIA due to land mines. While a carrying party was bringing in these WIAs another mine was set off resulting in 2 friendly KIA and 9 friendly WIA.

Buddy Scott said that Capt. Ord wrote a report that Eike and Kleintop died as a direct disobedience of orders. It is not apparent from the report what orders they disobeyed. There was an investigation into the circumstance but the platoon leader, Lt. Daniel Smith, and others were cleared of negligence.

Cpl L’Heureux was being rotated back to the U.S.A. Cpl Stroman was being evacuated to A Med. so Cpl Scott became the 1st Squad Leader and Gunner.

MONDAY, APRIL 7, 1952

Lt. Smith, the Mortar Section Leader, moved to a new position. Sgt. Menard, now at OP Bronco, helped pack PFC Eike and bud's (??Buddy Scott??) gear, and took over the CP in Lt. Smith's absence.

Sgt Russell “Comanche” K. Poulk was dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1952

About this time each Marine was getting a quart of Asahi beer a day. Since Sgt Tinkey was becoming a "short timer" he was not allowed to go on many patrols.

A deer stepped on a mine in front of the line. One of the squads went out got him,
and had a deer roast on the reverse slope. The word got out and they had many uninvited dinner guests.

The Mortar Section (and probably the rest of the Company) was still laying barbed wire in front of their positions.

PFC Aniello B. Monti Jr. was dropped from the Company.

Col. Walter N. Flournoy relieved Col. Sidney S. Wade as CO of the 1st Marines.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 1952

Sgt Menard made a trip back to supply point which was back at the MLR for beer. Later in the day he started on a new positions and bunkers on the MLR.

THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 1952

2nd Lt. Virgil Price, an April replacements, landed at Inchon with the nineteenth replacement draft. After a four-hour wait, he rode on a train that went through Yungdung-po, Seoul, and other smaller towns to get to the Munsan-ni railhead. Virgil had never seen so many children. They were abundant at every town and village the train passed. At Munsan-ni the replacements drew ammunition and got aboard trucks for further travel to a training area.

The nineteenth replacement draft suffered their first casualties on this trip. A truck driver that was said to have been at the wheel for over forty eight hours with no sleep or rest dozed off and ran off the road. His truck rolled over into a ravine and resulted in several of the troops being killed or injured.

Upon arrival at their destination, Virgil was introduced to Asahi Beer. It tasted good so he got reintroduced a second time.

2nd Lt. Richard "Dick" Reed was also in the 19th replacement draft. He was one of several newly-minted 2nd lieutenants who volunteered for Korea after completing the Seventh Special Basic Course at Quantico, VA in Nov. 1951. After several month in the field at Camp Pendleton, and being snowed-in at cold weather training at Pickle Meadow, he shipped out on the USS Weigh. Dick had taken the same trip from Inchon to the 1st Marine Division area.

on before Easter in April '52.

Sgt Menard continued to work on the new positions on the MLR all day. He ate dinner on the MLR. Some of the Mortar Section got a little tanked up. Lt. Smith broke the water Crock.

The Battalion Historical diary shows, at 2140 H/3/1 called mortars on an enemy bunker at coordinates 066099 resulting in an estimated 4 enemy KIA. They Company also called in mortar fire on enemy personnel observed in the open.

PFC Fausting Prezioso was dropped from the Company.

Several of the men were dropped from H/3/1 because they were being rotated back to the U.S.A. The include:

PFC Robert W. Dunne
Sgt. Johnny G. Foster
Sgt George F. Ga?rttner
PFC Kenneth H. Johnson
Sgt Charles Josephson
Cpl James H. Kavanagh
Cpl Alvin L. Kear (Ryan)
Cpl Adrian "Lash" A. L’Heureux
Sgt Lawrence Lilyroth
Sgt Victor Novak Jr.
Cpl Ralph C. Olson
Cpl Salvador Pena
Sgt Harry W. Reasoner
Cpl Anthony J. Rome
PFC Herbert R. Ronan
Sgt David Sanguinetti
PFC Robert G. Scherer
Cpl John S. Schonleber
Sgt Jerome Shoeless Schulist
Sgt Frederick Schuman
Cpl Ernest “Ernie”“Steve” O. Severson
Cpl Dennis Semrau
Cpl Norman W. Shilling
Cpl Gordon S. Sledge
Cpl Carl J. Stephens
Cpl James M. Tucker
Cpl Jack E. Vance
Cpl Robert C. Whalen
Lt. Col. Carlo A. Rovetta relieved Lt. Col. Spencer H. Pratt as CO of the 3/1. When Virgil Price, Dick Reed, and the others arrived they were behind the lines and slept on folding cots in squad tents at Battalion. They weren't too far behind the lines because they could hear the sounds of outgoing artillery and mortars. The devastation of war was evident. Everything was torn up. There was nothing left standing except shells of the sturdiest buildings and places that had been rebuilt. Koreans had been evacuated from the area except for a hand full of laborers.

The officer’s mess was about a hundred yards away in another tent where there were real dishes, plastic tablecloths, and good messmen. They even had a movie screen across the road but they were showing "Hong Kong" and Virgil couldn't stomach that again. The greatest discomfort was the dust. Every truck's movement kicked up a cloud of dust and with all the truck and jeeps running around Virgil could hardly breath.

The action at the front was light with hardly any casualties, perhaps because the peace treaty area, Panmunjom, was right in the middle of the Division's front. They were in a "static defense" mode with no one going out on patrols or attacking. They just lay in wait for the enemy probes. Both sides were throwing big stuff (artillery, mortars, etc) back and forth.

The training for new replacements lasted for about five days. After that, Virgil would be sent to the front to join H/3/1. They were to relieve a Canadian unit. While most of Lt. Dick Reed’s peers seemed to get immediate postings as platoon leaders replacing casualties or those rotated to the rear, he languished at 3/1 for some weeks. He had a collection of not-very-stimulating rear echelon duties at battalion while trying to gain a meeting with the Battalion Commander. The Battalion underwent a change-of-command ceremony when Lt. Col. Gerald T. Armitage relieved Lt. Col. Carlo A. Rovetta on May 2nd. This further delayed his meeting with the Battalion CO. Finally, he got through to the CO and learned he was being held in the CP "...in case we captured a Chinese prisoner...Lt. Reed could interrogate him." Col. Armitage was disappointed to learn that, despite the fact that Lt. Reed had been born in China, and had been assigned a secondary MOS of 0271 (Chinese Language Interpreter/Interrogator/Translator), he had no significantly useful residual knowledge of the language. Col. Armitage agreed to give Lt. Reed the next available Platoon Leader's billet. This would be about May 26th when he joined H/3/1.

Sgt Menard continued to work on the new positions until 1600 when it began raining.

Sgt Menard fixed the front of the bunker he was working on by name it "Castle Rock" in large letters. He also received a letter from home, his mother.

PFC Ralph C. Curry Jr., Harvey Lambert Jr., and PFC Olin J. J. MacMillan were dropped from the Company.

Sgt Menard went to Mass at Battalion, four miles to the rear. He had the watch at 2300 tonight.

PFC Leo Bowie Jr. was dropped from the Company.

At 0800 H/3/1 started relief of an outpost of the Royal Canadian Regiment at 092093 (about 700 yards WSW of Hill 111) and completed the relief at 1045. This action extended the Battalions sector of responsibility on the right.

Sgt Menard finished digging some holes and was promoted to right Guide of the Mortar Section.
During this day H/3/1, and the other organic companies of the Battalion, reported to Battalion receiving 76mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortar fire.

Things change! Just after finishing the bunker, "Castle Rock", Sgt Menard had the KSC Laborers tear it down and move the timbers to a new position.

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

1st Plt. Ldr Virgil Price (joined)
2nd Plt. Corpsman C. Reed "Doc" Carpenter
(Left for medical lab at 1st CSG at Mason)
3rd Plt. Ldr 2nd Lt. Richard "Dick" Reed (joined)

Lt Reed had been at Battalion for about a month and was now being transferred to H/3/1 about this date.

At 2325 I/3/1's outpost at coordinates 062080 (300 yards NW of Hill 119), was overrun by 75-100 Chinese.

At 2400 all companies of the Battalion reported they were still receiving many rounds of artillery and mortar fire of all types.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 16, 1952

Between 0015-0103 five WIA from the I/3/1 overrun OP at coordinates 062080 straggled back to the MLR. Enemy fire continued to be heavy for all companies in the Battalion. Friendly mortar fire caused the enemy to vacate the OP. At 1425 a friendly patrol reached the overrun OP and found four friendly KIAs (one remained MIA) and one enemy WIA. The enemy was transported back to the MLR but died reroute.

The Mortar Section moved into their new positions and registered their guns in on three concentrations. Registering guns on a concentration consists of shooting mortars on a selected area and then setting up aiming stakes near the gun. This is done with the coordination of the gun crew how is firing and a forward observer that can see where the mortars land. In this way they only need to aim at the stake (aiming stake) near the gun to cause the mortars to drop on a specific area. This is a very effective way of targeting enemy at night when you knew where they are but can not see them because of the darkness. A sock with a light is put over the aiming stake for night firing. When concentrations are accurate, a mortar section can effectively cover, or box-in, a given area.

More rain today. Sgt Menard had to go to the Company CP to sign his fitness report.

THURSDAY, APRIL 17, 1952

Sgt Menard spent his day building the new ammo bunker, carrying ammo from the supply point to the new positions, and filling sand bags for the bunker.

Corpsmen E3 Frank Castro Jr., E3 Garth D. Hansen, E4 Carl R. Havighorst, E4 James E. Jones, and E4 Howard J. Seay left the Company.

FRIDAY, APRIL 18, 1952

Some interesting things happened about this date. A 3rd Platoon Marine named Cpl Charles A. Lane who was from Texas had become friendly with the British and Canadian troops on the Company’s right flank. Although Lane was a rifleman he had some Texan pals in the Mortar Section. Lane learned the Canadians had obtained some .45 caliber pistols but were unable to obtain .45 caliber ammunition. Lane knew that the mortar men had .45 pistols and plenty of .45 ammo. He also learned that the British and Canadian had a good supply of grog. Lane worked up the deal where the mortar men would meet the Canadians and exchange .45 ammo for grog. Several exchanges were made and everyone had a good time.

Lane also did some trading for some Canadian or British hand grenades. They were the types that one could screw together to get a bigger explosion. Lane on the MLR, would call Buddy Scott on Bronco, 1100 yard away. Lane told Scott he was going to throw some of the grenades at 1000 at night. He wanted to see if Scott could hear the explosion at his location. Scott could hear the explosions but lied and told Lane, "It must not be too big
of an explosion because I didn’t hear it”.

About this same date Capt. Ord was also trading with the Canadians. He obtained several British beret-type “Tam” caps. The kind where one side can be pulled down almost over the ear. He obtained enough for all of the Officers in the Company. His was red and he got green caps for the other officers. On special occasions Capt. Ord would get on the phone and invite the Officers to the Company CP at a certain time (e. g., at 1400) for a “spot of tea”. They would set around and BS and listen to a Marine (from the South) play the guitar.

Sgt Menard was up at 1100 and coordinated the firing on concentration #1. He had his troops put a dirt roof on a bunker for overhead protection and then had a phone (probably EE8) installed.

At 1355 H/3/1 observed twelve enemy in the open at coordinates 071097 and called down 81mm mortar fire resulting in three estimated KIA and six estimated WIA.

SATURDAY, APRIL 19, 1952

It was a miserable day. It rained, sleeted, snowed, and then rained again all day and all night. It wasn't too cold but everything was muddy and messy. Virgil found that the bunker he was staying in leaked and it didn't take long for SSgt Johnnie Neely, Murphy, and himself to get soaking wet.

Sgt Menard got up at 1400 and received his first package and two letters from home. He went to chow with Sgt Woodbury "Woody" Phillips.

SUNDAY, APRIL 20, 1952

Officers usually didn't stand watch but there were only five persons in the 1st Platoon CP group including Lt. Virgil Price who stood his watch between 0200 and 0400. He stayed up after his watch rather than getting back in his wet sleeping bag. Even two hour watches are pretty long when alone in a hole in the ground covered by steal beams, cardboard, and layers of sandbags with only a couple of telephones for company.

The others in the 1st Platoon had it even rougher because they had to stand 50% watches at all times and then automatically go to 100% if they received any incoming mortar or artillery fire. Actually the guys worked damned hard considering the sleep and chow they got. Surprisingly, morale was pretty high.

Another thing that slowed work a lot was the firing of our own mortar and artillery concentrations. About three hours a day was used for test firing to make sure supporting arms could throw rounds anywhere they wanted them. During this firing all the men had to stay in their bunkers because some of the concentrations came in pretty close.

Marines on line didn't eat on any set schedule. They just cooked and ate when they got hungry. Some even cut down to one big meal a day. Occasionally the 1st Platoon would get eggs and fresh bread to supplement their C-rations. The bread is baked behind the lines in a field bakery and it is pretty good. Lt. Curt Gager had some bacon that he had "confiscated" from a mess hall back in a rest camp. This really added something to breakfast this morning. They also made toast over the gas stove by holding the bread over the flames.

The weather cleared up today and Virgil got his sleeping bag dried out.

About this date Lt. Gentry, the 2nd Platoon Leader, was called to the CP where Capt. Ord informed him that the 1/1 was relieving them on the right flank and the platoon’s positions would be changed. The days of H/3/1 being the show-case were to end in four days. Gentry’s position had been inspected by the Battalion Commander, Regimental Commander (Col. Sidney Wade), the new Regimental Commander (Col. Walter Flournoy), the new Assistant Division Commander (Bgen. Merrill Twining), and the Division CG (Gen. John Seldon).

It was the visit of Gen. Seldon that caused George Gentry to remove his mustache. All of the Company officers had mustaches but none as professional as Capt. Ord. George had also clipped off all his hair to be on the safe side of lice carried by rats in the bunkers. He did look a little funny when he removed his helmet but his hair had grown back
some by the day of Gen. Seldon’s visit. The XO, Lt. Tony Messina told George that Gen. Seldon was against wearing mustaches by any of his officers, especially the junior officers. After greeting so many senior officers, George had no awe of them anymore but he decided to heed Tony’s warning and shaved off his mustache. When Capt. Ord saw George without a mustache he questioned why he had shaved it off. He accepted George’s answer but said he would not shave his mustache for anyone. General Seldon was about to give him a chance.

The General and his staff arrived bright and early for the ten dollar tour, as they called it. He spoke to many of the men and viewed the front from the trenches. He questioned Gentry on the actions he would take in a general situations and appeared to be satisfied with the answers. As they returned to the Platoon CP they met the Canadian Liaison team. Gen. Seldon turned to Capt. Ord and said, “Jim, you know I don’t like mustaches. Would you shave yours off if I asked you?” Without a blink of the eye Capt. Ord replied, “No sir, not without a direct order.” Gentry waited for the order but none was forthcoming so Jim’s mustache remained. Other Lieutenants like Curt Gager, Jim Canelo, and George Hubbard avoided being seen so kept theirs too.

Sgt Menard got up early and went to the 1st Platoon CP at 0630 where he worked on a bunker. After working on the bunker he washed up in a stream and went to TSgt Clarence Dotson, the Supply Sergeant, to pick up the mail and beer for his section.

MONDAY, APRIL 21, 1952

Virgil stood his 0400 to 0600 this morning. He would have the 1900 to 2200 watch again this evening.

Virgil Price was out of stationary but the PX Gods smiled upon him this day. Some of his 1st Platoon Marines were at Battalion waiting to pick up barbed wire when a PX truck made its rare appearance at Battalion this morning. One of them bought some stationary for Virgil.

Now if only the beer ration would arrive. Virgil had been bumming off the men every since arriving and wanted to pay his debt. Lt. (Jim) Earl Lester Valentine, artillery FO with the 1st Platoon, gave Virgil two quarts of Asahi beer on this date. He understood they were to get stateside beer this time instead of Asahi beer. Most would rather have the Asahi beer because it is damn good and you get more for the money.

On this day Virgil relieved Curt Gager and officially became the 1st Platoon Leader. Curt stayed around a few days to advise Virgil but then was to become the Assistant XO of H/3/1. Virgil was wishing he had another squad with three more BARs or A-6 machineguns. Hopefully he would get some extra men when the 20th draft arrived next month. The Platoon's main job at this time was working on barb wire, bunkers, and fighting holes on an outpost called Bronco.

H/3/1 was assigned 34 additional KSCs (Korean Laborers) to haul gear. But this won't reduce the 25-man detail the 1st Platoon had to send back to the MLR each day to pack barbwire out to Bronco. It just didn't seem fair when the men had all their other responsibilities.

Lt. Jim Canelo arrived at Bronco, a few hundred yards in front of the MLR, to look over the positions. Virgil thought this might indicate that the 3rd Platoon, on the MLR, might be relieving Virgil’s 1st Platoon on Bronco in the near future. Virgil thought one was about as safe as the other. Virgil thought the work of getting wire laid was slow and all the added details (maintaining positions, keeping up morale, administrative duties, etc.) might give him a new growth of ulcers before going home.

Virgil didn't get any mail from his wife, Barbara, on Saturday or Sunday but he got three today. As usual, they really made his day. When he wrote home today he asked his wife to send some salt, black pepper, garlic, and a few onions to spice the C-rations. In response to Barbara's questions, he told her that his platoon had radios but dead batteries. When they had good batteries, there were two good Armed Forces Radio Stations in Pusan that came in loud and clear. He kept pretty well informed by regular receipt of the Stars and Stripes, the Armed Forces daily, although it was usually a couple weeks old by the time it arrived.
Virgil said his mustache was coming along quite well. It was all over his face. No one on Bronco shaved and he didn't want to be different. He did have a set of clean clothes but, without a laundry to send them to, he wanted to save them for a special occasion.

A machine gunner was sick with chills and fever and sent back to Battalion. They told Virgil that he would be replaced tomorrow by (sounded like) Marco Polo.

The phone lines went out during the night. The Capt. Ord was concerned but Virgil set up the radio and kept contact with the company throughout the night.

Sgt Menard had eggs and buttered toast for breakfast and made three trips to supply to pick up materials. The Mortar Section held gun drill.

2nd Lt. Daniel Smith, the Mortar Section Leader was dropped from the Company. There was no Officer to replace him so the Staff NCOs were in charge of the section.
Nelson repaired the phone lines that went out last night.

This was a busy day for the 1st Platoon Leader. In addition to his regular duties, Virgil had to show two captains from Battalion around his lines in the morning. At noon he had to meet with the Catholic Chaplain. Capt. Ord also told Virgil he was relieving his Platoon at Bronco with the 3rd Platoon. Virgil spent the rest of the afternoon showing Lt. Jim Canelo, the 3rd Platoon Leader, around all the holes and bunkers on Bronco.

While all this was taking place a Marine Corsairs was making a bombing and strafing strike on hills to the left front of Bronco. It was a pretty sight. Shortly after this, the enemy hurled a few mortar shells on the forward slopes of Bronco. Our observers spotted their muzzle blasts and called 4.2s and artillery in on them.

Meanwhile, back at the MLR, Sgt Menard and Sgt Phillips went to the 1st Platoon area to look over the concentrations (ensure our mortars were landing in the proper place). Sgt Menard later washed up and received new dungarees and skivies.

Cpl Stroman returned from A Med where he had been recovering from shrapnel wounds since April 6th.

In the Mortar Section:
MSgt Edward Clark became the Section Leader of the Mortar Section.
Cpl Leo Stroman, who had been evacuated to A Med. on April 6th returned to the Mortar Section.
Sgt Menard got some new dungarees (probably from and exchange at the shower unit) and received a box from home.
A squad of the 3rd Platoon relieved one squad or the 1st Platoon on Bronco.
Sgt Billy F. Ryburn was dropped from the Company.

On this day the rest of the 1st Platoon was replaced by the 3rd Platoon on OP Bronco. The 1st Platoon moved back to man the MLR. Their new position was on H/3/1's left front. They had good living quarters and their closer positions enabling them to provide a better defense than they could on Bronco. Soon after their arrival on the MLR, new orders came to pack up and stand by to move to another position. The orders were vague, tentative, and not for sure. Another of those hurry up and wait situations. Virgil had managed to obtain a radio, but no batteries yet.

The 1st Platoon now had one section of machineguns manning four light machineguns and a section of heavy machineguns. They had gotten rid of the 75mm recoilless rifle section and the anti-tank and rocket sections.
The Mortar Section was also told to pack their gear but never got the word to move out so they made good use of their time ("got shit faced" in the terms of those day). Sgt Menard took pictures at the Mortar Section's party.
John W. Alberts who had left H/3/1 on Feb. 23rd is KIA. His was in W/3/1 at the time of his death.

The 3rd Platoon no sooner got to Bronco when they were also told to pull back to the MLR, and abandon the outpost. Guess what this meant. You got it. All those rolls of barb wire, stakes, and logs that were hauled out to Bronco would have to be hauled back. All Companies were ordered to withdraw from the OPLR under the cover of darkness. It appears that from now on, the outposts would only be manned during the daylight hours by patrols sent from the MLR. The Battalion had moved to a new position, at coordinates 094058 and they set up a Battalion OP at 084066.

Lt. Gentry with two rifle squads of the 2nd Platoon and a light machine gun squad
were assigned to relieve the Canadians (RCR) on outpost Royal. This was the site that Capt. Ord had visited when he got the idea of putting "tangle-foot" wire in front of the trenches. Royal was about one mile in front of the MLR and east of OP Bronco. 1/1 which had moved to the east of 3/1 was manning an outpost east of Royal. One of the main functions of Royal was to act as a blocking area for any enemy tanks that might move south. The Canadians left an excellent cite for the 2nd Platoon with many extra hand grenades which Lt. Gentry thought were much better than U. S. grenades. Gentry enjoyed his tour on Royal.

Sgt Menard held a field day in his bunker and was presented some flowers by Cpl Leo.

SATURDAY, APRIL 26, 1952

The plan of action now called for patrols and ambushes at night in the vicinity of the abandoned outpost, Bronco. The 1st Platoon was catching this duty every other night besides manning their present position on the MLR, Hill 92. They caught the first patrol on this date.

This morning the 1st Platoon had to leave at 0330 to get in position before daylight. Virgil took his Assistant Platoon Sgt, a runner (to man the radio on the way out and the sound power phone after getting to Bronco), one rifle squad, and a machinegun squad. They also took artillery and mortar FOs to Nellie, a hill immediately behind Bronco. The FOs were there in case Bronco was occupied by the enemy and they needed to call fire on them. After the 1st Platoon occupied Bronco, the FOs were brought up. Their primary mission was to salvage everything possible in the way of wire, sandbags, metal stakes, logs, etc. They really worked hard this day. Virgil figures they saved stateside taxpayers $100,000 on this day alone.

At 2120 H/3/1 observed two enemy at coordinates 085090. Small arms were fired and the enemy withdrew. They were ready for any interference that came up. Virgil had his 45 with 35 rounds and a carbine with 120 rounds as did SSgt Neely and his runner, Keith. The machinegun had 1,750 rounds besides personal weapons (pistols, carbines, and Thompsons) and ammo carried by each of the eight machinegun ammo bearers. The rifle squad had three BARs with 180 rounds each, eight M1s with 72 rounds each, a carbine with 120 rounds plus a corpsman with a carbine and 120 rounds. Mortars and artillery support and, with the radio, Virgil could also call in an air strike. If this wasn't enough, he could get the help of two squads of the 2nd Platoon and attaching units to the left or a squad of the 3rd Platoon plus attached units just a few hundred yards behind them on the MLR. The greater danger was those damn mines and having to follow those trails in the dark. At least this night they had a new moon that would be with them for a while.

When they got back Lt. Virgil Price managed to get a battery for his radio. It was late, 0200 (the morning of the 27th) in the morning before he got time to write home to his wife Barbara. He was also listening to a recorded program that had Benny Goodman's "Jazz at Carnegie Hall Concert" with such songs as "It was just one of those things", "Avalon", and "I'll walk alone". He signed off his letter by saying he was going to sleep late in the morning.

The Mortar Section received their new beer ration and managed to steel an extra case from the Executive Officer, Lt. Tony Messina. Sgt Menard improved the camouflaged on his bunker and then wrote a couple letters.

Cpl Herbert E. Williams was dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, APRIL 27, 1952

Capt. Ord woke up Virgil at 0600. So much for catching up on lost sleep. Battalion was going to fire artillery and 4.2mm, 81mm, and 60mm mortars for new registration. The CO wanted Virgil to get all his troops off the forward slopes because they were going to fire artillery concentrations in close. After getting this accomplished, Virgil went back to sleep only to be woke up with the report that a round had dropped short.

The round fell in the area where the 2nd Squad was digging new bunkers. It set off a

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five-gallon gas can that burned them out completely. Virgil spent the rest of the day getting them new gear and setting up for Monday's scheduled ambush. He did manage to get a few hours sleep before his 0200-0400 watch and leaving for Bronco early Monday Morning.

Sgt Menard washed, shaved and wrote home while he made some soup. Later in the day he attended Mass at 1500 and then ate chow at Battalion.

MONDAY, APRIL 28, 1952

It was a miserable day on Bronco. It rained all day and, since all of the bunkers were torn down, everyone got soaking wet and was in terrible shape by the time they returned to the MLR in the evening.

When they got back, Virgil found that his new home leaked like a sieve so they tried to fix it before going to sleep. It didn't leak too much over Virgil's sack so he made out okay but the other guys in his bunker were dripped on all night.

With no reason to leave his bunker, Sgt Menard stayed there until late afternoon when he attended a party with nine other in another bunker.

TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 1952

Virgil had the 0400-0600 watch in the morning, after which he went back to sleep. He was awakened at 0900 by the 3rd Platoon, which was on patrol to Bronco. One of our artillery rounds had landed short and wounded one of their men. It wasn't too serious but they took him out by helicopter anyway. This is probably the incident reported in the Battalion's Historical Diary as a WIA from enemy fire.

Virgil had a good breakfast. He opened a can of sausage patties and fried them with some eggs and an onion he had managed to acquire. This he topped off with a big cup of pineapple juice and some jam on bread.

SSgt. Neely happened to be at supply when the mail arrived and got Virgil's letters for him. This circumvented the system, which would have caused a one-day's delay before they would normally get down to the 1st Platoon.

In the afternoon, while Virgil was writing a letter home, he received a call saying the Battalion Commander was going to be in the area. He cut the letter short to insuring his area was in good police and his men were wearing helmets and carrying their weapons.

Virgil had the 1900-2200 watch in the evening.

In the Mortar Section, Sgt Menard received four haircutters from supply. Cpl James Farber caught two snakes. One measured five and one half feet and the other was six feet long. Cpl Leo Stroman made his sack for Capt. Ord's visit/inspection.

PFC William M. Ahearn who was in the 1st Squad, 3rd Platoon was WIA by a short artillery round. He had shrapnel in the hip and spine. He was evacuated and did not return to the Company.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 1952

The 1st Platoon made another patrol to Bronco. This was an every-other-day event for a while. Virgil returned early because he had a meeting with Capt. Ord.

Virgil received three letters from his wife and one from his father-in-law. The last one was dated April 24th. Six days was about the norm for a letter to come from home.

Since Sgt. Robert C. Murray the Platoon Guide didn't have any family or love affiliations to write to and receive letters from, a Good Samaritan in the platoon decided to play Cupid. He had sent a "lonesome serviceman letter" to a paper in Dayton, OH and signed Murray's name. Murray received 50 letters in one bunch from high school girls, preachers, old women, widows, etc. Murray kept the Platoon in stitches all day reading parts of letters aloud. One widow sent a picture of herself and, to say the least, she wasn't Murray's type. Murray now had a new name, Lover. It would take some time for him to live this down. He started looking for the guy that sent the letter to the paper and signed his name.

The radio reception wasn't very good, probably because of the weather. However they
did hear a few programs that starred Jack Benny and Phil Harris.

A number of Marines were sent to Seoul for rest and relaxation. They were told the reason was because May 1st was a Chinese or communist holiday (May Day) and there was concern that something might happen in Seoul. They wanted troops available in Seoul should they be needed. Cpl Jack E. Hook and Sgt Mike Tinkey were sent from the 2nd platoon. They stayed in the Chosin Hotel. It was I Corp’s rest center for “battle weary Marines”. Apparently they enjoyed the hot showers, meals and beer-garden. They were ordered to be armed at all times. Outside of the Rest Center, the place was a mess and the stench was unpleasant to say the least.

The Mortar Section turned in their carbines and cut hair all day. Sgt Menard got a package from home that contained shots and a book.

THURSDAY MAY 1, 1952

Intelligence was expecting the Chinese to celebrate May Day with an attack on U.S. positions. Thousands of artillery rounds and rockets were fired throughout the night to thwart the anticipated Chinese attack. PFC John Lammers watched the fireworks all night and ducked in his bunker when short rounds exploded.

The Battalion CO, Lt. Col. Carlo Rovetta, informally inspected the Mortar Section. After taking a dip and washing clothes in a stream, Sgt Menard made a chow run with Ritch (perhaps Cpl Steve Richards) and Cpl Leo Stroman.

FRIDAY, MAY 2, 1952

PFC John Lammers obtained some ammo boxes and fabricated a table and chairs outside his bunker. This would be where he and his fire team ate chow. John was holding the job of a fire team leader and was hoping to get promoted to the rank of the position (Cpl). His problem was that he had a radio MOS (2500) and he was doing an infantryman's job.

Lt. Col. Gerald T. Armitage relieved Lt. Col. Carlo A. Rovetta as CO of the 3/1. He was one of the first visitors to outpost Royal that was not a Company officer. The Col. had taught Lt. Gentry “Company in the Night Attack” at Basic School in Quantico. The Col. acted like he remembered Lt. Gentry for the basic class. He told PFC Bobby Freeman’s machine gun squad that he would send them a case of beer if they could kill fifty Chinese that were verified by Lt. Gentry. It was a moral Booster for the whole outpost. The verification kept Lt. Gentry on call any hour of the day and night.

The new Regimental CO, Lt. Col. Armitage, informally inspected the Mortar Section. After this visit, Sgt Menard constructed a wash stand. He also took his M1 to the Supply Sgt (T Sgt Clarence Dotson) to get a replacement.

It rained in the afternoon.

SATURDAY, MAY 3, 1952

Sgt. Tinkey and Cpl Hook returned from their brief R & R in Seoul.
Sgt Menard visited the other mortar positions with Sgt "Woody" Phillips. After this visit he took a dip in the stream and cleaned his .45, M1, and carbine.

SUNDAY, MAY 4, 1952

Sgt Menard was told that he would be going to Staff School next in about a week. He wrote home and had the last watch.

One night in May a sentry reported a Chinese had penetrated our wire on outpost Royal and jumped into the trench line. Lt. Gentry was awakened from a sound sleep and initiated a search. They did a thorough search during the late hours of the night and early morning. They could not find the reported intruder.

MONDAY, MAY 5, 1952
Sgt Menard lost his gold cross that he wore around his neck. After fixing the table in the bunker and other things, he made a chow run with Rich (possibly Cpl Steve Richardson). A C/1/1 patrol was ambushed.

TUESDAY, MAY 6, 1952

Lt. Gentry left OP Royal to take a sponge bath in a creek at the base of the hill. This was a task that he required of all his men at least once a week. There were no showers available and clean men were freer of infections. As Lt. Gentry was taking off his first boot, a Marine AD (observation plane) aircraft surprised him by flying low over OP Royal. As Gentry turned his head to the north he could see a large cloud of black smoke on the other side of the OP. A muffled noise followed in a moment so he knew something was happening.

Lt. Gentry put on his boot and began to move carefully to the other side of the OP. The plane had crashed a hundred yards north of their position. As Gentry began to cross the nearest rice paddy, a fire from the crash began to cook-off fifty caliber ammunition that was in the plane. He took refuge in a low area of the rice paddy for about ten minutes. In the meantime, troops from the 1/1 began to come toward the crash site. Lt. Gentry anticipated the Chinese would take advantage of this situation to catch some of the Marines out in the open so he grabbed the NCO from the 1/1 patrol and ordered him back to their own area. The 1/1 patrol complied and Chinese mortars soon began falling near the site about two minutes later. They were too late to help the pilot who failed to bail out because of the low altitude.

Sgt Menard also recalls the downed plane event happening on this day. The Company was still on C-rations. The word was that Captain Ord wanted to break the record of the length of time a company was on C-rations. The record was 87 days and H/3/1 stayed on them for 92 days. Sgt Tinkey thanks his lucky stars that he was with the Canadians a couple of weeks and in Seoul a few days with hot meals at both locations.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 7, 1952

Sgt Menard went to Battalion to scrounge some gear and to get into his sea bag. He met TSgt Paul Wolf at Battalion and got a ride with him back to the Company supply point.

THURSDAY, MAY 8, 1952

The beer ration came and this was a lazy day for the Mortar Section. Something was up; possibly either an inspection (informal visit) or an alert because there was no swimming and everyone had to have their TO weapons with them. They also had to wear their flak jackets, and leggings.

FRIDAY, MAY 9, 1952

Sgt Menard's diary shows that the Company sent 120 men on a raiding party to Hill 173. One mortar squad, which included Sgt. Menard, accompanied the raid and the raid was successful. Lt. Gentry's notes also reflect the below activities on this night. Perhaps they are the same incident or there may have been two different actions on this night.

The only patrol that originated from Royal was against the recommendations of Lt. Gentry and Capt. Ord. Battalion or Regiment operations made the decision. It was an ambush patrol.

Lt. Gentry took a rifle squad, a radioman, and a corpsman to accompany him on the patrol to a crite where they might ambush Chinese line-crossers. An hour after dark they made their way out of the rear of the outpost, staying clear of the mine fields, and began a slow movement to the northwest. They suspected the line crossers were coming from that general direction. After traveling about a mile, Lt. Gentry designated the ambush site, deployed his men, and waited. It was bad enough to be roaming in unfriendly territory during the day, but night is worse since their minefields were unknown and visible evidence.
of mines could not be seen.

Time went slowly as all eyes peered into the darkness and ears were sensitive to any unusual noises. Every thirty minutes Lt. Gentry was required to report to Company that they were still in place and any activity.

SATURDAY, MAY 10, 1952

At 0100 Lt. Gentry requested orders to return the patrol to Royal which were given. He tapped the squad leader on the shoulder and quietly told him to begin retracing their steps back to outpost Royal. Lt. Gentry would cover the move with his M-1 carbine. The last man was supposed to tap Lt. Gentry on the shoulder before he departed the area.

Everything seemed to be going smoothly until Lt. Gentry turned around to see no one in sight. The patrol had left him alone in no-man's-land near the Chinese MLR. Lt. Gentry quickly moved out at a stooped run towards Royal. He stayed on the path hoping that it was the correct one. He never thought about the mines, only that he was alone. Within a few minutes he caught up with the patrol. He wanted to shout at the last man for leaving him behind but kept his wits until they got back inside outpost Royal.

Gathering the patrol in the CP bunker at about 0200, Lt. Gentry gave each a shot of Old Forester before they went to their own bunkers to get some rest. He told the squad leader what had happened and that he was not pleased. The squad leader had to bite his lip to keep from laughing since he understood the mentality of some of the men better than Lt. Gentry. Later, Sgt Meisner related to Lt. Gentry how funny the men thought it was to leave Lt. Gentry behind. The last man to leave stayed clear of Lt. Gentry for fear of retribution.

Sgt Menard returned from the patrol and hit the sack at about 0800 and was up again at 1300. Everyone had a late breakfast which included steak and eggs.

PFC Bobby Freeman's leadership pushed for excellence and got it. On this day Lt. Gentry verified the fifty kills.

SUNDAY, MAY 11, 1952

Sgt Menard departed for Staff NCO school at the Division HQ Battalion. The school would last for about a month and would include many formal classes, tests, inspections, problems, etc.

MONDAY, MAY 12, 1952

Sgt Menard's class was greeted by General Seldon's aid.

TUESDAY, May 13, 1952

The 3/1 Raider Platoon was organized on this day by Lt. Col. Gerald T. Armitage who was the Commanding Officer of 3/1. The platoon consisted of twenty Marines; a Platoon Leader, Lt. John Watson who had been H/3/1's 3rd Platoon Leader until he went on emergency leave on Mar. 10, 1952; a Platoon Sergeant MSgt Edward Clark (an Indian Chief) was H/3/1's Mortar Section Sergeant; and two nine man squads; William "Mace" Mason led one, and "Red Dog" Billy Goodman led the other. Lt. Col. Armitage called them the Raider Platoon. MSgt Clark was a former member of Col. "Red" Edson's 1st Raider Battalion on Guadalcanal, which is why Lt. Col. Armitage decided to name the Platoon the Raider Platoon.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 14, 1952

Hot meals started coming through and the Company was once again off C-rations. The 2nd Platoon was still on Bronco.

About this date D/2/1 relieved G/3/1 on H/3/1's left. Apparently H/3/1 had been volunteered to stay on line, attached to D/2/1, while the rest of the Battalion went into reserve.
THURSDAY, MAY 15, 1952

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

1st Plt. 2nd Sqd  Jerome Shoeless Schulist (left)
1st Plt. other    John "Jack" Sheard (left)
Robert L. "Bobby" Smith (joined)

A mine was set off in the so-called cleared area where H/3/1 was laying barbed wire. Two guys were scratched enough to put in for the Purple Heart and another got knocked out by the force of the blast but didn't get a scratch.

There were mines everywhere. M-3s, bouncing betties, and butterfly bombs that had been dropped from airplanes. You name it and they were there. When the Marines moved from the East Coast to the West Coast they relieved an ROK Division that was positioned across the Panmunjom corridor, a route that had been used twice before by the communists to invade South Korea. Virgil Price recalls that Marines had such a large front to cover that they had to resort to walking patrols along the trench-line instead of manning the foxholes in force.

In these first days in their new position, many Marine WIA and KIA resulted from these mines rather than from enemy fire. It was scary. You could see them everywhere, in the paddies, on the hills, wherever you looked. Engineers were assigned to all units to clear the mines but they just didn't have the time or the manpower to get them all. They did well to just clear the paths through the paddies and along the roads from which Marines soon learned not to venture. To do so, even in an effort to avoid incoming mortar or artillery fire, you knew your were exposing yourself to yet another danger.

During this night PFC John Lammers went on patrol. His four-man patrol left the MLR, circled a valley (called the Bowling Alley), and passed near some friendly outposts. He said in his letter that one of the outposts had been overrun shortly after they got back.

FRIDAY, MAY 16, 1952

Virgil Price described his day's activities in a letter he wrote to his wife on this date. It is herewith paraphrased to describe the activities of H/3/1.

This was one of the most hectic days since Virgil had been in Korea. He got up at 0330 and took a patrol out to OP Bronco, got into place, and set up without any trouble. As usual, he took his field glasses to the OP to look around. To his surprise, for the first time in over two weeks, he was able to see enemy troops. He called up a BAR man and had him fire a few bursts which made them dive for cover. He then had a machinegun set up to fire if any showed their heads again. They did and the gunners claimed at least two for sure. Nothing else happened so they secured about 0600 to come back to the MLR, after artillery observers got to the OP.

PFC Franklin Keith, the 1st Platoon Runner, and Virgil got back around 0800 and fixed breakfast. After breakfast Franklin went back to bed and Virgil stayed up to answer the phones. In his spare time, he was organizing the platoon's workday. T Sgt Robert Egan (the 1st Platoon Sgt.), Sgt. Russell Poulk, and Sgt Robert Murray (Machinegun 1st Section Leader) were having a cup of coffee with Virgil when the Company Gunny, MSgt Benjamin Hudson, came by with an engineer mine clearing detail. They were going to clear mines in the area where H/3/1 was laying barbed wire. Egan, who had been working with SSgt Neely, Assistant 1st Platoon Sgt., on the barbed-wire-laying detail, went along to see where they were clearing and to see where they wanted the barbed wire laid.

They hadn't been gone more than 15 minutes when Virgil heard an explosion. It doesn't take long to distinguish between explosion type when on line. It sounded like a mine. Virgil grabbed his helmet and .45 and ran up the hill to see what had happened. Keith was right behind him. He saw a body lying prone on the ground and engineers scrambling about. When Virgil learned that it was his Platoon Sgt., T Sgt Egan, he almost had a heart attack. It really hit him hard to know that something had happened to one whom he was just laughing and talking with. Especially since they were such close friends.

Somebody began yelling, "Corpsman", and Abbot, the Corpsman living in the 1st
Platoon's CP, and LaRue (possibly Adrian "Lash" L'Heureux, but he may have left before this date), the Company Corpsman, came on the double. As Virgil and Franklin got close to Egan, Franklin choked up and screamed, "He's dead Lieutenant. He's dead". Thank God, he wasn't.

Virgil said Egan was lucky. He had stepped right on an M-3 mine instead of hitting a trip wire. He mostly got the explosive effect and not the shrapnel. His right foot was blown off just above the ankle and was lying there still in his shoe. Some might think Egan was not so lucky in loosing a foot. But take into consideration that the last time Virgil knew of someone tripping an M-3 mine, two were killed and 11 wounded. The wounded included several leg and arm amputations so Virgil thinks Egan was lucky to be alive.

It just goes to show what can happen so unexpectedly. This is not the only casualty from this type of incident. Many others are wounded, maimed, and dead because of like occurrences. The mine Egan stepped on was in plain view. Virgil had seen it a number of times. In fact, he had pointed it out to Franklin Keith just an hour before when they were on their way back from Bronco. Egan knew about the mine and must have thought the engineers had already cleared the area. He just stumbled on the mine without looking. It is a terrible thing to happen. Hopefully, the men learned a lesson from it.

Virgil said, "When Sgt Poulk leaves it will be like losing my right arm, but with Egan gone, it feels like I have already lost it". SSgt Neely was elevated to the position of 1st Platoon Sgt.

Capt. Ord decided to have Egan evacuated by carrying his stretcher down the hill to a vehicle instead of having him helicopter-lifted to a hospital. This was a bumpy way to go that no doubt caused Egan some additional pain. In a moment of weakness, Virgil called Capt. Ord a, "Stupid Son of a Bitch", because of this decision. Although this was said in front of witnesses, Capt. Ord chose to neglect the comment instead of severely reprimanding Virgil. Capt. Ord possibly thought the presence of a helicopter might have invited additional incoming artillery and that the evacuation could be performed safer by vehicle. This comment by Virgil may have had an adverse effect to what one might have been expected from Capt. Ord. He never held this against Virgil and may have respected him more for the compassion and concern he had for his men.

After Egan was evacuated, Virgil, Murray, and Poulk visited D/2/1 who had relieved G/3/1 on their left about two days earlier. They wanted to see how they were tying in with H/3/1. They also scrounged some beer from them to tide them over until Virgil's beer ration arrived. They shot the bull with D/2/1 until D/2/1 had to shove off to try to take back their OP, Hill 190.5, which the gooks had occupied during the previous night. Hill 190.5 as the nearest Hill to Bronco, about 1,500 yards to the left. Hill 190.5 overlook Bronco, which was only 110 feet (or meters) high. D/2/1 had eight wounded and didn't retake Hill 190.5 on this day. Most of the eight casualties came from incoming artillery. Virgil recalls they also had a lot of artillery incoming. More than the total they had since moving to their present position.

SSgt Neely, at Bronco, called up early in the afternoon saying they were short on ammo so Virgil sent a detail of KSC laborers out with some ammo for them. Virgil went along taking Sgt Poulk his sniper's rifle. He also took Williams, Renick, and Wilkins with BARs and Cpl Charles A. Lane with his M1. He wanted to see if he could assist D/2/1 in retaking Hill 190.5. Virgil spotted an enemy Artillery FO and had Renick and Miller keep him pinned down. He also spotted a machinegun position and had it fired upon. Virgil also called in a few rounds of 155mm artillery on the suspected OP. During the fight, he watched an air strike in which one of our planes was shot down. He recalls that the gooks must have had plenty of ack-ack guns because the flak around those planes was so thick it reminded him of pictures of air raids on London during WWII.

They secured their position at Bronco after dark to come back to their homes in the ground. But not before they were shook up by a report that the enemy had been seen between them and their MLR position. They left Bronco expecting to have to fight their way back but only saw a couple of pheasants on the return trip.

Capt. Ord stayed on the phone practically all night expecting an attack. Every rattle of the bushes in front of them was showered by mortar and artillery fire. The big searchlights behind them lit up the sky like daylight all night. They were ordered to stay in their bunkers/holes so as not to be silhouetted by the lights. Morning came without an
enemy offensive. Virgil remembers he couldn't get out to relieve himself of the beer he had drunk. Daylight was a happy sight. Virgil ran out, untied the string and everything came out all right.

SATURDAY, MAY 17, 1952

Early in the morning Lt. Jim Canelo's patrol went out to Bronco and back without incident. Virgil thought the enemy didn't want their positions because of its low elevation. He sure was hoping D/2/1 would get back their position because the enemy was looking down their throat and had good FO positions to call artillery in on H/3/1. Virgil accompanied Capt. Ord during an inspection tour in the morning.

While Virgil was at chow a short round from friendly artillery landed about twenty yards from his Platoon's CP. It really shook the guys that were there but no one was hurt except Capt. Ord. He was several hundred yards away at the "piss tube" in front of his bunker relieving himself when the shell hit. He was nicked by a piece of shrapnel. He would receive a Purple Heart for this wound. The shell did do a lot of damage to the Platoon CP area to include: ripping holes in the top of their patio cover, knocking down the bunker door, ripping up SSgt Neely's sleeping bag that was out sunning, and spraying the area with large chunks of metal. It left a hole so big that, if they were into construction, they could scoop up the loose dirt and with a few logs, stakes, and sandbags build a bunker.

H/3/1 got paid this day and Virgil drew $60. He donated $5 to the Navy Relief and paid his debts. The rest was enough for his beer and whiskey rations until next payday. He would later receive a check of $170 from this payday that he would send home to his wife Barbara.

Lt. Curtis "Curt" Gager, the person Virgil relieved as 1st Platoon Leader was going to take over duties as the Regimental S-3 Officer. Curt had been serving as the Assistant Company Executive Officer. Before he left, he pulled a switch on the going away present stuff and gave Virgil three fifths of VO. Virgil passed them on to the squads in his Platoon, collecting a drink from each before letting the squad leaders have them.

Curt's departure stuck Virgil with an all night "Ambush", as Capt. Ord called it, on Bronco. Virgil calls it setting up a holding force because you can't ambush a enemy that's on ground a hundred meters higher than you, watching your every move. He took two rifle squads, a machinegun squad, and an extra unit of fire. Before nightfall, they called two air strikes on Hill 190.5. Virgil was hoping they would try to move in reinforcements while his sharpshooters on watch. The ambush yielded no combat.

Aside from the above activities the following information about this day's activities is known. When attacked by CCF troops, it was common for infantry units to call for "box-me-in" supporting fires. This was a defensive tactic that called for friendly artillery fire to surround a defending unit to, in effect, box them in and protect them from the enemy. When the enemy proceeded beyond the box-me-in fire, friendly artillery support had been of no value because of the danger to friendly troops.

According to recollections of veteran artillery and infantrymen, the first occasion that pre-planned Variable Time (VT), High Explosive (HE) artillery fire was placed on friendly positions occurred this date. This defensive tactic was sometimes used when the enemy had passed through the box-me-in fires and friendly troops had overhead cover in their bunkers. The defending units would call for friendly VT artillery on their own position. The artillerymen would set the VT fuses to explode in the air above the friendly positions. This rain of shrapnel was lethal to the exposed enemy but of less danger to friendlies who were under cover. Other types of artillery shells usually detonate after impact.

At Division HQ Battalion Sgt Menard was treated to the Division's Band music at the mess hall. Later in the evening he attended the movie.

SUNDAY, MAY 18, 1952

The Protestant and Catholic Chaplains arrived at Battalion for services. John
Lammers attended the Catholic services.

Lt. Curt Gager from Wellesly, MA, who had been H/3/1's Assistant XO was promoted to Assistant Regimental S-3 Officer. When he left H/3/1 he gave Virgil Price three fifths of VO.

Capt. James B. Ord was WIA from friendly artillery round that fell short.

TUESDAY, May 20, 1952

PFC John Lammers went back to Battalion for some hot chow. He was well satisfied with the chow. The even got ice cream, but seemed never to get any pie or cake. The Breakfast and noon meal were one (brunch). They could also go to evening show but usually chose to just stay on line and eat c-rations. John had just gotten two packages from home. The cookies in one package were shared with his friends.

One of the men in Lammers fire team got malaria and was evacuated. They now each stood a thirty percent watch instead of the two-man fifty percent watch they had been standing.

Laying barbed wire was the main project. The plan, as Lammers wrote, was to have a fifteen foot wide six feet high all along the Company front.

THURSDAY, MAY 22, 1952

Sgt Menard attended Mass at Division HQ Battalion and later went to the movie which was showing "Two Tickets to Broadway".

FRIDAY, MAY 23, 1952

Sgt Menard was being tested on mapping at the Staff NCO Division School.

SATURDAY, MAY 24, 1952

The Company had been on line 60 days.

Sgt Menard's morning was filled with Administration tests. In the afternoon he had classes on company, battalion, and Regiment weapons.

SUNDAY, MAY 25, 1952

About this day Virgil Pierce received a letter that TSgt Egan had written on the 22nd. It was just a short note to let them know that he was all right since he had to leave so abruptly. His right leg had been amputated between his knee and ankle and he was having some trouble with his left eye but he didn't think he would lose it. He indicated that he was going to be okay and wished the platoon well.

One thing that began to concern Virgil was the ease with which men were awarded the Purple Heart. He always thought this medal was a sacred honor bestowed on those killed or seriously wounded by enemy fire during combat. He thought it a farce when Purple Hearts were awarded to those who just got nicked, especially when it was from a friendly mines or artillery.

Lt. George Gentry received a call from the XO, Lt. Tony Messina, who told his replacement had arrived at Battalion and would move to the Company tomorrow. Lt. Messina said George’s replacement was Lt. Pat Morgan. Pat had been a classmates with Gentry at the University of Texas. Loosing his command was a shock but it had to come sooner of later. Replacements, especially second lieutenants, were arriving in large numbers. This meant that tours in the rifle companies would be shortened and tours of duty in staff positions would be filled by former combat leaders of all officer ranks. It would be nice if this luxury could have also been afforded enlisted men but there just weren’t enough higher level positions for them.

Sgt Menard attended Mass, missed breakfast, and then went to the showers. He attended the movie, "Golden Girl" in the afternoon.
At 0800 Lt. Pat Morgan arrived at outpost Royal. Gentry showed Pat around the outpost. When he was satisfied that Pat was ready to take charge, he left for the Company CP. Rifle squads on OP royal had been rotated from the rest of the Platoon on the MLR every two weeks. Only Sgt Meisner, the Platoon Corpsman, and Lt. Gentry had been at the outpost the entire time and now he was leaving. During his tour as platoon leader of the 2nd Platoon, Lt. Gentry had no casualties.

Lt. Gentry had forgotten to ask the XO about his new assignment. The mile-plus hike back to the CP wasn’t too bad in the daytime. Lt. Gentry arrived at the CP about 1500 where Capt. Ord and Lt. Messina were relaxing with a British Officer who was visiting Marine units near the Commonwealth Division. After being introduced Gentry stepped inside the bunker and asked the 1st Sgt., MSgt Henwood, where he would sleep. He smiled and nodded to the cot in the rear of the bunker and said, “Welcome to the Company CP group”. Lt. Gentry found time to blow up his air mattress before Lt. Messina broke free of the British officers. His first words were, “How would you like to be my XO?” Again Gentry was stunned to learn that Tony Messina was to be the CO when Capt. Ord would leave on June 16th and he was to be the XO.

It had turned warm in late April which caused the Division to call for turning back all winter clothing and equipment. Gentry had received permission to retain his winter sleeping bag while on OP Royal since bunkers were cold at night with no heat. Thermal boot had been replaced by boondockers and leggings except for Lt. Curt Gager whose size 14 foot. His boondockers had been lost during the move to Korea and no replacements were available. It would be several weeks before a size 14 would arrive for Curt. Gentry had his own boots that he had bought in San Diego just before coming to Korea. He spend quite a bit for the boots but they were well worth the cost.

Lt. Gentry got a full nights sleep for the first time in many weeks. No watches, no duties, just his air mattress and a cot with him in the sleeping bag. It had turned

Lt. Richard “Dick” Reed arrived at H/3/1 and was assigned to replace Lt. Jim Canelo as the 3rd Platoon Leader. Jim was completing his tour as a Platoon Leader and was about to be rotated to the rear. Dick was welcomed, cautiously, at the Platoon CP. He learned it was the custom, then, for each platoon to send out a patrol each night or early morning. The leadership of the patrol typically alternated between the Platoon Sergeant and the Platoon Leader. To get his orientation underway, Dick volunteered to go out, early the next morning with Jim Canelo’s patrol.

Action in the 3/1 sector was quiet as it was in the rest of the 1st Marines areas. While the Division’s right flank was quiet, the 7th Marines in the center of the Division weren’t so lucky. They were involved in the Division's major ground action in May.

Sgt Menard spent the day in the field on Fire Team Patrol problems at Division Staff NCO School.

Lt Canelo's Patrol moved out about 0300, slowly, in single-file through the wire and along a well worn path. The exact size of the patrol is not known but they had one or two Corpsmen (HM Donald Joseph Cunniffe and perhaps Corpsman Herman Castle) and an accompanying light machine gun crew. The patrol also included the two officers (Lts. Canelo and Reed), Cpl Chalmer Elkins, Cpl Willard Steel, and Cpl Lyonel D. Bundy. All together there were about 15 men in the patrol. The mission was to deliver the Naval Gun Fire/Air spotter to OP Bronco.

About a mile out, Lt. Canelo told PFC Clentoon Moon, a lanky black Marine, to set up his light machine gun to cover the patrol’s final approach to OP Bronco which was about 200 yards ahead. Cpl Steel remained with the machine gun group on OP Nelly. They set up on, or near, a Hill called Nelly. The rest moved forward behind a two-man point. Just as they approached Bronco, they were ambushed. Immediately all returned fire as they had been trained to do but specific targets were virtually impossible to identify in the predawn
darkness. When Lt. Jim Canelo's carbine jammed, Lt. Reed passed his carbine to Jim and starting using his .45 (his dad's WWI .45). PFC Moon's .30 caliber machine gun fire save the day.

Automatic weapons fire was Lt. Gentry's alarm clock this first morning at the Company CP. He turned over in his sleeping bag thinking he was dreaming. The noise level rose as telephone and radio traffic gained momentum. He got out of the sleeping bag and off the cot as quickly as possible moving to where Capt. Ord and Lt. Messina were monitoring radio reports from the morning patrol to OP Bronco and from OP Royal. OP Royal received more than the usual amount of incoming fire from the Chinese, probably to keep the outpost out of the firefight.

Lt. Messina, the XO, told Lt. Gentry to head out to the outpost to give assistance to the patrol. Gentry immediately strapped on his personal Colt .45 and headed down the trench line. About the same time some reinforcements from the 3rd platoon were dispatched to the action. Doc Roux also was with the relief group and he was the Corpsman who treated the WIA and KIA. Incoming fire had ceased and he moved at a fast pace getting to Bronco in about fifteen minutes. Lt.s Canelo and Reed had been notified that Lt. Gentry was on the way so they were not surprised to see him.

With daylight breaking the firing rapidly ceased as the enemy withdrew. The ambush ended with casualties on both sides. Some of the Chinese casualties resulted from them retreating through a mine field.

A quick check showed that the corpsman, HM Donald Joseph Cunniffe from the Bonx, NY, right behind Lt Reed, had been killed (probably first thing). Lt Reed believes that it was because he was the only one without a rifle or carbine and perhaps at such close range was assumed to be the Officer-in-Charge. Cunniffe had his flak jacket unzipped and was KIA when he was hit in the chest by a burp gun. Al Phipps recalls that Donald was hit with a burp gun during an ambush and said he was hit from the knees up to his head with a piece of his front-right forehead knocked out (piece about a .50 cent size). They also had two wounded which got immediate treatment. Cpl Bundy who is believed to have been one of the point men on the patrol was MIA. Apparently the Chinese let him pass through before firing and then snatched him during the action. He was taken POW and was released on Aug. 19, 1953. Corpsman Herman Castle was also taken POW on this day and is reported to have been in H/3/1. If this is the case, he was also probably taken during this action.

When Lt. Gentry arrived the shooting action was over. He saw the dead Corpsman and thought there was another KIA, a BAR man, who had been returned to the MLR. As it turned out, the BAR man was not KIA but WIA. Ammunition had been redistributed and their position consolidated. After reporting by radio to H/3/1 they began searching enemy bodies. The Officers discussed the situation and decided everything was under control as more 3rd Platoon troop began arriving. As they were about to withdraw to the MLR, H/3/1 radioed to bring the enemy bodies back to the MLR. Members of the patrol were not pleased to hear this order. Not only because they felt that Capt. Ord didn't believe they had actually killed eight (or thirteen) enemy but because bringing those bodies, in daylight, all the way back to the MLR was going to be a slow dangerous haul through likely mortar and artillery fire. After reporting their situation, a radio message recalled the three officer back to the Company CP for a briefing. It was about twenty-five minutes back since most of the last 100 yards was up hill.

The patrol and the 3rd Platoon reinforcements returned to the MLR, spread out to avoid providing too choice a target. Certainly all were glad to be alive but this was tempered by the devastating truth that they had casualties. The dead Chinese were also taken back to the MLR to be sent to higher echelons to be analyzed for intelligence that might be found on them.

Back at the CP, the officers gave their briefings. The briefing yielded the circumstances and determined there was nothing that could be done about the ambush. It could have happened to anyone. The main problem was they were occupying the outpost at the same time each morning to use as a forward artillery observation post. This was too predictable.

Later in the day, Lt. Canelo, left the Company as his transfer order directed. This was no doubt a memorable day for him.
The Chinese artillery shelling of OP Royal resulted in only minor casualties. One was the new platoon Leader, Lt. Pat Morgan. He had a minor wound in the hand. The remainder of the day passed calmly. 

Sgt Menard was involved in Squad Patrol Problems at the Division's Staff NCO School.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 28, 1952

Lt. Gentry got more involved in the CP activities. He soon was standing watch at night and getting briefings of the upcoming move off of the MLR. The date was to be June 1st.

Capt. Ord asked Lt. Dick Reed to write up award proposals for the action he saw in the patrol. Dick wrote up Lt. Jim Canelo for a Letter of Commendation for the presence of mind for setting up the machine gun. He also wrote up PFC Clenton Moon for the Bronze Star for his excellent work in saving the patrol with his timely and accurate covering machinegun fire. It is what turned the tables on the Korean's ambush. Dick also recommended Clenton Moon for promotion.

Sgt Menard was involved in Squad Reconnaissance Patrols and then night until midnight.

PFC Ervin J. Weimern was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, MAY 29, 1952

The 2nd platoon ambushed a large number of Chinese. This was after another platoon had a skirmish with a large number of Chinese a day or two earlier. They had 1 or 2 KIA's and 1 MIA. The 2nd platoon had no causalities. Sgt Tinkey wrote home that they counted 35 bodies, all of which they had to dispose.

The bunkers on OP Bronco were to be disassembled and the material transported back to the MLR. Cpl Willard Steele and PFC William Ahearn were working on this process when an incoming round wounded both of them. Cpl Steele was WIA in the left hand and fingers while William was WIA in the back. Steel had been blown off the bunker they were working on but Ahearn landed on top of the bunker. Ahearn was unable to move and thought he had broken his back. When Steel got to him he found that William had his feet entangled in some barb wire in the bunker and when that was released Ahearn regained his mobility. Ahearn's injuries consisted of a sizable hole in his back.

Sgt Menard had Platoon Problems all day. There was a USO show "Four Queens and a Joker" at Division. He went to the show and considered the performance fair.

FRIDAY, May 30, 1952

Also about this date H/3/1 was receiving rations of Asahi beer. Each Marine was to receive about eight quarts. They were to be distributed one per day until their beer supply ran out. The Supply Sgt, TSgt Clarence E. Dotson, learned that the Company was soon to be rotated to another location and he had the problem of moving all this beer. He solved this problem by issuing all the Asahi beer to the men at one time. The troops were happy to help him solve his problem. There was quite a bit of celebration that night on the MLR. The concertina wire obstacle was enhanced that night by broken glass.

It was also about this date that key personnel and guides from all units scouted the relief path. They walked most of the way south to the pick-up point where they would board trucks to move further to the rear during the relief.

Sgt. Tinkey went to Battalion, the start of his rotation trip to the good old USA.

Sgt Menard started a two-day platoon problem at Division Staff NCO School. He stayed out all night on Fire Team Recon Patrols and problems involving Platoon assaults.

SATURDAY MAY 31, 1952

It was 2000 when other elements of the 1st Marines began the relief of H/3/1 so that they could go into Regimental Reserve. Lt. Gentry, the XO, lead the movement with elements
of the Company command group. The 2nd Platoon followed in the order of march. The move went smooth as silk. All units reached their point of departure and pick-up points on time. Trucks from the Division Motor Transport Battalion were at the designated location to transport the Company to the reserve area which was two miles south of the MLR.

PFC John Lammers wrote home (on Tuesday June 3rd) that they had walked five miles back before being picked up. He said the plan was for them to be in this reserve area for ten days and then go further back in reserve. The reserve area was right beside the Imjin River. He said "It is a big river with a sand beach and the water was nice for swimming. When we don't have anything to do we swim and play ball."

Sgt Menard returned from his two-day problem at noon to be given a weapons-tactics test and critique at 1500. He was pleased to get a warm shower and clean clothes in the evening.

Sgt Tinkey left Battalion for Inchon to board the General William Weigel, the same ship he had come to Korea on almost a year earlier.

SSgt William D. Johnson was dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY JUNE 1, 1952

Hot food, hot showers, and a peaceful rest was well received by the Company. Lt. Gentry made a trip to Battalion Sick Bay to check on any of the H/3/1 Marines who were seeking help. There were no major problems that would require transfer. Lt. Gentry stepped on the scales to find he now weighed only 165 pounds. His uniforms were bagging but no one had bothered to tell him since they had all lost weight on the C-rations. Here in reserve they were fed B-rations twice a day with beer available in ample supply when not on duty. It took two weeks for Lt. Gentry to begin to get back some of his 205 pounds he weighed when he joined the Company.

Sgt Menard got up at 0900 and attended the 1130 Mass. He spent the rest of the day writing letters preparing a package to send home. He also attended the Division movie which was showing "Las Vegas".

MONDAY, JUNE 2, 1952

Sgt Menard, at Division NCO School, had classes on Amphibious Operations, Military Justice, and then a rifle inspection.

TUESDAY, JUNE 3, 1952

PFC John Lammers said that today they were supposed to go up and dig positions in a trench line but it was raining too hard. The Chow was good and they got two meals a day. The rain stopped while John was writing the letter and he could hear the machine gunner's radio playing "Whisperint while I cuddle near you". Everyone was laughing and enjoying the day off. He was thinking of, "guys like Cunniffe laying in his blood with his face shot off (note: Cunniffe may have been shot in the chest) and Bundy where all they found was a trail of blood where they drug him off."

The guy who had malaria (name unknown) returned from C Company (Medical Field Hospital). He reported that they lived in barracks, had bars, and a big chow hall. They even had curtains in the windows and got liberty in Seoul and Pusan.

Sgt Menard had classes all day. It was raining all day with hail in the afternoon.

The 21st Replacement Draft had arrived at Division.

Sgt Tinkey's ship was leaving Inchon. They made a one-day stop in Japan, and arrived in San Francisco on about June 18th just a year from the date he left San Diego.

The following were dropped from the Company.

SSgt John J. Mazza               Sgt Hector E. Morales
PFC Arnold L. Nash               Sgt Woodbury Phillips
Sgt Russell K. Poulk             Cpl Steve H. Richards
Cpl Marvin (Popasan) Rigel       Sgt Eulalio Sandoval
PFC Harold G. Saybrook           Cpl Neil V. Snarski
IN KOREA

Sgt Peter Stepaniuk Cpl Leo Stroman
Cpl William "Big Bill" L. Taylor Cpl Melvin L. Thompson
Sgt Arnold M. "Mike" Tinkey Cpl James W. Traynham
Sgt Juan Ugarte Cpl Jose E. Valle
Pvt Arthur E. Waller Cpl Frank O. Ward
Sgt Coy E. Whaling Cpl Delbert E. White
Cpl Lee A. Wilkins Jr. Cpl Jack D. Williams

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 1952

Sgt Menard, at Division Staff NCO School, attended classes which included mock trials of cases from 1815 to 1945.

THURSDAY, JUNE 5, 1952

Sgt Menard's class had critiques on amphibious operations and gave five-minute lectures.

FRIDAY, JUNE 6, 1952

Sgt Menard had classes at Division Staff NCO school that included tests on military justice, instructions, amphibious operations, and interior guard.

SATURDAY, JUNE 7, 1952

Sgt Ray Menard wound up his tour at Division Staff NCO School with three hours of instructions on radio and telephone. Graduation exercise was held at 1400 with Gen Seldon, the Division CG, presiding. At 1600 Ray returned to H/3/1.

The following were dropped from the Company.

Sgt Donald G. Moreton Sgt Clement J. Rowe Jr.

SUNDAY, JUNE 8, 1952

Sgt Menard got up at 0800 and put his gear away. He then took a swim in the Imjin River and washed clothes.

MONDAY, JUNE 9, 1952

Sgt Menard went to a blocking position until 1500 and then returned for the Colonel's inspection at 1800. The inspection lasted for one and one half hours.

TUESDAY, JUNE 10, 1952

Sgt Menard had Duty NCO on this rainy day. Everyone was issued summer sleeping bags which were too thin for the still cold nights. The officers had a party.

MSgt George D. Henwood was dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 1952

The Mortar Section had troop and stomp classes, gun drill, and then crew served weapons inspection.

THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 1952

Pay day for H/3/1 Marines and gun drill for Mortar Section.

FRIDAY, JUNE 13, 1952

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The Mortar Section continued to hold gun drill.
Sgt Menard signed his fitness report.
2nd Lt Holliway arrived in the Company.
Packs were made up in preparation for the movement to Kimpo Air Field.
There was a USO show at Regiment.
PFC August J. Ferrari was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, JUNE 14, 1952

Reveille went at 0800. There wasn't much to do for the troops. The officers were busy planning the details of the trip.
SSgt Johnnie M. Neely was dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, JUNE 15, 1952

On this date the 5th Marines began relieving the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 1st Marines. The third had been in regimental reserve since May 31st.
H/3/1 left the Battalion reserve area at about 0030 to move to another area on the Kimpo peninsula. In the movement to Kimpo, they rode thirteen trucks about eighteen miles in trucks over bumpy, dusty roads. They disembarked before dawn at an out-of-the-way Korean village and then hiked about seven miles over hill, dale, and rice paddies with all their gear on their backs to the banks of the Han River. They were then flown over a vast expanse of water, mud, and rice paddies by helicopter to a hill overlooking their destination, a tent city. From there they hiked another mile to finally arrive at their destination and arrived at 0900. The rest of the day was free to catch up on sleep, square away their gear, and set up in their tents. This is the same training area where Virgil Price first came to after arriving in Korea with his draft, where he received his initial training before joining H/3/1.

MONDAY, JUNE 16, 1952

Early rising (0600), exercises, and a full training schedule that lasted until late at night were in the typical training plan. They had training exercise for fire team, squad, and Platoon tactics. There was a large area to work in here without the fear of mines. There were also many lectures on the training schedules.
The Mortar Section, and probably the rest of the Company, had a 782 gear inspection. Sgt Menard also had some of his Mortar Section fixing-up the Company Co's area and the clean their weapons.
Kimpo is a very pretty area, fertile, with well-cultivated lands with ripe rice paddy grain weaving in the breezes that drift over the hills. The Koreans plowed with their cows, wading around in their rice paddies, and harvesting and threshing their grain in the same manner that their ancestors did thousands of years ago by means of the scythe, flail, and chaff blowing method. It really is a beautiful sight to watch.
This was the first time most H/3/1 Marines had contact with the Korean people. Most of the Korean civilians were a carefree lot, content to work in their rice paddies and let the rest of the world go by. But just like back in the USA., they had the ones who were looking for the opportunity to "make a fast buck". One order specifically stated that no contact would be made with the civilians in the area around the camp site. The exception being several Korean military widows who were allowed to was Marine uniforms for a price. It worked an added hardship on the Officers to deal with the pimps, whores, bootleggers, petty crooks, black market, etc. The tent area was enclosed with barbed wire and heavily posted guards but still some slipped by. Several men in the Battalion appeared at sick call with venereal diseases. Drugs were not adequate to cure some of the venereal diseases, especially gonorrhea.
The bootleg whiskey, which was reputed to be more powerful than wood alcohol caused some men to go blind. On Virgil Price's watch one day a Korean was caught selling whiskey to a Marine. The seal on the bottle appeared to be unbroken and the bottle even had a counterfeit tax stamp on it. An analysis of the contents showed it was 50% urine. The Korean boy led the MPs to the two Korean men who were making the stuff and they were turned over to the Korean police. During the night, sentries also caught four Sheba-Shebas ("loose women") who were the nearest thing to "diseased apes" Virgil Price had ever seen. They were also turned over to the authorities. They both had several dollars in military script. This was probably evidence of prior sexual encounters with Marines. Virgil Price recalls that it was fitting that they referred to Korean jails as "the monkey house".

Sgt Phil H. Kirby, 830338/0311, is shown on H/3/1's July 1953 Monthly Personnel Roster as leaving the states in May 1952. If this is not a mistake, he probably arrived in Korea about June 1952.

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.
- 2nd Plt. Corpsman Warner Len Leonard (joined)
- 3rd Plt. Charles "Charlie" Taylor (joined)
- Capt. Ord left, 1st Lt. Messina was moved up from XO to CO and was promoted to Capt. about the same time.

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.
- Capt. James B. Ord
- PFC Eugene E. Moore
- Cpl Robert C. Murray
- PFC Howard V. Rood

TUESDAY, JUNE 17, 1952

The Mortar Section had a junk-on-the-bunk inspection and then packed some ammo and gear for the KMCs.

About this date PFC John Lammers had been detached from the Company. He was one of eighty volunteers who had been picked to train for the 3/1 Recon Platoon. The initial eighty men would soon be reduced to forty. The forty then was reduced to 27 and they were reduced to get the eighteen best qualified men (two nine man squads). The Recon candidates training consisted of classes and training in Judo, knife, infiltrating, sniping, patrolling, etc. John made the cuts and was one of the Marines who made up the original Recon Platoon. He would be dropped from H/3/1 on June 21st to be picked up by H&S/3/1 who had administrative control of the Recon Platoon.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 18, 1952

Reveille went at 0130 and the Mortar Section the Company boarded trucks at 0230. Apparently H/3/1 relieved a KMC Battalion for just this day. The Company had a seven-mile front with each platoon covering 2 miles.

THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 1952

The Company participated in net (ship loading) practice classes in the morning. They took a conditioning hike in the afternoon and had a fire demonstration after dark.

FRIDAY, JUNE 20, 1952

The Company went to the docks (probably at Inchon) for positions and the tactical movement. They had an ambush patrol at night that lasted until 2230.

Cpl Buddy Scott and several other mortar men and some men from Company's rifle platoons were trucked to Inchon. They boarded the USS Henrico and were to become the ship's security force for H/3/1 which would soon arrive. Scott and other Cpls were to stand duty as Cpl of the Guard. There were some Sgts who would be Sgts of the Guards and about 20 enlisted men to man the posts. They were not going to take part of the amphibious exercise.
IN KOREA

SATURDAY, June 21, 1952

The Company had a rifle inspection at 0830. The Mortar Section had gun drill, HE lectures. In the afternoon they had more net practice and lashing drills.

The following were dropped from the Company. Most, if not all, of these men were probably transferred to H&S/3/1's raider Platoon.

2nd Lt. John E. Watson
Cpl Daniel L. Blubaugh
MSgt Edward L. Clark
PFC John E. Lammers
PFC John A. Miller

PFC Richard L. Biddy
Cpl Joseph A. Caid
PFC Paul H. Hawks
PFC John E. Lammers
TSgt James D. McMullian

SUNDAY, JUNE 22, 1952

Reveille went at 0430 and early in the morning H/3/1, and the rest of the Battalion, was transported by trucks over thirty miles of bumpy, dusty roads to Inchon. The last part of the road was even paved. This was the first paved road Virgil Price had seen in Korea. It was an interesting ride with lots of country to see and villages and towns to pass through. Most of the Koreans were leading their normal lives, but the scars of war were evident.

During the trip, Virgil realized, not for the first time, but more than ever, why he was there and what they were fighting for. Not for the hills, rice paddies, straw huts, mama-sans, and papa-sans, but for the many thousand innocent children trudging up the dusty roads on their way to school with their little white suits and dresses, student caps, and book satchels. Also to keep this from happening to other kids in other places in the world.

At Inchon, the company boarded LCVPs the Navy had waiting to take them to APA 45, USS Henrico, where they spent the rest of the day practicing embarking and debarking VIA cargo nets. All had their fill of the good Navy chow and the ship sailed at 2000. Clean Navy bunks, even though crowded, were considered a luxury.

Sgt Menard had Sgt of the guard for the 3rd relief.

Meanwhile, back at the MLR E/2/5 spotted a figure that appeared to be the body of a Marine in No-Man's-Land, the area between the CCF and Marine's MLRs. A man in the 1st Marines had been missing in this area during an earlier patrol and it was thought this might be him. The body was propped up against a mound of dirt in the open. An attempt to recover the body was made. A special E/2/5 patrol left the main line shortly before dawn and reached the recovery area at daybreak. Artillery laid down smoke and the patrol moved in to quickly recovered the body and set out for friendly territory. Before the Marines had advanced very far on their return trip, the Chinese interdicted their route with heavy mortar fire, which killed one member of the patrol and wounded another. When the E/2/5 patrol returned to the Jamestown Line shortly after 0700, it carried not only the body it had recovered but also that of the Marine who had been killed on the recovery mission. At present the author has not been able to learn the name of the recovered Marine.

MONDAY, JUNE 23, 1952

PFC Robert R. Allshaw was dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, JUNE 24, 1952

Reveille went at 0100 and "H" hour was 0330. The exercise began early using LCVPs and Marine amtracs to take the Company to Tokchok-To Island south of Inchon. Tokchok-To is a beautiful little island called Tokchok-To, 32 miles southwest of Inchon. Virgil said the 1st Platoon assaulted the steepest, if not the highest, rocky peak he had ever seen. H/3/1's security force stayed aboard ship and watched the exercise, which was the capture of Tokchok-To. The security force was billeted in Officers country and Buddy Scott and the others enjoyed sitting in lounge chairs and watching the landing through field binoculars.
A picture was taken of Virgil, Russ Renick, Jack Williams, and PFC Billy E. Felty during the exercise. The exercise was complete by 1700 and the Company re-embarked aboard the Henrico for the return trip to Inchon.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 25, 1952

Reveille went at 0200 and everyone had another great meal, ham and eggs, for breakfast. "H" hour was set for 0600. It was very foggy which may have caused some delays. At 1000 the Company debarked at Inchon by small boat for the ride back to shore. H/3/1 rode back to the reserve area over the same route they took three days before on Monday. George Gentry recalls that it was a fast trip but showed that they still knew their bread and butter job. The Battalion moved back to Kimpo for duty south of the Korean Marines who were on the MLR north of the Han River.

THURSDAY, JUNE 26, 1952

Sgt Menard, and some of the Mortar Section, had remained aboard the ship until the entire Battalion was gone. He was relieved from the next-to-last watch and then left the ship at 0530 to rejoin the Company at Kimpo.

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC Sanford Soufrine
PFC Robert L. Sproul

FRIDAY, JUNE 27, 1952

Sgt Menard had an inspection in the morning, packed his gear, and got a hair cut.

Cpl Lyonel D. Bundy was dropped from the Company. He is the same person who was MIA on May 27th.

SATURDAY, JUNE 28, 1952

The period of H/3/1's amphibious training had ended. Reveille went shortly after midnight. The Company moved out on truck headed back to their reserve area, north of the Imjin River behind the MLR. The trip took six and one half hours and was uneventful except that two truck with problems and had to pull off the road.

About this date Capt. Messina and Lt. Gentry shared a tent with George Hubbard, the Machine Gun Platoon Leader. A reconnaissance was necessary to know the best and quickest routes to blocking positions to the rear of the KMC units. The Imjin River had been at the back of H/3/1 to the east of the KMC Brigade. There were a few bridges to give support from the rear for quick personnel movement if the Chinese decided they wanted to begin an offensive for Seoul again. It had been rumored that the offensive plans of the Chinese were known at higher headquarters who moved the Marines west behind the KMCs to block any efforts made by the Communists.

Lt. Gentry enjoyed his first helicopter ride while on a reconnaissance possible crossing sites across the Han River. There was no gunfire at their fast-flying helicopter but it had happened in the past so he was glad to be wearing a protective flak jacket and diaper. The diaper was new to him although the vest was a standard item since coming to the west coast. He enjoyed the flight and told Major Kuhn and Capt. Messina his ideas of the proper positions necessary to block or cross the Han River. Capt. Messina had made the flight earlier and agreed with Gentry. Major Kuhn said he would take their recommendations to Col. Armitage when the plans were to be written.

PFC Michael J. Osker was dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, JUNE 29, 1952

PFC John Lammers, who was in training with the Recon Platoon at Battalion, wrote home to tell about the heavy rain this night. "Last night it rained as hard as I have ever seen rain in my life. The wind drove it right through our tent like there wasn't any tent. It
Sgt Menard also made a note in his diary that it rained all day. He found the time to attend Mass in the mess hall at 0900. After getting the Mortar Section's PX rations he cleaned his M1 and .38 pistol.

PFC Mike Momot was dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, JUNE 30, 1952

It rained again all day and after roll call the Mortar Section was free to clean up their tent area and relax. Sgt Menard took a shower after chow.

By the end of June 3/5 and 3/1 had taken their turns capturing Tokchok-To, the friendly island southwest of Inchon. This was a part of a training program for Battalion Landing Team Exercises. The entire program was designed to provide refresher training for Marines to perform amphibious assaults, their specialty.

Other training concentrated more on the task at hand. Division units in reserve rehearsed tactics for offensive and defensive warfare. Most ground units conducted extensive schooling in both mine and booby trap detection and clearance. Recognizing that patrolling was an important part of a Marine's life on the MLR, the Division included in its Noncommissioned Officers (NCO) Leadership School a through indoctrination in patrolling tactics. More than fifty percent of the training at all levels was a night. In addition, an extensive orientation was conducted for combat replacements arriving with the replacement drafts. They were at best not the greatest men you could want. It had been necessary for the Marine Corps to take draftees since recruiting could not replace the number of reserves being released from active duty after they had finished one year of service. A few of the officers stayed past the one year time limit but the enlisted left as quickly as possible, especially those stationed in Korea. Lt. Gentry had a few draftees in his platoon and found most were more than adequate as infantry, but a few were not good enough. He found that the average draftee was a school drop-out or had ranked so low in his graduating class that he could not qualify for college. Replacements were not to be committed to action until they had been in the Division for at least 72 hours.

TUESDAY, JULY 1, 1952

The Company cleaned up around their tent areas and had a rifle inspection.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 2, 1952

The Company had an inspection by a Major (possibly from Battalion). After the inspection the Mortar Section had gun drills and then first aid lectures in the afternoon.

About this date when Lt. Gentry returned to base camp, 1st Sgt. Henwood told him that Col. Armitage wanted to see him ASAP. Thinking an emergency existed, he reported without cleaning off the dust. Col. Armitage greeted Gentry with mild surprise. When Gentry told him why he had reported so quickly, he put him at ease and told Gentry that it was time for him to get some staff training but there were no vacancies at Battalion. He knew Gentry was a regular officer so he recommended that Gentry apply at Regiment where more positions existed. Gentry acknowledged and returned to the Company to ask the 1st Sgt to write him a request and reported the conversation he had with the Col. to Capt. Messina.

THURSDAY, JULY 3, 1952

The Company had an inspection by the Colonel (possibly Battalion CO). After the inspection they hiked down by the 7th Marines and then cleaned their weapons in the afternoon.

Lt. Gentry was surprised to receive a call from Lt. Gager who had moved to a Regimental S-3 position on May 17th. The said that Gentry should try to get assigned to Regimental S-3 if the chance arose.

According to H/3/1's July monthly personnel roster the following Marines were
FRIDAY, JULY 4, 1952

Sgt Menard went back to Regiment to for dental work (or check). When he returned he had Duty NCO with a Canadian officer, Neafon Rolly Roux).

Lt. Gentry was called by Regiment to get to the CP as quickly as possible. Gentry borrowed the Company Jeep and proceeded to Regiment. The day was a typical summer day in Asia which meant that it could get very hot before noon. Gentry pulled into the CP area and reported to the S-1 section who sent him to the tent used by the S-3, Major Stanley McLeod. He was at his field desk and told Gentry to come inside and have a seat. He looked Gentry over quickly and asked why he wanted to work in the S-3 Section. Caught off guard, Gentry responded with something not too stupid. The Maj. Said that Curt Gager had recommended Gentry for the job so he could expect orders the next day. Gentry was to be Gager’s replacement since he was rotating back to the USA. Gentry stopped by Gager’s tent to thank him and headed back for Battalion to pack his gear.

SATURDAY, JULY 5, 1952

Capt. Messina was not surprised by the announcement about Gentry’s transfer. There had been too many second lieutenants arriving in Korea to receive a front line position command. Therefore, the normal twelve month rotation policy for the was shortened by several months. Gentry said his goodbyes to Marines in the Company and left early in the morning. He stopped by Battalion to bid the Battalion officers farewell.

Sgt. Menard was up at 1145 and then laid barbed wire all day. There was come incoming down the road and it was raining.

H/3/1’s July monthly personnel roster shows that 2nd Lt. George H. Gentry Jr. was dropped this date.

SUNDAY, JULY 6, 1952

Sgt Menard attend 0900 Mass at Battalion.

PFC Harvey D. Brinkley and PFC Paul P. Krill were dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, JULY 7, 1952

Lt. Farrell assumed command of the Mortar Section. Sgt Menard had an 1100 appointment at Regiment to have one tooth pulled and then returned at 1500 to learn he had received a package from home.

TUESDAY, JULY 8, 1952

Sgt Menard went to the blocking positions on this very hot day. During the evening he received his coke ration.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 9, 1952

Sgt Menard again spent the day in the blocking positions and then wrote some letters home.
IN KOREA

THURSDAY, JULY 10, 1952

Sgt Menard had his Mortar Section painting the 60 mm mortars until 1000 and then they went on a five-mile conditioning hike with the 3rd Platoon.

About this date the peace talks were apparently over (or discontinued or broken off).

FRIDAY, JULY 11, 1952

Sgt Menard went to the blocking positions until 1530 on this very hot day.

PFC Samuel Eisenberg, Cpl Chauncey B. Emmons, PFC Clarence K. McKenney (or McKinney), and Cpl Robert J. Waugh were dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, JULY 12, 1952

Sgt Menard's Mortar Section had an inspection at 0830 and then gun drill. At 1300 they attended classes with the 3rd Platoon.

2nd Lt. Virgil Price was dropped from the Company. Virgil was being transferred to become the Assistant Division Historical Officer.

Lt. Earl Lester Valentine had arrived in Korea with Lt. Gentry in February on the 17th Airlift Replacement Draft. He had been an artillery FO and wanted to get the qualifications of a Platoon Leader on his record. He took over H/3/1's 1st Platoon when Virgil Price moved to the Assistant Division Historical Officer's billet. Earl is shown on H/3/1's July 1952 monthly personnel roster.

SUNDAY, JULY 13, 1952

Sgt Menard thought the breakfast was lousy. After breakfast he attended Mass at 0900 and then received and wrote letters home.

SSgt William A. Sanford was dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, JULY 14, 1952

A young Marine infantryman has a different frame of mind than most can imagine. We look at our grandchildren and have a hard time visualizing them filling the roll that we once served. The Marine Corps does a terrific job of condition their men, both physically and psychologically, to prepare them for the variety of jobs they must perform to do their part in protecting our country. The below letter that PFC John Lammers wrote home to his sister about this date reflects the mental attitude he had about his job. I realize that some may find this gruesome but if we didn't think that way, we couldn't have been Marine infantrymen. John's letter is paraphrased below.

"I heard "a Little Dutch Girl" the other day. How about that. The machine Gunners have a trans-oceanic set that we can listen in the daytime when we aren't doing anything. I've heard a couple of the new songs, Cry and Little White Cloud. They're pretty good. What's that new one that Frankie Lane has out? ... I got two gooks yesterday morning. Just when it was starting to get light. They must have been out probing the lines and were getting home a little late. We spotted them about 1000 yards out and I got them with my new telescope sight on my M1. I'm a killer. How does that sound. What does your brother do? Oh he shoots people and lays barbed wire. Hell! ...

Sgt Menard spend the day at blocking positions again. No mail from home was received in the Company.

TUESDAY, JULY 15, 1952

The Mortar Section again spent the day in blocking positions. PFC Willis C. Evans was sick again and they sent a jeep up to take him back.

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

60 mm mortars Frederick "Fred" Farrell (joined)
IN KOREA

(Farrell was also in 1st Plt. but it is not known when he changed position within
the company.)

60 mm Mortars    William "Big Bill" Taylor (left)
MG Plt.           Jack Dale (joined)
1st Plt. 2nd Sqd  David "Dave" Richardson (left)
2nd Plt. 3rd Sqd  Sanford "Sandy" Soufrine (left)
2nd Plt.          Jack Hook (left)

WEDNESDAY, JULY 16, 1952

Cpl Norman L. Carlson went to sick bay at 2400 and PFC Willis C. Evans went at 0730.
The rest of the Mortar Section had gun drill all day.
PFC John D. Cornue and PFC Raymond L. Murphy were dropped from the Company

THURSDAY, JULY 17, 1952

Sgt Menard accompanied the CO, Capt Messina, and some Lieutenants to Zebra in the
rain. He had duty NCO and his Mortar Section had gun drills in the afternoon.

FRIDAY, JULY 18, 1952

Jim (perhaps Sgt James P. Farber) got back from R&R (Rest and Recreation) in Japan.
There was a pretty good USO show at a near-by Army unit that Sgt Menard attended.
The Company CO, Capt. Anthony "Tony" Messina, was dropped from the Company and Capt.
Byron J. Melancon took over as the new CO.
Col Thomas A. Wornham relieved Col. Wilbert S. Brown as Co. of the 1st Marines.

SATURDAY, JULY 19, 1952

There was a Company problem all day. The Mortar Section (and perhaps the rest of the
Company) spent most of the day walking. The night problem scheduled for tonight was called
off.
The following Marines were dropped from the Company. Since there are so many that
were dropped on this date, it is possible that they were being dropped to rotate back to
the U.S.A.

Sgt Richard L. Baker, Jr.    Cpl Donald W. Beeson
Cpl Earl F. Blighton          PFC Jackson E. Doar
PFC William R. Erickson      Cpl Raymond M. Sullivan

SUNDAY, JULY 20, 1952

Sgt Menard attend 0900 Mass.

MONDAY, JULY 21, 1952

Reveille for Sgt Menard, MSgt Benjamin F. Hudson, and the rest of the advanced party
was at 0100. Soon thereafter they left for the 7th Marines who were on Hill 229. It was
another rainy day.

Sgt Menard had hot chow with the 7th Marines about noon and then went to the outpost
to observe Yoke and Hill 123 in the afternoon. When he returned he changed holes and now
was bunking with SSgt Hanlon, a heavy machine gunner with either W/3/1's advanced party or
the 7th Marines. The 7th Marines sent out a raiding party this night.

When the Battalion went on line bordering the Panmunjom corridor, they assumed the
responsibility of the rescue force that was to extract our troop that were involved in the
Panmunjom peace talks if the need arose. This task force was continuously on the alert
whenever the peace talks were in session. The task organization was set forth in the July
1952 command diary. Every member of the companies involved were instructed on the
security agreements and were given a written exam; the results of which were kept on file in each company office.

TSgt Clarence E. Dotson was dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, JULY 22, 1952

During the morning Sgt Menard and the Company Gunny Sergeant, MSgt Benjamin F. Hudson, went to observe the 3rd Platoon and mortar positions. In the afternoon Sgt Menard turned in an ammo report.

Cpl Anthony J. Gatti was dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 23, 1952

Sgt Menard had been up late last night and slept late to get hot chow. SSgt Hanlon went back to Battalion at 1300 and brought back two packages for Sgt Menard.

TSgt Leroy H. Meisner and PFC Joseph J. Sabata were dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, JULY 24, 1952

After noon chow Sgt Menard went to the 3rd Platoon's positions and stayed there until dark looking over the Mortar Section's concentrations.

H/3/1's advanced party and the 7th Marines were probably involved in some of the action described in the below July 25th United Press new article since Hill 229 and the associated outposts are east and northeast of Panmunjom.

"American Marines smashed back 3,000 attacking Chinese northeast of Panmunjom in heavy fighting for three front line positions on the already fixed-cease fire line.

Leathernecks of the 1st Marine Division forced back the Chinese regiment and were in full control of outpost Esther and two other hill positions.

Sporadic fighting was reported late in the morning, however, on the forward slopes of the two unidentified positions.

Other American Marines repulsed 50 Chinese who lunged at an outpost east of Bunker Hill."

FRIDAY, JULY 25, 1952

SSgt Hanlon went back to Battalion to learn that they were going to remove heavy machine guns from Hill 229. The Company Gunny Sergeant, MSgt Benjamin Hudson, brought back two letters for Sgt Ray Menard. Ray left for Green (probably a hill name) to participate in a night reconnaissance patrol

Sgt Stanley J. Brys was dropped from the Company.


SATURDAY, JULY 26, 1952

It started to train at 0300 and the reconnaissance patrol returned at 0700. Sgt Menard slept until noon and it was still raining. The Mortar Sections fired concentrations at 1500 in the rain.

SUNDAY, JULY 27, 1952

It rained again all day and Sgt Menard's bunker leaked, and then caved in. At 1600 the Mortar Section arrived. The rest of the Company also replaced the 7th Marine Company. At 2200 the 7th Marines retired from Hill 229. In the distance large balloons could be seen flying over Panmunjom. Hill 229 was behind outpost Bunker Hill. Sgt Menard was with the 1st Section (or right guide) of the Mortar Section.

Life in reserve was more relaxed but regimented. This is where Marines were reminded that they were still Marines. As much spit and polish as the situation would allow was
demanded. Tents were available in the best of situations. Training schedules prevailed to keep the men abreast of new techniques. Replacements often arrived while units were in reserve to fill in the ranks of those that had left, or never would. This gave them a better chance to adjust before going on line.

Life on the MLR was nothing like being in reserve. Men were continually improving positions during the day and patrolling or standing watch at night. MLR positions ranged from just a hole in the ground to reinforced bunker positions. The average rifleman usually manned the holes while bunkers were more likely to house machineguns. The machinegunners needed this added protection because they received more incoming mortar and artillery fire.

The MLR was a much better place to be than on a listening or outpost. Listening posts consisted of as few as a couple Marines who were sent some distance in front of the MLR to listen for any enemy that might be approaching. They usually had a phone to alert the MLR of any activity and they usually returned to the MLR before the enemy came too close.

Outposts are positions in front of the MLR that are manned by a few men or as much as a company. Most ranged between squad (13-man) and platoon (44-man) sized outposts. Distances between the MLR and outposts usually ranged between a few hundred yards to a mile. If the outposts didn't stink of dead bodies, they did from garbage dumps of half-empty C-ration cans. Outpost duty usually wasn't bad when it was quiet but it could be hell when the enemy attacked. There was always the fear of what might happen. In too many cases, a squad or platoon sized outpost had to hold off company, battalion, and regimental-sized attacks. In some cases it was just an impossible task (e.g., Ronson, Stromboli, and other outposts).

The 1st Marines came out of Division Reserve to relieve the 7th Marines. The 1st Mar. Div. front now consisted of the KMCs on the left, the 1st Marines in the center, and the 5th Marines on the right. Within the 1st Marines sector, 3/1 was on the left, 2/1 on the right, and 1/1 was in Battalion Reserve. Within the 3/1 sector, H/3/1 was on the left flank manning the forward slopes of Hill 229. A short distance in front of Hill 229 was Yoke, which was a hill that was an enemy stronghold. Outposts Hedy and Bunker Hill (Hill 122) was also to their front. The trenches on Hedy and Bunker were only about 40 yards from the Chinese trenches. Bunker Hill was soon to become the scene of bitter fighting that would last for about a month. 1/3/1 was on the right manning the forward slopes of Hill 201 looking out onto Hills 124 and 122.

While on the MLR (the Jamestown Line), each rifle company dispatched at least one reinforced squad combat patrol, combat outpost, and sufficient fire team listening posts forward of the MLR.

The 1st Marines Regiment was now charged with the organization of the “Rescue Task Force” for the United Nations True Team at Panmunjom. The mission of this Force was to prepare to execute rescue mission on order whenever the UN Truce Team is in session at Panmunjom. Every member of each company in the left sector was instructed on the security agreement portion to the conduct of the armistice negotiations. Following the instructions a written examination was administered and these exams were kept on file in each company office. This force consisted of a reinforced company, including tank and artillery support, rendezvoused near Panmunjom each time the Truce Teams were in session. Their mission was to move in quickly and extract the United Nations delegation to safety upon the prearranged signal “Need Aid”.

Enemy forces in front of the Marines, from west to east, were the 580th Regiment, 194th Division, 65th CCF Army and two regiments, 532nd and 354th, of the 118th Division, 40th CCF Army. The 40th Army had recently moved from a position opposite the British Commonwealth and U.S. 3rd Infantry Division. Infantry strength of these Communist units was established at 28,328.

In the second quarter of 1952, the Division rotated 433 officers and 6,280 enlisted from Korea. In exchange, 506 officers and 7,359 enlisted men arrived from the states in replacement drafts. The Division’s plan was for a new arrival to stay ten and one half months, although most of the troops probably weren’t aware of this at the time. It was just as well that they didn’t know because a review of H/3/1’s monthly personnel rosters
shows most enlisted Marines stayed a little longer. The difference between the number of arriving and departing Marines is probably equal to the number of Marines seriously wounded (and evacuated) and KIA in the respective drafts.

TSgt Charles H. West was dropped was dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, JULY 28, 1952

It was raining again today. Sgt Menard made an overlay of all concentrations. He later had the OP watch.

TUESDAY, JULY 29, 1952

Sgt Menard Sgt Menard awoke at 1000 and made concentration charts for the four guns in the Mortar Section. He then had the 1600-1800 OP watch.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 30, 1952

The 1st and 2nd Squad of the Mortar Section fired their concentations. After this firing, Sgt. Menard went to the 3rd Platoon to check their concentration.

SSgt William R. Ables was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, JULY 31, 1952

The rain ended at noon and Sgt. Menard went to Zebra with Lt. Farrell, the Mortar Section Leader, to fire the rest of the concentrations.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 1, 1952

I/3/1 was on Bunker Hill and the Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon was assigned the mission of tying in the left defensive position of Bunker with the MLR.

Soon after the Battalion arrived at their present position it was apparent that a program of flak suppression should be worked out to enable the supporting arms to effectively destroy active enemy targets. The TACP, S-3, S-2, and artillery Liaison Officer conferred and worked out the following plan.

Known or suspected enemy AA positions are designated to be covered by artillery and/or mortars (VT if possible). Only the targets that lie in the Pattern to be flown by the aircraft in the execution of the strike are selected. These targets are sent to the artillery and/or mortars as far in advance of the TOT as possibly in order that the necessary firing data may be computed and each target or group of targets assigned a code name.

As the aircraft leave the orbit point and approach the target vicinity the marking round is fired. Once the mark is observed by the flight leader, the flak suppression is called for by code name. With experience on the part of the Forward Air Controller it is possibly to have the first aircraft start his run just as the flak suppression rounds are on target. At any time during the strike the run may be broken off and more flak suppression fired if the situation warrants. As the last aircraft enters his final run another TOT is called for which should be on target after the aircraft pulls out. If it is necessary, a battery or two may be shifted to a new AA target for final TOT.

The weather cleared up and the mail came in at 1800, along with ice cream and oranges.

SSgt Edward J. Murray and PFC Thomas J. Walsh were dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, AUGUST 2, 1952

About this date an event happened that Cpl John Lammers (now in the 3/1 Recon Platoon) wrote home (letter post marked August 5th) to tell his sister about a patrol in which he participated. Following is the essence of what was written in his letter.
We have been on line a week today. Every night we've gone out to get acquainted with the terrain and where the Gooks are. Well it paid off. Last night we went out to hit Objective Brown with twelve men. We all had automatic weapons and tennis shoes so we could walk quietly. Five of us went up to investigate. We could see Gooks digging and coughing. We worked around slowly until we had them sky-lined. About 20 Gooks were digging a bunker. Mason cut loose and I saw a Gook drop like he'd been hit with an ax. I opened up on three. One went down and the other 2 ran for weapons. We were running after them when I saw one dive into a hole and heaved a WP grenade in with him. He came out burning and screaming and I cut him down. That's about all I remember until I was lying down changing magazines. The Lieutenant was yelling "Withdraw, everybody get off the hill." He had called in mortars and they were coming in already. I got out of there. Engles and Galvin (a Marine who would join H/3/1 in September), the only two to be injured, got nicked by grenades. The assault didn't last two minutes. By the time we got back it was 3:30 AM. We were all dead tired but we stayed up until daylight telling each other what we had done. We were happy as kids on a picnic. It was something to be happy about. We all came home OK but a lot of those Gooks won't.... P.S. That's six for me...another P.S. We get a lot of incoming rounds up here too so wish me luck. I need it.

Sgt Menard washed his clothes in a stream.

SUNDAY, AUGUST 3, 1952

This was a clear, hot day. Sgt Ray Menard had the 1800-2000 watch. It was already foggy all the way out to Yoke. At 0800 Ray received two gallons of ice cream and some donuts.

MONDAY, AUGUST 4, 1952

Col. Laver and the Company CO, Capt. Byron J. Melancon, visited the OP. Tanks in the direction of I/3/1 were firing to the front. There was some incoming in the H/3/1 area. Sgt Menard had the 2000 to 2200 OP watch.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 5, 1952

Division inspected H/3/1 on this date.

More ice Cream for the Mortar Section. Sgt Menard added four more concentrations. Lt. Farrell, the Mortar Section Leader went back to Division for a test.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 6, 1952

The Mortar Section got six more listening post concentrations.

2nd Lt. James "Jim" C. Canelo, the 3rd Platoon Leader, and Cpl Buddy "Bud" S. Scott (left at 1100) in the Mortar Section were relieved from duties and began getting ready to return to the states. They possibly went to Battalion to await those from the other companies who were returning on the same draft.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 7, 1952

Sgt Menard fixed up his bunker in preparation for the "Wheels" who would be coming to watch the air strike on Yoke (Hill 66). One of the pilots looked like he was doing stunts.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 8, 1952

Another air strike in front of the Company today. It was a pretty dull day for the Mortar Section except a Congressman came up at 1600. More mail arrived from Battalion.

SATURDAY, AUGUST 9, 1952

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I/3/1 had a patrol surrounded and suffered fifty percent casualties.

Sgt Menard received five letters in the morning and some pictures from home.

About this date a photographer took a picture and labeled it, "It's scrub day for PFC Lammers". The picture shows three Marines in a shallow creek taking a sponge bath. Below the picture is written, "Marine, PFC John E. Lammers (center), son of Mr. and Mrs. Louis H. Lammers of Hartington, NE is pictured in this official Marine Corps photo as he takes a stream somewhere in Korea. PFC Lammers' buddies, PFC George Sprague and Donald E. Whiteman, are both from Franklin, IN."

Lammers was in the 3/1 Recon Platoon, Sprague was in H/3/1's 2nd Platoon and Whiteman was in the 3rd Platoon. Apparently this was three hometown buddies getting together. Among other things they probably discussed Lammers' rat terrier dog, Toy, who was now 19 years old. The dog was only 6 month older than Lammers but was 133 when compared to the life of a human.

The following Marines were dropped from the Company:
- 2nd Lt. James "Jim" C. Canelo
- MSgt George D. Henwood
- TSgt Johnnie M. Neely
- Cpl Buddy S. Scott
- PFC David R. Bush
- Charles R. Kenawell
- PFC James R. Porter
- PFC Raymond M. Shields

SUNDAY, AUGUST 10, 1952

Sgt Menard had the last watch in the morning at 0400 and then went to Mass. At 1800 he watched an air strike with Lt Farrell and the Mortar Section 1st Squad's Assistant Gunner, PFC Enrique J. Riojas.

MONDAY, AUGUST 11, 1952

Sgt Menard had the first OP watch at 0600 and had his troops work on the mortar ammo bunker.

Lt. Farrell went to the rear for another test.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 12, 1952

Among the supplies available behind Bunker Hill, and the MLR was bunker materials. These materials included timbers that were piled together in stacks that representing one bunker. With each stack was a set of plans on how to construct the bunker. No nails are used. The only tool needed is a regular entrenching tool.

Marines had now been issued flak jackets and they would come in handy in the next weeks fighting. Fighting raged for control of the Bunker Hill complex. Regimental responsibility for Bunker Hill was transferred to 3/1. On this day I/3/1, with the 3/1 Recon Platoon attached, did most of the fighting for Bunker Hill while H/3/1 manned the MLR. At times the Chinese had control of the hill and it needed to be retaken. Flame-throwing tanks scorched Siberia (to the right of, and near Bunker Hill) in a diversionary tactic that sucked Chinese assets away from Bunker Hill. I/3/1 jumped off in the morning and after a tough battle had control of the hill by dusk.

By 1820 I/31/ was digging in as rapidly as possible. Even while the attack was continuing, Marines wearing armored vests were rushing up, carrying timbers of prefabricated bunkers. They used explosives to blast out holes. Then the timbers were driven into the holes. It was a furiously fast job of building bunkers and digging-in because they knew the Chinese would be counter attacking. They were well prepared when the Chinese did come.

The enemy caught their breath and then their reaction was strong and positive. They made a vicious and rare daylight assault on Bunker hill during the late afternoon. Preparation paid off and the Chinese were repulsed in the first of three major counterattacks they would make in the next thirty hours. For five days and nights the Marines, mainly from 3/1, would hold their ground through seven nightmarish attacks.

1st Mar. Div. casualties at Bunker Hill were so high that on this date the 1st Marine...
Division CG, Gen. Selden, directed that rear area and supporting units fill vacancies on the line. Two hundred volunteers came forward to fill the empty ranks. The CG also requested that HQMC air lift 500 enlisted Marine infantryman as soon as possible and to add an extra 500 men to the next two replacement drafts. HQMC approved the request and airlifted 500 men from the 3rd Division at Camp Pendleton. They arrived on August 21st.

Sgt Menard had the first OP watch at 0600 and also from 1600 to midnight. From his vantage point he could see B/1/1 jumping off on their flank and the attacks on Bunker and Siberia.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 13, 1952

At 0130 I/3/1 was being hit by a concentrated enemy barrage and estimated regiment of Chinese infantry assaulted the Bunker Hill. The enemy attack was directed against center and right flank platoons. At this point supporting arms played an important role by firing the necessary "box me in" fires. The 4/5 rocket company under the control of the 11th Marines fired nine rocket ripples in support of this operation.

Shortly after the attack I/3/1 called for reinforcements. At 0145 G/3/7 was alerted and instructed to pass through I/3/7 on the MLR and reinforce I/3/1 on Bunker Hill. However, before they could move, immediate reinforcements were called for and at 0225 I/3/7 dispatched two reinforced squads forward to fill the gaps. G/3/7 commenced reinforcing I/3/1. By 0430 the enemy began to withdraw, minus a large portion of their original force, but the enemy probe continued until 0710. At 0840, a patrol of platoon size swept forward to take prisoners but the attempt proved futile. All day Marine planes were in the air covering the infantry on the ground.

At 1015 H/3/7 was placed under operational control of 3/1 and commenced relieving I/3/1 and G/3/7 on the Bunker Hill position. At 1905, after a short rest in the Battalion CP area, I/3/1 was taken under operational control of 1/1 and proceeded to the latter's reserve area for reorganization.

At 2100 an estimated enemy infantry battalion was assaulting H/3/7 on Bunker Hill. Once again the supporting arms saved the day by completely disorganizing the enemy attack. By 2320 the probe was beaten off and all was quiet except for the occasional artillery and mortar rounds hitting within the forward position.

Sgt Menard's H/3/1 Mortar Section played an important role in helping to hold back the Chinese. After one hour's sleep he had his mortars firing from 0200 throughout the night. They fired at least as many 60mm mortar rounds as they received from their rear supply point, ninety six rounds at 0500 and six hundred more during the day. Sgt Menard found time to take a short nap in the afternoon.

At Mid-morning, General John T. Seldon, the 1st Marine Division CG, announced that "Bunker Ridge is Marine Territory now and we certainly are going to hang on to it".

The CCF made a diversionary attack on the MLR to the left of Bunker Hill. The initial attack was on COP 2 where G/3/1 was defending. Following this attack, H/3/1 began receiving artillery rounds in pre-assault proportions. In this twenty-four hour period the Chinese would employ 6,000 mortar/artillery rounds.

Following/during the diversionary attacks, the Chinese shelled Bunker Hill for two hours. Our illumination shells were fired on the northern slopes to silhouette the enemy as they came over the top. The Recon Platoon was defending I/3/1's left flank when the Chinese struck. As soon as the barrage ended, about 1600, they attacked with a screaming, yelling force of 400 Chinese troops. The Chinese attacked on three sides and swept around the left flank to engage in hand-to-hand combat. By about 1800 the Chinese were defeated thanks to the help of air, artillery, and tank fire.

PFC John "Luke" Lammers who had been in H/3/1 was transferred to H&S/3/1's Recon Platoon on June 21st and was in this action. Luke was fatally wounded in the chest with a burp gun. He collapsed, went into shock, and died without regaining consciousness. Another report says he was clubbed to death by a huge Chinese soldier whose Burp gun malfunctioned. Many other Marines were also WIA/KIA during the attack. Numerous (perhaps more than 100) dead Chinese were laying in and near the trench line.
THURSDAY, AUGUST 14, 1952

At 0225 the enemy again engaged H/3/1 in a fire fight on Bunker Hill. This was believed to be covering fire for the recovery of the enemy dead and wounded. At 0415 the 3/1 reconnaissance platoon went to hill 124 (Hedy or Yellow) in order to recover the body of one of their fallen comrade (probably PFC John Lammers). This attempt was futile because of enemy small arms and mortar fire, but the body was recovered several days later by a friendly fire team. At 1945, one platoon of A/1/1 reinforced H/3/7 in anticipation of another enemy attack on Bunker. At 2300 H/3/7 reported an unknown number of enemy on the topographical crest of bunker Hill was throwing grenades into H/3/7's position and H/3/7 countered with small arms and grenades.

Ron "Mack" "Crazy Kid" McKinney's who had just gotten off Bunker Hill with I/3/1 was transferred from I/3/1 to H&S's Recon Platoon. He was PFC John "Luke" Lammers' replacement after Luke's death yesterday. On the morning of the 12th Ron had been with I/3/1 when they made a raid on Bunker hill and was wounded with shrapnel when they withdrew. Corpsman Ron Shadwick plucked the slivers out of what Ron thought was a "million dollar wound", slapped band-aids over the holes and sent him packing to Captain Connolly, I/3/1's CO, who ordered him to report to SSgt Mason in 3/1's Raider Platoon. This Recon Platoon would become integrated into H/3/1 on Aug. 27th or 28th.

The Mortar Section got in another 200 rounds of illumination. They fired on target #18 until after midnight.

2nd Lt. George Hubbard, PFC Willis C. Evans, and PFC Carl L. Kiefer were dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 15, 1952

At 0058 the anticipated attack came at Bunker Hill and at 1220 they were receiving small arms fire. H/3/7 returned the fire and once again the "box-me-in" fires were requested and delivered. An excellent example of coordination between infantry, artillery, and air was disastrous to the enemy. By 0130 the enemy began withdrawing and our artillery fire followed their movement as tank lights illuminated them. H/3/1 sustained 2 KIAs while returning to the MLR as a result of enemy 82mm mortar fire on the trail. At 0430 B/1/1 commenced relief of H/3/7 on Bunker Hill and at 0645 B/1/1 assumed responsibility for the hill between Hedy and Bunker. The enemy probed again in daylight in the midst of a heavy rain. B/1/1 beat them off and the enemy left about 50 KIA behind. At 0715 H/3/7 returned to parent control and the B/1/1 rifle company that had been attached to them also returned to parent control.

At 1630 B/1/1 was being probed by an estimated enemy company on the center and right flank. B/1/1 employed small arms, automatic weapons, mortars, and artillery. At 1730 the enemy attack was diminishing and at 1750 they withdrew.

Sgt Menard was up again at 0200. At 1400 he sent 100 round of 60mm mortar illumination to I/3/1. He got to a shower unit at 1700, the first shower he had had in four weeks.

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

H/3/1 wireman     Wallie "Red" Hansen (left)
Rocket sect.      PFC Billy "Bill" Thomas Dean
MG Plt.           Paul Hawks (left)
                   (Hawks was also in 3rd Plt. but it is not known when he changed positions within
                   the Company.)
1st Plt. 2nd Sqd  PFC Franklin "Frank" D. Keith
                   1137017/5831 (left)
1st Plt.          Dave Moore (joined)
                   PFC Morris W. Wright
                   PFC William A. Yap

PFC Bradford B. Shinn, 1247509/0311, is shown on H/3/1's July 1953 Monthly Personnel Roster as leaving the states in July 1952. If this is not a mistake, he probably arrived in Korea about this date. It is also possible that there is a typing error and
Bradford left the U.S.A. in July 1953 and arrived about August 1953.

Bob Bosley recalls how he became a machinegunner. Shortly after he and his buddy, Mouse, arrived, they needed some replacements on line. The Sgt. took Bosley up and said there's a gun in that bunker, get in there. It was a machinegun and that is how Bosley became a machinegunner.

PFC Robert L. Jackson Jr. was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, AUGUST 16, 1952

At 0030 B/1/1 was in a fire fight with the enemy. At 0040 the enemy attack increased in intensity and B/1/1 was receiving heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire. At 0150 one platoon from I/3/7 was committed and commenced reinforcing B/1/1. After having been reorganized in reserve, at 0430 I/1/1 relieved I/3/7 on the MLR. At 0700 the forward aid station reported that B/1/1 had sustained 3 KIA's and 27 WIA's (evacuated).

3/1 reported early in the morning that artillery illumination was exhausted and 81mm mortar illumination was fast diminishing. Flare Planes were used to keep the area lighted. At 1815 A/1/1 came under operational control of 3/1 and relieved C/1/1 on the left sector of the MLR. C/1/1 in turn commenced relief of B/1/1 on Bunker Hill. H/3/1 shifted their right flank platoon farther to the right to close the gap left on the MLR.

To summarize, enemy mortars and artillery shells fell on Bunker Hill throughout the early morning hours. The Chinese struck before dawn with another four hundred men. Fresh Marine reinforcements were rushed forward from the MLR for the defense of the Hill. The main Chinese force came within 30 yards of the trench line and some even reached Bunker Hills trench line to engage in hand-to-hand combat with Marines. The Chinese withdrew after sustaining heavy losses. The 1st Marine Division estimated that the Chinese had 226 killed or wounded in this battle that lasted about a half hour. They also estimated the Chinese losses for the week were 3,735 killed or wounded.

Although not apparent at this time the Chinese were going to discontinued their major attacks on Bunker Hill. However, they still made several probes to maintain their intelligence of the strength and placement of Marine positions. The Chinese had made seven major attacks on Bunker Hill in the last five days.

There was no vegetation left on Bunker Hill. The results of the last week's artillery and mortar barrages left the hill looking like a sand dune during the dry days and a sea of mud in the rain. All approaches to Bunker Hill were observable and covered by enemy mortar and artillery fire. One Marine who was wounded at 0800 had to wait until dark to be evacuated. The glare of the sun reflecting off the white sand was severe enough that some of the Marines suffered from heat exhaustion. One Marine commented, "You got so hot you couldn't eat". The battles on Bunker Hill gave a good test of the new flak jackets. Marines were now believers in flak jackets and had stories of how they had saved lives and reduced the severity of wounds.

Sgt Menard had his section working on building a new head. The digging of the hole required some blasting. The Mortar Section's coke cola ration arrived and Sgt Menard submitted a request to supply for a wrist watch.

SUNDAY, AUGUST 17, 1952

About this date there was a patrol that left the MLR to investigate Bunker Hill ridge. The patrol included Squad Leader Sgt Paul Schick, PFC Billy Dean, and PFC Fred Buxton. They had no sooner left the MLR when there was a barrage of incoming. Sgt Schick radioed back to request and get permission to hold up the patrol for a few minutes. They hugged the ground in a depression and waited. About ten minutes later Sgt Schick called again and was told to "get moving". Sgt Schick replied, "You are about to get us killed". The response was, "Move out or you will all be court-martialed". About thirty seconds after they moved out, several rounds landed in the depression they had just left. If they had not have moved out, all would have been casualties and perhaps dead.

When they arrived on Bunker Ridge, they set up their position. Billy Dean investigated a bunker that had several Chinese grenades. He thought it was better to leave
them alone rather than handle an unfamiliar explosive and pull the cord (fuse). Sgt Schick decided to check out the forward slope without telling the rest of the patrol. About twenty minutes later, when he returned, Dean and Buxton first saw a helmet coming over the ridge, then, eventually, a silhouette. They unlocked their safety and were ready to fire when something just didn't look right. At the last minute Buxton called, "Is that you Schick?". He had gone over the ridge, lost his way, and was looking for them. This was one of the few occasions when a Sergeant took a cursing from two PFCs. He apologized and said he would never do that again. It would have been a disaster if they had fired because Sgt Schick was a very good Marine, a likeable person, very honest, and a very good friend. Except for the preceding near-death experiences, the patrol was uneventful.

At 0555 C/1/1 completed relief of B/1/1 and one Platoon of I/3/7 on bunker Hill. B/1/1 and their reinforcing platoon reverted to parent control.

At 2345 C/1/1 engaged an enemy squad-sized probe on the right flank. C/1/1 fired small arms and automatic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew a 0015.

The Mortar Section fired on targets #13, 14, and 15. The wrist watch Sgt Menard requested from supply arrived.

MONDAY, AUGUST 18, 1952

As stated in yesterday's report, the probing enemy squad withdrew with an unknown number of casualties from Bunker Hill at 0015. At 0130 C/1/1 reported 5 WIAs (evacuated) as a result of the fire fight and enemy 120mm artillery fire. At 0745 Battalion forward aid reported total C/1/1 casualties from encounters was 3 KIAs, 12 WIAs (evacuated), and 2 friendly WIAs (non-evacuated).

At 2045 one Platoon of H/3/1 were in an assembly area to the rear of the MLR. This platoon was to stand by as reinforcements for the company on Hill 124 (Hedy) and Hill 122 (Bunker Hill). The H/3/1 Platoon was replaced on the MLR by a provisional platoon of H&S/3/1 personnel and members of the Battalion reconnaissance platoon.

At 2315 G/3/1 reported 1 friendly KIA and 1 friendly WIA (evacuated) as a result of friendly small arms fire. There was a misunderstanding on the route to be followed by the friendly fire team which resulted in friendly fire engaging two member of the friendly fire team.

It was rainy and dreary all day. No mail arrived and Sgt Menard had the last, 0400, OP watch.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 19, 1952

C/1/1 on position between Hills 124 and 122 sustained 1 KIA, 2 WIAs (evacuated), and 2 WIAs (non-evacuated) At 0245 C/1/1 engaged an unknown number of enemy in a two-minute fire fight. The enemy broke contact with an unknown number of casualties.

At 0330 D/2/1 came under operational control of 3/1 and commenced relief of C/1/1 on Bunker Hill. The relief was completed at 0550 and C/1/1 reverted to parent control at 0640.

At 1155 friendly tanks fired on an enemy mortar postion, trench line, and bunkers in the vicinity of Hill 122. The tank destroyed the enemy mortar position, 50 feet of trench line, and severely damaged two enemy bunkers with an unknown number of enemy casualties.

The H/3/1 Mortar Section did no firing and they had the day pretty much to their selves. Sgt Menard cleaned his rifle and .38 pistol.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 20, 1952

At 0130 D/2/1 engaged an estimated platoon-sized probe in a five minute fire fight on Bunker Hill. The enemy attack was directed against the right and left flanks of D/2/1. Small arms and grenades were employed by the enemy before they withdrew with unknown number of casualties. D/2/1 sustained 1 WIA (evacuated) which resulted from an enemy grenade fragment.

At 1200 I/1/1 occupying the MLR destroyed an enemy 61mm mortar at coordinates 016046
with friendly 60mm mortar fire. The enemy suffered 2 KIA and 2 WIA. G/3/1 sustained 1 WIA (evac.) and 1 WIA (non-evac.) at coordinates 969029 from enemy 82mm mortar fire. D/2/1 sustained 1 WIA (evac.) and 1 WIA (non-evac.) from enemy 82mm mortar fire.

Lt. Col. Sidney J. Altman relieved Lt. Col. Gerald T. Armitage as CO of the 3/1. It has been reported that the reason Lt. Col Armitage was relieved was because, during his watch, a tank assigned to 3/1 fired a round into Panmunjom (no fires zone). Ron Mckinney, also reported on this incident, said "he was relieved of his command because he directed counter battery fire on the chink artillery parked beside the Truce Site and shooting over it at us on Bunker (a short round landed inside the O'Daniel neutral circle while nobody was there, but it left Admiral Joy in a pickle)."

Sgt Menard had the first, 0600, OP watch and was visited by some Generals and Col. Layer at 0830. He received two letters from home and a package slip. They were on 100% watch until 1130 but only heard horns being blown by the Chinese.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 21, 1952

D/2/1 on Bunker Hill sustained a total of 6 KIA and 6 WIA (non-evac) from sporadic enemy 61mm and 82mm mortar fire this day

Sgt Menard had the 0130-0400 phone watch. His package from home arrived in the afternoon. The Mortar Section's 2nd Squad was building a new 60mm mortar ammo bunker.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 22, 1952

At 0030 D/2/1 engaged a squad-to-platoon sized enemy probe on the right flank. The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons, grenades and 61mm mortars. At 0050 the enemy withdrew with an unknown number of casualties. D/2/1 sustained 1 WIA (non-evac.) from 61mm mortar fire. At 0515 D/2/1 sustained 2 more KIA who were in an uncovered fighting hole and hit by a 120mm mortar.

The Mortar Section had a 0600 reveille.

At 2025 D/2/1 engaged an unknown number of enemy in a five-minute fire fight. Small arms and automatic weapons fire was exchanged with the enemy breaking contact.

Action along the Division's forward position was more intense than in any previous period since arriving on the Western Front. The most persistent efforts of the enemy were centered around the Bunker Hill and Siberia outposts in the 1st Marines sector. Many heavy fire fights occurred on Bunker Hill about this date. During the stay there, Marines continued to resist enemy probes to hold the position.

About this date Cpl Willard Steel was evacuated to the hospital ship because he had a rupture. From there he went to Japan for further treatment. Willard remained in Japan and became an M. P. at Camp Fisher, Japan for the remainder of his tour.

SATURDAY, AUGUST 23, 1952

At 0401 4 enemy under cover of supporting small arms fire tried to infiltrate D/2/1's right flank. D/2/1 used small arms and grenades and the enemy withdrew with unknown casualties. At 0415 an estimated enemy platoon engaged the friendly position in a two-minute fire fight and then withdrew.

At 1020 D/2/1 reported 1 enemy sniper on the crest of Hill 122 was KIA from friendly .30 caliber sniper fire. At 1110 D/2/1 sustained 1 WIA (non-evac.) resulting from enemy sniper fire coming from the crest of Hill 122. At the same time 1 enemy sniper was WIA on Hill 122 as a result of .30 caliber friendly sniper fire.

At 2145 an unknown number of enemy engaged the right flank of D/2/1 with small arms and grenades. At 2205 the enemy withdrew with unknown casualties.

Sgt Menard worked on his bunker during this rainy day. During his OP watch he saw one gook on Yoke. No mail arrived today.
H/3/1 MARINES

SUNDAY, AUGUST 24, 1952

At 0100 F/2/1 came under operational control of 3/1 and commenced relieving of D/2/1 on Bunker Hill. At 0600 the relief was complete and D/2/1 reverted to parent control.

At 1930 F/2/1 sustained 1 KIA resulting from enemy sniper fire from Hill 122. Also at this time F/2/1 sustained 4 WIA (evac.) from enemy 57mm RR, 82mm, and 120mm mortar fire. At 2320 F/2/1 engaged an estimated platoon sized enemy probe on its right flank. Enemy 122 artillery fire fell on F/2/1 position during this probe. Friendly artillery and mortars fired counter-mortar fire and defensive fires for F/2/1. At 2335 the enemy withdrew with and unknown number of casualties.

It was a windy, rainy day again. The Mortar Section Leader, Lt. Farrell, had his men helping on other bunkers.

MONDAY, AUGUST 25, 1952

At 1325 F/2/1 sustained 1 WIA (evac.) from enemy sniper fire coming from the crest of Hill 122.

At 2043 and estimated 2 enemy squads charged the right flank of F/2/1. The enemy threw an estimated 60 hand grenades. F/2/1 engaged the enemy with small arms, automatic weapons, and grenades which caused the enemy to suffer and estimated 5 KIA. At 2120 F/2/1's center squad of the right platoon was attacked and overrun by and estimated two companies of enemy infantry. Soon after the attack commenced the enemy strength increased and he began to hit the center platoon area. Friendly artillery and mortar box-me-in fire was used in the defense. At 2145 the enemy attack was increasing and F/2/1 was receiving continuous small arms and automatic weapons fire. At 2245 one platoon of A/1/1 which had been placed on standby on the MLR was committed to reinforce F/2/1 on Bunker Hill. The attack was still in progress by 2300 and at this time the F/2/1 commander estimated the enemy strength to be that of a battalion. At 2345 one platoon of H/3/1 relieved the A/1/1 platoon at 2345 on Bunker Hill.

The 13th draft personnel were leaving the Battalion to begin their return trip to the USA.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 26, 1952

At 0210 F/2/1 estimated the enemy casualties to be 50 KIA and 20 WIA. At 0230 the enemy started another attack on F/2/1's positions. At 0230 A/1/1 reinforced with one platoon (probably the 3rd Platoon) of H/3/1 (or the H/3/1 Platoon alone) engaged the enemy in an intense fire fight to drive him from the forward slope of the ridge line between Hedy and Bunker Hill. The attack continued until 0340 when the enemy withdrew. At 0420 F/2/1 and H/3/1's 3rd platoon had regained all of its positions and the enemy attack ceased. At 0745 the F/2/1 commander estimated the enemy casualties to be 100 KIA and 170 WIA.

Andrew J. Morgan Jr., 1230120, of the 2nd Fire team, 1st Squad, 3rd Platoon was KIA in this action and dropped from the Company. He was from Peoria, IL and is buried there. Corpsman Alvin Joyner attended Andrew and then carried him back to be evacuated. Andrew apparently died while aboard the helicopter that was evacuating him. The official location of his death is Chang-dan, Korea (probably where the Battalion aid station was located) but his fatal wounds were received on Bunker Hill.

PFC Robert Hawkins, a BARman in 2nd fire team, 1st Squad, 3rd Platoon, was also wounded in this action. He was near Andrew Morgan and saw him get hit by shrapnel from a hand grenade and small arms fire in the groin area. He said Andrew was asking for someone to shoot him because of the severe pain. Robert also said Andrew was hit by a second grenade that caused severe head injuries, removing part of his head.

D/2/1 came under operational control of 3/1 at 1945 and commenced relieving H/3/1 on the MLR (Jamestown Line). At 2125 F/3/7 came under operational control of 3/1 and commenced the relief of A/1/1 on the left sector of the MLR. By 2245 both D/2/1 and F/3/7 had completed the relief and assumed responsibility for their respective sectors of the MLR. A/1/1 reverted to parental control at 2345.
After being relieved on the MLR, H/3/1 prepared to relieve F/3/1 on Bunker Hill. Since one platoon of H/3/1 had been committed to reinforce F/3/1 earlier only two platoons were involved in this relief. PFC Willard "Will" O'Hara, the 3rd Platoon Runner, was also wounded in an ambush on this, his birthday. PFC Clenton Moon was WIA.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 27, 1952

At 0230 H/3/1 commenced relief and had completed the relief of F/2/1 at 0510. H/3/1 assumed responsibility of the forward position at Bunker Hill. At 0545 F/2/1 reverted to parental control. As soon as H/3/1 assumed responsibility for Bunker Hill, one platoon of F/2/1 was taken under H/3/1's operational control. The Company may also have been reinforced by the remnants of the 3/1 Raider Platoon.

A battle for Bunker Hill had been going on for two weeks. So many mortar and artillery rounds by both sides had exploded on the hill there wasn’t a tree, shrub or weed left on it. The hill was zeroed in by both sides and any sign of movement in daylight was sure to draw a barrage of fire. The lines were perhaps forty yards apart with the crest of the hill separating sides. By day H/3/1 would stay cramped four-man bunkers which were so tight they had to leave their weapons outside leaning up against the bunker. Almost all the action took place at night.

About this date on Bunker Hill PFC Franz Brucks (Bruckschlogl noticed a pair of tan legs appear at his bunker entrance. He thought it was PFC Leocadio Rivera, a young Puerto Rican in his fire team. Franz shouted to get back in his bunker. In the same instant Franz looked up to see a Chinese soldier in the bunker entrance holding a box of grenades in his hands. Franz grabbed his legs an jerked him to the ground. The grenades spilled out of the box and rolled everywhere. His buddies in the bunker (Cpl Bill Capella, PFC Arme "Farmer" Berg, and Cpl Gerald Thaxton) tried to crawl unto their helmets and flack jackets. They thought they were toast. They wrestled for what seemed to an eternity, but was probably about fifteen seconds. Franz was hoping the Chinese was as scared as he was. The got to his feet and ran toward the Chinese lines. Franz’s M-1 was only an arms length away. He grabbed it, did what he was taught and empties a full clip into the Chinese. By then his buddies had scrambled out of the bunker an all along the line H/3/1 was ready for another night of action.

At 1030 H/3/1 sustained 2 WIA (evac.) resulting from enemy 122mm artillery fire on Hill 122.

Lt. Earl Lester Valentine, the 1st Platoon Leader, was wounded and lying exposed to enemy fire. PFC Robert Hawkins, a barman in the 1st Squad, 3rd Platoon, said Earl had a very large hole where he was wounded. The enemy would fire at him to add to his pain but not kill him. They did this to draw out rescuers they could target. It was a hopeless deathtrap until Cpl Charles "Charlie" R. Taylor braved the fire to performed the rescue. Earl was evacuated to the hospital ship where he died. Earl posthumously received the Navy Cross for his action in this battle. Charlie Taylor received the Silver Star for his action in rescuing Earl from the deathtrap and bringing him back to safety. Earl was dropped from the Company on this date.

Charlie Taylor received his award in the Battalion Commanders tent at some later date when the Company was on Hill 119 (later named Boulder City).

PFC Vic Rivera Rivera was also dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 28, 1952

H/3/1 reported casualties for the period between 1800, 8/27/52 and 0700 8/28/52 were 4 WIA (evac.) and 2 WIA (non-evac). All these casualties resulted from mixed enemy incoming on their Bunker Hill position.

The Battalions nightly combat patrols, outposts, and listening posts departed the MLR on schedule.

The remnants of SSgt William "Mace" Mason's Squad of Recon Platoon was reinforcing
How Company on Bunker Hill (and/or Hedy). H/3/1 had lost 32 men. About 30 replacements and the remnants of Recon Platoon were combined to reinforce the 3rd Platoon of How Company on Bunker Hill until 5 September. SSgt William Mason became the temporary Platoon Leader of this Platoon until Sept. 5th. SSgt Billy L. Goodman was also a squad leader in this Recon Platoon. Ron McKinney was with Recon and would stay as Capt. Byron J. Melancon’s (H/3/1 CO) driver for a couple weeks.

Sgt Norman L. Carlson was dropped from the Company.

Cpl Chalmer Elkins said he was WIA on this date.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 29, 1952

At 1600 H/3/1 sustained 1 KIA and 2 WIA (evac.) resulting from enemy 82mm mortar fire on Bunker Hill.

At 2040 H/3/1 engaged an estimated enemy squad probe on its right flank. The enemy supported this attack with heavy artillery and mortar fire. The fire fight continued sporadically until 0030, 30 August.


Ron McKinney was sharing a hole with another Marine he called Sharkey (name may have been Donny Jones). Sharkey, who was also a Recon Platoon replacement, was evacuated about this date.

Cpl Danny Blubaugh had joined H/3/1 as part of H&S/3/1’s Recon Platoon. Shrapnel from a heavy artillery round wounded him, Cpl John Miller, and a H/3/1 TSgt. Lt. “Dick” Reed and Cpl Franz Bruckschlogl was there to see them trying to reinsert Danny’s intestines. His left arm and leg was also shattered by the shrapnel. Danny was in such pain that he was asking them to kill him. Sgt Joseph Caid, Cpl Bruckschlogl (Brucks), and Ronald McKinney got them back to the CP where Corpsman Mike Roberts worked on them. Danny died on the stretcher while saying his Hail Mary’s at the aid station and was listed as KIA. He was from Tonkawa, OK where he is buried. Cpl John Miller had severe chest wounds that were not fatal and was evacuated. Miller never returned to the Company and sent a post card from Louisiana to the surprise of those who thought he surely would die from his severe chest wounds.

PFC William J. Bray Jr. was WIA in the right arm.

SATURDAY, AUGUST 30, 1952

At 0300 a platoon of (apparently H/3/7) relieved F/3/1 platoon that was reinforcing H/3/1 on Bunker Hill

At 0600 H/3/1 reported that 9 enemy were counted KIA as a result of the previous night's fire fight on Bunker Hill. The enemy strength was estimated to be 25-30 men.

SUNDAY, AUGUST 31, 1952

At 0550 H/3/1 on Hill 122 (Bunker Hill) sustained 1 WIA (evac.) from enemy 82mm mortar fire.

At 2345 3/1 assumed operational control of E/2/1. E/2/1 relieved H/3/1 on Bunker Hill at 2400.

Significant parts of a medical summary for the Battalion shows:

(1) During the early part of the month daily inspections of one line company were made by the medical officers of the Battalion. These inspections were especially made to combat Hemorrhagic fever and dysentery.

(2) No definite cases of venereal disease occurred during the month, however six cases of non-specific urethritis were treated.

(3) On August 11 a company aid station was set up at 1/3/1 and a Battalion forward aid station was set up near the MLR to facilitate the rapid treatment and evacuation of casualties sustained in the Bunker Hill operation. From 11 August–31 August there were 643 combat casualties treated at the Battalion forward aid station. Of these 115 were helicopter evacuated.
(4) Great help in evacuating casualties was given by armored personnel carriers provided by Charlie Company, 1st Tank Battalion. Due to the inclement weather the roads were impassable to jeeps and trucks and the armored personnel carriers were the only means of transportation.

(5) An extra tent was provided for illnesses not requiring evacuation in the Battalion Aid Station area. This contributed greatly to the comfort and better treatment of patients, and reduced greatly the number of days lost due to sickness.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1952

At 0510 H/3/1 was relieved from their position on Bunker Hill by E/2/1 which had been attached to 3/1. H/3/1 moved to the 2/1 reserve area and came under control of 2/1, the Reserve Battalion. H/3/1 had moved into Camp Meyer where there was hot chow and a shower unit where they could get clean, and sometimes new, dungarees. The camp also had a movie. A total of 227 rounds of mixed mortar fire fell on the G, H, and I/3/1 sectors during this day.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1952

SSgt Joseph "Mighty Joe" A. Young Jr., the senior man in the Mortar Section was dropped from H/3/1 on this date. Sgt Menard became the Section Sergeant when Joseph left. Sgt Menard got up too late to get to breakfast. He packed his gear because they were relieving G/3/1 on OP #2.

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC Larry W. Durand                PFC David F. Hunter Jr.
Sgt Edward P. Joy                   PFC William A. Just
PFC Franklin D. Keith               PFC Charles Koechling
PFC Robert D. Lockwood              Cpl Salvator Mirabella
Sgt Dean V. Mott                    Sgt Thomas C. Proffitt
Cpl Richard M. Rath                 Cpl Russell S. Renick
SSgt Homer "Roady" R. Rhode          SSgt Doyle Rowley Jr.
PFC Edward W. Simpson                Cpl Dale E. Smathers
PFC George E. Sprague               Cpl Dennis C. Stedman
Cpl Bobby E. Stephens                Cpl James N. Stephenson
Cpl Hugo D. Vernon                   Cpl Clarence J. Vos
PFC Robert E. Wagner                 PFC Willard T. Wallace
PFC Samuel Weir                      PFC Donald E. Whiteman
PFC Roy E. Wilder                    SSgt Joseph "Mighty Joe" A. Young Jr.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 1952

H/3/1 relieved G/3/1 assumed control of the left sector of the Battalion (and Regiment). The position included OP 2 at coordinates 970028. They were near the road to Panmunjom which had a non-combat area for 200 feet on each side of the road. The Panmunjom road ran from friendly positions behind Hill 229, in a northwesterly direction, to Panmunjom where the peace talks were being held.

At 0207 H/3/1 engaged 2 enemy infiltrators in a fire fight at coordinates 966029 (300 yards southwest of OP2). Results were 1 enemy counted KIA and 1 enemy estimated KIA.

It rained all day and night. The Mortar Section got out in the rain at 2230 to fire illumination over Bunker Hill. There were no casualties when one of their bunkers caved in, possibly from the rain.

This was about the first day on in the Company for PFC Billy Dean. He recalls someone calling, "One is on the way." and everyone would run for a bunker. He soon realized that it was incoming 61 mm mortars. There was a Marine on the forward slope that was that could heart the enemy mortar as it popped out of the tube and would give warning.

A total of 228 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery fire fell on H and I/3/1 and E/2/1 sectors this day.
It stopped raining and the Mortar Section started building a new bunker. They had several 61mm and 82mm incoming all day. They were pretty accurate because some landed right in the trench line.

The enemy had continued to make small (squad/platoon) probes on Bunker Hill. A total of 617 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery fell on H and I/3/1 and E/2/1 sectors on this day.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1952

At 0245 H/3/1 observed 1 enemy at coordinates 975030 (ENE of OP2). The enemy fired small arms at a Marine walking in a trench and then disappeared.

At 2130 H/3/1 reported a North Korean MP officer surrendered at a friendly check point. The POW was delivered to Division G-2.

The Mortar Section continued to work on their new bunker. They got some planks but ran out of sand bags. Mail came and Sgt Menard got two packages an a letter.

About this date the Raider Platoon were disbanded. SSgt Mason stayed with How Company for a short time, then he and MSgt Henson (Ron Mason was not positive of the name, but he was the Sniper School NCOIC) went to the KMCs or ROKs to teach them patrolling and sniping for a couple of weeks. The men that were in the H&S/3/1 Recon Platoon that had joined H/3/1 on Aug. 26th returned their parent company. Ron McKinney stayed as the Company CO's jeep driver.

About this date PFC Billy Dean went on his first patrol with five other Marines. At 2200 they went southwest, crossed the Panmunjom Road, and set up about 250 feet beyond the road (just outside of the non-combat zone). Billy recalls that when they arrived at the road, they moved out at ten yard interval counting steps to determine where the imaginary 200 foot line would be. They then walked another fifty feet to get to a satisfactory position where they could lay in wait for an enemy. They were near the Koran Marine Corps area and were concerned that they would not be able to tell the difference between them and an enemy soldier. The night was uneventful and they returned to their unit prior to daylight.

A total of 3,929 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery fell on H and I/3/1 and E/2/1 sectors.

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1952

At 0145 H/3/1 observed 1 amber flare to the left of Hill 70 (Claw, coordinates 994034).

Sgt Menard got another package and his Mortar Section continued to work on the new bunker. A General visited them at OP #2.

A total of 179 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery fire fell on H and I/3/1 G/3/1 sectors.

At 2300 I/3/1 was relieved by F/2/1 and proceeded to 2/1 reserve area.

PFC Donald P. Hamilton was dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1952

At 0310 G/3/1 reported 1 friendly WIA (evacuated) result of enemy grenade in the vicinity of Hill 122 (Bunker Hill).

About this date three Marines (PFC Fred Buxton, PFC Julius J. Davis, and PFC Billy Dean) were attached to the KMCs. They were all Marine that had recently arrived on the replacement draft and had not seen combat. They were assigned a machine gun bunker that was a little more than two hundred feet southwest of the Panmunjom Road. The bunker butted up with the KMC trench line. They knew the basics of a machine gun but none were very familiar with machine guns. There were five extra barrels for the machine gun but no one
know how to change the barrel on the machine gun. They did not tell the KMCs they were this inexperienced. These three Marines became good life-long friends.

They took C-rations to last for a while because they didn’t go back to their unit for chow. They got along well with the KMCs who spoke good English. Billy remembers sitting on top of his bunker with binoculars on Sunday (probably this Sunday) watching an artillery and tank battle about a mile to their left. The firing from both sides was extensive and he saw a tank take a direct hit. The battle lasted for about two hours.

They were notified that an attack was imminent and were concerned. The KMCs assured them that they would cover their position with a machine gun and small arms. They worked out a system where Julius Davis would fire the Machine gun, Billy Dean would be on the left side of the bunker and Buxton on the right. As it turned out, the enemy’s attack never happened.

The men of the Mortar Section put a roof on the new bunker and some sand bags. The moved into the bunker.

At 2330 1/3/1 completed relief of D/2/1 and assumed responsibility of D/2/1 sector of the MLR. D/2/1 reverted to parent control.

The following were dropped from the Company.
- 1st Lt. Pat Morgan
- Pvt Felix J. Gonzales
- Pvt William D. Groce

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1952

At 0330 D/2/1 (or D/2/5) arrived at H/3/7 sector of the MLR and came under operational control of 3/1. At 0820 D/2/5 (or D/2/5) assumed responsibility of the H/3/7 sector of the MLR. H/3/7 reverted to parent control.

Sgt Menard was up at 0900 and cleaned up as best he could because a Col. was visiting OP#2. Lt. French, the 2nd Platoon’s new Platoon Leader, had his troops laying barbed wire.

At 2050 a D/2/1 platoon arrived at F/2/1 assembly area and came under control of 3/1.

At 2135 an I/3/1 listening post at coordinates 014025 reported 1 friendly KIA and 3 friendly WIA (evacuated) from a land mine explosion.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1952

At 0405 a D/2/1 platoon departed from F/2/1 assembly area and reverted to parent control.

Sgt Menard went to Mass at the mess hall at noon. The he took a bath at a stream along with PFC Bernard W. Mack and Stick (Who is Stick?).

At 2120 a D/2/1 platoon arrived at F/2/1 assembly area and came under operational control of 3/1.

The following were dropped from the Company.
- PFC Robert A. Burns
- PFC Miguel Carrasco
- PFC Clifford G. Kavana
- PFC Christopher Mennella
- PFC Bonilla An Vasquez

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1952

At 0415 a D/2/1 platoon departed F/2/1 assembly area and reverted to parent control. At 2105 an E/2/1 platoon arrived at F/2/1 assembly area and came under operational control of 3/1.

PFC Frances McKenna was WIA (probably on this date) with a wound to his lungs. He was bragging to his squad leader, PFC Samuel Weir that he was going to get home before Sam. Sgt Menard got paid today. He withdrew $60 and also got $10 for PFC Trellin Q. McCoy’s camera. Word was passed that the troops on OP 2 were to be relieved Thursday night.

The following were dropped from the Company on this date.
- PFC Bufford L. Adams
- PFC Robert N. Beck
- PFC William J. Bray
- PFC John R. Brown
In Korea

Cpl Bertren R. Curry Jr.    Sgt James R. Davis
PFC Melvin Dethlefsen    PFC John Devries
PFC Darrell E. Downing    PFC Francis P. McKenna
Cpl Edward A. Mills    PFC Clinton Moon
PFC Charles C. Ruhl    Cpl Willard A. Steele
Sgt. Clifton J. Tabor

Thursday, September 11, 1952

At 0221 D/2/1 came under operational control of 3/1 and commenced relief of G/3/1 on Bunker Hill. G/3/1 reported receiving mixed 60 and 120mm mortar fire on Bunker Hill and on the trail back from Bunker Hill. At 0555 D/2/1 completed relief of G/3/1 and assumed responsibility of Hill 122.

At 1800 H/3/1 apprehended 1 enemy POW with a truck on the Panmunjom road. The POW was taken to Regimental S-2.

The men on OP2 packed their gear and were relieved by E/2/1 at 2230. They were moved by truck to Camp Meyer in the rain and came under operational control of 2/1. At 2335 E/2/1 assumed responsibility of H/3/1's sector of the MLR.

Friday, September 12, 1952

At 0105 H/3/1 passed under operational control of 2/1.

Sgt Menard got up at 1000, too late for chow. He squared away his gear and held a junk on the bunk inspection for his troops at 1100. At 2400 the Company relieved A/1/1 on the MLR behind Siberia. B/1/1 was on their left and F/2/1 was on their right.

Saturday, September 13, 1952

Sgt Menard was up at 1000 and went back to supply to see about getting some chow and water for his Mortar Section. .76s were incoming.

Sunday, September 14, 1952

About this date Billy Dean was involved in what he terms the “suicide watch”. This was a short tour (about five or six days) on outpost Samoa which was about 500 yards in front of the MLR on the Division’s central front. Samoa was manned twenty four hours a day by six Marines in three, two-man holes. PFC Morley D. Dishman was also on this outpost with Billy and shared his hole.

They had no information to determine what to expect on this outpost because they were with the 7th Marines and H/3/1 Marines had not previously manned this outpost. Billy just didn’t feel good about this tour on the outpost because there were just too many unknowns (enemy number and location, type of bunkers, trenches available, etc.). Dishman echoed these same concerns to Billy. They took C-rations for six days and all the water they could carry along with their weapons, ammo, grenades, etc. They knew the enemy was immediately in front of them but they did not know how far.

It was about 2130 as the six Marines jogged down the well worn trail toward their mysterious destination. They were told to button down and secure all loose equipment and move as quickly and quietly as possible. Billy recalls thinking that this was not good, having only one trail they must stay on when traveling back and forth to the outpost. This would be an ideal place for an ambush and the only deviation that could be made was to stagger the time of travel. They made it to the position in a very short time and came upon a slight hill where there was a Marine hiding in the foliage at the base of the hill. He hollered, “Halt, Password” and they responded with the correct password that was given to them before leaving the MLR. Billy was about in the middle of the six Marines. They may have been lead by Sgt. Smith. The Marine told them to crawl to their positions. There were three, two-man positions on top of very flat hill that was about one hundred yards long and thirty yards wide. The holes were about twelve yards apart.

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Billy and Morley were assigned the farthest holes so they started out first. They crawled past the first hole and the Marine there said, “Keep down, keep down, and keep going.” The same was said as they passed the Marine at the second hole. When they got to the third hole the Marine jokingly said, “This is the end.” The had time for a short orientation and they were told, “The enemy is directly to the front of you and they will let you know at 0600. Keep your head down or loose it.” The Marines happily crawled back toward the MLR and wished them good luck. Billy spent the rest of the night wondering what the Marine meant. The hole was an uncomfortable, concave, banana-shaped hole that was oriented north-south. It was about seven feet long and about four feet high in the center. It had two layers of 2X6 timbers on top and two layers of sand bags on top of the timber. They got situated with Billy facing the northerly direction and Morley facing the southerly direction. When looking out the parapet their heads had about one foot clearance and there was about six inches protective dirt in the parapets. Billy immediately wanted to start digging to improve the position but, after discussing it with Morley, decided they would make too much noise. The first fighting hole had communications (wire or radio) with the MLR.

They had settled in for what turned out to be a very long and stressful night. They had no more gotten into position when they began hearing noises to there front. They could hear movement and cans rolling and they just knew the enemy was sneaking up on them. Billy lined up all his grenades on the parapet in front of him along with his weapon and extra ammo. The night lingered on and Billy got a hand grenade with a 3-5 second fuse and straightened the pins so that it would be easier to pull. Noises were being heard most of the night and they knew there must be someone out there. It was just a matter of when they would come. The suspense must have been dreadful but they were at the ready for the whole night. They started to throw a grenade several times but didn’t want to give away their position and also didn’t want to let the enemy know they were rattled. By daylight they were as close to being nervous wrecks as one can imagine. Billy’s forearm was sore from holding the grenade so tight in his hand. At exactly 0600 they learned what the Marine they relieved was trying to tell them. An enemy soldier fired a full magazine (30 rounds) from his burp gun. Every morning during their stay on Samoa there was a full magazine fired from a burp gun at exactly 0600.

They got little sleep that day. It was situation where you tried to sleep with one eye open and of course they couldn’t but it was that type of nervous sleep. Every noise they heard was amplified in their minds. The first day was uneventful and they ate their c-rations and concentrated on keeping their heads down. When they learned that Samoa was manned on a continuing basis, twenty four hours each day, they wondered how they survived when it was 20 degrees below zero. You would think one would freeze living in those tight quarters where there was no room to move around.

Taking care of the body’s natural functions was always hard to manage while on outposts. The usual thing to do was to use a c-ration can to urinate in and then throw the can as far as possible. C-ration boxes were useful for the other body function and they too were thrown as far as possible. After a while these outposts would begin to smell real ripe. Marines learn that it is something you learn to live with while on outpost duty even though it is not an easy thing to do. Billy and Morley got to where they could even joke about it after a few days.

Subsequent nights and days were about the same routine. The days were comfortable and not too cool but the nights were a little chilly. As the nights went by the nerves got even worse. Just waiting for the Chinese to come was a terrible thing to have on your mind continually. They talked very little and whispered when they did. They never saw the Marines in the next bunker, just twelve yards away. They didn’t want to go to the next bunker because during the day they didn’t want to expose themselves in the open and during the nights they were preoccupied. Billy assumes the next bunker felt the same way because they didn’t come to the third bunker either. Thank goodness it did not rain while there stay on Samoa.

On the fourth day they really needed to talk to someone, so about dusk they decided one would go back to the other bunker. Morley drew the short straw and crawled to the next bunker. They were as alarmed as Billy and Morley about the nightly noises and 0600 wake up.
shooting. Morley Dishman stayed at the second hole while one of those Marines crawled to the first hole to see what was they knew. They called the MLR to learn the noises were usually rats and other varmints rummaging around in the used C-ration cans and boxes. Usually???? How sure were they??? The next night they were not quite so nervous but they could never be sure if it was just the rats. The next morning, at 0600, when the enemy fired the burp gun, they fired in the direction of Billy and Morley; perhaps to show that they knew where the were. Billy assumed the enemy was about one hundred yards away.

On the fourth morning about 0800 Billy was looking out the south aperture in the fighting hole.

To make a little more room in the hole Billy and Morley put their rifles, ponchos, and other gear outside the hole. The weapon were nearby where they could be quickly reached if needed. Billy's rifle was to his right and about 2 feet away. He left three grenades handily to his left on the parapet for obvious reasons. They were sitting talking and all of a sudden they heard the sound of mortars being fired from a tube and he knew there were three on the way to somewhere. They ducked and Billy's head, with helmet unstrapped, was about level with the six inch parapet. When the mortar exploded, it seemed like it was almost on top of them. It blew Billy's helmet off his head and it felt like his brain was being sucked out his ear. He was dazed and just couldn't get his thoughts organized. Morley came over and Billy regained his senses. Morley was shaking Billy's feet and wanting to know if Billy was alright. Billy's ears were ringing and a little later blood oozed out his right ear. The concussion had bothered Morley too and neither knew where the other two mortar rounds landed. They didn't know how close the round had landed until Billy reached for his poncho and rifle. They were gone. The round evidently had hit the rifle, or came very close, and had mangled it. Billy reached over the parapet and felt a four inch deep hole where the mortar had hit. Judging from the sized of the small crater, it must have been about a .61mm mortar. Recall that Billy said his hole was oriented north-south. Well, if it had been oriented east-west, or if there had been a westerly wind, the round would have been right on target and they would have been today's casualties.

After five days, or it may have been six days, the six Marines on Samoa were relieved. Billy and Morley were very happy to get back to the MLR.

The Mortar section cleaned up their area and registered #1 and #2 on Samoa. They then built an Ammo Bunker for #1 gun.

At 1000 3/1's command post at coordinates 023 007 (behind Hill 229) was closed and a new command post opened at coordinates 045012 (Camp Meyers). The Battalion was in reserve. H/3/1 probably stayed on the MLR and was under operational control of 2/1 when 3/1 went into reserve.

PFC Donald M. Burge, the Mortar Section's 1st Squadron Gunner, was WIA.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1952

Sgt Menard went to the 1st Platoon to inspect the mortar bunker.

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

2nd Plt. Richard "Dick" Dean (joined)
3rd Plt. Ldr Lt. James "Jim" Nugent (joined)
3rd Plt. Corpsman Bernard "Doc" Roux (left)

The H/3/1 July 1953 Monthly Personnel Roster shows the following men left the U.S.A. in Aug. 1952. They probably arrived in Korea, and may have joined H/3/1, about this date.

PFC Leonard J. Adams Jr. 1231344/2111
Cpl Walter M. Cox 1285927/0311
PFC Donald L. Dabney 1288437/0311
PFC James E. Davenport 1303791/0311
PFC Charles R. Davidson 1296537/0334
PFC Claud O. Davis 1256570/0311
PFC Julius J. Davis 1183370/0311
PFC Donald Debruyn 1279177/0311

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PFC Robert D. Derrigan 1224448/0300
Pvt Ronald C. Dixon 1271017/0300
PFC Robert K. Dougherty 1264346/0334
Cpl Alton P. Douglas 1257236/0334
PFC Charles Eggleston 1312909/0334
PFC Lawrence A. Gatta 1276340/0311
PFC James D. Griffin 1249752/0311

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1952

H/3/1 was probably still on the MLR this day while the Battalion was in reserve. The Battalion prepared Retirement Plans Able and Baker and a Counterattack Plan. Due to the Tactical situation these plans were constructed for 3/1 minus 1 rifle company. These plans would go into effect if the enemy penetrated either the right of center sector of the Division front or if this battalion were called upon to counterattack to restore the present MLR. Line Wyoming would be of primary importance in the case of Retirement plans Able and Baker. Blocking positions and counterattack routes had been designated for the Counterattack Plan.

Sgt Menard took a bath in a stream and then sank the base plate on gun #2. The Mortar Section fired all guns before dark.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1952

Between the period 17 Sept. and 30 Sept. while in reserve the Battalion furnished one platoon nightly as a standby platoon. This platoon left the reserve area and came under operational control of 2/1. Each morning the platoon returned, reverting to parent control. The remainder of the Battalion was working 100 percent of the time on the improvement of the Wyoming Line.

The coke ration arrived.

The Mortar Section fired in the morning.

A shower unit arrived.

PFC John A. Newton was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1952

Sgt Menard got another package from home.

Gen. Shepard was scheduled to come to the Company but he didn't show up.

Corpsman Christian Martinsen and Ron McKinney celebrated their birthdays with some 180 alcohol in Asahi beer. It was Chris' 19th and Ron's 18th.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1952

Sgt Menard attended Mass which was held near the Helicopter landing pad.

The Mortar Section fired 24 rounds on a new concentration.

The Company went on one Hundred percent alert starting at 2400.

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1952

The Company was probably still on the MLR this day.

Sgt Menard didn't get any sleep last nigh because of the one hundred percent alert so he hit the sack at 0500. He got up at 1100, picked up the mail, got a hair cut, and then went to supply to play a game of monopoly.

The Company went on one hundred percent alert again this night.

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1952

Adams, possibly the 2nd Platoon Sergeant, SSgt Albert S. Adams Jr., took out a patrol
late last night or in the early morning hours. The patrol was probably behind the MLR because the Company was probably in reserve at this time.
Again Sgt Menard didn't get any sleep because of the one hundred percent alert so he hit the sack at 0500. When he awoke, he played monopoly all day.
The Company went on one hundred percent alert at 2230.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1952

The Company sent out another patrol late last night or in the early morning hours. They returned at 0330.
The Mortar Section fired forty four rounds. PFC Trellin Q. McCoy of the Mortar Section's 1st Squad burned his hand during the firing.
The Company packed their gear in preparation for moving out tonight.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1952

At 0015 H/3/1 left the MLR and returned to the reserve area at Camp Meyers (coordinates 045012) to join the Battalion and came under parent control.
Sgt Menard went to chow at 0615 and attended a Company formation. Sgt. Menard finally got a shower and then saw the movie, "Sound Off".
TSgt Virgil Ferrell was dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1952

Reveille was held at 0615. The Company went to the Wyoming Line in a pouring rain at 1900 and returned at 2300. A truck went off the road during the trip.

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1952

Improvement of the Wyoming Line continued.
The Battalions Retirement and Counterattack Plans Able and Baker (see Sept. 16, 1952) were published to the Battalion staff and Company Commanders. During the period between Sept. 25 and Sept. 30 the company commanders and staff officers made physical reconnaissance of the assigned areas.
Sgt Menard received a package from Evelyn.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1952

The Company went to the Wyoming line at 0800. They had chow in the field at 1600.
At 1800 an H/3/1 platoon departed the reserve area and came under operational control of 2/1 (on the MLR).

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1952

At 0500 the H/3/1 platoon returned to the reserve area from the MLR and reverted to parent control.
The Company spent the day doing some more digging and preparing positions on the Wyoming Line. The company that was on the MLR last night probably had the day off.
The following were dropped from the Company.
PFC Arthur J. Boucher  PFC Bertram V. Mudd

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1952

The Battalion received 60 replacements from the 90mm AAA Gun Battalion for two days training prior to joining their assigned units. A training schedule was prepared for these men which included 8 hours of small unit defensive tactics, 4 hours on field fortifications and 4 hours familiarization firing.
The Company spent the day digging again on positions on the Wyoming Line again. About 1500 there was a rain shower that soaked everyone. Sgt Menard went to see a good movie, Glory Alley.

At 1830 an H/3/1 platoon left the reserve area for the MLR and came under operational control of 2/1.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1952

The Company packed their gear and prepared to move to COP 2 to relieve G/3/1. At 1800 the Company commenced relief of G/3/1 and came under operational control of 2/1.

Cpl Robert E. Roth and the 14th Draft left the Company to return to the USA.

PFC Robert J. Stroz was dropped from the Company.

Personnel strength of 3/1 at the beginning of the month was 38 Marine officers, 918 enlisted, 2 naval officers, and 37 naval enlisted. During the month 3/1 joined 1 Marine officer replacement. Three Marine officers were rotated and 4 Marine officers joined from Regiment, 104 Marine enlisted replacement joined, 7 Marine enlisted were transferred, and 19 Marine enlisted joined from Regiment. Ten Naval enlisted replacements were joined and 4 Naval enlisted were transferred. One Naval officer was transferred and 1 naval officer joined from Regiment. Seventy-one Marine Enlisted were sick evacuated, 89 Marine enlisted were returned to duty, 3 Marine Officers were sick evacuated and 1 Marine officer was returned to duty. Fifty Marine enlisted were WIA (evacuated), 40 Marine enlisted were WIA (non-evacuated) and 7 Marine enlisted were KIA. Three Naval enlisted were returned to duty, 2 Naval enlisted were sick (evacuated), 2 Naval enlisted were WIA (evacuated), and 3 Naval enlisted were WIA (non-evacuated). The strength at the end of the month was 38 Marine Officers, 995 Marine Enlisted, 2 Naval officers, and 42 Naval enlisted.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1952

3/1 was in Regimental reserve at Camp Meyers (045012 from Oct. 1st to Oct. 11th. While in reserve the Battalion furnished 1 rifle company, the 81mm Mortar platoon, and a reserve rifle platoon for operations against the enemy. These units, when tactically employed, were under the operational control of 2/1. On this date H/3/1 minus was in position on an outpost forward of the MLR (probably OP2) and one platoon of H/3/1 was placed on the sector of the MLR that crosses the Panmunjom corridor. The 81mm mortar platoon was in support of 2/1. G/3/1 and I/3/1 alternated each night in furnishing the rifle platoon to act at a reserve for 2/1.

Bob Bosley remembers a H/3/1 Marine named Pvt Wilbur Earl Linthicum who was WIA sometime during the fall of 1952.

Sgt Menard drew chow for his Section and then wrote five letters home until 2300.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1952

Thirty-two men from the Battalion were rotated to the USA. Because of the possibility of enemy artillery fire, G and I/3/1 worked on the Wyoming Line during the hours of darkness. H/3/1 remained on OP2.

The CCF began heavily attacking outposts, especially the four outposts on the 1st Mar. Div.'s right sector held by the 7th Marines, Detroit (also called Bronco, Felix, and Hill 15), Frisco (also called Gary and Hill 13), Seattle (also called Pete and Jill), and Warsaw (also called Hill 137 or 157). These outposts were an average of 450 yards in front of the MLR. Warsaw, defended by a reinforced platoon, and Seattle, defended by a squad,
were taken by the Chinese. Warsaw was retaken about two hours later by a counterattacking I/3/7 Platoon.

Sgt Menard wrote some more letters home. They had one hundred percent alert until 2400. The KSCs lost an outpost today.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1952

Attempts to retake outpost Seattle (in the 7th Marine sector) failed and the KMCs were still getting hit by the Chinese.

The Mortar Section registered a couple of concentrations in the morning. Sgt Menard had OP watch in the afternoon and there was no mail call.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1952

439 men from the 3rd Replacement Battalion arrived in the Battalion area for five days training prior to joining their assigned units. A training schedule was prepared for these men that emphasized the training of the individual Marine. The replacements were divided into three training companies to accomplish this mission. Each company was under the charge of an officer with three capable NCOs as assistants. Company Officers and NCO's were provided from the trainees. The trainees were billeted in tents and served hot meals at the Battalion mass hall.

The remainder of the Battalion (G and I/3/1) continued improving the Wyoming Line during the hours of darkness.

Sgt Menard got up late in the morning and watched two strikes across the river. They fired mortars again this night.

PFC Billy Dean’s friend, Sgt Paul G. Schick, decided to write his will and give it to Billy Dean to keep for him. The will reads:

To whom it may concern:

I Paul Schick do hereby will my watch to Walter Kennedy. To Billy T. Dean my pipe. To Morely (Morley) Dishman I will my extra cigarettes. My rifle and all 782 gear will go to the supply shed, whence they came. Bill (William) Hoffman gets my grenades and my ring. All my ammo goes to Bud (Fred) Buxton. To Count (Donald) Cunningham goes my flak jacket. Walter Kennedy gets all my clothes, dirty and clean.

This will is hereby effective as of 2015 Oct. 4, '52

Signed by: Paul G. Schick
Sgt. U.S.M.C.

A guy in the Machine Gun Platoon was hit by a sniper.

The following personnel were dropped from the Company.

SSgt Carl L. Burney
Sgt Robert L. Dearmond
PFC Alert G. Dormann
Cpl David J. Gimmi
Sgt Lawrence A. Hausner
PFC John J. Makad
Cpl Robert E. Roth
Cpl Richard B. Schenck
PFC Julian r. Torres

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1952

Sgt Menard took a bath right after reveille.

Four men from the Battalion departed for the NCO School near the Division CP.

The 5th Marines arrived to look over the position on OP #2.

The middle part of the MLR, held by the 1st Marines, received the least enemy attention in this period of all the 1st Mar. Div. Although frequent contacts were made with the enemy during the first part of the month, no outposts were lost. Most of the action was minor (i.e., patrol engagements and CCF probes centered on Bunker Hill and Hill
Late in the day a combat patrol from H/3/1 became involved in the most important ground action in the 1st Marines area during early October. A large Chinese force lying in wait surprised these Marines. The ambushers held their fire until the Marine combat patrol had cleared a small hilltop on Three Fingers Hill. At 2230, after a 20-minute firefight, the patrol withdrew to the reverse slope of the rise, called in 81mm mortar fire, then broke contact, and returned to the MLR. The patrol was split up during the withdrawal. PFC Richard "Babe" Feierstein and the one other man (perhaps the Corpsman) withdrew to a ravine and waited for a short while. When nothing followed, they made their way out to the Panmunjom road and then back up the road to OP2. There were 4 marine casualties and one Marine MIA, PFC Rocco William Derose. The count showed thirteen Chinese dead.

PFC Arnold C. Manning was dropped from the Company.
PFC Sidney Beckler joined the Company from the 3rd Replacement Battalion.

MONDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1952

Outpost Detroit, defended by two squads from G/3/7, was repeatedly attacked late in the evening with action continuing into the morning of Oct. 7th. Because of the Tactical situation on the Division's sector of the MLR, G/3/1(-) and I/3/1 were recalled from the Wyoming Line to a standby status in the Battalion area at 2030.

Mortar guns #1 and #3 fired 275 rounds during the night. Probably most of them were fired in defense of Hill 134 where the 1st Platoon was being assaulted. The Mortar Section was up all night either firing or on alert.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1952

Outpost Detroit defended by two squads of G/3/7 was lost to the enemy early in the morning. Frisco was held after very heavy fighting. However, it was determined that this outpost was not worth the efforts to defend and was abandoned.

During the first week in October, the 1st Mar. Div. lost or gave up six outposts, or forward positions; on the Division's left, COPs 36, 37, and COP #1 (Hill 86); and on the Division's right, Detroit, Frisco, and Seattle. The first three outposts were just across the Panmunjom road, and to the rear, of H/3/1.

H/3/1 was on the left flank of the Division. Elements of the Company (all of the 1st Platoon and perhaps the Entire Company) were located on COP #2 which was on the left of the Regiment and to the right of Panmunjom.

The 2nd Platoon sent out a patrol which was hit by the Chinese.

During this night the Chinese came up behind, and cut off, OP #2. They attacked at a heavy machine gun bunker as well as other places and caused many (perhaps sixteen) casualties. It has been said that there were four KIAs. Two are listed below and perhaps there were also two of W/3/1's attached heavy machine gun personnel that were KIA. The Mortar Section fired sixty two rounds in defense. It is apparent that no one got any rest this night.

PFC Thomas V. Moreland lost two of his fingers. This happened when he dropped a mortar in a tube. He didn't move his hand out of the way before the mortar round exploded out of the tube. It probably happened about this date when Thomas was dropped from the Company.

PFC Leacadio Rivera, 1240107, was KIA on COP #2. He was from Arecibo, PR where he is buried.

Cpl Charles Edward Skinner, Squad Leader of the 3rd Squad, 1st Platoon, took a mortar round in the chest and was KIA from multiple shell fragments at Chang-dan. Chang-dan is an abandoned village SSE of Hill 29 behind friendly lines. It was possibly where the aid station was and used to generally reference the area where death was pronounced. Charles was from Muncie, IN and is buried there. Charles was awarded the Bronze Star with combat "V" for this, or other actions. Investigation is continuing to determine the differences between his date of death and the date of the citation. His award reads as follows:
"For heroic achievement while serving as a Squad Leader of Company H, Third Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), during operation against enemy aggressor forces in Korea on 30 August 1952. Placed in charge of a critical sector of the company perimeter on a strategic outpost forward of the main line of resistance which was continuously subjected to intense hostile shelling and small-arms fire, Corporal Skinner skillfully deployed his men in driving off several attacks by numerically superior forces and constantly maintained a high state of morale and fighting spirit within his unit, thereby contributing greatly to the successful defense of the vital position. By his marked courage, daring initiative and selfless devotion to duty, Corporal Skinner served to inspire all who observed him and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Pvt (or PFC) Stanley T. Obanion was WIA on COP #2 and evacuated to the USS Repose. The Battalion prepared tactical Frag Order 070900 Wyoming. The Battalion would execute this order on Oct. 11th (see Oct 11th).

**WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1952**

At the truce talks, the Chinese had been given three separate proposals for ending the POW controversy. Since the Chinese refused to respond to either proposal, Brig. Gen. William K. Harrison, the senior UN delegate, took the initiative to recess the truce talks indefinitely until the Chinese made some forward-going response or proposals.

The Company was unsure what today would bring with the tense situation at Panmunjom and the loss of their left flank. The troops had no sleep last night defending their position. Now, with the peace talks breaking down and their left (southern) flank exposed by the loosing of Cop #1, the Company was packing up and preparing to move. It is unsure if they were packing because of the worsening situation or because they were soon to be relieved by the 5th Marines.

Being the left flank Company of the Division they also had the responsibility for extraction the UN peace-talks personnel in the event of danger to them. In anticipation of this danger, and probably at the direction of higher authority, the 2nd Platoon plus tanks were dispatched to Panmunjom.

PFC Freddie L. Bradshaw, from Bath, SC, was KIA and PFC Willard "Will" O'Hara, the 3rd Platoon Runner was WIA. They were ambushed while moving between the Panmunjom Road and COP2.

**THURSDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1952**

The 3rd Platoon of G/3/1 came up to fill in a gap in the defense. One probing enemy soldier got as close as the wire in the supply area.

Having completing their training, at 1400 personnel of the 3rd Replacement Battalion departed the Regimental reserve area for their assigned units.

PFC Stanley Thermond Obanion had been WIA on COP #2 on Oct. 7th and evacuated to the USS Repose Hospital ship where he died from wounds on this date. Stanley was from Langley, SC and is buried there.

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

- MG or 3rd Plt: PFC Robert "Bob" G. Bosley 1276254/0311 (joined)
- MG: Jack Dale (left)
- MG: William "Dog" Dobberteen (joined)
  (Dobberteen was also in 3rd Plt. but it is not known when he changed positions within the Company.)
- 1st Plt.: PFC Robert "Bob" J. Boyer 1160766/0311 (joined)
- 3rd Plt.: William "Cappy" Capella (left)
- 3rd Plt.: Charles "Charlie" Taylor (left)

The H/3/1 July 1953 Monthly Personnel Roster shows the following men left the U.S.A. in Sept. 1952. They probably arrived in Korea, and may have joined H/3/1, about this date.
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1952

The 5th Marines relieved the H/3/1 at 1900 except for one platoon which remained on the MLR. At 2011 the Company moved into the Battalion Reserve area and came under parent operational control. A mortar barrage arrived just during the relief. When the Company got back to Camp Meyers there were no cots or even tents for the tired Marines because the Battalion was preparing to move out again. The movie at Camp Meyer was "Clash by Night". Camp Meyer was about two miles behind (east) of Hill 229 (the MLR) (at coordinates 045012) and in a canyon at the right of a valley that extended about two miles to the southwest. About two miles east of this position Camp Rose (at coordinates 078095) was located.

PFC Walter Cox was in his 1st Sqd. 1st Platoon. It was probably on this date that he was WIA by a burp gun when his patrol was ambushed. He was evacuated to a Hospital Ship and the Dec. 14, 1952 unit diary shows Walter was joined from the 1st Provisional Casualty Co. on Dec. 9th.

Cpl Walter M. Cox, PFC Harold E. Fry, PFC Harvey T. Jurgens, PFC Mathew Nitkiewicz, Sgt Jesse C. Norris, and PFC Willie A. Parker were dropped from the Company. It is likely that these Marines were ambushed while on the same patrol as Walter Cox.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1952

The Battalion executed the Frag Order they developed on October 7th. It called for them to move the Battalion's companies to move tactically to their assigned positions on the Wyoming Line. While in this position they were to continue to improve the Wyoming Line. The Battalion CP at Camp Myers (coordinates 045012) was closed and the new Battalion CP was established at coordinates 073031.

Reveille went at 0300 and the morning meal was served at 0400. They moved out to Hill 90 on the Wyoming Line at 0400. All hands prepared to move to the Wyoming Line. At 0510 the Battalion forward CP was opened on the Wyoming Line. At 0600 H/3/1 reported they were in position on the Wyoming Line. At 0615 I/3/1 reported they were 30 percent in position and at 1630 G/3/1 reported 75 percent were in position. By 0930 the H/3/1 platoon that remained on the MLR last night rejoined the Company. During this stay on the Wyoming Line the Battalion continued to improve existing positions.

At 1710 G/3/1 reported 2 rounds of enemy 76mm fire at coordinates 061038. At 1720 I/3/1 reported 2 rounds of enemy 77mm fire at coordinates 063046. At 1725 G/3/1 reported 1 round of enemy 76mm fire at coordinates 061038. There were no casualties from this enemy fire.

At 2000 the Battalion 81mm platoon arrived in the reserve area and reverted to parent control. They had been on the MLR under the control of 2/1 since 3/1 came into Regimental reserve. At 2100 the 81mm Mortar Platoon again departed from the reserve area and again reverted to the control of 2/1.
The 5th Marines had relieved the 1st Marines in the center sector and the 1st Marines went into Division Reserve. For the next two weeks there was a lull across the front. The 1st Marines continued improvement of the secondary defensive lines, conducted extensive training, and dispatched numerous security patrols throughout the regimental area. These routine reserve roles were in addition to the primary mission of augmenting units on the Marine MLR in order to counterattack and defeat any attempted penetration of the Jamestown Line in the Division area. As part of the counterattack mission, the Division Reserve Regiment was to be prepared for employment anywhere in the I Corps sector to block an enemy advance.

At 0330 the 81mm Mortar Platoon returned to the Division reserve area and reverted to parent control. A premature relief of positions necessitated their return to the control of 2/1.

At 0430 H/3/1 departed their sector of the Wyoming Line and arrived in the Division Reserve area at 0625. I and G/3/1 followed. All movements from the Wyoming Line to the Division Reserve area was made by foot. The Battalion CP was closed at 0700 on the Wyoming Line and the new CP in the Division Reserve Area, at coordinates 078995, was opened. All hands commenced shaking down the camp area. Four men from the Battalion departed for the NCO School held in the vicinity of the Division CP.

After manning the Wyoming Line for a period of 24 hours, the Battalion moved to the Division reserve area at Camp Rose (coordinates 078995). The administrative echelon of the Battalion had arrived earlier to prepare the new camp site. While in Division reserve the Battalion conducted prepared training schedules and worked on the Kansas Line. The time was divided in 75 percent work on the line and 25 percent training.

In accordance with 1st Marines Operation Plan 9/52, daily surveillance Patrols were dispatched while the Battalion was in Division reserve. A total of 7 motorized patrols and 2 foot patrols were sent out each week. These patrols had the mission of apprehending any person not on authorized business. An additional duty of the patrols was to collect salvageable material found along their routes of march.

During the month of October officers and men of 3/1 attended the various schools conducted by units of the 1st Marine Division. One officer and 25 men attended the Mine Warfare School held by the Engineer company in the division reserve area. The Battalion sent 2 officer and 12 men to attend school conducted by Division Headquarters for an electronic device to plot location of small arms fire. Twelve men attended the NCO school held by the 1st Marine Division.

In accordance with a verbal agreement with HQ first Marine Regiment, the Battalion sent 20 men daily on a liberty trip to Seoul, Korea since reverting to Division reserve. This group, under the supervision of an officer, departs from the Battalion area each morning and returns by approximately 1700. While in Seoul the men are allowed to purchase gifts and visit points of interest. This policy was started on 14 October and it was anticipated that 50 percent of the Battalion will be able to make the trip while in Division reserve. The first trips were cancelled when the tactical situation on the Division's sector of the MLR necessitated committing 3/1.

The Company moved from Hill 90 on the Wyoming Line to Camp Rose (coordinates 078095) at 0400. Sgt Menard attended Mass at 0900 and then took a shower. The first movie at Camp Rose was "Carson City".

Sgt Benjamin A. Grimes and SSgt Melvin W. Hollums were dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, October 13, 1952

The Battalion continued to shakedown and make minor changes in the existing facilities to improve the conditions of the area. All hands prepared to carry out the assigned mission of the Battalion while in Division Reserve.

During the period in Division reserve, the Battalion furnished a security force for X-ray Bridge and Devastate Charlie, the radar control station for aircraft. A total of 50 men were deployed at these positions as a permanent guard.
Mickey Rooney was giving a USO show at Service Battalion. Sgt Menard went to the show, took pictures, and got Mickey's autograph.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1952

Sgt Menard, along with the rest of the Company went to the Kansas line where they improved positions. They had chow in the field. The movie at Camp Rose this evening was "Frances goes to West Point".

The following Marines were dropped from the Company:

- PFC Robert F. Adams
- PFC Charlie M. Alloway
- PFC Clarence L. Apple
- PFC James R. Bergstron
- PFC Thomas J. Breig
- Sgt William "Cappy" D. Capella
- PFC Frank C. Clark Jr.
- Pvt James L. Clemman
- PFC Gerald A. Degner
- PFC Robert J. Deotte
- Cpl Arthur L Gellun (or Arthur L. Gillum)
- PFC Harry R. Hutton
- PFC Louis R. Null
- Cpl Harold W. Swindell
- Sgt William L. Yates

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1952

The Mortar Section had an ordinance inspection. After the inspection Sgt Menard went to pay call and drew $10 of the $155 he had on the books. He spent the night in his tent.

- PFC Frank I. Brown, the 3rd Squad Gunner in the Mortar Section went to Seoul on liberty.

One Officer and 12 men from the Battalion started a 5 day Mine Warfare School which was held in the Engineer company reserve area.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1952

Sgt Menard, and possibly the rest of the Company, went to the Kansas line all day again.

Hog Jaw (likely a Mortar Section Marine) (possibly PFC Frank I. Brown) went to Seoul. While there he purchased a Parker Pen for Sgt Menard.

H/3/1 had the responsibility for the motorized patrol on this day. At 1330 they departed and returned at 1620 with negative contact reported.

2nd Lt. Michael A. Ciaburro was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1952

Sgt Menard, and possibly the entire Company, again went to the Kansas Line again. He received some mail and was getting ready for tomorrow when he would receive a new M4 sight.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1952

There was a Battalion inspection and presentation of decorations in the morning from 0800 to 1200. The Battalion Commander, Lt. Col. Sidney J. Altman, presented 17 Bronze Stars and 26 Letters of Commendation to Marines for their action against the enemy.

The Company returned to the Kansas Line in the afternoon.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1952

There was a Company rifle inspection at 0745. After the inspection there was a holiday routine. Sgt Menard attended Mass and the got his mail at 1000. He was ecstatic to receive his "Kodak Signet" camera in the mail. This induced him to write four letters home.

MONDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1952
The Company had classes on CBR (Chemical, Biological, and Radiological) warfare subjects. They also attended classes on mines and mine warfare.

Sgt Menard got three shots (medical) and received no mail.

One Officer and 5 men from the Battalion went to a school for an electronic device to plot location of small arms fire. The school was held in the vicinity of the Division CP. H/3/1 was tasked to furnish the motorized surveillance patrol again. They left the company at 1330 and returned at 1630 to report negative contact.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1952

Sgt Menard, and possibly the rest of the Company, went to the Kansas Line again. Because of inclement weather work on the Kansas Line was secured at Noon and all hands returned to the company in the rain. The continued the scheduled training program in the company area. It rained all night.

PFC Bernard W. Mack of the Mortar Section 3rd Squad went to Seoul on liberty.

Thirteen men from the Battalion started the Mine Warfare School held in the Engineer Company area of the Division reserve area.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1952

Sgt Menard, PFC Russell G. Schultz of the 1st Platoon, Cpl Bertren R. Curry Jr., and a person named Dean (either SSgt Richard "Dick" A. Dean the 2nd Platoon Sergeant or PFC Billy Thomas Dean of the 3.5 Rocket Section) went to the Battalion Aid Station for a physical. Sgt. Menard also went to Regiment for a dental appointment.

G/3/1's foot surveillance patrol found a body in a combination bunker and cave in grid square 08-98.

The Company had a night problem but Sgt Menard did not participate.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1952

It was H/3/1's turn to furnish the foot surveillance patrol. It departed at 0900 and returned at 1200 with a negative report.

Sgt Menard went to the rear to get an x-ray and blood test. While there he visited A-Medical Company and other areas where he saw some friends (Kosmar, J. P. Morrisely, and Gidden).

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1952

Sgt Menard went to the Kansas line where they had gun drill all day.

The night problem scheduled for the Company was called off.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1952

There was a Battalion inspection. During the inspection, Brigadier General H. O. Bare decorated 6 Marines in the Battalion with a Silver Star Medal.

After the inspection Sgt Menard and the rest of the Company went to the Kansas Line to improve positions. Later in the day Sgt Menard received a package from home.

There was no night problem this night because the Company was on stand-by.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1952

One officer and 7 men from the Battalion were sent to a school for an electronic device to plot the location of small arms fire. Four men from the Battalion were also sent to the NCO School at the Division CP.

The Company participated in a Regimental Memorial Service that was held at 1st Marine Regiment. The memorial was for Marines and attached Navy personnel who died between July
IN KOREA

26 and Oct. 12, 1952. The services included:

- Church Call
- The National Anthem
- The Invocation
- Introduction of the Commanding General
- The Memorial Address
- The Marine Hymn
- Roll Call of the Dead (from the three Battalions)
- Minute of Silent Tribute
- The Memorial Prayer
- Rifle Salute
- Taps
- The Benediction

Shortly after dark 3/1 was alerted and moved to the 7th Marine reserve area because of the tactical situation in the 7th Marines area of the Division sector of the MLR. H/3/1 with the attached AT Assault section, following I and G/3/1 departed the reserve area at 2237 for the 7th Marines Reserve area. Battalion had opened a forward CP in this area at 2220. W/3/1 followed H/3/1 during the move.

A major battle began this night when the CCF attacked, and overran the 7th Marines squad that was defending outpost Ronson. They were also attacking the platoon that was defending outpost Warsaw 800 yards northeast of Ronson. Shortly thereafter, the enemy made a very strong attacked and severely penetrated the Hook. Both, OP Ronson and OP Warsaw were overrun by the Chinese.

MONDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1952

At 0030 the enemy made another major assault, the second in less than six hours. This assault was against Outpost Reno that was held by 2/7. This assault had been anticipated for some time and the Marines preparedness throttled the enemy's attempt to seize the outposts. During this action 9 Marines were killed and 49 wounded (29 evacuated). The enemy lost about 60 KIA and 51 WIA at Reno. The Battle at Reno was thought to be a diversionary action to keep the allies from sending additional reserves to the Hook area. The Chinese wanted to take and occupy the Hook. Their occupation of Reno at this time was apparently not their primary consideration.

The 7th Marines were fully committed. All of their reserves were committed they needed additional help. Therefore, Gen. Pollock, 1st Mar. Div. CG, ordered the forward battalion of the Reserve Regiment, 3/1, to aid the 7th Marines in the defense of the Hook. When word was received, 3/1 had already displacing from their bivouac site at Camp Rose north of the Imjin and traveled about ten miles to an assembly area behind the 7th Marines on the MLR. At 1040 H/3/1 and I/3/1 cleared the 7th Marines reserve area and came under the operational control of the 7th Marines. H/3/1 was reinforced with W/3/1's AT Platoon. The Heavy Machine Gun Section of W/3/1, assigned to H/3/1, was relieved by elements of 2/1 as the guard at X-ray Bridge and joined the Company.

A/1/7 and H/3/7 had commenced the counterattack of the Chinese on the Hook and had become bogged down under the pressure of heavy mortar and artillery fire and the Chinese small arms fire. I/3/1 was directed to move through these companies, continue the attack, and drive the Chinese from the Hook. H/3/1 was to take over the right sector of 1/7 and relieve B/1/7 who would be used to occupy both the critical MLR sector and OP Warsaw. I/3/1 sustained 14 KIA, 1 DOW, 71 WIA (evac.), 6 WIA (non-evac.), and 3 MIA while accomplishing their mission. PFC Richard Arnold Johannes, a friend of Bernard Mack (a H/3/1 Marine), was one of the I/3/1 Marines that was KIA (recorded as 10/28/52). The seventh Marines lost about 56 KIA, 309 wounded (215 evacuated), and 36 MIA, of whom were later definitely known to have been captured. The captured were mostly taken when the Chinese overran Outposts Ronson and Warsaw.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1952
In the early morning hours PFC Billy Dean walked the trench line becoming familiar with the terrain features. His bunker was in line with the enemy. He learned that he had a bad bunker location because a tank lumbered into position above Billy’s bunker and began sniping with the .90mm rifle. Everyone had to evacuate Billy’s bunker because they were not able to handle the sound and concussion. Billy recalls grabbing his sleeping bag and going one hundred yards away up the trench line with Buxton and Davis. They got very little sleep. The tank fired for a couple and, strange as it was, there was no incoming. The enemy generally fire counter mortar and artillery fire at tanks that are firing.

Keeping down as much as possible to avoid snipers, Billy canvassed the area with his binoculars. Actually, as it turned out, they were not bothered by snipers and there was not much incoming on the MLR. Billy walked to his right to a point to his right and on the point was .50 caliber machine gun. Billy sat down and looked the area over. There was plenty of ammo and he thought this was a very good position that could cover a large area with the machine gun. A beautiful valley was sweeping to the right and appeared to be about 3 miles in length. This was the Samichon River valley. Billy remembers thinking how beautiful this must be in a heavy snow. In the middle of the valley, there was the Samichon River running from right to left. There was a large, damaged bridge with an overhead superstructure that crossed the river. Billy could not see a road but assumed there had been some sort of road that crossed the bridge. He could see a trail from the enemy position in the distance that went in the direction of the bridge. There was also a trail from their position to the bridge.

Billy thought if he were the enemy and was going to make a big push or attempt to overrun the allies position, that this valley would be the area he would choose. The valley floor was very smooth, this tanks, truck, and equipment could maneuver quite easily. He realized that they would have to contend with the allies defensive forces that could be formidable. Billy, being a 3.5 rocket person, could see himself down in the valley doing what he could to stop the enemy tanks. He would have been useless from the MLR because the maximum firing range of the 3.5 rocket launcher was about 900 yards. Billy realized he was dreaming but evaluating possible scenarios that could develop was something he liked to do. He realized he was going a little overboard but trying to put himself in the enemy’s position and trying to predict their next move helped him plan defensive strategies. It is interesting to note that, after the cease fire, Billy read that our intelligence had predicted that, in the event of an all-out assault toward Seoul, this most probably would be the route they would choose to use. This made Billy feel good that he was able to foresee this approach.

With Billy’s binoculars he scoped out the mine fields. There appeared to be a mine field on each side of the trail to the bridge. He could not see the mine field boundary wire but he would later when on patrol.

Outposts Ronson and Warsaw had been under continuous friendly artillery and mortar barrages since the Chinese had overrun the outposts on the night of the 26th (or early morning of the 27th). The purpose of the barrages were two fold; to keep the enemy from fortifying the position before Marines could counterattack and retake the outposts; and to keep them from giving supporting fires to their Chinese on the Hook while Marines were clearing them out. Restrictions on the number of mortar and artillery shells that could be fired by allied forces was lifter for this battle.

There were many aircraft strikes flying in support of the Hook and the two outpost battles. Some were attacking the enemy which were attacking the Hook and other were attacking the enemy on outposts Ronson and Warsaw. Air support strikes was also dropping bombs and napalm on areas behind the said outposts and in other surrounding hills. The purpose of these strikes was to break up, disorganize, and eliminate groups of Chinese that were being funneled into the battle from those positions.

Billy Dean was pretty much just watching the show as mortars and artillery were bombarding Warsaw and aircraft were doing their job. A couple of planes had come in, strafed, then dropped bombs, peeled to the right, and then flew down the Simachon Valley to exit. They may have been dropping 250 or 500 pound bombs because they really made a lot of noise. On one particular pass (probably on OP Warsaw), one plane flew not more then 500 above Billy and slightly to his left. Just as he was getting into position to drop his
bomb and pull up, Billy noticed debris was falling off the right side of the plan and the right side of the cockpit covering. Billy realized the plane was being hit with machine gun fire. He looked over and thought he could see the muzzle blast from a machine gun and they continued to pepper the plane. Immediately there was smoke coming from the engine. Billy knew the pilot was in serious trouble as bullets continued to hit the plane. Billy thought that the pilot was surely hit with bullets and/or flying debris from the canopy. It looked like the plane was going to dive into the hill it was attacking but, at the last instant, the pilot pulled up, never releasing his bomb. He began turning his sputtering plane to the right and followed a small stream down middle of a valley that was 2-3 miles long. Flames were now coming from the engine and the cockpit was full of smoke. This upset Billy more than anything else he had seen in Korea. It didn’t matter who the pilot was, at this instant it seemed like it was Billy’s brother and Billy began screaming, "Set it down, set it down, and I will come get you.” He was so upset that this was the first time Billy cried while in Korea. Billy ran toward the point where the .50 caliber machine gun was located and got there just in time to see the plane crash into a mountainside. Billy asked the person in the .50 caliber machine gun bunker to call the CP and get permission for Billy to fire on the enemy in hopes that they could keep them down for the other planes to make their run. Permission was denied. Billy returned to his fighting hole and continued to watch the battle.

PFC Bernard Mack also saw the corsairs drop napalm and bombs. He may have had a little different view and saw the damaged plane just before it crashing into the mountain. He said that just before the plane crashed the pilot climbed from the cockpit, ran out on the wing, and jumped off the plane. It is not known what injuries the pilot sustained.

Billy does not remember any significant attacks by or on H/3/1 at this location. Mortar and artillery came in once in a while and our tanks continued to fire at intervals but they were not attached on the Company. After a few days of not receiving sniper fire they were not as alert and did not take the normal precautions. This was not too smart but this was their mental attitude. They had no supply problems and survived C-rations were eaten as the usual meal.

Notwithstanding Billy Dean’s recall that this tour on the Hook was rather uneventful, there were many casualties. Nearly all of the casualties were Marines from I/3/1 and the 7th Marines. Apparently Billy Dean’s platoon (probably the 3rd Platoon), and perhaps all of H/3/1, did not see much action in the retaking of the Hook and outposts Ronson and Warsaw.

The Hook was finally retaken during the early morning hours. Outposts Ronson and Warsaw were also reoccupied at 0630 and 0845. All of the ground lost to the enemy in the area of the Hook on October 26th was finally retaken after much hard fighting.

At 1200 I/3/1, with attached units from W/3/1, returned to the Battalion area and reverted to parent control. H/3/1 remained on their assigned sector of the MLR. Outpost Warsaw (Hill 137) was about 800 yards to the front. To H/3/1’s left front was Hill 141 (OP Ronson).

As the last plane flew over, word was passed that the Chaplain was behind a small hill near the MLR. Billy was told they could go back, two at a time, for prayer and communion. Incoming was light but it still wasn’t a safe place. Billy thought that it might not be the best time for the Chaplain to be holding prayer service. Nevertheless, Billy went back for the prayer service and assumed everyone else in the company, in some way, expressed themselves in prayer. Billy doesn’t recall the Chaplain’s name or denomination but remembers that he was a cool fellow. He didn’t let the incoming bother him while attending to the parishioners.

It was about noon when Billy left the Chaplain’s service and went back to his area. He noticed a Marine in a one-man bunker about twenty yards from his and Fred Buxton’s bunker. Billy recalls that this Marine he had known for a some time was undependable and of questionable ability in combat. Billy was not alone in this opinion. Suddenly Billy heard a shot from the Marine’s bunker. When the dust in the bunker cleared, Billy looked in and expected the worst. The Marine was sitting with on a cot with his M1 rifle under his chin. Billy said, “I always knew you had no guts.” (Today, Billy realizes that was pretty tough words and he cannot imagine how he could have said it.) The Marine started crying, put his rifle down, and said, “I can’t take it, I can’t take it.” Billy felt
really bad about this whole incident and returned to this bunker where he relayed the incident to Buxton. Fred said he wasn’t surprised this had happened. Billy wanted to go back and apologize but he didn’t and this has bothered him. Someone else visited with the Marine and called the CP to advise them of the incident. Billy was told that someone from Division Headquarters transported him to the rear and Billy never saw him again. Someone told Billy that the guy turned out to be a basket case (probably meaning he had psychological problem).

Sgt Menard's notes reflect that he, the Mortar Section Leader (2nd Lt. Frederick "Fred" Farrell), and the 1st Mortar Section Squad were with the Company CP. The Company had moved into the "Palisades" which had previously been the positions held by B/1/7. At one time while on the hook (perhaps this day) he and Donald Burge were running from incoming (possibly 82mm mortar) rounds when Burge didn’t run fast enough. He got a piece of shrapnel in his upper arm and was gone for a day or two to the Battalion aid station. When he got back he was the jokingly told he had to learn to run faster.

It was possibly about this date that PFC Trellin Q. McCoy, a mortar man, had his hand burned (and perhaps hit) by a 60mm mortar as it was leaving the tube.

TSgt Kenneth H. Curney was dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1952

Sgt Menard took the 2nd and 3rd Mortar Squads and moved in with the 1st Platoon. They left most of their gear behind and only took their mess gear, sleeping bags, and weapons.

At 1600 the Battalion closed the forward CP in the 7th Marines reserve area. Units of the Battalion (H/3/1) remained in the area for administrative purposes.

About this date Billy Dean participated in the first of two patrols he went on from the Hook position. It was about a six or man patrol and was uneventful. The patrol checked on a bridge that crossed the Samichon River and laid in wait for two or three hours near the bridge. Having seen no enemy, they returned to the MLR before daylight.

Cpl Vincent J. Danca was dropped from the company.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1952

H/3/1 remained on the MLR with the 7th Marines.

Sgt Menard had left his diary book behind when he went to support the 1st Platoon yesterday so there is no detailed record of the events. However, he included notes in his diary later that shows they had about fifty percent casualties about this date. He also included the note that he was "dead as Hell" (probably meaning tired) these last few days in October.

With the opening of the new spoonbill bridge on 30 October 3/1 was also tasked with furnishing 30 men as a security force at that location. The 30-man security force came from W/3/1.

G and I/3/1 continued improving positions on the Kansas Line. While digging the trench line, G/3/1 found a skeleton and notified Graves Registration.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1952

Even in the heat of battle there is still consideration for those who have earned their rest. About this day "Stick" (who is stick) (from H/3/1) went on R&R to Japan.

The strength of the Battalion at the beginning of the month was 37 Marine Officers, 995 Marine enlisted, 2 Naval Officers, and 40 Naval enlisted. During the month the Battalion joined ? Marine officer replacements, 139 Marine Enlisted replacements, and 70 Marine enlisted from Regiment. Six Marine Officers were transferred, 33 marine enlisted were rotated and 38 Marine Enlisted were transferred. One Naval officer was joined, 9 naval enlisted were joined, 1 Naval Officer and 11 Naval Enlisted were transferred. One Naval Enlisted joined from Regiment. One Marine Officer, 74 Marine Enlisted, and 3 Naval Enlisted were sick evacuated. three Marine Officers, 78 Enlisted, and 5 Naval enlisted were returned to duty. One Marine Officer, 89 Marine Enlisted and 5 Naval enlisted were
WIA (evacuated). One Naval and 27 Marine enlisted were WIA (non-evacuated). One Marine Officer and 16 Marine Enlisted were KIA. Two Marine Enlisted DOW. Three Marine Enlisted were MIA. The personnel strength at the end of the period was 37 Marine Officers, 1026 Marine Enlisted, 2 Naval Officers, and 35 Naval enlisted.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1952

Billy Dean recalls that he was on a 12-man reconnaissance patrol that left the MLR at 2300 about this date. They walked down the same trail as they had previously, with mine fields on the right and left. The patrol moved out with about ten yards of spacing between individuals. He had heard that the last man in patrols was in danger of being snatched by the Chinese and, on this night, he was very cautious because he was the last man. He remembers telling the next man up the line that, "If I get grabbed just start shooting, one of us has got to get some relief." Billy spent part of time walking backwards to keep an eye on his rear.

As they came within two hundred yard of the bridge that crossed the Samichon River, the pace slowed and word was passed to, "Get down". The Lt. in charge of the patrol (name unknown) came to PFC Billy Dean and stated, "I think I saw something on the other side of the bridge." He asked Billy to come with him to investigate. Billy assured the Lt. that he had no desire to check out the matter. Billy asked the Lt. if he was asking Billy to volunteer to go with him. He was, and Billy reluctantly agreed. The other members of the patrol moved to within one hundred yards of the bridge. Billy and the Lt. moved another twenty five yards and got down in a squatting position. It was very dark but their eyes had become accustomed to the darkness. They crawled up to the end of the bridge. The Lt. punched Billy to get his attention and pointed to the other end of the bridge, about fifty feet away. Billy saw a flicker of light and the wind had brought him what he thought was the smell of smoke. The enemy cupped the their hands as they took drags. It appeared they were in a circle as Billy could see one enemy on the left and one on the right as they took drags from their cigarettes. Billy and the Lt. watched the enemy for about five minutes before leaving. They crawled back for a short distance and then walked, bent over, to prevent exposing their silhouette.

Billy went back to his last-man position in the patrol and the Lt. gave the word to move out. Billy thought they would turn around and return to the MLR but the Lt. had other ideas. They moved down (south or east) the right side of the river and came out approximately three quarters of a mile down stream. Billy felt somewhat comfortable in following the stream because the minefield probably did not extend to it. The patrol came upon a wire that was about eighteen inches off the ground. Wire such as this is often used to mark mine fields and all were very concerned. The question was, were they coming to a mine field (on the other side of the wire), or had they been in a mine field and now exiting it. Another problem was that it was nearing daylight and they may not have time to return to the MLR by back-tracking. After consulting with there patrol members the Lt. decided they would go to their right, toward friendly lines (the name of the friendly unit is unknown). Word was passed to stay in a straight line and try to walk in the same steps as the man in front. As they got near the middle of the field and near the expected trail, someone flushed a pheasant. For the first few seconds the pheasant sounded much like an incoming round and everyone’s heart skipped a beat. None of the Marines dropped to the ground or moved from their position because they had been trained to freeze when in a mine field. They continued until they reached the trail, made a left turn, and followed the trail toward friendly lines. Billy heard the challenge and the patrol halted to give the password before they were permitted to pass. It was now nearing daylight. They passed through the friendly unit’s position and proceeded to H/3/1’s position.

Billy now wonders what would have happened if they had not returned before daylight. He thinks they would probably have had to just lay down and hide until darkness when the could move again. They were close enough to the enemy that they would have been easy targets for small arms and mortar fire.

From Nov. 1st to Nov. 16th 3/1 (minus H/3/1) was in Division reserve at coordinates 078995 (Camp Rose). H/3/1 remained on the MLR in the 7th Marines sector until Nov. 3rd.
While in reserve the Battalion followed prepared training schedules and worked on improving the Kansas Line. While in Division reserve the Battalion continued to furnish the security forces at Spoonbill Bridge and Devastate Charlie, the radar control station for aircraft. Thirty men constituted the force at Spoonbill Bridge and thirteen men were deployed at Devastate Charlie.

Daily surveillance patrols were dispatched while the Battalion was in Division reserve. A total of seven motorized patrols and two foot patrols were sent out each week. The mission of the patrols apprehending any person not on authorized business in the Division reserve sector. An additional duty of the patrols was the collection of salvageable material found along the routes of march.

During this day there was a foot surveillance patrol in the Battalion reserve area that departed at 0900 and returned at 1200 with negative results. A motorized surveillance patrol departed at 1330 and returned at 1630 and reported negative results. It is not known which companies provided the personnel for these patrols.

During this period of reserve twenty-six men attended the Mine Warfare School held by an Engineer Company and eighteen men attended the NCO School held by the 1st Marine Division.

About Nov. or Dec., when the H/3/1 CO was transferred to Regiment, Ron McKinney, the H/3/1 Co's jeep driver was reassigned to I/3/1 from which he had come when he joined the 3/1 Raider Platoon. Others, like Art Vega and Anthony Caldeira aka "Sea Daddy" also went back to Item company. Many Marines in the Raider Platoon that had been merged into H/3/1 about Aug. 26th originally came from other units (W/3/1, H&S/3/1, and I/3/1). Some were now being returned and reattached to their parent units.

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1952

Four men departed the Battalion for the NCO School at the Division CP and thirteen men began a Mine Warfare School held by Engineer Company in the Division Reserve Area.

At Battalion, Catholic Memorial Mass was held at 0900 by Chaplin P. Adams and Protestant Memorial Services were held at 1030 by Chaplain G. Kuhn for the roll of 3/1 Marines who died between July 1952 and October 1952. The roll of the dead follows with an asterisk beside H/3/1 Marines.

Manuel G. Alvarado             Leo A. Biross
  * Daniel L. Blubaugh             Allan J. Bouquin
  Freeic L. Bradshaw             Romolo A. Bucci
  Robert L. Epperson             Clarence C. Farrell Jr.
  Kermikt M. Ferrell             John E. Finn
  Herbert L. Golding             Edward H. Goodman
  Cornelius F. Harney            Fran Harris
  John J. Hughes                 Antonio Jaime
  Marion E. King                 Robert King
  Richard Y. Kono                Ray A. McClaskey
  Merlin M. McKeever             * John Lammers
  Frederick W. Miner             * Andrew J. Morgan Jr.
  Robert A. Muth                 Tommy J. Neves
  * Stanley T. O'Banion           Carol C. Prejean
  * Leocadio Rivera              * Charles Skinner
  Spurgeon Wright                * Earl L. Valentine Jr.
  Melvin Weiss

The asterisks denote personnel from H/3/1.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1952

At 0300 the Black Watch, 29th Infantry Brigade, 1st Commonwealth Division relieved 1/7 of responsibility of the Hook Sector, ending Marine Occupation of that part of the Jamestown Line. This slightly reduced the 1st Mar. Div. front to 33 miles.

Although the 7th Marines had administrative control of the Hook area, it was H/3/1's
Marines who were still manning parts of the trench line. At 1650 the first elements of H/3/1 Marines that had been under the administrative control of the 7th Marines began returning to the Battalion. The last of H/3/1's troops arrived at 2130.

Sgt Menard, who cherished his mail from home, received two packages and some letters.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1952

The Company was back in reserve and there was no reveille this morning. The Company was given the day off after returning from the line the previous night. Sgt Menard got up, showered at 1000, and then squared away his gear. He sent two packages home.

PFC Joseph E. Revell went on R&R.

Jewish Memorial Services was held at 1100 by Chaplain S. Sobel for the 3/1 Marines who died between July and October 1952. (See names listed on November 2nd)

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1952

The Battalion's original policy of 25 percent training and 75 percent work on the Kansas line was changed on this date. Between Nov. 5 and Nov. 13 one rifle company, with attached units of W/3/1, worked on the line each day, while the remainder of the Battalion conducted the training program. The rifle companies alternated as the unit to work on the Kansas Line. The majority of the work was on the left of H/3/1's sector of the line.

The Battalion's motorized surveillance patrol departed at 1300 and returned at 1600 with negative results.

The Company zeroed in their weapons at the range in the morning and then had classes in the afternoon.

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1952

Advanced details from the Battalion's rifle companies departed for the 7th Marine's sector of the MLR. These details consisted of one officer and approximately fourteen men from each company. These men remained on the MLR to familiarize themselves with the positions, terrain, and patrol routes.

H/3/1 was trained, with attached w/3/1 units, from 1300 to 1700 in Platoon Tactics in the Company training area.

The Battalion's foot surveillance patrol from 0900 to 1200 and the motorized patrol from 1330 to 1530 returned with negative results.

At pay call Sgt Ray Menard drew $45 of the $245 he had on the books. He went to "Administrative Rear" (possibly Battalion or Regiment) with Dean (either 2nd Plt Sgt SSgt Richard "Dick" A. Dean or PFC Billy "Bill" Thomas Dean who was with the 3.5 rocket Section). They got back too late for chow.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1952

The Battalion's motorized surveillance patrol from 1315 to 1530 returned with negative results.

It snowed in the morning but they went out to dig (probably on the Kansas Line) all day anyway.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 1952

A Battalion formation was held for the Regimental Commander's inspection and presentation of awards. The award presentation was made to persons for actions against the enemy. Col. W. F. Layer, the Regimental Commander, presented 1 gold star in lieu of a second Bronze Star, 5 Bronze Stars, and 7 Letters of commendation. In the afternoon there was as clothing inspection from 1300 to 1700.

The Company had classes all day. At 1900 they went out on a night problem and returned at 2200.
A foot surveillance Patrol departed at 0900 and returned at 1215. The motorized patrol covered their assigned route from 1330 to 1630. Both had negative results.

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1952

The Company had an inspection at 0730 and then class at 0900 on squad infiltration. After a field problem in the afternoon they had another inspection at 1600. The motorized surveillance patrol covered their assigned route from 1400 to 1630 with negative results.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1952

Even in War Marines celebrate their Marine Corps Birthday. There was no reveille this morning. At 1030 there was a formation in which Sgt. Menard was the Company Right Guide. Col. Layer cut the eight-hundred pound birthday cake and the afternoon was spent in organized athletics. The motorized Surveillance patrol covered their assigned route from 1300 to 1550 with negative results.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1952

There was no official reveille. The Mortar Section (and possibly the rest of the Company) went out to dig on the Kansas Line in the rain. They returned at 1300 and it was still raining. At 1400 Ten officers and 102 men of the 1st Replacement Battalion joined the Battalion and were assigned to the respective companies to receive training. The men were instructed on current operations, an intelligence summary, current orders and memorandums, supply discipline, and the organization of the 1st Marine Division. In addition they conducted live firing on the rifle range. The 26th Draft replacements arrived at the Company today. This probably included Frank Mayberry who was probably assigned to H&S/3/1 and then sent to H/3/1 as the Company Wireman.

The H/3/1 July 1953 Monthly Personnel Roster shows the following men left the U.S.A. in Oct. 1952. They probably arrived in Korea, and may have joined H/3/1, about this date.

Sgt Paul J. Calleja 1191391/0845 (joined)
SSgt. Robert L. Culp 664142/0516 (joined)
Cpl Edward I. Domain 1166287/0334
PFC Lester A. Ehlers 1317029/0311
PFC John Euclon 1266778/0311
PFC Juan G. Evaro 1334052/0311
PFC Willie Fockers 1299659/0311
PFC Roy C. Feister 1327621/0311
Cpl Lawrence L. Fugate 1262754/1372
PFC Heyo F. Groenewold 1225226/3000
PFC Fred N. Guerin 1331143/0311
PFC John N. Hakey 1343888/0311
PFC Anthony G. Hamilton 1253491/0311
Sgt Paul Hoff 1163643/3534
GySgt George A. Hyde 929760/0316
PFC Albino Pao 1268259/5841
GySgt William R. Weber 366477/0316

The motorized surveillance patrol move by foot on this day because of a shortage of transportation. The patrol left at 1300 and returned at 1530 with negative results. Sgt Clyde W. Keel, who had been a H/3/1 Marine, returned to Korea and joined H&S/1/5.

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1952
The Company fired the 3.5 rockets and rifle grenade in the morning and then went out to the tank-park in the afternoon. They were also trained in Military Courtesy and Discipline.

The surveillance patrol departed at 1245 and returned at 1545 with negative results. The patrol again moved via foot. H/3/1 was the unit responsible for the surveillance patrol on this date. Motorized patrols consisted of 1 staff NCO, a fire team, in interpreter, and 2 jeeps with trailers. The foot patrol consisted of 1 staff NCO, 2 fire teams, and 1 interpreter.

The Company went out on a night problem.

Sgt Menard noted in his diary that the Company lost their CO on this date. Capt. Byron J. Melancon had been the CO. Perhaps he was the CO they lost. Capt. Carl R. Gray became the new Company CO.

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1952

Sgt Menard had a bad ankle so he didn't go to the field with his troops. He and the mortar section's first Squad Gunner, PFC Donald M. Burge, painted mortar tubes and then went to supply to draw cold weather gear.

The surveillance patrol departed at 1315 and returned at 1550 with negative results.
Newly arrived replacements fired on the rifle range.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1952

Sgt Menard went to positions with TSgt John F. Gilroy and SSgt William "Mace" Mason on this cold, cloudy day. they returned after dark.

Work on the Kansas Line was stopped. The Battalion continued training and preparing for the coming move to the MLR. H/3/1 was trained in The Rifle Company in Defense. The Battalion's surveillance Patrol departed at 0900 and returned at 1145 with negative results.

The Battalion administrative order directed that the last hot meal to be served at Camp Rose would be this evening's meal. After this evening's meal the Battalion mess would move to the new Battalion CP. The meal plan at the new CP while on line was that troops would be fed twice daily. Half A and B and half Charlie (C) rations. Company galleys will be operated wherever practicable starting on Nov. 15th.

About this date George Broadhead, a H&S/3/1 wireman, joined H/3/1 this date and met up with his old buddy, Willard T. O'Hara, who was already in H/3/1 when he got there. They were in reserve when he joined the company and due to go back on line the next day.

PFC Carral Cole and Cpl Russell Schultz went TAD to Camp Fisher, Japan (R&R).

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1952

There was a Company CO's inspection at 0900. Sgt Menard spent the rest of the day squaring away his gear and getting ready to move out.

At 1000 the security force at Devastate Charlie was relieved by a unit from 1/7. The Battalion's surveillance patrol covered their assigned area from 1300 to 1550 with negative results.

Two reinforced rifle squads from H/3/1 departed at 1405 and 1530 respectively. These units were to be the combat outposts on Hill 19 (Berlin) and 19A (East Berlin). The relief of all of the Battalion's outposts was to be completed 24 hours before the relief of the MLR.

On this evening the Battalion began relief on the MLR. Advanced details had been in position for nearly a week to lay the ground work for the relief. The relief was accomplished and the Battalion assumed responsibility for the assigned sector of the MLR at 2300 on Nov. 16th.

In mid-November about this date, India introduced a compromise measure that would eventually lead to a continuation of the peace-talks on April 6, 1953.
About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

3rd Plt. Ldr  LT. Richard "Dick" Reed (left)

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1952

Reveille was at 0530 and the Company mortar section departed on trucks at 0745 for the 3/7 area of the MLR. They arrived at Hill 119 (Boulder City) at 0930 and the mortar section fired in the afternoon. At 1230 elements of 1/7 assumed the mission of security force at Spoonbill Bridge. At 1800 George and How companies (-) cleared the reserve area for the MLR. The truck drivers from the motor pool did a very good job of driving without lights over the hazardous roads. The Battalion CP in the reserve area was also closed at 1800 and the new CP opened at coordinates 108072. H/3/1 commenced the relief of G/3/7 at 2010 and the relief was completed at 2230. H/3/1 was manning Hill 119 (Boulder City) and they may also have been manning positions on Hill 126 (Notice that on Dec. 20-21 they had casualties there.) G/3/1 was probably manning position from Hill 111 (and perhaps part of Hill 126) to the right (north) of Hill 119. I/3/1 was manning positions to the left of Hill 119 (Vegas, Reno, and Carson). The outposts (Hill 19 (Berlin) and Hill 19A (East Berlin)) were each manned by a H/3/1 reinforced squad. At 2300 3/1 assumed responsibility for their sector of the MLR. Patrois and ambushes returned with negative contacts. It was G/3/1's Marines on these patrols.

When H/3/1 disembarked from the trucks they still had to walk about a mile uphill to their positions on Hill 119. All were loaded down with weapons, ammo, and all of their personal possessions. The weapons PFC Billy Dean and PFC Fred "Bad Buck" Buxton each had were a M1 Rifle, a M1 Carbine, and a Thompson .45 submachine gun. The ammunition for these weapons probably at more than doubled the weight. The trek was not too difficult on this night because the night was cool, and the pace was not too fast. G/3/1 Marines moved back down the hill to the same trucks that brought H/3/1. All knew enough to be very quiet because the enemy was within 1000 yards. The 1st and 2nd Platoons were to the left of the 3rd Platoon.

The Thompson was not the normal issue. Fred Buxton had commandeered the weapon while in reserve. Commandeered is a word used to mean stolen from an unsuspecting (likely an Army quad .50 gunner) person who, in the Marine’s opinion, didn’t need the weapon as well as the Marine could put it to use. The M1 carbines were military issue at one time. But they had long since been recalled. The reason given for the recall was that the carbine was undependable in extreme cold weather and the magazine would fall out of the weapon if taped together with a second magazine. Billy Dean said he never had any of these problems. When they were in reserve the weapons and ammo were hidden in a safe place (buried in water proof bags below their bunks in their tent. Fred also had his .38 in a shoulder holster. This he would loose in the heat of a firefight while on patrol.

Billy Dean remembers that after getting into position they immediately filled the fighting holes and attempted to establish as quickly as possible. The Chinese were known to attack when they knew a unit was being replaced. The terrain was always unfamiliar to the new unit and organization was least effective initially. Billy hated this because they only had a general idea of where (which direction) the enemy’s location. In the dark you had it was also hard to distinguish the terrain features. Billy looked forward to daylight so they could better understand the situation.

About five minutes after arriving (probably about midnight) in their position the squad leader, Sgt. Schick received the word to put out some listening posts. PFC Billy Dean and PFC John Euglon were chosen for the first watch.

They asked where the listening post was but no one seemed to know. They were told to move out in front to try to find the listening post position. The two moved to the right end of the trench line and then in front to find the barbed wire. After crossing the barbed wire and concertina they were unsure if there were any mines in the area. They soon found a large crater that was about a foot deep and decided to make this their listening post. The hole had frozen water in the bottom and was covered with a light coat of snow. Both had carbines, grenades, and John had an M-1 rifle.

They were sweating from carrying their stuff up to their position. As Billy recalls,
the temperature was about 10-15 degrees below zero and the began to cool down too quickly. The learned that they were about 100 yards from the correct listening post but didn't know there that was so they stayed in the crater, lying on the ice. They began to realize they were becoming a liability when they movement was almost nonexistent and they could hardly talk. They made the decision to return to the MLR about 0400. Bill got up first and John said, "I can't get up, you will have to help me." Bill told John that he was in the same condition and that he would have to help himself because he couldn't help him. The had the most difficult time getting moving and then getting through the wire and back to the trench line. When they returned to the line, someone put them in a fighting hole and then realized they were in no condition to stay there. They were taken back to squad leader's bunker. Sgt. Schick realized they were almost frozen and put them in a corner with several blankets over them. They was no heater in the bunker but they were given warm hot chocolate to drink. The next day the corpsman checked them out for frost bite but could find none. The reason they were not relieved at their position was that no one could find them. After daylight they learned they were about 100 yards out in front of the trench line. Billy would catch the listening post duty another 4-5 times during their 63 days on Hill 119.

The 1st Marines completed relief the 7th Marines on the 1st Mar. Division's right. The 1st Marines right-most portion was probably Hill 111 at this time. Hill 111 was to be heavily involved in many battles and especially in the very last battle of the war in July 1953.

Four men from the Battalion departed for the NCO School held by the 1st Marine Division.

On this date PFC J. R. Elmore was transferred from C Co., 1st Medical Battalion to the hospital ship, USS Constellation.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1952

Sgt. Menard got up at 0800 and fired in the morning. After getting some hot chow they fired in the afternoon. He worked in his bunker and then again in the evening they fired some H&I (harassment and interdiction) fire.

George Broadhead, a Company wireman, got the word that new men didn't do much the first few day, just observe. However, He was eager. When the TSgt. asked for volunteers, George was the first to say, "He'd go". George and a Marine from Mississippi, C. W. Bird, was to run a telephone line from Hill 119 to the another Hill (possibly Hill 19, Berlin). It was raining hard and the trenches were full of mud so they stayed above the trench-line. This was not a good place to be. They had gone about half way when the line broke. The next thing George knew was that there were several Koreans coming toward him. He didn't know what to do. They might be enemy or they could be friendly Korean labors. As it turned out they were friendly South Korean labors hauling ammunition up to the line. Such was his first night on line.

Billy Dean and others noticed about 150-200 yards in front of their position there was a M1 rifle with a bayonet that was stuck, upright, I the ground. No one knows how it got there. It was thought there was a mine field around the rifle so no-one attempted to retrieve the rifle. It became a well known land mark that many passed on their way out and back from patrols.

All combat patrols and ambushes returned to the MLR with negative contact.

Total enemy artillery and mortar fire in the Battalion area was 9 rounds of 60 (probably 61mm), 11 rounds of 82mm, 3 rounds of 120mm and 20 rounds of 76mm.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1952

Sgt Menard repaired the ammo pits and received two packages from Ms. Eike (PFC Jan Robert Eike's (KIA Apr. 6, 1952) mother).

All of the Battalion's patrols and ambushes departed the MLR as scheduled. A squad sized patrol that G/3/1 sent out sustained 2 WIAs which were evacuated at 2020. This happened at coordinates 096098.
At 2105 the H/3/1 reported heavy incoming and an estimated reinforced platoon of enemy was probing Hill 19 (Berlin) which was manned by a H/3/1 reinforced squad. The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons, and grenades. The H/3/1 squad countered with the same. At 2130 the enemy withdrew with an estimated 10 KIA and 13 WIA. Friendly forces received 1 WIA which was evacuated. The friendly WIA was a result of mixed enemy artillery and mortar fire.

At 2105 the Company observed an estimated enemy squad moving in the direction of the MLR. Small arms, automatic weapons, and 60mm mortars were fired at them with no estimate of enemy casualties.

G/3/1 was also firing on an estimated enemy platoon at Hill 13 (also called Gary and Frisco).

At 2150 H/3/1 and G/3/1 received heavy enemy artillery on Hill 19 (Berlin) and the MLR. G/3/1 sustained 2 W/IA's which were evacuated and H/3/1 sustained 1 WIA which was evacuated.

At 2216 an estimated squad sized enemy probe was again hitting Hill 19 using small arms, automatic weapons, and grenades. The H/3/1 squad countered with the same and the enemy disengaged with unknown casualties. H/3/1 sustained 1 KIA and 2 W/IA's which were evacuated and 1 WIA which was not evacuated from the enemy artillery and mortar fire on the MLR. The KIA was PFC Wesley Kinard who was from Brookville, MS and is buried at Macon, MS. The official location of his death is Korangp'o-ri, Korea. This is possibly the location of Battalion Doctor that verified the death but he apparently died on Hill 119, Hill 19, or Hill 19A.

At 2300 H/3/1 observed an estimated enemy squad approaching Hill 19 from the left front. They fired small arms and automatic weapons at them and the enemy withdrew with unknown casualties.

A total of 4 rounds of 61mm, 28 rounds of 82mm, 29 rounds or 76mm, and 398 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery fire fell in the Battalion area. The H/3/1 mortar Section fired over 700 rounds, mostly in defense of Berlin which had a five hour probe.

George Broadhead recalls that his second night on line he was with a platoon that was going to support another platoon that was raiding a Chinese-held hill in front of the MLR. The attack went well and the attacking platoon released the supporting platoon.

George thought this would be a good time to visit his buddy, Willard D. O'Hara, who was in a forward bunker. He proceeded toward the front after getting permission from the lieutenant. He found O'Hara, the South Koreans who were bringing up the ammunition, and a Corpsman in a bunker. O'Hara had a rosary and had just finished saying the Act of Contrition while the corpsman died. O'Hara had also been wounded twice. This was not a good start for a new replacement on line.

PFC Joseph Morra who was WIA on this date and was likely in one of the actions described for this date.

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1952

The Mortar Section received 200 rounds of 60mm ammo from the rear. They cleaned up the pits and stripped the ammo.

At 2015 the Company observed an unknown number of enemy in the vicinity of the protective wire on Hill 19 (Berlin). The Chinese may have been in the process of picking up their KIA that were laying in the wire. The H/3/1 squad that was defending Hill 19 employed small arms and threw hand grenades to cause the enemy to withdraw with an unknown number of casualties. At 2205 Hill 19 was receiving enemy machine gun fire from Hill 139. The Company's 60 mm mortars performed a search and traverse operation (fired) on Hill 139 which was about five hundred yards NW of Berlin. The Battalion's 81mm mortars were also used to silence the machine gun.

On this day PFC Michael Noone was transferred from C Co., 1st Medical Battalion to the USS Consolation hospital ship.

G/3/1 was also in action. Their combat patrol made contact with an estimated enemy reinforced squad at coordinates 092091. The enemy fired small arms, automatic weapons, and employed a machine guns from the vicinity of Hill 15 (Detroit). The G/3/1 patrol countered
with small arms and automatic weapons. 60mm and 81mm mortars were also called into the fight. The enemy machine gun was destroyed by a 4.2 mortar round. At 2350 the enemy withdrew after sustaining 3 KIAs and 4 WIs. The G/3/1 parol had 2 KIA from enemy small arms fire during the encounter.

A total of 20 enemy rounds of 60mm, 16 rounds of 82mm, 20 rounds of 120mm and 7 rounds of 76mm fire fell in the Battalion sector on this day.

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1952

Sgt Menard had six KSC Laborers all day and used them to get his area squared away (mortar areas cleaned up bunkers/ammo pits repaired, etc.).

All the Battalion patrols had negative contacts. At 1400 an enemy OP bunker at coordinates 072086 (in front of Vegas) was destroyed by .75mm HE fire. At 2255 a 4.2 mortar was called on an active enemy mortar at coordinates 071081 (in front of Vegas) and the enemy mortar was silenced.

There was a probe behind Merlin (unknown where Merlin is located) near How 1 (perhaps 1st Platoon).

A total of 160mm, 15 rounds of 82mm, 7 rounds of 120mm mortar fire and 5 rounds of 3.5 Rocket fell on friendly positions.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1952

All Battalion patrols returned with negative contact. Enemy rocket launchers were observed firing at 0645 from positions at coordinates 091093 (behind Hill 98 (probably west of Betty Grable) and coordinates 088092 (west of Hill 110 (Detroit)). The 4.2 mortars were employed and the targets were displaced.

At 0845 4.2 mortar fire was also employed on an active enemy mortar at coordinates 087089 (west Detroit) resulting in the mortar being destroyed.

This was an easy day for Sgt Menard. They had 100% alert all night and he hit the sack at 0630.

D/2/1 made a raid on/near Vegas.


A total of 11 rounds of 82mm mortar fire fell in the Battalion area.

Cpl John Cabello, PFC Robert Hawkins, and Cpl Stanley Kroski went TAD to Camp Fisher (R&R) this date.

PFC Carral Cole and Cpl Russell Schultz returned from TAD in Camp Fisher, Japan (R&R).

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1952

All patrols returned with negative results.

A Company raid was conducted in the 1/1 sector to the left of 3/1. As a diversion prearranged fires were employed (some probably by H/3/1) on known enemy positions upon order. Small arms, Automatic weapons, rifle grenades, 60mm, 81mm, 4.2 mortars and tank fire were used.

Sgt Menard got up at 0900, went to chow, and then took a shower. On his way back from the shower he fired sixteen rounds while sighted in his .38 pistol. The PX truck had arrived but he was broke.

The 1st Marines were defending the Divisions right sector with 1/1 on the Regimental left front and 3/1 on the right. 2/1 was in regimental reserve. Raids on enemy positions and ambushes became a pattern of action in late November and December. There was a lull in enemy activity beginning about this time that would last through December and January.

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1952

This was cloudy day.

PFC Billy Dean recalls that there was no real big snow while during this tour on
line. He hated to have just a little snow because the enemy could silhouette you no matter the color of your cloths. With no snow Marines could wear dark clothes, with snow they could wear white snow suits, but movement could easily be seen in patches of snow no matter how they were dressed. The snow suits fit right over their uniforms and even had a hood for the head. This may sound like a small thing now but it could have been a life and death matter in Korea.

All patrols returned with negative contacts. At 1250 4.2 mortars fired on an active enemy OP and bunker in the vicinity of coordinates 087088 (west of Hill 110 (Detroit)) resulted in 35 yards of trench and 1 bunker destroyed and 1 enemy KIA. At 2305 a H/3/1 company patrol sustained 4 WIA (evacuated) and 5 WIA (non-evacuated) from an enemy mine at coordinates 086085 (about 400 yards SSW of Hill 110 (Detroit)).

When D/2/1 made their raid last Friday they had one MIA. He returned through H/3/1's lines from No-Man's-Land on this date.

A total of 1 round of 60mm and 1 round of 82mm mortar fire fell on the Battalion's positions.

PFC Michael Noone was transferred from the US Consolation hospital ship to a hospital in Japan and was dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1952

All patrols departed and returned to the MLR with negative contacts.
The Marine Corps Museum reports that at 0605 the Company sustained 4 WIA (non-evacuated) from 2 rounds from an enemy 60mm mortar fired from coordinates 085097. (***NOTE: These coordinates would be about 2500 yards north of H/3/1's positions and out of range for a 60 or 61mm mortar. No doubt there was casualties but probably the coordinates of the enemy mortar are incorrect.)

At 1545 and enemy mortar at coordinates 095097 (just west of Berry Grable) was silenced by 4.2 mortar fire.

First Platoon Leader 2nd Lt. Donald R. Holliway stopped by Sgt Menard's bunker to say farewell before he left (on Nov. 27th.) for Japan. Sgt Menard was working on his bunker doorway.

It rained this night.

A total of 24 rounds of 60mm, 7 rounds of 82mm, 5 rounds of 120mm mortar and 2 rounds of 76mm artillery fire fell on the Battalion sector.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1952

All patrols returned with negative results.
The rain stopped so Sgt Menard got his camera out and used up the rest of his colored film (tank, burp gun, etc.). He received some cookies from home and Lacy's pictures arrived.
PFC Richard Coston was WIA Nov. 25, 1952 and evacuated to the 1st Medical Battalion.
A total of 9 rounds of 82mm, 6 rounds of 120mm, and 33 rounds of 76mm artillery fire fell on the Battalion area.

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1952

All Battalion patrols returned with negative results.
Sgt Menard's diary reflects that he "got pile caps" and worked on the front of his bunker. Everyone was on watch (100%) until 0200. All guns (mortars) were set.
A total of 17 rounds of 82mm mortar fire fell on the Battalion sector.

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1952

George Braodhead remembers his thanksgiving dinner as follows:
It was Thanksgiving Day and we were on Hill 119 on the Western front of Korea. Hot chow was delivered by truck to a comparatively safe location behind the main line of
resistance (the MLR). The 12-man squads sent 3 or 4 men back at a time to have a hot Thanksgiving meal; then to return to allow the next group to share in the same treat. Standing in the chow line, from where one could see men scooping mashed potatoes or cranberry sauce and placing it in mess kits held by Marines who had been living on "C-rations", I could see a large full turkey from which a cook was slicing light or dark meat as requested. It doesn't get any better than this, I thought. I held out my mess kit and mashed potatoes were plopped into a section of the small oval shaped tray. Then candied sweet potatoes, followed by peas, stringbeans, squash, cranberry sauce--both jellied and with cranberries--a choice of light or dark meat from the turkey. Corn on the cob was placed on one side of the sectionalized half of the open mess kit. This was undoubtedly the best Thanksgiving meal I would ever eat. Continuing down the line opposite the men on mess duty, both sides of the tray began to look like two adjoining hills. Black olives, green olives with pimento filling, apple sauce, and on the remaining spot of the sectionalized tray, a piece of pumpkin pie and then, a large piece of apple pie followed by a huge glob of vanilla ice cream. For breakfast I had eaten a can of beans and franks, and now it was to be a feast fit for a Pilgrim. Nearing the end of the row of makeshift tables holding the food, I was too absorbed to notice the angry (now that's a sweet politically correct description) Marines up front. I reached the last messman, but he didn't ask whether you wanted or if you did, how much: He dipped a large scoop into a pan and before I could move away he poured the spicy hot Korean sauce with small shrimp over every particle of food on my mess kit. Was that his idea of a hot Thanksgiving meal.... After nearly a lifetime of Thanksgiving meals, it is difficult to remember one from another, even those with grandparents and family and friends, but I have never forgotten that Thanksgiving meal in Korea. May each of you have a great Thanksgiving.

Billy Dean also has the following to say about the Thanksgiving dinner; I remember it well but am unable to say it with words so beautifully. I remember the trek from the MLR up and over the hill to the assembly area, and to find a bunch of trucks, tables, and heaters heating hot water so that we might clean our mess gear. It was a joyful time, and I remember thinking of good and great things and for an hour of peace, knowing full well as we returned to the MLR the snipers resumed firing at random once we reach about half way to our trench line. So it was Korea Thanksgiving 1952.

Sgt Menard hit the sack at 0300 this morning, got up at 1100, and went to chow at 1300.

All Battalion patrols returned to the MLR with negative results.

2nd Lt. Donald R. Holliway left for Japan and was replaced by Lt. Frederick "Fred" Farrell as the 1st Platoon Leader. Lt. Farrell had been the Mortar Section Leader and may have also kept that position.

A total of 7 rounds of 60mm, 8 rounds of 120mm mortar and 8 rounds of 76mm artillery fell on the Battalion sector.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1952

All of the Battalion's patrols returned with negative results. Sgt Menard had some more KSC Laborers working with timber and sand bags for a new bunker. His radio was in bad shape. He stayed up until 0100 in the morning.

At 2120 a H/3/1 squad-sized patrol engaged an estimated reinforced enemy squad at coordinates 085085 (about 500 yards SW of Detroit (Bronco, Hill 110, Hill 15, Felix). The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons, hand grenades, and 2 machine guns. The H/3/1 patrol returned small arms fire and broke contact at 2125 after suffering WIA (non-evacuated) from enemy small arms fire. There was no estimate of enemy casualties.

A total of 7 rounds of 60mm, 8 rounds of 120 mm mortar and 8 rounds of 76mm artillery fell on the Battalion sector.

There was an enemy sniper that was firing from the area of Detroit, probably about 1200 yards away. He often fired at targets in a small open area near the 3rd Platoon that was visible to him. The open area was on the trail back to the showers and Battalion mess hall. The sniper only hit one person while Billy Dean was there but that was one too many.
He also fired at many others on their way to and from the showers and mess hall. This open area was of great concern the third platoon and the subject of many stories. Thanksgiving dinner was a good example of when the sniper fired at several as they dispersed and filtered back in twos and threes for the hot meal. Billy Dean remembers that on his way back from the mess hall the next Marine was about 100 yards in front of him and was not shot at by the sniper. Billy thought the sniper must have gone to get his Thanksgiving dinner. Not so. When Billy got to the open area, there were three quick shots. Two landed in front of him and one went behind him after passing between his legs and through his pant leg between his knee and ankle. All he felt was a little “puff”. For the next 100 yards Billy was the fastest Marine on the block. He didn’t realize that the bullet had passed through his pant leg until he got back to his position and stopped shaking.

There is another story about the sniper and PFC Julius Joyce “JJ” Davis. Julius was the unofficially designated trench line cook. He got permission to go back to the rear to see what he could scrounge from the mess hall. Somehow he was (probably commandeered) able to get a 50-pound sack of onions. Billy Dean recalls vividly that they were in a red mesh sack. PFC Billy Dean was near the end of the trench with PFC Fred Buxton, PFC William Hoffman, and a Puerto Rican whose name is unknown. These guys would be the unofficial eaters of the unofficially cooked food. They saw JJ come over the hill and the red sack on his shoulder stuck out like a sore thumb. Sure enough the sniper started firing at him with probably five or six rounds. As JJ approached the safer area, they started shouted to JJ, “Don’t drop the onions, don’t drop the onions!” When JJ made it to where the crowd was, he was huffing and puffing something awful. In a huff and with a few expletives mixed in, JJ said, “I go out and get you guys some chow and you laugh at me while I am being shot at.”

Billy and Fred could periodically see some movement in the distance, usually just a glimpse of a person walking down a trench line. When he learned about their interest in this sniper and their sightseeing, the Platoon Leader, Lt Robert E. Lee, designated Billy Dean and Fred Buxton as the designated sniper, or counter sniper. He provided them with binoculars and a rifle with a scope. Their instructions were to set up in the mornings and target the enemy. They sighted in the rifle and fired from their bunker. Others in the bunker complained that they were disturbing their sleep time and expressed their concern that the enemy would target snipers with artillery, mortars, or recoilless rifles. They took several shots of opportunity during their sniping career but only Fred can claim a sure hit. Other shots could not be recorded as sure hits and, probably most, were near misses.

Another trip to the showers was recorded by Billy Dean (was he really that clean?). While walking back from the showers with Fred Buxton, Johnson, and another (name unknown). It was cold and the road was sloppy from the recent thaw as they walked near the area where they had originally disembarked from the trucks. They were passing over a hill and nearing the sniper’s field of fire when they heard SWOOSH. They immediately dropped as they recognized the familiar sound of incoming. The round hit about 50 yards from them but there was no explosion. It was an .82mm mortar shell and there it was, stuck in the frozen rice paddy with the fins sticking out of the ground. Against the other’s advice, Johnson went looped some communications wire around the fins and got back several feet to try to pull the mortar from the ice. When TSgt Melanson said that it may have a delayed fuse they departed. TSgt Melanson and and the unnamed SSgt took the left trail and Dean, Buxton, and Johnson continued up the trail. Sure enough, the sniper fired at them again. Everyone was not to happy because after risking their lives to get a shower, they were muddy again from diving to the ground when they heard the SWOOSH.

Cpl John Cabello, PFC Robert Hawkins, and Cpl Stanley Kroski returned from TAD in Camp Fisher (R&R).

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1952

All of the Battalion patrols retrun with negative results.
Sgt Menard had six KSC Laborers again to help him tear down an old bunker and build a
new one. He received a package from home.
The company was on 100% alert.
S Sgt Warren E. Miller was given a meritorious combat promotion to TSgt on 29 Nov.
1952.
PFC Donald Cunningham was transferred from the USS Repose hospital ship to a hospital in
Japan and dropped from the company.
A total of 7 rounds of 60mm, 27 rounds of 82mm, and 1 round of 120mm enemy fire fell
on the Battalion sector.
PFC Ignacio Mendoza went TAD (R&R) to Camp Fisher Japan.

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1952

All of the Battalion's patrols returned with negative contacts.
Sgt Menard did some more work on the new bunker and then took a shower after chow.
Mack (possibly PFC Bernard W. Mack) got a forty three pound package from home.
Lt Farrell took out his first patrol this night.
A total of 10 rounds of 60mm and 2 rounds or 82mm enemy mortar fire fell in the
Battalion sector.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1952

A Battalion patrol dispatched on 30 November engaged the enemy in an action which
lasted until about 0001.
A total of 4 rounds of 82mm and 1 round of 120mm mortar fire fell in the Battalion
area today.
Sgt Menard had his troops policed up the area. He "got some gung-ho cards".
It started snowing about 2030.
During the month of December the Battalion continued to improve and defend the
Jamestown Line (the MLR). In addition to the MLR positions H/3/1 occupied Hill 19 (Berlin)
and Hill 19A (East Berlin) While I/3/1 manned Hill 21 (Vegas).
During the first part of the month the Battalion dispatched a minimum of 4 combat
patrols each night. These patrols were of fire team size or larger. On Dec. 15th the
patrol policy was changed to send out 3 combat patrols per week. The proximity of the
enemy necessitated the patrolling and contact were frequent. Reconnaissance patrols from
rifle companies covered the terrain immediately to their front each night to observe enemy
movement, positions, and to scout routes for combat patrols. During hours of darkness,
listening posts, varying in strength from 2 men to a fire team, were located at strategic
point in front of each company to report enemy movements.
Layouts were used frequently throughout the month, ranging in size from 2 men to a
fire team. These units are dispatched prior to first light. From concealed observation
points, the layouts observed the enemy and positions. By means of wire communications
these units reported enemy movements and were used to call in friendly mortar fire on enemy
personnel. In one case, on 15 December, a B/3/1 layout was discovered and smoke was used
to cover their withdrawal to the MLR.
In an effort to prevent accidental discharge of weapons, the Battalion produced
regulations for the use of weapons. The weapons handling policy was as follows:
(1) Personnel on reconnaissance and combat patrols may keep weapons loaded with a
round in the chamber, safety on, when the tactical situation dictates. At all other times
they will comply with the next paragraph.
(2) All other personnel forward of the Command Post, of the MLR Battalion will
habitually carry pieces with the bolt forward (or Hammer down) and the chamber empty. A
loaded magazine or clip may be carried in the piece when the tactical situation so
dictates. Those personnel at or in the rear of the MLR battalion CP's (including personnel
of units when ir Regimental or Division reserve), will not carry a magazine or clip in
their weapons unless personal attack is imminent, but will have a clip or magazine
available for use if necessary.
(3) sentinels on post will carry their weapons with bolt forward (or Hammer down),
and chamber empty, with a loaded clip or magazine inserted. Sentinels will not load a round in the chamber unless danger of personal attack is imminent, or to preserve order or protect lives or property.

Dave Moore was promoted to TSgt.

The following were promoted to Sgt.

Charles Arbogast          Joeph Caid                 Bernardino Correia
Harvey Dunn              Chalmer Elkins             Paul Fields
John Gaza                Donald Geary             William Miller
Chester Swietek

The following were promoted to Cpl.

Willard Barnes            Joseph Breaux              Frank Brown
Robert Burns              Paul Calleja             William Cheatham
Glenor Dabbs              Robert Devine            Walter Durrett
Steve Evans               Robert Hawkins           James Illa
Richard Kosinski          Bernard Mack             Edward Pangburn
Eddie Parmeley            Jose Rodriguez-Rodriguez Otto Schlegel
Antonio Soares

PFC John Dornberger had his MOS changed from 0300 to 2500.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1952

There was about two inches of snow on the ground in the morning.
Sgt Ray Menard and Cpl Henry C. Requate went back to get a shower.
It was twelve degrees above zero tonight.
A total of 5 rounds of 82mm and 9 rounds of 120mm mortar fire fell in the Battalion sector today.
Pvt Adolfo Collazo was promoted to PFC.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1952

Lt. Farrell learned this morning that he was the father of a nine pound baby boy.
The Company began issuing mittens and parkas.
At 1257 I/3/1 received 1 round of enemy 82mm fire which caused 1 KIA and 1 WIA (evacuated). A total of 47 rounds of 82mm and 3 rounds of 120mm mortar fire fell in the Battalion sector today.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1952

Friendly fire doesn’t always fall where intended. One night about this date a friend of PFC Billy Dean’s called from a bunker to tell him that a fire mission would commence in five minutes. The fire mission was the 105s or 155s shelling an area about 2000 yards to the right front. The rounds would be coming right over Billy Dean’s position on Hill 119. While observing the shelling, Billy noticed an awful noise a short distance overhead. He immediately went to ground as quickly as possible. The round hit about 30 yards to his right front and exploded. He hadn’t quite gotten to the ground when there was shrapnel flying everywhere. Some went right over Billy and pierced the ground behind where he was standing. Luckily, Billy only felt the dust, concussion of the blast, and ringing in his ears.

Sgt Menard was fixing his door and cleaned the stove today. He fired five rounds on Jersey Ridge (located about seven hundred yards north-northeast of Berlin) for a patrol that was near that location.

At 2235 a combat patrol from H/3/1 engaged an estimated enemy squad in a fire fight at coordinates 083086 (500 yards north of Berlin). The patrol and the enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades in the fight.
Ten rounds of 82mm, 3 rounds of 120mm, and 13 rounds of 76mm fire fell in the Battalion sector today.
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1952

At 0005 the enemy force that was involved with combat patrol broke contact with 1 counted KIA and 3 estimated WIAs. There were no friendly casualties.

The Company had 100% watch until 0130.

At 2315 a H/3/1 combat patrol had 1 KIA (Sgt Leonard Denti) and 1 WIA (evacuated) from an enemy mine at coordinates 080083 (800 yards NW of Hill 119). Leonard was from North Hollywood, CA and is buried in San Fernando, CA.

There was 14 rounds of 61mm and 11 rounds of 83mm mortar fire that fell in the Battalion area this day.

PFC Floyd Ellison was WIA, treated, and returned to duty.

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1952

The Mortar Section worked on building a shed for oil storage.

The 2nd Platoon Corpsman, Warner Len Leonard, was transferred from the Company to E Medical Company.

Three rounds of 61mm, 6 rounds of 82mm, 7 rounds of 76mm, and 15 rounds of mixed artillery and mortar fire fell in the Battalion area today.

Twelve officers and 34 enlisted men of the Third replacement Battalion joined the Battalion. These officers and men received 5 days of training, conducted by the regimental reserve battalion, before joining 3/1. After being assigned to their respective units, there replacements were allowed to go forward to the MLR until they had become acquainted with the existing condition and tactical situation.

The H/3/1's July 1953 Monthly Personnel Roster shows the following men left the U.S.A. in Nov. 1952 with the 27th Draft. One would think they would have joined H/3/1 about this date but they are not shown as being joined on the December unit diaries.

Cpl Keith L. Fieger 1301708/2111
PFC Edward O. Freuerick 1262683/0311

The Dec. 7th unit diary shows the following persons joined the Company on this date.

2nd Lt. J. R. Meyers                 2nd Lt. James W. Nugent
2nd Lt. John M. Schaeffer           SSgt Ray L. Aiken
PFC Domingo H. Almanzar             Ssgt Leon G. Bentz
SSgt Robert E. Breathitt            PFC George O. Campbell
PFC James L. Carroll                PFC William J. Cheatham
PFC George Chegaty                  PFC Donald M. Chernetzki
PFC Billy B. Childs                 PFC Herbert R. Forsythe
PFC Kenneth Foster                  PFC Edward O. Frederick
PFC Herman P. Furchtsam             PFC Wyman H. Griggs
SSgt. Charles "Bud" A. Melanson

Cpl Norman Carsey, who was WIA on Dec. 9th was transferred from C Co., 1st Medical Battalion to the USS Repose hospital ship on this date.

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1952

Lt. Col. Ernest G. Atkin, Jr. relieved Lt. Col. Sidney J. Altman as CO of the 3/1. Col Altman was rotated to the U. S. A.

The Mortar Section fired WP and HE at a sniper in the afternoon. Sgt Menard talked to the PIO about "H" mortars but just got a big snow job.

A total of 11 rounds of 82mm and 1 round of 3.4 rocket fell in the Battalion sector today.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1952

The PIO came to the Mortar Section and they fired on Hill 139. Sgt Menard received more packages from home.

H/3/1 called 60mm mortar fire on 15 enemy in the open on Hill 139 (1500 yards NW of
Hill 119) at 1630. The result was 3 counted KIA and 5 estimated WIA.

Three rounds of 82mm mortar and six rounds of 76mm artillery fire fell on the Battalion sector today.

The Company possibly sustained 8 casualties.

PFC Robert Daugherty returned to the company from C Company, 1st Medical Battalion.

2nd Lt. Donald Holliway returned from temporary duty in Japan.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1952

Catholic Mass was held in the mess hall and the PX truck was coming to the supply area daily.

Sgt Menard had a radio fixed and then stayed up until 0330 eating oatmeal snacks.

Three rounds of 61mm and 3 rounds of 82mm mortar, and 2 rounds of 76mm fire fell on the Battalion sector today.

Cpl Norman E. Carsey was WIA for the second time while in Korea.

PFC Stanley Cole returned to the Company from the USS Repose hospital ship on Dec. 9th and his dependents were changed from W to W1DC (probably wife and dependent child).

PFC Richard Reed returned to the Company from the USS Repose hospital ship on Dec. 9, 1952.

PFC Venseslado "Bennie" P. Roman went TAD to Camp Fisher, Japan (R&R).

PFC Walter Cox was joined from the 1st Provisional Casualty Co. He apparently had been away from the Company for some reason.

PFC Ignacio Mendoza returned TAD in Camp Fisher, Japan (late from R&R).

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1952

Sgt Menard got up about 1100, received three letters from home, and stayed up until 0100.

From 1150 to 1445 the Battalion's 75mm recoilless rifle section fired from the H/3/1 area. A total of 17 rounds of HE and 3 rounds of WP were expended with the following results: 50 yards of trench line and 1 AA position at coordinates 082086 (1000 yards NNW of Hill 119) were damaged.

The mess hall was closed because of incoming. This reduced the possibility of having many casualties from a single round.

At 2103 a 26-man raiding party from the Division's Recon Company made contact with an estimated 5 to 12 enemy at coordinates 088088 (1300 yards north of Hill 119 and just before getting to Detroit). There was no estimate of casualties.

A total of 21 rounds of 82mm mortar, 29 rounds of 76mm recoilless rifle, and 25 rounds of mixed mortar fire fell on the Battalion sector today.

2nd Lt. Donald Holliway was dropped from the Company and transferred to H&S Company, 1st Marines.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1952

A friendly fire incident occurred about this date. In the early morning after sunrise PFC Billy Dean and PFC Fred Buxton were standing in a fighting hole on their position on Hill 119. It was a terrific sight to see the attack on a hill, just like in the movies, but this was the real thing. F86 planes were dropping bombs (perhaps 500-pounders), machine gunning, and firing missiles from their wings at enemy positions on the reverse slope of Detroit which was about 1200-1500 yards to the northeast. The planes were approaching Detroit from the far side and flying toward Hill 119 on their assault approach. They was the F86 diving and firing and just before he pulled up, they saw that he had fired his wing missiles. Immediately they realized the pilot had fired too late and had missed his target. They saw what looked like two large BBs getting bigger and bigger as they coming straight toward them. Realizing what was happening, they dropped to the bottom of the fighting hole. One of the missiles when right over them and hit about 40 yards up the hill. There was an extreme loud noise when it went over them and then the explosion was...
very loud. Their friends that were sleeping in a bunker near by came out and was wondering what happened. They notified the Platoon Commander and who initiated contact with the pilot. Billy was told that the pilot expressed his apologies, and said he would send beer (which was never received).

A reconnaissance Patrol went to Detroit (about 1500 yards north).

PFC J. R. Elmore returned to the Company from the USS Consolation hospital ship.

The Mortar Section fired thirty one rounds on Songuchon, the remnants of an abandoned village about 1200 meters north of Hill 119.

Five rounds of 61mm, 8 rounds of 82mm, and 3 rounds of 76mm enemy fire fell in the Battalion sector today.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1952

The Battalion 75mm recoilless rifle section fired from H/3/1's positions between 0730 and 0830. They fired 17 rounds of HE and 2 rounds of WP to destroy 1 enemy bunker at coordinates 089089 (on Detroit).

A Col. inspected the Company's defensive positions.

PFC Martin "Marty" H. Boyle who had been in the 3rd Platoon and PFC Clenton Moon who had been in the Machine Gun Platoon joined the Mortar Section.

PFC Charlie M. Alloway was dropped from the Company.

At 1735 a H/3/1 layout at 087085 called 60mm mortar fire on 3 enemy at coordinates 088089 (Detroit). The results was 3 counted KIA.

A total of 4 rounds of 61mm, 6 rounds of 82mm, and 3 rounds of 76mm enemy fire fell in the Battalion area this day.

PFC Richard Coston, who had been WIA on Nov. 25th, returned to the Company.

PFC James Bishop returned to the Company from the hospital (C Co., 1st Med. BN)

PFC Bruce L. Tibbs was transferred to the 1st armored Amphibious Battalion.

PFC Joseph R. Denardo was dropped from the Company and transferred to Marine Barracks, Brooklyn Naval Base, NY while on emergency leave.

PFC Richard Reed was dropped from the Company and transferred to HqBn., 1st Marine Division.

2nd Lt. Roy H. French was reassigned as the Machine Gun Platoon Commander. 2nd Lt. J. R. Myers was assigned as a rifle platoon commander. 2nd Lt. James W. Nugent was assigned as a rifle platoon commander (he took over the 3rd Platoon).

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1952

The Mortar Section fired two concentrations in the afternoon.

At 1535 a friendly sniper firing from COP 19 (Berlin) inflicted 1 counted KIA on Hill 139 (600 yards NW of Berlin).

Sgt Menard went to the rear to get a shower and stayed up until 0230.

A total of 8 rounds of 61mm, 7 rounds of 82mm, and 8 rounds of 120mm fire fell on the Battalion sector today.

Billy Dean shared the experience he had while on the following patrol. The events probably occurred about his date.

They had recently had a snow fall that resulted in an accumulation of 10-12 inches. PFC Billy Dean and Fred Buxton were in a group of six that was sent out on a recon patrol. They donned their snow suits and started before leaving on the patrol. Billy recalls, as they went by the listening post the two Marines on post had the snow uniform on and they walked right up on them before they could actually see them. That was a very good sign because it reflected the difficulty the enemy would have in spotting the patrol members.

They continued and, after traveling about 200 yards, saw the M1 rifle sticking in the ground as they continued down the trail. At the base of the hill, there was a trail going to the left and one that went somewhat to the right. The bad thing about going on patrol is that they had to used the same trail all the time due to the minefields on both sides of the trails. About the only thing they could do when going on patrol was to vary the times of departure from the MLR. About three fourths of the way up the enemy-held outpost,
Detroit (about 1200 yards in front of the MLR), was a very large rock that jutted out from the normal terrain. It was about midnight and they very quietly moving up to the area of this rock. It was very clear and the reflection off the snow could make sighting someone rather easy if they had on dark colored clothing.

They were about 120 yards from the enemy’s trench line and could not see nor hear the enemy. They huddled and discussed the how they should proceed. Someone, possibly Fred Buxton, suggested that Billy and he crawl up to the enemy’s trench line. This idea to approach the trench line had not been previously planned but seemed to come up on the spur of the moment. The two slowly crawled up the mountain being careful not to make any noise. Billy had his M1 carbine and drug it along in the snow with his right hand as he crawled along the ground. He stopped periodically to check the carbine to insure the magazine was locked in the carbine and the weapon was ready for use. Fred was on Billy’s right and they stopped several times to pass the binoculars between them and search the trench line for Chinese. They exchanged the binoculars very slowly because they were black and could be silhouetted against the snow background. All of a sudden they noticed someone standing right in front of them about 30 feet away and he was silhouetted from the waist up. They were too close for comfort and for the binoculars to focus so they moved back another 10-20 feet. The Chinese looked like a very large man that was not holding a weapon. Billy could see him so well through the binoculars that, as the Chinese picked his teeth, he noticed three gold teeth on his upper left side. Fred and Billy discussed the possibility of snatching the Chinese but Billy didn’t think that was a good idea, although today, he thinks they could have pulled it off. Meanwhile, the four other Marines on the patrol had moved further up the hill and were standing in front of the big rock. The side of the rock was dark and the four Marines in their snow suits were silhouetted and stuck out like a sore thumb. Billy and Fred decided that Fred would go back down the hill and warn the others that they were silhouetted. Before Fred left they made the decision that, if the Chinese saw any of them, Billy should shoot the Chinese. Their nerves and tension were racing at high levels. After about ten minutes Fred had warned the four Marines and they were no longer silhouetted against the dark boulder. It seemed like an eternity before Fred returned. Not surprisingly, being alone increases the fright factor. When Fred did return, he approached Billy from the back (below) and shook his boot. Billy’s heart skipped a beat and was pounding like crazy. He knew Fred was coming but nevertheless, it still scared the life out of him. While Fred was gone, Billy determined that the enemy was wearing a Marine Corps Parka with fur on the hood just like he was wearing under his snow suit. Fred also noticed the parka and said, “Kill him”, but Billy couldn’t pull the trigger. He just, “didn’t think it was a fair kill”, although he didn’t feel the enemy would gave him the same consideration. Had these two forgotten they were on a reconnaissance patrol (a patrol to gain to gain info, not engage in combat)?

They crawled back down the hill, making sure the did not silhouette themselves in front of the large rock. When they got to the huge boulder they couldn’t find the other four Marines but they showed up further down the hill. They proceeded back to the MLR without incident, and were challenged for the password before being allowed back in the trench line.

PFC Philip D, Cuff was dropped from the Company and transferred to H&S/3/1 where he was to become a cook.

Ssgt Lucindo Pimentel joined the Company from I/3/1.

PFC Coston (who had just returned to the Company yesterday) was sick and sent to C Co., 1st Medical Battalion.

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1952

Sgt Menard got up at 1000 and went down the hill to get the Mortar Section's mail. On the way back he ate at the mess hall.

The Mortar Section fired on the forward slopes of Berlin.

A total of 24 rounds of 61mm and 14 rounds of 82mm fell in the Battalion sector.

PFC John Devries, Cpl Sebert S. Huffman, PFC Leonilo Juarez, and Anthony Hy returned to (or were still in) the Company.
MONDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1952

The Mortar Section got some word on a new alternate position.
The 16th Draft personnel left the Company for rotation back to the USA.
The list of those who were selected for SSgt were being released.

Sgt Menard received a big package from home.

A total of 23 rounds of 61mm mortar and 2 rounds of 2.5 rocket fire fell in the Battalion's sector.

About this date the following Marines left the Company
- 2nd Plt. Corpsman Warner Len Leonard
- PFC Richard J. Early
- Cpl Willie De Blasé (transferred to H&S/3/1
- PFC Edward Brown was moved from the A Co., 1st Medical Battalion to the USS Repose hospital ship.
- Cpl Richard Kosinski’s MOS was changed to 3531.
- Cpl Bertrand H. Baker Jr. was transferred to the 1st Tank Battalion.
- Cpl Norman E. Carsey, PFC Garland A. Edwards, and PFC Francis M. Moran were transferred from the USS Repose to a hospital in Japan and was dropped from the Company (transferred to 1st Provisional Casualty Company, Kyoto, Japan).

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1952

The Mortar Section fired on Detroit and Hill 139 about 0001. They were firing again at 0700. Sgt Menard went to the old 81mm positions to see if thee positions were useable by the Company.

At 1525 H/3/1 received 1 WIA (evacuated) in the vicinity of coordinates 083080 (Berlin) from an enemy sniper.

G/3/1 made a 45-man raid on Hill 13 (Frisco, Gary). The raid was reinforced with flame throwers, and tanks and heavy machine guns firing from the MLR. The enemy had 18 counted KIA and an estimated 5 WIA. G/3/1 sustained 10 WIA (evacuated), 2 WIA (non-evacuated) and 1 MIA whose body would be recovered on 20 December.

A total of 22 rounds of 61mm, 23 rounds of 82mm, 3 rounds of 120mm, and 4 rounds of 3.5 rocket fire fell on the Battalion today.

PFC John Cabello, PFC Carral Cole, and PFC Robert Hawkins returned to (or were still in) the Company.

PFC Allen Braithwaite and Sgt Joseph Breaux went TAD (R&R) to Camp Fisher Japan.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1952

Marines of the 3rd Platoon were informed about this date that they were to be in a combat patrol that was to attack the enemy outpost, Detroit. PFC Billy Dean was among those to be in the patrol. He was not particularly happy to attack at Christmas time but it is never a good time to put yourself in jeopardy. Because of this advanced information, Billy spent many hours scanning the area of Detroit with his binoculars. They could see the south side of the hill but the plan of attack was to go up the left side which was not viewable from Hill 119. He noticed that there was a small indentation near the bottom of the hill which may have been a trench line. (see Dec. 26th, the date of the patrol)

The Mortar Section fired at 700 and then worked on alternate positions.

2nd Lt. Roy H. French who had been the 2nd Platoon Leader took over the Machine Gun Platoon.

The 75mm recoiless rifles expended 15 rounds of HE from the H/3/1 sector between 1555 and 1610. They destroyed 1 enemy cave at coordinates 094104 (3000 yards from H/3/1 positions (seems like they could have gotten closer. e. g. from G/3/1's positions).

A total of 19 rounds of 61mm, 39 rounds of 82mm, and 7 rounds of 120mm mortar fire
fell in the Battalion area.

SSgt George Hyde went TAD to Gifu, Japan to Chemical Biological Radiological School.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1952

Sgt Menard received much mail and then had his men and six KSC Laborers working on alternate positions. The Mortar Section fired at 1100 and again at 2330. TSgt George A. Hyde, a platoon Sgt. was WIA and evacuated. After spending time in the Hospital and as Battalion S-2 chief, he would return about May-June to become the Company Gunny Sgt.

The Battalion Command diary shows I/3/1 had 2 WIAs at coordinates 085073 (just behind H/3/1's position on Hill 119). Since they don't show an H/3/1 WIA this date, it could be that the WIA reported as being from I/3/1 could have been T/Sgt Hyde.

H/3/1's OP, Berlin (Hill 19) reported an estimated 10 enemy in the vicinity of coordinates 083083. Small arms and 60mm mortars were used with unknown results.

A total of 10 rounds of 61mm, 17 rounds of 82mm, 3 rounds of 120mm mortar and 29 rounds of 76MM recoilless rifle fire fell in the Battalion area.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1952

At 0400 3 or 4 enemy were discovered cutting the protective wire around COP 19 (Berlin). The COP employed small arms and the enemy withdrew with 1 estimated KIA.

The Mortar Section registered concentrations for a patrol.

At 1940 a H/3/1 combat patrol engaged an estimated 30 to 35 enemy at coordinates 085086 (Jersey Ridge, 1200 yards north of Hill 119). The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons, and concussion grenades. H/3/1 utilized small arms, automatic weapons, and bunker bombs. Tanks provided covering fire from the MLR. At 1953 H/3/1 withdrew after destroying 3 machine guns and inflicting an estimated 9 KIA and 7 WIA. Friendly casualties were 5 WIA (evacuated) and 6 (non-evacuated).

Sgt Bobby Smith and PFC Henry J. Guillemette (2nd time WIA), both of the 2nd Platoon, was WIA returned to duty. Cpl Peter Santori was also treated and returned to duty. 2nd Lt. John Schaeffer, Cpl John Cabello, PFC Leonard Hanks, PFC Casimer Kowalczyk (of the 2nd Platoon) and Ssgt Lucindo Pimentel were WIA and evacuated to C Co., 1st Medical Battalion.

Some of these WIAs were likely the WIAs mentioned in the above described action.

Lt. French, who had earlier been the 2nd Platoon Leader and then the Machine Gun Platoon Leader, went back to the 2nd Platoon.

A total of 29 rounds of 61mm and 26 rounds of 82mm mortar fell in the Battalion area.

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1952

With regard to the planned raid on Detroit on Dec. 26th, the 3rd Platoon had several meetings which included fire team leaders, squad leaders, and platoon headquarters. They discussed the time tables of when they would leave the MLR and the procedures they would follow on the planned raid. PFC Billy Dean was to be in the squad that was to attack the enemy's trench line. He remembers the names of two that were in this squad, PFC Fred Buxton and Joseph Coleman, and he also remembers that there were two or three Puerto Ricans in the group. PFC Robert Hawkins and probably Frank Mayberry were also in this squad. Billy also believes that PFC Lionel Johnson and PFC William F. Hoffman may have also been on this raid. The other squad was to remain at the base of the hill to support the attack. He also remembers there were two or three Puerto Ricans in his attack squad, one of whom was the radio operator. They discussed how they were going to execute the raid and where to assemble after the fight. Weapons to be used were grenades, their T/O weapons, and some had carbines.

At 0430 a G/3/1 patrol departed to recover the body of the MIA from their raid on Dec. 16th.

Capt Gray held Reveille and promotions were given at a formation. Sgt. Menard went to the rear for a shower. Since they were on line and it was not likely the Company
Commander would have many persons in one place, it can be assumed that the formation was small and perhaps in side a bunker.

With the coming of the holiday season the enemy increased their propaganda activity. Appropriate leaflets were fired on friendly positions and recorded music to support the topics was heard occasionally. Approximately 50 leaflets of assorted types were found in the clothing and surrounding the body of the G/3/1 MIA (see 16 December) recovered.

At 1600 H/3/1 had 1 WIA (evacuated) in the vicinity of 093087 (about 1000 yards SW of Hill 126 and about 1500 yards NW of Hill 119) from enemy 82mm mortar fire.

At 1855 G/3/1 had 2 WIA (evacuated) in the vicinity of coordinates 096093 (Hill 111, a short distance north of Hill 126) from enemy 61mm mortar fire.

A total of 24 rounds of 61mm, 10 rounds of 82mm, 2 rounds of 120mm mortar and 5 rounds of 75mm enemy fire fell in the Battalion sector.

PFC Ignacio Mendoza was reduced from PFC to Pvt because he was late returning from R&R. His MOS was changed to 0300.

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1952

The Mortar Section received one hundred fifty 60mm HE mortar rounds. They fired some on Little Rock (about 1000 yards north).

At 2139 H/3/1 received 2 WIA (evacuated) in the vicinity of 092087 (about 1500 yards EN of Hill 119 and about 1200 yards SSW of Hill 126) from enemy 61mm mortar fire.

SSgt Eugene B. Ingram, a W/3/1 Marine (perhaps heavy machine gunner), was attached to the 3rd Platoon. While watching an air strike on Detroit (likely from Hill 119 (Boulder City)) they received an incoming 61mm round and SSgt Ingram dropped to the ground with a fatal wound. They didn't see any wounds but it was later learned that he had a small wound in the neck area that wasn't visible in the hairline. He was evacuated. The location of this incident is recorded as being at Korangp'o-ri, Korea (location unknown but possibly a medical aid station in the rear). See Dec. 27th for more information about his wounds and when he died.

Combining what is given in the previous two paragraphs, it could be that SSgt Ingram's wound came during daylight but the casualty was not reported until a few hours later. Perhaps it took that long for the communications to get from location of injury, to Platoon, to Company, to Battalion.

Billy Dean also reported a similar incident about this date. His recollection follows: He too was watching an air strike on Frisco and Capitol Hill. It was a rather large and involved air strike and they were really pounding the enemy. The strike was conducted by Marine Corps pilots flying gull wing corsairs. Billy had taken a few pictures and had just taken a picture showing a large mushroom cloud in the distance. He was about to take another picture when a very loud explosion came from about twenty five feet in front of him. This occurred just as he was taken a picture and he got a very distorted view in the photograph. This startled Billy because there had been no other incoming artillery or mortars. The round hit right in front of Billy but he was in a trench and protected from the shrapnel which went into the ground in front of him and over his head. Billy thinks the explosion was caused by an enemy artillery shell rather than a mortar shell. After the explosion there were a few more rounds that landed nearer the enemy than the MLR. He doesn't remember the enemy firing any Anti Aircraft Artillery (AAA) at the planes so he doesn't think the explosion resulted from a stray AAA round.

A total of 23 rounds of 61mm, 9 rounds of 82mm mortar and 3 rounds of 76mm artillery fell in the Battalion area.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1952

The Mortar Section received one hundred more 60mm HE rounds. They also received some candies from the Red Cross.

A total of 25 rounds of 61mm, 1 round of 82mm mortar, and 1 round of 76mm artillery fire fell in the Battalion area.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1952
The Chinese were digging trenches in front of the Company's outposts. Sgt Menard went back to Supply at 2200 to pick up a package that he received in the mail.

From 1530 to 1600 the 75mm Recoilless Rifle Section in the H/3/1 area fired 8 rounds of HE. There was no surveillance from the fire Mission.

A total of 1 round of 61mm mortar fire fell in the Battalion area.

PFC Allen Braithwaite and Sgt Joseph Breaux returned from TAD (R&R) to Camp Fisher Japan.

PFC Billy Felty, Cpl Jerrell Hamby, and PFC Negron Morales went TAD (R&R) to Camp Fisher Japan.

The Dec. 28, 1952 unit diary shows Lucindo went on TAD on Dec. 23rd to 54th QM Bn., APO 234 conn related to personnel matters.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1952

Billy Dean recalls thinking about friends and loved ones at home and how nice it would be to have been with them during the Christmas season. Spaghetti was on the menu at the mess hall.

No patrols were dispatched on Christmas Eve.

A total of 1 round of 61mm and 1 round of 82mm mortar fell on the Battalion area.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 25, 1952

The night had been uneventful until daylight, and there was an alarming discovery immediately about thirty yards in front of the MLR. Billy Dean went outside of his bunker to see a large banner, approximately thirty feet long and two feet wide, that said "Merry Christmas" hanging on the hanging on the protective wire in front of the trench line. Little packages wrapped in Christmas paper were tied to the banner with red, Christmas-type string. It was immediately assumed that whoever had been on the listening post had not done their job. The Marines could possibly understand that they were not seen from anyone in the fighting hole, but that too was questionable. Everyone started pointing fingers and it got pretty nasty among the troops. Billy Dean recalls Sgt Paul Schick asking questions trying to determine who should have been on duty at the listening post and why this was allowed to happen. This is when it really got nasty. There was shouting, screaming, and names were being called. Billy Dean was upset because there was no reason for it to have happened if everyone done their duty. About this time he hightailed it to see the 3rd Platoon Commander, 2nd Lt. Robert E. Lee, who was in his bunker. After explaining to Lt. Lee what had happened, Lt Lee said he would check into it and make sure that it didn't happen again. Lt. Lee asked if there were any injuries and Billy reported that there were none. Billy took a picture of the banner but lost that role of film. Billy recalls someone saying they were going to get one of the packages hanging on the banner but others convinced him that it may be booby trapped. Billy doesn't remember anyone getting any of the packages and supposes that the banner remained on the wire for a while but doesn't remember what happened to it. This whole incident kind of spoiled the Christmas atmosphere for everyone but in a couple day it cooled down. You imagine the psychological victory that the Chinese felt.

The 3rd Platoon had a Christmas tree that was about one and a half feet tall. They things of color and curlicues (in place of icicles) they had cut from the tops of C-ration boxes on the tree. There were no presents under the tree.

The 75mm Recoilless Rifle Section in the H/3/1 area fired 20 rounds of HE from 0740 to 0805. An estimated 1 WIA on Hill 15 (Detroit) and 75 yards of trench in the vicinity of 081085 (1000 yards NNW of Hill 119 were destroyed.

There was a Jet air strike on the enemy but one of the bombs landed behind the 3rd Platoon.

Sgt Menard didn’t see the Banner or presents but remembers the Chinese leaving propaganda leaflets on elevated boards in front of the trench line. He went forward to the
OP (possibly Berlin or East Berlin) to take some colored photos on this day.

SSgt Fay "Gus" L. Aiken, Platoon Sgt. of the 1st Platoon, recalls that there was a billboard type thing left between far in front of our lines that had propaganda leaflets "presents".

The Company had 100% alert this night.

A total of 41 rounds of 61mm, 7 rounds of 82mm, 1 round of 120mm, and 10 rounds of mixed 61mm and 82mm mortar fire fell in the Battalion sector.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1952

Billy Dean recalls listening to a transoceanic radio a few days before this and the temperature on the 38th parallel (unknown where on the 38th parallel) was 25 degrees below zero. He doesn't know how cold it was on this night but he guesses that it was 10-15 degrees below zero.

Sgt Bobby Smith's 3rd Squad, 2nd Platoon and another squad from the 2nd Platoon manned the MLR in place of the absent Marines who were going on a raiding party. He told Billy Dean that Detroit looked a War Zone during the raid and Billy told him, "It was."

A raid was planned on Detroit this night. No doubt the new radios (the ANPRC-6) that had been issued were used in this operation. The enemy employed small arms, concussion and fragment grenades, and machine guns. The enemy was also supported by machine gun fire from Hill 13A (Gary/Frisco) and the vicinity of 083088 (Jersey Ridge). The H/3/1 patrol countered with small arms, automatic weapons, and plenty of grenades. Tanks and heavy machine guns on the MLR were used for covering fires. Mortars and artillery were also used during the raid. Billy Dean recalls that the raiding force consisted of about 24 Marines. Nine of these Marines and Billy Dean would be WIA during this patrol and all miraculously made it back, or were brought, back to the MLR. In letters that Fred Buxton wrote home he said that 2nd Lt. Robert E. Lee was in charge of the force.

As ordered, before leaving on the patrol the Marines spent several minutes in unlit bunkers to accustom their eyes to the darkness. Several of the Marines took this opportunity to pray before leaving. Billy Dean recalls asking God for strength, courage, and to protect him. Wouldn't you know it, just before leaving the bunker, someone came off watch and entered the bunker to light a cigarette. This guy really caught the flak from everyone in the bunker. The guy apologized but his apology was not very well accepted. Outside it was dark but there was some light from moon and star reflection.

They moved out from the bunker about 2200 and left the MLR, being careful to be as quiet a possible. The squad Billy Dean was in was in the lead and he was about the 5th or 6th man in line. The Marines on the listening post wished them luck as they passed by. They continued along the trail and passed the area where the M-1 was sticking in the ground (although Billy didn't notice it). When they came to the fork in the trail, they continued on the left fork.

They had excellent communications and the radio operator was in contact with rear area elements. When ordered, the radio operator called for artillery, mortar, and tank supporting fires. The bombardment lasted about 12-15 minutes before the final assault. The artillery and mortar support was extremely accurate and was hitting on target, in the trench lines. The fire support rounds were not flying over the attacking squads but were fired from an angle so that the rounds passed over a point about 40-50 yards to their left.

The patrol arrived at the base of the hill where there was some small brush and scrub trees. The rest of the hill was completely devoid of trees due to the heavy concentrations of shelling. When ordered, the assault squad formed a skirmish line and commenced very slowly up the hill leaving twelve Marines at the base of the hill to provide small arms supporting fire. One could barely see the next person to the left and right in the darkness. Billy Dean had his carbine with three magazines of ammo and seven grenades. Additionally, about two days before the raid Billy fabricated a "Molotov cocktail of sorts". This consisted of an ammo box, gasoline-napalm mix, and a white phosphorus grenade. The device probably weighed about ten or twelve pounds. In a separate interview with Bob Hawkins, he also recalls that he and another person had a "hellfire bomb". These bombs/cocktails were to be thrown in the enemy trench line during the attack. Hellfire
bombs were also cans of napalm with white phosphorus grenades attached to the bomb. It would explode and burn everything within it’s considerable range. Interesting that after more than 55 years both of these Marines don’t remember each other in 1952 and have never met each other since can remember this device. Apparently Billy Dean was the other Marine that Bob Hawkins said had the other device.

Billy Dean was stumbling in holes and craters with his heavy load and had proceeded about 30-40 yards when he came upon an indentation in the ground. This was the dark indentation he had notice when viewing the hill earlier with binoculars (See Dec. 17th) from Hill 119. As best he could tell it was a trench line that had partially caved in from artillery and mortar explosions. Billy was very aware of the artillery and mortars that were exploding in front of him. The noise was terrific and he could see silhouettes of individuals during the flashes.

Billy was about to step out of this area when he heard a “Twang”. He immediately dropped to the ground thinking that he had run into a trip wire and there was an explosion to follow. Actually he probably could not have gotten down quick enough if there had been a explosion. Marines also set up a trip wire like this to give warning and identify the location of an enemy to know when and were to throw grenades. He laid on the ground a few seconds but no explosion came so he got up and moved forward. At this time he was unable to see anyone. He was supposed to be the second or third spot from the left but there was no one to his left. He thought he had moved straight up the hill but he apparently was too far to the left so he started to angle to the right, hoping to get back into position. He stepped in a hole that was about three feet deep and dropped his Molotov cocktail. He felt around to try to find it on the hill side but couldn’t so he got up and continued to move forward. He was concerned that, in the darkness, he might accidentally pull the pin and explode the device. He might not be able to get far enough away from the explosion and it certainly would have given away his position. He realized he was getting pretty close to the Chinese’s trench line and expected the artillery barrage to cease soon. Sure was lonely here and he was hoping to find other members of his team soon.

Finally, during a flash from an explosion, he saw the silhouette of someone on their knees about nine yards to his right and four yards ahead. Sure felt good to be near friendly forces. He was probably too far to the left but that would have to do for now. He had no idea who the fellow was but that didn’t matter. About this time there were many explosions to his right and he realized that they had been discovered. The enemy was throwing grenades by the handful. Being a target for a grenade-throwing China-man was awful. He had to wait in this location for the bombardment to stop. The person on Billy’s right appeared to get up and was immediately knocked down from the grenade which exploded near him.

As Billy learned later, the first Marine hit was the radioman and this may be the reason for the coordination/communication anomaly. A grenade had exploded behind the radioman and had virtually blew the radio off his back. The radioman was severely injured. It seemed that most of the grenades were exploding to Billy’s right so he moved up closer to the trench line but then they started coming his way. Billy says the enemy grenades have sparks that come from them similar to a firecracker. You can see them coming and where they were going to land. There was a Chinese right in front of Billy that was throwing grenades and they were now landing in front of Billy. It seemed that the Chinese was throwing them two at a time. Billy would get up to advance and then down before the grenade would explode. The same thing was happening to the Marine on his right. Then it seemed that the grenade throwing ceased for a minute and Billy moved forward to within about 20 feet from the trench line. Then the Chinese started throwing grenades again but, lucky for Billy, he was throwing them behind Billy. While this was going on, all of a sudden, there was a white phosphorus shell that exploded to Billy’s immediate left. It landed close enough that the umbrella of falling white phosphorus came within ten feet of Billy. As planned, this signal resulted in the cessation of the friendly artillery and mortar bombardment. Billy realized that he was too far to the left and he could see, through silhouettes, that the Marine on his right was moving farther to his right so Billy also moved to the right oblique. Billy kept an eye on the Chinese who was throwing grenades. He could never see anything but his hands. He decided that throwing a grenade
at him would be ineffective because he probably was on a ledge where the shrapnel wouldn’t hit him. Besides, the grenades the Chinese was throwing were now landing behind Billy and hurting no one.

Suddenly a machine gun opened up about thirty feet to Billy’s right and about eight feet from the Marine on his right. He could see there was a parapet around the machine gun and a silhouette of the gunner. It was firing about six-round bursts and Billy knew they were in trouble. He looked back to the right and could not see anyone and then the Machine gun opened up again. They had blue tracers as opposed to our red tracers. He backed down from the trench line a little bit and then all of a sudden the grenades began falling closer to him. He was up and down trying to avoid being in a position where he would get hit with the shrapnel. It was about this time that he lost some of his faith and said, “Lord, please don’t let the shrapnel hit my face.” He could hear the shrapnel zinging by his head and then he was hit in the back, evidently with a pretty large piece from one of the grenades. It could have caused lung damage, however, it just popped real loud when it hit his flak jacket and caused no damage to Billy. A few seconds later another grenade exploded to his left and he felt a stinging pain in his left hand. He could wiggle his fingers but his hand was bleeding. The wound was there but not too debilitating. He remembers saying to himself, “I guess this is the answer and I won’t get hit in the face, so be it.”

Billy could see the flame from the end of the barrel as the machine gun opened up again. The individual to his right had seen Billy crawling and jumping around. He crawled toward Billy. It was PFC Fred Buxton who asked, “What the hell are you doing over here?” Billy answered, “I guess I am out of position. I am supposed to be to your right.” Fred said, “Boy, we got us a problem.” and Billy agreed. Billy told Fred that he was concerned about fire from their left flank because they probably had this machine gun covered with another machine gun, but, thankfully, fire from the left flank never came. Fred said he had been knocked down and fallen into holes so many times that he lost all his grenades. He asked Billy if he had any and Billy still had two grenades left. Fred asked if they had a 3-5 or 5-7 second delay fuses. Billy felt the grenade and said 3-5 and then, in reply to Fred’s request, gave them to Fred. Fred crawled back to the right and Billy noticed that the grenade thrower was now about six feet to his front but Billy could still only see his hands as he threw grenades. The enemy’s grenades were landing far behind Billy again. Billy watched the grenade thrower out of the corner of his eye as he saw Fred crawl near the front of the machine gun. The machine gun fired again and the noise must have been deafening to Fred because he was only a couple feet in front of the barrel. Billy could see Fred’s hand silhouetted as Fred flipped the grenade in the Machine gunners face from a distance of about 2 feet. Just before Fred’s grenade exploded the grenade thrower in front of Billy stopped throwing grenades. He stood up and silhouetted himself from the waste up and that was a his big mistake. Billy fired five rounds right in his chest and heard, “Ugh”. Fred’s grenade exploded and Billy could see bodies lifted a little bit over the dirt parapet. Immediately Buxton and Dean jumped up and opened fire with their carbines. Three or four enemy were lying in the trench and they could easily be seen in their dark uniforms against the lighter colored dirt background. Billy could see movement and emptied the rest of his magazine into the Chinese. He then reloaded another magazine and fired down the trench line to the left and, just as if it was rehearsed, Fred fired down the trench line to the right which was pretty much a 90-degree turn.

Robert Hawkins had been among the other ten men in the assault squad that was to the right of Billy and Fred. During the assault, a hand grenade explode under him and pulverize him with shrapnel in the face, arm, head, etc. If he not had his flak jacket on he would have surely sustained fatal injuries because it was pulverized with shrapnel. His helmet also saved him because one piece of shrapnel went through his helmet and, having lost most of it’s momentum, barley lodged in his scalp. When he removed his helmet (after returning to the MLR) the piece was easily plucked from his scalp.

This part of the raid was over for Billy and Fred. They did what they were trained to do and did the job expertly. All of a sudden it was very quiet. Billy was still concerned about the possibility of fire from their left flank. The trench line in that direction proceeded westerly and then turned in a southerly direction. A machine gun along
that trench line could easily give covering fire for the machine gun they just put out of action. He was less concerned about their right flank because there was the crest of the hill which prevented any direct covering fire from that direction. Also, the rest of the raiding party was in that direction and were probably taking care of business over there. Billy and Fred had a brief discussion about how they had silhouetted themselves when they jumped into the trench to get the Chinese. They both agreed that if there had been other Chinese in the area they would have been a relatively easy target. However it was something they had to do to get the job done.

Billy and Fred agreed that, having done their job, it was time to get off the hill as quickly as possible. They were anxious to return over the trail to the MLR before the Chinese could set up an ambush. The Y previously mentioned would be a likely place to expect such an ambush. Also, the Chinese no doubt had that trail well zeroed in with their mortars and artillery. They wanted to get back before the Chinese got the word to commence firing on the trail.

The above is a long, detailed explanation of events that took place but it all happened very quickly. When adrenaline flows things happen fast and instinct is a prime source of direction. On this night these two young men, and others in the raiding party, had recollections so deeply etched in their memory that they will remain there for the rest of their life. Both agree they probably killed the same enemy that they had seen during their reconnaissance patrol of Detroit on December 13th.

Billy recalls that he had no fear during the raid. He thinks this is because he had strong faith and of course Marines are taught to act instinctively so that emotions will not effect their performance. He still marvels at how much flying shrapnel they walked through without getting seriously wounded. Billy’s movements to evade shrapnel (always being in a prone position, away from the explosion, when the grenade was expected to explode) no doubt helped protect him. The ten Marines to their right didn’t fare so well because they had about 90 percent casualties.

Marine Corps records show that the patrol disengaged at 0435 after inflicting 6 counted KIA and 10 estimated WIA. Friendly casualties from the encounter were 9 WIA (evacuated).

There was no action by the enemy at this time and they began to hear moans to their right where the other ten Marines were located. They both went in that direction but got separated. Both were looking for wounded Marines and assisting them in getting back to the MLR. There were about nine wounded with two or three being seriously wounded. Some of the Marines that were in the support squad at the bottom of the hill came up the hill to aid in evacuating the wounded. PFC Julius Joyce Davis was one of the Marines that came from the bottom of the hill to help. He found the radioman who had been hit by a grenade drifting in and out of consciousness. The radioman was lodged between two stumps and Davis was having a hard time getting him out. Finally he grabbed the radioman’s feet and pulled hard and was able to dislodge him. He knew that he had injured him (perhaps broke, one or both arms) but it was the necessary thing to do. These activities were taking place about 50 feet in front of the enemy’s trench line but there was no enemy left to interfere. Julius had some help from the other Marines getting the radioman back to the MLR.

It was at this time that Billy came upon an injured Marine that was in obvious pain. It was PFC Joseph Coleman, one of Billy’s bunker buddies. Joseph said he thought his right foot was just about blown off and said, “Please don’t leave me here.” A feeling of protection and responsibility immediately came over Billy and Coleman was Billy’s responsibility to get back to the MLR. Billy said, “If I get out, you will get out.” Joseph still had his carbine and Billy had his. Billy positioned himself on the downhill side of Coleman and put him on his right shoulder. From there he started down hill, stumbling in craters and almost loosing his balance. He remembers getting to the second trench line that Billy had been in earlier in the night and knew he was getting near the base of the hill. He was in some scrub trees but didn’t know which direction to go to find the trail back to the MLR. He asked Coleman if he knew where they were but Joseph didn’t know. Billy started waking slowly in what he thought was a strait line down the hill but apparently he was veering to the right. After a while they again stopped to try to get their bearings but to no avail. They decided they had gone too far right and needed to
turn left. They finally were able to get to the base of the hill without falling and stopped to see where they should go next. About this time, in the darkness, a voice called out, "Marine, Marine, go left, go left, you are about to go into a mine field." The voice startled them. Billy doesn't know who this Marine was but the Marine stated that he, "would wait there a little longer because everybody is going too far to the right and I will direct them." It is a terrible feeling to be alone in a situation like this and this voice gave Billy and Joseph a jolt of confidence. After walking a short distance to the left Billy found what he thought was the trail. Billy began jogging with Coleman on his shoulder. It was cold and they were now going parallel to the enemy’s trench line at a distance of about three quarter of a mile away. Coleman weighed 190 pounds and it felt like 390 to Billy. He was huffing and puffing and when he stepped in a hole, it jogged Coleman. Coleman commented, "Can't you miss those holes." to which Billy responded, "I'm doing the best I can." As Billy was jogging he thought to himself, "Oh, Lord, help me to see the trail when it turns back to the right." That probably was a distance of five hundred yards from where he came off the base of the hill to where they make the turn. There was no one following. It seemed like everybody was on their own and everyone was contending with their own problems.

Billy was becoming exhausted and Coleman suggested they stop and rest. Billy stopped and dumped Joseph off his shoulder. They decided they could not stay there any longer because they were in an open valley with no cover, an awful position if mortars started dropping. After about twenty seconds Billy was sweating profusely but was able to get his breath. Billy managed to get Joseph back on his shoulder and started jogging again toward the MLR but the weight was unbearable. He remembers barely seeing the M1 rifle to his left in a little patch of snow to his left and knew they were getting closer to the MLR. Exhausted, he had to stop one more time but didn't take Coleman off his shoulder. Billy doesn't know how Coleman was carrying his carbine but it was beating Billy to death. Billy remembers getting to the Listening Post and passing it. From there on Billy’s stamina went down terribly. He got approximately twenty yards from our MLR on Hill 119 and was in great pain. He dropped, completely exhausted. Billy has no recollection of how he got to the bunker but assumes someone assisted him. Billy never saw Joseph Coleman again.

PFC Willard O'Hara, the 3rd Platoon Runner, was at the MLR in charge of the Korean Service personnel and the stretcher bearers. Their job was to bring back anyone who might have been injured during the raid. George Broadhead, the Company wireman and a buddy of O'Hara's from their teen years in Brooklyn, had also volunteered to help O'Hara.

As the troops were making their way back to the MLR following the raid, the first men Broadhead (on the MLR) saw was PFC Robert Hawkins (2nd fire team, 1st Squad, 3rd Platoon) from South Carolina and Frank Mayberry, the Wireman, from Ohio. Both were hit and helping each other while singing the Marine Corps Hymn out loud. They were bleeding like stuck pigs. You could see the wounds were no joke but they weren't going to be fatal. George thought they were happy because they were going to be sent back to the states. George Broadhead was still naive and can remember vividly thinking, "This is why I joined the Marines".

As more men from the raiding party made their way towards the MLR, O'Hara and Broadhead were told there was a man with a leg wound and his leg was probably fractured. O'Hara, Broadhead, and the KSCs moved forward to help "a tall blonde-haired guy from Texas", PFC Billy Dean, who had carried the wounded man back from the patrol. Dean continued to help and supervise as they got PFC Joseph Coleman onto a stretcher. Several men held the stretcher above their shoulders in order to maneuver through the trench line without bumping and causing additional pain. After insuring Coleman's safe evacuation, Billy passed out from exhaustion. Joseph Coleman was evacuated, eventually to the USA.

Billy still (in 2005) is concerned that Fred Buxton never received any recognition of his heroism that night. He pretty much single handedly knocked out that machine gun although Billy did assist him somewhat. Had the machine gun not been knocked out, the outcome might have been catastrophic and the twenty four Marines in the raiding party might not have made it back to the MLR. The machine gun might have caught them in the open or may have called had the capability to call in mortars on the withdrawing Marines. Fred Buxton was never very concerned that he received no recognition and thought he had just
done his job directed.

Fred commented on Billy wounded hand. He thought Billy should have gotten the Purple Heart for the wound. He said, "Hell, you spilled blood, didn't you?" They kicked around the idea of Billy reporting his wounded hand but as Billy says, "It was not really difficult then to leave it alone. You need to understand that we had people really, really hurting, and people seriously injured and accordingly, one does not make an issue when others are hurting so badly. I suppose that is somewhat of a cop-out on my part for regretting not having been awarded the Purple Heart, However, that is the way is was and the that is the way it is."

Billy Dean says, "I have had one or two people ask me about killing the enemy, particularly on this raid, and my answer was it did not bother me then and it does not bother me now. Having said that, if I had my rathe rs, I would rather it had not happened. After all, the enemy had many chances having thrown so many hand grenades at us, and I continue to be amazed that the shrapnel we were able to get through without any serous injuries. I do not believe Buxton was ever touched. If he was, he never mentioned it to me."

Billy says he learned one important thing from this raid. If he was ever in a situation where the enemy was attacking him, approximately every third grenade would be thrown just a few feet in front of the trench line or fighting position. Had the enemy done that, there would have been several Marines sent home in body bags.

Billy Dean also reported that Sgt Paul Schick was also wounded while on the above mentioned raid.

Paul Schick was instrumental in the success of this raid. His activities are documented in the Bronze Star Medal citation he received for his actions on this night. The citation reads as follows:

"For heroic achievement in connection with operations against the enemy while serving with a Marine infantry company in KOREA on 26 December 1952. Serving as a squad leader during a raid on an enemy held position forward of the main line of resistance, Sergeant SCHICK displayed exceptional courage, initiative and professional skill in the performance of his duties. Although painfully wounded before reaching the enemy trench line, he expressed complete disregard for his personal safety and continued forward to a point from which he could throw grenades into the hostile position. Despite the intense enemy fire, he kept the enemy pinned down, thereby permitting his squad to reach the objective and accomplish its mission. Throughout the withdrawal, he assisted in rendering aid to the more severely wounded and refused aid for himself until all other casualties had been treated. Sergeant SCHICK's heroic actions and aggressive leadership served as a constant inspiration to all who observed him and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Sergeant SCHICK is authorized to wear the Combat "V".

Richard "Dick" Dean recalls that he, as a SSgt and 2nd Lt. Robert E. Lee were on this patrol. Dick said that he remained with the squad that was at the bottom of the hill and Lee was with the troop that made the assault.

Sgt Menard's diary notes for this day shows there was a patrol on Detroit and that there were nine WIAs from Sgt Paul G. Schick's squad.

At 1630 the 75mm Recoilless Rifle Section in the H/3/1 sector commenced firing and expended 26 rounds of HE during a 30 minute period. The surveillance was one enemy bunker and 20 yards of trench line in the vicinity of 082084 (1000 yards NNW or Hill 119).

The 12/28/52 unit diary shows the following WIAs on this date were evacuated to C Co. 1st Med. Bn.

- PFC Domingo Almanzar
- PFC Joseph H. Coleman
- PFC William Hoffman (2nd award)

The following were also WIA on this date

- Frank Mayberry
- PFC Billy Dean (non-reported)

A total of 44 rounds of 61mm, 12 rounds of 82mm, 5 rounds of 120mm mortar and 7 rounds of 76mm artillery fell in the Battalion area.
SATURDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1952

When Billy Dean awoke, he was in his bunker and was having difficulty functioning. He was extremely sore, and several days it would take several days for back to normal. He attempted to find a corpsman because his back pain was unreal and the wound on his hand could use a bandage. Billy again looked at Detroit through binoculars and had the feeling, "Been there, done that."

The Mortar Section received another one hundred more 60mm HE rounds. PFC Shelby J. Daily gave Sgt Ray Menard a haircut and then Ray went to the OP to see Lt Fennessey (not a known H/3/1 Marine).

This was SSgt Eugene Ingram’s birthday and the day he died of wounds aboard the USS Consolation, a hospital ship that was docked in Inchon Harbor. He had been wounded on Dec. 21st and died of a wound to the neck that caused cerebral hemorrhaging. Eugene was born in Moss Point, MS, rejoined the Marine Corps at Georgetown, SC, and was from Hyde Park, MA. He is buried in Boston, MA.


A total of 3 rounds of 61mm, 6 rounds of 82mm mortar, 13 rounds of 76mm artillery and 3 rounds of rockets fell in the Battalion sector.

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1952

The Mortar Section fired fourteen rounds on Hill 139 in the afternoon.

Sgt Menard got his new watch ($32.75).


SSgt Lucindo Pimentel was dropped from the Company.

A total of 13 rounds of 61mm, 1 round of 82mm, and 6 rounds of 120mm mortar fell on the Battalion sector.

Sgt Dexter C. McNeil was transferred to H&S/3/1 and dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1952

The 1st Platoon hit Little Rock (about 900 meters north of Hill 119) while the 3rd Platoon made a diversionary attack on Detroit (about 1500 meters north of hill 119). (Not sure where the above was reported but the Command Diary says nothing about H/3/1 combat patrols.)

At 1155 H/3/1 called 60mm fire on 4 enemy in a sniper hole in the vicinity of coordinates 088088 (Detroit) with 4 counted enemy KIA resulting. At 1255 H/3/1 dispersed 2 enemy at the same location with 60mm mortars.

Sgt Menard went to early chow, to church, and then to the showers.

F. I. (possibly Cpl Frank I. Brown) left for Japan (probably on R&R).

A total of 24 rounds of 60mm, 11 rounds of 82mm, and 9 rounds of 120mm mortar fire fell on the Battalion sector.

PFC John H. Dornberger had a change of MOS from 2500 to 2531.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1952

At 0428 a H/3/1 combat patrol engaged an estimated 15 to 25 enemy in the vicinity of 083084 (800 yards north of Hill 119). The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons, frag and concussion grenades. Machine guns from Hill 123 and 125 and automatic weapons from Hill 139 were used as supporting fire by the enemy. The patrol employed tanks, heavy machine guns, and 4/2 mortars for support. At 0444 the patrol withdrew after damaging a machine gun on the objective and inflicting 3 enemy KIA and 4 WIA. Friendly casualties were 1 WIA (evacuated) from enemy small arms fire.

Billy Dean, being the demolition specialist in the Company, was often able to obtain
C3. C3 was a form of plastic explosive that was detonated with a detonator cap (great for digging holes in frozen ground, making booby traps, blowing up things, etc.). Billy also found another use for C3. He and his buddies would put a little on the ground, place a can of c-rations (hamburgers for example), and then light the C3. Presto, instantaneous heated chow. This expertise came in real hand, especially during the cold winter days when hot chow was so much appreciated.

At 1100 and advanced party of 1 officer and 14 enlisted arrived in the H/3/1 area and came operational control of the Battalion. SSgt Baldyga of A Company was one of the party from A/1/1.

The 75mm Recoilless Rifle Section in the H/3/1 area fired at 1535 and damaged 40 yards of trench and a tunnel entrance at coordinates 094103 (3000 yards NNE of Hill 119) after expending 20 rounds of HE.

A total of 12 rounds of 61mm mortar fire fell in the Battalion sector.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1952

The Mortar section fired 31 rounds on Hill 139. Sgt Menard got another package from home and stayed up until 0100.

Episcopal Bishop Austin Pardue, of the Pittsburgh Diocese held Holy Communion at the 1st Mar. Div. CP Chapel.

A total of 64 rounds of 61mm, 22 rounds of 82mm mortar, 36 rounds of 76mm artillery and 3 rockets fell in the Battalion sector.

Personnel strength at the beginning of the month was 39 Marine officers, 1098 Marine enlisted, 2 Naval officers, and 36 Naval enlisted. During the month of December 3/1 joined 12 Marine officer replacements, 84 Marine enlisted, and 20 Naval enlisted from Regiment. Two Marine officers, 45 Marine enlisted, and 12 Naval enlisted were transferred. Six Marine officers and 13 Marine enlisted were rotated. Fifteen Marine enlisted and 3 naval enlisted were sick evacuated. Six Marine officers, 38 Marine enlisted and 4 Naval enlisted were WIA and evacuated. Twelve Marine and 1 Naval enlisted were WIA but not evacuated. One Marine enlisted was ?IA. Four Marine enlisted were KIA and one Marine enlisted DOW. One officer, 33 Marine and 2 Naval enlisted were returned to duty. The personnel strength at the end of the month was 40 Marine officers, 1103 Marine enlisted, 2 Naval officers, and 39 Naval enlisted.

A breakdown of the total number of visits during the month to the Battalion Aid station reveals the following; 62 WIA, 47 of the WIA that were evacuated; 13 of them by helicopter, 11 patients were evacuated because of sickness, 62 patients were seen with dental complaints, 20 physical examinations were given, the majority to officers for promotion and annual requirements, 41 patients were examined and returned to duty after previous evacuation, 7 cases of diarrhea; and 12 cases of venereal disease were reported. Four KIA incurred by this battalion were handled by the aid station.

THURSDAY, JANUARY 1, 1953

Sgt Menard got up at 0930, went to chow, and wrote a letter home.

At 1730 H/3/1 fired 60mm mortars on 3 enemy in a trench in the vicinity of coordinates of 088089 (Detroit) and inflicted 1 counted WIA.

A total of 15 rounds of 60mm, 13 rounds of 82mm, 7 rounds of 120mm mortar and 8 rounds of 122mm artillery fell in the Battalion sector.

While 3/1 was on the MLR they dispatched 3 combat patrols per week and reconnaissance patrols from each rifle company covered the terrain to their immediate front each night to observe enemy movements, positions, and to scout routes for combat patrols. During the hours of darkness, listening posts, varying in strength from 2 man to a fire team, were located at strategic points in front of each company to report enemy movements.

FRIDAY, JANUARY 2, 1953

About this date TSgt Charles "Bud" Melanson, Johnston (probably Cpl Peter F.
Johnston), PFC Fred "Bad Buck" C. Buxton, PFC Billy "Bill" Thomas Dean, and one other person (name unknown) went back to the showers. They got all cleaned up and even smelled pretty good. This was another cold day. The road had begun to thaw and it was muddy. They were walking along when they heard "swish" and everyone dove into the muddy trying to get as low as possible waiting for the explosion. Billy Dean looked up and about thirty yards away in a rice paddy there was about six inches of an 82mm fin sticking out of the ice in a rice paddy. They were hacked off because they were all muddy again. They got up and moved out to continue their trek to Hill 119, again testing the accuracy of the CCF snipers on Detroit as they passed through an exposed area.

Sgt Ray Menard fired concentrations while SSgt Baldyga observed. Later they watched an air strike. Ray then got numbers for bunkers to turn into Mike #1.

The following details from 1/1 arrived in the Battalion sector and came under control of 3/1 at the times listed as follows: at 1100 1 enlisted man from H&S company and one enlisted man from A/1/1; at 1415 14 enlisted men from W/1/1; at 1600 1 officer and 13 enlisted men from C/1/1.

A total of 14 rounds of 60mm, 23 rounds of 82mm, 6 rounds of 120mm mortar and 2 rounds of 76mm artillery fire fell in the Battalion sector.

SATURDAY, JANUARY 3, 1953

Another friendly fire incident involving PFC Billy Dean and PFC Julius Davis. It is not known what date this event happened but it could have been about this date. - Billy and Julius were in on a listening post one night and the machine gunners were fire H&I (harassment and interdiction) fire. All of a sudden and without warning, the machine gun bullets began landing all around Billy and Julius. They quickly got as low as the 3-foot hole would allow and grabbed for the phone. While whispering was the norm over this phone, it now heard loud, scared screams calling for the machine gunners to cease fire. The Platoon Leader, 2nd Lt. Robert E. Lee, put a halted the H&I fire. From this perspective Billy has a high respect for the effectiveness of H&I fire. He really knows what it feels like to be on the incoming side.

There was a meeting for all right guides at the Company CP.

There was also a near miss on a tank in the Company area.

A total of 27 rounds of 60mm, 63 rounds of 82mm mortar, and 20 rounds of 76mm artillery fire fell in the Battalion sector.

SUNDAY, JANUARY 4, 1953

Sgt Menard went to the showers with Stick and Drew and then they then went to chow at the mess hall.

A 75mm recoilless from H/3/1 fired 6 rounds of HE between 1730 and 0800 causing an estimated 1 enemy bunker damaged at coordinates 087089 (Detroit).

The following details from the 1st 1/1 arrived in the Battalion sector and came under the operational control of 3/1 at the following times: At 1530 16 enlisted men from B/1/1 and at 1630 8 men from A/1/1.

A total of 11 rounds of 60mm, 13 rounds of 82mm, 2 rounds of 120mm, 12 rounds of 76mm artillery, and 9 duds of rounds of unknown caliber fell in the Battalion sector.

MONDAY, JANUARY 5, 1954

The Company CP had some incoming and the Mortar Section fired in the afternoon and at night. Sgt Menard got into a big argument with SSgt Baldyga but the subject is not known.

At 1455 H/3/1 reported 1 WIA (evacuated) in the vicinity of coordinates 086078 (Berlin) as a result of enemy 76mm artillery fire.

At 1800 personnel of A/1/1 commenced relief of H/3/1 on Cop 19 (Berlin) and 19A (East Berlin). The relief of East Berlin was completed at 1900 and the relief of Berlin was completed at 2000. One officer and 26 enlisted men from A/1/1 arrived in the Battalion at 1630.
At 2040 H/3/1 called 60mm mortar fire on an active enemy machine gun at coordinates 088089 (Detroit) and as a result the enemy was silenced. A total of 18 rounds of 60mm, 5 rounds of 82mm mortar and 30 rounds of 76mm artillery fell in the Battalion sector.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 6, 1953

At 0830 W/1/1 commenced relief of W/3/1 and the relief was completed at 1045. At 1115 W/3/1 arrived at the regimental reserve area and came under the control of 1/1.

At 2008 A/1/1 arrived in the H/3/1 area and commenced relief of H/3/1. A/1/1 assumed responsibility of H/3/1 sector and H/3/1 commenced to return to the Regimental reserve area. At 2400 H/3/1 arrived in the Regimental reserve area. Shortly after being relieved from duty in the morning, Sgt Menard, Babe, Stick, and PFC Donald M. Burge went to chow. Battalion went into Regimental reserve at coordinates 090033.

The Battalion would remain in Regimental reserve until Jan. 25th. While in Regimental reserve, the Battalion conducted training from prepared training schedules. In order to adapt the personnel of the Battalion to the tactical situation, training was devoted primarily to small unit tactics. While in Regimental reserve, unit leaders in the Battalion made a thorough reconnaissance of assigned blocking positions.

From Jan. 6th to Jan. 22nd, the Battalion dispatched a reinforced platoon each night to D/2/1 to occupy a position on the MLR vacated by a platoon of that company which occupied blocking positions each night. This reinforced platoon was under the operational control of 2/1. It returned the following morning and reverted to parent control.

Daily surveillance patrols were dispatched while the Battalion was in Regimental reserve. A total of 2 motorized patrols and 2 foot patrols were sent out daily. These patrols had the mission of apprehending any person not on authorized business in this sector and collecting all salvageable material found along the routes of march.

While in Regimental reserve, the Battalion conducted a raid. G/3/1 (-) (Reniforced) made this aggressive move against an active enemy outpost. They succeeded in destroying enemy personnel and installations. This raid was closely supported by artillery, mortars, and heavy machine gun fire. These supporting weapons were very effective in discouraging enemy reinforcements from their adjacent outposts.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 7, 1953

The Mortar Section arrived in their new area at 0100. At 0600 Sgt Menard got up, squared away his gear.

All hands commenced shaking down the new area. The camp had only been established a short time before and needed minor changes to be made to existing facilities.

From 1130 to 1230 a Carolina Cotton variety show was held in the Camp Theatre for the benefit of all personnel who could attend.

Sgt. Menard went to the movie night tonight.

PFC Martin M. Boyle was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, JANUARY 8, 1953

There wasn't much for Sgt Menard to do today so he showered, got paid $406.00, and then went to the movie.

Because of the tactical situation in the Regiment's sector of the MLR, H/3/1 was alerted at 2030.

On this date the following Marines were dropped from the Company (probably for rotation to the U.S.A.)

Pvt Roy H. French
Cpl Wayne K. Blackburn
Cpl Robert A. Burns
PFC Joseph H. Coleman
Cpl Jack K. Degel

PFC Robert F. Adams
PFC Thomas J. Breig
PFC Melvin Carmen
Cpl Glenor Dabbs
PFC John H. Dornberger
FRIDAY, JANUARY 9, 1953

There was a junk on the bunk inspection and then Sgt Menard sent home a money order for $400.00. He paid for two fraternity pins and then saw the last reel of the movie. The Battalion continued to make improvements to the reserve area and prepared to carry out the prescribed training while in Regimental reserve.

Sgt Bobby H. Smith was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, JANUARY 10, 1953

There was a Battalion CO's inspection at 1015 and then embarked on a program of training with a classes at the theater. Sgt Menard went to the movies in the evening.

At 1145, 335 men from the 3rd Replacement Battalion began arriving in the Battalion area by Helicopter for five days training prior to joining their assigned units of the 1st Marines. At 2030 the arrival of the replacements was completed. A training schedule was prepared for these men which emphasized orientation as to the tactical situation and training of the individual Marine. The replacements were divided into three training companies to accomplish this mission. The third company included Marines replacements for 3/1. Each company was under the charge of an officer with 3 non-commissioned officer assistants. Company officers and non-commissioned officers were provided from the trainees. (This appears not to be true because platoon leaders, Galvin and Moore, had arrived on previous drafts and were in H/3/1 when this draft arrived). Lt. Robert E. Lee was the Commander of the 3rd Company with SSgt David H. Moore, SSgt Donald R. Galvin, and C. S. Fleet were the platoon leaders within the 3rd company. Moore and Galvin would become H/3/1 Marines. The trainees were billeted in tents in the 3/1 camp and ate at the Battalion mess hall.

SUNDAY, JANUARY 11, 1953

The Battalion observed a holiday routine. Sgt Menard attended the 1000 Mass at the theater and went to the movie in the evening.

At 1445 the Assistant G-3, 1st Marine Division inspected the training of replacements.

Cpl William Dobberteen was dropped from the Company.

The replacement battalion personnel that was scheduled for the 3/1 began receiving the following training:

1st Day
0800-1000 Company Commander's time
1000-1100 Current orders and memorandums
1100-1200 Organization of the 1st Mar. Div
1300-1400 Close order drill
1400-1500 First aid-personnel hygiene
1500-1600 Escape and evasion
1600-1700 Summary of current operations
1830-2330 Conditioning hike

2nd Day
0530-0630 physical drill (12 exercises)
0730-0830 Close order drill
0830-1000 LMG-HMG
1000-1100 3/5 rocket launcher
1100-1200 60-81mm mortar
1230-1430 Camouflage-camouflage discipline
1430-1750 Cold and wet weather training & indoctrination
IN KOREA

1830-2130 night firing technique
3rd day 0530-0630 Physical drill (12 exercises)
0800-1200 Range firing (zero M-1s and carbines)
1300-1400 Close order drill
1400-1700 Map and compass reading
1830-2330 conditioning hike
4th day 0530-0630 Physical drill (12 exercises)
0730-0830 Close order drill
0830-1200 Principles of fire team, squad, & Platoon in attack and defense
1300-1500 Mine field identification and conduct of mined areas
1500-1700 Combat training of the individual soldier and patrol
1830-2230 Night patrol & night ambushes
5th Day 0530-0630 Physical drill (12 exercises)
0730-0830 Close order drill
0830-0930 Supply discipline
0930-1200 Enemy tactics
1300-1500 Inspection of personnel, arms and equipment
1500-1700 Company Commander's administrative time

MONDAY, JANUARY 12, 1953

The Company had inspection and then drill while ordinance worked on weapons.
It was H/3/1's turn to provide the Platoon that would go to the MLR and relieve teh D/2/1 platoon that moved to a blocking position. At 1600 a reinforced platoon departed the Battalion area and came under the operational control of 2/1.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 13, 1953

At 0028 G/3/1 (-) (reinforced) departed the Battalion area for 1/1 and came under their operational control. G/3/1 were going to conduct a raid in 1/1's area.
At 0730 the H/3/1 reinforced platoon returned to the reserve area from D/2/1.
There was troop and stomp and then classes all day. A scheduled drill to the blocking position was cancelled because the Battalion was put on alert.
At 1555 a H/3/1 reinforced platoon departed the Battalion's area for D/2/1 and came under their operational control.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1953

At 0745 the H/3/1 reinforced platoon returned from D/2/1 positions.
After having troop drill in the morning, the Mortar Section went to the field with the rifle platoons. Later there were classes at the movie theater.
At 1615 a H/3/1 reinforced platoon departed the Battalion for D/2/1.

THURSDAY, JANUARY 15, 1953

The H/3/1 reinforced platoon returned from D/2/1 positions.
There was Troop and drill again today. Some of the troops went to get a dental check.
At 1300 the new replacement draft completed their five days training and those assigned to the 1st and 2nd battalions embarked on trucks to be taken to their respective battalions. Those remaining in 3/1 were assigned to companies.
About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.
3rd Plt. Joe Flori (joined)
H/3/1's Mar. 1952 personnel roster shows that the following Marines left the U.S.A. on Dec. 12, 1952 and arrived at H/3/1 about this date. They were likely some of the replacements mentioned on January 10th.
PFC Charlie J. Wright 1266632

317
PFC George L. Wright 1302294
The H/3/1 July 1953 Monthly Personnel Roster shows the following men left the U.S.A. in Dec. 1952. They also probably arrived in Korea, and may have joined H/3/1, about this date.

PFC Charles A. Brazell 1247028/0331
PFC Roy M. Brooks 1300498/0311
PFC Milton M. Brown Jr. 1335379/0311
PFC Wayne L. Brown 1298315/0311
PFC Wesley A. Brown 1210668/0311
PFC Norman E. Covington 1123314/3016
PFC Leroy Elliott 1336446/0311
Pvt Frank C. English
60 MM Mortars  Pvt Frank "Francis" C. English 1337932/0300 (Frank says he came to H/3/1 in June 1953. Perhaps he was in another unit before joining H/3/1.)

Cpl Duayne J. Estrada 1228219/0311
Cpl John W. Everett 1106886/0311
Pvt Harvey C. Felix 1223826/0311
PFC Alexander C. Flores 1190841/0311
Pvt Louis T. Frye 1253028/3500
Cpl Earl W. Gill 1202321/2543
Cpl Gerald L. Holloway 1164016/1371
Cpl Lowell Popham 1268591/1375
PFC Maynard B. Sutton 1309942/3516
PFC Donald F. Wolsker 1318385/0331
PFC Herbert G. Yingst 1320186/0311

FRIDAY, JANUARY 16, 1953
The Company had squad problems on the training schedule.
PFC Joseph J. Cameron, Cpl Otto E. Schlegel, and Cpl Antonio N. J. Soares were dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, JANUARY 17, 1953
After a CO's inspection the troops went out to the field.
From 1030 to 1200 an all Marine Variety show was held in the Camp theatre for the benefit of all personnel who could attend.
2\textsuperscript{nd} Lt. J. r. Myers was dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, JANUARY 18, 1953
Sgt Menard was up at 1000 and went to mass at 1030. He went to the showers and then the movie that evening. Later in the night he was sick.

MONDAY, JANUARY 19, 1953
Sgt Menard didn't get up all day because he was sick.
At 0830 a H/3/1 reinforced platoon departed the Battalion for A/1/1 and came under their control.
At 1640 a H/3/1 reinforced platoon departed the Battalion area for D/2/1 and came under their operational control.
Sgt Glynn Davenport died as a non-battle casualty.
Sgt Glynn E. Davenport and Cpl Robert M. Hawkins were dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 20, 1953
At 0715 a H/3/1 reinforced platoon returned from D/2/1 and reverted to parent contro.
At 1635 a H/3/1 reinforced platoon departed the Battalion area for D/2/1. At 2035 a H/3/1 reinforced platoon returned from A/1/1 and came under parent control.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 21, 1953

At 0700 a H/3/1 reinforced platoon returned from D/2/1. At 1620 a reinforced H/3/1 platoon departed the Battalion area for D/2/1. PFC Leonard Debruyn was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, JANUARY 22, 1953

At 0635 a H/3/1 reinforced platoon returned from D/2/1 and reverted to parent control.

FRIDAY, JANUARY 23, 1953

At 1555 H/3/1 received 1 round of enemy 76mm artillery fire in the reserve area. The result was 3 WIA (evacuated). One of these three was PFC Billy "Bill" E. Felty who received shrapnel in the back and legs. Perhaps PFC Elmore was another casualty because he was also dropped from the Company this date. PFC J. R. Elmore was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, JANUARY 24, 1953

The Battalion Commander conducted a thorough inspection of the personnel and company areas. Measures were taken to remedy discrepancies noted.

SUNDAY, JANUARY 25, 1953

The Battalion reverted to Division reserve. At 0630 C/1/5 arrived in the Battalion area and commenced relief of G/3/1. At 0645 W/1/5 commenced relief of W/3/1. At 0730 B/1/5 commenced relief of I/3/1. At 0745 A/1/1 commenced relief of H/3/1. By 0810 the relief was completed and 3/1 closed the old CP at 090033 and opened a new CP at coordinates 103973. By 1000 all components of the Battalion had made the move to the new battalion area (103973).

Training for the remainder of January was devoted to the preparation for the Marine Landing Exercise (MARLEX), which was scheduled to take place during the period 2-6 February 1953. The training was intended primarily to qualify all individuals and units of the Battalion to perform their functions effectively in assault landing techniques. Training was progressive and adhered as closely as practicable to prescribed doctrine in order to accomplish the required state of readiness. An operation order was prepared to execute the MARLEX, but on 29 January the exercise was cancelled.

MONDAY, JANUARY 26, 1953

SSgt George A. Hyde was dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 27, 1953

The Battalion Commander presented awards to deserving personnel of the Battalion. A formation was held in the camp movie area for the occasion.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 28, 1953

At 0800 the rear area foot patrol returned with 1 Korean boy. At 1310 a special rear area patrol departed and returned at 1415 with another Korean boy. Both Korean boys were
pocked up in the vicinity of coordinates 103967. The boys were delivered to Regimental S-2 for interrogation.

Memorial services were held for all faiths at the Camp Chapel. The services were held in memory of the personnel of the Battalion who were killed during the period from November 16, 1952 to January 27, 1953.

THURSDAY, JANUARY 29, 1953

At 1300 the Regimental Commander addressed the Battalion in the Theatre area.

SATURDAY, JANUARY 31, 1953

At 0800 the rear area foot patrol departed and returned at 1050 with 9 Korean boys. All boys were picked up at coordinates 100967 and were delivered to Regimental S-2 for further interrogation.

The following were dropped from the Company.

2nd Lt. John M. Schaeffer
PFC Domingo H. Almanzar
Cpl Albert J. Distel

During the month of January, the men of the Battalion attended the various schools conducted by units of the 1st Marine Division. Sixteen men attended the Non-Commissioned Officers School conducted by the 1st Marine Division. Ten men attended the Machine Gun School conducted by the 1st Marine Division.

Personnel strength of the Battalion at the beginning of the month was 39 Marine Officers, 1101 Marine Enlisted, 2 Naval Officers, and 40 Naval enlisted. During the month of January the Battalion joined 2 Marine Officer replacements, 97 Marine Enlisted and 7 Naval enlisted replacements. Fourteen Marine Enlisted joined from other units in the Regiment. Five Marine officers and 36 Marine enlisted were transferred to other Division units. Three Marine officers and 99 Marine enlisted were rotated. Thirty nine Marine enlisted and 1 Naval enlisted were sick and evacuated. One Marine officer, 19 Marine enlisted, and 3 Naval enlisted were WIA (evacuated). Fifteen Marine enlisted and 1 Naval enlisted were WIA (author's note: this may have meant to be KIA). One Marine officer, 56 Marine enlisted and 2 Naval enlisted, previously evacuated, returned to duty. One Marine died of disease. The personnel strength at the end of the month was 33 Marine officers, 1076 Marine enlisted, 2 Naval officers and 39 Naval enlisted.

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1953

The month of February was devoted to intensive training. This training was progressive in that it began with small unit tactics (fire teams) and progressed through successive stages up to and including platoon tactics.

During the month of February the Battalion command group participated in 3 Command Post Exercises, the Battalion conducted 1 Battalion Field Exercise, and participated in 1 Regimental Field Exercise. The Command Post and Field Exercises provided all echelons of the Battalion invaluable experience in time space factors; the control and coordination of the attack in a moving situation and the proper use of the communication facilities available to the Battalion in a moving situation. The regimental Field Exercise conducted on 23 February involved moving the Battalion a distance of 8 miles to contain and counter attack an assumed enemy penetration.

On 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8 February USMC personnel and KSC personnel were engaged in development and completion of the Combat Out Posts in the Battalion sector of the Kansas Line. On all other days during the month of February KSC personnel, under the supervision of USMC personnel, were engaged in the Maintenance of the Battalion sector of the Kansas Line.

Maintenance and replacement of communication wire in the Battalion was ongoing during the month. Classes were held every except Saturday and Sunday for training of wiremen and radiomen. Forty five wiremen were trained during the month as well as the organic wiremen. All personnel were given excellent insight into wire and radio communications requirements.
IN KOREA

At 0600 1 platoon from each rifle company departed the Battalion area to work on outposts on the Kansas Line. They returned to the Battalion area at 1600. Due to the tactical situation, top priority was given to work on the defenses of the Kansas Line. The Battalion continued to train in accordance with the prepared training schedule. Rear area patrols were sent out while in reserve and returned with no reportable incidences unless noted on the given day.

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1953

Training was conducted daily while in reserve but details the identify the type of training are not readable on the Command Diary.

At 0930 the command group of the Battalion departed the Battalion area to participate in a Command Post Exercise. This exercise was scheduled for a duration of 24 hours. During this time, telephone silence was maintained between the Battalion and all other units of the 1st Marines.

At 2030 a Korean boy and a prostitute were apprehended by the Battalion guard and delivered to the Regimental stockade.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1953

At 0930 the Battalion command group returned to the Battalion area.

About this date PFC Dick Fall was on a field problem involving tanks. While climbing aboard the tank he severely burned his hand on the exhaust manifold. The wound would heal up in the next week and his hand would be as good as new.

Also about this date Dick Fall got into a fight. His nose was broken and his eye was swollen shut. (I wonder what the other guy looked like.)

PFC Richard Feierstein was dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1953

At 1000 the assistant G-3 inspected Battalion training.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1953

At 0800, 1 platoon from each rifle company departed the Battalion area to work on outposts on the Kansas Line. They returned to the Battalion area at 1600.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1953

PFC Richard "Dick" Fall had a cold and didn't feel too good. He wrote home to say he had received four letters tonight and sent a $23.00 money order home.

At 0800, 1 platoon from each of rifle company departed the Battalion area to work on outposts on the Kansas Line. At 1530, 2 Korean boys were apprehended in the vicinity of coordinates 099967. They were delivered to the Regimental stockade.

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1953

At 1300, 1 platoon from each of rifle company departed the Battalion area to work on outposts on the Kansas Line and at 1600 they returned to the Battalion area.

At 1400, a rear area patrol apprehended 2 Korean boys

At 1630, the Battalion moved out to occupy its assigned sector of the Kansas Line. They departed in good order and were in position in a minimum of time. The companies occupied and worked on improvement of their assigned positions and returned to the Battalion area at 1030.

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1953
IN KOREA

H/3/1 MARINES

At 0800, 100 men each from G/3/1 and H/3/1 departed the Battalion area to work on outposts on the Kansas Line. They returned to the Battalion area at 1600.

The remainder of the Battalion observed holiday routine.

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC Gene H. Alig                  Cpl Willard H. Barnes
PFC Robert C. Barthule            Cpl Joseph B. Breaux
Sgt James P. Farber               Sgt Donald P. Geary
PFC Ronald D. Leo                 Sgt Raymond N. Menard
Pvt Ignacio R. Mendoza            Cpl Raymond T. Phipps
Cpl Joseph E. Revell              PFC Gambino G. Rodriguez
Cpl Russell G. Schultz            PFC Carlos E. Seelig

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1953

At 0600, 6 officers and at 0900, 176 enlisted Marine Corps personnel and 9 Navy enlisted personnel arrived in the Battalion area from the 1st Replacement Battalion. These personnel were assigned to companies of the Battalion and commenced training with their respective units. In addition they received training in certain subjects designed to acquaint them with the current situation affecting the Battalion in accomplishing its assigned mission. Required training included: 1 hour intelligence summary; 1 hour current orders and memorandums; 1 hour first aid; 1 hour compass and map reading; 3 hours escape and evasion; 1 hour supply economy; 1 hour orientation of the 1st Marine Division.

Having arrived with the new draft and after traveling from Inchon all night, 2nd Lt. Harvey Lindsay arrived at the Company at about 0900. The 1st Marines were in division reserve which meant a vigorous training schedule, (classes and many day and night problems). He assumed command of the 1st Platoon.

The following were dropped from the Company

SSgt Donald R. Galvin            Cpl Jerrell E. Hamby

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1953

At 0630, the command group departed the Battalion area to participate in a Command Post Exercise. The exercise was secured at 1230 at which time the command group returned.

At 0900 the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division addressed the replacements in the Battalion theatre area.

At 1600, a rear area foot patrol returned with 3 Korean boys.

The 1st Marines was again on line. The following five weeks would be relatively quiet at the front.

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1953

At 1250, the Battalion conducted a practice air raid drill (flash red) and secured from same at 1305.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1953

At 0930 the Assistant Division Commander inspected Battalion training. At 1000, a rear area patrol returned with 2 Korean boys apprehended at coordinates 102966 and at 1030 a rear area patrol returned with 3 Korean boys apprehended at coordinates 102966. All were delivered to the Regimental stockade.

The following were dropped from the Company.

2nd Lt. Frederick Farrell        SSgt Leon G. Bentz

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1953

2nd Lt. Harvey Lindsay took some of his troops to Seoul for the day. He wrote home that the daytime temperatures were about 30 degrees.
At 1030, a security check of the Battalion was made by Counter Intelligence Corps.

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1953

At 1035, a rear area patrol apprehended 3 Korean boys in the vicinity of 102996 and at 1130, 1 Korean boy was apprehended in the vicinity of 102996. All were delivered to the Regimental stockade.

2nd Lt. Harvey Lindsay was attending Mine Warfare School this Saturday and Sunday.

At 1900, a Command Post Exercise was conducted and then secured at 2057.

At 2100 a rear area patrol apprehended 3 Korean boys at coordinates 102966. They were taken to the Regimental stockade.

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1953

The Battalion observed holiday routine.

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

- H/3/1 Wireman Cpl Mac MacCarthy (joined)
- H/3/1 Wireman Robert "Bob" Kelley (joined)
- 2nd Plt. 1st Sqd. PFC John R. Dunbar 1269825/0311 (joined)
- Cpl Arthur E. Caselli 1180610/3011
- CPL Joseph R. Cottrell 1162832/1361

(Arthur and Joseph were probably in country but didn't join H/3/1 until about July 26, 1953. They are shown on the July monthly personnel roster.)

The H/3/1 July 1953 monthly personnel roster shows the following men left the U.S.A. in Jan. 1953. They probably arrived in Korea, and may have joined H/3/1, about this date.

- Capt John J. Zulkofske 032525/0302 (probably joined H/3/1 about 3/28/53)
- Cpl Charles Ashenberner 1189296/5861
  (Arthur didn't join H/3/1 unit about July 26, 1953)
- PFC Otis F. Coleman 1196750/0311
- PFC Peter M. Dahl 1252059/0311
- PFC Louis A. Daniel 1250117/0331
- PFC Daniel L. Daugherty 1241852/0311
- PFC George G. Dellis 1267060/0331
- PFC Junior C. Denney 1287974/0311
- Sgt Claud D. Dennis 1154884/2511
- PFC Donald G. Dery 1170951/0331
- PFC William L. Demeeese 1261280/0331
- PFC James T. Dexter 1297441/0331
- PFC William J. Diele 1279930/0311
- SGT Peter P. Dobo? 1190038/0311
- PFC Edward J. Doman 1312577/0311
- PFC John J. Dooley 1150333/0311
- Cpl Horace J. Drake 1172395/0311
- PFC Dennis B. Driscoll 1186954/0331
- PFC Walter A. Duckworth 1291635/0311
- PFC Alex L. Duh 1245860/0331
- PFC Robert L. Dulinski 1189520/0311
- PFC Terry D. Dunn 1242616/0311
- PFC Robert A. Engel 1240564/0331
- PFC Edward England 1250442/0331
- PFC William T. Farrell 1136224/0333
- PFC Frank R. Fassy 1221128/0333
- Cpl Verlin E. Foley 1241668/0333
- PFC Julius Franklin 1318637/0333
- PFC Vernon J. Freitas 1321643/0333
- Cpl James M. Grimes 1206672/0311
- Cpl Kenneth L. Heiman 1197068/0844
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1953

H/3/1 was involved on a Battalion field problem in the field. 2nd Lt. Lindsay saw some skeletons while in the field.

At 1300, Battalion had a practice air raid drill and it was secured at 1345.

The Battalion also conducted a field exercise commencing at 1300. The purpose of the exercise was, to gain experience in time-space factors, control and coordination of the attack in a moving situation, employment of small unit tactics: and to exercise the communication facilities and staff functioning of the Battalion. Umpires were assigned to each rifle company to develop special situations and to note discrepancies. A critique was conducted following the problem to point out discrepancies noted for correction.

At 1630 a rear area patrol returned with 4 Korean boys apprehended at coordinates 102066. They were taken to the Regimental stockade.

PFC Billy E. Felty was dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1953

At 0800, three instructors arrived in the Battalion area from Division API section and commenced API school for selected officers and enlisted personnel. Twenty officers and enlisted personnel attended the instructions from 0800 to 1200 and 20 officers and enlisted personnel attended the instruction from 1300 to 1700.

At 1300, two reinforced squads from the H/3/1's 3rd Platoon staged a combat patrol demonstration for personnel of the 1/1. The demonstration stressed the importance of control, the coordination of supporting arms, demolitions, communications and the evacuation of casualties. The demonstration was well received. It pointed out that careful planning, intensive training, rehearsals, and painstaking attention to detail are requisites for the successful conclusion of this type of patrol.

At 1910 a rear area patrol returned with 3 Korean men (1ROK and 2 KSC). The 3 men had identification cards and were released after a thorough check of their credentials were made by the Battalion S-2.

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC Paul Ascuragi
PFC William S. Feldt

WEDNESDAY FEBRUARY 18, 1953

At 1300, the two reinforced squads of H/3/1's 3rd Platoon gave another demonstration (see 2/17/53) except that this day the demonstration was for 2/3.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1953

At 0915 the rear area patrol returned with 4 Korean boys that were apprehended in the vicinity of the Regimental dump. They were taken to the Regimental stockade.

At 1300, the two reinforced squads of H/3/1's 3rd Platoon gave another demonstration
IN KOREA

(see 2/17/53) except that this day the demonstration was for 3/3.

PFC Richard Fall received Holy Communion.
PFC Stanley W. Cole was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1953

Unit commanders and staff officers of the Battalion established liaison with 3/7 in preparation for effecting relief of that units sector of the MLR. Reconnaissance, familiarization visits, and inspection of assigned sectors were carried out from 20-26 February.

PFC Richard Fall finished cleaning his BAR for inspection which was scheduled for tomorrow and wrote a letter home. He told his parents how tired he was and how hard they were working every day. He preferred to be on the line taking his chances than to be in reserve. He asked his mother to send his camera.

Cpl Robert E. Ancker was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1953

Personnel of W/3/1's 81mm mortar section conducted live firing training in the left MLR Battalion area of the 5th Marine sector.
At 1430, Battalion had a practice air raid drill (flash red) and secured from the drill at 1500.
Lt. Lindsay wrote home that the Company was patrolling (probably to the rear of the Division's MLR) during nights and were seeing very little action.
This night was a very cold night and Dick Fall's tent didn't have any heat. The stove in the tent wasn't working.

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1953

The Battalion observed holiday routine and 2nd Lt Harvey Lindsay had a day of leisure after spending two week in country.
PFC Richard "Dick" Fall and his squad (1st Squad, 2nd Platoon), didn't have that much leisure. They had Battalion Guard duty this twenty four hours from 0800 Sunday until 0800 Monday. While on guard duty they were divided into groups of four men on OPs with a fifty percent alert.
The following were dropped from the Company.
PFC Richard C. Brinson          PFC Edward D. Brown
Cpl John Cabello                PFC Gilbert D. Chadwick
PFC Carral G. Cole              PFC John R. Cook
PFC Richard C. Coston           PFC Robert B. Cox
PFC Lenes J. Credeur            PFC Martin E. Dale
Cpl Morley D. Dishman           PFC Harry L. Jarzombek
PFC Charles C. Modzel           PFC Joseph A. Morra
PFC Robert H. Mueller           PFC Joseph J. Neilon
PFC Willard T. O'Hara Jr.       Cpl Eddie G. Parmeley
Cpl Richard B. Schenck          Cpl William F. Sullivan
Cpl Chester J. Swietek

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1953

As part of a Regimental Field Exercise, the Battalion received orders to execute at 0705. All elements embarked aboard assigned vehicles and were clear of the Battalion area by 0825. At 0927 all elements of the Battalion were in their assigned assembly areas (vicinity of coordinates 003957) prepared to carry out the assigned mission. The move was accomplished without difficulties and was a compliment to the state of readiness achieved by the Battalion. At 1130 the exercise was secured and all elements of the Battalion returned to their reserve area at 1330.
H/3/1 participated in this Regimental field exercise. The whole Battalion was moved by motor convoy up to the Korean Sector (possibly the Division's KMC Regiment). They crossed Freedom Bridge to get to their destination (possibly on the Division's left front).

PFC Richard Fall wrote home to say that the 1st Squad, 2nd Platoon was supposed to be relieved from guard duty at 0800. This didn't happen. Instead they stayed on guard duty for another twenty four hours and didn't participate in the Regimental field exercise. He had heard a rumor that the 7th Marines had been pushed off the MLR last night. The rest of the Battalion was drawing flak jackets and ammo. Dick didn't know if they were going back to retake the section of the MLR that the 7th Marines lost or if they went out on a live firing exercise.

February was characterized by a marked increase in ground contacts between Marines and the CCF.

Sgt Clyde W. Keel, a Marine who had been a H/3/1 Marine and now on his second tour in Korea with A/1/5, was WIA.

The H/3/1 training schedule called for:
- 0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
- 0900-1000 first aid
- 1000-1100 military courtesy
- 1300-1630 platoon in the offense

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1953

The training schedule for this day called for:
- 0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
- 0900-1000 map and compass
- 1000-1100 Platoon offensive tactics (live firing)
- 1300-1630 platoon offensive tactics

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1953

2nd Lt. Lindsay, and probably some of the other officers from H/3/1 visited an Army artillery battery which was supporting the Division. While there, the Army received a fire mission and the officers got a first hand look at them in action.

PFC Richard Fall received a letter from home and wrote a letter to his parents. He hadn't heard from his girl friend for eight days and was concerned.

The training schedule called for:
- 0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
- 0900-1000 anti-aircraft
- 1000-1100 supply economy
- 1300-1630 platoon in the offense

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1953

The H/3/1 CO, another Lt., and 2nd Lt. Lindsay went by jeep to the MLR to make a reconnaissance of the area to which they would be moving. After dark, while the moon was full, Lt Lindsay left the MLR and went through a trench line to get to OP Hedy which was about 300 yards in front of the MLR. He found it unique and interesting that the enemy was only about 20 yards over the crest of the hill. A few mortar rounds landed on the OP while he was there and it didn't take long for him to find the ground. One gets acclimated quickly.

The H/3/1 training schedule called for:
- 0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
- 0900-1030 Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
- 1030-1130 Talk by Chaplain
- 1300-1630 Platoon raids

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1953
PFC Dick Fall wrote home again. He had been in an argument with his squad leader (probably Sgt Charles Arbogast) and, during the argument, Charles had hit him in the eye and they wound up in a fight. Dick got the best of the fight but his eye was swollen shut, black eye. It has not been eleven days since he has heard from his girl friend. He had been going to Holy Communion and to his parents, "... If my number does come up while I am over here, you will know that I did my best and will be in the state of grace." He said the temperature was warmer and the mud was getting deeper.

The H/3/1 training schedule called for:
  0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
  0900-1130 platoon in offensive combat (live firing)
  1300-1600 attack of fortified positions

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1953

Another trip to reconnoiter their future sector of the MLR was made during this night.

The H/3/1 troops had an inspection
At 1845 one officer and 21 enlisted men from G/3/1 and 2 enlisted W/3/1 men departed the Battalion area for the MLR in the 3/7 sector. These personnel were part of the advanced liaison group from Battalion. They came under operational control of 3/7 at 2030.

During the month of February members of the Battalion continued to attend the various schools conducted by Division as follows: 18 enlisted personnel attended the Division Non-commissioned Officers School; 20 enlisted personnel attended the Division Machine Gun School; 6 officers and 34 enlisted men attended an Aerial Photo Interpretation class conducted by instructors from the Division Aerial Photo Interpretation section. In addition instruction was conducted for motor transport personnel in the use and functioning of the .50 caliber machine gun. Two officers and 38 enlisted personnel attended the Mine Warfare School conducted by Engineer Battalion. Ten enlisted personnel from the Battalion S-2 section attended Intelligence School conducted at Regimental Command Post. Eight enlisted personnel from the Battalion S-2 attended the Scout Observers School conducted by the Regimental S-2 section.

Personnel strength at the beginning of the month was 33 Marine officers, 1076 Marine enlisted, 2 Naval officers, and 39 Naval enlisted. During the month the Battalion joined 6 Marine officers, 173 Marine enlisted, and 13 naval enlisted replacements. 2 Marine officers, 10 Marine enlisted, and 13 Naval enlisted joined from regiment. Three Marine officers, 32 Marine enlisted, and 13 Naval enlisted were transferred. Four Marine officers and 158 Marine enlisted were rotated. One Marine officer, 36 marine enlisted and 1 Naval enlisted returned to duty. One Marine officer, 29 Marine enlisted and 1 Naval enlisted were sick and evacuated. The personnel strength at the end of the month was 34 Marine officers, 1076 Marine enlisted, 2 Naval officers, and 39 Naval enlisted.

During the month 670 patients visited the Battalion aid station. There were no men KIA or WIA. There were 10 sick and evacuated and 7 non-battle evacuated. There were 4 cases of venereal disease and seventeen other suspected cases whose laboratory confirmation had not yet been confirmed. Cowpox inoculations and influenza vaccines were given to all personnel during the month.

SUNDAY, MARCH 1, 1953 (possibly Easter Sunday)

Holiday routine.
During the first part of March the Chinese assumed an inactive posture. Few contacts were reported by patrols.
Dick Fall attended Mass in the open air theater area. It rained during the Mass and everyone got soaked. He said today's chow was terrible and he asked his mother to send some chow and the Camera he has been requesting.
At 1850 the Company sent an advanced detail of one officer and twenty six enlisted personnel to the 3/7 sector of the MLR and they came under their operational control at
SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

1. Elements of the 65th and 46th CCF Armies are deployed along the general line from coordinates 930050 (probably about north of Panmunjom) to 043063 (north of the 1st Marines right flank) along the 1st Marines front. These forces are fully equipped, consisting of infantry units with supporting artillery, tanks, engineers, service, and headquarters units. The 3/1 is opposed from west to east by the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd companies of the 1st Battalion and unknown companies of the 3rd battalion, with the 3rd battalion directly supporting; of the 360th regiment, 120th division, 46th CCF Army, from coordinates 002037 to coordinates 039061.

2. The 136th division is accepted as reserve of the 46th CCF Army. All reserve units of the 136th division of the entire division is capable of reinforcing within 12 hours or less.

3. Enemy is capable of firing on friendly targets within the 3/1 sector with 2 battalions 75/76mm guns/howitzers; 2 battalions 122mm howitzers; and 1 battalion 105mm howitzers.

4. Enemy moral is considered good, and their combat efficiency excellent. These units will take precautions to prevent our capturing prisoners. The CCF units have developed scouting and patrolling and night attacks to a high degree. The enemy utilizes to the maximum all aspects of terrain appreciation.

5. The enemy has observation of our MLR from one or more prominent terrain features to the front. The TAEDOX-SAN Hill mass offers the enemy observation of our battalion sector, portions of our rear areas. Hill 123 (coordinates 006040) gives the enemy observation of a small portion of our MLR sector. (author's note: it is unlikely these coordinates (--6-40) are correct because they are on Hill 229 which was held by friendly forces.)

6. The enemy's present activity continues to be confined to counter-reconnaissance, "creeping" tactics, and repairing and strengthening his defense. His attitude is one of continuous defense.

7. The enemy is capable to attack anywhere in our battalion sector with a whole or parts of the regiment opposing us. It is believed the enemy will continue an active defense, using artillery, mortars, and small arms fire; with continued probes on friendly outposts by small groups of men, possible limited objective attacks on prominent terrain features in our battalion sector. Such attacks or probes taking place at any time. The most critical area for such attack is CT 0103.

While on the MLR, the Battalion fed two meals daily in the reserve camp area.

MONDAY, MARCH 2, 1953

The Battalion was alerted to prepare for to conduct a Command Post exercise, "Eveready Five", in accordance with a Division Training Order.

The H/3/1 training schedule called for:
- 0900-0900 troop inspection and drill
- 0900-1000 mine warfare
- 1000-1100 escape and evasion
- 1300-1630 platoon in offensive combat

TUESDAY MARCH 3, 1953

At 0531 the Battalion received orders to execute Eveready Five which involved physical movement of the battalion into blocking positions on the Kansas Line. At 0535 the Battalion reconnaissance group departed to reconnoiter routes and assembly areas at the assigned positions. At 0558 a security group left to cover the movement of the battalion into the assembly area. The Battalion left camp area and moved via motor march to the assembly area. H/3/1, the first rifle company to leave, left at 0626 and arrived at the designated area at 0701. At 1030 the Eveready Five exercise was secured and the battalion returned to the battalion camp site. H/3/1 was the last rifle company to return to the battalion area. They departed their exercise area to return to the battalion camp at 1150.
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 1953

H/3/1's training schedule was:
- 0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
- 0900-1030 M-1 rifle (functioning and nomenclature)
- 1030-1130 .45 piston (functioning and nomenclature)
- 1300-1630 infantry tactics
- 1915-2215 platoon in offensive combat (live firing)

All of the Battalion's rear patrols accomplished their assigned missions with no reportable incidents.

FPC Stephen C. Bradshaw was dropped from H/3/1 on this date.

THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 1953

H/3/1's training schedule:
- 0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
- 0900-1030 M-1 and M-2 (functioning and nomenclature)
- 1030-1130 first aid
- 1300-1630 ???
- 1915-2215 patrols and raids

Lt. Lindsay reported that March came in like a lion and it was very cold. The Regiment was still in Division reserve and he also said that the action had been slight with a few night raids and patrols. The Division had been on line for twenty one months and rumors were that they were due to go into Corps reserve.

All of the Battalion's rear patrols accomplished their assigned missions with no reportable incidents.

FRIDAY, MARCH 6, 1953

H/3/1's training schedule:
- 0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
- 0900-1130 light machine gun (functioning and nomenclature)
- 1300-1630 platoon in offensive combat (live firing)

All of the Battalion's rear patrols accomplished their assigned missions with no reportable incidents.

SATURDAY, MARCH 7, 1953

There was a Battalion Commander's inspection in the morning.

The Battalion began relief of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines. H/3/1 was to relieve G/3/7. H/3/1, along with G and I companies, commenced relief of the Combat Outposts in their assigned sectors forward of the MLR. Sixteen enlisted men from the Company departed the battalion area at 1750 and came under operational control of 3/7 at 1930.

All of the Battalion's rear patrols accomplished their assigned missions with no reportable incidents.

SUNDAY, MARCH 8, 1953

During this day H/3/1 completed relief of the G/3/7 Combat Outposts that were forward of the MLR. A detail of thirty eight H/3/1 enlisted men departed the Battalion area at 1815 for the 3/7 sector of the MLR.

All of the Battalion's rear patrols accomplished their assigned missions with no reportable incidents.

MONDAY, MARCH 9, 1953

At 2220 the Company departed the battalion area for the G/3/7 sector of the MLR and
TUESDAY, MARCH 10, 1953

3/1 assumed responsibility of the 3/7 sector of the MLR. At 0420 H/3/1 assumed responsibility of the G/3/7 sector and at 0430 completed the relief of G/3/7.

At 1200 the Company reported two friendly WIA as a result of enemy 76mm and 120mm fire from coordinates 016038.

All patrols in the Battalion departed and returned to the MLR with negative results and negative enemy contact.

The Company was guarding the MLR and manning outposts in the Bunker Hill, Hedy, and Ester Area. H/3/1's 3rd Platoon was probably on Hedy and Hill 229 about this date. Part of a Platoon of A/1/1 (about a squad) was on an outpost called New Bunker in front of the MLR. The ridge line included (from right to left) Old bunker, New Bunker, Snipers Ridge (sometimes occupied by the Chinese), Hedy, and Ingrid.

The first week in this position was one of little significance with combat and reconnaissance patrols being dispatched daily. Some sightings of enemy movement were made but enemy action was limited to harassing and interdicting mortar and artillery fires. A POW interrogation report of Feb. 11, 1953 revealed that the enemy was planning limited objective offensives.

SSgt Fay L. Aiken, the 1st Platoon Sgt was WIA. The Shrapnel wounds in his legs were severe enough to cause him to be evacuated but would eventually heal. He would not return to H/3/1.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 11, 1953

At 1550 the company reported one enemy sniper wounded in action in the vicinity of coordinates 106038 as a result of friendly sniper fire.

All patrols in the Battalion departed and returned to the MLR with negative results and negative enemy contact.

The Catholic Chaplain, Father Brengartner, wrote to PFC Richard Fall's mother saying that, "Am just dropping you a cheerful note to tell you your son was at Mass and Holy Communion Sunday. This fact should bring joy to your heart knowing that Richard is staying close to God."

About this date H/3/1's 3rd Platoon took turns on OP Hedy. Cpl James E. Jones said they would spend three nights and four days during a tour on Hedy. They wore flak jackets and shorts.

James' hole was on the point. Looking out of the aperture you could see a burned out tank that the Flame Platoon, 1st Tank Battalion had lost and never recovered. To get into James' hole you had to go over a big rock with your ass in the air and then sand bag yourself in the hole. A sound powered phone was used to keep in contact with the Platoon Leader. James could hear the enemy drop mortars into the tubes, hear the pop, and hear the burst after counting to about five. In the daytime you had to hunker down because a sniper was using the burned out tank from which to fire.

One of these nights James was doing his game of counting to five and then ducking and that was the last thing he remembered for about forty five minutes. When he came back around, he couldn't hear and had "one hell of a head ache". When James got his hearing back, he checked in with the Platoon Leader who asked if he wanted to be evacuated. James declined. James reported that he thought he could hear the Chinese tunneling under his bunker but no-one took him seriously.

There was always a squad ready to reinforce Hedy when they were probed. On one occasion James Jones was in this squad. He ran down the trench line to Hedy and found a Marine with the top of his head blown away. Jim recalls that it didn't look like this guy would last very long. Jim volunteered to carry him back through the trench line. About this time some Marines came up with a stretcher. The stretcher wouldn't work in the trench line so the four Marines took off down the tank road, in broad daylight, carrying the stretcher. It was about a four or five hundred yard dash to the MLR. James doesn't recall
if anyone shot at them because he was so preoccupied with the keeping his end of the stretcher up and level. About fifty yards from the MLR some guys came out to relieve the four men carrying the stretcher. Apparently some got the Bronze Star for this heroism but James was not one of them.

THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 1953

At 0600 Battalion reported that all patrols departed and returned to the MLR with negative results and negative enemy contact.

At 0745 the Company reported one Marine who WIA and was evacuated. The casualty came as a result of enemy machine gun fire received from the vicinity of coordinates 015041.

At 2050 a Company reconnaissance patrol made contact with an estimated five to seven enemy in the vicinity of coordinates 013035. The enemy approached the patrol from its left rear and the patrol was force to fire on the enemy who was in a position to cut the patrol's return route. The enemy did not return fire. The patrol reported one enemy KIA in the action. At 2153 the patrol continued on its mission and on return reported no further incidents or contact with the enemy.

The following Marines were dropped from H/3/1 on this date. Since there were so many, it would seem to indicate they were rotated back to the U.S.A.

Sgt. Charles F. Arbogast       PFC Robert R. Becker
PFC Ruben Bera               Cpl Arne A. Berg
PFC Charles Bierwerth        PFC Richard C. Brumback
PFC Donald H. Burge          Pvt Jerry J. Carlsen
PFC Shelby J. Daily          PFC John J. Delargy
PFC Henry A. Friday          SSgt Billy L. Goodman
SSgt Richard T. Levis Jr.    PFC Guido J. Montopoli
PFC Clenton Moon             PFC Reyes Merm. Morales
PFC Francis M. Moran         Sgt. Robert C. Murray
Cpl Peter Santori            Sgt. Gerald R. Thaxton
Sgt. Leroy H. Warneke        PFC Joseph Watson

FRIDAY, MARCH 13, 1953

At 0600 all of the Battalion's patrols had returned to the MLR with negative enemy contact.

At 1030 the Company reported one WIA and evacuated as a result of enemy sniper fire received in the vicinity of Bunker Hill (COP 122A). At 2350 the Company reported six WIA and evacuated as a result of enemy 82mm mortar fire received in the vicinity of Bunker Hill (COP 122A). These last casualties are likely the casualties reported by Dick Fall in the following paragraph and shown as dropped from the company on Mar. 13th. Guzman's death is also reported as being on Mar. 14th (probably late this night perhaps after midnight).

PFC Richard "Dick" Fall was in the trench line on New Bunker Hill near the gate when incoming mortar fire was received, possibly from the direction of Hill 123. Three or four men from a patrol that was passing through the gate were wounded. One of the wounded was PFC Jose Delores Guzman-Rodriguez who would die of his wounds. Robert Baumann reported that Jose had one, or both, legs blown off. Richard Fall also reported that one man who died had lost a leg and his hand. This was the first time Dick put his minimal medical training to use. This was also the first time he knew what it was like to be WIA. Although the wound on his left thumb was minor, it "burned like Hell". He also had other pieces of shrapnel in his flak jacket.

PFC Aubrey Bounds was also there when Guzman was KIA. He recalls that they were in a trench line waiting to go on patrol when a round hit him at the top of the trench line. He remembers others being wounded (perhaps Anthony Hamilton and a person he thought was Galvin).

SATURDAY, MARCH 14, 1953
IN KOREA

At 0040 the Company reported two WIA (not evacuated) as a result of enemy .82mm mortar fire received in the vicinity of Bunker Hill (COP 122A).

At 0600 all of the Battalion's patrols had returned to the MLR with negative enemy contact.

At 1030 the Company reported one WIA (evacuated) as a result of enemy sniper fire received in the vicinity of Bunker Hill (COP 122A).

During the day some planes flew a napalm strike against Chinese positions and Lt Lindsay had a good view of the spectacle. He could see the Chinese come out of their caves and return fire at the planes with "everything they had". At night it was a war of nerves and tension. It was hard not to imagine noises and smell garlic while still being alert for the real thing.

There had been a couple of night of snow but the Spring thaw was evident. During the night Lt. Lindsay saw a good example of coordination between units. Two tanks came up to the MLR. One had a search light and another with guns loaded for bear. Planes were also on station. At a prearranged time the tank would use the search light to illuminate Chinese strong points and the planes would drop bombs. The timing was perfect.

MSgt Harold E. Bird and Cpl Richard L. Kosinski were dropped from the Company PFC Jose D. Guzman-Rodriguez, of the 1st Plt., died on this date at C Co. 1st Medical Bn (Kaesong-ni, Korea). Jose was from Camuy, PR and is buried there.

SUNDAY, MARCH 15, 1953

At 1018 the Company reported one enemy KIA in the vicinity of coordinates 017043 as a result of friendly sniper fire.

This was a nice Spring day with lots of sunshine and a little cool.

During the preceding five months there were no major offensives by the Chinese nor the UN forces. However, there were many smaller life-taking battles.

The enemy made two attacks on outposts in the 1st Marines sector. At 0105 a CCF company struck in the vicinity of COP Hedy while a second lunged at COP Esther, about one and one half mile to the right (northeast). G/3/1 was operating in the vicinity of Esther.

Actually the main fight in the H/3/1 sector was to the rear of Hedy on the MLR. The Chinese only indulged in a brief firefight at Hedy, bypassing it in favor of a crack at the Jamestown Line (MLR). H/3/1 did not yield to the enemy thrust, which was supported by 2,400 rounds of mortar and artillery fire along the MLR and outposts.

While all this was happening, Lt. Lindsay took out his first patrol and was praying all the way. They had negative contact.

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

- 60 MM mortars Frederick "Fred" Farrell (left)
- MG William "Dog" Dobberteen (left)
- 2nd Plt. 1st Sqd PFC Bobby L. Asher (joined)
- 3rd Plt Sgt SSgt. Robert Culp (joined from G/3/1)
- 3rd Plt 3rd Sqd Paul "Scrap" Carlton (joined)

The H/3/1 July 1953 Monthly Personnel Roster shows the following men left the U.S.A. with the 30th draft in Feb. 1953. They probably arrived in Korea, and may have joined H/3/1, about this date. Some may have joined another company before joining H/3/1.

- 1st Lt. Charles Fimian 052035/0302
- 2nd Lt. Theodore J. Lutz Jr. 056516/0301
- PFC William W. Adams 1305899/0331
- PFC Roy C. Allen 1354650/0311
- PFC Michael J. Alvarez 1290630/0331
- Cpl Richard Battershell 1139501/0311
- Sgt Joseph C. Brown Jr. 1124110/3371
- PFC Wilson Cephas 1336009/0311
This was another nice sunny day. The 1st Platoon CP had two colored men, one a runner and the other a corpsman.

Several tanks again came up to the MLR to do some direct firing on selected targets. This was always a good news and bad news situation. While seeing the enemy get a heavy dose of fire, the repercussion was the incoming artillery and mortar fire they drew. Everyone in the vicinity took cover until the tanks left.

About this date Company supply was issuing a new and improved type of hand grenade. Previously, grenades were corrugated so that when they exploded they separated into many pieces of shrapnel. The new grenades were smaller but heavier and had a smooth surface. When they exploded they separated into many more pieces of shrapnel. The new grenades were detonated in the same way as the older model grenades (pulling the pin, letting the spoon go the ignite the fuse, etc.).

About this date (date unknown) PFC Billy Dean was involved in another friendly fire incident. The were on OP Hedy, a few hundred yards SW of Bunker Hill, and the trench line back to the MLR from OP Hedy was partly covered with timber and sand bags. Billy and a couple other Marines (one being Sgt. Paul Schick) were coming back to the MLR from Hedy. An artillery fire mission began firing in on the left flank of Bunker Hill. Just after Billy Dean, the last person in the column of returning Marines, passed a right turn in the trench line, a short round landed in the trench line, It caved in both sides of the trench and shot shrapnel up and down the trench line. Luckily Billy was far enough around the right turn that the shrapnel was stopped and only the blast got him.

About this date Cpl James E. Jones went on a reconnaissance patrol. It was a five-man patrol that carried a sound powered field telephone; an attached spool of wire, a PRC-9 radio, a WP (White Phosphorus) grenade, and their basic load.

The sound power would be used at check points to keep the CP informed of the patrol's progress. The radio would be used if they got hit to report the emergency. The WP grenade was to be used to reveal their position to friendly units if they were hit.

James was on the point and he was very careful to observe his front and sides during the patrol. He had a lonely feeling and, after a while, looked back to see no-one following him. He dropped to the ground and waited for what seemed to be five or ten minutes. Still no-one came. He backtracked his steps, with the fear that the gooks could have snatched the rest of his patrol. He came upon them wrestling with the spool of wire that had gotten entangled. The patrol members didn't want to break silence to signal James and in his haste, he was more concerned with what might have been in front of him.
The Marines used code names for the different types of patrols. A Rolls Royce was a body-snatching team. A Diesel was a combat patrol. A mercury was an ambush patrol.

One of James' favorite meals was ham and eggs B-1 unit. It was made by Universal Foldiro Box Co. in Hoboken, NJ. It included a can of apricots, a B-1 unit crackers, and candy. The cheese spread accessory packet included a plastic spoon, chewing gum, toilet paper, instant coffee, cream, substitute salt, sugar, and cigarettes.

C-rations came in different varieties (pork beans; frank beans, chicken noodles, etc., with samples (about four) smokes which may have been phillip morris, camels, luck strikes, and chesterfield). Everyone had their "handy dandy" can opener.

James Jones recalls that Cpl Dingleberry, with the 3rd machine gun section, was always firing harassing and interdiction missions. These interdiction fires are fired many times throughout the night in all sectors of the front. They are not usually directed at specific targets, but at possible areas of approach (e.g., gullies and obscure areas).

The Chinese had probed Bunker Hill and PFC Roy A. Hansen was wounded. Barman, PFC Richard Fall, carried Roy Hansen back to the MLR.

Richard Fall also wrote home this date to tell his parents that he (his unit) had returned from the OP Bunker Hill after being out there for nine days. They moved back to the MLR when another group relieved them on the outpost. They expected to be on the MLR for about four days and then go back on Bunker Hill.

After PFC Richard Fall got back to the MLR he went back out with a fire team to act as shotgun for a wireman who was laying some new wire. Richard, with his bar, was in charge and took the point. They had a re-enforced squad standing by on the MLR because they were told there were gooks in the area and were in danger of being ambushed. The mission was accomplished and they returned to the MLR with no casualties. He also spent some time on a listening post directing mortar fire on Chinese mortars. He thought he might be responsible for knocking out four of their mortars. He wrote about the day's activities while in the CP on phone watch while our tanks were outside blasting away at enemy positions. One of the tanks was hit by an enemy round.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 18, 1953

On this night the 1st Marine Regiment was opposed by forward elements of the 359th and 360th Regiments of the 120th Division, a non-organic division attached to the 46th CCF Army. The 358th Regiment of the 120th Division was located to the right of the 1st Marines in front of the 5th Marines. Two unidentified divisions of the 46th CCF Army were believed to be in depth behind the 120th Division. The enemy forces located immediately forward of the right battalion of the 1st Marines were estimated to be five infantry companies dug in on enemy-held critical terrain features. The closest points of static contact between enemy and friendly forces in this sector was forty meters forward of the friendly outpost "Hedy" (COP 124), two hundred meters northwest of the friendly outpost "Bunker" (COP 122A), three hundred and fifty meters northwest of the friendly outpost "Ginger" (COP 100), two hundred meters directly north of friendly outpost "Ester" (COP 56A), and five hundred meters directly north of the friendly outpost "Dagmar" (COP 52). There was not an excessive number of troop sightings or incoming artillery and mortar fire during the day and early evening hours. The only reports of any significance during this period were an observation at 1300 of two camouflage-vehicles at the vicinity of the grid coordinates 021053, an observation at 1812 of twenty enemy troops moving into position on "Three Fingers" (Hill 80 at coordinates 983032), and an observation at 2200 of seven yellow flares at three minute intervals at grid coordinates 925965. These reports were not considered indicative of any particular enemy course of action, but supported his capacity of continuing an active defense.

In the evening, routine patrols and listening posts were dispatched forward of the MLR. The enemy gave no indication of any special activity in the early evening hours. Enemy mortar and artillery fire was negligible. The weather was cool, clear, dry, with a first quarter moon and moonset at 0040 on Mar. 19th.

A G/3/1 combat patrol departed the MLR at 2000 and at 2110 this patrol made contact at grid coordinates 022044. The patrol completely surprised eight enemy troops in the
process of setting up an ambush on low ground as the G/3/1 patrol was moving on a high bluff overlooking them. The patrol employed hand grenades, small arms, automatic weapons, and directed 60mm fire on the enemy. The enemy returned small arms fire and after a five-minute firefight the friendly patrol broke contact and returned to the MLR. Enemy casualties were three counted KIA, two estimated KIA, and three estimated WIA. There were no friendly casualties. No attempt was made to recover or search the enemy bodies since the terrain was disadvantageous and would have caused the friendly patrol difficulty in returning to the MLR.

The entire sector remained quiet until the enemy made his probe later in the night. Only sporadic mortar fire was received in the 1st Marines Sector. This was almost routine for the first week on the MLR.

At 2305 H/3/1 reported 2 WIA and evacuated as a result of enemy 61mm mortar fire in the vicinity of 019038

THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 1953

A G/3/1 reconnaissance patrol was dispatched at 0005 with the mission of reconnoitering the area west of Esther (COP 56A). At 0105 the patrol made contact at coordinates 027048 with advance elements of an estimated enemy company. The friendly patrol employed small arms and automatic weapons and their surprise fire slowed the enemy long enough to allow the patrol to withdraw to Esther. The small arms fire led friendly forces on Bunker (COP 122A) to believe it was coming from Ginger (COP 100). Outposts Esther, Bunker, Hedy (COP 124), and H/3/1 were immediately put on 100% alert.

Almost Simultaneous with the contact, G and H/3/1 reported that Esther, Hedy, and Bunker received heavy enemy mortar and artillery fire. The enemy that had been encountered by the patrol, engaged Esther and a violent exchange of small arms, automatic weapons, and grenades ensued.

G/3/1 controlling Esther, called in 81mm mortars, 4.2 mortars, and artillery fire in support of Esther.

The enemy bombardment of G/3/1’s held Esther destroyed a section of wire entanglement sufficiently to give the enemy an avenue of access to the trenches and positions of the outpost.

When information of the enemy activity reached Regimental Headquarters, the following actions were taken. Tanks of Dog Company, 1st Tank Battalion, were ordered to 3/1 to support defense of the outposts and MLR at coordinates 021039, 028032, and 023043. A reinforced platoon of the reserve battalion (1/1) was ordered to move to 3/1’s CP. Armored personnel carriers were moved to 3/1’s forward aid station at grid coordinates 019035 to assist in evacuation of casualties. The regimental air officer also requested a flare plane.

While Esther, manned by 18 Marines, was engaged by the enemy and continued to receive heavy mortar and artillery fires, Hedy (at coordinates 014036) was attacked by an estimated company of Chinese on both flanks and the forward slope and the MLR in the vicinity of coordinates 016047 were engaged by an estimated enemy company at 0110. They were also subjected to intense mortar and artillery fire. Hedy, manned by a reinforced squad (18 Marines) of H/3/1’s 3rd Platoon, and the MLR sectors held their positions and the enemy was stopped at the wire entanglement by withering small arms and supporting fires. F/2/1, on H/3/1’s left flank, supported Hedy by fire. Wire entanglements, accurate small arms fire covering them, mortars (60, 81, and 4.2), and artillery once again proved to be the obstacles the enemy could not overcome and his attempts to overrun friendly positions was thwarted.

The action in the H/3/1 sector (Hedy and the MLR) at 0200 continued to follow the same pattern as on Esther. An estimated two more enemy platoons assaulted Hedy and the MLR at coordinates 019039 following heavy mortar and artillery fires.

The enemy followed the same pattern that he employed in previous assaults on the outposts. They moved across a tank road at, coordinates 015036, thus cutting off a possible reinforcement route. Once again accurate and deadly small arms fire and supporting mortar and artillery fire broke the back of the enemy effort.
At 0230, all enemy action broke off and reinforcements were rushed to Ester during the lull. The platoon from 1/1 that had arrived as reinforcements was used to reinforce H/3/1's MLR at 0415 and a provisional platoon from headquarters 3/1 was moved into the G/3/1 sector.

At Esther at 0320, the enemy, taking advantage of the breach in the wire entanglement, was able to get into the trenches and closed in hand to hand combat with the Marines. This penetration was short lived as once again deadly small arms fire and hand-to-hand combat repulsed the enemy and completely drove them from the outpost. Mortar and artillery fire was extremely effective in disorganizing and destroying any remaining enemy units.

Small arms and machinegun fire was requested from the left company of 1/5. The fire was directed on Hill 44 and its timely accurate delivery resulted in reducing enemy fires received from that vicinity.

A squad-sized patrol was dispatched at this time to sweep the area around Ester with the purpose of recovering enemy casualties. At 0620 G/3/1 reported enemy casualties as a result of the engagement was: 40 counted KIA, and 50 estimated WIA. Their friendly casualties were 7 KIA, 17 WIA (evacuated), and 10 WIA (not evacuated).

Two green flares were reported at 0315 at coordinates 008040.

At 0415, enemy fire became sporadic and it appeared that the enemy was withdrawing.

The patrol that was sent out to recover enemy casualties was recalled early to permit flare drops. It returned at 0500 with negative results.

At 0502 the flare plane commenced dropping flares on the MLR area.

One flare run was made with six flares being dropped before the plane was secured because it interfered with an early morning raid planned by 1/5 on the 1st Marines right. At 0540 the enemy again commenced an intense bombardment with mortar and artillery fires on Ester and the MLR. Under this covering fire and unknown number of enemy attempted to police the battleground. Once again accurate friendly small arms fire and supporting mortar and artillery forced the enemy to abandon his effort. Enemy fires slowed considerably by 0620 and at 0700 all enemy fires ceased. It was estimated that the enemy used 1700 rounds of mortar and artillery in this engagement. Four enemy bodies were left on Ester but a search for material of intelligence value on the bodies proved fruitless. The enemy carried no identifying documents and only two burp guns were recovered.

At 0800 the 1/1 platoon that had reinforced H/3/1 departed the company and reverted to parental control.

At 1945 another platoon from 1/1 arrived at Battalion and came under the operational control of the Battalion as a possible clutch platoon.

A recap of the casualties for the engagement is:

- Enemy - 40 counted KIA, 50 estimated KIA, and 65 estimated WIA
- Friendly - 7 KIA, 17 WIA (evacuated), and 10 WIA (non evacuated)

Friendly supporting arms fired the following number of rounds.

- 60mm mortar 2322
- 81mm mortar 816
- 4.2mm mortar 417
- Artillery 624
- 30 Caliber MG 250,000

Cpl James Alfred Illa and PFC Joseph W. Pierce (both in the Machinegun Platoon) were KIA this date while in a trench line on Hedy. James was from Stillwater, MN and is buried in Bayport, MN. Joseph was from Newark, NJ and is buried on Long Island, NY.

PFC Thomas J. Fitman was dropped from the Company.

Following is an account of the events that were told to the author by Bob Bosley about the death of Joseph Pierce.

Shortly after mail call Joseph Pierce was sitting in a bunker with Bob Bosley reading a letter from his girlfriend or wife. It was just after dark when he was looking at a silverware folder/brochure that he had received in the letter. The Silverware they were going to purchase was to be a wedding gift for someone. About this time they were attacked. Joseph dropped the brochure and letter and they all quickly moved from the living bunker to the next bunker over where a machinegun was set up. Living Bunkers and
the CP were on the forward slope next to the fighting bunkers. Pierce had his flak jacket on but it was not zipped up.

Bob Bosley manned his A4 machinegun while Joseph Pierce and another Marine went out of the machinegun bunker to man their fighting holes that were just outside the bunker. During the fight a round came in the aperture of the Machinegun bunker and hit the leg of the machinegun's tripod. It is a miracle that Bosley wasn't hit. Joseph Pierce wasn't so lucky. His fatal wound was in the middle of his chest, between his unzipped flak jacket.

Sgt Glynn Davenport was a non-battle casualty on this date.

FRIDAY, MARCH 20, 1953

Later last night, or early this morning, after the fighting stopped Bob Bosley found two unexploded (dud) hand grenades in the trench next to the door of the machinegun bunker door. They covered them over with sandbags to absorb the blast in case they exploded.

The Chinese knew exactly where the machinegun bunkers, ammo bunkers, fighting holes, aid bunkers, and etc. were. They had it all plotted out on a map that Bob Culp, the third Platoon Sgt., saw when the map was taken from a dead Chinese NCO. Bob Culp thinks they probably got the information from the South Korean laborers (sometimes called "Eidewas" or "Yobos") that came up to the line to help police the area. (Eidewa, or however you spell it, is Korean which means, "Come here").

A definite increase in enemy troop sightings and a slight increase of incoming artillery and mortar fire from over the previous day's total characterized enemy activity during the day and early evening. Observation of continuous enemy troop movement in both northern and southern directions was reported throughout the period. The most significant of the observations was a report at 1610 of 171 enemy with four carts moving south in column from coordinates 992045 to coordinates 996113 (Author's note: This does not appear to be a southerly movement. Could the coordinates be in error?). This increase of sightings was interpreted as an indication of enemy relief of lines or possibly reinforcement of his forward elements. This intelligence was disseminated to subordinate units for appropriate action.

The encounter of 20-21 March occurred in front of the F/2/1 sector. It was believed to have been another enemy effort designed to follow up the preceding night's activity.

F/2/1 dispatched a 21-man patrol to coordinates 007032. As the patrol was moving down a ridge on Hill 64, at coordinates 001030 at 2115, the point was fired upon by an estimated 25-30 enemy at coordinates 005031. It is believed this group of enemy was the advanced element of an enemy company probably advancing toward Hedy. The enemy employed the usual weapons they had used in previous encounters, small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades. Enemy machineguns located in the surrounding terrain also fired upon our patrol. The F/2/1 patrol deployed and returned small arms, automatic weapons fire, hand grenades, and direct mortar and artillery on the enemy. After a 21-minute sporadic firefight, the F/2/1 patrol broke contact, reassembled in a rice paddy at the base of Hill 64A, made a check of the area and returned to the MLR.

At 1630 H/3/1 reported 2 KIA and 2 WIA (evacuated) as a result of enemy 61mm mortar fire received in the vicinity of Hill 124 (Hedy). One of the KIA was likely Sgt Robert Smith who was KIA this date from shell fragments.

At 2145 a red flare was reported in the vicinity of coordinates 023048 and a white flare was reported in the vicinity of coordinates 017042.

Enemy casualties resulting from the initial contact were 8 confirmed KIA, 3 estimated KIA, 4 confirmed WIA, and 4 estimated WIA. Later sightings of the enemy were made in the surrounding area. The enemy was observed in groups of 10 to 20 as flashes of artillery VT barrages revealed them on Yoke (coordinates 001037), the Boot (coordinates 997031), and the Claw (coordinates 995035). Observation of the enemy troops amounted to an estimated enemy company in this area.

The F/2/1 platoon suffered 4 MIA and 2 WIA and at 2215 a platoon was dispatched to sweep the area of contact in an attempt to recover the 4 MIAs. A squad from B/1/1 was also sent to search the area.

For his action during this day (probably either in the early morning or evening
H/3/1's PFC Roy Feister received a Commendation Medal with Combat "V". The citation says that while serving as a stretcher bearer, PFC Feister displayed outstanding ability and professional skill. He aided in the expeditious evacuation of four seriously wounded Marines who were located on an outpost far forward of the main line of resistance (likely Hedy). For a distance of over three hundred yards he fearlessly rushed along an open tank road under heavy enemy barrage. Disregarding his personal safety he exposed himself to enemy sniper fire in order to assure that the critically injured men were carried to safety.

Meanwhile the following H/3/1 Marines were KIA on OP Hedy:
- PFC Ronald P. Ferguson of the 3rd Platoon
- Sgt Robert L. Smith (from Billings, MT) of the 3rd Platoon from shell fragments at Sogong-ni (Hedy or MLR).
- PFC Junior Frazier of the 3rd Platoon was also WIA and evacuated. He would die of his wounds on Mar. 21st. PFC James "Jim" Hilton and PFC Joseph "Joe" "Blackie" A. Flori both received a Letter of Commendation, with Combat V, for carrying Junior Frazier back to the MLR.

SATURDAY, MARCH 21, 1953

At 0355, H/3/1's ambush patrol ambushed 4 of the enemy in the vicinity of coordinates 015040 (about 500 yards south of Hedy). The patrol employed automatic weapons and small arms fire. At 0410 the patrol began returning to the MLR as the enemy began firing 61mm mortars at them. The patrol returned to the MLR at 1440 reporting that they enemy had 3 KIA and an estimated 1 WIA. There were no friendly casualties.

The F/2/1 platoon returned to the MLR at 0529 with bodies of 2 of the 4 MIA's. The B/1/1 squad returned at 0658 with negative results. The final casualty report for the patrol was 2 KIA, 2 MIA, and 2 WIA.

As a result of friendly artillery fire, the enemy suffered additional casualties of 5 counted KIA, 19 estimated KIA, and 53 estimated WIA.

Enemy activity during the day and early evening was characterized by no increase in troop sightings and no increase of incoming artillery and mortar fired over the previous day's totals. Significant reports were observation of 2 enemy green flares at coordinates 020040 at 2205, a confirmed report of enemy vehicles operating in the vicinity of coordinates 025055, a flash light observed at coordinates 015065 at 0450 and 2 red flares observed at coordinates 015042 at 2400. This intelligence was disseminated to subordinate units for appropriate action. All units were placed on 100% alert.

I/3/1 sent a combat patrol out at 2350 it was engaged by five enemy in the vicinity of coordinates 029049. The I/3/1 patrol was ordered to break contact and 60mm mortar and .50 caliber machinegun fire was directed on the enemy. No friendly casualties were suffered and no estimate was made of enemy casualties in this initial contact.

At 2353 H/3/1 reported 1 WIA (not evacuated) as a result of enemy 61mm mortar fire received in the vicinity of coordinates 016034 (apparently on the MLR).

The following H/3/1 Marines casualties occurred on this date.
- (KIA on Outpost Hedy) Jerome M. Daly (1st Platoon) was from Jackson Heights, NY and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.
- (DOW on Outpost Hedy) PFC Junior E. Frazier, of the 3rd Platoon, was from Doylesville, VA and is buried there.

Sgt. Paul Schick became listed as MIA. It has been reported that Paul left the trench line, started running toward the enemy firing a Thompson, and never returned. Many Marine riflemen had automatic weapons. Automatics were much preferred by Marines in the
trench line. The more lead an automatic could throw made it the preferred weapon over the semiautomatic M1 rifle. The Marines also kept their standard issue weapons because the Thompson was only good when the enemy was within short range (about twenty five yards). The Thompson that Paul Schick had when he was MIA was one he borrowed from PFC Billy Dean and PFC Fred Buxton apparently just before the below described action. Paul received the Silver Star Medal for his actions this night. His citation reads as follows:

“For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity while serving as a Squad Leader of Company H, Third Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea on 21 March 1953. With hostile troops overrunning the position during a savage enemy attack against a vital combat outpost which his platoon was defending far forward of the main line of resistance, Sergeant Schick courageously moved through the trench line and delivered a withering hail of deadly, accurate fire upon the enemy. When his sub-machine gun failed to fire, he quickly picked up an automatic weapon from a near-by wounded comrade and, continuing to move along the defensive line in the face of enemy fire, shouted words of encouragement to his comrades, hurled grenades and fired his weapon with exceptional accuracy, inflicting heavy casualties on the . enemy. By his aggressive fighting spirit, resourceful initiative and unyielding devotion to duty, Sergeant Schick served to inspire all who observed him and upheld the highest tradition of the United States Naval Service.”

PFC Roy C. Feister (3rd Platoon) was talking on the phone when a mortar shell exploded near him and wounded him with shrapnel in the cheek. He was evacuated and returned to the Company after recuperation.

SUNDAY, MARCH 22, 1953

At midnight the enemy commenced the bombardment of Hedy with mortar and artillery fire and then moved their fire to OP Bunker Hill at 0003. The enemy was duplicating his tactics of the night of Mar. 18-19. At the same time, 0005, Hedy was engaged by an estimated enemy reinforced platoon which penetrated the position. Marines closed in hand to hand combat with the enemy and repelled them.

On Bunker another estimated enemy reinforced platoon engaged the Marines with small arms, automatic weapons, hand grenades, and mortar and artillery fire. The enemy was moving to both OPs through his own preparatory fires as mentioned above. While he succeeded in getting into Hedy, the enemy failed to penetrate the position on Bunker, which was held by 32 Marines.

The defenders of Hedy and Bunker made effective use of small arms and automatic weapons in repulsing the enemy. The defensive fire of friendly mortars and artillery were very effective as in previous engagements.

On receipt of the first information of heavy enemy barrages falling on Hedy and Bunker, the regiment issued orders to move up various supporting and reserve elements. The provisional platoon from HQ 3/1 departed for H/3/1 at 0005. C/1/1 was ordered to occupy blocking position 6 in the vicinity of coordinates 022029. Dog Company, 1st Tank Battalion was ordered to proceed to H/3/1 sector. A flare plane was requested. A/1/1 was also alerted and at 0100 the 2/7 was alerted by Division and dispatched a liaison officer to the 1st Marines.

The enemy continued pressing the attack on Hedy and Bunker and then at 0008 heavy mortar and artillery fire was received in the H/3/1 sector of the MLR. At 0012 the fighting at Hedy and Bunker became so intense that a request for reinforcements was received from both outposts.

In the I/3/1 sector all was quiet until 0017 when Dagmar began receiving small arms fire from the vicinity of coordinates 035055. Since this fire was for a short period and no subsequent action followed, it is assumed the enemy was harassing this outpost. Support from the left company of 1/5 by small arms fire again assisted in quelling the enemy fire received from coordinates 035055.

At Hedy, marine marksmanship once again took its toll of the attacking enemy and at 0019 the fighting was reported slowing. At 0025 the enemy was completely repulsed from
Hedy but the outpost continued to receive heavy mortar and artillery fire.

Two green flares were reported at 0015 at coordinates 015042.

At 0020 the enemy launched another attack under the cover of mortar and artillery fire. This time it was an estimated enemy reinforced platoon attacking both flanks of H/3/1's MLR sector in the vicinity of 016036. OP Ginger (Hill 100) took under fire the enemy who were attacking the right flank of H/3/1's MLR position. There was no noted deviation in enemy tactics in this assault. He employed small arms and automatic weapons fire and moved in under his mortar and artillery fire to assault the MLR positions. The Marines employed small arms, automatic weapons, machinegun fire, and mortar and artillery to interdict the enemy. At 0047 enemy incoming fire was reduced to sporadic artillery weapons and small arms fire. The small arms fire covering wire obstacles in front of the MLR once again prevented the enemy from getting into H/3/1's positions. At 0050 enemy incoming fire ceased and the enemy in a rice paddy to the front of H/3/1's right flank continued to fire on friendly positions with automatic weapons and small arms. At 0058 all enemy fire ceased and the enemy withdrew.

At 0030 C/1/1 departed from the 1/1 CP and moved to blocking position 6 at coordinates 022029. The company was in position at 0132 and passed to control of 3/1.

Hedy reported that shelling and small arms fires had ceased at 0035. The same report was received from Bunker at 0044. Dog Company Tanks reported to be in position at coordinates 021039, 028032 in the H/3/1 sector at 0055. The enemy was reported to be policing the battlefield between the MLR and Bunker. They were taken under fire by small arms and automatic weapons.

Throughout the battle enemy activity in the area indicated the enemy had planned additional assaults on friendly positions.

At 0140 the enemy again subjected OP Bunker to heavy mortar and artillery fire, it was believed to be the prelude to another enemy attempt to overrun Bunker. Artillery, 4.2, 81mm, and 60mm mortar counter fires were called in and at 0142 enemy incoming fire on OP Bunker ceased.

In the meantime, the flare plane arrived on station and at 0135 commenced dropping flares. This procedure of illuminating by flares was continued through the remainder of the night. The enemy fires decreased with the release of the first flare. It is believed that the flares restricted enemy activity almost completely and definitely prevented any further attacks on our positions for the night. The flares also limited the enemy in his efforts to recover his casualties.

Two green flares were reported at 0142 from coordinates 099047 and one red flare was sighted at 0147 in the vicinity of 000039. At 0155 four green flares were sighted at coordinates 099047. It is believed these enemy flares signaled the attacking troops to break contact and to commence withdrawing.

The enemy finally broke contact and discontinued his efforts on the H/3/1 MLR at 0202. Enemy mortar and artillery also ceased at that time and the enemy made no further move.

Casualties for the engagement were as follows: enemy 28 counted KIA, 30 estimated KIA, 54 estimated WIA. The 28 KIAs were verified by observation plane at daybreak. The estimation of enemy casualties is a conservative figure and is based on early debriefing of personnel who were in the midst of the heavy fighting. Friendly casualties incurred were 1 MIA, 1 KIA, 6 WIA (evacuated), and 4 WIA (non evacuated). Our supporting arms fired the following number of rounds:

- 60mm mortars 1128
- 81mm mortars 482
- 4.2mm mortars 773
- artillery 473
- 30 Caliber MG 272,000

A newspaper article reported the Chinese attacked H/3/1's outpost Hedy early this morning. H/3/1 was manning Hedy during this period. The article said:

The Corridor to the gates of outpost Hedy last night burned like archways to the road to Hell.

Up the flame-lit path came a battalion of creeping Chinese Communists shrieking with
laughter. They wore sneaker shoes, yet they screamed, all 800 of them.

They wore burp guns at their breasts, hand grenades at their sides, with mortars on their backs.

And then they went away behind the smoke of their shells, screaming farewell to the Marines, who stood fast on the high ground above them. Over 1700 whistling shells covered their retreat.

"I'll never forget their screams - it seemed like they were laughing - a strange, weird, crazy laugh, said Marine T/Sgt James Coleman."

"I never heard or felt anything like it in my life."

At midnight, two platoons and communists reserve troops drove across Hedy's Ridge. Eight minutes later another Chinese force crept to the base of Bunker Hill, where others of their number, a full battalion, stuck forcibly just four days ago. They began to shell the hill to keep Marines heads down.

In other assaults, 12 minutes later a third and fourth force crept up to the nearby main line and opened up with burp guns.

"We never heard them come until a single grenade went off on our left," began 2nd Lt. Robert E. Lee. We sent up a flare and saw them swarming up over the hill. We opened up with everything we had."

The 23-year-old Lt. Robert E. Lee from Vancouver, WA, Commands Outpost Hedy—a slim 40 yards from Communist positions. He added, "Some of them were just five yards away. And you could look right at them and they were screaming at you. They tossed a volley of grenades and some of them came slipping and sliding right into the trenches with us—Yelling."

The young commander vividly recalled the fight over the field phone. He was still on the beleaguered hill and it was almost impossible to reach him on foot because the waiting Chinese were picking off daylight visitors.

"I saw at least 40 of them pushing and shoving their way up," said Lee, "It was too late, so we had to kill them at a five to ten yard distance."

At 12:40 A.M. much of the shelling ceased and the men suddenly realized the Chinese had fled.

END OF FIRST ARTICLE

Another article, written by PFC Jim Morrisey, of what was undoubtedly the same action read: It was just like any other night then the moon went down.

Just before midnight the moon faded away, and darkness engulfed no-man's land. But for the next 50 minutes there was to be plenty of light as a Marine unit drove an invading Chinese battalion from the slopes of Marine outposts, Bunker Hill and Hedy.

2nd Lt. Robert E. Lee, Vancouver, WA, said the silence was shattered right at midnight by a blast of a grenade in front of Hedy. Before anyone could pinpoint the blast, all hell broke loose.

Seconds after the initial explosion was heard, 1,700 rounds of mortar and artillery rocked the area from Bunker Hill to Hedy as four Red companies attacked from different directions under the protection of the artillery umbrella.

"They charged up the slopes right under their own fire, Lee said. "I didn't see the first group until they were only 5 yards from us."

When the raiding party was discovered, a light machinegun cut down the leaders of the assault. They threw everything they had at the gun, but it kept firing throughout the night.

One Chinese platoon moving around the left flank of Hedy toward the MLR was chopped to pieces by machinegun and small arms fire from the Marines trench-lines on the MLR.

After several minutes of bitter fighting, the Chinese raiders slid over the muddy trench-line but were soon driven out in a point-blank small arms and grenade duel. One Communist body bearing 15 magazines of burp gun ammunition was recovered the next day a few yards in front of the lines.

As the heavy artillery fire continued to saturate the allied lines, a relief unit crawled up the muddy slopes to drive the invaders away with small arms fired. PFC Juan
Evaro, Camlemesa, NM, took out three enemy with his BAR when he reached the top of the hill.

"I reckon they saw us coming, because they sure threw the mortars in on us," Evaro said. "But when we made it to the top they started to leave."

The Communists' supporting fire withered as fire-bearing planes and illumination artillery rounds turned the darkness into daylight.

When the crippled Chinese invaders retreated from the hill there were 28 among them who wouldn't fight no more.

END OF SECOND ARTICLE

PFC Juan Evaro apparently was also a radioman because Bob Culp, the Platoon Sgt., remembers being on Hill 229 or perhaps Hedy and the radioman, Evaro, was just outside the Platoon CP bunker operating the radio. Culp told Evaro to get in the bunker because the radio would operate inside the bunker. Soon thereafter, a round landed where Evaro had been standing. The next morning the sandbag Evaro was standing on was nonexistent. Bob Culp had saved his life by telling him to get inside.

At 1845 H/3/1 was reinforced by 1 platoon from H&S/3/1.

At 2010, one reinforced company and one reinforced platoon from 1/1 came under operational control of 3/1.

PFC Floyd S. Ellison Jr. and PFC Jack Lavite were dropped from H/3/1 on this date. (reason unknown-WIA?)

MONDAY, MARCH 23, 1953

At 1439 H/3/1 reported 1 WIA (not evacuated) as a result of enemy sniper fire received in the vicinity of Hill 122A.

At 1630 H/3/1 reported 1 WIA (not evacuated) as a result of enemy sniper fire received in the vicinity of coordinates 018037 (probably on the MLR).

At 1855 H/3/1 was reinforced with 1 platoon from H&S/3/1.

At 1930 one reinforced platoon from 1/1 arrived at Battalion and came under operational control of 3/1.

PFC Junior C. Denney of the 1st Squad, 3rd Platoon was WIA by a sniper. The slug went through his helmet and creased the left side of his head.

TUESDAY, MARCH 24, 1953

At 0015 H/3/1 reported 3 enemy approaching a friendly listening post at coordinates 014043. Friendly troops opened fire with automatic weapons. The enemy returned fire with sub machine guns and withdrew with 2 enemy estimated WIA. There were no friendly casualties.

At 0745 the H&S/3/1 platoon that was sent to H/3/1 last night returned to Battalion.

About 1000 Lt. Henry Schlueter and PFC Richard "Dick" Fall were near an ammo bunker on New Bunker Hill discussing PFC Junior Denney who was wounded yesterday by a sniper. They were considering the possibility of having Dick set up before dawn to see if he could get the sniper. About this time, only a foot away from PFC Dick Fall, Lt. Henry Schlueter fell dead from the sniper's bullet. The company reported Henry's death on Hill 122A to Battalion at 1250.

1st Lt. Henry F. Schlueter, Platoon Leader of the 2nd Plt., was from Abie, NE and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 25, 1953

At 2345 a H/3/1 listing post in the vicinity of coordinates 016043 (about 200 yards north of Hedy) reported observing an estimated 25 enemy in the vicinity of Hill 122A (Bunker Hill). The listening post fired automatic weapons and the enemy threw grenades as they withdrew. Enemy casualties were 4 KIA and there were no friendly casualties.
During this night, a series of skirmishes broke out in the 1st Marines sector between two-or-three platoon size Chinese infantry forces and Marine outpost defenders. The CCF attacked Hill 229. About the same time they were also hitting hard on Bunker Hill, Reno, Carson and Vegas.

THURSDAY, MARCH 26, 1953

During the day and early evening hours enemy activity was characterized by a slight increase in enemy movement. The only indication of enemy attack during the period were observations made of enemy with packs moving south at coordinates 000038, 986036, and 953033 at 1800. This intelligence was immediately disseminated to subordinate units for appropriate action.

The fourth enemy attack against the 1st Marines occurred on this night. The enemy attacked four outposts but his main effort was directed at Dagmar. These attacks coincided with attacks on Reno, Carson, and Vegas, Berlin, and East Berlin in the 5th Marine sector.

2nd Lt. Harvey Lindsay was in good spirits when he wrote home. He told about the first hot meal (steak) he had in two weeks. He also got a haircut and had a clean change of clothes.

At 1900 Dagmar (COP 52) and I/3/1 sector of the MLR received heavy mortar and artillery fire. An estimated reinforced platoon commenced the attack on Dagmar at his time and engaged the outpost with small arms, automatic weapons, hand grenades, satchel charges, and bangalort torpedoes. Intense enemy machinegun fire from Hills 44, 114, and 116 supported the attack. The 27 Marines occupying Dagmar returned small arms, automatic weapons fire, and called in Mortar and artillery fire. The enemy succeeded in breaching the wire entanglements on Dagmar and an estimated 25 enemy penetrated the defenses on the outpost. The Marines engaged the enemy with small arms fire and hand to hand combat. Supporting arms continued firing in support of the outpost with "box me ins" that proved effective.

At 2200, Bunker was subjected to mixed artillery, 82mm, 61mm, sub machine gun, and small arms fire. An estimated reinforced squad attacked each outpost. The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades. The Marine defenders employed similar weapons and called for mortar and artillery. Enemy casualties were 5 counted KIA and 4 estimated WIA. Friendly casualties were 1 WIA (evacuated) and 2 WIA (not evacuated).

Also at 2200 Hedy (Hill 124) was receiving 61mm, sub machine gun, and small arms fire. This enemy enemy fire was covering the advance of another estimated enemy reinforced squad. Our troops returned fire and called in artillery, 81mm, 61mm mortar, and .50 caliber machine gun fire. At 2135 the enemy withdrew. Enemy casualties

H/3/1 also had 1 WIA (evacuated) and 3 WIA (not evacuated) on the MLR.
G/3/1's Ester was attacked by and estimated two reinforced enemy squads at 2010. The usual small arms, mortar, and artillery fire was used by the enemy. The marines countered with small arms, mortars, and artillery in repelling the enemy. At 2120 the enemy broke contact and withdrew from Ester with no estimate of enemy casualties.

The provisional platoon from 1/1 arrived at coordinates 024037 at 2015 and came under operational control of 3/1.

Back at Dagmar the Marines held their ground and fought off the enemy efforts to overrun the outpost. At 2120 the enemy broke contact and withdrew. Enemy incoming fire was reduced to sporadic 82mm and 61mm mortar fire. The enemy suffered 9 counted KIA and 11 estimated WIA. Friendly casualties were 4 KIA and 13 WIA (evacuated).

I/3/1 also had 1 KIA and 8 WIA (evacuated) on their MLR.

The enemy broke contact and withdrew from Bunker and Hedy at 2135. The enemy suffered 5 counted KIA and 4 estimated WIA on Bunker. They also suffered an estimated 3 WIA on Hedy.

H&S/3/1's communications section had 1 WIA (evacuated) and 1 WIA (not evacuated) as a result of enemy artillery or mortar fire received in the vicinity of I/3/1's Command Post. This was the limit of enemy activity for the night in the 1st Marines Sector. As a precaution, 3/1/1 was moved into blocking position 6 at 2230.

As stated above, the CCF resumed their attack of yesterday. This coincided with what
developed into a massive regimental assault unleashed against Carson, Reno, and Vegas. Carson, Reno, and Vegas had previously been called Allen, Bruce, and Clarence respectively. There, the 5th Marines would shortly be the target of the bloodiest Chinese attack to date on the 1st Mar. Div. in western Korea. Although the Nevada Hills were where the main battles raged, reverberations ran through the nearly 10,000 yards of Division front from the two Berlins, 1000 yards east of Vegas, to COP Hedy, midpoint in the 1st Marines sector. During this period there were about 1,000 Marine casualties (KIAs or WIAs).

PFC Larry A. Carella was listed KIAs on this date and were probably involved in the above-described action. Larry was from New York, NY and is buried there. He probably was in W/3/1 and attached to H/3/1 at the time of his death.

FRIDAY, MARCH 27, 1953

Precautions were taken to have additional troops in a standby status and A/1/1 arrived at blocking position six at 1925. A provisional platoon from 1/1 was in position at coordinates 021036 (on the reverse slope of Bunker Hill) at 1925. Both were under operational control of 3/1.

At 2344 Dagmar was attacked by an estimated 2 reinforced enemy platoons. The attack was supported by mortar and artillery fire as the enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons and hand grenades. Heavy volume of machinegun fire from hills 44, 114, and 116 again supported the enemy attack. The friendly small arms, automatic weapons, machinegun fire, and were supported by mortar and artillery fires. The supporting fires were "boxing in" the outpost in addition to firing on the approaches to the outpost.

Two enemy squads also milled around the wire defense at COP Kate, defended by B/1/1, but Marine small arms, BARs, and mortars routed them after a 15 minute fire fight.

SATURDAY, MARCH 28, 1953

Last night, just before midnight, at 2352 the enemy had penetrated outpost Dagmar and fighting was reported in the trenches. After twenty minutes of close combat the Marines called for "VT" on position at 0012. The Marines used "crab holes" for individual protection during the VT barrage. These "crab holes" gave the Marines protection from the VT and permitted them to come out fighting when the barrage lifted. Coordination between the outpost and the artillery forward observer was outstanding in that additional VT was used and the Marines on the outpost were given an "on the way" by the forward observer and had time to get into their crab holes before the rounds hit the outpost. At 0030 more VT was requested for the forward slope of Dagmar to interdict the enemy as he was trying to reinforce.

The outpost was reinforced at 0100 by a nine-man ambush patrol that was scheduled to move out in front of COP 50A. Close coordination with the patrol and Company CP enabled the nine men to enter Dagmar safely with one side of the boxing fire was lifted.

The friendly mortar, artillery, and small arms fire was too much for the enemy and at 0122 they withdrew completely from Dagmar. Enemy casualties were 15 counted KIA, 25 estimated KIA, and 25 estimated WIA.

At 2000 an advanced detail of 20 men from A/1/1 arrived at H/3/1 and came under operational control of 3/1.

Again this night the enemy harassed Hedy, using as cover an abandoned Marine tank just east of the outpost. They also harassed the MLR to the rear of COP Bunker. In both actions, Marine small arms and mortars dictated a quick retreat of the enemy.

About this date some of the Marines were coloring their grenades with Easter egg colors to give the enemy a special egg.

Capt. Carl R. Gray was dropped from H/3/1 on this date.

Capt. John J. Zulkofske replaced Capt. Carl R. Gray as the Company CO

SUNDAY, MARCH 29, 1953

at 0300 H/3/1 reported receiving 61mm mortar fire in the vicinity of 018037 (on the
H/3/1 MARINES

IN KOREA

MLR) and machine gun and small arms fire from an estimated enemy squad in the vicinity of Hill 122. Our troop in the vicinity of 018037 (MLR) sighted an estimated enemy squad in the vicinity of 018049 (1200 yards north) (Author's note: The enemy were possibly at coordinates 018039 (200 yards north) because there was close combat with the enemy and they could not have been 1200 yards away). Our troops called in 81mm and 60mm mortar and machine gun fire. At 0305 the enemy ceased firing and withdrew with 5 estimated WIA. There were no friendly casualties.

Summary of operations for the previous ten days is as follows.

It is believed that the five actions are closely related and comprise a portion of the enemy's plans as divulged by a POW who was captured on Feb. 11, 1953. The POW indicated that limited objective attacks would be attempted in the area of the above-described contacts and that the attacks would be in increasing strength. Documents removed from enemy dead on Dagmar established the 3rd Battalion, 360th CCF Regiment as being involved in the attacks on the right. It is believed that unit conducted all attacks on the right. The heavy flare activity on Yoke (coordinates 000038), the patrol contact on Hill 64A, and the direction of the attacks tend to indicate that the 1st Battalion, 360th, and the reserve battalion located behind them were engaged in the attacks on Bunker, Hedy, and the MLR. These abortive attempts at dislodging us from the outposts resulted only in decimation of one regiment of the 120th CCF Division.

Our initial reaction to the increased enemy activity left something to be desired in that there was a paucity of information flowing from the lower echelons. The morning following the first action the Regimental Commander held a conference with the Executive Staff and all unit commanders. The purpose of the conference was to point out omissions in timely reporting and to improve staff procedures. The volume and accuracy of reports during the ensuing action was improved to a great degree and proved the value of the conference.

The intensive period of small unit training while in reserve paid great dividends in the five actions. Accurate small arms fire greatly served to stem the enemy attacks. Fire control and discipline were excellent. Numerous examples of excellent small unit leadership highlighted all actions.

A most important combat lesson was learned in the engagement of Dagmar. It proved the effectiveness of "Crap Holes" as an effective individual protective fortification and a springboard to action against the enemy when the "VT" barrage lifted.

The success of the conduct of the defense in the actions reaffirmed the value of well-integrated fire plans.

It is believed that the defense of Dagmar provides an outstanding example of small-unit leadership and the results that can be achieved with proper use of supporting arms. When the heavy shelling on the forward slopes of the position commenced, the outpost commander withdrew his force to the reverse slope trenches and set up automatic weapons covering the crest and the trenches. He called in continuous VT fires on his position, and had his Marines man their crab holes on being given an "on-the-way". On being reinforced he took half the force, advancing up the trench-line on one side while the remainder of the force used the other side of the trench. The counterattacking force cleared the enemy from the forward trench by calling VT on the forward slopes of the position, taking cover on "on-the-way", throwing grenades, and advancing. This technique was repeated until all the enemies were killed or withdrew and the position was successfully reestablished.

The enemy's instructions to his troops during the fight indicate his respect for wire and other obstacles. Wire must be laid in greater quantities than was true of the wire on Esther to withstand heavy bombardment. All positions should be wired in with a minimum of two double aprons on either side of the fifteen-foot triangle wire. Wire, to be effective, must be covered by fire.

The role of the patrols in two of the actions prevented the enemy's catching us off guard. It also further emphasizes their importance in maintaining the initiative in a defensive situation.

For this ten-day period the 1st Marines inflicted the following casualties: 110 counted KIA, 127 estimated KIA, 4 counted WIA, and 215 estimated WIA. The 1st Marines suffered 3 MIA, 14 KIA, 38 WIA, and 8 WIA non-effectives.
In defense of the outposts and MLR the 1st Marines expended 11,932 rounds of mixed mortars and 6,031 rounds of artillery. The enemy fired approximately 7,400 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery in his attacks.

2nd Lt. Harvey Lindsay took out a night patrol but made no contact with the enemy. SSgt Robert E. Breathitt and PFC Leonard Hanks were dropped from the Company on this date.

MONDAY, MARCH 30, 1953

At 2005 H/3/1 reported that they were receiving sub machine gun fire from an estimated 5 enemy and machine gun fire from the vicinity of Hill 122. Our troops called in artillery and 81mm mortar fire. At 2007 the enemy ceased firing.

Lt. Lindsay noted that when the activity picks up as it had in the last couple weeks, you can't seem to relax enough to write a letter. He said the spirit of the men was good. He had little faith in what the newspapers were saying. With the initial exaggeration and the glorifying of it by the newsmen, it was hard to believe what was said. He felt that the article that quoted Gen. Van Fleet as saying, "They do not have enough ammunition if the Chinese make a large scale offensive." was probably informative to the Chinese and appreciated by the troops on the line.

One night, (probably not this night but shortly before) Lindsay was on Hedy, just forty yards away from the Chinese in their positions over they crest. This was part of his six-day stay on the outpost. Before he knew it the Chinese were atop his bunker. He called mortars and VT on his own position and the troops got down in their crab holes. The Chinese were forced to withdraw due to the mortar fire and a rescue squad that was sent from the MLR.

PFC Ernest W. Yehle Jr. was in the 2nd Platoon when he was wounded. He was taken to the USS Haven in Inchon Harbor where he died of wounds. Ernest was from Flint, MI and is buried in Lowell, MA.

TUESDAY, MARCH 31, 1953

Troops from A/1/1 arrived at Hills 124 (Hedy) and 122A (Bunker) arrived at 0215 and to relieve 50% of the H/3/1 personnel. This relief was completed at 0300 on Hill 124 and 0506 on Hill 122A.

During the relief H/3/1 had a reconnaissante patrol out and at 0454 they reported 25 enemy digging on the forward slope of Hill 124 (Hedy). Our troops called in 4/2 and 60mm mortar fire and the enemy dispersed with an estimated 6-10 WIA.

More troops from A/1/1 arrived at Hills 124 at 2300 and the relief of H/3/1 personnel was completed at 2345. Troops from A/1/1 arrived at Hill 122A at 2400 and relief was completed at 0115 on Apr. 1, 2004.

At 2235 a reconnaissante patrol from H/3/1 made contact with an estimated 4-5 enemy in the vicinity of coordinates 019041 (north of their position on the MLR). The enemy threw hand grenades and fired sub machine guns. Our troops returned the fire with automatic weapons. At 2240 the enemy broke contact with 1 estimated WIA. There were no friendly casualties.

A medical summary for the month of March 1953 follows:

Four hundred and three (403) patients visits comprised the bulk of the work of the medical section; one hundred and six (106) men were evacuated; forty four (44) casualties were not evacuated; and twenty two men were KIA. Two (2) non-battle casualties were evacuated and 19 non battle casualties were not evacuated. Due to disease 6 men were evacuated and 54 were not evacuated. Eight casualties were not evacuated due to VD. One neuro-psychiatric patient was evacuated. Eighty men were general medical patients. one dermatology patient, 1 man general surgery, five ____ patients, and 71 eye, ear, nose, and throat patients.

Immunization was not administered nor required during this period. The following changes in battalion medical personnel are shown below:

Dr. Robert Owen was relieved by Dr. M. J. McCarthgan on 3/14/53
IN KOREA

H/3/1  MARINES

Dr. Robert Maxeiner was relieved by Dr. Robert Hass on 3/21/53
Dr. Owens reported to Ascom City to take up his new duties
Dr. Maxeiner reported to Dog Medial Company as his new assignment

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 1, 1953

Lt. Col. Lowell E. English relieved Lt. Col. Ernest G. Atkin, Jr. as CO of the 3/1. About this date some Marines, including PFC Junior Denney received letters that were race-related from Hot Springs, AR. The apparent intent of the letters was to create racial unrest.

At 1050, elements of A/1/1 commenced relief of Hill 122A. At 0500 Hill 122A reported receiving semi-automatic fire from the vicinity of Coordinates 016041. Friendly forces used small arms fire to cause an estimated 2 enemy casualties. There were no friendly casualties.

At 1035 the heavy machine gun personnel from W/1/1 arrived in the Battalion area and commenced relief of W/3/1's machine guns which was completed at 1132. Meanwhile 81mm mortars were being relieved.

THURSDAY, APRIL 2, 1953

At 0032 A/1/1 commenced relief of H/3/1. At 0240 A/1/1 assumed responsibility for the H/3/1 sector.
At 0207 2/1 assumed responsibility of the 3/1 sector. 3/1 closed the old CP in the vicinity of coordinates 047029 and opened the new CP at coordinates 047013 (Camp Meyers).
3/1 went into regimental reserve at coordinates 047013 (Camp Meyers) and H/3/1 left the line last night and this morning. They weren't far back from the front because they could still see the action but at least they were more comfortable. They would be in regimental reserve until April 15th. While in reserve the Battalion was engaged in the improvement and maintenance of strong points on Hills 229 and 181 and the Wyoming Line. Three rear area surveillance patrols were dispatched daily while in reserve.

Also during the time 3/1 was in reserve they dispatched 1 provisional reinforced platoon each evening. Their mission was to reinforce 1/1 in the event of an attack. The platoon returned to the Battalion each morning.
During the month of April the Battalion continued to send representative to various Division schools. Fourteen enlisted were sent to the NCO School and 8 enlisted to the Machine Gun School.

FRIDAY, APRIL 3, 1953

The Battalion began shakedown and making minor changes to improve the existing facilities of the new Battalion area.
A weapons inspection was conducted for H/3/1 by the Regimental Commander from 1300-1630.

SATURDAY, APRIL 4, 1953

H/3/1 had commander's time this day. This usually meant that personnel were allowed to square away their gear and area.

SUNDAY, APRIL 5, 1953

The Battalion completed the shakedown of the new Battalion area.
H/3/1's plan of the day called for:
0800-0900 Troup inspection and drill in the Company area
0900-1000 school on first aid for Battle casualties
1000-1430 Divine services in the Chapel
1430-1630 camouflage & camouflage discipline in the training area
UN representatives and the Communist delegation sat down at the Panmunjom truce tents to resume the peace talks that had been stalemate for six months. If there was a word that could be said to reflect the attitude of American officials, private citizens and the atmosphere at Panmunjom, it was caution, not optimism. It had been a weary dialogue and diatribe, and then ultimate plateaus of intransigence that had marked negotiations with Communist leaders since the original truce discussions had begun in July 1951.

3/1 had embarked on a program of training.

H/3/1 was scheduled for the following training:

- 0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
- 0900-1130 Company commander's time
- 1300-1630 fire team formations for rifle platoons
- 1300-1630 mortar gun drill for mortar section
- 1400-1500 Gun exercises for Machine Gun Platoon
- Terrain Appreciation (Fields of fire, routes, selection of ground)

The Battalion was responsible for training of the new replacement draft personnel that were assigned to the 1st Marine Regiment. At 1245 personnel from the 3rd Replacement Battalion assigned to the 1st Marines, commenced arriving in the Battalion area by truck. At 1330 the arrival of replacements was complete. The replacements were billeted in tents and served a hot meal from the Battalion messing facility. The replacements were divided into 3 companies, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd which would go to the respective battalions after their training.

Because the tactical situation on the MLR had worsened, H/3/1 was placed on a 15 minute alert.

At 0545 H/3/1 was taken off the 15 minute standby alert.

H/3/1 was scheduled for the following training:

- 0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
- 0900-1130 BAR (nomenclature, functioning, care, cleaning) (rifle platoons)
- LMG M1919A4 (functioning, care, cleaning) (MG Plt)
- 60mm mortar (functioning, sight setting, care, cleaning) (mortar Plt)
- 1300-1630 Conditioning march
- 1300-1630 map and compass reading

Lt. Harvey Lindsay was the Company Commander of the 2nd Company of new replacements that would be training for the next five days. TSgt D. H. Moore, SSgt J. Gaza, and Sgt B. Correia were his platoon Sergeants of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd platoons respectively. The Division's policy was to keep the men back five days for training before going on line. During this time they would get oriented to the situation and get broken in before going into battle.

The new replacements received the following training:

- 0800-1000 company commander's time
- 1000-1100 current orders and messages
- 1100-1200 organization of the 1st Marine Division
- 1300-1400 close order drill
- 1500-1600 Escape and evasion
- 1600-1700 theater orientation
- 1830-2230 night patrols and ambushes

At 0115 I/3/1 (reinforced) was alerted to standby and at 0210 they departed the Battalion area for the 1/1 sector. They returned at 0533.

At 0653 H/3/1 (reinforced) was alerted to standby and at 0855 they were secured from
the alert.
At 1655, an advanced detail of one officer and 18 enlisted men from H/3/1 departed the Battalion area for the 2/1 sector of the MLR and came under operational control of 2/1 at 1710.

Advanced details from the rifle companies departed from the Battalion area for the 2/1 sector of the MLR. These details consisted of, on an average, 1 officer and 18 enlisted. It was their mission to familiarized themselves with the positions, terrain, and patrol routes of the 2/1 sector. When the Battalion assumed responsibility of this sector of the MLR the advanced details instructed their respective units in the situation then existing.

H/3/1 was scheduled for the following training:
0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
0900-1130 fire Team tactics and patrolling
1300-1630 company commander's administrative time
2000-2400 night patrols and ambushes

The replacements received the following training:
0530-0630 physical drill
0800-1200 range firing
1300-1400 Close order drill
1400-1700 map anc compass reading
1830-2230 night patrols and ambushes

THURSDAY, APRIL 9, 1953

Routine day.
H/3/1 was scheduled for the following training
0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
0900-1130 LMG M1919A4 (functioning, care, cleaning (rifle Platoons)
0900-1130 .50 Cal. MG (nomenclature, functioning, characteristics (MG Plt)
0900-1130 gun drill (mortar section)
1300-1630 conduct of squad in ambush and combat patrol

The replacements received the following training:
0530-0630 physical training
0730-0830 troop inspection and drill
0830-1130 wire entanglements and wire laying
1300-1400 camouflage and camouflage discipline
1400-1500 cold and hot weather training and indoctrination
1500-1630 MLR procedures and routines
1800-1930 bayonet drill

FRIDAY, APRIL 10, 1953

Routine day.
At 1700, an I/3/1's reinforced provisional platoon was sent to 1/1 for the night. Another provisional platoon (from unknown company) left at 1840 for 1/1.

H/3/1 was scheduled for the following training:
0900-1000 first aid and personnel hygiene
1000-1130 thompson sub machine gun (nomenclature, functioning, characteristics)
1300-1630 company commander's time
1300-1630 Machine gun drill (MG platoon)
1300-1630 gunners test (mortar sections)
2000-2400 night patrols and ambushes

The replacements training was as follows:
0530-0630 physical drill
0730-0830 troop inspection and drill
0830-1130 principles of fire team-squad in the defense
1300-1500 mine field identification and conduct
1500–1700 combat training of the individual soldier and patrolling
1830–2300 conditioning hike

SATURDAY, APRIL 11, 1953

At 0640 I/3/1's reinforced platoon returned from 1/1 and at 0715 the other provisional platoon returned.

Routine day (company commander's administrative time)
The replacements had the following training:

0530–0630 physical drill
0730–0830 troop inspection and drill
0830–1000 bayonet drill
1000–1100 enemy tactics
1100–1200 supply discipline

At 1300 the replacement battalion completed their training. Those assigned to 1/1 and 2/1 and regimental headquarters embarked on trucks to be taken to their respective units. Those remaining in the 3rd Battalion were assigned to companies.

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

3rd Plt. Ldr Lt. James Jim Nugent (left)
Joseph Doc Candilora (joined)
PFC Charles C. Westlake, 1221649/0311 is shown on the July 1953 Monthly Personnel Roster as leaving the states in March 1952. If this is not a mistake, he probably arrived in Korea about April 1952. It is also possible that there is a typing error and Charles left the U.S.A. in March 1953 and arrived in Korea about this date.

2nd Lt. Carl E. Lindquist Jr. (joined)
2nd Lt. Gregg F. Moses (joined)
2nd Lt. Louis G. Proctor (joined)
Sgt Charles Beckemeyer
PFC Ronald H. Bowman (joined)
PFC Erwin H. Boyer (joined)
2nd Plt PFC Eugene Finley Bradford (joined)

(According to the H/3/1 Reunion Group Personnel Roster, Eugene thought he might have arrived in Korea earlier (Oct. 1952).

Cpl Joseph Brady (joined)
PFC Leardis Brewer (joined)
PFC Clayton J. Broadway (joined)
PFC Donald C. Brown (joined)
PFC Loutellis D. Brown (joined)
Cpl John H. Buentello (joined)
PFC Julian J. Bullard Jr. (joined)
PFC Jasper M. Bullock (joined)
PFC Charles S. Cameron (joined)
PFC Arvey L. Campbell Jr. (joined)
PFC James E. Capps (joined)
PFC Jessie B. Caraveo (joined)
3rd Plt. Ldr PFC Paul Carlton (joined)
3rd Plt. Ldr PFC Joseph L. Carter (joined)
3rd Plt. Ldr PFC Jerry Castronuove (joined)
3rd Plt. 3rd Sqd PFC Robert L. Cawley (joined)
PFC Alfred S. Hanson (joined)
PFC Ellis L. Little (joined)
Sgt Leonard G.(or C.) Shank (joined)
Cpl John W. Stafford (joined)

At 1847 a provisional platoon (company unknown) departed the Battalion for 1/1.

SUNDAY, APRIL 12, 1953
Routine day (company commander's administrative time).
At 0640 the provisional platoon returned.
At 0945 H/3/1, reinforced, as part of the Rescue Task Force, departed the Battalion area for 2/1 and came under their operational control at 1016. They returned to the Battalion area at 1125 and parental control. At 1355 H/3/1's advanced detail, composed of 1 officer and 14 enlisted, departed the Battalion area enroute to 2/1 and came under their operational control at 1415.

MONDAY, APRIL 13, 1953

Routine day. At 1430 a H/3/1 advanced detail, composed of 2 officers and 12 enlisted, departed the Battalion area enroute to 2/1 and came under their operational control at 1450.
H/3/1 was scheduled for the following training:
0800-0900 inspection and drill
0900-1130 neutrality inspection plan and exams
1300-1630 live firing (test fire and check sight settings)
1830-2130 small unit patrolling and LP (rifle platoons)
1830-2130 night firing (machine gun platoons)
1830-2130 night firing problem (mortar section)

TUESDAY, APRIL 14, 1953

H/3/1 was scheduled for the following training:
0800-0900 inspection and drill
0900-1000 use of 60mm mortar in defensive combat
1000-1130 use of artillery in defensive combat
1300-1630 Company commander's administrative time
1830-2130 small unit patrolling
Advanced details from companies moved to 2/1 starting at 0500.
On this day and April 15th the Battalion relieved 2/1 on positions. The ease and speed with which this operation was completed may be attributed to the groundwork laid by the advanced parties. Throughout the relief active patrolling was continued forward of the MLR.
I/3/1 moved to the 2/1 positions at 1950.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 15, 1953

At 1410, thirty seven enlisted from H/3/1 departed the Battalion area enroute to 2/1
At 1545 the Battalion closed the old reserve area (coordinates 047013 (camp Meyers)) and opened the new CP at coordinates 023007. At 1545 assumed responsibility of their sector of the MLR at 1545. It also had the operational control of E/2/1.
At 1600, fifty seven enlisted from H/3/1 closed the Battalion area and came under 3/1 control. At 1945 H/3/1 (-) departed 2/1 area enroute to 3/1 and came under their control at 2007. At 2007 H/3/1 commenced relief of F/2/1 and the relief was completed at 2225 and they assumed responsibility for their section of the MLR. At 2313 F/2/1 cleared the Battalion area.
Active patrolling forward of the MLR was conducted throughout the remainder of the month. One combat patrol was sent out each night until April 24th, after which 2 combat patrols were dispatched nightly. At least 6 reconnaissance patrols were sent forward of the MLR nightly. The patrols made frequent contacts with the enemy. The Battalion averaged 22 listening posts forward of the MLR nightly.
In addition to patrols, the Battalion manned six permanent outposts forward of the MLR. Hill 64A (Ingrid) was manned by H/3/1, 128 (Kate) by G/3/1, 92 (Marilyn) by E/2/1, and 86 (COP#1 or Nan), 21, and 2 were manned by I/3/1
THURSDAY, APRIL 16, 1953

The Company was back on line again after a short stay in regimental reserve. They did not return to the same sector but were still in the vicinity of Hill 229. H/3/1 was manning OP Marilyn and the rest of the company was probably on the MLR between the Height of Hill 229 and OP Marilyn.

Lt Lindsay now was in charge of the Mortar Section. He spent this day in the artillery observation bunker registering mortar rounds on likely avenues where the Chinese might approach.

There had been little action in recent days.

FRIDAY, APRIL 17, 1953

Another day of no combat for H/3/1, although G/3/1's combat patrol had 3 KIAs and 16 WIAs (evacuated) and 9 WIAs (non evacuated) when fighting with a CCF ambush.

The Company had a patrol out and the moon was just beginning to show at about 0100. Lt. Lindsay was sitting in his CP bunker following the progress of the patrol and keeping his mortars aimed in likely areas of an ambush in case they get into trouble. He knew just about where the patrol was at all times. The moon is important to a combat Marine. The brighter it gets, the farther down the Chinese move in their holes. Funny how the moon never seemed to be that important at home, unless you were out with your girl.

SATURDAY, APRIL 18, 1953

All patrols in the Battalion departed and returned to the MLR with negative contact. The Chinese were speaking to Marines over their loudspeakers. They were broadcasting that the War would be over June 20th. They were always broadcasting something and the Marines would yell back with something. Guess the obscenities.

SUNDAY, APRIL 19, 1953

While on patrol in the Hill 229 area PFC Richard "Dick" Fall was WIA by fragments from a mine. He had been the flank guard for the patrol and Cpl John J. Sporer came out to tell him the patrol was going to make a turn. About this time one of them tripped the mine. John Sporer was hit in the face and Dick had wounds to the head and neck and a concussion. Dick's wounds were cared for by HM3 Joseph "Doc" Candilora. John Sporer's wounds were more serious and he was evacuated to the hospital ship. John never returned to H/3/1.

MONDAY, APRIL 20, 1953

At 0030 H/3/1 reported two WIA as a result of a mine explosion(s). This is the report of Dick Fall and John Sporer, the two WIAs documented on April 19th.

At 1036 the Rescue Task Force (rescue of UN personnel from Panmunjom) departed 2/1 and arrived at 3/1 at 1055. This was practice exercise or a false alarm because at 1520 they departed the 3/1 area to return to 2/1 parental control.

At 2020 H/3/1 called machine gun fire on 17 enemy in a trench line in the vicinity of coordinates 012039 (SSW of Hedy). Results were 7 counted enemy KIA and 6 estimated enemy WIA.

At 2230 H/3/1 reported 2 WIA (non evacuated) in the vicinity of coordinates of 017027 (on the MLR) which resulted from enemy 82mm mortar fire.

TUESDAY, APRIL 21, 1953

Another quiet day. Lt. Lindsay's Mortar Section was firing H&I (harassing and interdiction) on possibly enemy avenues of approach and assembly areas.

About this time Cpl Alvarez received a box of food from home and Sgt Thompson and
IN KOREA

some of the others were kidding him.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 22, 1953

All of the Battalion's patrols departed and returned to the MLR with negative enemy contact.

THURSDAY, APRIL 23, 1953

Lt. Lutz, the 3rd Platoon Leader, had an .03 rifle that he kept in his bunker. He used it for sniping when the opportunity arose.

At 0530 the Division Recon Company retrieved 4 friendly bodies, previously reported as MIA.

All of the Battalion's patrols departed and returned to the MLR with negative enemy contact.

THURSDAY, APRIL 24, 1953

All of the Battalion's patrols departed and returned to the MLR with negative enemy contact.

FRIDAY, APRIL 25, 1953

All of the Battalion's patrols departed and returned to the MLR with negative enemy contact.

SATURDAY, APRIL 26, 1953

At 2215 a H/3/1 recon patrol reported an estimated enemy squad in the vicinity of coordinates 012023 (about 1,000 yards NW of Hill 229's Peak). The patrol fired small arms and called 60mm and 81mm mortars. The enemy returned fire. At 2232 the patrol withdrew on order. There were 2 estimated enemy WIA.

E/2/1 was evidently attached to 3/1 while the Battalion was on line.

MONDAY, APRIL 27, 1953

At 0410 a H/3/1 recon patrol called in 60mm and 81mm mortars on 5 enemy in the vicinity of coordinates 008027 (500 yards SW of Ingrid).

At 0430 a H/3/1 recon patrol in the vicinity of coordinates 012026 (400 yards South of Ingrid) received small arms fire and on grenade from an estimated 3 enemy in the vicinity of 008027. The patrol returned fire and the enemy fire ceased. There was no estimate of friendly casualties and no friendly casualties.

About this date Lt. Lindsay left the Company to attend a school near Tokyo, Japan.

TUESDAY, APRIL 28, 1953

At 0205 H/3/1 reported 1 friendly WIA (non-evacuated) as a result of enemy 82mm mortar fire.

Another change at this time affected the designation of the UN MLR. Called the Jamestown Line in the I Corps sector (and variously in other parts of the EUSAK front as Missouri, Duluth, Minnesota, and CAT), the allied front was redesignated simply as the "Main Line of Resistance (MLR)," and was to be known in all further orders and communications.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 29, 1953

The Battalion was soon due to be relieved from the MLR and go into reserve. At 600
the advanced detail from the Army's 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment arrived in the Battalion area. The advanced detail from C/2/35 went to the H/3/1 sector.

THURSDAY, April 30, 1953

At 1552 E/2/1 (under the operational control of 3/1) reported 2 friendly casualties as a result of a misfire from friendly 90mm gun.

At 1830 H/3/1 reported 1 enemy counted KIA as a result of friendly machine gun fire. The enemy was in the vicinity of coordinates 011039 (900 yards north of Ingrid). Ingrid was being manned by H/3/1 Marines.

While on line H/3/1 had the following personnel attached: H&S/3/1 communication personnel, artillery FO from 3/11, mortar FO from 4.2 mortars, mortar FO from 3/1's 81mm mortar section, personnel from 3/1's heavy machine gun sector, and personnel from 1st Signal Company.

While on the MLR the Battalion provided 2 meals daily. The rifle companies were fed 2 meals (A&B and "C") daily on the MLR positions.

The Battalion shower unit was located at coordinates 028013 (1200 yards east of Hill 229's peak).

Lt. Harvey Lindsay was in Tokyo, Japan waiting to go to Embarkation School. School was to start Monday, May 4th and last until May 26th.

Following is a summary of the strength of the Battalion at the beginning and end of the month of April.

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<th>1 April 1953 to 30 April 1953</th>
<th>USMC Officers</th>
<th>USMC Enlisted</th>
<th>USN Officers</th>
<th>USN Enlisted</th>
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<td>971</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>2</td>
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The following is a report and summary of all casualties evacuated and non evacuated with a supplementary list of additional men treated during the month of April 1953.

visits to Battalion aid 567
general medicine 345
dermatology 15
general surgery 2
surgery dress Bn 127
ophthalmology 2
eye, ear, nose and throag 64
N. P. cases 2
immunizations (smallpox) 75

1. BATTLE CASUALTIES
   a. evacuated 19
   b. non evacuated 17
   c. KIA 3

2. NON BATTLE CASUALTIES
   a. evacuated 6
   b. non evacuated 86
   c. fatalities 0

3. DISEASES
IN KOREA

a. evacuated 15
b. non evacuated 207

4. VENEREAL DISEASES
a. evacuated 0
b. non evacuated 0

5. N. P. CASES
a. evacuated 1
b. non evacuated 1

COMMUNICATIONS SUMMARY

Communications during the month of April were normal and continuous and _________ in an excellent fashion. There were few problems encountered some of which will be discussed herein.

Wire: Upon assuming responsibility for the Battalion's MLR sector, it was found that the communication wire in the area was in a good state of cable and police. The state of wiring along the MLR in the Chang Dan corridor and the Panmunjon Road was excellent. The wire police along the 229 road was, however, unsatisfactory and was policed by the Battalion's communication platoon. There was a great amount of dead wire in the area and approximately 30 miles were recovered and turned in as salvage.

Radio: Because of the Hill base 229 difficulties were encountered in radio communication on the Battalion Tactical net and the How Company net. On the Battalion Tactical net the difficulty was in communicating with COP #2. Many types of antenna arrays were tried at both ends but without success. It was finally decided to remote a radio set AN/PRC-10 from Hill 229 to the Command Post area. the radio was remoted into the Operations Bunker and the Radio Control Bunker. This produced excellent results and radio communication remained loud and clear for the period. The Battalion maintained a 24 hour listening watch on the Battalion Tactical net and had radio check every hour. In the H/3/1 area numerous radio dead spots encountered and the platoons could not be worked from the Command Post Bunker. A position was located about 200 yards from the command post were radio communications were loud and clear. Since there were no radio remote units available it was necessary for the Company Commander to displace to this area in order to have radio communications if the company wire net went out. On patrols, the radio set AN/PRC-6 proved satisfactory even though the patrols moved out a considerable distance in front of the MLR.

Visual: All patrols, listening posts, layouts, and ambushes had pyrotechnics available in the event land line and radio communications didn't work.

Sound: On Cop 2 it was possible for friendlies to ascertain when the enemy was firing mortars at them by listening for the report of the tubs firing. A warning device was initiated at the Company Command Post to sound a warning indicating an "on the way". The device consisted of three horns mounted on a beam and powered by a six volt wet cell. This horn was affectionately known as the "Truepappy".

FRIDAY, MAY 1, 1953

At 0510 the H&S Company provisional platoon arrived at the Battalion Command Post.

At 0745 the Rescue Task Force reported on position and under operational control of 3/1.

At 1040 eighteen enlisted reported from 2/35/25 as an advanced detail to W/3/1 and came under 3/1 operational control.

At 1158 the Rescue Task Force left the 3/1 area enroute to their parent unit, 2/1.

At 1925 the H&S Company provisional platoon departed the 3/1 CP and for E/2/1 (on the MLR and under operational control of 3/1) and reported at 2000.

At 2110 an I/3/1 reconnaissance platoon sighted six enemy in the vicinity of coordinates 976030 (front of OP 1 and left front of OP 2). Friendlies employed 81mm mortar fire with results of 1 counted enemy KIA, 1 counted WIA, and 2 estimated enemy WIA.

At 2110 H/3/1 reported 1 friendly WIA (non evacuated) in the vicinity of coordinates 017023 (on the MLR) as a result of enemy 60mm mortar fire.

At 2330 the H&S provisional platoon departed E/2/1 and arrived at the 3/1 Command post area at 0015.
Active patrolling forward of the MLR was conducted throughout this tour as line. The Battalion sent 2 combat patrols and at least 6 reconnaissance patrols forward of the MLR nightly. The patrols frequently contacted the enemy. The Battalion averaged 22 listening posts forward of the MLR nightly. In addition, the Battalion manned 6 permanent outposts forward of the MLR. Hill 64A was manned by H/3/1, 128 by G/3/1 and 92 by E/2/1 and 1A, 2A, and 2 were manned by I/3/1.

Col. Wallace M. Nelson relieved Col. Hewitt D. Adam as CO of the 1st Marines. Prior to this relief, Col. Nelson was the UN Personnel and Medical Processing Unit Officer.

Tactical relief of the 1st Mar. Div. officially began this date for them to go into Corps Reserve. The process would take four days. The entire 1st Mar. Div. which had been on line for 20 months, were to go into Corps Reserve at Camp Casey. The 25th Army Division and the Turkish Brigade who would take responsibility for the 33 mile front relieved them.

Located approximately 15 miles south of the Marine MLR, the Camp Casey reserve complex consisted of three major areas. The first was the central one, Casey, which gave its name to the entire installation and would house the new Division CP and 5th Marines. The second one was Indianhead, to the north, where the 7th Marines, 1st KMC Regiment, Division Reconnaissance Company, Machinegun, and NCO schools were to be located. The third was Britannia, to the south that was the home of the 1st Marines. Motor transport, engineer, and medical units in support of the respective regiments were to locate nearby.

SATURDAY, May 2, 1953

At 0750 the Rescue Task Force reported in position and under 3/1 control. At 0850, an advanced party of 1 officer and 15 enlisted from G/3/1 departed the MLR for the reserve area.

At 0900 an advanced party of 19 enlisted from H&S/2/35 25th Army Infantry arrived at 3/1 and came under their operational control.

At 1307 the Rescue Task Force departed the 3/1 area.

At 1410 an advanced party of 1 officer and 20 enlisted departed H/3/1 for the reserve area. The same number E/2/1 departed the MLR for their respective unit, 2/1.

All of the Battalion's patrols departed and returned to the MLR with negative contact.

SUNDAY, MAY 3, 1953

At 0035 thirteen (13) enlisted from G/2/35 (25th Army Division) arrived for relief of the H/3/1 Marines on OP Ingrid (Hill 64A). This relief was for 50% of the men on Ingrid. Other OPs held by the Battalion were also being relieved.

At 0412 twelve (12) enlisted from H/3/1 departed the Battalion area for the reserve area.

The relief of H/3/1 came too late for PFC Richard Fall. He took a bullet in the stomach and would spend a lot of time in hospitals until his eventual discharge at Chelsea Naval Hospital one year later.

At 0800 the Rescue Task Force arrived to come under operational control of 3/1.

At 1130 another 20 enlisted from G/2/35 came under operational control of 3/1.

At 1130 H/3/1 reported 1 WIA (evacuated) as a result of an accidental discharge in the vicinity of coordinates 023028 (on or behind the MLR).

At 1450 H/3/1 reported 1 WIA (non-evacuated) in the vicinity of coordinates 016032 (on the MLR) as a result of enemy 60mm mortar fire.

At 1910 Eleven (11) enlisted from C/2/35 arrived to relieve some of H/3/1 Marines. At 2000 C/2/35 commenced the relief of H/3/1 on Combat Out Post Ingrid (Hill 64A).

The relief was completed at 2030.

At 2140 ten (10) H/3/1 enlisted Marines departed the 3/1 area for the reserve area. All of the Battalion's patrols departed and returned with negative enemy contact.

MONDAY, MAY 4, 1953

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During this day and May 5th the Battalion was continuing to be relieved on the MLR by 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment, 25th Division.

At 2313 C/2/35 (2nd Army Infantry) commenced the relief of H/3/1 on the MLR. At 0124 C/2/35 assumed responsibility of the H/3/1 sector of the MLR.

One might get the impression that infantry units carry everything on his back. While this is true for the individual Marine. He does carry just about everything he owns on his back but there is much more to consider when moving an infantry company or battalion. The unit's assets must be inventoried and accounted for. Responsibilities must be acknowledged by receipt when units turn over, exchange, or order equipment. The following items must be taken under consideration when moving:

- That all persons must be located and fed before during and after the move.
- The transportation requirements to move about 1000 personnel and their equipment. Also the logistics planning to insure everything has a place in a vehicle. Fuel and maintenance requirements must be coordinated.
- The entire galley (kitchen) equipment required to feed a battalion (stoves, pots, pans, vats, food trays, garbage cans, furniture, tents, etc.). Keeping perishable items fresh.

Other considerations include: cots blankets, sleeping bags; tents and tent repair kits, mosquito nets, fire extinguishers, sleeping bags/blankets; stoves Yukon and space heaters; 5 gallon fuel, gasoline, water cans; prefabricated heads, screening, sanitizing, and digging materials; 55 gallon fuel drums and lubricants; fortification materials (timber, sandbags, barbed wire, etc.); electrical requirements (wire; light sockets, outlets, light bulbs); fresh water, water points, shower units, water trailers; medical equipment (surgical instruments, supplies, medicines); desks, chairs, filing cabinets, type writers); communications equipment (radios, switchboards, phones, wire, batteries); armory supplies and spare parts; ammunition (basic loads for individuals, extra ammunition, grenades, 60mm and 81mm mortars);

TUESDAY, MAY 5, 1953

At 0242 the remainder of H/3/1- departed the MLR for the reserve area. They arrived at the reserve area at 0420.

At 0312 2/35 (Army 25th Infantry) assumed responsibility for the 3/1 sector of the MLR. The Battalion closed the old Command Post (vicinity of 024006) and opened their new Command Post at coordinates 226946.

By this date the entire 1st Mar. Div. moved to I Corps Reserve. The 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment, 25th Infantry Division's assumption of control of the 1st Marine sector at 1120. The Turkish Brigade took over the right sector that included the COPs of Carson, Reno, Vegas, Berlin, East Berlin, and extended to Hill 111. While the Division was in reserve, one of its tactical missions included that of being prepared for commitment on I Corps order as a counterattack force in any of the four division sectors of I Corps.

The Battalion was in reserve at coordinates 226948 and would remain there until May 28th.

Camp Britannia was near a very small village of (name unknown). H/3/1 was located in an area about a mile from Battalion Headquarters and a little less distant from the Battalion's mess hall, which was located in a large, dried up, rice paddy field. The area was like a tent city what was spread out in about a two-mile square. Everything was housed in squad-sized tents with dirt floors. This was luxury compared to what has been available on the MLR.

About this date PFC Aubrey Bounds went to Battalion for a tour of duty as a mess-man. He would return about a month later (normal mess duty tours were about 30 days).

The following were dropped from the Company.

- PFC Aubrey G. Bounds
- Sgt Franz Bruckschlogl
- Sgt Bernardino Correia
- PFC Kenneth W. Dirxx
- Cpl James B. Fain

- PFC Erwin H. Boyer
- Sgt Joseph A. Caid
- Cpl Bertren R. Curry Jr.
- Cpl Hervey Dunn
- Sgt Paul W. Fields
The Battalion began the shakedown of the new area and made an inventory of weapons
and equipment. in accordance with the Regimental Training Order.
About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.
MG. Plt. John (Big John) Bowman (joined)
(Bowman was also in 1st Plt. but it is not known when he made the change within the
Company.)
MG. Plt. Seth E. Britt (joined)
2nd Plt. 1st Sqd PFC Laverne A. Gould (joined)
2nd Plt. 1st Sqd PFC Charles E. Graham (joined)
3rd Plt. Corpmann Doc Fitzgerald (joined)
The H/3/1 July 1953 Monthly Personnel Roster shows the following men left the U.S.A.
in Apr. 1953. These Marines were the 32nd Replacement draft that arrived in Korea in May
and most joined the Company about this date.
2nd Lt. Carlo Romano
Cpl Theodore J. Breuer
PFC Robert H. Briggs Jr. (joined)
Cpl James R. Browne
PFC Lawrence J. Gordy
PFC Roland J. Gravelye -3rd Plt. 3rd Sqd
PFC John F. Greshle
PFC Paul Irving Gulick -3rd Plt. 3rd Sqd
PFC James W. Hagon
PFC David R. Hall
PFC Earl A. Hamilton
Sgt Richard T. Harding
PFC Walter H. Harvey
Pvt Roger N. Hausen
PFC Verdis A. Haynes
PFC Elvin Henderson Jr.
Cpl Russell F. Herbruck
PFC Louis C. Hiceman
MSgt Charles Hoss
Cpl Joseph C. Martin II
Pvt Willie L. White

When PFC Paul Gulick joined the third squad of H/3/1's 3rd Plt they were located in
Camp Britannia of the Camp Casey complex. He arrived with the 32nd replacement draft and,
like many before him, had his first introduction to Korea, the Marine replacements' tour
from Inchon to their respective units.
In Korea Gulick debarked from the USS Nelson Walker which had been his home since
leaving the states about two weeks earlier. Two weeks of continuously butterflies in the
stomach. The only time he actually got sick was on May 1st, the day he sailed into the
port of Kobe, Japan. They were only there for a short time and were not allowed to debark
because of the Communists May-Day celebration. The sea was very calm just before arriving
at Kobe but the 12 foot swells very gently caused the ship to continually, monotonously,
unendingly, and unforgettable move up and down and up and down and up and down and ... slowy rocking from side to side to side to etc. After two weeks of butterflies and
fighting off the nausea, seasickness finally got to Gulick.
There were about 5,000 men aboard the ship with whom Gulick shared the cramped
shipboard quarters. These were the same friends with whom he had been through advanced
Infantry training at Camp Pendleton.

Some of the ravages of war were still apparent when he arrived at Inchon. One could still see the shell holes in the sea walls and buildings even though the Inchon landing had taken place almost three years earlier.

They boarded a well shot-up train that looked more like a relic and soon headed toward the railhead at Munsan-ni. The train had very uncomfortable crude wooden seats and no window glass. He realized that even this was probably better accommodations than some of the earlier occupants enjoyed. Some of the less-lucky ones didn't have the luxury of riding in enclosed cars and apparently made the trip on flatbed cars. April was still pretty cold and the trip was very uncomfortable. They did our share of complaining, probably without considering the alternative of walking.

Many young boys and girls along the way greeted them. They were selling chewing gum (that troops on the previous train had given them from their C-rations), Asahi beer, and sheba-sheba (what's that????). These young salesmen/pimps ranged in age from about eight to eighteen. The replacements had been schooled and warned about the possibilities of getting crabs, syphilis, or gonorrhea and other diseases. When asked, the pimps assured us that every one of the girls, many of which were often their sisters, were all virgins. It really didn't matter because the train only stopped for short periods of time to allow for head calls. For those who don't understand Marineese, this is a piss calls.

The train took us from Inchon to Seoul and then about thirty miles through some hills to the Munsan-ni railhead. The train just crept along, never going very fast. I suppose Munsan-ni was a Korean village at one time but when we arrived, there was none.

We were all concerned that they hadn't issued us any ammunition yet. Could they have been so inept as to forget about that little item? No, they new better, that we would probably cause more casualties to ourselves then any enemy that we were unlikely to meet. Never the less, we didn't appreciate the lack of confidence our superiors had in us. Besides, we needed something to joke/complain about and what better than the expensive, elaborate, heavy club we carried called an M-1 rifle. We had enough of this terminology-edited tour by the time we arrived at Munsan-ni and were happy to end this part of our Korean tour.

We boarded trucks at the Munsan-ni railhead and headed for Camp Casey and our respective locations to fill the ranks as replacements for those who were going back to he states or never would. H/3/1 was located at Camp Britannia, a part of the Camp Casey complex.

When Gulick finally arrived in H/3/1's 3rd platoon, he was relieved of the heavy nine pound, six ounce M-1 rifle he had brought from the states and given a nineteen pound Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR). When you add to this the BAR's bipod and thirteen magazines it was quite a load. He resented having to carry the added load but eventually grew to love that BAR. Later, when he had the chance to give up his bar and become a fire team leader, he opted to remain a BARman.

Shower and clothing exchange units were setup in a central location within the battalion. There were scheduled days and times for each unit to take showers. The men would undress in one tent and turn in their dirty cloths, take a show in the next tent, and then dry off in another where they would be reissued new dungaree tops and bottoms. A person who wore size 30 was luck to get less than size 34 pants. Guess they figured that larger size pants would fit all.

Washing our skivy shirts, drawers, and sock was our own responsibility, which we happily turned over to local women over he fence who did the job for a small fee. That village must have had a good supply line because they never ran out of Asahi beer. Although they weren't allowed to buy beer, the Marines used this to supplement their weekly two-can ration of beer. They also managed to pick up a few bottles of hard liquor from the locals.

The locals also had portable brothels that were always outside of the barbed wire fence that enclosed our area. The fence never stopped those who felt the need to fulfil their sexual appetites. MPs roved the perimeter and often set up ambushes to catch those crossing the fence. Many stripes were lost by those who were caught and court martialed. PFC Thomas Blake was among those who lost a strip to become a Pvt.
Squad sized units lived together in tents. This made for some very close relationships. Members of the squad got to know each other very well.

THURSDAY, MAY 7, 1953

The Battalion continued the shakedown of the new area.
The Regimental Training order called for Company Commander's Time for H/3/1.

FRIDAY, MAY 8, 1953

The Battalion continued the shakedown of the new area.
0800-1130 weapons inspection
1300-1630 Company Commander's time
PFC Herman P. Furchtsam was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, MAY 9, 1953

The Battalion continued the shakedown of the new area.
The Regimental Training Order directed:
0800-1100 Battalion Commander's inspection
1300-1630 Organized Athletics
Wizard six (6) visited the Battalion area at 1100. (** who is the Wizard?)
The following were dropped from the Company.
PFC Harry J. Bouie Jr. PFC Centeno G. Bracero
PFC Horace Bright PFC Ronald C. Dixon
PFC Harmon D. Finken PFC Blanton H. Fleming
PFC Rivera P. Gonzalez PFC Albert L. Halvorsen
PFC Lionel Johnson PFC Casimer Kowalczyk
Cpl Richard J. Manning PFC Trellin Q. McCoy
PFC Calvin Randle

SUNDAY, MAY 10, 1953

Holiday routine.

MONDAY, MAY 11, 1953

In previous days the Battalion was guided by the Regimental Training Schedule which called for inspections of equipment and personnel. Beginning on this date the Battalion was guided by the Battalion Training Schedule.
The Battalion commenced an intensive training schedule stressing the training of the individual Marine and small unit tactics. Due to the similarity in the following days, a days program will be referred to as a routine day. The parts of the training schedule shown below and in other parts of this book are primarily for H/3/1 except where the training also applies to other parts of the Battalion.
0800-1130 regimental ordnance team
1300-1400 .45 Cal. pistol-function, stripping, safety precautions (by SSgt Culp)
1400-1530 individual combat in the attack (by Lt. Lutz for rifle platoons)
1530-1630 M-1 rifle-function, stripping & safety prec. by TSgt Melanson for rifle platoons)
1400-1500 .30 Cal. function (by Lt. Proctor for MG platoon)
1500-1630 gun drill (by Lt. Proctor for MG platoon)
1400-1500 60mm mortar nomenclature & functions (by Sgt Marshall for Mortar Sect.)
1500-1630 gun drill (by Sgt Marshall for Mortar Sect)
The following were dropped from the Company
PFC William W. Adams           Sgt William J. Cheatham
PFC Billy B. Childs            Cpl Albert Gonzalez
TUESDAY, MAY 12, 1953

Routine day. Wizard nine (9) visited the Battalion area.
0800-0900 troop inspection & drill (Lt Fimian for all)
0900-1130 conditioning hike (Capt. Zulkofske for all)
1300-1500 BAR nomenclature & function (SSgt Harrington - rifle platoons)
1500-1630 camouflage & discipline (Lt Lindquist - rifle platoons)
1300-1630 .30 cal MG nomenclature & function (Lt. Proctor - MG Plt)
1500-1630 gun drill (Lt Proctor - MG Plt)
1300-1630 gun drill (Sgt Marshall - mortar sect)

WEDNESDAY, MAY 13, 1953

Routine day.
0800-0900 troop inspection & drill (Lt Fimian - all)
0900-1000 mine warfare (Lt Lutz - all)
1000-1130 Enemy tactics and equipment (Lt. Lutz - all)
1300-1630 conditioning hike (Capt Zulkofske)

Cpl Bernard W. Mack was dropped from the Company. He had been in the Mortar Section for almost a year. His Mortar Section consisted of three sections. Each section included about five men and had one mortar tube.

THURSDAY, MAY 14, 1953

Routine day.
0800-0900 troop inspection & drill (Lt Fimian - all)
0900-1130 individual conduct on night patrols & ambushes (Lt. Moses - rifle Plt)
0900-1130 gun drill (Lt proctor - MG Plt)
0900-1130 gun drill (Sgt Marshall - mortar sect)
1300-1600 administrative time
2000-2330 conduct of individual on night patrol & ambushes (Capt Zulkofske - rifle Plt)

2000-2330 night gun drill & night firing devices (Lt Proctor - MG Plt)
2000-2330 night gun drill & night firing devices (Sgt Marshall - mortar sect)

PFC Robert A. Baumann was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, MAY 15, 1953

Routine day.
0800-0900 troop inspection & drill (Lt Fimian - all)
0900-1000 escape & evasion (Lt Moses - all)
1000-1130 field fortifications, barb wire, & mine positions (Lt lindquest - all)
1300-1630 conditioning hike (Capt Zukolfske - all)

The Battalion headquarters group participated in a Division Command Post Exercise (CPX). the group left the Battalion at 0730. At 0800 the Battalion group arrived at the problem area. At 0930 the Battalion CP was set up and the problem began. The problem secured at 1600 and the CP group returned to the Battalion area. The CPX stressing mobility, security, and operational procedures.

SATURDAY, MAY 16, 1953

The Battalion marched en mass to the Regimental Parade Ground for Memorial Services conducted for those killed in action during the previous tour on line. The remainder of the day was scheduled for organized athletics. A Sunday Memorial Service was held for the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, who died
between March 7, 1953 and May 17, 1953. Chaplains presenting services in the Chapel this day were:

Chaplain R. E. Brengartner - Catholic Mass at 0900
Chaplain S. D. Chambers - Protestant Services at 1015
Chaplain M. I. Rothman - Jewish Services at 1100.

A Roll Call of the dead included:

Homer V. Anderson
Froiler Cabrera-Gonzalez
Larry A. Carella (W/3/1 attached to H/3/1; KIA on 3/26/53)
Aubrey D. Carroll
Thomas L. Chancellor
John E. Corbett
Victor Cordes
Clifton C. Cotten
Jerome M. Daley (PFC; H/3/1's 1st Plt; KIA 3/21/53)
James J. Delvin
John A. Doyle Sr.
Donel F. Earnest
Donald R. Fahrenzholtz
Ronald P. Ferguson (PFC H/3/1's 3rd Plt; KIA 3/20/53)
Lanty R. Frame
Junior E. Frazier (PFC H/3/1's 3rd Plt; KIA 3/21/53)
Oscar Garcia KIA 3/28/53)(also may have been in I/3/1)
Ralph Greco (PFC: H/3/1; KIA 3/26/53)
Jose D. Guzman-Rodriguez (PFC; H/3/1's 1st Plt; KIA 3/14/53)
Howard J. Hahn
Earl C. Hawthorne
Raymond F. Hejny
Donald E. Hendricks
James A. Illa (CPL; H/3/1's MG Plt; KIA 3/19/53)
George F. King
James E. Kimball
John J. McCoy, Jr.
Cecil G. Mellinger
Jose H. Mercado
Joseph W. Pierce (PFC; H/3/1's MG Plt; KIA 3/19/53)
Henry F. Schlueter (1st Lt.; H/3/1's 2nd Plt; KIA 3/24/53)
Robert L. Smith (Sgt; H/3/1's 3rd Plt; KIA 3/20/53)
Ernest W. Yehle Jr. (PFC: H/3/1 2nd Plt; KIA 3/30/53)

Someone wrote on the Memorial list that all of the above, after Victor Cordes, were men of H/3/1. However, Larry Carella is thought to have been with H/3/1 and some after Cordes are not on the H/3/1 KIA lists. This would indicate that the above statement might not be correct. Penned on the Memorial Service Brochure, or added by the Author, are the men's rank, platoons in which they served, and other information. Those noted, and perhaps others, are thought to have been in H/3/1.

The Chinese were taking advantage of the lull in the peace talks to make massive buildups of ammunition and supplies all along their position. Many thought they were preparing for a very big offensive to the south.

The following were dropped from the Company:

SSgt Richard A. Dean
PFC Morris W. Wright

SUNDAY, MAY 17, 1953

Holiday routine.
The following were dropped from the Company.
PFC Robert J. Carsno
PFC Dale Cunningham
PFC Roy H. Koponen
MONDAY, MAY 18, 1953

The below training was scheduled.  
0800-0900 troop inspection and drill (TBD - all)  
0900-1000 supply economy (S-4 - all)  
1000-1130 mine warfare (TBD - all)  
1300-1400 military courtesy and discipline (TBD - all)  
1400-1500 enemy tactics and equipment (S-2 - all)  
1500-1630 field sanitation and personal hygiene (TBD - all)  

The following were dropped from the Company.  
PFC Wayne R. Ambler  
PFC Oliver L. Brooks

TUESDAY, May 19, 1953

The below training was scheduled.  
0800-0900 troop inspection and drill (TBD - all)  
1000-1130 CIC lecture (W/3 - all)  
1300-1630 technique of fire (TBD - all)

WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 1953

The below training was scheduled.  
0800-0900 troop inspection and drill (TBD - all)  
0900-1130 field fortifications (TBD - all)  
1300-1630 compass and map reading (TBD - all)  
2nd Lt. Harvey L. Lindsay was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, MAY 21, 1953

The below training was scheduled.  
0800-0900 troop inspection and drill (TBD - all)  
0900-1130 fire team tactics (TBD - all)  
1300-1630 rifle range (TBD - all)

FRIDAY, MAY 22, 1953

The below training was scheduled.  
0800-1630 rifle range (TBD - all)

SATURDAY, MAY 23, 1953

The below training was scheduled.  
0800-1130 Bn Commander's inspection (Bn Cmdr - all)  
1300-1630 organized athletics (Co Cmdr - all)  
At 1300 the Battalion was inspected by the Regimental Commander.

SUNDAY, MAY 24, 1953

Holiday routine.

MONDAY, May 25, 1953

The below training was scheduled.  
0800-0900 troop inspection and drill (Co Cmdr - all)  
0900-1130 Camouflage and camouflage discipline (TBD - all)  
1300-1400 first aid (TBD - all)
IN KOREA

1400-1500 venereal disease control (TBD - all)
1500-1630 defense against chemical attack (Reg. training NCO - all)

About this date Cpl James E. Jones was sent to NCO school for two weeks. The school was in a Division camp where they also had a mine warfare School. The class included Marines of all ranks from MSgt down to Cpl. A typical schedule for the NCO School was:

0500 reveille
0540 chow
0630 police call
0700 inspection and close order drill
0800-1130 Classes
1200 chow
1300-1400 class
1400-1800 field problems
1830 chow

Four nights there was a night field problem. They marched in formation everywhere they went. Each man had to assume the following posts for a day; Company Commander, First Sgt, Platoon Leader, Platoon Sgt, and Platoon Guide.

The following were dropped from the Company.
PFC James L. Carroll
SSgt Denton Carter
PFC Kenneth Foster

TUESDAY, MAY 26, 1953

The below training was scheduled.
0800-0900 troop inspection and drill (Co Comdr - all)
0900-1130 rife team tactics (TBD - all)
1300-1630 company commanders time (all)
2000-2300 night patrols (fire team size) (TBD - all)

At 0700 the advanced party of the Headquarters group left on 2 day Division Command Post Exercise (CPX). At 0730 the main body of the Battalion opened the CPX at coordinates 187945. At 2220 they closed the CPX and opened another CP at coordinates 159976.

SSgt Jack M. Dizney was dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 27, 1953

The below training was scheduled.
0800-0900 troop inspection and drill (Co Comdr - all)
0900-1000 defense against biological attack (Reg. CHC NCO - all)
1000-1130 escape and evasion (S-2 - all)
1300-1630 squad tactics (TBD - all)
2000-2300 night patrolling (squad size) (TBD - all)

A CPX Firing Exercise (CPX-FEX) was held. Realism bowed to current ordnance supply economics in that ammunition was carried for individual weapons, but it would "not be loaded except on specific orders from an officer." This CPX was held as a trial exercise for an Eighth Army CPX scheduled for later in the month. The Battalion returned to the reserve area at 1100.

2nd Lt. Denton Carter was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, MAY 28, 1953

The below training was scheduled.
0800-0900 Troop inspection (Co. Cmdr - all)
0900-1000 Anti aircraft defense (TBD - all)
1000-1130 defense against radiological attack (Reg. ??? NCO - all)
1300-1630 squad tactics (TBD - all)

The CCF made major attacks across 17,500 yards of the I Corps front stretching from COP #2 eastward to the Berlin COPs. This was the area the 1st Marine Division manned
before going into I Corps reserve the first part of May. They were also making massive assaults on the Hook area. The Turks, who were defending Hill 111 next to the Hook and behind East Berlin, were overrun. They wound up in bloody hand-to-hand combat in the valley behind Hill 111 in order to take back their position. This valley which could be seen by enemy FOs was often a target for sniping with their 76mm recoilless rifles, especially during the last days of the war. This area, probably along with several other areas of similar nature, was commonly referred to as a, "76 Alley". This area around Hill 111 would also be the site of fierce fighting by H/3/1 during the last days of the war.

COP Carson had fallen to the enemy on this date and the 25th Division withdrew from COP Elko.

At 2115 the Battalion was alerted to standby and at 2300 the Battalion was put on a six-hour standby.

FRIDAY, MAY 29, 1953

Prior to this date the companies of the battalion were instructed to have preliminary competition for drill. On this date, the Battalion's semifinal competition was scheduled to select three finalists in individual and squad competition.

The below training was scheduled, but other priorities prevailed as noted below.
0800-0900 troop inspection and drill (Co Cmdr - all)
0900-1030 duties of sentinel & interior guard duty (TBD - all)
1030-1130 care and cleaning of equipment (TBD - all)
1300-1630 Company commander's time (Co Cmdr - all)

The planned Eighth Army CPX was postponed indefinitely because of the critical battlefront situation and continuing enemy attacks across the Eighth Army front. Extensive preparations were still underway for the 1st Marines' MARine Landing Exercise (MARLEX) III scheduled for 14-23 June.

At 0800 the Battalion was alerted and the men were issued armored vests and ammunition.

At 1315 the 1st Marines were transferred to operational control of I Corps. 3/1 loaded aboard trucks at 1330 and ready to move out. H/3/1 moved out of their reserve area at 1440. At 1630 the battalion opened the new CP at coordinates 118005.

The Regiments three infantry Battalions, antitank, and heavy mortar companies promptly moved out from their Britannia based camps and within two hours had relocated at 25th Division bivouac areas (at or near coordinates 118005) south of the Kansas Line in readiness for counterattack orders. They were to be used to plug holes, retake positions, etc. as directed by I Corps.

Control of Vegas changed hands between the enemy and the indomitable Turks several times. By dark, the CCF had wrested the northern crest from the Turks, which still held the southeastern face of the position. At 2300 the I Corps Commander and the 25th Division CG decided the defense of Vegas was not worth the cost and withdrew from the out post.

The following were dropped from the Company.

Sgt Lee R. Brown
Cpl Fred C. Buxton

SATURDAY, MAY 30, 1953

Prior to this date the companies of the battalion were instructed to have preliminary competition for drill. On this date, the Battalion's semifinal competition was scheduled to select three finalists in platoon competition.

The Battalion began a shakedown of the new area and the troops had organized athletics.

SUNDAY MAY 31, 1953

Holiday Routine and the Battalion continued the shakedown of the new area. During the month of May the Battalion continued to send representatives to the
various Division schools.
Non-Commissioned Officer School........14 enlisted
Machine Gun School......................13 enlisted
Mine Warfare School.....................9 enlisted
Motor Transport School..................1 enlisted
Embarcation School........................1 officer and 1 enlisted
Legal School................................1 officer

The following is a summary of the strength of the Battalion at the beginning and end of the month.

1-31 May 1953

USMC Officers-USMC Enlisted-USN Officers-USN enlisted
Beginning strength 38 984 2 41
Jd- from Regt 7 35 1 1
Transferred 7 41 1 18
Returned to duty 0 49 0 0
Rotated 0 1 0 0
replacements 4 92 0 15
SK evacuated 0 37 0 0
KIA 0 1 0 0
Killed (non-combat) 1 0 0 0
DOW 0 0 0 0
WIA Evacuated 0 2 0 0
WIA Non-evacuated 0 2 2 0
Ending strength 41 1056 2 39

The following summary of all casualties evacuated and non evacuated with a supplementary list of additional men treated by the Battalion medical personnel during the month of May.

visits....................................1260
treatments................................1260
general medicine.......................... 927
dermatology............................... 37
general surgery........................... 8
surgical dressing room.................... 185
ophthalmology............................ 32
ear, nose, and throat..................... 63

1. BATTLE CASUALTIES
   a. evacuated.............................. 5
   b. non evacuated.......................... 1
   c. KIA.................................... 1

2. NON BATTLE CASUALTIES (ACCIDENTALLY DISCHARGE)
   a. evacuated.............................. 1
   b. non evacuated.......................... 0
   c. fatal.................................. 1

3. NON BATTLE INJURIES
   a. evacuated.............................. 2
   b. non evacuated.......................... 26
   c. fatal.................................. 0

4. DISEASES
   a. evacuated.............................. 13
   b. non evacuated.......................... 158

5. VENEREAL DISEASES
   a. evacuated.............................. 0
   b. non evacuated.......................... 62

MONDAY, JUNE 1, 1953

The Battalion was located at coordinates 118005 in reserve for the 25th Infantry Division where they would remain until June 6th. While in this position they continued to
IN KOREA

carry out the scheduled training activities.

The three finalists in the individual, squad, and platoon drill competition was to be completed today.

The below training was scheduled.

0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
0900-1000 nomenclature and functioning of light machine gun
1000-1130 nomenclature and functioning of the 60mm mortar
1300-1630 platoon tactics
2000-2300 conduct of ambushes

TUESDAY, JUNE 2, 1953

Lt. Harvey Lindsay returned from the month-long embarkation school in Japan. When he arrived at Regiment he was reassigned at a Platoon Leader of a regiment's antitank (.75mm recoilless Rifle) platoon. When on line, his sections were assigned to the rifle battalions.

The 1st Marine Division, who was in Corps reserve, was brought up behind the Army (who had occupied their position while in reserve) to support them in the event that the Chinese should make a major offensive that would break through the lines.

The below training was scheduled.

0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
0900-1000 nomenclature of live firing of the 3.5 rocket launcher
1000-1130 tactics of the 60mm mortar (live firing)
1300-1630 Company Commander's administrative time
2000-2300 fight raids

The officers were scheduled for training on supporting arms (air) classes in the general mess between 1900 and 2000.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 3, 1953

The below training schedule was probably not followed as H/3/1 relieved some C/2/35, and army unit.

The following training was scheduled.

0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
0900-1130 compass march
1300-1630 platoon tactics

THURSDAY, JUNE 4, 1953

The Communists agreed on all major points of the UNC final offer and it appeared that a cease-fire was close at hand.

The below training was probably not completed because H/3/1 was relieved by C/2/35 and returned to the reserve area by foot and/or motor march.

The following training was scheduled.

0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
0900-1130 use of booby traps
1300-1500 tank infantry tactics
1500-1630 Company Commander's administrative time
2000-2300 platoon tactics (offense)

The officers were scheduled for training on supporting arms (artillery) classes in the general mess between 1900 and 2000.

FRIDAY, JUNE 5, 1953

Following Eighth Army's decision not to retake the Carson-Elko-Vegas outposts, the 1st Marines were reverted to Marine control and returned to Camp Britannia.

The following was on the training schedule.
IN KOREA

0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
0900-1130 company tactics (offensive)
1300-1630 company tactics (defensive)

The officers were scheduled for training on supporting arms (artillery) classes in the general mess between 1900 and 2000.
At 2320 H/3/1 departed the battalion forward area enroute to the base camp.

SATURDAY, JUNE 6, 1953

At 0100 the Battalion closed the advanced command post in the vicinity of coordinates 118005 and reestablished the command post at coordinates 226948. H/3/1 closed the Battalion's advanced command post at 0245.

This paragraph is written by a anonymous contributor to protect the guilty. He was really a pretty nice guy.

About this date getting Asahi beer from the locals across the fence had become a common means of filling individual's supply needs. The Marines usually put their beer under their cots on the dirt floor. Several members of the squad noticed they were missing beer at times. No one in the squad would admit to stealing our beer but they had a pretty good idea of the identity of the culprit because one guy always seemed to have a buzz on.

One night while sitting and chatting about the situation they decided to treat the thief to a special treat, Asahi beer a la urine. After relieving themselves, they put the cap back on the bottle (3/4 beer and 1/4 urine) and made a pencil mark on the label for identification. Then the bottle was placed on top of two other bottles lying under a bunk.

Sure enough, the bottle came up missing a couple days later. The inventive brewers hilariously told everyone what they had done and everyone seemed to have a good laugh.

The Battalion Commander inspected the H/3/1 and the troops had organized athletics the rest of the day. This inspection was probably canceled for the troops foot and/or motor march back to their Corps reserve area which was a few miles distant at coordinates 232947 (or 226948).

The Battalion scheduled the below instructions for Saturday mornings, either before or after inspections.

- 30 min. current and/or world events
- 30 min. history of the Marine Corps
- 60 min. reading and explanation of the UCMJ articles
- 15 min. venereal disease
- 15 min. R&R liberty; conduct and bearing as representatives of USMC
- 60 min. discussion, forums, and conferences on (a) leadership qualities, (b) army talk pamphlets, or other suitable subjects

SUNDAY, JUNE 7, 1953

The training scheduled called for Company Commander's administrative time.
About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

- 2nd Plt. 1st Sqd  PFC Robert Bond (joined)
- 2nd Plt. 1st Sqd  PFC Phillip R. Brohen (joined)
- Sgt Bobby Smith (left)

The H/3/1 July 1953 Monthly Personnel Roster shows the following men left the U.S.A. in May 1953. This is probably the 33rd Replacement draft that arrived in Korea in June and joined H/3/1, about this date.

- Cpl Melvin H. Barker
- James H. Bartley
- PFC Jerry T. Bess
- PFC Morris R. Bowles
- PFC John D. Bowman Jr.
- PFC William A. Brede Jr.
- PFC Earl Brewster

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IN KOREA

MONDAY, JUNE 8, 1953

The following training was scheduled.
0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
0900-1000 naval customs and shipboard routine - by Bn S-3
1000-1130 boat discipline and duties of the boat team commander - by Lt Lutz
1300-1630 use of lashing and guide lines - by Tsgt Melanson

Officers were scheduled for class on enemy tactics. The class was to be taught in the mess hall by SSgt Hyde.

TUESDAY, JUNE 9, 1953

A directive from the Commander Naval Forces, Far East notified the 1st Mar. Div. of the cancellation of the forthcoming 1st Marines' MARLEX III scheduled for 14-23 June. All available shipping was being held on 24-hour readiness for the expected final repatriation of POWs (Operation Big Switch). All afloat training exercises by Marine, Army, and Navy units between 6 June and 15 October were canceled.

At 1615 the Battalion held a review and presentation of awards.

The following training was on the schedule.
0800-0900 troop inspection
0900-1000 shipboard maintenance of uniforms and equipment - by Plt Sgts
1000-1130 characteristics & nomenclature of the LVT - by Tsgt Melanson
1300-1630 organization of the boat team & arrangement of the personnel in landing craft

Officers were scheduled for class on enemy tactics. The class was to be taught in the mess hall by SSgt Hyde.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 10, 1953
IN KOREA

The following training was on the schedule.
0800-0900 Troop inspection and drill
0900-1130 employment of amphibious vehicles during initial landing movement - by Lt Lindquist
1300-1630 conduct of the assault - by Plt cdr

THURSDAY, JUNE 11, 1953

The following training was on the schedule.
0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
0900-1130 debarkation procedure and lashing of equipment - by TSgt Melanson
1300-1630 conduct of the assault - by Plt cdr

Officers were scheduled for class on communications. The class was to be taught in the mess hall by Lt Smith.

FRIDAY, JUNE 12, 1953

One of the Corpsman's jobs was to burn out the portable commodes (four hollers) for sanitation purposes. They also sprinkled a powder on the seats to kill any crabs that might be there. Crabs were a big problem about this time. Ask Bob Culp, the 3rd Platoon Sgt. He got them from the Staff and Officers four holler about this time. There was a four-holler just past the 3rd squad, 3rd Platoon's billeting area that the corpsman would burn out periodically. Considering the field conditions, this was a state of the art four-holler that one would go out of their way to occupy. It had a screened enclosure that helped to keep the flies out (as well as keeping them in). Toilet paper was abundant and there were orders for those that piddled on the seat to wipe it off to keep it neat.

About this date, a new Corpsman arrived in the company. He was inexperienced at burning out four-hollers but had to get the job done. He obtained a five-gallon can of gasoline from the fuel dump and poured the whole five gallons down a hole. He probably felt proud of the service he was providing when he lit the match and dropped in down one of the holes. However, he had overestimated the amount of fuel it would take to extricate the bacteria.

With a big "poof like a huge mortar blast and a flash of flame the four-holer seats and the roof was blown off and the state of the art four holler was in flames. The singed, soot-covered, corpsman exited hurriedly. He was in a daze but unhurt. Shell-shocked Marines made a mass exodus from their tents to determine what caused the explosion. Being relieved that the sound was not that of an incoming round, they gave the corpsman a huge round of applause.

The following training was scheduled.
0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
0900-1000 communications during ship-to-shore movement - by S-3
1000-1130 initial supply of the landing team - by G-3
1300-1630 regimental guard

Officers were scheduled for class on communications. The class was to be taught in the mess hall by Lt Smith.

SATURDAY, JUNE 13, 1953

The Battalion marche en mass to the regimental parade ground to participate in a Regimental Review and presentation of awards in honor of Major General Pollock. Following the ceremony the Battalion marched back to the area.

The following was on the training schedule
0800-1130 Battalion Commander's inspection
1130-1630 organized athletics

SUNDAY, JUNE 14, 1953
Holiday routine, company commander's time.

MONDAY, JUNE 15, 1953

The following was on the training schedule.
0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
0900-1000 enemy tactics and equipment - by S-2
1000-1130 tank infantry tactics - by Lt. Lutz
1300-1630 conditioning hike

Officers and staff NCOs were scheduled for classes on Supporting arms (mortars) in the mess hall between 1900 and 2000.

TUESDAY, JUNE 16, 1953

At 0912 the Battalion commenced a 1 day Command Post Exercise (CPX), based on the situation contained in the prepared and canceled Mar-Lex. The Battalion initially maintained the CPX OP at base camp and opened a Map CPX at coordinates 207963. At 1203 the Battalion headquarters group closed the old Map CPX command post, vicinity coordinates 207963, and physically opened a new CPX command post, vicinity coordinates 216966. At 1520 the Battalion closed the old CPX command post, vicinity coordinates 216966, and returned to base camp, vicinity coordinates 226948.

The following was on the training schedule.
0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
0900-1000 supply discipline - by Lt Fimian
1000-1130 hand to hand combat - by Lt Lindquist
1300-1630 Platoon infantry in the offense - rifle platoons - by Plt Ldr

Officers and staff NCOs were scheduled for classes on Supporting arms (mortars) in the mess hall between 1900 and 2000.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 17, 1953

The following was on the training schedule
0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
0900-1130 compass march
1300-1630 company commander's administrative time
2000-2330 night compass march

THURSDAY, JUNE 18, 1953

About this date Cpl George Broadhead, a H/3/1 Wireman left the Company. It is not known where he went but his tour of duty in Korea was not up and he was probably transferred within the Division. It is likely that he went to H&S/3/1 because he was with H/3/1 again about July 24-27.

With orders from South Korea's President, Rhee, the South Korean Provost Martial Command released about 25,000 prisoners that had been in POW camps in South Korea. South Korea's President, Syngman Rhee, did this to disrupt the Panmunjom peace talks. The Chinese insisted that the Chinese POWs were to be returned to China, regardless of their desires. Syngman Rhee, and the UN, were arguing that those who wished to stay in South Korea, or another country, should have the right to make that choice. He didn't like the terms of the peace negotiations and wanted the Chinese pushed back into Mongolia. This release had been secretly planned and carefully coordinated at South Korean top levels. Even President Rhee was in on the planned escape/release of POWs.

Consider that the South Koreans had a tremendous fear and distrust of the Chinese Communists. Their fear was greater then most Americans can imagine. They put no trust on the Communists fulfilling their peace proposals because for the past fifteen years they have been deceived and bullied by the Russians, Japanese and Chinese. Why should they believe them now?
Gulick remembers the concern being expressed and the confusion in the first few days. "We were put on alert and told that we didn't know if we were going to go back on line or turn around and fight our way out of Korea." Apparently our officers and officers further up the line weren't sure which was the enemy, the North or South Koreans.


Before 1800 today the rifle companies submitted the team representatives (4 men with 2 alternates) for the rifle and pistol matches. The Battalion's match would be held on June 23rd and the qualifiers would go to the Regimental matches to be held later.

The following was on the training schedule.

- 0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
- 0900-1000 bayonet drill - by Lt Lindquist
- 1000-1130 60mm mortar nomenclature, function, & application
- 1300-1630 supply issues

Officers and staff NCOs were scheduled for classes on civil disturbances in the mess hall between 1900 and 2000.

FRIDAY, JUNE 19, 1953

The following was on the training schedule

- 0800-0930 BAR nomenclature & function
- 1030-1130 mob and riot control
- 1300-1630 company in the attack

Officers and staff NCOs were scheduled for classes on civil disturbances in the mess hall between 1900 and 2000.

SATURDAY, JUNE 20, 1953

At 1430 the Battalion competition was held to select the one battalion winner in both individual and squad drill. The winners would continue to the Regimental competition. The Regimental semi-final competition for individual and squad drill would be held on June 25th.

The following was on the training schedule.

- 0800-1130 Battalion Commander's inspection
- 1300-1600 organized athletics

SUNDAY, JUNE 21, 1953

Holiday routine.

At 1430 the Battalion competition was held to select the one battalion winner in Platoon drill. The winner would continue to the Regimental semi-final competition to be held on June 27th.

PFC William J. Duffy was dropped from the Company.

The following was on the training schedule.

- 0800-1630 company commander's administrative time

MONDAY, JUNE 22, 1953

The following was on the training schedule

- 0800-0900 troop inspection and drill of machine gun and mortar units
- 0800-1630 squad live firing exercise
- 0900-1130 gun cleaning for machine gun platoon
- 0900-1130 concentration of fire for mortar section
- 1300-1630 technique of fire direct ?ating for machine gun platoon
- 1300-1630 conservation of fire for mortar section

Officers and staff NCOs are scheduled for training on artillery support in the
TUESDAY, JUNE 23, 1953

The participants in the Battalion Rifle Match competition was conducted at Range #6 between 0800 and 1200. The Battalion Pistol Match competition was conducted at Range 6 between 1430 and 1700. The match was to determine the battalion team members who would participate in the Regimental matches.

The following was on the training schedule:

- 0700-1630 live firing for machine gun and mortar units
- 0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
- 0900-0930 rifle platoon in the offense
- 0930-1130 combat (approach phase)
- 1300-1630 rifle platoon in the offensive attack phase

Officers and staff NCOs are scheduled for training on artillery support in the offense in the mess hall between 1900 and 2000.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 1953

- 0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
- 0900-1000 tactical use of smoke
- 1000-1130 organization of the infantry regiment
- 1300-1630 company commander's administrative time
- 2000-0500 overnight bivouac, security patrol, aggressor force, etc.

THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 1953

The Regimental semi-final competition for the individual and squad drill competition commenced at 0830. Winners would continue to the finals to be held on June 29th.

The following was on the training schedule:

- 0800-1630 platoon fire exercise for rifle platoon
- 0800-0900 troop inspection and drill for mortars and machine gun units
- 0900-1630 technique of fire, positions for machine gun platoon
- 0900-1630 gun drill squad for mortar section

Officers and staff NCOs are scheduled for training on air support in the offense in the mess hall between 1900 and 2000.

FRIDAY, JUNE 26, 1953

- 0800-1130 Battalion ???
- 1300-1400 troop inspection and drill
- 1400-1500 ????? guidance
- 1500-1630 ??

Officers and staff NCOs are scheduled for training on air support in the offense in the mess hall between 1900 and 2000.

SATURDAY, JUNE 27, 1953

Routine day. Major W. L. Williams, Battalion Executive Officer, was transferred to the Division Provost Marshal's office.

The Regimental semi-final competition for the Platoon drill competition commenced at 0830. Winners from would continue to the finals to be held on June 29th.

The following was on the training schedule:

- 0600-1330 model defensive position demonstration
- 0600-0700 breakfast
- 0700-0900 truck to Camp Indianhead
- 0915-1115 conduct demonstration
IN KOREA

1130-1330 truck to base camp
1430-1630 organized athletics

SUNDAY, June 28, 1953

The days have been very hot and the nights are cool with plenty of rain.
The following training was scheduled.
0800-1630 company commander's administrative time
A Battalion review and presentation of awards ceremony was conducted at 1900 at the Regimental parade ground (located at coordinates 263919). The commanding general presented awards.

MONDAY JUNE 29, 1953

At 1800 the Regimental finals commenced for the individual, squad, and platoon drill competition.
The following was on the training schedule.
0730-1200 live firing (possibly for competition group)
0730-0830 march to range
0830-0900 safety regulations; problem explanation
0900-1030 live firing
1030-1100 critique
1100-1200 march to camp
0800-0900 troop inspection and drill (for all others)
0900-1130 hand to hand combat (for all others)
1300-1430 platoon in defense (use of alternate and supplemental positions) (rifle & machine gun platoons) by Lt Lindquist
1300-1430 sight setting M4 sight (60mm mortar section) by Lt Romano
1430-1630 gun drill (60mm mortar section) (Lt Romano)
Staff NCOs and officers were scheduled for training on administration (the service record book) at the mess hall between 1900 and 2000.

TUESDAY, JUNE 30, 1953

At 1805 the advanced party of the Headquarters group left on a 2 day Regimental Command Post Exercise (CPX). At 1840 the main body of the Battalion headquarters group opened the CPX at coordinates 265890.
The following training was scheduled.
0800-0930 troop inspection and drill
0930-1030 combat intelligence
1030-1130 defense against radiological attack
1300-1630 company commander's administrative time
1400 showers
2000-0500 night bivouac, company problem, security patrols, listening posts, etc.
Staff NCOs and officers were scheduled for training on administration (the service record book) at the mess hall between 1900 and 2000.
During the month of June the Battalion continued to send representatives to various Division schools.
Non-commissioned Officer School...............16 enlisted
Machine Gun School..........................15 enlisted
Mine Warfare School..........................13 enlisted
Motor Transport School...................... 1 enlisted
Search Light School......................... 5 enlisted

Following is a summary of the strength of the Battalion at the beginning and end of the month.

JUNE 1-30 1953  USMC OFFICERS  USMC ENLISTED  USN OFFICERS  USN ENLISTED
strength on 6/1/53  41 1059 2 39
IN KOREA

H/3/1 MARINES

returned to duty  27  1
replacements       2  109  7
rotated           2  122
transferred       5  30  6
Sick evacuated    28  1
joined from Regiment 6  15
strength on 6/30/53 42  1030  2  40

The following summarizes all patients seen and treated in the Battalion Aid Station during the month of June.

1. visits................................. 1217
treatments........................... 1217
general medicine..................... 1037
surgical dressings............... 89
general surgery....................  4
E. E. N. T......................... 90
N. P................................  3
2. Battle casualties......................  0
3. Non battle casualties (accidental discharge)
evacuated...............................  2
Non battle injuries
evacuated.............................  5
non evacuated......................  80
fatal.................................  0
4. Disease
evacuated.............................  5
non evacuated......................  80
fatal.................................  0
5. venereal disease
evacuated.............................  0
non evacuated......................  41

WEDNESDAY, JULY 1, 1953

From 1 to 5 July the Battalion was in I Corps reserve at coordinates 226948 on this day. During this period an intensive training schedule, stressing company and platoon sized tactics, was carried out.

During days of inclement weather, the scheduled training was substitute with prearranged training in covered areas.

The Battalion concluded an overnight CPX at 0730. The CPX OP was located at coordinates 269890 and at 0830 the CPX was closed. At 0915 the CPX Group arrived at base came (vicinity coordinates 226948).

The following was on the training schedule.

0700-1630 demonstration; attack of fortified positions; live fire exercise (squad)
0730-0800 march to range
0800-0830 safety regulations and explanation of problem
0830-1100 live fire exercise (ATA sec. give 1 hour demonstration)
1300-1530 live fire exercise (tech of fire coordination and control)
1530-1600 critique
1600-1630 march to camp
1300-1430 first aid treatment of simple wounds (60mm and machine gun sect./plt)
1430-1530 care and cleaning of M1 rifle (60mm and machine gun sect./plt)
1530-1630 military courtesy (60mm and machine gun section/platoon)

THURSDAY, JULY 2, 1953

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.

James D. Bishop            PFC Joseph A. Flori
IN KOREA

TSgt John F. Gilroy       Sgt Dalton "Dingleberry" R. McCord
PFC Ellis L. Prevatt      Sgt Burt R. Redick

Most, or all, were probably being rotated back to the U.S.A.
The following training was on the schedule.

0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
0900-1130 patrolling, day, combat (for rifle platoons)
0900-1000 ammunition types description and ??? (60mm mortar sect.)
1000-1130 gun drill (60mm mortar sect.)
0900-1030 mechanical training (machine gun platoon)
1030-1130 gun drill section (machine gun platoon)
1300-1630 company commander's administrative time
2000-2400 night tactical march; move into attack; preparation for attack; etc.

Staff NCOs and officers were scheduled for training on CBR defense (radiological) at the mess hall between 1900 and 2000.

FRIDAY, JULY 3, 1953

There had been a few days of rain.
Cpl John J. Johnson was dropped from the Company.
The following training was on the schedule.

0800-0900 troop inspection and drill.
0900-1030 hand and arm signals, w/ combat formations (rifle platoons)
0900-1030 use of mil conversion table & firing tables (60mm mortar sect.)
0900-1030 gun drill (machine gun platoon)
1030-1130 use of LMG in company defensive firing (all)
1300-1630 company in the attack

Staff NCOs and officers were scheduled for training on CBR defense (radiological) at the mess hall between 1900 and 2000.

SATURDAY, JULY 4, 1953

Holiday routine. The Battalion representative, 2nd platoon of G/3/1 at the Division drill competition placed second.
Sgt William A. Bates, SSgt Willard A. Covert, and PFC Dale G. Jenkins were dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, JULY 5, 1953

From 5 to 9 July, the Battalion moved from coordinates 226948 to a camp located at coordinates 122982 where it assumed the mission of a battalion of the reserve regiment, the division having moved up to the MLR.

Holiday routine. Advance echelons from units of the Battalion departed to open a new camp at coordinates 122982. At 0848 H/3/1 departed with 1 officer and 15 enlisted. Other companies of the battalion departed later in the morning.

The following training was on the schedule.

0800-1630 company commander's administrative time

MONDAY, JULY 6, 1953

Relief of the 25th Infantry Division by Marine units got underway when 7th Marines moved up to the right regimental sector manned jointly by the U.S. 14th Infantry Regiment and the Turkish Armed Forces Command. The 1st Marines were to be held in Division Reserve.
No one needed to remind the 1st Mar. Div that the territory it was moving back into was not the same with respect to the right regimental sector. Three of its six major outposts there (Carson, Elko, and Vegas) had fallen to the enemy in the late-May battle, despite the formidable resistance of the defending Turks.

The following training was on the schedule.
IN KOREA

0830-1130 formal inspection by Regimental Co and parade
1300-1400 Artillery indoctrination
1400-1500 character guidance
1500-1630 CBR; defense against chemical weapons
1900-2300 live fire, rifle squad fire power demonstration
  1900-1915 march to range
  1915-2015 fire power, also safety regulations & problem explanation
  2015-2245 live fire demonstration
  2245-2300 march to camp

Officers and staff NCOs were scheduled for tactical employment (search lights) training in the mess hall between 1900 and 2000.

TUESDAY, July 7, 1953

It has been raining steadily for the past four days.
At 0455 the 7th Marines assumed responsibility for the right regimental sector.
At 1300 the 1st Marines began arriving just south of the Imjin River. The regiment would be responsible for security of the Spoonbill and Libby (formerly called x-ray) Bridges.

Cpl James E. Jones was issued what was called a "snooper scope" that mounted on an M-1 carbine. This snooper scope is the front runner for what we use today as night-vision equipment. A person within about fifty feet could be seen through the scope as a dull, green, shaded, figure.

At 2355, after heavy fighting, the CCF overran COP East Berlin, which was defended by a platoon of the 7th Marines. Berlin was also hit about the same time, but the Turks and also the 7th Marine unit that was relieving them, defended it. Although Communications were lost, it was learned at 0630 the next morning that 18 effectives were still holding the position.

The following training was on the schedule.
  0800-0900 troop inspection and drill
  0900-1000 bayonet drill
  1000-1130 military symbols
  1300-1600 company raid

Officers and staff NCOs were scheduled for tactical employment (search lights) training in the mess hall between 1900 and 2000.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 8, 1953

The Battalion moved from coordinates 226948 to a camp located at coordinates 122982 on this day and remained there until about July 21st. The Battalion assumed the mission of a battalion of the reserve regiment. Since the camp had not been occupied for several months, it was necessary to rebuild much of the camp.

At 0906 one officer and 44 enlisted from H/3/1 departed the base camp to assume the mission of bridge security for Libby Bridge (coordinates 097013) which crossed the Imjin River. They assumed responsibility for security of the bridge at 1058 from elements of the 14th Infantry Regiment. PFC Paul Gulick was among this group of 44 enlisted. The Xs in the below diagram show the approximate locations of machinegun bunkers and quad fifty machine gun positions. The Os show the location of gate sentries guarding the bridge. Roving patrols were also continually being made under and around the bridge area.

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X | O | X
---|---|---
Imjin River                       \| Libby Bridge
---|---|---
X | O | X
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At 1233, after a two and a half-hour battle, East Berlin was retaken by two platoons from G/3/7 and H/3/7.

At 2305 H/3/1 (minus the 45 guarding Libby Bridge) departed the old camp leaving 2 officers and 60 enlisted behind.

About this date 3/1 got the word to move out. They were coming out of reserve and going on line. Like bees in a hive, everybody was humming around, doing all of the necessities of getting ready to move out. When the 3rd squad of H/3/1's 3rd platoon started digging up the floor in their squad tent, young Paul Gulick started wondering if they were going to dig in here. The excavation soon uncovered a cache of automatic weapons, mostly carbines, grease guns, and Thompson sub machineguns, that were well oiled and buried in waterproof bags. It seems that when H/3/1 came off line, the word went out to confiscate all extra weapons that were not authorized. Everyone knew the value of an automatic weapon in the trench-line and no one was willing to part with his automatic weapon so they buried them until they were ready to go back on line.

The following training was on the schedule.

0800-1630 live fire (for 60mm mortar sections)
0800-0900 march to range
0900-0930 safety regulations, problem explanation
0930-1530 live fire
1530-1630 march to camp
0800-0900 troop inspection and drill (for all others)
0900-1000 voice radio procedure
1000-1130 ___ markings & ___ reports
1300-1630 platoon in attack

Officers and staff NCOs were scheduled for combat intelligence training in the mess hall between 1900 and 2000.

THURSDAY, JULY 9, 1953

From 9 to 21 July the Battalion conducted a shakedown of the new camp and continued an intensive training schedule, stressing platoon and company defensive tactics as well as related subjects. Since the campsite had not been completely occupied for several months, it was necessary to rebuild most of the camp.

After the flare-up at the Berlin outposts, there was relatively little action for the next ten days.

At 0128 the H/3/1 group that left the old camp (minus 2 officers and 60 enlisted left behind at the old camp and the 45 men guarding Libby Bridge) arrived at the new camp (coordinates 122982). At 0145 the remainder of H/3/1 (2 officers and 60 enlisted) departed the old camp and arrived at 0554. Following reveille shakedown of the new area began and the Battalion assumed the mission of Battalion in reserve.

The following training was on the schedule.

0800-2400 Battalion fire

FRIDAY, JULY 10, 1953

The Battalion continued shakedown of the new camp.

The following training was on the schedule.

0001-1200 Battalion firing
1300-1630 company commander's administrative time
1300-1400 Battalion supply
1400 showers
1400-1500 lecture for all men who arrived with the June & July (32nd and 33rd) drafts
1900-2400 compass march (company - night)

Officers and staff NCOs were scheduled for combat intelligence training in the mess hall between 1900 and 2000.
While the Battalion continued the shakedown of the new area, the 34th replacement draft assigned to 3/1 arrived at 1330.

The H/3/1 July 1953 Monthly Personnel Roster shows the following Marines were probably in the 34th replacement draft. They arrived in Korea in July and joined H/3/1 about this date.

- Cpl Dewey Maltese 041103/0302
- PFC Thomas J. Absher 1339844/0300
- PFC Robert M. Alverson 1265280/0300
- SSgt Kenneth L. Anthony 813750/5711
- Pvt Henry K. Beckwith 1020457/0300
- PFC Joseph S. Blake Jr. 1313414/0300
- PFC Ronald R. Boone 1271516/0334
- Cpl Julius D. Braun 1190626/3531
- PFC Paul F. Brehun 1254835/3531
- PFC Donald L. Craig 1306799/0300
- Sgt Homer H. G. Eachus 1229590/0316
- PFC John "Gus" A. Foote 1264828/0311 (joined 1st Sqd. 2nd Plt.)
- PFC Thomas J. Franzese 1337530/0311
- Cpl Tommie J. Freeman 1271583/2531
- PFC Oscar R. Gomez 1318883/0331
- Sgt Bremman G. Thielen 1130546/0335

The following training was on the schedule.
- 0800-1130 Battalion Commander's inspection
- 1300-1630 organized athletics

Holiday routine.
The day was very hot.
The hazards of warfare were not only on the front line. This day four Marines (not from H/3/1) were killed and eight wounded by mines to the rear of the MLR.

Routine day. Indoctrination of the 34th Replacement draft began

It rained very hard this night and the next morning. On this day and the 15th, flood conditions existed when the Imjin crested to 26 feet at Libby Bridge. Roads were impassable for three days.

Joseph Doc Candilora (left)(possibly to Bn Med.)
PFC Allen C. Entwistle was dropped from the Company.

A CPX commenced at 2000. The CPX OP was maintained at base camp

At 0700 the CPX, that began yesterday, was secured.
Sgt James Kicklighter was dropped from the Company.

SSgt Clyde W. Keel, who had been a H/3/1 Marine, was now on his second tour in Korea with A/1/5. Clyde had received a Letter of Commendation (with Combat V) and a Bronze Star (with Combat V) while serving with H/3/1. On this day he was KIA and received a Silver Star (Posthumously) for his actions while serving with A/1/5. Clyde was from Cliff, NM and is buried there.

SATURDAY, JULY 18, 1953

Indoctrination period for the Battalion’s 34th Replacement Draft personnel was completed.

SUNDAY, JULY 19, 1953

The truce negotiators working at Panmunjom had reached final agreement on all remaining disputed points. Staff officers were scheduled to begin drawing up details of the armistice agreement and boundaries of the demilitarized zone.

Notwithstanding these peace negotiations, the enemy started another major assault against the two Berlin outposts during this night. An estimated enemy reinforced Battalion engaged the 7th Marines at Berlin (grid coordinates 083079) and East Berlin (grid coordinates 088079). The 7th Marines employed small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades supported by mortars, artillery, and tanks. The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades supported by mortars and artillery. At 2250 the outposts were engaged in a strong firefight and at 2315 the CCF overran Berlin.

MONDAY, JULY 20, 1953

At 0025 the CCF overran East Berlin. At 0045 action ceased with both outposts under enemy control. At 0146, Berlin, defended by 44 Marines, and East Berlin, defended by 37 Marines, were officially declared under enemy control. Friendly casualties were 4 KIA, 96 WIA, and 85 MIA. Enemy casualties, 9 counted KIA, 275 estimated KIA, and 630 estimated WIA. The numbers of casualties exceeded the number of Marines manning the outposts but it is assumed that others (reinforcements, supporting units, etc) were also involved in the action.

I Corps canceled a planned counter attack by 2/7 a half-hour before it was to begin, at 0730. A decision subsequently rendered from I Corps directed that the positions not be retaken.

As a result of the loss of the outposts and the number of casualties suffered, the 7th Marines requested that units of the Division Reserve (the 1st Marines) be placed under their control to help check further aggressive moves by the enemy. It now appeared the enemy might attempt to seize Hill 119, Boulder City, which was a short distance south of Berlin and East Berlin.

The employment of the Defense-in-Depth concept was put into effect. One company occupied Hill 119 to the rear of the Berlin complex. Three companies organized the high ground to the right and rear (east and north) of the MLR to Hill 111, the limiting point on the boundary between the 1st Marine Division and British Commonwealth Division. Three more companies fortified the Hill 126 area, which was to the rear and left of Berlin (not the Hill 126 that was directly south of Hill 111), to its juncture with the western battalion sector held by 1/7.

During the afternoon, 2/1 was transferred to 7th Marines control as a first step in the scheduled relief of the 7th, due off line on 26 July. Late this night or early next morning, F/2/7 was assigned the mission to reinforce Hill 119. Later another 2/1 platoon was also ordered to strengthen the position.

Reveille was held at 0230 and at 0500 all companies of 3/1 were working on the Kansas Line (Located between 137024 and 165025. At 1130 all companies of the Battalion secured work for the day.
TUESDAY, JULY 21, 1953

On this day the Battalion moved to another camp in division reserve for possible immediate tactical employment. The new camp was located at coordinates 078995, Camp Rose, and a rear echelon was left at coordinates 122982 as a security and maintenance detail for equipment left in that area.)

The same work plan as the previous day was followed. Approximately 75% of the trenches were brought to a depth of 6 feet and approximately 75% of the fighting and crap holes were reconditioned.

At 1937 advanced details from all units of the battalion left for the 3/7 area of the MLR to establish liaison for relief. They arrived at 3/7 at 2105. H/3/1 sent 1 officer (Lt Lindquist, the 2nd Platoon Leader) and sixteen enlisted Marines. Cpl. James E. Jones (the 1st Squad leader of the 3rd Platoon), Sgt. Edward Crawford (the 3rd Squad leader of the 3rd Platoon), Bob Culp (the 3rd Platoon Sgt), Lt. Carl Lindquist, and Sgt. Paul Calleja (2nd Section Leader of the Machine Gun Platoon) were among those in the advanced party who went to Hill 111. Hill 111 is on the extreme right flank of the Marine sector. The Australians, who were manning the Hook, were tied in with the Marines on their right. They consisted of the 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (2 RAR) and the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR) as the forward elements of the 1st Commonwealth Division. The Australians would incur 5 KIA and 24 WIA during this last battle before the cease fire. There would be a lull in the fighting for the next few days that was to last until July 24th.

At 0855 the Battalion was released from the 30 minute alert it had been on since the yesterday. At 1716, one platoon from G/3/1 departed for 3/7 and came under their operational control at 1802. At 2130 the G/3/1 platoon occupied a portion of Hill 119 (Boulder City) (coordinates 084078). During the night this platoon suffered 1 KIA and 2 WIA from incoming.

At 1900 the Battalion was again put on a 30 minute alert with trucks standing by.

Guarding Libby Bridge wasn't all work. Even Marines get a chance to relax and enjoy themselves. On this date PFC Gulick and some of the other Marines in his squad were swimming and bathing in the Imjin River near the northwest corner of Libby Bridge. They were having such a good time on this sunny day that time passed without thought. Later in the evening, Paul realized that one area of his body, his ass, had not yet been sufficiently tanned to protect him from the sun. He had a terrific sunburn on his rear end and the back of his legs.

Normally this would not have been much of a problem because the burns were not bad enough to cause severe damage, just a lot of pain and peeling of the skin. However, unknown to Gulick at this date, starting on the next day, he would not be able to change clothes for the next week and would have to deal with the pain from the raw and uncomfortable peeling skin.

Up at the front, planes were bombing Berlin and east Berlin, two outpost in front of Boulder City (Hill 119) that had recently been lost to Chinese. Lt. Lindsay, how had been a H/3/1 Marine and now a Regimental AT Platoon leader, witnessed the event. He couldn't see how anyone could survive the bombing. Then he recalled how the Chinese were like moles who dug deep and far.

THURSDAY, JULY 23, 1953
At 0833 the Battalion was released from the 30 minute alert they were put on at 1900 last night.

At 1856 the remainder of G/3/1 (reinforced) departed for 3/7 and came under their operational control at 1945. Meanwhile, 3/1 was again put on a 30 minute alert at 1922. At 2010 G/3/1 departed 3/7 for Hill 119 and assumed a portion of the responsibility for defense of Hill 119 (Boulder City). They received incoming during the night but no enemy ground activity.

Cpl James E. Jones (with the advanced party on Hill 111) found a case of grenades in a fighting hole. At first he thought they were concussion (stun) grenades. After a closer look he learned they were the new fragmentation grenades. They were colored olive drab and had a smooth surface as opposed to the older type of corrugated fragmentation grenades. They were smaller but a bit heavier. The new grenade divides into many more fragments when exploded.

The Chinese have a grenade they call a potato masher. Instead of pulling a pin, to arm the potato masher you must unscrew the wooden cap which is attached to a string inside the wooden handle. When the string is pulled, the fuse is lit.

Cpl James E. Jones was told to report to the H/3/7 CP. He was to go on a reconnaissance patrol with the 7th Marines to learn their patrol routes. He was briefed on the check points and what to do if they were hit by the Chinese. They left the gate on Hill 111 and followed a path of communications wire that had been left by previous patrols. Both sides of the trail were mined. After about 150 yards they came to a little stream with a bank on both sides where they stopped. Jones approached the patrol leader and asked, "aren't we going to run the whole patrol?" The reply came back, "Some of us are short-timers and this is as far as we go." About this time they heard noises and watched about thirty Chinese forming on the other side of the bank. The Marines remained in position for about thirty to forty five minutes, when the Chinese pulled back. The CP was shooting flares but couldn't see the patrol. When the Chinese were out of sight and hearing range, the patrol came up on the sound powered telephone and reported the sighting. The patrol was told to return to the MLR.

Pvt Charlie J. Wright Jr. was dropped from the Company.
There was some confusion about which Hill/Hills constitute the area referred to as "Boulder City". In the "U.S. Marine Operations in Korea," volume V states that Hill 119 is more formally referred to as Boulder City. In other books/magazines, Hill 111 is incorrectly referred to as Boulder City. In yet other books Boulder City is referred to as the complex of hills in the extreme eastern sector of the Division.

A copy of "3rd Battalion, 1st Marines History of "D" Division Sector 27 July-10 Aug. 1953" has cleared up the confusion about the location of Boulder City. That document gives the specific grid coordinates of Hill 119 and identifies it as Boulder City. The grid coordinates show that Boulder City, Hill 119, is located about 2,000 yards (a mile and a quarter) to the southwest of Hill 111. However, because some authors did not know the true identity of Boulder City, they wrote documentation that identifies the Hill complex (general area) between Hill 119 and Hill 111 as Boulder City and documentation identifying Hill 111 as Boulder City. When reading documents referring to "Boulder City" care should be taken to determine which Hills the author is addressing.

Early in the evening, a heavy preparation of 61mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars combined with 76mm and 122mm artillery shells began raining down on Boulder City (Hill 119) and Hill 111. The lull in ground fighting ended when the enemy attacked Hill 111, defended by H/3/7, and Hill 119, defended by G/3/1. The Platoon Sqt. of H/3/7's 2nd Platoon, Charles Owens, said his under-strength 2nd Platoon was the only unit on Hill 111. He said the rest of the company was across the narrow valley to the south on Hill 126 and their Company CP was behind Hill 126. Charles also said that there were very few H/3/7 Marines left on the morning of the 25th. They had all been KIA or WIA and evacuated. H/3/7's 2nd Plt. Sgt. said he could get no Marine artillery and mortar support during this evening. He said the only support he could get was from the Australians. The 3rd Platoon and two squads from the 2nd Platoon of H/3/1 were the units who were on their way to relieve the H/3/7 unit on Hill 111. They arrived too late (about 2400) to help defend Hill 111 (but were the unit that retook the hill the next morning). By 2100, the CCF had overrun the entire trench-line (about 500 yards) on the forward slopes of Hill 111. It is fortunate they did not continue their attack to the reverse slope because there were few 7th Marines left at this time to keep them from continuing their attack to the reverse slopes.

It is stated in, "Marine Corps Operations in Korea, Volume V, (Operations in West Korea)", that "By 2120, the bulk of the Chinese had began to withdraw from Hill 111." The referenced book also states that Hill 111 was apparently only a diversion and Hill 119, Boulder City, defended by G/3/1 was their main Objective.

From the author of this book's viewpoint, it is not apparent why the Chinese would withdraw the majority of their troops from Hill 111 and leave an insufficient number of troops to defend it. The author thinks it is more likely that the Chinese who survived the assault of Hill 111 were not strong enough to continue the attack and, after taking the trench-line, remained there in an attempt to prevent the Marines from retaking the hill. Furthermore, the Chinese's approaches to Hill 111 were observable by Marines on Hill 126 and Australians on the Hook and neither of these units reported seeing any Chinese withdrawing from Hill 111 after arriving for the initial attack. It is therefore assumed by the author of this book that the Chinese who arrived on Hill 111 died there, either that night or the next morning when H/3/1 retook the trench-line.

The enemy attacked Hill 119 (Boulder City) at 2030 with a Battalion. The close, heavy fighting raged on through the morning hours, with enemy troops steadily reinforcing by way of the Berlin and East Berlin Gates, the best avenue of approach to forward positions of Hill 119. At 2100, the CCF hurled a second attack against Hill 119 in the strength of two companies supported by mortar and artillery fire. Again at 2030 the Chinese threw another force against Hill 119. An hour later hand-to-hand combat had developed all along the 700 yards of forward trench. G/3/1 was down to half their original number, ammunition was running low, and evacuation of casualties was slowed by the fact that two of the eight corpsmen had been KIA and most of the rest were themselves casualties.

By midnight, the front, left, and right flanks of the perimeter had been pushed back.
to the reverse slope of Hill 119 and only a never-say-die resistance was keeping the enemy from seizing the remainder of the position. By 2400, an estimated 6,000 to 8,000 hostile rounds had fallen in the Division sector. Almost all of this incoming was in the 3/1 sector. In response to the enemy's bombardment, Marine artillery hammered the CCF continuously from 2100 to midnight. Four friendly rocket ripples were launched in support of the Hill 119 defenders. In one of the Regiment's most intense counter-battery shoots on record, the 11th Marines in three hours had fired 157 missions.

Let's take a minute to review the location of units to better understand the overall situation at this time.

3/7 had operational control of the 1st Marine Division's extreme right sector, which encompassed a mile, and a quarter of MLR between Boulder City (Hill 119) and Hill 111. The Hook was to the right of Hill 111 and the Australians were defending it. They hadn't been attacked by the Chinese. Because of the heavy action, and resulting casualties by the 7th Marines, the CO, 7th Marines requested and got the use of two 1st Marine rifle companies, G/3/1 and I/3/1. This is the reason G/3/1 was on Boulder City during the night of the 24th. The Chinese were supported by heavy artillery and mortar fire. I/3/1 also got into the action behind, and on, Boulder City. At 2215 they moved out and took especially heavy casualties when caught in an artillery barrage behind Hill 119 on their way to reinforce G/3/1.

The morning of July 25th, D/2/7 and a platoon from C/1/1, relieved G/3/1 and I/3/1 on Hill 119. G/3/1 and I/3/1 were put in reserve to allow them time to reorganize after sustaining heavy losses the night of the 24-25th. E/2/7 and I/3/7 defended the MLR between Boulder City and Hill 126. They were not attacked by Chinese infantry. Starting about dusk on the night of the 24th, H/3/1's 1st Platoon began relieving the same unit of H/3/7 on Hill 126 and H/3/1's 2nd and 3rd Platoon began relieving the H/3/7 units on Hill 111. During the last couple days of the war, even though 3/1 had operational control of the extreme right fount, H/3/1 was the only organic 3/1-rifle Company that remained on line. G/3/1 and I/3/1 were in reserve recuperating and being reinforced.

Most of the information provided for the last few days of the war, and the post war period, came from PFC Paul Gulick, a BAR-man in the 3rd Squad, 3rd Platoon and author of this book. It is the result of his recollections and research. Contributions from other Marines have also been received and incorporated in the text to give their account of the activities. The following is what is known of those activities.

At 0730 the Battalion secured from the 30 minute standby to which they had been ordered and commenced their relief of 3/7. The relief was scheduled to be completed by daylight of July 25th. That time schedule would not be met because of the seriousness of the situation.

At 0740, W/3/1, who had left 3/1 at 0730 arrived at 3/7 and came under their operational control.

At 1220 the Battalion closed the old CP at coordinates 078995 (Camp Rose) and opened the new CP at coordinates 108072 (about 2 miles east of Hill 119). When they arrived they came under operational control of 3/7.

At 1430, the H/3/1 platoon (probably the 3rd Platoon) that was guarding Libby Bridge was relieved by a platoon of the 7th Marines. PFC Gulick was among the H/3/1 platoon. When he returned to the 3rd Platoon area from his afternoon tour of guard duty at Libby Bridge, his platoon was loading aboard a convoy of trucks. Their leisurely tour of guard duty at Libby Bridge was being cut short. They weren't originally scheduled to relieve the 7th Marines until the 26th but the 7th Marines were being hit hard and needed reinforcements fast.

This was what Paul was waiting for. He was anxious to get into the fighting. Every since he was sixteen he had wanted to get into battle to see what it was like. It may have been the movie, "The Sands of Iwo Jima," the need to prove himself, or just the desire for adventure. Whatever it was, he had changed his birth certificate and joined up when he was sixteen but was exposed when his mother squealed on him. Then in December 1951, before his seventeenth birthday, January 12, 1952, he signed up with the Erie, PA Marine Recruiter to go as soon as possible after his birthday. On January 15th he was on his way to the Buffalo, NY recruiting center for further travel to Parris Island.
When his aptitude were high, they offered to send him to a school after boot camp, but he wasn't having any of that. He wanted nothing but infantry. How's that for being Gung Ho? It wasn't until after boot camp that they told him that he couldn't go into a combat zone until he was eighteen years old. What a put down! They sent him to NAS (Naval Air Station), Lakehurst, NJ where he became a member of the guard detachment for the remainder of 1952.

Among his friends at Lakehurst was PFC Philip (Lefty) Brohen who had arrived at Lakehurst later in 1952. Lefty had been a boxer in the NJ Golden Gloves competition. He had a good left hook. Paul still has the broken nose to prove it. Notwithstanding this altercation, they were great buddies and spent many happy times on liberty together at Otto's and the Alligator Inn, two bars between NAS, Lakehurst and the city of Lakewood. Like Paul, Lefty was Gung Ho, and also couldn't wait to get to Korea.

While Paul was on Christmas leave there was an opening for one man to go to Camp Pendleton for advanced infantry training. When Paul came back from leave, he learned they had put Brohen's name on the list to go to Camp Pendleton. Paul complained to the 1st Sgt. that he had seniority. They replaced Brohen's name with Gulick's name, and Paul was on his way.

When he arrived at Camp Pendleton, he was anxious and ready to begin his training and get on his way. Hell, he didn't need any training anyway, he had been convinced by his boot camp DI that there wasn't anything he couldn't do and he was sure that was true. He was in a hurry to get to Korea. Why not just send him now? He was ready.

However, the chow Gods decided that the Marines needed to be fed more than Gulick needed to get to Korea so they put him on mess duty for 30 days. Gad, what a letdown. He had already spent a month on mess duty in Lakehurst and it wasn't fair to have to do it again. Another delay! Wouldn't he ever get there? The War to end all Wars (WW II) was over and this may be his last chance to see combat in this "Police Action".

The bottom line is that his endless tour of mess duty finally came to an end. Advanced infantry training followed and he was finally ready to go. Philip Brohen arrived at Pendleton about two months after Gulick and they spent more good times together. Then finally, Paul boarded ship and he was on his way to Korea with the 32nd Replacement draft.

Is Paul an exception or is this similar to the types of thoughts, feelings, and actions that are characteristic of a young man joining the Marines and seeking combat experience? After observing young Marines during his twenty four-year career, Paul has concluded that he, like all others, is unique. They all have their own individual motivations and reasons for their actions. Few would want to confess some of their true feelings. Especially when they are still young and macho. You probably couldn't have gotten this story from Paul until he was over fifty and finally able to laugh at some of his many mistakes and misadventures. Notwithstanding this confession, he wouldn't change his past even if he could.

Anyway, back to July 24th, with the loading aboard trucks to go to the front. During Paul's short convoy ride to the front, he could hear the sounds of our outgoing artillery and mortars growing louder. After a while, some of the noises sounded a little different. Upon further investigation, the sounds were coming from areas where there was no friendly artillery firing, but where puffs of smoke could be seen. Paul thought, "Hey, somebody is shooting at us! Does the driver know? Somebody better tell the Platoon leader, Lt. Lutz!". Nobody else seemed too alarmed. At least they didn't show it. So Paul just sat in the back of the truck and thought about it as those sounds of landing rounds got louder and louder - and closer and closer.

While the H/3/1 convoy was enroute, Cpl James E. Jones, who had been with the advanced party on Hill 111, again reported to the H/3/7 CP behind Hill 126 to go on another patrol. They moved to the patrol's point-of-departure at the gate on Hill 111 and waited for the word to move out. The gate is not a gate with hinges but rather a controlled access to friendly trench lines from/to no-man's land. It is referred to as a gate because it is a controlled access point (openings in the barbed wire) where Marines go between the MLR trench line and no-man's land (the area between the MLR and the Chinese). The gate is guarded by machine guns, BARs, and riflemen instead of hinges and a barbed wire fence. Incoming mortar and artillery shells were landing heavily. About midnight word came to
abort the patrol because H/3/7 was being hit heavily on the left the other side, of Hill 111.

James Jones reported that at one time, while he was with the 7th Marines, he captured a prisoner and was treating his wounds. He had been told that he would get a five-day R&R in Japan for capturing a prisoner. A 7th Marine came up behind Jones and "emptied his magazine into the Chinese". Jones didn't get his R&R but he did get powder burns on his cheek.

At 1915 the H/3/1 convoy arrived at the new Battalion CP and everyone disembarked from the trucks and waited orders. They came under operational control of 3/7. After receiving instruction, Lt. Lutz came back to brief the platoon. Paul's Platoon, the third, and two squads of the second platoon were to relieve H/3/7's 2nd Platoon on Hill 111. The H/3/7 2nd Platoon Sgt. was Charles Owens. The 1st Platoon and one squad of the 2nd Platoon was to man Hill 126 (or else the one squad of the 2nd Platoon was to be held in reserve at/near the Company CP). Hill 111 was a little over two miles further up the road. They were told that H/3/7 was currently being attacked by the Chinese and the situation was unknown because they had lost contact with H/3/7. It was later estimated that a force of about a company of Chinese had attacked Hill 111 under the cover of heavy enemy mortars and artillery. They were told to double-time up the road widely dispersed, and get to Hill 111 as soon as possible. They were told that members of the advanced party would meet them on the road near Hill 111 and would guide them along the way.

The road to Hill 111, which was tied in with the "Hook" on the right, was a dirt road a narrow one lane wide. It had hills on the left and flat areas to the immediate right of the road that may have been small rice paddies at one time. Farther to the right, on the other side of the flat area, were more hills. Paul didn't know where he was but could tell that the front lines were just over the hill to his left because he could hear the sounds of war in that direction. Incoming mortars were landing along the road in front and in back of him. The closer to Hill 111 he got, the more frequently the mortars were dropping and the closer they were coming.

The platoon started moving up the road toward Hill 111. They were double timing and soon became widely disbursed. Paul remembers there were few other Marines around him on the road. He was at or near the front of the platoon. He came across a Marine who was really shook up (crying, incoherent, unable to communicate, etc.) on the road. Paul stopped to see if he could help him but somebody came along and told Paul, "Get going. A corpsman would be along to take care of him." He thinks both of these guys may have been in H/3/1 but doesn't remember their names.

Paul started running up the road again. After running a long way he stopped to rest and collect his thoughts. He was really out of breath and wandered where the whereabouts of the rest of his squad and platoon. He knew that most were behind him but thought there might be someone ahead. About this time he heard a heavy mortar (sounded like a 120) landing back down the road about two hundred yard where he had just came from. He wondered about the guy he had just left. Then a mortar round landed about one hundred fifty yards down the road; then another about 125 yards away; then another about one hundred yards away, all on the road. He got the message. They were walking mortars up the road. He knew they were coming his way so his first though was to get down and let them pass over, but then he thought he would try to outrun them so he started running again as fast as he could with his heavy load (bar, full ammo belt, and backpack). Other mortars landed around him but those walking up the road never caught up to him. By this time it was very dark.

Shortly after the War was over, on August 2, 1953, Sgt John Gilligan wrote a letter home and told about his involvement in the following action.

Sgt John Gilligan, the 1st Squad Leader of the 2nd Platoon, also remembers going up this road that lead from Battalion to the back of Hill 126 and then on to Hill 111. He recalls when he got about half way, "... all hell broke loose". He said, "Mortars and artillery came in so thick it was pitiful". He and his squad dove in the mud gutter on the side of the road. They stayed there for an hour and twenty minutes before the barrage lifted a little. When it did, they ran the remaining mile to Hill 126 at full gate.

Meanwhile, Paul came to a place where the road was cut through a small finger that came down from a hill on the left. This was Hill 126 but he didn't know it at that time.
There, in the cut in the road, was a couple Marines who asked Paul if he was from the 3rd Platoon. Paul's not sure who the Marines were but they were probably part of the advanced party.

A Marine told Paul to drop his backpack beside the road and then took him through the cut, which was only about 30 yards long, to near the other end of the cut. Little did Paul know that this would be the last time he would see his backpack for about three months. Looking through the cut to the north, there was open terrain to their front; what probably had been a rice paddies in earlier years. It was now overgrown with a few short scrubb bushes. The Marine pointed up the road and told Paul that the road turned to the left and went over to Hill 111. He pointed to Hill 111 which was visibly silhouetted by moonlight and flares. It was about 4-500 yards away and seemed very quiet. The Marine said to be careful because he didn't know what the situation was on Hill 111. The last he knew was that the Chinese had attacked a few hours before and he had heard nothing from the Marines on Hill 111 since. The Marine told Paul to run across the valley and meet up with other Marines on Hill 111. Then the Marine quickly left to go back and meet with other Marines who were coming up the road and arriving at the cut in the road.

Paul left the cut in the road and started moving up the road through the open valley that lead to Hill 111. His conversation with the Marine had been brief and the Marine didn't seem to be sure how many, if any, Marines were over there on Hill 111. The Marine had told Paul to run through the valley until he got over to Hill 111 but it wasn't clear why Paul should run into the unknown and perhaps get ambushed.

Paul thought it better to stalk his way over to the hill, keeping an eye open for any movement that might alert him to danger. He went twenty five yards, then fifty yards out in the open valley, and that's about when everything around him began exploding. He dropped to the ground and, in an instant, a revelation came; they were shooting at him! Apparently somebody could see him in the light of the flares or moon and was shooting at him with artillery or something! Later Paul would learn that he was in a valley where the Chinese would snipe at anything that came through with 76mm recoilless rifles. They called this, and many other areas like this, "a 76 alley". He got up and made a 400-yard dash for Hill 111. Now he better understood why the Marine back in the cut had told him to run through the valley.

As he approached the foot of Hill 111 he was winded from the run and still apprehensive about what lay ahead so he dropped in a depression beside the road to get his wind and evaluate the situation. It turned out to be a partially dried-up, mud puddle but it was relative safety for now. A few minutes later, two Marines came running up the road behind Paul, stopped to look at Paul, and then continued. Paul didn't move because they were approaching him from his rear where he couldn't see them so he just laid there not making a move. He didn't know if they were friend or foe until they continued on up the road to his front where they could be seen. After another couple minutes of catching his breath, Paul got up and continued up the road toward Hill 111, following behind the two Marines who had just passed.

After about another fifty five yards, Paul came upon two Marines who told him to take a defensive position in the ditch by the road and watch up the hill. As he recalls there was probably less than a dozen Marines behind Hill 111 at this time. The Chinese had taken the forward trench-lines and top of the hill. They were expected to come down the reverse slope at any minute. It was very lonely at first because there were only a few Marines with Paul and he thought there must be quite a few Chinese up there if they could overpower a dug-in, reinforced platoons of H/3/7. Other H/3/1 Marines that came behind Paul also took up hasty defensive positions in the muddy ditches beside the road. Incoming mortars were continually landing heavily in the area. As more H/3/1 Marines came, Paul began to feel a little more secure, but still scared. He wasn't thinking about how he got here or other such things. He was concentrating on only one thing, "Getting those guys that are coming down that hill before they get me".

As time went by, more H/3/1 Marines arrived. The growing number of Marines in a concentrated area was resulting in several casualties from the in coming mortars. Later in the night, as they got better organized, they decided to take turns staying in a living bunker on the reverse slope of the hill to get cover from the falling mortars and
artillery. If the Chinese came, there was enough Marines outside the bunker to delay the Chinese until those in the bunkers could get out and aid in the defense.

For those who aren't familiar with living bunkers, they are bunkers where there is relative protection from artillery and mortar fire. The few on the reverse slope of Hill 111 were about six to eight feet square, with room enough for about three cots. They were built of timbers (about 12 X 12) and had a couple feet of sandbags on top. They could pretty well stand a hit from about anything except a direct hit from a 120mm mortar. H/3/1 threw the cots out and as many as possible took shelter in the living bunkers.

John Gilligan also remembers arriving at Hill 111 with his squad (eleven counting John). When he arrived, about 0100, he found a bunker to put his squad in and went to look for his Platoon Leader, Lt. Carl Lindquist. He didn't know that Carl had been in the forward trench-line earlier in the night when the Chinese hit and would never be seen again (MIA).

Lt. Carl Lindquist (2nd Platoon Leader) and Sgt Paul Calleja (2nd Section Leader of the Machine Gun Platoon) were with H/3/7 in the trench line on the left side of Hill 111. They were two of the advanced party that had arrived a few days earlier to coordinate H/3/1's arrival. Just before the Chinese attacked, Sgt Calleja had left Lt Lindquist to move down the trench line to the left, towards the low, narrow valley between Hills 111 and 126. Lt Lindquist was near a small hole that had been dug into the hill from the trench line. Sgt Calleja is the last person who remembers seeing Lt. Lindquist. During the action Sgt Calleja was WIA and evacuated this night. He was laying in a hospital with the loss of an eye and was not available on July 28th (after the cease fire) to look for Lt. Lindquist. At that time, he didn't even know Lt. Lindquist was missing. Cpl James Browne became the squad leader of the 2nd machine gun section.

Bob Culp also remembers Lt. Carl E. Lindquist. He remembers that Carl was afraid of snakes and played a joke on him having to do with snakes about July 23rd.

During the night, Gulick remembers seeing only four of the H/3/7 Marines who had been defending Hill 111. When Paul saw them they were in a living bunker on the reverse slope of the hill and they weren't talking. Where was the rest of H/3/7's Marines who had been defending Hill 111? H/3/1's reinforced 3rd Platoon and two squads of the 2nd Platoons consisted of about a hundred Marines. There must have been seventy five or a hundred H/3/7 Marines defending Hill 111 before Paul arrived. As far as Paul knows, they weren't there when he arrived so he assumes that they must have been KIA or WIA and evacuated. Paul has tried to get in touch with the H/3/7 reunion group to find out just what happened from their view point. It is not known where the missing 7th Marines were but Paul has since learned that there weren't that many H/3/7 Marines that were KIA. Probably many of them were WIA and some may have moved back down the road without Gulick noticing when they were relieved.

Paul's defensive position on his turn outside the living bunker was just around the corner of the bunker, looking up hill. Luckily he was laying flat on the ground when a mortar round (probably about 82mm) landed about 6-8 feet to Paul's right front. About this time Paul wanted to crawl under his helmet and pull in the few hairs that stuck out. Any additional protection would be welcome. The mortar round had left a slight depression where it landed. Paul was thinking about crawling over there to get in the depression and a little lower when another mortar round landed in exactly the same place. Who said procrastination doesn't pay off. It saved Paul's life this time. Neither round had caused any physical damage to Paul because he was hugging the ground so closely. Had he been standing, he surely would have been hit with shrapnel. He went into the bunker shaking and said it was someone else's turn out there. He had enough for a while.

One of the times when it was Paul's turn to get in the bunker, he heard two Marines telling about a dead Marine who was laying in a mud puddle at the bottom of the hill. Paul soon realized these were the two Marines who had passed him earlier and they were talking about him. He assured them that he was still alive.

Cpl Wilber "Bubbles" T. Barbeau 1159141/0311 was KIA and dropped from H/3/1's rolls this date. One report said Wilbur was helping to evacuate some wounded Marines when he received fatal head wounds. Another report said he was behind a tank directing fire to those inside the tank (via the tanks phone) when the tank backed over him. Aubrey "Dick"
bounds reported that a round (perhaps 61mm) landed between he and Wilber and was the cause of Wilber's death. Bounds thought he was wounded but it turned out that he only had mud in his yet as a result of the explosion.
SATURDAY, JULY 25, 1953

The 1st Platoon and one squad of the second Platoon were located on Hill 126 under the command of Lt. Louis Proctor. It is believed that the one squad of the 2nd Platoon that was on Hill 126 was probably held as the reserve (clutch) force. As they began arriving at about 1000 they filed into the trench to relieve elements of H/3/7. The trench line on the right (north) side of Hill 126 ended when it came down to a low valley. On the other side of the low valley was the beginning of the trench line on Hill 111. This is one of the many areas in Korea that was called "76 Alley" meaning that when you walked through the valley you could be seen by the enemy and they would snipe at you with 76mm recoilless rifles.

Many of the 7th Marines who had been overrun by the Chinese this night tried to make their way to safety by moving to the left (south) through the Hill 111 trench line, then across the valley to safety with the friendly forces on Hill 126. Erwin Boyer was with the troops on Hill 126 and he said that Eugene Bradford should have gotten a medal for his actions on this night. Erwin said that Eugene made several trips across the valley to help direct the Marines from Hill 111 to Hill 126. He aided several wounded Marines in this process. Eugene's WIA probably came during this action.

Meanwhile on Hill 119 about a mile and a quarter to the SW of Hill 111, G/3/1 had their hands full. At 0015, the thinning ranks of G/3/1 (now down to 25 percent effective) were cheered by the news that I/3/1 was about to reinforce their position. This latter unit itself suffered 35 casualties while moving into the rear area, when the Chinese intercepted a coded message and shifted a substantial amount of their mortar and artillery fire to the rear approaches of Hill 119. The Chinese had broken through a substantial part of the trench-work on the forward slope of Boulder City. For a while they occupied the rocky, scrub-grown crest of the hill as well.

A swift-moving counterattack launched at 0130 by G/3/1 and I/3/1 that was led by Capt. Louis J. Sartor began to restore a favorable balance to the situation. At 0330 the MLR had been reestablished and the Marines had the controlling hand. By 0530 the Hill 119 area was secured, with four new platoons, E/2/7 and a platoon from C/1/1, aiding in the defense. Scattered groups of Chinese still clung to the forward slopes, and others vainly tried to reinforce by the Berlin-to-Hill 119 left flank trench-line.

The CCF was also attacking outposts Ester and Dagmar farther to the SW in the 5th Marines Sector where the forward trench-lines were lost. This was the heaviest encounter of the month in the 5th Marines sector and it cost them 12 KIA, 35 evacuated WIA, and another 63 less serious WIA.

Back at Hill 111, enough H/3/1'3 Marines had arrived by about midnight to begin getting control of the situation. H/3/1 was on the right flank of the 1st Marine Division and were supposed to be tied in with the Australians on the right. No one knew how bad they had been hit nor even if they were still there. Lt. Lutz, 3rd Platoon Commander, told the 3rd Squad to patrol to the right side of Hill 111 and to see if they could make contact with the Australians.

The 3rd Squad made contact with the Australians's lines to the left, back toward Hill 111. There were a couple of Auzies with a Bren gun in the last Auzie bunker. It was a machine gun bunker. This was a relatively low area in a saddle between Hill 111 and the Hook which the Australians held. From there, the trench-line went to the left, up the right side of Hill 111 just below the military crest. About twenty feet up the trench-line from the Auzie bunker there was a dead 7th Marine in the trench-line. The Auzies said he had tried to go up the trench-line earlier that night but was killed by a Chinese grenade. James E. Jones said the Australians had told him, "They kept challenging the 7th Marine coming down the trench line. He would not answer and just kept coming so they killed him with a bren gun." The 3rd squad used sandbags to fabricate a bridge over him so they wouldn't have to walk on the body. Nothing could be seen farther up the trench-line toward the top of Hill 111 but it was obvious that the Chinese were there. The 3rd squad found another trench-line that lead from this last Auzie bunker back to the reverse slope. They left a few Marines to help defend this area and returned to report their findings to Lt. Lutz. He had set up a temporary CP on the bottom of the Hill.
on the reverse slope of Hill 111.

Lt. Lutz decided to make his own reconnaissance of the area and took his radioman along. They went VIA the newly found trench-line that led from the reverse slope to the last Auzie bunker. When they got to the Auzie bunker and looked to the left, up the forward trench-line that wound around the front of Hill 111, it seemed to be quiet. Paul wasn't there at this time but he remembers someone quoting Lt. Lutz who said, "There ain't any Goonies up there". Lt. Lutz wanted to take a closer look but decide he wouldn't go up the trench-line. He didn't want to make the same mistake as the dead H/3/7 Marine lying in the trench. There was no room to maneuver and get out of the way of an incoming grenade. He got out of the trench-line and crawled a short distance up the hill.

The quiet was broken by a burst from a burp gun. It had hit Lutz with a tight pattern of about four to eight rounds and left a two-inch diameter hole in his helmet. The rounds had gone through the right side of his helmet and grazed Lutz's forehead. A dazed Lt. Lutz returned to the reverse slope. He kept repeating, "There are Goonies up there". His wounds weren't serious but bled a lot and required several head bandages. Right after the War, probably on July 27th, Life Magazine took pictures of Lt. Lutz and Lt. Romano, the Mortar (or 2nd) Platoon Leader, on Hill 111. The August __, 1953 issue of Life Magazine show this picture of Ted Lutz's bandages and Carlo Romano.

John Gilligan, not being able to find Lt. Lindquist, reported to Lt. Lutz shortly after Lutz was WIA. Lutz told John there were two gooks in the bunker to the left of the Auzies and to stand by until daylight.

Gulick remembers making at least one more patrol up to this Auzie bunker during the night. The 2nd squad leader was also along on this patrol.

Other than manning his defensive position on the reverse slope of Hill 111, Gulick remembers no other significant action he was involved in during the very early morning hours. He assumes other patrols were sent out to probe other areas.

At 0830, the Chinese again assaulted Hill 119 in company strength. Friendly units employed small arms and automatic weapons supported by mortars, artillery and tanks. The enemy returned small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades supported by mortars and artillery. The Marines Mortar repulsed the enemy, leaving them with heavy enemy losses. Seesaw action continued for most of the rest of the day on the position.

No major enemy infantry attempt was made to reinforce the Chinese on Hill 111 during the morning although the CCF still occupied all of the forward trench-line (about 700 yards long) in the early morning. Hill 111 continued to receive intense enemy shelling during the morning, especially when Marines exposed themselves in efforts to evict the Chinese from the trench-line. Whenever a Marine exposed himself to the enemy FOs, there would soon be an enemy 76MM recoilless rifle snipping at them.

While Hill 119 was being secured, fighting was continuing on Hill 111 to get the enemy out of the trench-line. Heavy incoming (at the rate of 60-70 rounds per minute for ten minutes duration) rained down on Hill 111 in the early hours of the morning. The U. S. Marine Corps Operations in Korea, states that the 7th Marines were still in operational control of Hill 111 but the Author remembers that their were only about nine H/3/7 Marines left on Hill 111 when he arrived. Apparently the 7th Marines still had operational control even though they were few in number on Hill 111. It was H/3/1, with perhaps the help of very few, if any, H/3/7 Marines, who defended Hill 111 from the reverse slope during the night and retook the forward trench-lines the next morning.

Altogether the Communists had committed 3,000 troops across the Marine Division front during the previous night and this morning. The 11th Marines and the ten battalions under its operational control in the Division's sector had fired a total of 23,725 rounds. This includes batteries from the Army's 25th Division Artillery, I Corps Artillery, and 1st Commonwealth Artillery. The artillery outgoing represented 7,057 rounds to assist the 5th Marines at outpost Ester and 16,668 in defense of Boulder City. It is not known how many round were spent in the defense of Hill 111. Perhaps the numbers are a combination of the Boulder City and Hill 111 action as has been done many times in the past. From the author's viewpoint, it appears that the authors of "Marine Corps Operation in Korea", and some other books, may not have realize that the two hills (111 and 119) were about 2,000 yards apart.
Things had quieted down a little bit by daylight and H/3/1 continued to get a more secure grip on their defensive positions. They had sent out patrols and had a better understanding of the situation. It was now time to evict the enemy. If not to evict them, at least to find out how strong their hold was on the forward trench-line.

Sgt John Gilligan recalls taking his squad up the trench the first time. They had been told there were two Chinese in the first bunker. PFC Thomas Hallmark, PFC Roy Brooks, and PFC Bobby Asher were in the front. There was a six-foot gap and then PFC John R. Dunbar and John Gilligan followed. Ten yards behind Gilligan was his other five men (PFC Phillip Brohen, PFC Charles E. Graham, PFC John "Gus" Foote, PFC Robert Bond, PFC Laverne Gould, and the Corpsman "Doc" Caster). Brooks threw two grenades in the first bunker and Hallmark stepped in to spray it with his Thompson sub machinegun but no Chinese were in the bunker. About this time grenades started coming in like rain from above. After Asher was hit in the legs, others in the squad dragged him out. They found out that the two Chinese weren't in the bunker but there were many more above, at least twenty.

The second time, Gilligan got his squad in the trench just out of reach of the Chinese's grenade-throwing range. He then took his squad behind the Chinese and tried to an envelopment to overrun them. Everything went wrong, the ground was a sea of mud and all but two weapons wouldn't fire. Apparently they were having the same problem Gulick was having with his BAR. The chamber had become clogged with mud. Dunbar was hit in his right thigh and then turned to Graham who was with him. He pointed in the direction of the Chinese that had shot him. Graham had a perfect shot but his weapon wouldn't fire. Graham turned and started running as the Chinese shot a couple of rounds. One bullet grazed Graham's leg. He dove for cover in a hole just as the Chinese fired a second burst. All but one round missed. The one round hit his helmet but didn't touch his head. The squad then withdrew and went back to the CP. When Hallmark complained of a chest pain, he unzipped his flak jacket to find a slug had just barely penetrated his skin.

The third time Sgt Gilligan took his squad into the trench, they got about twenty-five yards when they had to withdraw. In this action Bond got a little piece of shrapnel in the cheek, probably from a grenade. This little piece of shrapnel caused him to loose his eye.

The fourth time Gilligan's squad went into the trench, they got about the same twenty-five yards. Then the enemy, in an effort to support their infantry on Hill 111, laid a heavy artillery and mortar barrage down. Bond was hit in the same cheek again and this wound may have caused him to loose his eye. The 1st squad withdrew again.

While this was happening, other 2nd and 3rd Platoon Marines were hitting the Chinese in other places on Hill 111. Gulick recalls the 3rd squad of the 3rd Platoon was trying to go directly over the top of Hill 111 in an attempt to penetrate the trench-line. They made it to the top without opposition. Looking over the top of the hill, they could see the Chinese in the trench-line about 50 yards below. They had seen the Marines coming too. The Chinese had the protection of the trench but the Marines on top, although in the open, had a little mound of dirt that had been made by a tracked vehicle. At least they were out of direct sight of the enemy in the trench.

Gulick laid down in the prone position and took his first shot at the enemy with his BAR. Seeing one running down the trench-line, he took careful aim and pulled the trigger. Without a flinch, the bolt went forward, picked up a round from the magazine, pushed it into the chamber and then crunch. A failure to feed. The round has stopped before going all the way into the chamber.

Not to worry, Marines are taught to be cool and improvise. Gulick frantically pulled the bolt back, yanked out the magazine, pulled out the failed round with his round extractor (index finger), cleaned the dirt out of the face of the BAR's chamber with his trusty ramming tool (little finger), poured in some oil, put in another magazine, pulled the trigger, and bang. He was back in action again. Thereafter, Gulick got some quick shots at some Chinese skirting through the trench-line. A quick glimpse is all you could get as they quickly ran between bunkers in the trench-line.

About this time another BARman was hit in the action. Gulick doesn't recall who he was but must have known him because he was probably in his 3rd squad or another squad in the 3rd Platoon. Bob Cawley was in his squad and was hit about that date. Could it have
been him? When they took out the wounded Marine, Gulick got the wounded Marines' belt of BAR magazines. Gulick always was a pack rat and never could throw anything away. Anyway, the other guy wasn't going to need his belt of ammunition anymore. A BARman never has enough ammunition. The rounds go fast when firing the BAR on automatic and twice as many magazines means you can fire twice as long before reloading magazines.

About this time, a grenade landed about 15 yards in front of Gulick. He looked for the source and soon saw the arm of a Chinese soldier throwing another grenade from a bunker just below him about 50 yards away. Gulick ducked and again the grenade landed about 15 yards short of the mark. The Chinese soldier was in the bunker lobbing grenades from the bunker's aperture that was facing no man's land. He was lobbing the grenades back, over the bunker, up the hill, to the rear, in Gulick's direction hoping to hit the Marines. Little did he know that he couldn't throw a grenade far enough to reach the Marines. He was probably throwing them from the cover of the bunker because if he had been in the trench he would have been exposed.

Gulick soon got the timing down. It went like this. The gook would throw a grenade and Gulick would get a burst at the arm as it appeared over the edge of the bunker. Gulick would then duck, the grenade would explode about 15 yards in front of him, and then he would get back in position to aim at the point where the gook's arm would appear when throwing another grenade. The gook must have had a case of grenades because they just kept coming. Finally, either the gook ran out of grenades or Gulick hit his mark. Anyway, the bottom line is that the Gook didn't throw any more grenades. Gulick would like to think he hit his mark. After all, at that time, they all want to be do-gooders!

About this time the Marines had just about achieved total fire superiority. Marines could aim over the small mound of dirt with relative safety and shoot at any Chinese that showed themselves to take a quick shot. Gulick had a feeling that the battle was won and that the Marines were about to make the assault. He felt confident they had the situation well in hand.

All of a sudden somebody yelled, "Let's get out of here". Gulick couldn't understand why. They had the top of the hill, fire superiority, were in good shape, and were ready to make the heroic charge. Could someone have panicked and made a mistake?

It was about this time that Gulick got the message. Just like last night in the .76 alley behind Hill 111, the gooks were sniping at them with 76s, mortars, or other things that were making loud noises all around him. It began sounding like the fourth of July and he was in the middle of the fireworks. Incoming was landing all around. He looked around and he was alone. He hadn't realized that the others had already pulled back. All he could see was one person who he thinks might have been Ed Crawford, his squad leader. Ed was in a shallow (about 1-foot deep) trench, calling Gulick back.

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Gulick got to his knees, looked back over his right shoulder at Ed, reached for the extra BAR belt to his left front, and then started moving from his knee to his feet to begin running. Wouldn't you know it? He had missed the BAR belt, just like a football end that takes his eye off the football just before he tries to catch it. No sweat, he could quickly pick it up. He kept turning to his left to make a complete 360-degree circle, grabbed the BAR belt, continued turning to his left and began running. Because of this turning momentum, he had started running a little to the right of the direct line of sight with Crawford who was standing at the beginning of the shallow trench-line that lead to the rear (relative safety). Gulick wound up running into some knee-high barbed wire. He was kicking and trying to get loose of the barbed wire and explosions were going off all around him. He tore his legs up on the barbs but finally got loose from the barbed wire. It probably didn't take long to get loose but it seemed like an eternity with all the dust in the air and shrapnel whizzing by.

He headed for the shallow trench where Ed was still urging him on. As he recalls, it was like when you see a slow motion television replay of a touchdown. You hear the spectators urging the runner on and the video replay shows the runner in slow motion. It was like that, Gulick could see Ed urging him to hurry and, with all the shrapnel flying around, it seemed like Gulick would never get to the relative safety of that trench-line. When he got almost there, he gracefully dove for the trench. It's hard to be graceful when diving into a narrow trench at full run with a 20 pound BAR, bipods, extra BAR belt, your
own bar belt, and a couple bandoleers of ammunition but instinct, fear, fortitude, or just plain panic got him there. He busted hell out of his upper lip in the process but was safer and heading back toward the living bunkers where there was overhead cover and less incoming. When Ed saw the blood on his face from the busted lip and legs from the barbwire cuts, he thought Gulick had been hit, but he wasn't.

Gulick learned two very important lessons that day. One was what they tried to teach him at Paris Island but he had never before mastered. There the Marines would go out and do our duty even if it was raining. The Sgt Albers, his Drill Instructors, told them they were Marines now and would not get wet because they would learn to run between the raindrops. Gulick had finally learned that lesson because he had just run through a rain of shrapnel and never got hit once. He thinks of his DI's teachings and this experience every time he and his wife go out in rain. She always takes an umbrella and can't understand why Paul doesn't. He tells her, "You don't need one if you know how to run between the drops".

The other lesson improved upon Gulick's understanding of the expression, "Shot at and missed but shit at and hit". He never could visualize a situation to which this applied. During this, and the next few days, he was shot at many times and never hit, but they scared the shit out of him. Thus, he has a better understanding of the expression, "He was shot at and missed but shit at and hit." Does this make sense?-anyway.

Many were wounded during the day. During the daytime Cpl James E. Jones was standing in the doorway of a sleeping bunker on the reverse slope of Hill 111 when a mortar round hit the bunker. The force threw him into the bunker. He had a lot of small pieces of shrapnel which the Doc (probably Fitzgerald or Clark) removed. He was a little hard of hearing for awhile but his normal hearing eventually returned.

Later in the day the Chinese were cleared out of the trench-line. Gulick is not sure who did the final mopping up. He thinks they all did a little bit here and there to gain back parts of the trench-line. The following was told to Gulick that day by one of the Marines who were helping in a particular part of the mopping up operation.

Some occupants of one of a bunker the Marines were trying to take back had barricaded themselves in with sandbags leaving only small slits to shoot through. They had been told to surrender but had given no response. They were putting up stiff resistance so they called in a bazooka team to blow them out. As the bazooka team was getting into place for the shot, the occupants could see whom they were fighting for the first time. They raised a white flag and gave up. It was four H/3/7 Marines who had been overrun the previous night. The Chinese had dropped satchel charges in the bunker and had deafened the occupants so they couldn't hear the Marines telling them to surrender. As far as is known to the author, these four Marines, and the five Marines found on the reverse slope the previous night, were the only H/3/7 defenders left of the hill. It is assumed that most of the rest were KIA or WIA and evacuated.

The Marine Operations in Korea book states that incoming on Hill 111 reached peaks of 125 to 150 rounds per minute at 1100. This was probably about the time H/3/1 was eliminating the last of the Chinese in our trench-line. The heavy mortar barrage was probably an attempt by the Chinese to support the Chinese we were attacking. Refer above to Gilligan and Gulick’s recollections of the heavy incoming while they were trying to evict the enemy.

After this action Gulick realized that the zipper on his flak jacket didn't work. He went to the platoon CP to see if he could get one but supplies of this type were not available. He was told that there was a dead H/3/7 Marine lying on a stretcher near the mud hole he laid in early last night when he was approaching Hill 111. They told Gulick, "You can have his if you're not squeamish". Gulick didn't like the idea but he also didn't want to be accused of being squeamish by his comrades. He didn't think he would have a problem and his chest did need protection from enemy fire so he went down to the dead Marine. Gulick unzipped the flak jacket and started to remove it but maggots covered the area between the flak jacket and the dead Marine's body. That was enough. Paul decided his flak jacket didn't need a zipper. Just call me squeamish.

Gulick, Jones, and Gilligan all recall that a quad .50 machinegun was moved up to help support the defense of Hill 111. A quad .50 is four .50 caliber Machineguns mounted
on a vehicle. They could fire simultaneously and could really chew up an area. It was located about 300 yards behind Hill 111 on Hill 121, just across the valley, and to the right-rear of the 3rd Platoon CP. To the right of the quad .50s was a tank road where a Australian tank was positioned.

In the afternoon Gulick was sitting on the reverse slope of Hill 111 when a tank came up the road to help provide defensive support. As it came from behind Hill 126 it came up the same road Gulick had come up the night before. Just like Gulick experienced the night before, after it left the cut in the road behind Hill 126, it began receiving incoming from sniping, Chinese 76mm recoilless rifles. The tank got through but it sure was a sight to see. Rounds were landing all around the tank as it made its way through that ".76 alley". Everyone realized that we were going to get few supplies from our company CP that was located down that road and behind Hill 126. C-rations were better than risking lives for hot chow.

By late afternoon, 13,700 rounds of Chinese mortar and artillery had landed in the Division's right sector – the highest rate of incoming for the 24-hour period during the entire Berlin sector action, which included Hills 111 and 126. The last of the Chinese marauders were also forced off the forward slopes at Boulder City at 1335. About the same time the last Chinese on Hill 111 were also being eliminated. None were seen leaving and they all fought to the end. Thereafter, for some welcome hours, both Marine positions remained quiet. It has been written that a conservative estimate of the enemy's total cost for their efforts were 75 CCF KIA and 425 WIA. This is really conservative because almost any Marine that was on either Hill 111 or 119 could easily see 75 Chinese dead from wherever they stood.

About this date Eugene Finely Bradford, Robert Cawley, and John "Gus" Foote, already mentioned above, were WIA on or near Hill 111. Foote was evacuated and eventually returned to H/3/1 after his wounds healed. Foote says his Purple Heart citation says he was WIA on Boulder City but his is incorrect. He was on Hill 111. Robert Cawley had severe wounds in the chest and was evacuated, eventually to the U.S.A. His wounds eventually healed and he was a councilman in Colchester, MA for 35 years. Lt. Lutz received the Navy Cross for his services while on line with H/3/1 these few days.

By this time Gulick was getting hungry. He hadn't eaten since the night before. The sunburn on his butt and back of his legs was also hurting but not too much. He wanted the C-rations and clean clothes he kept in his backpack, but it was over there, about 400 yards away, on the other side of that ".76 Alley". So close yet so far. Little did he know then that he wouldn't see his backpack again for about three month. It didn't matter much to him. He really didn't have much of an appetite after all he had seen that day and his dirty cloths and sun burned butt were the least of his worries.

Things were happening fast. After the Chinese assault the night before, all H/3/1 Marines were sure the Chinese would make a really big assault this night. The 3rd Platoon CP was like a beehive with everyone hurriedly going in and out. Gulick and the rest of the 3rd squad sat near the Platoon CP awaiting orders. Gulick remembers watching in awe as stretchers were going in and out of the aid bunker. Those seriously wounded were rushed back to the Battalion Aid Station in jeeps and trailers. Those who didn't make it were laid by the road on stretchers to await transportation back to Battalion, graves registration, and eventually home.

Meanwhile, Col. Nelson's 1st Marines continued with their relief of the 7th Marines. At 1100 Maj. Robert D. Thurston, 3/1's S-3, assumed command of Hill 119 and sent the embattled G/3/1 and I/3/1 in reserve to reorganize. D/2/7 and a platoon from C/1/1 relieved them. At the eastern Hill 111 after clearing the trench-lines of the enemy, H/3/1 completed their formal relief of H/3/7 at 1815.

About a mile and a half to the SW of Hill 111, beginning at 2130, two Chinese companies again assaulted Hill 119. MLR fire support plus artillery and tank guns lashed at the enemy and they eventually withdrew.

Late in the afternoon, H/3/1's 3rd Squad moved into the trench-line for the night's defense. The third squad was on the extreme right side of Hill 111 and tied in with the Australians. They had a machinegun bunker in their area of responsibility that was probably manned by Marines from the Machine Gun Platoon's 3rd section.
Gulick remembers his 3rd Squad took the trench that led from the reverse slope to that last Australian bunker in the forward trench-line. From there, they turned to the left to go up the trench-line, past the location where that dead H/3/7 Marine had laid earlier. He was gone now and Gulick didn't have to be careful to walk around him any more. But he did anyway, just as if he was still there. The squad filed up the trench-line, through a machinegun bunker, and continued up the trench-line toward the top of the hill. Men were dropped off in their fighting positions as they went along. The machine gunner, a Hawaiian whose name may have been Caban, and his crew were already in their bunker. Gulick was dropped off in the first fighting hole beyond the machinegun bunker. It was just a place that had been dug out from the trench-line to allow others to pass while a man stood in his fighting position. There was no overhead cover. Just an uncovered hole about two feet square and five feet deep. He was about 20-30 yards to the left of the machinegun bunker and quite some distance to the right of the highest point in the trench-line on Hill 111. He doesn't know how far away the man on his left was but it was too far for him to see and too far away for his comfort.

The terrain in front of Hill 111 was barren. It had been swept clean of most vegetation by exploding mortars, artillery, napalm, etc. Not a tree was standing. The only vegetation left was newly grown grass and shrubs that were sprouting up.

Before dark Gulick wondered if his BAR sights were still accurate. His bar had been bounced around quite a bit and that dive he took into the trench in the morning may have knocked them off. He also wanted to get a feel for distance and how much elevation would be needed. He looked over his front to see if he could determine from which direction the Chinese would come. There was a draw that led into a dry streambed that would offer cover to an attacking enemy. Gulick set his sights and aimed at a stone near that streambed and fired. The three rounds all landed a little high and to the right but close enough to insure his sights were relatively accurate. A Marine came running from the machine bunker and wanted to know what he was shooting at. Gulick explained that he was just sighting in his weapon. The machinegunner didn't appreciate the lack of fire discipline but Gulick felt more assured.

As darkness set in Gulick began to feel the loneliness that others probably felt. He was feeling alone and scared. He had no communication with anyone. Neither did the machinegun bunker. Apparently the communication lines had been cut. Mortar or artillery rounds began landing with greater intensity along the trench-line as the night passed.

Our outgoing from multiple rockets mounted on jeep-like vehicles lit up the night like multiple flash cameras when fired. Then shortly thereafter, you could see the multiple flashes as the rockets landed. This helped to point where to look for the enemy because if you couldn't see them before, you knew where they were now. Marines called the Rocket Units "Charlie rockets". The 4.5 rockets are fired in what is called a "rocket ripple" from 144 tubes. Each projectile weighs 42 pounds and has a range of about 5200 yards. Although they are not very accurate, they can be used for enemy concentrations to cover an impact area of several hundred yards.

There were searchlights that were projected into the sky above the MLR from hills far behind Hill 111. These lights and especially their reflections from clouds provided some degree of light. This, along with the periodic artillery and mortar flares, lit up the area enough to see any enemy that was approaching.

About 1815 Sgt Gilligan put his 1st squad of the 2nd Platoon into position on the extreme left of Hill 111's forward trench-line. As they were moving up to get into position the Chinese must have seen them walking through the trench. They snipped at them with .76s and shrapnel from one of the rounds hit Gus Foote in the leg and foot. He was evacuated.

The 1st Squad, 2nd Platoon's position consisted of three bunkers with riflemen (or BAR men), in riflemen's holes, in the trench-line on each side of the first two bunkers. In the first bunker was a machinegun. PFC Roy Brooks was dropped off there to man one of the rifleman's holes. PFC Charles E. Graham, PFC Phillip Brohen, PFC Thomas Hallmark, and Sgt John Gilligan manned the 2nd bunker area. Two Marines would take turns manning the rifleman holes outside and two would stay inside the bunker. PFC Laverne Gould and Doc Caster manned the third bunker. Beyond their squads area of responsibility, to Gould's
right, was another machinegun bunker.

Things were quiet in Gilligan's area until what he thinks was about 2300. When the "Chinks" started bird calling all around them. At exactly 2300 a solid wall of mortar and artillery fire fell on the Gilligan's 1st squad. They could see Chinese in front of them and began firing at available targets. Then at 2304 the barrage lifted and the Chinese began entering the trench from all sides. They had eliminated many before they got to the trench-line, so it wasn't too long before they cleared the rest out. Sgt Gilligan recalls that the 2nd Platoon's 2nd squad, on his right, had it a lot worse.

About the same time, 2300, incoming got real heavy on the right side of Hill 111 where Gulick was too. Gulick could hear shrapnel hitting the ground nearby. He walked down the trench-line to the machinegun bunker to ask if they had any word on what was happening. They didn't. They probably realized that Gulick was scared and told him to stay in the bunker until the artillery barrage was over. Gulick was concerned about covering the ground in front of his hole but the machinegunner assured him that he could see in front of his hole. This was like heaven to Gulick. He had been so scared out there alone and in the open. Now he was in here with others and had overhead cover. A round lit right in the aperture of the bunker near the end of the machinegun. The machinegunner didn't budge an inch except for dropping his head. Gulick thought he was hit and asked him if he was okay. He wasn't hurt but it is a miracle because the round landed so close in front of him. It must have landed far enough in front that the dirt between where it landed and the aperture took the blast.

Cpl James E. Jones' 1st Squad, 3rd Platoon was a little to the left of the center of Hill 111. The units in the trench line from right (where they were tied in with the Australians) to left were: 3rd Squad, 2nd Squad, and 1st Squad 3rd Platoon and then the two squads of the 2nd Platoon were in the trench line on the left of Hill 111. Across a narrow valley an on hill 126 was the 1st Platoon. Cpl Jones was cited for his actions this night with a Silver Star Medal. Following is citation wording:

"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity while serving as a Squad Leader of Company H, Third Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea on the night of 25-26 July 1953. Although severely wounded during the initial stages of an enemy attack, Cpl Jones refused medical aid and fearlessly exposed himself to murderous hostile artillery, mortar and small-arms fire in order to lead his squad in repulsing the vicious enemy attack. After personally supervising the evacuation of his wounded comrades, he moved through the devastating barrage of enemy fire to assume an exposed position in a weakened portion of the defensive line. When the communication line was severed by enemy fire, he carried out two trips through the entire trench line in the face of intense fire in order to inform his platoon leader of the situation in his sector. On numerous occasions during the night, he left the comparative safety of his position and stationed himself in an exposed area to observe and adjust friendly mortar fire and to report its results, consenting to medical treatment only after the battle had ceased and his men had received proper medical care. By his aggressive fighting spirit, marked fortitude and courageous devotion to duty, Corporal Jones contributed in large measure to the successful defense of his platoon sector and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

About this date, during the dark hours, concussion from a round flipped PFC George Broadhead through the air on Hill 111. Although he was hurt, his injuries were not severe enough to require evacuation.

During this night Cpl Roy Felster received the Commendation Medal for his actions. The citation says that while serving as a platoon runner, Corporal FEISTER displayed outstanding ability and professional skill. While serving in the company command post during an intense hostile artillery barrage which was followed by waves of attacking enemy troops, reports came in from platoons that casualties were numerous and that stretcher bearers were urgently needed. Unhesitatingly, he volunteered to go to the point of the attack and bring the wounded back. Expressing complete disregard for his personal safety, he exposed himself to the intense enemy barrage and with the aid of three comrades moved into the impact area to aid the wounded. After determining that moving the wounded through the trench line was too slow, he jumped out of the trench and carried the wounded over an
exposed hill crest to the battalion aid station. Corporal FEISTER's initiative and heroic conduct served as an inspiration to all who observed him.

The following Marines were KIA on Hill 111 and dropped from the Company:

- PFC Phillip R. Brohen of the 2nd Platoon from Newark, NJ is buried in Hanover, NJ. Although Phillip is shown as KIA this date, he probably died shortly after midnight, on July 25th (see Sgt Gilligan's account of Brohen's death on July 25th).
- PFC Floyd D. Cameron was from Notasulga, AL and is buried there.
- PFC Ramon Castillo of the 2nd Platoon was from Canutillo, TX and is buried in El Paso, TX.
- PFC Michael J. Gilbride, 1216389, from Buffalo, NY and is buried there.
- PFC Arthur R. Steele was also reported as being KIA on this date. Arthur was from Birmingham, AL and is buried in Los Angeles, CA. HQMC shows that Arthur was in H/3/7 at the time of his death. H/3/1 was relieving H/3/7 on the night of the 24th and both units were on Hills 111 and 126 at the same time. Arthur is not included on H/3/1's July monthly personnel roster. It could be that Arthur was in H/3/7 or attached there from H/3/1.
- 2nd Lt. Carl E. Lindquist was MIA and presumed dead.
- TSgt George A. Hyde, the Company Gunny Sgt was also WIA.

The Company received several replacements on this day. One of the replacements was Sgt Roy P. Conway who was an engineer that had spent some time with the 5th Marines.

While all this is going on, the peace talks at Panmunjom are continuing. This means nothing to the man on the line because his motive is to hold his ground and survive. Most of the men on the line didn't even know what was going on at the peace talks and most didn't care. The was little they could do other than be a Marine. This means staying organized, doing their job, and defeating the enemy.
About midnight Sgt Gilligan got a direct hit on his bunker that turned him for a flip and deafened him for about ten minutes. He got a piece of shrapnel in the leg but didn't even notice it at the time. Then again about 0030 a round hit the right side of his bunker but caused no casualties.

Hallmark was standing outside in the rifleman's holes and Graham was inside with Gilligan. The close combat action had died down so Gilligan let Graham doze for a while. After all, the 2nd and 3rd Platoons had been fighting one battle or another for the last 30 hours. Most had not slept for the last 42 hours, since awaking on the morning of July 24th.

At 0115 Gilligan woke up Graham. They were going to go to relieve Brohen and Hallmark in the fighting holes outside the bunker. Right after Graham was awake, and before he could stand up, another round came in the trench-line behind the bunker and killed Hallmark and Brohen. Graham was also hit by a piece of shrapnel in the leg.

Four from the Machine Gun Platoon, PFC John (Big John) Bowman, PFC Seth E. Britt, PFC George G. Dellis, and PFC Leardis Brewer, were in a bunker. Dellis was in the doorway keeping watch when Britt relieved him. A short time later a round exploded in the bunker doorway that killed, Britt. He had severe damage to his back side which took the brunt of the explosion. Bowman and Dellis were wounded with shrapnel from the same round and Brewer had a concussion wound.

At the other end of the trench-line, Gulick found a sandbag to sit down on and leaned back against the dirt wall of the bunker. He remembers the artillery/mortar barrage but, by now it was like a roar but he was safe. That's the last thing Gulick remembers until some one was shaking him. All was quiet and Gulick jumped up and started running for his hole. He thought they were telling him to get out there and cover his area. They stopped him as he went out the door. They told him that he had slept through a fierce artillery barrage and never woke up. Apparently some of the artillery was our own VT coming in on top of us. Gulick always was a heavy sleeper and after not sleeping for about two days, he had it coming.

The rest of the night Gulick spent in his hole with short visits to those in the machine gun bunker. He felt more comfortable now that he knew his neighbors on the right and had someone with whom he could communicate. At times he caught glimpses of movement far to his left in front of the MLR. He fired when he thought he had a reasonable target but doesn't know the results of his efforts. A short time later he heard gunfire and grenades exploding up the trench-line to his left and a over the top-front of the hill. He kept watching his front, up the trench-line to the left, and also up the hill behind him in case any gooks had gotten by his left flank. The shooting lasted for about an hour and then stopped.

The Marine Corps Operations in Korea book states that between 0130 and 0300 the Chinese again probed Hill 111, gaining small parts of the trench-line before being driven out by superior Marine firepower. Marine casualties were 10 KIA on Hill 111 during the last days before the cease fire. The CCF had suffered 30 known KIA, and an estimated 84 KIA, and 310 estimated WIA. This is probably the action Gulick described in the previous paragraph.

It was probably during this night's action that H/3/1 couldn't get support from artillery that included the use of VT (Variable Time) fuses. Lt Romano happened to be near the Auzie's (Kewee's) and their Artillery Battery Commander was there (The Auzie Forward Fos are the Artillery Battery Commanders). He asked if the Auzies could provide VT support and that is one of the factors that helped save the "day" (night) for H/3/1. Sgt John Gilligan said, if it weren't for the VT, they might have not been able to hold their position against the masses of Chinese that were coming. However, he is not so sure that the VT was not responsible for one or two WIA or KIAs in his squad.

Another report says about the same thing: (That at 0150 Marines on Hill 111 (grid coordinates 099095) were engaged by an estimated nine CCF companies that employed small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades supported by mortars and artillery). Friendly forces used the same type of weapons and were supported by tanks. After a 40-minute
firefight the enemy withdrew. Enemy casualties were estimated at 20 KIA and 100 WIA. Friendly casualties were 24 WIA. Short Sporadic fire fights between the MLR and small isolated groups of enemy continued for a while.

During these early morning hours PFC Erwin Boyer was with the 3rd Squad, 2nd Platoon and was on the extreme right side of Hill 126 down were the trench line ended at the valley. There wasn’t much of a trench line because it had pretty well been demolished by mortar and artillery fire. He recalls the Chinese coming under the cover of their mortars and PFC Floyd Horton firing at them with his BAR. He also recalls PFC Charles Cameron, a black guy, was WIA during the action. Something thereafter his other members of Boyer’s squad moved to the top of hill 126 to take up defensive positions. He doesn’t remember who gave the word to with draw and it turned out the he and Cpl John Everett were the only two in the trench line so they went up to the top of the hill also. When Boyer arrived at the top of the hill Lt. Fimian, H/3/1’s XO, said to him, "your supposed to be dead". Sometime during the course of this action PFC Floyd Horton was WIA with shrapnel in the arm when he got out of the trench/bunker to pee.

Lt. Louis Proctor, the 1st Platoon Leader, was awarded the Silver Star for his actions during this early morning as follows:

PROCTOR, LOUIS G.

Citation:

"The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Silver Star Medal to Louis G. Proctor (0-56992), Second Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action against the enemy while serving with a Marine Infantry Company of the FIRST Marine Division (Rein.), FMF, in Korea, on 25 July 1953. Serving as a Platoon Commander, Second Lieutenant Proctor displayed outstanding courage, initiative and devotion to duty. When the company's sector of the main line of resistance was subjected to murderous enemy mortar and artillery fire, he received a call for aid from the extreme right flank of his position. Expressing complete disregard for his personal safety, he courageously exposed himself to the devastating hostile fire and while moving through the trenchline, he was twice knocked down by blasts of enemy mortar and artillery rounds. Although painfully wounded he dauntlessly reached the right flank and found a seriously wounded comrade. When attempts to evacuate the wounded Marine through the trenchline failed, he called for volunteers and carrying one end of the stretcher he gallantly aided in carrying the stricken man over the crest of a hill that was under direct enemy observation to the aid station approximately four hundred yards away. After assuring that the wounded man was being properly cared for, he returned to his platoon, consolidated his badly depleted forces and defended his position against numerous vicious enemy attacks. When the hostile troops succeeded in driving back the flanks of his position, he gallantly led his men in a counterattack and restored his line. Only after his line was fully regained and all his men cared for did he allow his own wounds to be treated. Second Lieutenant Proctor's gallant and courageous actions combined with his indomitable spirit served as an inspiration to all who observed him and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

With dawn came the first real quiet the battlefield had known for two days. Small enemy groups tried to reinforce their positions on Hill 119 by way of the Berlin Trenchline, only to be stopped by Marine riflemen and machinegunners. Hostile incoming continued spasmodically. At 1330 the 1st Marines assumed operational control of the right sector, as scheduled, and of the remaining 7th Marine units (Companies D and E and elements of the 4.2-inch Mortar Company) still in the area. By this time Marine casualties since 24 July numbered 43 KIA and 316 WIA.

The units occupying 3/1's sector had changed several times in the last two days. At this time H/3/1 was the only 3/1 Rifle Company left on line. G/3/1 and I/3/1 had been moved back in reserve on the 25th to reorganize after sustaining heavy casualties on/near Hill 119, boulder City. D/2/7 and a platoon from C/1/1 were now occupying Hill 119 which was a mile and a quarter SW of Hill 111. E/2/7 and I/3/7 was defending the MLR between Hill 119 (Boulder City) and H/3/1's left flank on Hill 126. It is interesting to not that the Chinese attacks during these final days of the war were on Hills 119 and 111. They apparently made none or few assaults on the mile-wide sector of MLR between these two
positions.

Some Marines had been sent up from the rear as reserves to help bolster H/3/1's depleted ranks. They came from supply, shore party, and wherever else the Division could spare men for the line. One of these men, a black Marine, was reporting into the 3rd Platoon CP at a time when there was a dead Marine that was lying by the entrance with a fatal head injury. The sight of this dead Marine by the reserve was devastating. He was all shook up and wanted no part of this war.

Sgt Roy Conway and Capt Dewey Maltese were with the Company about this date and may have been some of the reserves. Roy Conway says he remembers, "the 1st Sgt making coffee in a 5-gallon can; the man with the communications line (possibly George Broadhead) constantly running new communications line down Hill-111 because the line was always getting cut; piling the bodies of the Chinese up like cord-wood to await the APCs to come and get them; sitting down among the Chinese bodies and eating C-Rations (and not being bothered by the dead bodies); digging out the body of a dead Marine who was buried in a collapsed bunker (about half way down Hill-111); and a dead Chinese Officer that was wedged into a high step in the trench-line between bunkers three and four from the end of Hill 111 and we used to use his knees as a step. Capt Dewey Maltese who recalls the many bodies lying all over the place.

About this time they brought in a wounded Marine PFC that was near death, an American Indian named George Chegay. The Corpsman that was treating Chegay needed some albumin to give to Chegay but none was available. SSgt. Culp, 3rd Platoon Sgt. dispatched the new reserve back to the Company Aid Station for some albumin. He never returned and was never seen again. It was too late to help Chegay anyway. He soon passed away. Ironically, there was a box of albumin under a bunk in the Platoon CP that had been left there by the H/3/7. Having arrived in the Chaos of the night before, no one in H/3/1 knew anything about the medical stores that H/3/7 had left in the Platoon CP.

PFC George Chegay received the Silver Star Medal for his actions on this day. His citations reads as follows:

"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity while serving as an automatic rifleman of Company H, Third Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against aggressor forces in Korea on 26 July 1953. With his company defending a vital portion of the main line of resistance while subjected to constant enemy small-arms, mortar and artillery fire, Private First Class Chegay continuously exposed himself to the murderous barrage in order to fire on hostile troops forward of his position, accounting for one enemy dead and the probable wounding of two others. Despite the increasing intensity of the enemy mortar and artillery fire, he remained in his position during the approaching hours of darkness to observe enemy activity to his front and, when the leading wave of enemy infantry charged the position, immediately proceeded to deliver intense and accurate fire, thereby warning the remainder of this company of the proximity of the hostile troops. Although his weapon was damaged by a nearby exploding enemy shell, he picked up an abandoned rifle and fearlessly moved into the trench line to engage several of the enemy who had entered the friendly position. Mortally wounded when the immediate area was shattered by an enemy mortar barrage, Private First Class Chegay, by his intrepid fighting spirit, courageous initiative and resolute determination in the face of heavy odds, served to inspire all who observed him and upheld the highest tradition of the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country."

After day break Gulick and the rest of his squad came back to the reverse slope to get some rest. Gilligan's squad did the same. Gulick was hot, dirty, hungry and very tired. There wasn't enough room in the living bunkers for everyone and he remembers he found a place next to a living bunker that provided a little shade. He slept restlessly because the bugs just wouldn't let him alone and it was just too hot to sleep.

Gulick had been wearing a flack jacket that had a broken zipper for a couple days and it left him vulnerable in the front-chest area. He went to the CP bunker to get another one but they had none. They said there was a dead marine laying on a stretcher at the bottom of the hill and if he wasn't squeamish that he could have his. Gulick wasn't squeamish (at least he thought) so he went down to the bottom of the hill (about 50 years) to take the flack Jacket off the dead marine. He got to the stretcher and
unzipped the jacket and what he saw was changed his mind. Under the zipper and between
the flack jacket and the Marine's chest it was covered with hundreds of maggots. Gulick
quickly decided that he didn't need another flack Jack.

Early in the afternoon someone told Gulick that the Australians had invited some
Marines to dinner. Gulick and a few others went over and had pork chops that were greasy
but good.

About this date Arthur Art Caselli joined H/3/1's third platoon. He was a supply man
who came up to replace H/3/1's casualties and reinforce the ranks.

The Chinese again attacked Boulder City at 2130 with a platoon-sized unit.
Gulick remembers working in the trench-line in the afternoon. He helped to remove
bodies, dig trenches deeper, and shore up bunkers with sandbags.

At dusk again Gulick manned the same fighting hole he had been in the night before.
In the middle of the night he could hear some gunfire over the hill to his left where the
trench-line wound around the front face of Hill 111. Again the night was long, lonely, and
scary but thankfully, uneventful in Gulick's area.

Gilligan's squad spent this night to the right of their previous nights position,
near a bunker he called "Red Bunker" further up on Hill 111. They saw very little action
in this location.

The following Marines were KIA this date and probably died defending Hill 111.
PFC Seth E. Britt was from Odessa, TX and is buried in Hazelhurst, MS.
PFC George Chegay was from Show Low, AZ and is buried in White River, AZ.
PFC Vernon J. Crawford was from Dover Foxcroft, ME and is buried in Medford, ME.
PFC Thomas J. Hallmark was from Bessemer, AL and is buried there. (Hallmark was
referred to as Halloran in some documents.)

Michael Alvarez reported that he received the Bronze Star for actions on Hill 111.

Cameron (black guy) got hit by arty or mortars
Horton-barman (peeing outsid & got WIA ) & Everett
Boyer in depleted fox hole
At 0045 a CCF platoon nosed about the Hill 111 area for an hour and twenty minutes. This was probably the shooting the Gulick heard this night. H/3/1's 3rd platoon and two squads from the 2nd platoon discouraged these last faltering enemy efforts. Action at both of the Hills ceased and what was to become the concluding combat action of the 1st Marine Division in Korea. Dawn finally came and Gulick and some of his squad returned to the reverse slope to get some rest.

At 1000 on this day the United Nations Command (UNC) (Gen. Harrison) and Communist (Gen. Nam II) delegations sat at a green baize cloth table and signed their names to the agreement that would end the fighting in Korea. They agreed to cease-fire at 2200 in the evening to allow time for the word to be passed too the troops.

About mid day Gulick was awakened by some of his squad members and told the latest scuttlebutt, "An armistice had been signed and they were to stop shooting at 2200". At first he thought it was a joke and didn't believe it. Why would they sign an armistice now and not stop shooting until twelve hours later at 2200? As the day wore on they got the official word through the chain of command. Sure enough they were to stop shooting at 2200 unless it was a life-threatening situation.

There had been no indication to PFC Gulick or any of the other Marines fighting in the Hill 111 area that the armistice was about to be signed. Yes, there had been talk for the last several months that the war was about to end. However, more impressive were the deadly attacks the Chinese were making on the Marine outposts and lines. When you hear this same old story month after month and then consider the hostilities, you lose faith in this cease fire baloney. After the action of the previous few nights, there was no good news and certainly no reason to think the War was about to end. About 1200 when PFC Gulick and the rest of the Marines on Hill 111 were notified of the cease fire, it came as a total surprise. They were told the cease-fire was to take place at 2200. No firing after 1945 unless in self-defense or an active hostile attack. H/3/1’s Mortar Section was allowed to fire only one star cluster at 2200 to signify the end of the war.

About this date SSgt. Robert "Bob" Culp, 3rd Platoon Sgt., made a trip back to Bn. He passed near the Bn. Aid station and still remembers the long line of bodies and the smell of death. Bob says he doesn't think they used body bags in those days. At least the Marines he saw weren't in them. He says this is the saddest thing he has ever seen.

Many of the Marines on Hill 111 also remember the stench of the dead Chinese that were deteriorating and even exploding from expanding gasses within. Gulick remembers the buzzing sound of flies that were having a feeding frenzy on and in the corps. There are doubtless many other Marines who served in Korea and other places who experienced similar such sights.

Some Marines worked in teams to mark, remove, and clear mine fields while others stood watch. However, on Hill 111, the battle front had been quiet only since about 0300 this morning and most Marines were taking a, "Lets wait and see." attitude. The first priority there was to take care of the dead and wounded. Air action, incoming, and outgoing artillery was heard right up until about 2130 and H/3/1 wasn't ready to let down their guard.

At 2200 the artillery illuminated the sky and mortar star clusters authorized to signify/celebrate the end of the war. The Chinese could be seen policing their dead and wounded in no-man's-land. After the initial illumination at 2200, they could be seen using torches to find their way around.

At about 2130, thirty minutes before the cease-fire became effective, Chinese were walking up the slopes of Boulder City. They were seen from outpost Hedy. A Corpsman was said to ask, "Why don't we open up on them, we have twenty five minutes left". Their officer would not let them firing.

Cpl Joseph C. Martin was a H/3/1 Marine during these last days of the war. He provided comments in the June/July, 1995 or 1996 issue of the VFW Magazine and stated that ... "Our battalion could have held roll call on the hospital ship in Inchon because there were only a few of us left on line." His comments in the magazine stated that H/3/1 was the only 3/1 company left on line because G/3/1 and I/3/1 had been lost. Actually, he was
H/3/1 MARINES

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partly correct. H/3/1 was the only 3/1 company on line because G/3/1 and I/3/1 had heavy losses and were in reserve to allow them to reorganize.

Despite impressive tenacity and determination, the Chinese attacks throughout July on the two Berlin outposts (which were lost) and Hills 119 and Hill 111 achieved no real gain. Their repetitive assaults on strongly-defended Boulder City and Hill 111 up until the last day of the war was an attempt to place the Marines (and UN Command) in an unfavorable position when the armistice agreement was signed. While talking at Panmunjom, the Communists pressed hungrily on the battlefront for as much critical terrain as they could get under their control before the final cease-fire line was established.

Had the enemy succeeded in taking the two hill defenses after the earlier seizure of the Berlins, under the terms of the agreement, UNC forces would have been forced to withdraw southward to a point where they no longer had free access to the Imjin River. If the Chinese had taken Boulder City and Hill 111, this would have also provided them a major high ground positions (Hill 126) and direct observation into Marine rear areas and important supply routes. This Hill 126 is not the Hill 126 that was defended by H/3/1's 1st Platoon. This is another hill of the same elevation about 2 miles SSW of Hill 111.

From the standpoint of casualties, the last month of the Korean War was a costly one, with 181 infantry Marines Killed in action and total loss of 1,611 men (181 KIA, 86 MIA, 862 WIA evacuated, 474 WIA not evacuated, and 10 non-battle deaths). This was the highest rate for any month during 1953. It was second only to the October 1952 outpost battles (186 KIA and 1798 casualties on outposts Detroit, Frisco, Seattle, Ronson, Warsaw, Bunker Hill, Hill 124, Reno-Carson-Vegas, and Hook) for any month during the year the 1st Mar. Div. defended the line in West Korea. The closing days of the war produced the last action for which Marines were awarded the Navy Cross. These Marines were 2nd Lt. Bates, H/3/5; 1st Lt. Swigart, G/3/1; 2nd Lt. Theodore J. Lutz Jr., H/3/1; and Sgt Robert J. Raymond, F/2/7, who was mortally wounded.

The 7th and 1st Marines, as the two regiments evolved during July in the Berlin sector defense, sustained high monthly losses; 804 and 594, respectively. Forty eight men from the 7th Marines and 70 from the 1st Marines were KIA. Chinese losses were also high: 405 counted KIA; 761 estimated KIA; 1988 estimated WIA, 1 POW, or 3,155 for the month of July.

The precise number of casualties that H/3/1 and H/3/7 sustained while fighting for Hills 111 and 126 is not known at this point. It is known that the number of casualties were heavy. One person reported to the author that H/3/7's casualties were 41 KIA, 61 WIA, and 17 walked off the Hill. If this is true, and the numbers reported in the previous paragraph are true, this would mean that H/3/7 sustained 41 of the 48 KIAs the whole 7th Marines had during this period. Knowing that the rest of the 7th Marines also sustained heavy losses, it is unlikely that H/3/7 had 41 of the 48 KIAs.

In their unsuccessful attempts to dislodge the Marines from their MLR positions, the Chinese pounded the right regiment flank with approximately 22,200 artillery and mortar shells during the 24-27 July battle.

A volume of the U. S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 states that altogether, there were about 54,246 Americans died (33,629 died on the battle field and 20,617 died from other causes), over 250,000 WIsA (103,284 were hospitalized), and more than 8,177 MIAs during the Korean war. There are 389 of these MIA for which an accounted can not be made. There were 7,140 American POWs of which 2,701 died in captivity. Only 221 of these were Marines POWs. The breakdown of these Marine POWs: 49 were Officers and 172 were enlisted Marines; 190 were Ground personnel and 31 were aviators; the 190 ground troops consisted of 19 officers and 171 enlisted Marines; and of the 31 aviators, 30 were officer pilots and 1 was an enlisted Marine. The 7th Marines, which was the unit on line at the time of several major CCF attacks, had the highest number of POWs in the Division. A total of 70 men of the 118 infantry Marines were from the 7th Marines. The record during the 1950-1953 period of others is as follows: 1st Marines, 15 POWs; 5th Marines, 33; and 11th Marines 14. There were 42 Congressional Medals of Honor awarded during the Korean War.

There were also 225,784 (or 415,000) South Korean troops killed and 3,157 KIAs from nineteen other allied countries. Hundreds of thousands of Korean civilians also lost their lives. There were 1,263 British KIAs and 1,800 other UN KIAs.
The Chinese lost 938,880 men and the North Korean's lost 528,120 men. Pvt Robert Begay was dropped from the Company.
Robert (Bob) Bosley remembers right after the cease-fire was effective when he went down to get a souvenir (burp gun) from a dead gook. He also took a sulfa pack from a dead Chinese soldier. The Chinese used this sulfa as a medication to treat their wounds. The allied troops also had a sulfa pack for the same purpose. He read the printing on the sulfa pack and discovered that it had been made in Baltimore, MD, just 20 miles from his home.

A burp gun is a recoil-operated sub machine gun that is cheaply made and easily assembled. There are only major five parts to gun. It has about a 35-round magazine and can fire approximately 900 rounds per minute. However, the stopping power of a burp gun is little. The slugs are a little wider than our 30 caliber and very short. The powder charge is small.

To Gulick, it seemed that everyone had a souvenir except him. A burp gun would be a pretty good treasure to take/smuggle home. Gulick remembered when they were taking back the trench-line that there was a damaged bunker to his left where there were some dead gooks in and in front of the bunker. About 0300, all had been quiet for quite a while so this was his chance. Things were real quiet so he left his BAR in his fighting hole, got out of the trench-line, and started walking toward the dead gooks about 75 yards to his left front. As he got in front of the bunker, he could see two feet hanging out of the aperture. It was probably one of those dead gooks in the bunker.

About the time Gulick got to the three dead gooks, 15 yards in front of the bunker, the feet moved. Gulick had been caught cold with his BAR back in his fighting hole. He froze and hoped that the gook wouldn't see him. If he did, he hoped the gook had gotten the word that the War was over.

Then he heard the words, "What the Hell are you doing out there?" No Korean accent, just plain English, thank God. A machinegun crew had cleared the dead gooks out of the bunker earlier in the night and taken it over. Gulick's souvenir hunt had been cut short. After a little conversation with the machinegun crew, Gulick went back to get a burp gun. There wasn't any left so Gulick took one of the dead gook's rice bowls as a souvenir.

Sgt Gilligan says that about this time he, and others, went out in front of the trench-line to see the spectacle. They counted 236 dead Chinese.

As daylight came, the Chinese were in front of the bunkers getting their dead. They even came up to the Hill 111 trench-line to get their dead. Hill 111 Marines even showed them one dead gook that they almost missed. He was behind our trench-lines. H/3/1 was happy to see them getting their dead because if they didn't, H/3/1 Marines would have to do it, and it wasn't a pleasant job. H/3/1 had enough of their own to deal with. A couple Chinese that had been lying there for days were really ripe. The Chinese soldiers were bloated up and smelling real bad. To move them would cause and explosion of the gasses within. The Chinese just dug a shallow slit trench next to a couple of these and rolled them into the hole for burial. Many others were tied to ten foot poles by two pieces of communications wire; one around the chest just below the shoulders and another wire around the knees. They carried them back like an animal that was killed on safari. One Chinese soldier that still had a burp gun magazine belt on his chest had been brought out of H/3/1's bunker positions by Marines earlier to get him out of the way. He was lying behind Hill 111 on a stretcher. Marines brought him around in front of the trench-line for the Chinese to reclaim. Gulick still has a picture of this guy and has given a copy to the H/3/1 Reunion Group Historian.

The Chinese came for their dead, apparently unarmed, but Hill 111 Marines were at the ready with their guns. The Chinese were also weary of the Marines. Rightfully so because there was a lot of mixed emotion in the Marines of Hill 111. Some had sympathy for the
Chinese while others were very hostile, remembering their own losses.

Gulick remembers that he was befuddled by the situation. For the last few days he had experienced a wide variety of sights, emotions, and feelings. He was tired and still up tight, still not knowing what the next hours had in store for him. One thing for sure, he wasn't going to leave his ready position until the Chinese went away; and it seemed like that they never would. He just motioned away the few Chinese that came real close. For the most part, he just sat there, and watched.

Later in the day the Marines of Hill 111 were ordered to working parties. First priority was to get out the wounded and remaining dead. They were especially searching for a Lt. Lindquist, a H/3/1 Marine that was MIA. They never found him. Other working parties included such activities as: collecting salvageable items (weapons, flank jackets, helmets, etc); cleaning out anything of value and destroying bunkers; policing up the brass; filling in the trench-lines; loading salvageable materials aboard trucks; etc. Nothing was to be left behind. There seemed to be no end to the work that needed to be done for the weary Marines. They only had two days to get the work done and it seemed like all they had time to do was work and sleep. One unforeseen benefit that resulted from this hectic work schedule was that their minds were kept occupied and they didn't have time to think about lost friends.

Hot meals were served. This was the first time H/3/1 Marines had been fed a hot meal since they came on line three days ago. It just wasn't worth a man's life trying to get a jeep trailer of food through 76 alley. They had been surviving on C-rations except for the few meals that had been provided by the Australians. Paul recalls that he really didn't have much of an appetite any way. The experiences of the last few two-day had left him kind of numb. He just wanted to get out of there.

The armistice agreement dictated that all forces must abandon the MLR area and move back 2,000 yards, leaving a 4,000-yard buffer zone between opposing forces. This 4,000-yard buffer zone was named the DeMilitarized Zone (DMZ). The men on line were told they had just three days to move equipment back 2000 yards or destroy what was left. The troops also had to be out of the area within that three-day period.

Marines worked around the clock with only short breaks, periods when they quickly fell asleep. This was usually during the middle of the day when it was too hot to work. It was almost too hot to sleep but they were so tired that sleep prevailed over the heat.

Later, after the three-day period, they extended the period of time a couple months for working parities from the opposing forces to go back and get what was left. This was done by issuing pass to working party groups who were sent out daily.

About this date PFC George Broadhead got a ride back to what was probably the Battalion staging area to get cleaned up. After getting cleaned up he noticed all kinds of fresh supplies being dumped off 6X6 trucks. He grabbed a huge box of new socks and with the jeep driver that was going back to H/3/1, put them in the jeep. When he arrived and pushed the large box of socks off the back of the jeep, he yelled to some of the guys and everyone was only too happy to get dry (and clean) socks. As he made his way to the Hill 111 aid station to thank Doc Fitzgerald, and give him some socks, a guy with a camera said, "Wait until you see it up there". George was so clean the guy thought he had just arrived. The guy was the same photographer who took the picture of the guys in the bunker.

**WEDNESDAY, JULY 29, 1953**

Gulick remembers the Australians came to visit, have a drink, swap stories, and trade souvenirs on several occasions after the war. Marines were trading such things as carbines, grease guns, Thompsons, burp guns, beer, etc. The Australians were trading sten guns, Owen guns, White Horse Scotch, etc. They were a fine bunch of men.

Gulick wanted his camera that was in the backpack he had dropped off behind Hill 126 on the night of the 24th. The packs were gone. Gulick did get several pictures that included shots of dead gooks, dead Marines, individual pictures of Marines, and some group pictures that included Marines with the Australians. Bob Culp says he is the one who took those pictures and later distributed them to the platoon.

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.
THURSDAY, JULY 30, 1953

In accordance with the cease fire agreement, all units had to move back 2000 meters from the MLR not later than 36 hours after the cease fire. At 1500 H/3/1 began their tactical withdrawal from the demilitarization zone to Camp Lee (grid coordinates 088037) followed by G, I, and Weapons Companies. H/3/1 walked back that dirt road to the Battalion area; that same road Paul and the rest of the 3rd Platoon had come up on the night of the 24th. H/3/1 boarded trucks and were moved back to the Camp Lee where a truck with cots was also unloaded. The Battalion Command Post was opened at Camp Lee at 1730. All troops were cleared of the demilitarized zone and were in Camp Lee by 2145. Marines promptly set up their cots and, one by one, quickly went to sleep right out in the open. Fortunately, it was a nice night and they all got a well needed rest after their hectic work schedule of the past three days.

PFC Robert O. Dunlap and 2nd Lt. Gregg F. Moses were dropped from the Company and transferred to H&S/3/1.

FRIDAY, JULY 31, 1953

3/1's stay at Camp Lee was short. Upon awaking, they again moved back farther by foot and motor march to a new camp area (grid coordinates 084896). Here, 3/1 assumed the role as one of the battalions of the Division Reserve Regiment. Nine days were allotted to building a camp where nothing but rice paddies and hills existed. Here again, they arrived dead tired, unloaded cots, and quickly fell asleep.

The following is a summary of the strength of the Battalion at the beginning and end of July.

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<th>USMC ENLISTED</th>
<th>USN OFFICERS</th>
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SATURDAY, AUGUST 1, 1953

As H/3/1 Marines awoke, they began to care for themselves. Gulick was still wearing the same clothes he went on line with on night of the 24th. He must have really stunk but it didn't matter. This was probably the norm at this time. All of this personal gear was in his backpack that he had dropped behind Hill 126 the night of the 24th. Others were in the same situation. For the first time in days some laughter was heard. Gulick has a picture of David Hall and Jim Hagen that was probably taken on this day. David was in his birthday suit (naked). The H/3/1 Reunion Group Historian has copies of the pictures.

During this month there would be a lot of administrative paperwork to get in order. Some who were WIA and evacuated during the fighting would be dropped from the Company rolls when it was learned they would not be returning to the Company. Also, some who temporarily joined the Company during the fight for Hill 111 would be returning to their companies.

PFC Charles Deem, who had been in the Machine Gun Platoon was put in charge of H/3/1's ammunition dump.
SUNDAY, AUGUST 2, 1953

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.

PFC/Cpl Leonard J. Adams Jr.     PFC Walter M. Cox
PFC Donald L. Dabney             PFC James E. Davenport
PFC Charles "Noble" R. Davidson  PFC Claude O. Davis
PFC Julius Joyce Davis           PFC Robert D. Derrigan
Pvt Ronald C. Dixon              PFC John J. Dooley
PFC Robert E. Dougherty          PFC Alton P. Douglas
PFC Charles Eggleston            PFC Blanton H. Fleming
PFC Lawrence A. Gatta            PFC James D. Griffin
Sgt Phil H. Kirby

MONDAY, AUGUST 3, 1953

Between August 3rd and September 13th H/3/1 sent daily working parties into the DMZ to evacuate any materials left by Marines. Other working parties were also sent to clear brush and lay barbed wire.

A continuous double-strand barbed wire fence, known as the No-Pass Fence, or No-Pass Line, was erected 200 yards below the southern boundary of the DMZ by infantry units. Appropriate marking signs, in Chinese, Korean, and English were placed at regular intervals along the fence prohibiting unauthorized entry into the DMZ.

Those that didn't go on working parties into the DMZ were left with the task of improving the Company and Battalion area. A tent city was erected to house the Battalion. Marines even had tents reinforced with 2 X 4 lumber.

The 1st Marines also received the assignment of developing the blocking positions on what had been the Kansas line. H/3/1 continuously hiked up the hills were they dug trench-lines for what might be a future defensive position. They also had a crew from Engineers to help blast where the ground was too rocky.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 4, 1953

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.

PFC Julian J. Bullard Jr.        PFC Jasper M. Bullock
Cpl Edwin C. Depalo              Cpl Donald G. Dery
Pvt Frank "Francis" C. English   Cpl Fred Estevane
Cpl Lawrence L. Fugate           PFC Verdis A. Haynes
Pvt Donald D. Hollister          PFC Ellis L. Little
Cpl Lowell Popham

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 5, 1953

3/1 issued Training Orders for the training of replacement personnel. The order set forth the schedule for training to begin on Aug. 12, 1953 and identified instructors from the Battalion's units who would be involved in the training.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 6, 1953

H/3/1 Marines were now living in a luxury they hadn't know for quite some time. They lived in sixteen-man tents (Squad Tents). The tents had two pot-belly stoves centrally located in the tent. Later, the tents would even be supported by wooden framework. The inside of this framework was covered with heavy paper that helped give a layer of insulation. Each man had his own cot and a sleeping bag which was well needed in the winter months.

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.

PFC Ronald H. Bowman (also dropped on Aug. 19th)
Pvt Louis T. Frye Jr.
Sgt Richard T. Harding (also dropped on 1/26/1954)

FRIDAY, AUGUST 7, 1953

SSgt. Robert "Bob" Culp was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, AUGUST 8, 1953

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

MG. Plt.          Charles "Critch" Critchell Jr. (joined)
1st Plt. other    Dave Moore (left)
2nd Plt.          Eugene Finley Bradford (left)
2nd Plt.          Richard "Dick" Dean (left)
3rd Sqd. Ldr.     Sgt. Edward (Ed) Crawford (left) went to Division Special Services (perhaps a boxing coach.).
3rd Plt.          Robert Bosley (left)
3rd Plt.          Arthur Art Caselli (left)
                       (It is not known to where Art was transferred. He had come as a temporary reserve to fill in the depleting ranks about 7/26/53 and perhaps returned to his previous supply job.)

PFC Harry Lynn also arrived on the 35th replacement draft at G/3/1. Lynn had joined the Marine Corps with Gulick in January 1952 but got separated in Boot Camp (PI) when Lynn had to have a hernia operation. They had been good buddies before the joined the Marine Corps.

Lynn lived in Meadville, PA where Gulick lived until about the first part of 1951 when his parents moved to Arlington, VA. During 1951, Gulick and Lynn hitchhiked back and forth to see each other.

Lynn and Gulick wanted to get together so they concocted a story that they were 1st cousins. Gulick then went to the H/3/1 1st Sgt and said he would extend his tour in Korea to go home with the 35th draft if they would transfer Lynn in H/3/1. It didn't take much to convince them and the transfer came about. Lynn probably joined H/3/1 about the end of August.

The Battalion area had evolved with the three-infantry companies surrounding the Battalion mess hall. H/3/1 Marines had to walk through a dried up rice paddy to get to the mess hall. One day while walking back from the mess hall, Gulick saw what looked just like a Pennsylvania grass snake. He noticed how aggressive the snake was so he was careful pin down the head before picking it up. Paul took the snake back to the H/3/1 area and was playing with it with an 8 inch tent peg. The snake was very aggressive, striking at the tent peg. A corpsman came along and told Paul that the snake was a Pit Viper and very poisonous. Since that day Paul has handled every snake as if it were poisonous, no matter how well he knew what it was.

MONDAY, AUGUST 10, 1953

On this day the Battalion assumed its mission of constructing defensive work on "Baker Block", and construction of the defensive position commenced.

The Battalion Training Plan for replacement personnel that was issued on Aug. 5th became effective this day. The following personnel were assigned duty as instructors:

2nd Lt. R. E. Werckle, Chief Instructor
2nd Lt. A. Virzi, Instructor
2nd Lt. C. R. Hogan, Instructor
SSgt. R. Maloon, Instructor
Sgt. C. A. Cook, Instructor
Sgt. E. F. Crawford, Instructor (from H/3/1)
Sgt. C. C. Teany, Instructor

The individual Companies marched the replacement personnel detail to the Battalion
Parade Field (rice paddy) each morning during the period of six days at 0715 and turned them over to the instructor(s).

The first day's training involved, close order drill, welcoming address, map reading, personal hygiene, range safety, familiarizing with firing (BAR, rifle, individual weapons), and zeroing of individual weapons.

PFC Robert "Bob" J. Boyer was dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 11, 1953

Training for replacements involved fire prevention, camouflage, patrolling, enemy tactics, supply economy, showers, and night combat patrolling.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 12, 1953

Training for replacements involved escape and evasion, map reading, tactics, communications, squad tactics, Theater orientation, and patrolling.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 13, 1953

Training for replacements involved close order drill, squad tactics, compass reading, combat intelligence collection, and patrolling.

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.

PFC Norman Covington
PFC John V. McAuliffe

FRIDAY, AUGUST 14, 1953

Training for replacements involved Squad Tactics, patrolling, night raids, and problem orientation

SATURDAY, AUGUST 15, 1953

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.

PFC Bobby L. Asher
PFC Ronald R. Boone
Cpl Paul J. Calleja
PFC Robert Cawley
PFC John S. Dickenson
PFC John R. Dunbar
Cpl Patrick J. Laffey

PFC Norman Covington
PFC John V. McAuliffe

PFC Bobby L. Asher
PFC Ronald R. Boone
Cpl Paul J. Calleja
PFC Robert Cawley
PFC John S. Dickenson
PFC John R. Dunbar
Cpl Patrick J. Laffey

PFC Loutellis D. Brown
PFC James E. Capps
PFC James L. Curry
PFC Dennis B. Driscoll
PFC Lawrence J. Gordy

SUNDAY, AUGUST 16, 1953

Another very hot day.
Cpl Julius D. Braun was dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, AUGUST 17, 1953

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.

PFC Harold G. Hudson
PFC Fernand Villanueva (also dropped on 7/14, 1954)

TUESDAY, AUGUST 18, 1953

Another very hot day. Most units were working on a tropical schedule (starting work at 0400 and quitting at 1300.

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.

MSgt Charles Hoss
PFC John V. McAuliffe

Pvt Rolin D. Jenkins
PFC Burland W. Perry
IN KOREA

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 19, 1953

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.
PFC Ronald H. Bowman (also dropped on Aug. 6th)
PFC Curtis L. Comstock

THURSDAY, AUGUST 20, 1953

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.
PFC Henry J. Brock
PFC Peter M. Dahl (returned later)

FRIDAY, AUGUST 21, 1953

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.
PFC Charles L. Boring

MONDAY, AUGUST 24, 1953

2nd Lt. Carl E. Lindquist, who had been MIA since July 24, 1953, was dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 26, 1953

Cpl Arthur Caselli was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 27, 1953

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.
PFC Robert M. Alverson
PFC Jerry T. Bess
PFC Daniel L. Daugherty
PFC Daniel L. Daugherty
Sgt Claude D. Dennis
PFC Eli Derenoff
PFC William J. Diele
PFC Tommie J. Freeman
Cpl Earl W. Gill
Cpl Lowell Popham

FRIDAY, AUGUST 28, 1953

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.
PFC Robert H. Briggs Jr.
PFC Maynard B. Sutton

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1953

The Chinese and North Korean delegation did not like the fact that some of their POWs did not want to be repatriated would not be forced to return to Communism.

During September the 1st Marine Regiment, still in reserve, maintained one battalion in constant readiness to move into the Demilitarized Zone. Their mission was to repel any force which might attempt to recover non repatriated POWs and to cover the evacuation of the non repatriates.

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1953

General Dean, a POW, was repatriated on this day.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1953

Training for replacements involved Squad and Platoon tactics, inspection, and squad defensive combat.
About this date a truck arrived with several backpacks. Among them was the backpack that Gulick had left behind Hill 126 on the night of July 24th.

PFC Bradford B. Shinn, 1247509/0311, is shown on H/3/1's July 1953 Monthly Personnel Roster as leaving the states in July 1952. If this is not a mistake, he probably arrived in Korea about Aug. 1952. It is also possible that there is a typing error and Phil left the U.S.A. in July 1953 and arrived about this date.
SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1953

Capt. O. R. "Ray" Swigart, Jr. was apparently H/3/1's CO at this time.
A Memorial Service was held, "In honor and glory of the of the men of the United States Marine Corps who gave their lives for God and Country," between July 23, 1953 and July 26, 1953. Following is a copy of the program from the Memorial Ceremony held for the 3rd Battalion, First Marines.

Assembly..................................... Bugler
National Anthem..............................Division Band
Invocation......................Chaplain R. E. Brengartner

MEMORIAL ADDRESS

Major General R. McCall Pate

MARINE CORPS HYMN

Division Band

ROLL CALL OF THE DEAD

G/3/1 (presented by Capt. F. J. Hunt)
PFC Aleson Milton Anderson       PFC James Layton Ashbrook
PFC Thomas Gerald Barrett       PFC Donald Beam
PFC Ralph Larkin Bernhardt      PFC Lee Edward Bever
PFC Theodore Fred Binette       Cpl Oscar Mullan Brown
PFC Gerald Edward Charlesworth PFC Robinson Chase
PFC Terrill Owen Coats          PFC Donald Richard Comtois
PFC John Marshall Drake Jr.     PFC Patrick James Edmunds
PFC Erich Richard Fickter       PFC Timothy James Gilmore
PFC Willie Hamilton             2nd Lt. Robert Gerald Herlihy
Cpl Wayne Raymond Hill          Cpl Paul John Himmels
PFC Jackie Doyle Jackman        Cpl Charles Buford Johnson
PFC Joseph Henry Jones          PFC Marvin Howard Jolliff
2nd Lt. John Justin Leonhard.

(****Author's note - Its an interesting coincidence that not one person whose name starts with the last half of the alphabet (M-W) was KIA.)

H/3/1 (presented by Capt. O. R. Swigart, Jr.)

Cpl Wilbur Thomas Barbeau       PFC Seth Everett Britt
PFC Philip Ronald Brohen (2nd Plt) PFC Floyd Dale Cameron
PFC Ramon Castillo (2nd Plt)    PFC George Chegay
PFC Vernon James Crawford       PFC Michael Joseph Gilbride
PFC Thomas J. Hallmark

(****Author's note - Its an interesting coincidence that not one person whose name starts with the last half of the alphabet (I-W) was KIA. The platoons in which the individuals served was added by the author and not included in the Memorial Brochure.)
IN KOREA

I/3/1 (presented by Capt. F. T. O'Leary)

PFC Richard Edward Bustle   SSgt Orlando Anthony Ciccone
PFC John Bernard Coleman, Jr. 2nd Lt. Mortimer West Cox, Jr.
PFC Charles Samuel Crisp     PFC Gilbert Manuel Deliz
PFC Roy John De Nike, Jr.   PFC Lewis Robert Elze
PFC Marvin Duane Ferguson   PFC Robert Joseph Fitzgerald
PFC William Harrie Fortenberry 2nd Lt. Claudius Joseph Grey
PFC Walter Lowell Griffin   Pvt James D. Hammond
PFC Homer Manuel Hammonds   PFC Woodrow Robert Hausermann
PFC Thomas Kenneth Jenkins  Cpl Demar Doe Keener
PFC Leon Lee               PFC Elvin Huston Lyons
Pvt John Martin.

(****Author's note - Its an interesting coincidence that not one person whose name starts with the last half of the alphabet (N-W) was KIA.)

Weapons Co., 3/1 (presented by Major E. "H" Mackel)

PFC Raymond Bernard Campbell  Cpl John Nicholas De Virgilio
Pvt William Francis           PFC Homer Francis Gribbins
PFC Eugene Robert Jackson     PFC Reuben Delbert Kamphaug
Sgt Robert Arnold Missman     PFC Truman Dwight Trowbridge, Jr.
PFC Roger Leon Uhll           PFC Robert Kenneth Walters.

Memorial Prayer.........................Chaplain F. T. O'Leary
Rifle Salute..............................Honor Guard
Taps...........................................Bugler
Benediction...............................Chaplain S. D. Chambers
H/3/1 Marines in Korea

Thursday, October 1, 1953

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.

2nd Lt. Louis G. Proctor  Cpl George C. Bain
Sgt Roy P. Conway

Friday, October 2, 1953

Cpl Horace J. Drake was dropped from the Company.

Monday, October 5, 1953

By early October the 1st Marines completed construction of the blocking positions despite fierce summer heat. A number of rock formations in the area were difficult to dig out with limited tools and demolitions. Shortage of personnel due to participation in the new series of Division MARLEX exercises which resumed in October also hampered the progress. Within three months, the Marine Division had thus largely completed building of a solid defense in its new main battle position. H/3/1 Marines were very active in this task.

Tuesday, October 6, 1953

Cpl Duayne J. Estrada was dropped from the Company.

Thursday, October 8, 1953

By this date the Regiment was again on the front, manning the center of the Division zone.

The following were dropped from the Company.

Cpl Alvin J. Baynard  Cpl Sidney J. Beckler
Cpl Robert D. Blair  PFC Thomas H. Blake
Cpl William L. Bowers  Pvt Robert J. Boyer
PFC Charles B. Cameron  PFC Louis A. Daniel
PFC Leonard Debruyn  Cpl Verlin E. Foley
Cpl Herbert R. Forsythe  PFC Flim Hollingsworth

Friday, October 9, 1953

By this date the 1st Marine Regiment was again on the front manning the center of the Division’s zone.

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC Paul P. Brehun  PFC Morris L. Brusett

Sunday, October 11, 1953

Col. Wallace N. Nelson was relieved as Co. of the 1st Marines by Col. Ormond R. Simpson.

Thursday, October 15, 1953

About this date Aubrey Dick Bounds joined the Company.

Friday, October 16, 1953

Cpl John N. Hakey was dropped from the Company.
H/3/1 MARINES

MONDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1953

Cpl Joseph R. Cottrell left the Company.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1953

During the fall of 1953 there was a MARLEX. Perhaps it was about this date.

John Bowman and Paul Gulick remember the MARLEX. H/3/1 boarded the carrier, Point LaCruz, probably at Inchon. They went to sea for a few days and then boarded helicopters for a vertical assault somewhere on the coast of South Korea. Gulick has photographs he took during this exercise. The helicopters landed them atop a hill where they spread out in defensive positions. Gulick recalls that this was the easiest exercise he had experienced. After the landing they walked down about a mile down to the beach where they loaded aboard landing craft for transportation back to the carrier. The carrier sailed them back to Inchon and the exercise was over.

H/3/1 was waiting at Inchon for transportation back to camp. The Red Cross was there at Inchon to greet the Marines. They were serving coffee and donuts (if you had the money to pay for them). During Gulick's eighteen months in Korea this was the only time he saw the Red Cross and they were charging for the coffee and donuts.

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1953

About this date Gulick was to be promoted from BAR-man to fire team leader. When the offer came up, Gulick refused because he didn't want to give up his BAR. He had grown to love that thing.

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1953

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

H/3/1 1st Sgt. Charles Bud Melanson (left)
H/3/1 Bob Boyer rotated to the USA and was discharged about Nov. 20, 1953.

When Gunnery Sergeant, TSgt Charles "Bud" Melanson, returned to the states. He brought with him the girl that he had shared with others.

The story of "their girl" goes like this. Initially someone (perhaps S/Sgt Ingram’s wife/girl friend) sent a paper doll, along with her clothing. The doll and clothes were the cardboard paper type that could be clipped out of a book. This was a popular type of doll in the 1950s for little girls to play with. The clothes fit the paper doll girl with a little tab that folded back around the doll. Different types of clothing cutouts were provided for each doll.

The Marine (probably S/Sgt. Ingram) was told that this was the only type of doll he could play with until he got home. Unfortunately, Ingram never made it home alive. When he was KIA, the doll passed to a buddy, S/Sgt. Galvin. The paper doll then went to Sgt. Moore when Galvin was WIA; then to SSgt. Gaza (whom some think was KIA but there is no record in HQMC) when Moore was WIA. The doll then passed on to TSgt. Charles "Bud" Melanson who brought her home with him.

He sent a copy of her to the author in April 1996. Bud also generously provided photocopies of pictures, news articles, free passage fliers, etc. to the author for incorporation if the information in this document and sharing with his H/3/1 buddies.
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1953

About this date Gulick and some members of the 3rd Squad, 3rd Platoon were looking for something to liven up their living. They decided to solicit help from three major newspapers, the Dallas (TX) Times, the Cleveland (OH) Harold, and another unknown newspaper.

Specifics of what was written in the letters are forgotten but the letters to the three major newspapers all read the same. They asked that the newspaper run an article soliciting help. The Marines wanted to correspond with residents of their town, female in particular, who would be sympathetic to these poor unfortunate souls and provide them with what comfort they could through correspondence. About six of the Marines in the 3rd squad signed the letters.

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1953

A wedding took place this day between H/3/1's PFC Paul Irving Gulick (son of Harold Eugene Gulick and Ella Ruth Beers) and SFC Mary Teresa Haller (daughter of David Roger Haller and Laura Synthia Gibbs) of 1st Med. Bn., U. S. Army 24th Division. Chaplain George Reen administered the marriage at the 1st Marines Regimental Chapel. PFC Harry Ellsworth Lynn and Brenda Ann Swagger were witnesses. Gulick sent a copy of the marriage certificate home to his parents.

If you believe this, I have some beachfront property in Arizona to sell you. The real truth is that Gulick and Lynn got hold of a blank marriage license form and filled it out. If Gulick's recollection is correct, Mary Haller was the name of Harry Lynn's girlfriend in the states at that time.

About a week later Gulick wrote home to tell his parents that it wasn't really true. This was harder to do than he had thought. Gulick and Lynn had done such a good job filling in the marriage that the Mr. and Mrs. Gulick found it hard to believe that Paul wasn't married. He had a hard time convincing them. He remembers his mother writing, "If this is true, that's okay with us".

Actually this had happened so long ago that Paul Gulick had forgotten about it until he found the old marriage license in his collection of H/3/1 memorabilia. It still looks pretty real and in 1995, after he found the old marriage license, he had a hard time convincing his wife that he really wasn't first married to Mary Haller.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1953

About this date some of the Marines in the 3rd squad began receiving correspondence in answer our letters to the newspaper. About five or ten different people answered our plea. Most were obviously women but one we weren't sure about.

As correspondence went back and forth, one of the correspondents really got juicy in his/her writing. We got all of the details of everything sexy that could happen, some even unrealistic. We finally decided that this was a gay guy that was corresponding but we kept him/her going. No matter who it was, we enjoyed receiving the letters. It was like subscribing to a sex magazine and we were always waiting for the next issue. The main controversy about this person was what their sex was. When one of our Marines rotated home about Feb. 1954, he was going to look up the sender and let the squad know. Paul forget who was going to do this but we never heard from the Marine and the correspondence with the subject person stopped about this time.

Another person from Eldorado, AR wrote to Paul Gulick and Jim Hagen. Apparently she didn't know that Paul and Jim knew each other because she would write the same letter to both. Paul and Jim both wrote her for a few months.

See the February 10, 1954 entry for more about Paul Gulick and Jim Hagen's correspondence with this person.

Time has faded memory about others with whom the 3rd squad, 3rd Platoon Marines corresponded.
IN KOREA

JANUARY 1954

During this month the 1st Marine Regiment assisted in the return of non repatriated POWs to the United Nations.

SUNDAY, JANUARY 3, 1954

PFC Wayne R. Ambler, PFC Henry G. Wagner, and Pvt Thomas E. White were dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, JANUARY 4, 1954

PFC Donald C. Brown was dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 5, 1954

Sgt Homer H. G. Eachus was dropped from the Company.

MONDAY, JANUARY 11, 1954

Sgt Anthony A. Figueroa was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 1954

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.
- 3rd Plt Sgt James "Jim" Gallagher (Joined)
- 3rd Plt. 3rd Sqd Paul Scrap Carlton (left for USA)

MONDAY, JANUARY 18, 1954

Capt. John J. Zulkofske, H/3/1's CO, was dropped from the Company. Capt. James H. Bryson probably became H/3/1’s new CO on this date.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 20, 1954

PFC Johnny R. Brown and Cpl John Gokey were dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, JANUARY 23, 1954

PFC James Boseman, Cpl Paul Carlton, PFC Peter M. Dahl, PFC Dennis B. Driscoll, and Pvt James E. Jones were dropped from the Company. They were being rotated back to the U.S.A.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 26, 1954

PFC Morris R. Bowles, Cpl Theodore J. Breuer, Sgt William J. Duggan, and Sgt Richard T. Harding were dropped from the Company.
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1954

About this date Jim Hagen from the 3rd squad 3rd Platoon decided he didn't want to write to the girl from Eldorado any more (reference 16 December 1953). She had been sending the same letter to Paul and Jim all this time and Jim didn't need to write to see what was in her letters. All he had to do was read Paul's letter.

They got together and decided to concoct a story that would explain Jim's not writing any more and, in the same stroke, generate some refreshments. Paul wrote her and said that Jim had been in an accident and had been taken to the hospital. Paul said that he thought it would be a good Christianly idea to send him some cookies. They would be forwarded to him through the H/3/1 address.

See more about these cookies in the April 10, 1954 entry.

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1954

A Marine from the 3rd squad, 3rd Platoon was on mess duty about this date. This gave them the much needed supplies for their raisin-jack (apples weren't available) receipt. They mixed up a mess and put it in a 5-gallon water can to ferment. At this time H/3/1 was living in squad tents with the sides reinforced by 2" X 4" lumber. Heavy paper was tacked to the inside the 2" X 4"s for added insulation from the winter's cold. We even had hardwood floors by this time. The 5-gallon can of raisin-jack was hidden behind Gulick's cot, between the paper insulation and tent, to ferment for the required length of time.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1954


SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1954

About this date there was an inspection of quarters by H/3/1's CO. When they inspected the 3rd Squad, 3rd Platoon's tent, Gulick was reprimanded for the stench around his bunk. The raisin-jack was getting ripe.

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1954

The 1st Marine Regiment moved into reserve.

MONDAY, MARCH 1, 1954

The following were dropped from the Company.

Capt. James H. Bryson            PFC Howard L. Davis

MARCH 8, 1954

About this date Paul Gulick and Harry Lynn remember going by truck to Regiment to see Marilyn Monroe when she came over with a USO show. Gulick remembers that he was disappointed because all Marilyn did was sing two songs, pause for some pictures, and that was it.

Harry remembers that she was riding in a jeep that passed nearby and he touched her.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 1954

The following were dropped from the Company.

2nd Lt. Paul E. McHale           PFC Earl Brewster

MONDAY, MARCH 15, 1954
About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.
60mm Mortars       Frank "Francis" English (left)
H/3/1 MARINES

IN KOREA

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 1954

About this date Gulick was transferred to 1st Marine Division's Schools to attend a two-week Mine Warfare class.

SATURDAY, MARCH 20, 1954

About this date Gulick was attending a class that taught Marines how to use enemy weapons in case they needed to. There were 39 Marines and the instructor. The class was being taught in a quonset hut with two pot belly heaters near the center about twenty feet apart. Gulick was warming himself by the stove in the back while the instructor was just in front of the back stove, and between the two stoves.

During the day Gulick had been shown how to use a bangalor torpedo (pipe bomb). The pipebomb was live and kept in a closet at the instructor's end of the quonset hut. The day's instruction continued with the instructor, a Sgt Smith from TX, taking a Chinese 61mm mortar out of the closet. The mortar had been disarmed but the fuse in the mortar was a good one. He showed how the Chinese had a large cork-type plug in the fuse instead of the pins we have in our 60s. He then brought out a live Chinese 82mm mortar with no fuse. He explained it was a dud that had been taken out of an old battle position. He removed the fuse from the 61mm mortar and inserted it into the 82mm mortar to show the fuses were interchangeable. About this time Gulick was facing the back stove with his right side toward the instructor. He was reaching back with his right hand to get a pencil off the desk/table behind him. Sgt Smith then asked why the round was safe. Some one raised their hand, and when called upon, said it was because of the cork-type fuse still being in the fuse. Another Marine raised his hand and asked, "You mean that won't go off now?" Sgt Smith dropped the mortar to show it was safe. This was a mistake that would effect all in the class (8 deaths and 32 injured Marines out of the 40).

The concussion blew Gulick back against the wall near the door and he landed in a crouched position. The windows and doors had been blown out. His first thought was the live bangalor and he started to drop to the deck. About the time his knee hit the floor, he realized that the bangalor would have already gone off if it was going to so he ran out the door and about 50 yards to the corpsman's tent. The Corpsman grabbed for him but Gulick told him he was okay and to get over to the quonset hut. Gulick was numb and felt no pain. The corpsman grabbed his bag and ran out the door.

Another person in the tent told Gulick he was bleeding. Closer inspection revealed that Gulick had shrapnel throughout his right side. The most serious looked to be three holes in his chest area just under his right upper arm area. About this time Gulick thought he could feel some pain in his back and thought it may have gone through to his back. He had been taught not to move a patient who might have a back injury so Gulick laid flat on the floor. He wasn't worried and he thought he was pretty calm. He just wanted to wait for the corpsman to return before moving because of his possible pack injury.

About that time he began the cold sweat. As cool and calm as he was, the shock still came on in the form of a cold sweat. He reached up to the corpsman's rack to get a blanket to use to cover himself. Gulick was also thinking it could be a lung wound. He had been told that if wounded in the lungs he would spit up blood. He spit and sure enough, it was full of blood. He remembers thinking that, "If I am dying, this is good way to go because I don't feel any pain". As it turned out, he had a piece of shrapnel in his lip, which he carries there today, that had caused blood to trickle into his mouth. Lung injuries don't always cause bleeding from the mouth.

Gulick lay there for quite some time. Choppers were called in to evacuate the wounded. The corpsman had gotten all of the injured out of the quonset hut and then returned to his hut where someone had told him Gulick was. They put Gulick on an upper stretcher in the chopper where Gulick remembers holding a bag of plasma for the patient below.

At A-Med. two guys grabbed Gulick's stretcher and started running with him. He was bouncing about a foot off the stretcher an Gulick was concerned about his back. He told
them to slow down, but they paid no heed. Gulick got up on his left elbow and was going to take a swing at the rear stretcher-bearer when they finally slowed down and walked him the rest of the way.

They unclothed Gulick to examine his wounds. They quickly sent them back aboard a chopper for a ride to the hospital ship, USS Haven. All he had with him was his cigarettes and lighter.

After X-rays they told Gulick that he had several pieces of shrapnel in the right side of his body. He had three holes in his right lung and if he didn't stop bleeding, they would have to operate. The rest of the wounds didn't seem that serious. The bleeding didn't stop so they operated on him that night.

Another wound that was left to heal by itself was a small piece of shrapnel about the size of a .45 slug that had hit him in the right side of the neck. Gulick remembers having a stiff neck when recuperating from the lung injury but it eventually seemed to get better. The shrapnel had broken the neck bone but it had healed itself. However, the bone spurs that developed eventually began effecting a nerve in 1963-1970. Over a period of time, sixteen years later, a problem progressively developed. By 1970, his left hand would continually fall asleep and the skin on that hand would continuously peel, like a snakeskin. In 1970 he had an operation to repair a broken neck bone. They removed the spurs and channeled a path through his neck bone for the nerve that goes to his left hand.

Below is another recollection from Larry Rickman who was in the area.

Dear Paul Gulick,

I was a driver from Headquarters Betal. with the USO show. They were to put on a show across the road from the school. When we found out about the explosion that afternoon they cancelled the show. We went back to the headquarters Betal. They were wanting as many people as they could find to donate blood. Two or three weeks later, I guess, I was TAD to the school as a driver. I remember seeing the quonset hut that the 32 men were in when it blow up. They said that the Corpsmen saved many lives that day. But from what I understand, I was, told that the men had found a Chinese mortar in the field and the sergeant disarmed it and brought it back to the quonset hut for the class to see. Somebody asked what would happened if he would dropped it and the sergeant said nothing because he had disarmed it. So he dropped it and it went off. They say there was 5 ways to disarm it and he new of 4 ways only it was a new Chinese mortar that they didn't know much about. That is why it blow up. The quonset hut from the inside looked like a sprinkling can. It had little holes all through the walls and the roof from all the bomb fragments. That's all I heard and saw back in 1954.

Larry Barickman - (Driver for the 1st Mar. Div. NCO School)

The following were dropped from the Company.

Cpl James E. Cook
PFC Oscar R. Gomez
PFC Paul I. Gulick (returned from the hospital about 2 months later)
PFC Richard A. Williams
IN KOREA

TUESDAY, MARCH 23, 1954

PFC Lawrence E. Snide was dropped from the Company.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 1954

PFC Stanley Spryn Jr. was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, APRIL 1, 1954

About this date the USS Haven arrived at Yokosuka, Japan to unload patients at the Yokosuka U. S. Naval Hospital. Gulick was among those debarked.

Meanwhile, back at H/3/1 about this time, Gulick's 3rd squad was probably drinking Gulick's raisin-jack. They were also eating the cookies that Paul and had conned from the girl in Lorado, AR. Also because of Gulick's exemplary (good or bad) service, H/3/1's CO decided to promote Gulick to CPL. His promotion was forwarded (somewhere).

SATURDAY, APRIL 10, 1954

About this date Gulick's mail was beginning to catch up with him. Among the letters was one from Eldorado, AR. She told Paul how sorry she was to hear that poor dear Jim had been in an accident and had to go to the hospital. She wrote that she had sent him some cookies and hoped they would cheer him up (ref. February 10, 1954)

There Gulick was in the hospital, in a similar situation he had depicted for Jim Hagen in the letter he had sent to her. Back at H/3/1 Hagen was probably eating the cookies and laughing about it. I guess Gulick got what he deserved this time.

THURSDAY, APRIL 15, 1954

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

MG Plt.           Jewell Tex Sanders (joined)
                Alden Clesi (joined)
                Robert Scottie McKim (joined)

SUNDAY, APRIL 25, 1954

About this date PFC Gulick received orders to go from Yokosuka Naval Hospital to Camp Fisher (near Kyoto, Japan) for further transfer back to H/3/1 in Korea. He still didn't have any clothes so they gave him an issue slip and sent him to supply to get some clothes.

Yokosuka Hospital was enclosed by a fence and was a separate base within the Yokosuka Naval Base. When Gulick started walking through the gate, the sentry wouldn't let him pass in his pajamas and robe. When he reported back to the administrative office, they again sent him back to supply. After bouncing back and forth a few times they finally drove him to supply in an ambulance and Gulick got finally his clothes.

These were real Marine cloths. Some who had gone this way early in the war wound up in Army Hospitals and were issued Army clothing. They had to paste a piece of paper labeled "U.S. Marine" over the "U.S. Army" stencil.

At Camp Fisher they wouldn't let Gulick go back to Korea because he was still on light duty and couldn't reenter a combat zone. They put him on mess duty and kept him there for 30 days. This broke Gulick's heart to have to spend and additional 30 days R&R (or was it I&I). He really worked hard to get back on full duty. He worked as a mess-man during the day and spent the night on R&R. He now tells his wife stories of how he spent most of his time in the Camp Fisher's church and library during this period. (???)

TUESDAY, MAY 4, 1954

The following were dropped from the Company. This many being dropped on the same
date probably means that most (if not all) were being rotated back to the USA.

PFC William C. Adams  PFC Roy C. Allen
Cpl Bobby L. Asher  PFC Melvin H. Barker
Sgt Joseph C. Brown  PFC Wilson Cephas
PFC Robert L. Charlton  PFC William M. Clark Jr.
Cpl James A. Cope  Cpl Robert M. Cuccio
Sgt James M. Grimes  PFC William R. Hansford
SSgt Leonard G. Shank  PFC Charles C. Westlake

TUESDAY, MAY 11, 1954

PFC Charles Cunningham was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, MAY 14, 1954

1st Lt Noel D. Highfill was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, MAY 15, 1954

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

3rd Plt. 3rd Sqd  Roland (Rock) Graveline

TUESDAY, MAY 25, 1954

About this date PFC Gulick was transferred from Camp Fisher back to H/3/1. When he arrived and reported to the Company Office, they were going to court martial him. They had sent his CPL Warrant to the Marine Detachment at Yokosuka and they returned it saying he had been transferred back to H/3/1 a month ago. They had him recorded as being AWOL.

Eventually, after verifying his whereabouts (he was at Camp Fisher on mess duty), they promoted him to Cpl in June. He had spent about 30 months as a PFC. This Marine retired from the Marine Corps in 1975 as a Master Gunnery Sergeant. The interesting thing is that he spent longer as a PFC than he did as any other rank below Master Gunnery Sergeant.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 26, 1954

1st Lt. William R. Mather was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, MAY 27, 1954

PFC Donald E. Shultz, 1378503/0311, was dropped from the Company.

TUESDAY, JUNE 15, 1954

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

2nd Plt 1Sqd Ldr  John Gilligan
(rotated to USA for discharge)
SATURDAY, June 26, 1954

About this time Paul Gulick had been promoted to Cpl and was now the 3rd Platoon's 3rd Squad Leader and Harry Lynn was a Company Wireman. The Company was giving liberty for those who wanted to go to a major PX that was a few miles to the south. Gulick and Lynn wanted to go on liberty together and submitted a chit to go on liberty the same day. Lynn's was approved but Gulick's was not.

It was on a weekend and Gulick didn't think they would miss him so he went any way. Instead of going to the PX they went down another road and wound up in a Korean village where they bought two quarts of liquor. Gulick thinks it was Segreams VO.

Enlisted men weren't allowed to have hard liquor and they didn't want to get caught with the bottles. They put the bottle inside their dungaree jackets and under their arms. When a vehicle approached from the front, they would slide the bottles to the rear behind their arm. When vehicles approached from the rear, they slid the bottles to the front.

A 6x6 truck stopped to give them a lift and they jumped in the covered back of the truck, Paul on the right rear and Harry on the right rear. There were about ten other Marines already in the truck. They were sitting on the seats that folded down from the side of the truck. Wouldn't you know it, H/3/1's 1st Sgt. was the fourth person sitting to Paul's left. Gulick thinks his name may have been Arnie Hickman.

As they rode in the truck, with elbows on knees to absorb the shock of the bumpy road, Harry's bottle began to slide forward and the neck of his bottle was protruding out between the buttons in his jacket before he noticed it. The 1st Sgt. said nothing and neither did Paul nor Harry. They were hoping that he wouldn't notice they were from the same company.

When they got to company area, Gulick had a message that the 1st Sgt. wanted to see him. Gulick remembers that the 1st Sgt. spoke with a mannerism that reminded him of Pa Kettle, a show that was on TV in the 1950s. The 1st Sgt. explained to Gulick that, "Enlisted men aren't supposed to have hard liquor, you know. One might get into trouble that way, you know. I think you had better turn that bottle over to me and I might forget about it, you know." Gulick got the message. The 1st Sgt wanted his bottle and Paul was glad to get away that easy. The 1st Sgt. apparently didn't know Gulick and Lynn had two bottles or they would have lost them both. The 1st Sgt. had only seen the neck of the one that stuck out between Harry's buttons. Probably the 1st Sgt. didn't realize Paul was AWOL.

FRIDAY, July 2, 1954

The following Marines were dropped from the Company to rotate back to the USA.

- Cpl Thomas C. Gaddis
- PFC Roland "Rock" J. Graveline
- Cpl John E. Ham
- Cpl Alfred S. Hanson
- Sgt Joseph C. Martin II
- PFC Raymond J. Thomas

- Cpl Frankie Garcia
- Cpl James "Jim" W. Hagon
- PFC Earl A. Hamilton
- PFC Russell F. Herbruck
- Cpl Bradford B. Shinn
- Cpl Clarence Ward

SATURDAY, July 3, 1954

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.

- Pvt Curdsy Antoine
- PFC Leon R. Steele
H/3/1  MARINES

IN KOREA

MONDAY, July 5, 1954

The following Marines were dropped from the Company.

PFC Edward Brookshire  PFC  Cpl Lawrence J. Gordy
PFC Lee T. Gosnell  PFC Ivan R. Steenhoven
Pvt Ian M. Stewart

WEDNESDAY, JULY 14, 1954

Cpl Fernand Villanueva was dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, JULY 25, 1954

PFC Bobby G. Rogers was dropped from the Company.

FRIDAY, JULY 30, 1954

Lt Tom McKenney who arrived with the 42nd replacement draft remembers that about this
date the 1st Marines were on the OPLR, the 7th Marines were on the MLR, and the 5th Marines
were in reserve. H/3/1 was on positions south of Hills 229 and 181 and the ruins of the
Village Chang Dang. The Company was also north of the Libby (X-Ray) bridge. Tom was the
3rd Platoon Leader and on an outpost called Tam Bang Dong.

SUNDAY, AUGUST 1, 1954

Pvt Robert D. Mead was dropped from the Company.

Lt. Maurice Curan was the 2nd Platoon leader and recalls that he, and parts of the
Company were on a hill called Tam Bang Dong. This hill was probably on the west side of
Libby Bridge.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1954

The following were dropped from the Company.

1st Lt. William Threlfall  Cpl John "Big John" Denzil Bowman Jr.
PFC Bobby J. Buster  Cpl Ray A. Byler
PFC Jerome P. Byrne  Pvt John Condupi Jr.
Pvt Billy R. Forman  Sgt John R. Giglio
Pvt Manuel Gomez  PFC Dean W. Jillson
PFC Forrest R. Stevens  PFC William M. Struss
PFC Donald D. Swain  PFC Fred Thomas
TSgt William R. Weber

FRIDAY, AUGUST 13, 1954

1st Lt. Wesley H. Rice was dropped from the Company.

SATURDAY, AUGUST 14, 1954

Cpl William "Bill" A. Brede Jr. was dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, AUGUST 15, 1954

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

John "Gus" Foote (left)
John (Big John) Bowman (left)

MONDAY, AUGUST 16, 1954
Paul Gulick and Harry Lynn remember that during the summer of 1954 they were providing security for Libby Bridge and the surrounding area along the Imjin River. Gulick remembers finding a 2.36 bazooka round under the bridge. He took it up on Libby bridge and, in an attempt to explode the round, dropped it over the side. The round fell the height of the bridge, about 35 feet, and landed on some rocks below but didn't explode. Gulick then had them call demolitions to take it away. Gulick remembers that he caught hell for trying to explode the round but he thought he was doing it safely.

Harry Lynn also remembers an occurrence while guarding Libby Bridge. He challenged a stranger in the night but the stranger wouldn't answer and kept coming. Harry fired a warning round high above the intruder who turned out to be a H/3/1 Lt. The Lt. quickly told Harry who he was. Harry really shook up the Lt. because he thought Harry was shooting at him. The Lt. told Harry not to tell anyone about this incident, probably because he was embarrassed. Harry didn't. A few days later, H/3/1's CO called Harry in and threatened him with a court martial. The Lt. had returned to the Company and told a different story. Eventually, it was cleared up and the indecent was dropped with no action taken.

**WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 25, 1954**

The following were dropped from the Company.

- PFC Donald W. Cody
- Cpl Roy A. Fryman
- PFC Thomas L. Greenwood
- Cpl Herman L. Rutledge

**WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1954**

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

- 3rd Sqd  3rd Plt  Cpl Paul Irving Gulick (left for USA)
- H/3/1  Wireman  PFC Harry Lynn (left for USA)
- 3rd Plt.  Aubrey Dick Bounds (left)

**SUNDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1954**

The following were dropped from the Company.

- PFC Carl Ferro
- PFC Louis D. Fortuna
- PFC Charles E. Fox
- PFC Joseph J. C. Fruge
- PFC Ronald J. Frye

**THURSDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1954**

The following were dropped from the Company.

- Cpl James "Jim" F. Gallagher
- Cpl Elemene T. Sua

**FRIDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1954**

Pvt Donald E. Shultz was dropped from the Company

**SATURDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1954**

2nd Lt. William C. Dobson was dropped from the Company.

**SATURDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1953**

About this date Paul Gulick got the word that he was due for rotation back to the states. He had come with the 32nd draft in May of 1953 and was going home with the 35th draft because he had agreed to extend and go home with his buddy, Harry Lynn. Paul had been at a gate on the southern border of the DMZ. He, and the 3 or 4 others who were
manning this gate had the job of insuring that no one was allowed to enter the DMZ without a proper pass. They would also periodically go out on night patrols to try to catch line crossers. They would patrol the fence line and looked for signs of activity or wait in ambush for the line crossers. Gulick doesn't remember catching any line crossers but Scottie McKim, who was on the same type of duty at another position, remembers catching some.

After getting the word that he was going home, Gulick was sent back to Battalion, the assembly area for 3/1 personnel going home on the draft. He visited his buddy and old squad member, PFC Schultz, who was now a cook at Battalion. Gulick's unit wasn't allowed to have any alcohol on DMZ duty, but back here at Battalion it was a different story. Schultz had all the beer in the world and Gulick took advantage of the situation. He bought about 3-4 cases of beer, put it in his sea bag. The beer pretty well filled the sea bag and there wasn't much left for anything else; perhaps this shaving gear and a change of clothes.

During that night Gulick had his fill of beer. Schultz was on duty to cook breakfast for the battalion the next morning. Among other duties, he was supposed to prepare the coffee. He did this in a thirty-two-gallon garbage can filled with water and then added coffee grounds to boil. The water was heated over an open cook fire and the grounds eventually settled to the bottom. Gulick barely remembers that morning. He does remember salting down the coffee with cigarette ashes. Schultz must have really had his hands full with Gulick that morning.

When the word came for the draft to load aboard truck to go home, Gulick was still in the mess hall. He had to run back to Schultz's tent to get his sea bag and then just barely made it back to the convoy before they left. He threw his sea bag on the back of the 6x6 truck and it landed with a loud clank. Gulick doesn't remember many of the details on the way back to Inchon. Perhaps he was sleeping.

When they got to Inchon it was warm and the flaps on the squad tent were rolled up. The word was passed to prepare for a junk-on-the-bunk (clothing) inspection. The purpose of this inspection was to determine how much clothing Marines were missing so they could reissue their shortages when they returned to the states. There is a specific format for clothing to be laid out in this type of inspection but Gulick had just about nothing to lay out. He realized that he would be in trouble if he were caught with the beer so he decided to hide the beer inside the rolled-up tent flaps around the tent. He then neatly put the few articles of clothing he had left on his bunk. While waiting for the inspecting officer, Gulick fell asleep (or passed out) on top of his clothing.

Some (thankfully understanding) 1st Lt. came along to hold the clothing inspection and woke up Gulick. The perturbed Lt. just put on his list to give Gulick a complete reissue of clothing when he got back to the states.

With all the trouble he got into, how did Gulick ever get out of Korea with his Cpl. stripes? The gods must have been smiling upon him.

MONDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1954

The below Marines were dropped from the Company.
  PFC Raymond G. Bonnell            Cpl Grover C. Casen
  Sgt Gerald Lacy (also dropped on Oct. 14th)

THURSDAY, OCT. 14, 1954

Sgt Gerald Lacy was dropped from the Company (also shown as dropped on Oct. 11th.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1954

Pvt Frank J. Johnson was dropped from the Company.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1954
PFC Herbert Flachofsky was dropped from the Company.
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1954

About this date Paul Gulick and Harry Lynn were on the ship coming back to the states. Harry was on mess duty. They were hungry one night so Harry went down and told the mess cook that he was picking up the sandwiches for the men on guard. Actually they only wanted a few sandwiches but they had to take them all if they were for the guard. Paul and Harry had their fill that night.

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1954

About this date Arthur "Art" Bramley, a Machine gun Section Leader, spent much of his time guarding Libby Bridge. He also spent much of his time in machine gun bunkers on the DMZ line. He knew the Marine's sector was considered to be a prime Chinese attack route if the War started up again. They would keep watch in the bunker overnight and then report back to the Company in the morning. When not providing security, they spent much of their time training and on conditioning hikes.

When a Condition George was announced they would quickly get to their defensive positions in the trenches and bunkers until they received the all clear. Condition Fox was the real thing.

On a few occasions the Company experienced harassment activities from North Korean line-crossers. On one occasion they blew up the fuel dump and another time set fire to the storage tent when the Company was gone on an exercise. Most of the time they were elusive but on one occasion three suspects were caught and turned over to Battalion intelligence for interrogation.

Although the cease fire was in effect land mines still remained a hazard.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1954

PFC Ronald Kuchenbecker was dropped from the Company and transferred to MP where he was to become a brig guard.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1954

The following were dropped from the Company.

PFC Burl R. Covington  Pvt Billy D. Scott

MONDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1954

The following were dropped from the Company.

Cpl Dennis D. Dawson

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1954

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.

MG Plt.  Jewell Tex Sanders (left)

The following were dropped from the Company

Capt. John C. Scharfen  Pvt Raymond G. Miller
TSgt Kenneth E. Price

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1954

Pvt Paul C. Dockens was dropped from the Company.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1954

2nd Lt. John J. McLoughlin was dropped from the Company.
PFC Robert R. Ferrin had developed a Kidney problem and was dropped from the Company
IN KOREA

to be sent o the hospital in Japan. He did not return to the Company.

SATURDAY, JANUARY 15, 1955

About this date the following Marines joined or left the indicated units in H/3/1.
MG Plt. Charles "Critch" Critchell Jr. (left)

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1955

It must have been a cold winter because Scottie McKim remembers it was the coldest
winter he can remember.

MARCH 17, 1955

The 1st Marines were relieved of its MLR responsibilities for the last time and
transported to Ascom City near the port of Inchon. The U. S. Army 24th Infantry Division
relieved them. They stayed at this staging area for a few weeks waiting for their turn to
sail. The 1st Marine Regiment was the last to leave for the USA.

APRIL 1, 1955

The first echelon of the 1st Marine Regiment sailed for the United States. Art
Bramley recalls that some, if not all, of the Company was aboard a LST ship for their 20
day voyage to San Diego.

APRIL 3, 1955

The second (last) echelon of the 1st Marine Regiment sailed for the United States. The 5th and 7th Marines had returned to San Francisco and there was some kind of an incident
that caused the 1st Marines to be routed back through San Diego.

APRIL 1955

During April H/3/1 returned to Camp Pendleton in the United States. Robert (Scottie)
McKim was with them when they returned. Alden Clesi also returned to the states about this
time. Perhaps he returned with H/3/1.
Scottie remembers taking trucks to Inchon VIA Seoul and then spending a few days in
tents at Inchon. They loaded ships and the voyage lasted about three weeks. After docking
at San Diego they were transported by truck to Camp Pendleton.
Almost everyone in H/3/1 remembers Camp Pendleton because this is where they took
their advanced infantry training before going to Korea. It is only appropriate that the
Division would return here to the familiar surroundings. Now they were returning to
Barracks that were constructed with concrete.
H/3/1 REUNIONS AFTER KOREA

NOV, 1991
First H/3/1 reunion in Parris Island, SC
14 members attended - total persons attending ?

JUNE 6-11, 1993
Second H/3/1 reunion in Albany, NY
24 members attended - total persons attending 40
  Toured the NY Capital Building
  Went to Saratoga Race Track

JUNE 23-26, 1994
Third H/3/1 reunion in Arlington, VA (or Washington, DC)
? members attending - total persons attending 61
  Toured Washington, DC
  Attended Marine Back parads
  Saw the Commandants house
  Toured Quantico, VA

JULY 1994
Bob Kelley attended the Massachusetts Korean War Memorial dedication at the Charleston-Boston Navy Yard. He, with a little help from others, donated $250 for a brick engraved with "IN MEMORY OF THOSE WHO DIED H-3-1 1ST MARINE DIVISION". The brick is built into the memorial.

SEPTEMBER 1995
Fourth H/3/1 Reunion in Nashville, TN
? members attending - total persons attending ?
  Toured hard Rock Cafe
  Went to Grand Old Opry to see Patsy Cline review
  Cruised on the General Jackson
  Banquet was in Embassy Suites
IN KOREA

OCTOBER 9-12, 1996 - FIFTH H/3/1 REUNION IN PENSACOLA, FLORIDA
(? members attending - total persons attending ?)

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1996

Some had checked in earlier but this was the first official day of the reunion. Registration began at 1200 and those in charge of the Hospitality Suite had it ready with the beer iced. The rooms had a coffee pot (with coffee provided), a refrigerator, and a microwave. Continental Breakfast was served between 0700 and 0199. The rooms were very reasonably priced at $65.00 (beach-view rooms were a little higher) for being right on a beautiful beach. This first day of the reunion was a leisurely day to allow everyone to get acquainted and say hello to old friends in the Hospitality Suite. Beer and soft drinks were provided. Ed Skokowski, H/3/1's historian had a huge display of information and pictures available for everyone to review. Three copies of the first version, the 1996 Version, of H/3/1 MARINES IN KOREA, was also available for review and comment.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1996

About 0900 we all mounted up and left in a convoy for a very interesting morning and early afternoon at the Naval Aviation Museum at Jacksonville NAS. Rides were provided for those who wanted to go but didn't have transportation because they flew to Jacksonville. The guided tour was very interesting.

At 1530 the Hospitality Suite was opened and was very active for the rest of the day. Again the beer and soft drinks were provided.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1996

A members organizational meeting was held in the Hospitality Suite. Major points discussed were:

Officers were elected; the same ones had done such a good job that everyone wanted them to continue. However, Ron Mason, who had done such a fantastic job in the past, declined because of other commitments and perhaps health problems. He also did a fantastic job with this reunion. Larry O’Shea replaced him. It was determined that the 1997 reunion would be held in September in the St. Louis, MO area. Bob Culp will be coordinating the 1997 reunion. The 1998 reunion was scheduled in Southern CA with "Doc" Reed Carpenter coordinating. The 1999 reunion tentatively planned to be on Arabian Cruse.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1996

The Hospitality Suite was open from 0900 until 1630. At 1730 chartered buses took everyone to the buffet dinner and dance at the Lighthouse Point Restaurant at Jacksonville NAS.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1996

About everyone checked out of the Motel in the morning. After saying goodbye, most returned home except for those who went on to continue their vacations.
OCTOBER 1-5, 1997 - SIXTH H/3/1 REUNION IN ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI
(57 members attending - total persons attending 107)

There were 57 members registered and 50 guests for a total of 107 participants. Considering all reunions through the 2006 reunion, this reunion had the fourth most participants.

The sixth H/3/1 reunion is planned to be at the Hampton Inn (1211 Market St., St. Louis, MO 63103; phone (800) HAMPTON

The sixth reunion is being planned and coordinated by Robert "Bob" Culp who can be reached at 1440 North 27th St., Allentown, PA 18104; phone (610) 437-5829

Toured the St. Louis Arch
Toured Budweiser (or was it Bush) Brewery and saw the clydesdale horses.
went on a riverboat Casino.
IN KOREA

OCTOBER 27, 29, 1998 - SEVENTH H/3/1 REUNION AT SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
(46 members attending - total persons attending 82)

The 7th reunion was held on the at the Holiday Inn on Point Loma in San Diego in Oct. 1998. Ciro Reed "Doc" Carpenter, Corpsman with H/3/1’s 2nd Platoon from Sept. 1951 to March 1952, planned the reunion. Doc resides at 1215 Anchors Way #143, Ventura, CA +93001.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1998

The early birds arrived to help coordinate the reunion before the planned activities were to begin.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1998

All enjoyed assembling in the hospitality room and enjoying the refreshments. Old friends exchanged long over-due greetings.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1998 at 1000

The H/3/1 Ladies met in the hospitality room at 1000 to plan their activities coordination of future events.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1998 at 1315

Buses were provided and at 1315 Marines and their ladies enjoyed a cruise of the San Diego Harbor was taken. Sights seen included the Cabrillo National Monument (site of California’s discovery), the famous Hotel Del Coronado, the magnificent Coronado Bay Bridge and more. Close-ups were of many ships (sleek destroyers, submarines, magnificent aircraft carriers, and merchant ships) were seen as the cruise craft sailed beneath them. The Star of India (oldest merchant ship afloat) was also seen.

During the evening the hospitality room was open again to chat and review tables full of pictures and historical information about H/3/1.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1998 at 0900

Buses were provided at 0900 for a round trip to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) to attend a graduation of Marines who had done their tour in boot camp. The invaded the PX and then all enjoyed a buffet on base. After reviewing the receiving barracks and training area they all attended a memorial service to honor fallen comrades.

The hospitality room provided the evenings entertainment for those who didn’t go out to see the city.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1998

The Ladies left for their trip tot Seaport Village at 0945 for sightseeing, shopping and lunch.

H/3/1 Marines held their annual membership meeting in the at 1000. A cash bar was opened at 1800 and the banquet and dance was held in the evening to conclude the reunion.

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1998

H/3/1 Marines departed the reunion.
IN KOREA

1999 H/3/1 REUNION AT SAN ANTONIO
(56 members attending - total persons attending 92)

OCTOBER 6-9, 1999

The Eighth H/3/1 Reunion was held at the Four Point Sheraton River-walk North on Lexington Ave., San Antonio, TX. The agenda included:

Wednesday, October 6, 1999
1100 AM Check in at the Guadalu Room
0900- Hospitality Room 9045 with snacks and beverages

Thursday, October 7, 1999
Free day - plan your own activity

Friday, October 8th
0900 Tour to Johnson Ranch and Nimitz Museum. Lunch H-3-1 at Fredericksburg

Saturday, October 9, 1999
0800 Memorial services were held for our Marines and Corpsman who have passed on to a higher calling
0900 H/3/1 reunion group men’s annual meeting
OFFICERS ELECTED
Commandant - Bob Culp
Assistant Commandant - Bob Kelly
Adjutant - Chuck Lyman
Secretary - George Broadhead
Treasurer - Billy Dean
Company Gunny - Jack Dedrick
Historian - Ed Skokowski
Next year the reunion will be in Seattle, WA
Candidate places for 2001 reunion are Paris Island, SC; New Orleans, LA; Norfolk, VA; and Kansas City
0900 H/3/1 women’s tour
1800 Cocktail hour in the Coronador Room
1900-2300 Colors were presented by Cadets from the Marine Military Academy
A banquet was held in the Coronador Room and the band play music

Sunday, October 10, 1999
Checkout
WEDNESDAY, October 18, 2000
Check in (for early comers) at the Ramada Hotel in downtown Seattle. Approximately 60-80 Marines and family members attended the reunion.
0800- Two hospitality rooms were available. One for refreshments and one for review of H/3/1 memorabilia

THURSDAY, October 19, 2000
H/3/1 Honeys had their meeting
0800- The day was free for visiting, shopping, tours, etc.

FRIDAY, October 20, 2000
0800 Participants left, via bus and ferry, for a full day tour of the Bremerton Shipyard

SATURDAY, October 21, 2000
1000 H/3/1 members had their meeting
Next years reunion will be in Parris Island, SC
2002 candidates were New Orleans, Philadelphia, Kansas City
1600 Participants left for their banquet which was in the Space Needle

SUNDAY, October 22, 2000
Farewells and check out
IN KOREA

2001 H/3/1 REUNION AT Paris Island, SC
(? members attending - total persons attending ?)

TUESDAY (and even earlier), October 2, 2001
Check-in (for early comers) at the Holiday Inn in downtown Beaufort

WEDNESDAY, October 3, 2001

0800- Check-in continued throughout the week with most of the members arriving on Wednesday. Approximately 120 Marines and family members attended the reunion. A very large hospitality room, was available. Food and refreshments were available.

THURSDAY, October 4, 2001
0900 Two full buses left for the trip to Charleston. After arriving, tour buses were boarded and all had a very nice, well orated tour of the city. Everyone was dropped off at the market/flea market where they had a few hours for lunch and shopping.
1600 Everyone boarded the bus for the two hour return trip to the Holiday Inn.
1800- Food and beverages were available in the hospitality room

FRIDAY, October 20, 2001
0700 Participants left, via three buses for a full day trip to Parris Island.
It included watching the graduation ceremony

SATURDAY, October 21, 2001
1000 H/3/1 members had their meeting
H/3/1 Honeys held their meeting
The reunion was concluded with a banquet

SUNDAY, October 22, 2001
Farewells and check out
There were 69 members registered and 62 guests for a total of 131 participants.

Tuesday, Oct. 29, 2002. Considering all reunions through the 2006 reunion, this was the reunion that had the largest attendance.

Many early birds checked in to the hotel

Wednesday, October 30, 2002
Registration began and the hospitality room was open.

Thursday, October 31, 2002
The group took a bus tour of New Orleans, LA.
The hospitality room was open in the evening.

Friday, November, 1, 2002
The group attended the D-Day Museum in New Orleans.
The hospitality room was open in the evening.

Saturday, November 2, 2002
A business meeting was held.
Choices for the banquet were chicken breast florentine, roast prime rib. of beef, and fresh gulf filet of fish

Sunday, November, 3, 2002
Most of the reunion's participants left for home.

There were 59 members registered and 57 guests for a total of 116 participants.
Considering all reunions thru the 2006 reunion, this was reunion had the second most attendees.
The reunion was coordinated by Joe Reed through the Armed Forces Reunion Planner group. Several within the group helped with various functions.

2003 H/3/1 REUNION AT BRANSON, MO
(59 members attending - total persons attending 116)

There were 59 members registered and 57 guests for a total of 116 participants.
Considering all reunions thru the 2006 reunion, this was reunion had the second most attendees.
The reunion was coordinated by Joe Reed through the Armed Forces Reunion Planner group. Several within the group helped with various functions.

2004 H/3/1 REUNION PLANNED TO BE IN BALTIMORE OR PHILADELPHIA
(45 members attending - total persons attending 79)
2005 H/3/1 REUNION IN DENVER, CO
(48 members attending - total persons attending 108)

There were 51 members registered and 55 guests. There were also six Marines guests (Color Guard and guest speaker and coordinator) at the banquet for a total of 112. Considering all reunions through the 2006 reunion, this reunion had the 3rd most (113) participants.

Monday and Tuesday, September 20-21, 2005
The early birds checked into the Hotel and started preparing for Wednesday’s registration.

Wednesday, September 21, 2005
1000- Hospitality Room (Tulluride Room) open
1300-1700 Reunion registration

Thursday, September 22, 2005
Hospitality Room open all day
0800-0930 Reunion registration continues
0930-1200 Tour of Golden and Coors Brewery. The brewery tour lasted 40 minutes and ended in a tasting room.
1730-2230 Dinner and playhouse “Ain’t Misbehavin”

Friday, September 23, 2005
Hospitality Room open all day
0945-1130 Memorial at Ft. Logan National Cemetery
1130-1400 Choice of one of the below two activities; Return to hotel VIA tour of Denver
Tour of Red Rocks Park and lunch

Saturday, September 24, 2005
0830-1030 Presentation of Ssgt Brian Ivers, USMC, in the Aspen Room
Subject: his tour in Korea and today’s Marine equipment
1030-1200 Business Meetings - men in the Aspen Room - Women in the Evergreen Room
1200-1330 Deli style luncheon
Hospitality Room open rest of the day
1800-1900 Cash Bar open before Banquet
1900-2200 Banquet

Sunday, September 25, 2005
Departures
The schedule of events for the 2006 reunion follows:

The reunion is to be held at the Town & Country Resorts & Convention Center. (room rates $99 includes continental breakfast). The Hospitality Room is to be in the Royal Palm Tower. Suites in the Royal Palm Tower incudes and outside patio with seating and private bathroom, a small refrigerator, a microwave, buffet counter, sofa, table chairs, etc. The resort contains five unique restaurants, 3 cocktail lounges, 4 pools and Spa, Bella Tosca European Day Spa, salon & Fitness center, 27 hole golf course, premier shopping, and light rail transit (trolley) system.

WEDNESDAY, September 27, 2006

Registration is scheduled in the Hospitality Room from 1300 to 1700.

Hospitality room will be open at 1300 and all free times during the reunion.

THURSDAY, September 28, 2006

Visit Camp Pendleton. Depart at 0900 and return back to the hotel between 1500-1600. Possible have lunch at Camp Pendleton (not firm yet.

FRIDAY, September 29, 2006

Memorial Service at Fort Rosecrans. Depart 0930 and services (with floral wreath and color guard) commence at 1030.

Following the services, at 1200, we will have a harbor-side buffet luncheon, complete with desert and coffee.

Following luncheon, we will proceed to either the site of the USS Midway or Seaport Village and return back to the hotel between 1530 and 1600.

All inclusive price per person for all of the above Midway Tour is $49.00

All inclusive price per person for the above Seaport Village is $39.00

SATURDAY, September 30, 2006

0900-1130 A Speaker's presentation will be given by a Marine Major followed by the men’s and women’s business meetings.

1200-1330 Buffet luncheon

1800-1900 cash bar

1900-2200 Banquet with servings of:

Roast Prime Rib, that is a half pound of delectable slow-roasted, aged, perfectly seasoned prime rib, butcher shop carved for maximum flavor and served with horseradish sauce.

Petti Di Pollo Arrosto, that is fire roasted, free range chicken breast marinated in fresh herbs, extra virgin olive oil and preserved lemon and finished with a sun dried tomato butter.

Vegetarian Meal that contains fresh seasonal vegetables.

All meals are $46.00 incl tax and gratuity

SUNDAY, October 1, 2006

Departures
H/3/1 MARINES

IN KOREA

THE 2007 H/3/1 REUNION IN KANSAS CITY, MO
(32 members attending - total persons attending 64)

October 3-7, 2007

This year’s reunion will be held Oct. 3, 2007-Oct 7, 2007 at the Hilton Airport Hotel, Kansas City, Missouri. The room rate, $89.00 + tax per night per room, includes free parking.

SCHEDULE

SATURDAY, September 29, 2007

The earliest birds to arrive were Paul and Pat Gulick. No, they weren’t that dedicated. They arrived early because they were to drive to Topeka, KS early Sunday morning to meet with their Granddaughter and two great grandchildren. Other early birds began arriving on Monday and Tuesday, October 1st and 2nd.

WEDNESDAY, Oct. 3, 2007

The Hospitality Room officially opened at 1300 and registration of participants began. Gil Heyblom did a terrific job (as usual) of providing the liquid refreshments and snacks. Most of the members filtered in during the afternoon and evening to register and visit with old acquaintances.

ACTIVITIES

THURSDAY, Oct. 4, 2007

A Day with the President, 0900-1400 with a cost of $49.00 per person which included the library fee and the dinner. The day began with the tour bus leaving the hotel and then touring through Independence, MO as the tour guide provided details of the city’s historic and current cites. The tour ended at the Truman Presidential Museum and Library where everyone browsed. The tour bus departed the Museum about 1200 and took everyone to a very nice buffet Ryan’s Steak House. After everyone had their fill they were returned to the Hilton Airport Hotel. Many stayed in the hospitality room to swap remembrances. Many went to nearby restaurants because of the hotel’s high cost for dinner.

FRIDAY, Oct. 5, 2007

We started a tour of Kansas city from 0900-1600 with a cost of $45.00 per persons which included the museum fee and the dinner. Another tour guide gave the details of the city's highlights. The tour ended at the World War I Museum which was very interesting. The museum was so large and comprehensive that it took several hours to view everything. The tour concluded with a memorial service in the auditorium of the museum to pay respect to our fallen comrades. After leaving the museum the bus took us a short distance to dinner Harvey House Diner where a terrific meal was enjoyed by all. After leaving the Harvey House we returned to the hotel for more liquid refreshments and visiting.

SATURDAY, Oct 6, 2007

In the morning at 0900 a Korean War Veteran gave an interesting presentation. Following this presentation the men and women broke up for their respective business meetings. After the meetings a luncheon was provided in the hotel restaurant. The luncheon prepaid for by the registration fees.

The bar was opened at 1800 before the banquet which began at 1900. Everyone enjoyed their selection of food (beef, chicken, or fish).
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SUNDAY, Oct. 7 - Departures
THE 2008 H/3/1 REUNION IN ARLINGTON, VA
SHERATON NATIONAL HOTEL
June 4-8, 2008
(?? members attending - total persons attending ??)

SCHEDULE

WEDNESDAY, June 4, 2008
Registration: 1300-1700
Hospitality Room opens at 1300 and during all free times
Schedule will be posted on the door.

ACTIVITIES

THURSDAY, June 5, 2008
0900-1500 Trip to new U.S. Marine Corps Museum, Quantico, VA
1500- Dinner on your own - hospitality room open

FRIDAY, June 6, 2008
A.M. Trip to Korean, Korea, World War II and Iwo Jima Memorials
1200-1900 lunch on your own - hospitality room open
Evening trip at 8th and I’s famous Evening Parade

SATURDAY, June 7, 2008
0900- Men’s and ladies meetings
1200-1300 luncheon
1400- Memorial service
1800-2200 Speaker Lt. Col. Ken Kassner (experiences in Iraq) and Banquet

SUNDAY, June 8, 2008
Departures
THE 2009 H/3/1 REUNION IN New ORLEANS, LA
HOTEL - TBD
about Sept.-Oct, 2009
(TBD members attending - total persons attending TBD)

being coordinated by Wilmer Morgani and Gus Marcotte

Planned activities

Visiting the World War II Museum.
CHAPTER 11
KOREA IN THE 21ST CENTURY

The South Korean Government has hosted a "Korean Veterans Revisit" program since about 1975. The revisit program provides a five-day schedule of tours and activities in Korea if the veteran will pay the cost of the air fare to Korea. All costs, except for personal expenses, are paid for by the South Korean government. This program was still in effect in 2004 and scheduled to be continued through 2005. The program was coordinated (in 2004) by Military Historical Tours based in Arlington, VA.

The author of this book, Paul Gulick, took advantage of the revisit program and went to Korea in October, 2004. The below information is based on his experience during his visit to Korea and information supplied to him by others who have participated the revisit program.

Following is a summary of what Paul experienced during his trip to Korea.

The total cost for our trip was about $2600.00 for my wife and I ($1300 per person). This was what Military Historical Tours called the air fare to Korea. However I noticed then we got our tickets, they were about $1,000 each. I guess the extra $300 was for their cost of coordinating, supplying two tour guides, etc. which was well worth the price. All expenses (hotel, food, tours, Korean tour guides, admissions, etc.) during the visit to Korea were paid for by the Korean Government. The only money we spent was for personal items (gifts, souvenirs, tips, etc.).

We flew out of Los Angeles Airport (LAX) on Korean Air lines. There may have also been an option in the tour package to fly from the east coast. Our non-stop flight to the Inchon airport in Korea took us about twelve and one half ours. We left LAX at about 1230 PM and arrived in Korea about 5:30 PM. It was daylight during our entire trip. We were aboard a fully packed Korean Air Lines 747 and had a private monitor attached to the back of the seat in front of us. Earphones were provided for passengers. Several movies were available for our viewing pleasure. There was also a channel that provided continual visual updates on were the plane currently was passing, the time in flight, time left before arriving at destination, local time at destination, miles traveled, miles to go, etc. We were fed full meals and snacks while in flight.

When we arrived in Korea, there were buses waiting and female Korean tour guides to take us to our hotel near down-town Seoul, which was about thirty to forty miles distant. The Sofitel Ambassador Seoul hotel is listed as a three star hotel but appeared to have the conveniences of American four or five star hotels. The rooms were very adequate and we lacked for nothing. The tour guide were very pleasant and well informed. We had the same tour guides during our stay in Korea that went with us on all tours and continually informed us on all aspects of Korea. During the trip the tour guides gave us our meal tickets for the five days we were to be in Korea.

FIRST NIGHT

Dinner was served at the hotel when we arrived at the hotel. There was a wide variety of food to satisfy all ethnic groups. There was about ten different types of meat and 10 different types of vegetables. Many other foods (fish, sea food, pasta, many pastries, etc.) and drinks were available.

We did nothing special. We just stayed in hotel, exchanged American dollars of Korean Wan and handled the jet lag. We met our two Military Historical Tours guides (one
for each bus) who stayed with us the entire time of the trip.

Others tour groups joined us this night. They consisted of the veteran and a wife or relative. There was a group from Hawaii that consisted of about thirty persons. There was also a diversified group from England (English, Irish, Welch, Scotch), Europe (Turkish, Dutch, German), Africa (South African), India, and perhaps other countries that were our allies in the Korean War. The total group consisted of more than one hundred persons.

**DAY TWO**

Each tour group had its own bus when traveling. Our group (from continental U. S. A.) had two buses because of the large number (about seventy) in the group. There was a Military Historical Tour Guide and a Korean tour guide in each bus. Sophie was the Korean tour guide in our bus and was very helpful in coordinating transportation, logistics, etc. While in motion, the Korean tour guide continually spoke over the bus’s intercom providing information about all aspects of the location to which we were going. They also provided other interesting information about the Korean economy, way of life, attitudes toward American, living standards, etc. They were continually available to answer our questions and satisfy our needs.

During our trips, the buses crossed several of the twenty seven bridges that crossed the Han River. Marines will remember that there were none when Seoul was liberated in 1950 and there was only one bridge during the Korean War. The typical bridge was four or six lanes wide and a length of about one half mile. Lining the banks of the Han River, and throughout the metropolitan area of Seoul, there were hundreds of huge apartment buildings where many of the residents lived. Seoul had a population of 11,000,000 persons in 2004.

We took buses to a memorial/historical center. This building compared to one of the Smithsonian building in Washington, D.C. and covered an area of about twenty square acres. Outside the building were huge carvings, statues, and monuments that were mostly depicting simulations of what might be seen in the Korean War. Some were depicting other aspects of Korean history. The size and detail of the monuments were as good, if not better than can be seen in the Washington, D. C. Mau and the Iwo Jima monument. There are huge plaques on the outside walls of the building that were under the cover of a very large overhang and corridor. There was one group of plaques for each of the United States that had engraved names of every military person from that state who lost his life in the Korean War.

Inside the multi story building, where one could easily get lost, was the history of Korea. Much of the history was about the Korean War. There were many other parts of the building on various floors that showed the history of Korea dating back thousands of years. Included were ships that were a thousand years old and many aspects of the Korean culture (weapons, bronze age products, products used in earlier Korean history, etc.). Young school children visited the museum and learned about the United States’ involvement in the war. They would greet us with American greetings and thank us for helping them.

We also visited a many, many acre cemetery and had a memorial service. It, too, had many huge statues and sculptures. The ten-foot high walls were sculpted depicting person in the Korean War. Huge (15 foot high) statues of lions, animals, and cultural interest were also present. Many dignitaries were present for this particular service and it was covered by may newspapers. Pictures and news articles were in the next day’s newspapers telling about the memorial ceremony.

**DAY THREE**

We went on bus trip to that once was Walmi-do Island. The space between Walmi-do and Inchon, where the was a narrow causeway at the time of the invasion in September 1950 is not widely filled with land. There are many business and factories in this area. We went to the north side of Walmi-do where there was a seventy-five foot wide paved walkway that was hundreds of yards long. Typical shops (10-12 foot wide fronts that are closed with metal pull-down doors) lined the left side of the walkway. Most shops were about the size of a typical one car garage in the U.S.A. The right side of the walkway was lined with a well constructed, neat looking concrete railing. There were no swimming beaches insight at
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this location.

After leaving Walmi-do, we traveled by bus to a location that was about four miles distant from Walmi-do. The location was atop a hill that was several hundred feet high. The buses drove through residential/business streets that were barely wide enough for the bus to pass. Atop this hill was a memorial site where they had a huge stature of General Douglas McArthur who is highly thought of in Korea. The view of Walmi-do and the surrounding waters was beautiful. We had box lunches at this location and there were a few small sales places for those interested in shopping.

DAY FOUR

We went on bus trip to tunnel #3 (see below for a description of the tunnel). At the tunnel location we were taken to an observation building that was well guarded by the Republic of Korean (ROK) Army. The DMZ is four thousand meter (about three miles) wide. From this high vantage point one could see several miles north across the DMZ into North Korea. Looking to the left, we could see the Samichon River Valley and what was once the Hook on the MLR. The Hook is now in the DMZ. We could also see the DMZ several miles to the right.

The 3rd Infiltration Tunnel

Only 44 kilometers from Seoul (less than an hour's drive), the third tunnel was discovered in October 1978. Almost identical in structure to Tunnel 2, the 1.635 kilometer-long tunnel is 1.95 meters high and 2.1 meters wide. It penetrates 435 meters south of the Military Demarcation Line at a point 4 kilometers south of Panmunjom, running through bedrock at a depth of about 73 meters below ground. Capable of moving a full division (plus their weapons) per hour, it was evidently designed for a surprise attack on Seoul. This tunnel is only 2 kilometers from a key outpost defending the Munsan corridor leading to Seoul.

To get to Tunnel #3 we traveled from Seoul on multi-lane highways, following the Han River, and eventually, over narrow paved roads to the DMZ. The total distance was probably about fifty miles. Along the way we passed Freedom Bridge, Munsan, and Libby Bridge. Freedom Bridge is the bridge on the road that went to Panmunjom, the site of the peace talks and where POWs were released. It crosses the Imjin River. Libby Bridge also crosses the Imjin River and is a bridge which Paul Gulick guarded shortly before the cease fire on July 28, 1953.

We stopped at Munsan on the return trip. Many of the 1952-1954 veterans of Korea will recall that Munsan-ni is where there was a rail head. This was the last stop on the railroad from Inchon. Marines would disembark from the cattle cars and board trucks for the ride to their combat units. While at Munsan we had boxed lunches and the we shopped in the few stores that at that location. We also had a wreath-laying service at this location at a memorial site where flags of all of the UN countries in the Korean War were flying.

We also toured a reconstructed village that is visited by many school children and depicts the way Korean people lived in earlier times. It was a very interesting tour.

On the return trip to Seoul we rode on a multilane road that passed the Seoul Train Station. This is the site where H/3/1 Marines did some serious fighting in September 1950 while liberating Seoul.

The buses stopped at a well-known shopping center before returning to the hotel and all had a couple hours to shop. The shopping center was about a half mile square of narrow
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(about eight feet) inter-winding corroders that passed between, and through, shop after shop. One could find almost anything desired in these shops. All merchants were happy to sell their products and there was much competition between them. The shops were crammed full of stuff with most shops having about a fifteen foot frontage. Collectively, the shops resembled an extremely large flea market that one would find in the U. S. A. There were no doors on about half of these shops. Apparently they stay open twenty four hours a day, seven days a week. Here, as in many other places, a lot of haggling went on, especially by Paul’s and others interested in the art of haggling.

There was a banquet held for us the night in a huge banquet room that easily handled our approximately two hundred participants. At each eight-place table, there was a dignitary from Korea seated with the veterans and their wives. All veterans were call forward and awarded a Korean medal for their service in the War. Young members of the Korean military provided excellent entertainment (Singing, instrumental music, etc.).

DAY FIVE

We were given a little more time to shop before being bused to the Inchon Airport for the return trip home.

The Korean Airlines plane on the return trip had personal viewing monitors on this plane. Movies were shown on central screen and headphones were provided.

The trip back to the U. S. A. took about eleven hours. We left in evening and, because of the earth's rotation, passed through the night and arrived in Los Angeles in the morning. The trip was very interesting and, at a cost of $1300, was a bargain when considering all of the things that were provided.