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Marine Helicopters in Korea
[KWE Note: The following article was written by Major Rodney R. Propst,
USMC. It was copied to the KWE from the USMC Combat Helicopter Association website at
http://www.popasmoke.com/korea/chronology.html
with the permission of Wally Beddoe. Pilots and crew members who flew in helicopters in Korea, as well
as military personnel who were passengers in these aircraft, are encouraged to submit their memoirs on this
subject to the KWE.]
In August of 1945 the world entered the Atomic Age at Hiroshima, Japan. The atomic bomb created a new era in
warfare and as a result of it the Marine Corps began to concentrate on ways to increase dispersion and reduce
vulnerability to this new and very lethal weapon. In the years immediately following World War II, the Marine
Corps pioneered and developed a new concept in the mobility of assault troops and logistical re-supply with the
advent of the helicopter. Vertical envelopment was conceived at the Marine Corps base in Quantico and proven
during the Korean War.
In 1946, Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific viewed the atomic
tests at Bikini Lagoon. General Geiger felt strongly that atomic weapons would impact on how the Marine Corps
conducted amphibious operations. In a letter dated 21 August, 1946 that General Geiger sent to the Commandant he
stated, "It is quite evident that a small number of atomic bombs could destroy an expeditionary force as now
organized, embarked, and landed..." [General Geiger urged the Commandant to] "consider this a very serious and
urgent matter" [and that the Marine Corps] "use its most competent officers in finding a solution to develop the
technique of conducting amphibious operations in the Atomic Age."
The Commandant, General Alexander A. Vandegrift, acted by referring General Geiger's letter to a special
board of General officers with instructions to "...propose, after thorough research and deliberation, the broad
concepts and principles which the Marine Corps should follow, and the major steps which it should take, to wage
successful amphibious warfare at some future date..."
On 16 December, 1946 the special board submitted an advanced report to the Commandant recommending that
parallel programs be initiated to develop a transport seaplane and a transport helicopter. The board further
recommended that an experimental Marine helicopter squadron be organized to train pilots and mechanics and that
the Marine Corps Schools develop a tentative doctrine for helicopter employment. General Vandegrift
concurred with the special board's results and began the actions to make Marine helicopters a reality. General
Vandegrift visualized the Vertical Assault Concept as:
"With a relatively unlimited choice of landing areas, troops can be landed in combat formations and under
full control of the flanks or rear of a hostile position. The helicopter's speed makes transport dispersion at
sea a matter of no disadvantage and introduces a time-space factor that will avoid presenting at any one time
a remunerative atomic target. It should also be noted that transport helicopters offer a means for rapid
evacuation of casualties, for the movement of supplies directly from ship to dump and for subsequent movement
of troops and supplies in continuing operations ashore."
The Commandant's goal for 1947 was to organize one developmental helicopter squadron with 12 helicopters in
order to study helicopter employment in amphibious operations.
On 10 March, 1947 the Marine Corps Schools' Committee of the Academic Board headed by Colonel Robert E.
Hogaboom submitted its report on "Military Requirements of Helicopter for Ship-to-Shore Movement of Troops and
Cargo". The report stated: "... it is more realistic to approach the problem in increments, establishing
initially the characteristics for a purely assault conveyance. . . "
The Mogaboom report went on to list the specifications for the assault helicopter as:
1. 5,000 pound payload
2. 200 to 300 nautical mile range (500 miles with an auxiliary fuel tank)
3. 100 knot cruising speed
4. 4,000' hover ceiling
5. external hook and hoist
6. self-sealing fuel tanks
7. overall dimensions to be able to fit on the hangar deck and elevators of the aircraft carrier.
On 1 December, 1947, in compliance with the Commandant's goal, Marine Helicopter Squadron One (HMX-1) was
commissioned at MCAS Quantico, Virginia. Colonel Edward C. Dyer, who had been instrumental in establishing the
Marine helicopter program, was the Commanding Officer. HQMC established the mission for HMX-1 as:
1. Develop techniques and tactics in connection with the movement of assault troops in amphibious
operations, and
2. Evaluate a small helicopter as a replacement for the present OY aircraft.
On that first day of December 1947 Colonel Dyer was the sole member of HMX-1 and the squadron would not
receive any aircraft until 9 February, 1948 when two Sikorsky HO3S-1's would arrive. At the request of
Lieutenant Colonel Victor H. Krulak, the Assistant Director of the Senior School of the Marine Corps Schools,
HMX-1 participated in Operation Packard II during May of 1948. This operation was an amphibious command post
exercise developed and planned by the Marine Corps Schools. The operational plan was prepared by the student
staff and provided for an element of the landing force, the staff of a regimental combat team (RLT), and HMX-1
to be embarked on escort aircraft carriers. Utilizing 5 HO3S-1s, HMX-1 flew a total of 35 flights carrying 66
Marines and a considerable amount of communications gear ashore from the ship. Operation Packard II provided the
framework that proved helicopters could play an integral part in amphibious operations.
The Marine Corps Schools, by November 1948, had developed the world's first manual entitled Amphibious
Operations--Employment of Helicopters (Tentative). This book was numbered 31 in a series of publications on
amphibious operations.9 Phib-31 detailed many of the advantages of the helicopter and vertical assault, but more
importantly it projected the concept of vertical envelopment well into the future, far outreaching the current
capabilities of the helicopters the Marines were flying in 1948. Lieutenant Colonel Krulak describes the
approach that the Marine Corps Schools used in preparing Phib-31, "...a prospective military philosophy. It
consists of thinking in terms of the next war instead of the last. This means starting with ideas, when
you have nothing more tangible, and developing them into the concepts, procedures and weapons of the future."
Although, the Marine Corps was the last American military service to have helicopters, it became the first to
institute a long-range program of working out helicopter combat techniques. (Phib-31 was copied by the U.S.
Army, almost word for word, in its first helicopter manual.)
The months between 1948 and August of 1950 saw HMX-1 and the Marine Corps Schools continue to work on both
the concept of vertical envelopment and the machines used to fly it. There were more Packard Operations, new
helicopters like the HRP-1 and HTL-3, continued test and evaluation, and a Marine Air Ground Task Force
demonstration for President Harry S. Truman and the members of Congress.
On 25 June, 1950, eight divisions of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA), crossed the 38th Parallel
brushing aside patrols of the army of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and rapidly moved south in order to unify the
Korean peninsula into a Communist state. In response to the Republic of Korea's request, on 28 June 1950, the
United Nations ordered military sanctions against the North Korean invaders and by 7 July the U.S. Marines were
ordered to activate a Regimental Combat Team. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was activated under the command
of Brigadier General Edward A. Craig and was built around the 5th Marine Regiment and the 33rd Marine Air Group
(MAG-33) of the 1st Marine Air Wing. 6,534 officers and men prepared to go to Korea.
HMX-1 was ordered, on the 7th of July, to send 8 officers and 30 men to the 1st Provisional Brigade for
assignment to Marine Observation Squadron 6 (VMO-6) of MAG-33. These Marines would fly and maintain four HO3S-1
helicopters and would be the first helicopter unit organized for combat. 14 July, 1950 saw VMO-6,
commanded by Major Vincent J. Gottschalk, embarked on the USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116) bound for Korea. After
only 31 months of evaluation for both the concept of helicopter employment and the aircraft themselves the
Marines were on their way to war for the first time with helicopters.
The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade landed at Pusan, Korea on 2 August, 1950. The next morning General Craig
made a reconnaissance of the area in a HO3S-1. This flight began a new era in command and control. General Craig
eventually came to call the helicopter the "emergency weapon" of the Brigade command and staff. The Brigade
maneuvered rapidly with the intent of counterattacking and stopping North Korean penetrations. The helicopters
of VMO-6 proved their worth. General Craig said of them:
"Marine helicopters have proven invaluable. They have been used for every conceivable type of mission. The
Brigade utilized them for liaison, reconnaissance, evacuation of wounded, rescue of Marine flyers downed in
enemy territory, observation, messenger service, guard mail at sea, posting and supplying of out guards on
dominating terrain features and re-supplying of small units by air.
General Joseph L. Stewart recalled the use of the helicopter when he was a Lieutenant Colonel and the G-3 of
the 1st Provisional Brigade at Pusan, Korea:
"I was the G-3 of the brigade in Korea that employed the first helicopters in combat. It was really
dramatic to observe those who hadn't seen a helicopter operate before, to see the reactions and expressions of
those who saw for the first time how the helicopter could be of such great assistance to us in planning these
fast moving, put-out-the-fire type of operations."
Major Gottschalk, the Commanding Officer of VMO-6, stated, with historical significance, that the helicopter
brought back a personal element to command and control on the battlefield that had not been seen in modern
times:
"Perhaps the most important use of the helicopter in the early months of the Korean War concerned command
and control. The flexibility provided the Brigade Commander to control his forces, change direction of
movement, give personal instructions to subordinate commanders, and observe the resultant battlefield movement
in a dynamic fast moving situation provided a new dimension to tactical control of the battlefield in a
difficult terrain setting."
Major Gottschalk said, speaking of medevac flights, that, "The availability of the helicopter to pick up
wounded from units that were cut off some distance from the main body improved the morale of the men in the
lines." [He added that rescue missions also] "helped the morale of the fighter pilots in support of the Marine
brigade."
The night of August 8th found Captain Victor A. Armstrong flying the first night medevac by lifting a wounded
regimental surgeon to safety. The HO3S proved to be a rugged aircraft that could continue to fly regardless of
hard landings in rough terrain and taking enemy small-arms rounds. Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr.,
Commanding General, FMFPac, after observing the helicopters operate in Korea, said, "Later in Korea I saw
helicopters come in with a dozen bullet holes in their wings and bodies--unless they are hit in a vital part,
they will continue to fly." During the month of August 1950, the helicopters of VMO-6 logged 580 flights and a
total of 348 flight hours with their HO3S's.
General Craig was such an advocate of the use of helicopters he wrote the following regarding their use in
Korea and in future conflicts:
"VMO-6 was flown to Pusan from Japan. These aircraft have been invaluable in reconnaissance and the
helicopters are a Godsend in this type of terrain, not only for reconnaissance but for supporting of combat
patrols in mountainous terrain; for supply of food, water, ammunition; but also for the evacuation of
casualties. . By separate dispatch to you.. .a request has been made to bring out elements of the Helicopter
Transport Squadron. It is believed that this innovation will meet with outstanding results in combat in this
mountainous terrain for the landing of patrols on top of mountain ranges.. .The helicopters presently
available have been invaluable beyond expression ...[However] I feel they will not be able to sustain all the
demands."
In September, 1950 VMO-6 prepared for the amphibious assault at Inchon. The helicopters of VMO-6 would play
no part in the landing because there were not enough of them to lift the assault troops. On 16 September, D+3,
Captain Armstrong landed his HO3S at the newly captured Kimpo airfield with General Shepherd and Colonel Krulak
as his passengers. VMO-6 relocated to the airfield at Kimpo and began flying a dawn-to-dusk schedule in support
of the 1st Marine Division as it fought its way across the Han river and on to northwest approaches to Seoul.
Seoul was officially liberated on September 29, 195O and on 12 October the Marines of the 1st Marine Division
were back-loaded on ships at Inchon to be moved to the other side of Korea for a new adventure.
After a non-contested landing at Wonsan, Korea the 1st Marine Division, in November of 1950, was so extended
that it had units at Hagaru, some 50 miles from the division CP at Hungnam. Major General Oliver P. Smith, the
Division Commander, realized that he had unusual command and staff problems. General Smith ordered that the Main
Supply Route to the Chosin Reservoir be strengthened and that an airstrip be constructed at Hagaru. As a result
of Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) attacks in late November the 1st Marine Division was divided into five
self-contained perimeters. The helicopters of VMO-6 provided the only means of contact between these isolated
groups.
The night of December 1st saw the Marines come out fighting their way from Yudam-ni to Hagaru, 14 miles that
would take 59 hours to cross. On 6 December, 1950 the 1st Marine Division began its breakout attack from Hagaru
to Koto-ri. By the evening of the 7th of December with the 7th Marines leading and the 5th Marines covering the
division fought its way to Koto-ri. From there the division marched to Hamhung with the lead elements reaching
the sea late on the 10th of December. Every day of the breakout from the Chosin Reservoir the aircraft of VMO-6
were on call. Although the altitude reduced payloads and the bitter cold added to the difficulties of upkeep and
repair, the helicopters of VMO-6 saved lives by flying medevacs and bringing in medical supplies. From
October 28 to December 15 VMO-6 flew 1,544 flights for a total of 1,624.8 flight hours.
The 1st Marine Division was back-loaded from Hungnam, between 10 and 24 December, by the Navy ships of TF-9O.
The division was taken back to Pusan, which had been the first assembly area of the Brigade. In five months the
Marines had managed to fight all around the Korean peninsula.
The spring of 1951 saw VMO-6 continuing to support the 1st Marine Division as it had in 1950. General
Shepherd again spoke of helicopters by saying, "Due to the rugged terrain it would have been most difficult to
operate in Korea without helicopters. They were a Godsend to the Marines."
In the summer of 1951, as the first year of Korean operations drew to a close, Marine helicopters had flown
every mission except the one that had been envisioned for them--vertical envelopment during an amphibious
assault. The remedy for this lack was to be filled by Marine Transport Helicopter Squadron (HMR) 161. HMR-161
was commissioned 15 January, 1951 at MCAS El Toro, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel George W. Herring.
With 43 officers, 244 men and 15 Sikorsky HRS-1 helicopters HMR-161 sailed for Korea on 15 August, 1951. The
HRS-1 was a transport helicopter capable of carrying five or six combat Marines. HMR-161 arrived at Pusan, Korea
on 2 September, 1951 as the 1st Marine Division launched an attack in the Punchbowl area in eastern Korea.
HMR-161 moved to the front and shared Field X-83, near Chondo-ni, with VMO-6. The observation pilots of VMO-6
briefed the transport pilots of HMR-161 on the flying conditions in Korea.
On 12 September, 1951 HMR-161 indoctrinated the Marines of the 1st Shore Party Battalion in the techniques of
loading and giving landing instructions to the large transport helicopters. The next day, in preparation for
Operation Windmill I, supplies were sorted into 800 pound loads. At 1550 that day seven HRS-1 helicopters lifted
with supplies suspended below each aircraft to fly a seven mile route in order to re-supply the 2nd Battalion,
1st Marines. Upon landing each helicopter picked up battle casualties and the wounded Marines were admitted to a
hospital facility only 30 minutes after being wounded. Operation Windmill I consisted of 28 flights for a
total of 14.1 flight hours. 18,848 pounds of cargo were lifted and 74 casualties were medevaced.
On 20 September, 1951 the first helicopter-borne landing of combat Marines took place in Operation Summit.
Despite dense fog, HMR-161 lifted 224 fully equipped Marines to the objective--Hill 884. The HRS-1's also
transported 17,772 pounds of cargo in support of Operation Summit. The entire operation consisted of 65 flights,
31.2 flight hours, and took a total of four hours overall.30 The official report of Operation Summit, read in
part:
"These initial efforts have demonstrated strikingly the great contribution to tactical and logistical
flexibility that the assault helicopter offers ...[The report went on to say that]...helicopter functions will
be progressively enlarged as time passes, and that the aircraft type must be recognized as a requisite
component of a balanced military force."
On 27 September HMR-161 conducted the first night troop lift of combat Marines in Operation Blackbird. The
HRS-1's lifted 200 Marines of "E" Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines to the Punchbowl, on a night with no
moonlight, in two hours and ten minutes. Operation Blackbird was not an unqualified success but many lessons
were learned. The official report stated, "...night troop lifts in mountainous terrain are feasible provided a
daylight reconnaissance of the landing zone together with the avenues of approach and retirement can be
effected. Present equipment indicates that under present conditions in Korea these night lifts should be limited
to movements within friendly territory." Operation Blackbird was the only large scale night lift of combat
Marines in the Korean War.
11 October, 1951 saw HMR-161 make history and headlines again. Operation Bumblebee began that morning at 1000
when the lift of 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines and it equipment commenced. The statistics tell the story of
Operation Bumblebee:
- Number of helicopters: 12
- Number of flights: 156
- Total flight time: 65.9 hours
- Over-all time: 5.5 hours
- Number of Marines lifted: 958
- Average weight per man: 240 lbs
- Total weight lifted: 229,920 lbs
HMR-161 continued to support the 1st Marine Division in operations like Bushbeater, Rabbit-Hunt, Switch,
Farewell, and logistical support in Muletrain. As 1952 passed HMR-161 grew both tactically and in their ability
to respond to the needs of those they supported.
On 23 February, 1953 the Marines of HMR-161 began Operation Haylift II. This operation proved that the
helicopter was destined to have a unique place in logistical support of combat Marines. Over a four day period,
an average of 12 HRS-1's, flew from dawn to dusk carrying a combined total of 31,589 pounds per hour. Each
aircraft made 27 round trips of the 15-mile leg and carried 11 tons of supplies. It would have taken a large
fleet of trucks to provide this type of support and it would have taken four times as long. Again HMR-161
and the helicopters from VMO-6 continued to provide tactical and logistical support to the 1st Marine Division
in 1953 until the armistice was signed on 27 July, 1953.
Helicopter pilots and aircrewmen suffered a total of nine operational deaths in Korea, proving that their
machines were not overly vulnerable.
HMR-161, from the first landing in Korea to the Armistice in 1953, flew a total of 18,607 flights, 16,538
flight hours, lifted 60,046 people, and transported 7,554,336 pounds of cargo. The transport squadron also
evacuated 2,748 casualties in its 23 months in Korea. VMO-6 flew out 7,067 casualties during its 35 months in
combat.
As a newcomer to Marine aviation, the helicopter proved to be a valuable tactical weapon in Korea. It met and
exceeded the expectations the pioneers of vertical envelopment had for it. The tactical technique of hit and run
had proved most effective when used in major troop movements and not when used in small lifts. The concepts
developed at Quantico, Virginia in the late `4Os by HMX-1 had stood the test of war and had been proven in
Korea. Amphibious operations of the future would owe much of their success to the pilots and men of VMO-6 and
HMR-161 who flew in Korea.
Back to Page Contents
G-3-1 History - Korean War
The History of George Company, 3rd Battalion, First Marines. These are large PDF files, so the history
has been broken up into 4 individual volumes.
Semper Fi,
Carleton "Bing" Bingham, Secretary, G-3-1 KOREA Assn
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