Air Defense Support to Defensive Operations

In the defense, the NKA will give priority to the protection of critical facilities from CFC air assets in the main and rear defensive zones. The missions of air defense units in the defense are as follows:

- Detection of CFC air activity
- Interdiction of CFC aerial attack of forward and rear areas
- Utilization of electronic countermeasures (ECM) against CFC aircraft, and air-related communication and radar systems
- Air defense in depth
- Prevention of CFC aerial reconnaissance
- Air defense protection to NKA artillery and armor units
- Air defense against CFC airborne operations.
The NKA will plan to use air observation posts within 10 to 15 km of the defensive front lines. Firing positions will be selected to provide maximum protection of critical fire support assets (concentrations of artillery and tanks) and command and communications sites. Special attention will be given to anticipated CFC aerial avenues of approach.

Anti-aircraft guns will be deployed down to the platoon level. Man-portable SAMs such as the SA-7 and SA-16 will be deployed down to the company level. Though part of the NKA strategic air defense system, larger SAM systems such as the SA-2 can range into South Korea. As part of NKA deception operations, dummy SAM sites for larger systems will be employed to deceive CFC as to the actual location.

North Korean Antilanding Operations

Considering the devastating effect that amphibious operations had against North Korean offensive operations during the Korean War, the emphasis by North Korean military planners on lessons learned from that war, and CFC's capability to conduct operations from the sea, it can be assumed that North Korea has made extensive preparations to
oppose a CFC amphibious task force (ATF) composed of U.S./ROK Navy and Marine amphibious forces.

To date, North Korea is limited in its capability to project military power beyond the Korean peninsula and as such, is limited in conducting significant conventional military operations against a CFC ATF in the early phases of the preparation, embarkation, rehearsal, movement, and assault (PERMA) cycle of amphibious operations. During the preparation, embarkation, and rehearsal stages, North Korea will attempt to collect information and intelligence against CFC’s amphibious forces. However, other considerations, such as North Korea’s emphasis on SOF, the ranges of NKN submarines and some NKAF aircraft, and the development of long range missiles, cannot be discounted.

During the assault phase North Korea antilanding operations will consist of the following:

- NKN and NKAF reconnaissance assets that will attempt to locate the ATF in order to engage with attack aircraft and/or naval antiship missile platforms and to identify the probable location of the beachhead
• Employment of land-based antiship missiles

• Extensive use of naval mining

• Utilization of water obstacles

• Employment of coastal artillery

• Employment of land obstacles and mines

• The reinforcement of NKA ground antilanding forces with any available infantry, mechanized, artillery, antiair, or armor assets.

SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES (SOF)

North Korea’s SOF is organized into 22 brigades and 7 independent battalions. These forces will have five basic missions: conducting reconnaissance, performing combat operations in concert with conventional operations, establishing a second front in the enemy’s rear area, countering the CFC
special operations in North Korean rear areas, and maintaining internal security.

The Ministry of the People's Armed Forces (MPAF) has two primary commands that control special operations units: The Reconnaissance Bureau and the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau. North Korea classifies its special operations units as reconnaissance, light infantry, or sniper.

**NOTE:** Though light infantry units will perform SOF missions, all NKA divisions and brigades will have a light infantry element which will be forward deployed to conduct conventional infantry tactics in the offense. Light infantry SOF missions will include combat operations conducted by company or battalion size units against military, political, or economic targets. Sniper operations basically are the same as light infantry SOF except they are conducted in team size units.

North Korea's SOF will perform operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Basically, strategic operations will support national or MPAF objectives, operational
operations will support corps objectives, and tactical operations will support maneuver divisions and brigades.

The SOF strategic missions will include reconnaissance, sniper, and agent operations. Strategic reconnaissance will be intended to ascertain CFC intentions, develop targeting information, conduct poststrike assessments of CFC units and facilities, and assess the potential reactions of the South Korean civilian and military populace. Sniper missions will include attacking critical nodes, such as special weapon delivery systems and storage facilities, command, control, and communications facilities of combined field command and higher, and air and air defense facilities. In addition, snipers will attempt to assassinate, kidnap, and/or interrogate key personnel to hinder allied operations and lower morale.

The SOF operational missions will include reconnaissance, sniper, and light infantry operations. Operational reconnaissance will be conducted to ascertain CFC intentions, develop targeting information for SSMs and long-range artillery, conduct poststrike assessments, and determine the status of LOCs, chokepoints, and CFC reserve locations. At the operational level, sniper missions will be similar to those
at the strategic level but will also include attacking port facilities and major LOCs. Light infantry units will concentrate on attacking division and higher command posts, capturing key terrain to assist maneuvering units, and locating CFC reserve forces.

The tactical mission of the SOF will be to support maneuver division and brigades objectives with light infantry operations. The organic reconnaissance element of the maneuver unit will perform tactical reconnaissance. Both the light infantry and reconnaissance elements will develop targets for destruction. These targets will include CFC command, control, and communications facilities, air and air defense sites, CFC force concentrations, and LOCs. Light infantry units will concentrate on attacking brigade and division command posts, capturing key terrain, and locating and destroying CFC reserve forces.

Personnel selection for SOF units come from politically reliable troops who are members in good standing of the Korean Workers Party and who have served 4 to 7 years in the combat branches. Only under special circumstances (language
capabilities and technical skills) will they be recruited and trained directly from civilian status.

The training of SOF personnel is believed to take 12 to 24 weeks, or longer, depending on the skill levels. The skill and training that SOF personnel receive, such as infiltration, mountaineering, night operations, swimming, martial arts, airborne, intelligence collection, demolition, and rigorous physical fitness, are typical of elite units throughout the world. Discipline is strong and harsh, with an emphasis placed on intensive physical training and political indoctrination. When training is completed, the trainee is awarded a senior NCO or junior officer rank, and assigned to an operational unit for the remainder of his career.

During combat operations it can be expected that many deep strike SOF personnel will be attired in civilian clothing or South Korean military uniforms. Infiltrations will normally occur at night or during periods of limited visibility, with the assistance of escorts who are familiar with the area.

The equipment carried by most SOF personnel will vary considerably, depending on the mission. Typical equipment
will include a dagger and/or bayonet, pistols (to include silenced versions), rifles (AK-47 or M-16), submachine guns, hand grenades/demolitions, rocket launchers (RPG-7 or AT-3), and 60-mm mortars, or other allied weapons.

North Korean SOF infiltration methods into CFC rear areas will include: overland, through tunnels under the DMZ, air, and from the sea. The NKAF will support SOF operations with airborne infiltration and resupply missions. The primary aerial insertion aircraft will be the An-2/COLT and helicopters. The NKN will support SOF operations by using amphibious operations, covert sea infiltration, and resupply. The principle vessels that will be used to support these operations will be the KONG BANG I/II/III, NAMPO A/B LCPA (air-cushioned), and NAMPO LCPs. In addition, minisubmarine and semi-submersible insertion craft may also be used to support SOF operations from the sea.
Tunnel Constructed by the North Under the Demilitarized Zone. All but the last few meters would be completed before an attack. A regiment could pass through this tunnel in about 1 hour and come up south of the Demilitarized Zone. Although 4 have been discovered, as many as 20 more may exist.