OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

ATTN: 6th 350.05/28 (MCI) (C) 16 November 51

16 November 1951

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

TO: See distribution

Inclosed extracts from command reports are forwarded for your information, evaluation and any necessary action in accordance with SR 525-85-5.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

[Signature]

P. C. Casperson
Major, AG
Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl
Extracts from sources
157 thru 182

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(Over)

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

Copy No. 136

11-139-P
UNCLASSIFIED
The Commanding General directed that all vehicles in the Division be marked at the highest position possible in addition to the normal markings on the front and rear bumper of each vehicle. The step was taken in order to easily identify units to which the vehicles belonged and thereby expedite traffic control of convoys. The constant presence of either mud or dust obliterated bumper markings. (RESTRICTED)

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Pressure from higher headquarters continued on searching for, reporting and evacuating captured enemy material. The problem now became one of coordination between the reporting and evacuating agencies. It has been found that items were reported incorrectly, both in types and quantities, and were therefore impossible to evacuate as requested. When large ammunition dumps were found, it was particularly hard to make initial inventories and final evacuation agree. There was also the problem of who was going to evacuate these items when found in large quantities; units were responsible for evacuation to the limit of their capabilities, but these were soon exhausted. The Division was meeting the problem by detailing transportation to ordnance for such recovery while the units remained responsible for guarding the dumps. No solution has yet been reached to balance the daily reports and the monthly technical service captured material reports. (RESTRICTED)

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Once again a critical shortage of oxygen and acetylene existed. It was often impossible to perform maintenance on vehicles without these items. It was never possible to keep much oxygen and acetylene on hand because, as in the present case, so many vehicles pile up on the deadline awaiting arrival of oxygen and acetylene, that the new stock is immediately dissipated. (RESTRICTED)

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(Over)
The problems involved in accomplishing the tremendous task of maintaining the Division's vehicles and other Ordnance equipment were magnified by the rapid advances of the Division. The maintenance section of the Ordnance Company, by using a leap-frog system that enabled one platoon to remain in place for a longer time and to work unmolested, increased its production a great deal. (RESTRICTED)

Command Report - 6th Medium Tank Bn
March 1951
Source No. 158

Air observers should critically regard the width of a road before its projected use by heavy vehicles. (RESTRICTED)

Command Report - 70th Tank Bn (Heavy)
April 1951
Source No. 159

The first and third Platoons of Company "D", from opposite sides of ridge of Hill 278, placed fire on entrenchments. Upon assault by 1st Platoon tanks, the Chinese ran over the ridge, coming under fire from 3d Platoon tanks. Many Chinese then retreated to the opposite side and once again came under the deadly fire of the 1st Platoon. This continued until all Chinese on the ridge were destroyed. (RESTRICTED)

Command Report - 6th Medium Tank Bn
April 1951
Source No. 160

During the period 1-22 April 1951, five (5) tank patrols were conducted from ten (10) to fifteen (15) miles into enemy territory. Artillery Forward Observers, and in some cases, Air Forward Controllers, accompanied the patrols and achieved excellent results. (RESTRICTED)

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OCAFF Form No 73.
(Revised 15 Oct 51)
The major problem involved in the rotation program is reconciling the low state of training of replacements received as compared to the highly skilled rotatees returned to the ZI. As long as replacements are received in relatively small groups, they can be integrated into tank crews on the line and trained by the old crewmen. This method of training would least affect the combat efficiency of the organization. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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It has been found that M-32 recovery vehicles with radial engines are inadequate for towing M-46 tanks due to their lack of power. The M-32 recovery vehicle with a Ford engine performs admirably. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - Aviation Section EUSAK
DATE: May 1951

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That SR 385-10-43 be amended to clarify distinction between major and minor aircraft accidents.

2. Future personnel planning should include greater availability of trained and qualified Army aviators so as to permit a rotation of flying duties.

3. That the replacement stream provide a flow of school trained aircraft mechanics.

4. All limited standard aircraft should be returned and only one model of aircraft for each class, i.e., rotary, two (2) and multipassenger fixed wing, should be used.

5. Engineer pilots, helicopter qualified should be provided for Engineer units. (CONFIDENTIAL)
The caliber of replacement personnel appears to be very satisfactory. The majority are draftees with fourteen (14) weeks basic training. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Most halted columns were caused by inconsiderate drivers and ineffective officer supervision. On two (2) occasions, halts of 30 minutes or more, affecting miles of vehicles packed bumper to bumper, were caused in each case by one disabled vehicle and the build-up of vehicles three (3) abreast trying to pass. Evidence indicated that too many officers were prone to sit back in their vehicles and let circumstances work themselves out. In neither case was a justifiable obstacle found for the halting of the column, yet these halts caused the column to build-up from Ayang-Ni to Songdong-Po, a distance of about ten (10) miles, and critically affected the evacuation of units from Seoul. (RESTRICTED)

Recommend that an Ordnance Artillery Vehicle Park Company be assigned to this command to combat load, control issue and complete processing of major items. Currently, field depots are performing this mission, using qualified mechanics and inspectors detailed from the direct support Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies. (RESTRICTED)
Several items of unserviceable equipment were received during the period, indicating sabotage, carelessness in assembly, and faulty manufacture. Examples are:

1. 155-mm Howitzers - right hand studs on both wheels.
2. Vehicle, tank recovery, H-32 - gas tanks full of oil; ground electrode broken off close to base, and center electrode broken off close to porcelain on spark plug.
4. Engine assembly for M/T Vehicle - main bearing oil seal leaking very badly.
5. Carriage, motor, multiple gun, M-16 - inlet gas line filled with lead.
6. Tank, M-4A3EC - fuel system and gas tanks full of water.

(SECRET)

During the month of May the Artillery with X Corps used VT fuse with 26 percent of the ammunition expended. (CONFIDENTIAL)

REQUESTS FOR L-19 PROPELLER MODIFICATION

Request consideration be afforded the matter of developing a two (2) position propeller for use on the L-19 aircraft in order
to increase the speed. To minimize the damage from enemy fire it is essential that the aircraft be capable of developing speeds which will limit the duration of exposure to such fire. In addition, a much greater time is required to accomplish courier missions than would be the case if a faster cruise were available. (CONFIDENTIAL)

L-19 PARKING BRAKE MATERIAL FAILURE

Malfunction of the parking brake of the L-19 aircraft has recently developed. It has been found that an excessive build-up of pressure when releasing the parking brake has caused failure of the brake housing. It is believed that improper parking brake setting by the pilots is the primary cause of the malfunction; however, the units have been advised to disconnect the parking brake in order to prevent future failures of this nature. It is recommended to the aviation units that the control lock be used in lieu of the parking brake when securing the aircraft. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: OCAFF Observer Team

DATE: 12 October 1951

Source No. 168

The Corps G3 Air stated that in his opinion the Division G3 Air was not in a position to properly advise the division commander on air support matters while stationed in the FSCC. As a result, commanders and G3s were selecting the targets and the G3 Air merely acted as a forwarding agency for the requests. He felt that the Division G3 Air adequately fulfilled his role as a coordinator, but not as an air advisor to the commander. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - 38th Inf Regt, 2d Inf Div

DATE: April 1951

Source No. 169

REORGANIZATION AND RECEIPT OF REPLACEMENTS

Except for the first six (6) days of the month, the regiment was in reserve, yet the regiment had a total of 204 non-battle casualties. This was an excessive number. It was found that over
100 of the non-battle casualty cases were men who joined the regiment since the February 12 action and, as pointed out in the March evaluation report, the majority of these replacements came from ordnance, quartermaster, and engineer units and truck companies located in rear areas. Although these recent replacements made up only 30% of the regimental strength, they accounted for 50% of the non-battle casualties. Also during the month the regiment had seven (7) self inflicted wounds, five (5) of which were men who had joined the regiment since 12 February. Stragglers were numerous during the first six (6) days of the month and the main offenders were new men who had become exhausted or lost; or, never having received infantry training before, became confused and lacked confidence in themselves. (SECRET)

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A great number of cases came up where enlisted men had physical defects, such as bad eyesight not corrected by glasses, severe flat feet, disturbances from old wounds and other similar defects that rendered the men unfit for duty in an infantry regiment. These men were given a new profile but still remained in the regiment after several attempts to have them reassigned to jobs in rear areas. Medical channels would not handle such cases, as individuals were not sick but only had physical defects. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Again during the month, while the regiment was in reserve, a group of replacements was received from every branch of service but the infantry. Men from ordnance, transportation, engineer units, etc, had not had any training with the infantry since their basic training days two (2) or three (3) years ago. In addition, many of the new replacements were unfit physically for assignment in an infantry unit. As a result these individuals were a "drag" on the rest of the outfit. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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It is sincerely believed that greater emphasis should be placed on the physical profile. A warm body is not enough in a combat unit and is frequently a handicap rather than a help. Soldiers lacking in stamina and/or courage are best employed elsewhere. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Many of these replacements were re-profiling without previous experience in Ordnance. This necessitated an intensive program of on the job training. (CONFIDENTIAL)

The Control Point at the 1st Ordnance Maintenance Battalion (Prov) was given authority to turn away organizational vehicles being submitted for repair or turn-in if organizational maintenance had not been performed to meet the required standards.

Roadside "spot check" inspection teams were put into operation. These teams operated at fifteen (15) different points. Two (2) teams were manned daily to cover the greatest number of available vehicles. These inspections have been instrumental in decreasing the organizational deficiencies from an unsatisfactory rating to a satisfactory rating of 2.13 deficiencies per vehicle during the month of operation.

Contact teams visited organizational motor pools for the prime purpose of reducing the number of vehicles on deadline. The teams were hampered by the lack of adequate transportation and could only carry a limited amount of spare parts and sub-assemblies to the using units. Despite this fact, they accounted for a twenty-five percent reduction in the number of deadlined vehicles in organization motor pools. (RESTRICTED)

While wires and mine obstacles were excellent in slowing down the first waves of enemy, their inclination to utilize column attacks made these obstacles effective only against the first few waves. (RESTRICTED)
The use of artillery in support of patrols proved very effective. A forward observer moved with each patrol. As the patrol advanced, the FO would periodically call for a registration. As a result, when the patrol ran into the enemy, there was no time lag between the adjusted fires and the "fire for effect." It is recommended that all patrols probing deep into enemy territory use this system, for maximum enemy casualties. (RESTRICTED)

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Patrols departing from various company areas would have to be guided through the minefield. By observing these departures the enemy could ascertain the safe lanes in the minefield. To offset this, a certain portion of the minefield would be disarmed just prior to daylight and the patrol would pass through the area just as if there was nothing there. This proved to be very effective in deceiving the enemy. (RESTRICTED)

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Our greatest asset was the bunker-type emplacement with overhead cover. This overhead cover should be thick enough to withstand our artillery "VT" fires. Time and time again the Chinese would penetrate our positions only to be repulsed by artillery "VT" fires which we called on our position. In addition, it was learned that, if possible, bunker-type emplacements should have apertures in all directions. Then the enemy cannot assault the position from flank or rear without being detected. Also, these bunkers should be constructed for three (3) men to insure maximum firepower as well as a feeling of security among the men. (RESTRICTED)

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The use of tactical wire in conjunction with minefields did much to stem the Chinese. However, it is felt that a 6-strand (toward enemy) double apron fence is the most effective barrier. (RESTRICTED)

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It is recommended that in operating over difficult terrain, the 3.5 rocket launcher be replaced by a light machine gun to increase the firepower. At no time during the past month was the 3.5 rocket launcher used when the same mission could be accomplished by the 57-mm recoilless rifle. A 3.5 rocket launcher ammunition bearer is only able to carry a few rounds due to the weight. As yet, suitable targets for the 3.5, such as tanks, have not been encountered. The
3.5 rocket launcher could be left in the trains and if an operation is made over tank country then the 3.5 rocket launcher could be utilized. (RESTRICTED)

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Civilians approaching friendly tactical wire and minefields should not be turned back, but should be allowed to pass through friendly lines and assembled, under guard, in the rear areas. It is felt that on some occasions, civilians that approached our positions and were turned back relayed vital information concerning our defense area to the enemy. (RESTRICTED)

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During the period 1-15 May, a new system of patrolling was introduced: a series of phase lines were set up and as each phase line was reached, the patrols halted, made lateral communication, and awaited orders from regiment to move to the succeeding phase line. This method minimized the opportunity for enemy encirclement, concentrated the firepower of patrols, and gave members of the patrols an added sense of security. This method proved to be very satisfactory and is highly recommended. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 64th Heavy Tank Bn
DATE: February 1951

MAINTENANCE

It is believed that most of the maintenance difficulties are due to:

1. Poor driving habits.
2. Lack of proper emphasis on care and maintenance of vehicles.
3. Lack of supervision by officers and NCOs.
4. Lackadaisical attitude on part of all concerned.
5. Lack of trained maintenance personnel.
6. Inherent weak points of the tank. (RESTRICTED)

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When the tank battalion is employed in the unusual manner of Operation Punch (the force was dispatched daily and recalled daily) it is recommended that time and an assembly area be provided to accomplish refueling, replenishment of ammunition and required daily maintenance. During the first two (2) days of Operation Punch the task force was assigned a segment of the main line of resistance which had to be occupied by dark. The unit was recalled so late that resupply and maintenance, with its inevitable noise and movement, had to be conducted on the forward positions. (RESTRICTED)

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On 12-February, while tanks were traveling over very rough terrain during the regrouping and movement to a rear area (about fifty miles) approximately thirty (30) tanks developed oil cooler fan trouble. Also two (2) final drive shafts were broken and three (3) transmissions were burned out, making a total of approximately thirty-five (35) tanks in ordnance at one time out of fifty-eight (58) in the battalion. Since parts were not available for the oil cooler fans, the 30th, 2d, 4th, 21st and 703d Ordnance, working as a team, rebuilt clutches and fans to get the tanks back into action. The total number of tanks for duty at the end of the month was fifty-four (54). (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Much trouble was experienced with the auxiliary idler mounting bolts being sheared off. Inspections with a subsequent follow-up proved that crew members were not tightening these mounting bolts. Since correcting this we have had no such failures. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Quarterly checks on the M-46 have proven that the fan tower units become loose and should be tightened monthly. Also that many gas tank leaks develop in places impossible to see without pulling the power-pack. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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SOURCE: Command Report - 151st Engr C BN

DATE: April 1951

Source No. 174

The matter of shipping men to the Zone of Interior for discharge or emergency leave is being delayed due to the fact that soldiers
may not depart Korea without their military pay cards, and the Finance office is located 110 miles away. There should be provisions for forwarding the records to the next Finance office without holding up the soldier concerned. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - 68th AAA Gun BN
DATE: May 1951

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the replacements for the unit include non-commissioned officers of all grades.

That the replacements sent to units in Korea from those in Japan be of an equitable cross section of personnel and not those who have undesirable disciplinary records.

That specialists, who have been trained in a particular anti-aircraft MOS by extensive schooling, be assigned to antiaircraft units - not to Infantry or Field artillery units where the specialization cannot be used. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - Hq Japan Replacement Training Center
DATE: May 1951

Replacements continued to arrive with personal, medical and supply records in far from perfect condition. This resulted in the expenditure of several thousand man-hours of work correcting deficiencies which existed prior to departure from the Zone of the Interior. As an example, 11,464 immunizations were needed by the first 23,615 men processed at the Initial Receiving Point during the month. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 8th Cav Regt
DATE: February 1951

In retreating from the hill, the enemy was caught in a cross-fire from a tank platoon which had previously been sent out to
reconnoiter the area from the rear. Heavy enemy casualties resulted. (RESTRICTED)

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Throughout the entire campaign there has been a complete lack of aerial photographs for use by the ground elements. The few air photographs that have been received were delivered too late to be of material value to the unit. It is recommended that a photomap service be established so as to deliver the required information within twenty-four (24) hours. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - 5th Cav. Regt

DATE: March 1951

Comments on Winter Clothing

Ski socks - wear out too easily on the heel.

Shoe Pads - approximately 25% of the shoes rip at the seams near the instep.

Overcoat, field - Too heavy and long for active troops.

Parka - Best liked in the field. It is light and warm. Does not restrict movement.

Gloves - Should be designed with a free trigger finger and lined for warmth.

Items best liked - parka; cap, pile liner; jacket, pile liner.

(CONFIDENTIAL)
Difficulty in supply processing of replacements, due to necessity of posting forms 189 and 191 to date prior to showdown inspections, continued. The collection of forms 446, 447 and non-standard mimeographed issue and turn-in slips so posted from six ships from Camp Stoneman and Fort Lawton weighed seven hundred and fifty pounds. Time studies showed that the return to the Government as a result of statements of charges following posting and showdown inspection was not economical, as 1034 manhours of posting resulted in collection of $1043 from enlisted men in one shipment.

Recommendation was made that a single form be substituted, at Zone of Interior ports of embarkation, for the forms 446, 447, 189 and 191; the form to be a mimeographed list of clothing and equipment in possession of the soldier, receipted by him and witnessed by an officer. (RESTRICTED)

The Engineer Company is conducting a four (4) week course for the Battalion Pioneer and Ammunition Platoons and the Regimental Antitank and Mine Platoon. Upon completion of the course, the units will have received limited instruction in the following: Laying of minefields (LT and AP); recording minefields (LT and AP); booby trapping of all type minefields; proper handling and use of all types of explosives; engineer road reconnaissance; booby traps; employment of wire entanglement and trip flares; use of native materials for construction purposes. It is felt that familiarization with this type of work will be a decided benefit for the respective battalions concerned. (RESTRICTED)
Plugs and bungs for POL drums are lost at an excessive rate. Twenty-five percent of emptied drums are returned without them. During the month 180,000 each of plugs and bungs were needed to replace those which were lost, but only 100,000 of each were received. A stock on hand made up the difference. Either resupply must be increased, or loss must be decreased. (RESTRICTED)

At the very outset a serious error was made by the lead company. It had failed to clear paths through the minefield surrounding its defensive position. This meant that much of the effect of the heavy preparation for the attack was wasted. When the unit did go through the field, however, it did the job well. It cleared multiple lanes on a broad front, thereby preventing the enemy from stopping our advance by bringing fire to bear on a single point. (RESTRICTED)

Although good results were obtained from the 57-mm recoilless rifle, it was the 75-mm recoilless rifle which proved to be more effective in destroying bunkers. Initial attempts to use the flame thrower were soon abandoned. It was simply too heavy and of too short a range to do much good. Rifle grenades were used with good results in one of the companies. Other companies, which had not trained in marksmanship with the rifle grenade, disclaimed that they were of much value. The lack of training probably accounted for the difference in opinion. (CONFIDENTIAL)

One battalion pre-planned a resupply system which proved to be most effective. Each man advancing up the trail carried three (3) rounds of 60-mm mortar or one round of 75 recoilless ammunition. When approaching the spot where he left the trail to go into the dune, he simply dropped his load, leaving it to be picked up later by the ammunition bearers. (RESTRICTED)
The supporting artillery fire left little to be desired. This was due primarily to two reasons: good forward observers and accurate shooting. The forward observers with lead companies were each allowed to control two guns of the battery directly, and in this way "walked the fire" ahead of them during the movement of the infantry. By far the best feature of infantry-artillery coordination was the close support by the artillery, allowing the infantry to "lean into it." When heavy small arms fire was received from the enemy, company commanders quickly backed off from the scene and put heavy concentrations of HE and VT on the area, and then charged back again. It worked. (RESTRICTED)

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Air support played a negligible role in this attack. As usual, in this type of terrain, it was found that strafing was of practically no value, rocketing of limited value, and napalm the only really effective weapon. But even the napalm drops were quite inaccurate. Several major defects in technique were revealed: defects which need correcting before we can get maximum use from air support. First, the mosquito dominated the control of the air by telling it when and where to strike. Granted that an air observer may occasionally spot a target of opportunity which is of greater value than that seen by the ground commander, the latter undoubtedly knows best what is holding up his advance and should, in the majority of cases, be allowed to influence the conduct of his battle. Another serious defect lies in the lack of close timing between the fires of the air and the artillery. Upon learning that air was due or in the vicinity, the artillery immediately suspended its firing so as not to endanger the aircraft. And then again for minutes and sometimes hours after the strike was finished, the artillery liaison officer could not ascertain whether or not the air attack was indeed finished. At one crucial time during the attack no artillery was available for 2½ hours; 15 minutes of which were actually consumed by an air strike. The need for better coordination is obvious. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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The new replacements reacted fairly true to pattern: a few performed very well, but the majority have to learn by experience before the bravery that is in them can be demonstrated. Outstanding deficiencies which need more emphasis in training are their failure to recognize the sound of friendly supporting fire (small arms and recoilless as well as mortar and artillery), ignorance of the basic principles of first-aid, and unfamiliarity with the automatic rifle and the hand grenade. As a general rule they were in poor physical condition. (RESTRICTED)
Shell Reports submitted during this action were practically nil. This is a serious deficiency which needs more emphasis in training. Our troops were subjected to long periods of shelling. It must be stressed that enemy guns can be silenced by our artillery if there is sufficient data available. (RESTRICTED)

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The battalion surgeons and company aid men handled medical evacuation in a superb manner. But among the men in ranks too little knowledge of first-aid was displayed. In two instances men bled to death who might have lived had their comrades known where and how to apply tourniquets. Another serious error developed: Riflemen of one company went to the aid of the wounded in such large numbers that at one time over half the company was engaged in carrying or assisting wounded to the rear. More training is required to indoctrinate men to the fact that the wounded are the problem of the aid men. It is natural and quite understandable that a man wants to help his comrade. But he must be impressed with the fact that it is vitally necessary to keep the attack moving; that only in this way does he assist and hence protect those still fighting. Lack of trained medical replacements was perhaps largely to blame.

In order to help overcome this deficiency a 10% over-strength has been assigned the Medical Company at the expense of riflemen for the battalions. It is believed that this will serve not only to augment the strength in order to better cope with peak loads, but will make a greater number of men available for centralized training in medical subjects. (RESTRICTED)

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Perhaps the most serious defect of all in medical evacuation was the total ineffectiveness of evacuation by helicopter. The long hand-carry of evacuees resulted in the death of several persons who might otherwise have lived. The refusal of helicopter pilots to land (reportedly because of rarefied atmosphere at the 3500 ft elevation, as well as for a host of other reasons given which do not appear to be valid to the laymen) have made for general dissatisfaction among infantrymen. The "pilot's choice" whereby the pilot can decide whether or not it is safe to land does not sit well with the fighting soldier. He would prefer to have higher authority survey the conditions, decide whether or not a reasonable risk is involved, and then order the pilot to go in or stay out accordingly.
The reasoning is self-evident — the infantry officer does not have a choice of "safe" or "unsafe" objectives, his mind is made up for him by higher authority. True, the helicopter did transport a number of wounded from the collecting station back to the rear. But the loss of life occurred during the long carry to the collecting station — often as much as 24 hours — and not from there on back.

It appeared that speed was less essential in getting a man to better medical care once he got some care other than that possible on the front line. (RESTRICTED)

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Individual sand bags were found to be convenient receptacles in which to carry ammunition and other supplies, thus discarding the extra weight of the outside packaging and crating. This gave two strings to the bow; not only were the supplies more easily handled, but the bags themselves were available for immediate use. (RESTRICTED)