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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
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7 December 1951

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1976 BY Katers

P. C. CASPERSON
Major, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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Fort Monroe, Virginia

EXTRACTS OF COMBAT INFORMATION

SOURCE: Command Report - 187th Abn RCT - Engr Co

DATE: February 1951

Source No. 183

Due to the enemy's preference for night attacks and the time-factor involved in setting up defensive installations, it is more effective to lay trip flares first, AP mines next, and then barbed wire. For the time and transportation required the trip flares are particularly effective. M-49's can safely and quickly be laid by the infantry (or engineers) across the entire front and should be used whenever the unit moves into a defensive position. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 300th Armd FA Bn

DATE: April 1951

Source No. 184

During the month, some items of T/O&E equipment were received in duplicate -- one issue through requisitions submitted to the technical services after the unit's arrival in Korea, and the duplicating issue through POM requisition that was filled at the POE and eventually shipped overseas to the unit. The long delay in receipt of items requisitioned on POM requisition in ZI necessitated duplication of requisition to local theater technical services in order to obtain missing items authorized on Table of Equipment. It is recommended that POE's in ZI not attempt to fill POM requisitions in the event such requisitions cannot be promptly filled and immediately shipped to the unit overseas. It is felt that duplicate requisitioning could be eliminated if items not immediately available for shipment in the ZI be "zeroed" and the unit instructed to requisition such items from the appropriate overseas technical service. This battalion received items on POM requisition from ZI POE as late as two (2) months after its arrival at overseas destination. (RESTRICTED)

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An alarming weakness developed in rear idlers for the carriage, motor, 105-mm Howitzer M7, and M7B1. The outer and inner rim of the idler broke away where the rim is welded to the outer band. This condition allowed a crack to develop at the weld of the band to the outer and inner disc. Final deterioration results in a radial cracking of the outer and inner disc from the junction of the disc and band to the hub of the disc. Ordnance could not supply replacement idlers, so it became imperative to make an attempt to repair idlers as soon as cracking first appeared. Rims were heavily welded to the band. The junction of the band and outer and inner disc was reinforced with more weld. A preliminary test of the durability of these "rebuilt" idlers based on actual use indicates that these idlers will stand up better than idlers issued heretofore. It is recommended that a technical study be made with the object of developing a heavy duty idler which will take the punishment received by normal operation over the sandy, rocky terrain of Korea. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - Hq 8th US Army Korea (EUSAK)
Sec II: Supporting Documents - Book 19: Ordnance

DATE: March 1951 Source No. 185

SHIELDS FOR M-16's

A modification of the M-16 Motor Carriage was recommended. The proposal was approved and modification undertaken to effect approximately 300 vehicles. The addition of a protective armor plate is being employed without appreciable hindrance to the effectiveness of vehicle and weapon. Shields are fabricated in Japan and air-lifted, as they become available, to Division and/or unit ordnance personnel where they are mounted on vehicles. Approximately 39 vehicles are completed as of the end of the month. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 21st AAA AW (SP) Bn

DATE: February 1951 Source No. 186

The electrically operated turret, which, it is believed, is not required for ground firing, adds further maintenance problems.

The crew of the M16 is exposed to enemy small arms and shell fragments because of the high silhouette and inadequate armor protection of the M16 carriage. (RESTRICTED)

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SOURCE: Command Report - 1st Cav Div

DATE: April 1951

Source No. 187

DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Barbed Wire. In conjunction with the tactical principle of digging in for perimeter defense, it was learned that it was wise to have barbed wire readily available to continue the preparation of defensive positions on short notice. (RESTRICTED)

2. Rocket Launcher. The superiority of the 3.5 rocket launcher is such that it should replace the 2.36 entirely. (RESTRICTED)

3. Civilians. The enemy used partisan and guerrilla warfare as an integral part of his military doctrine. He is not bound by Western concepts of the rules of warfare, nor is he bound by past treaties or conventions. He, therefore, resorts to disguising himself in civilian clothing to infiltrate. Hence, civilians must be evacuated from the battle area, and no civilian movement permitted in the direction of the enemy. (When both friend and enemy are of the same nationality, it is especially difficult to detect espionage agents, or enemy troops, disguised in civilian clothing.) In the event the enemy makes use of airpower, more stringent measures would be required to prevent the enemy in civilian clothing from giving ground-to-air signals. It is recommended that partisan and guerrilla warfare and espionage activities, studied at first hand in Korea, fill more space in the Intelligence Bloc of the Programs of Instruction at the Service Schools, particularly those for the combat arms. We should not handicap future replacements by putting an atrocity label or a war crime label on what might better be defined as normal enemy doctrines and tactics. (RESTRICTED)

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<p>SOURCE: Command Report - 955th FA Bn</p> <p>DATE: April 1951</p>	<p>Source No. 188</p>
	<p>The month of April witnessed the battalion's full-scale entrance into combat. On the basis of our experience, it is considered most desirable to attach a fresh artillery battalion to a division for its initial employment in combat. The close contact with such a tightly knit and smoothly functioning organization provides valuable experience. (RESTRICTED)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">* * * * *</p> <p>Recommend that an all-weather map roll be developed and included in the T/O&E of this type unit. (RESTRICTED)</p>
<p>SOURCE: Command Report - 7th Inf Div Arty</p> <p>DATE: April 1951</p>	<p>Source No. 189</p>
	<p>The "turn-around" time of 36 hours, experienced during the month of April, renders it nearly impossible to maintain a sufficient supply of medium artillery ammunition on hand. This problem was partially solved by having the service battery ammunition train haul from the ASP to a forward dump. The battery ammunition vehicles were then used as a train to haul from the forward dump to the battalion position. (RESTRICTED)</p>
<p>SOURCE: Command Report - 187th Abn RCT - S2 Section</p> <p>DATE: February 1951</p>	<p>Source No. 190</p>
	<p>A definite lesson was learned during the month of February 1951 when heavy enemy fire was placed on the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon. Machine guns mounted on the vehicles were of no use, because personnel were pinned down on the ground. The addition of two (2) Browning Automatic Rifles per squad is recommended. Thus, men would have firepower either in or out of the vehicles. (RESTRICTED)</p>

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SOURCE: Command Report - 987th Armd FA Bn

DATE: April 1951

Source No. 191

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. During the latter half of April, the battalion at times was required to furnish Liaison and Forward Observer parties to two (2) divisions. T/O&E 6-165N provides for one Liaison Officer with no section and three (3) Forward Observers each with a section. This was not sufficient to meet the requirements. Recommend that the divisional column of the T/O&E be used to provide the necessary personnel and equipment for these sections. Drawing personnel and equipment from other sections for these requirements necessarily results in decreased efficiency.

2. The D4 bulldozer is too small and too slow for use in an artillery battalion. Recommend that the present D4's be replaced with D5's, or that at least a suitable means of transporting the D4's be provided. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: G4 Journal File - 40th Inf Div

DATE: March 1951

Source No. 192

The boxing requirements for the 40th Infantry Division, as anticipated by the Division Engineer, were very accurate. About 2000 five (5) cubic foot boxes and about 500 three (3) cubic foot boxes are required.

It is recommended that packing and crating supplies be available on the Post in order that training in proper processing and packing methods may be presented to the troops, in accordance with the ATP, during advanced training. Instruction should be given troops to include proper placing and securing of vehicles on flat cars, and loading of impedimenta in box cars. If necessary, this can be accomplished by the use of mock-ups. An up-to-date manual or circular is recommended, covering latest processing requirements, oils, preservatives and other materials. The manuals should be available on the Post for use during the training phase. (RESTRICTED)

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SOURCE: Command Report - 187th Abn RCT

DATE: February 1951

Source No. 193

In the future, the SI section will not take the morning report and casualty section forward, but will process work sheets and send them to the rear stationary command post by courier. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps

DATE: April 1951

Source No. 194

A lesson learned during the construction of these bridges was that any unit detailed for floating bridge construction should be well-rested before the operation commences even though starting time must be delayed as much as twelve (12) hours. This time will be more than compensated for during construction and a better job will result because the same unit can complete the entire bridge in one continuous operation without relief. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 1st Cav Div

DATE: February 1951

Source No. 195

SHARPENED BAYONETS

An order was received directing that all bayonets would be well sharpened. Immediate investigation revealed that proper facilities to accomplish this were lacking. The Quartermaster requested individual pocket stones for each man authorized a bayonet. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 780th FA Bn

DATE: April 1951

Source No. 196

TRAINING

It became increasingly apparent that a more basic training program was necessary. This was felt to be due to the large number of officers and NCOs in the Battalion who had not had previous Artillery experience, and had not had sufficient opportunity, since recall to active duty, to learn their jobs. (RESTRICTED)

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SOURCE: Command Report - 19th Inf Regt

DATE: March 1951

Source No. 197

The use of searchlights has proved highly successful, not only as a morale factor for friendly troops but also because, according to PW reports, the enemy is afraid to move at night while the searchlights are on. It is recommended that a searchlight unit be made available to the regiment on call. (~~RESTRICTED~~)

SOURCE: Command Report - 13th FA Bn

DATE: January 1951

Source No. 198

Recommend that shell, illuminating, 105-mm Howitzer be provided for this theater. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

SOURCE: Command Report - 999th Armd FA Bn

DATE: January 1951

Source No. 199

Recommend that consideration be given to development and test of rubber grousers; or to tracks equipped with alternate steel and rubber blocks; or to the issue of rubber tracks for winter campaigns. Also, that a one (1) ton Cargo trailer be an authorized item of issue for the firing battery maintenance section of the 155-mm Armored Field Artillery Battalion equipped with M-39 personnel carriers. (~~RESTRICTED~~)

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SOURCE:	Command Report - 24th Inf Div Arty - S3 Sec
DATE:	February 1951 Source No. 200

Information from wire crews indicates that friendly troops are to blame for at least 90% of the wire failures that occur. Some examples are: Building fires on wire lines; deliberate driving of vehicles through wire lines; improving roads; tanks pulling off the main road, etc. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:	Battle of the Soyang River (An analysis of Artillery Support) By CG X Corps
DATE:	1-29 May 1951 Source No. 201

Aerial photo interpretation, shelling reports, and aerial observation served as the chief means by which hostile artillery was located. No sound, flash, or radar teams were available. It is felt that assistance from such sources would have materially aided counterbattery work. Had the enemy employed a more extensive artillery program, the lack of sound, flash, and radar teams would have seriously hampered one of the most important functions of the Corps Artillery, that of locating and destroying enemy artillery and mortars.

Shelling reports were used extensively in order to locate active hostile artillery pieces or mortars. They were of considerable value in this respect. However, in many instances, the enemy fired a single gun or battery at only one limited sector. This precluded the securing of shelling reports from widely separated points which would have facilitated the locating of enemy weapons. Accurate azimuths, showing direction of enemy artillery fires, were obtained from some shelling reports and were valuable in determining which suspect areas air observers should search. All elements of UN Forces were found to be deficient in reporting vital pertinent data connected with reports of enemy shellings. Troops should receive more training in this respect. (RESTRICTED)

In attempting to identify caliber of enemy artillery rounds through analysis of shell fragments, it was found that lack of training hindered these efforts. Subsequent developments proved that personnel could be easily trained in shell fragment analysis, using current DA and theater publications for reference. (RESTRICTED)

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LESSONS LEARNED

Best results can be obtained through use of standard methods of wire communication. Wire lines must be securely tied, tested and tagged, and whenever possible, elevated. Laying wire several yards off roads is not a sufficient guarantee of protection from vehicular traffic. Wire lines must be laid well off the road and, if possible, cross country by hand reel. Although it is time consuming, the cross country laying of wire insures the best guarantee of continuous wire communications.

Lateral communications between adjacent units should be encouraged. Too often lateral lines are laid only when ordered by higher headquarters.

Continuity of communications is not always maintained during displacement of artillery units. Proper utilization of radios will provide units with a means of communication especially adaptable for use while displacing. Benefit will also be gained by laying of wire to rear artillery position areas selected for future occupation. Forward position areas, if accessible to wire crews, should be treated in the same manner. Continuity of communications, in every situation, is enhanced if each unit will keep one or more wire trucks completely loaded and ready for use at all times.

Radio operators often break net contact needlessly, or without proper authority. Thus, at a critical time, a tested alternate means of communication may be unavailable. In order to prevent this, strict radio net control must be exercised. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * *

Artillery must sometimes, of necessity, be emplaced in valleys from which there is only one avenue of withdrawal. Plans must be made to insure success in case retrograde movement is necessary. Engineer construction or pioneer work must be considered in these plans. (RESTRICTED)

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It is necessary, in defensive combat, to direct artillery fire on enemy areas located well to the rear of the line of contact. Thus, enemy supplies and troops can be neutralized before the enemy can employ them in an attack. The 8" Howitzer and 155 gun are ideal for this purpose. When used in the defense, these weapons should be placed well forward in order to exploit their range and effectiveness to the maximum. (RESTRICTED)

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Artillery must be prepared to use its automatic weapons to the fullest extent, both when on the move and when in position, in order to repel the local attacks which are almost certain to materialize. (RESTRICTED)

Artillery forward observers and liaison officers must make determined efforts to assist the infantry toward a better understanding of artillery support. They should help improve the infantryman's knowledge of the conduct of fire and submission and use of shelling reports. They should obtain the supported infantry's coordinated fire plan and must constantly report changes or contemplated changes in location of infantry elements. (RESTRICTED)

The technique of employing artillery barrages, during emergencies, in order to place a protective curtain of fire around friendly troops, must not be forgotten. A fine example of this use of artillery fire occurred during the "Battle of the Soyang River." An infantry battalion had been caught in a road block and surrounded on all sides by a well positioned enemy. A friendly artillery barrage was adjusted around the entrapped unit. At an opportune time, a portion of the barrage, covering the rear of this unit, was lifted. The friendly force then fought a withdrawal action in that direction. Since artillery fire protected it on three (3) sides the battalion was able to concentrate its strength against the enemy covering its rear. A successful withdrawal, with negligible losses, was effected. The use of the artillery barrage is credited with making this possible. (RESTRICTED)

Artillery units are sometimes too slow in producing fire plans. This is especially true when, on short notice, a shift is made from defensive combat to offensive combat. All artillery battalions, especially those in a direct support role, should be able to prepare fire plans on short notice under all types of combat conditions. (RESTRICTED)

Through faulty intelligence, it is often impossible to assess the value of a target. For the same reason, worthwhile targets were sometimes classified as undeserving of fire. Accurate reporting of

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intelligence data will correct this situation. All personnel should be trained in processing of both oral and written messages.
(RESTRICTED)

* * * * *

Use of light aircraft for aerial observation should be coordinated for all artillery by Corps Artillery Headquarters. Zones of observation should be assigned consistent with a unit's mission and the availability of aircraft. The practice of placing Division Artillery light aircraft under division control is not desirable.
(RESTRICTED)

* * * * *

The enemy tries to compensate for inferiority in arms and equipment by using superiority in numbers, and by fighting in mountainous terrain unsuited for mobile warfare. These tactics definitely accounted for most of the gains made by the enemy. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * *

Command posts, field artillery batteries, and key points along MSR's are prime objectives for enemy infiltration parties. He has proven himself adept at reaching these objectives and all such installations must be adequately protected. Units should stress defense against infiltration and train in anti-guerrilla measures.
(RESTRICTED)

* * * * *

The capture of supplies, weapons and ammunition is a vital part of the enemy's plan for resupplying his troops. If forced to abandon such items, friendly troops should insure their total destruction.
(RESTRICTED)

* * * * *

The enemy quickly ascertains the approximate range capabilities of artillery that is opposing him. He then makes every effort to confine the bulk of his activities to areas just beyond reach of our artillery. It is therefore advantageous for friendly artillery, preferably 155 Howitzers or 155 guns, to be moved forward into daylight positions in order to reach targets in rear areas. (RESTRICTED)

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After an enemy gun position has been neutralized, the enemy will make every attempt to salvage equipment. For this reason precision adjustment should be made on enemy guns after neutralization of the gun position. Following this, harassing fires should be placed periodically to prevent salvage operations. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * *

Attacks are made by the enemy over extremely rugged and almost inaccessible approaches to our lines. This enhances the element of surprise. An example of this sort was Hill 1051 in the US 2d Div Sector. The enemy made this mountain a focal point of his attack even though it was the most rugged and the highest point along the entire X Corps defensive line. No approach to our lines, however difficult, should be ignored as a possible point of enemy attack. Artillery defensive fires and disposition of artillery in support of the infantry should be planned accordingly. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * *

One of the chief complaints of enemy PW's is our devastating artillery fire. No opportunity to exploit the use of our artillery to the maximum should be overlooked. Many PW's stated that at night they used ridge lines and avoided valleys since our harassing and interdiction fires seem to be placed mostly in the valleys. Any H&I program must be well balanced with concentrations placed on key spots in all types of terrain. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * *

The enemy is adept in the art of camouflage, using natural material such as trees or brush. Air and ground observers find it difficult to locate his gun positions and other installations. This must be accomplished, oftentimes, through use of aerial photo interpretation. A round of artillery fire, placed in a suspect area, will also serve to disclose enemy installations by destroying any existing camouflage or exciting enemy personnel to activity. (RESTRICTED)

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<p>SOURCE: Command Report - 176th Armd FA Bn</p> <p>DATE: April 1951</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Source No. 202</p>
<p>Battalion has great need for Browning Automatic Rifles and .30 cal. machine guns for use in perimeter defense. (RESTRICTED)</p>	
<p>SOURCE: Command Report - 11th FA Bn</p> <p>DATE: January 1951</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Source No. 203</p>
<p><u>RECOMMENDATIONS</u></p> <p>1. That one truck 2½ ton, 6x6, cargo, LWB, be issued to Service Battery, in addition to present allowance, to be used for transporting POL supplies. The one truck, presently authorized, is incapable of hauling enough POL products to keep the Battalion supplied during a constantly changing situation.</p> <p>2. That one carrier, universal, T16, be issued to Headquarters Battery of each 155-mm Howitzer Battalion for the purpose of laying wire communications in bad weather.</p> <p>3. That a special authorization be made to issue eight (8) .30 caliber light machine guns per battery for perimeter defense. (RESTRICTED)</p>	
<p>SOURCE: Command Report - 24th Inf Div - G4 Section</p> <p>DATE: February 1951</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Source No. 204</p>
<p>A test was conducted by the 2d Battalion of the 5th RCT on use of heat tablets by individuals in front line units to dry ski socks in foxholes. The test proved successful. This should assist in reducing frostbite of the feet for those men who are unable to build fires because of the tactical situation. (RESTRICTED)</p>	

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SOURCE: Command Report - 39th FA Bn

DATE: January 1951

Source No. 205

The direct support Artillery Battalion Commander is the officer best qualified to decide when and where to displace since he is in closest contact with the Infantry Regimental Commander and knows best where the latter requires the support. (RESTRICTED)

Due to the wide frontages assigned infantry regiments in Korea, the direct support artillery battalion cannot assume that there will be infantry to its front at all times. The Battalion must be prepared to provide its own perimeter (and front line) defenses. To do this it must have additional weapons, specifically light .30 caliber machine guns and Browning Automatic Rifles. The infantry battalions usually attack during the daylight hours and at night go into fairly tight perimeters. This leaves the direct support artillery battalion wide open and vulnerable to attack at night - in effect just as much of a front line unit as the infantry battalion. It is seldom that any of the infantry battalions of the regiment can or will assist in the protection of the artillery. The artillery is not manned or equipped to repel enemy infantry attacks. The artillery battalion needs a minimum of four (4) light .30 caliber machine guns and four (4) BARs per battery, total twenty (20) MGs and twenty (20) BARs, to protect its perimeter. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 3d Inf Div

DATE: February 1951

Source No. 206

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following changes to T/O&E of the Infantry Rifle and Heavy Weapons Companies, designed to increase the ratio of firepower to manpower, are recommended:

- 1. Delete one M-1 rifle per rifle squad and add, in lieu thereof, one automatic rifle. Delete the pistol, cal .45 now carried by the automatic rifleman.

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2. Add one LMG per weapons squad of the rifle platoon to be manned by the men of the rocket launcher squad, with the rocket launcher becoming a secondary weapon normally carried on the company vehicles.

3. Add one 60-mm mortar per mortar section, to provide an additional weapon for isolated strong points and patrols, without weakening the permanent position.

4. The addition of one section of 81-mm mortars to the mortar platoon, to provide the flexibility afforded by having one section per rifle company, each with its own forward observer. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 1st Cav Div

DATE: April 1951

Source No. 207

From a Division Artillery viewpoint the lessons brought out in this operation were: (1) that the T/E allowances of mine detectors is entirely inadequate; (2) that medium artillery with a minimum amount of engineer support has practically the same mobility and position capability in mountainous terrain as light artillery and (3) that in mountainous terrain, medium artillery may have to be employed in a direct support role because of its greater range. In such instances its ammunition expenditures will be high and will consist entirely of white bag charges. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 15th Inf Regt

DATE: February 1951

Source No. 208

This regiment was given the mission of crossing the HAN RIVER in search of enemy positions and for the purpose of capturing prisoners. The only boats available for this work were the two (2) man boat, reconnaissance, canvas, and the nine (9) man plywood, assault boat, both issued by the Engineers. The first mentioned boat was found to be incapable of supporting two (2) men with equipment if they were not highly trained in its use. The latter type boat has to be hand carried. It is recommended that a boat similar to the six (6) man rubber pneumatic survival raft used by the Air Force be made available for river crossing patrols. All personnel crossing in small boats should be equipped with a suitable lightweight life preserver. (RESTRICTED)

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