OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

ATTNG-6h 350.05/3h(DOCI)(C)(28 Dec 51) 28 December 1951

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

1. In accordance with SR 525-85-5, Processing of Combat Information, the attached EXTRACTS are forwarded to Department of the Army, Army Field Forces and the Service Schools for evaluation and necessary action. It may be appropriate, in certain cases, for these agencies to take action upon a single extracted item; in others, it may be desirable to develop a cross-section of accumulated extracts on a particular subject before initiating action; and often, the extracted item serves to reaffirm our doctrines and techniques.

2. Copies of Dissemination of Combat Information are forwarded, with department of the Army approval, to information addressees for use at the headquarters of the installation or activity concerned to keep them informed concerning theatre problems from front line through the logistical command.

3. These EXTRACTS are derived from reports which are classified SECRET. For the greater convenience of the user, this Office downgrades each extracted item to the lowest classification compatible with security. No effort is made to paraphrase or delete any portion of the extracted remarks, so that none of the original intent is lost.

4. Generally, the EXTRACTS which pertain to training appear under the classification of RESTRICTED. For combat information of training value at the Company-Battery level, addressees are referred to Army Field Forces TRAINING BULLETINS, which are also published under the classification of RESTRICTED.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF
W. H. WILKES
Lt Col, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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TACTICAL DECEPTION

To further this secrecy and deception, a cover plan was put into effect five (5) days in advance of the actual crossing. This plan provided for the two (2) front line Regiments holding the main line to make a tank-infantry reconnaissance each morning to the river crossing sites and other sites along the river. This was carried out constantly each day, and at first drew considerable fire from the enemy. As it was continued each day, the enemy became accustomed to these "morning patrols" and ceased fire on them. Thus, when the morning for the assault crossing arrived, the same movement was initiated toward the river bank. But this time the assault boats were brought forward hitched to tanks. It is believed that this cover plan contributed materially to the surprise achieved during the crossing. (CONFIDENTIAL)

* * * * * * *

INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS

In compliance with an Eighth Army TWX, a survey on "Inadequacy of the Carbine and Pistol, caliber .30, in Combat" was conducted within three (3) Infantry Regiments and Tank Battalion. The following comments were submitted:

1. Carbine
   a. One company indicated that the carbine was too light and was considered inadequate, as it does not have sufficient stopping power.
   b. All units agreed that the weapon was unsatisfactory due to malfunction when moving parts became dirty and when used in cold weather.
   c. One regiment commented that the carbine was inaccurate when fired at ranges over two hundred (200) yards, and that (Over)

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CAFF Form No 73
Revised 15 Oct 51)
ammunition supply creates a problem because the type of magazine used is not available for replacement as are clips and bandoliers for the other weapons.

2. Pistol, caliber .45:

   a. One regiment indicated the pistol to be adequate for the purpose for which it was intended, as a defensive weapon for close-in fighting.

   b. Two (2) regiments indicated that the pistol was too heavy and too complicated for field maintenance. One of these two (2) regiments recommended that the carbine and pistol be replaced with a light sub-machine gun. (RESTRICTED)

INFANTRY MATERIAL LOSSES

Operations during the "Battle of the SOyang" presented a tremendous supply problem. Vehicles used in supply transport were kept mobile-loaded within the battalion perimeters. The tactical situation resulted in a large scale enemy road block being established to the rear of two (2) battalions which denied the use of the MSR as an avenue of withdrawal. This resulted in complete loss of seventy two (72) quarter ton, sixteen (16) three-quarter ton and fourteen (14) two and a half ton vehicles with numerous quarter and one ton trailers. These vehicles carried the organic loads, kitchens, P&A equipment, communications equipment, battalion ammunition supply, etc, to include two (2) full platoons of 4.2 mortars. This costly operation clearly indicates the necessity for logistical operation from a regimental trains area established within reasonable supply radius in rear of regimental sector. (CONFIDENTIAL)
ARTILLERY MATERIEL LOSSES

The combat losses of artillery pieces due to direct enemy action have reached a total of 108 for all calibers. As has happened in previous attacks, the enemy infiltrated to the rear of the artillery positions and placed a fire block on each side of the road, making it impossible for the artillery to move its vehicles and weapons through the road. The loss by US Artillery units has been 212 weapons and by Korean Army units 196 weapons. (CONFIDENTIAL)

* * * * * * *

HIGH ANGLE FIRE

The percentages of high-angle missions of the various type units are as follows:

1. Division Artillery
   1st Marine Division
   105-mm  14.5%
   155-mm  1.4%
   7th Div Arty
   105-mm  4.0%
   155-mm  2.0%
   2d Div Arty
   105-mm  17.0%
   155-mm  5.0%
   1st Cav Div Arty
   105-mm  11.0%
   155-mm  1.0%
24th Div Arty

1% of all missions to 31 Dec 50.
8% of all missions from 1 Jan 51 to 28 Apr 51.

25th Div Arty

3% of all missions.

3d Div Arty

5% of all missions

2. Non-Divisional Units

- 17th FA Bn (8" H TD) 0%
- 955th FA Bn (155 H TD) 0%
- 936th FA Bn (155 H TD) 0%
- 96th FA Bn (155 H TD) 10%
- 196th FA Bn (155 H TD) 0%

3. All SP units 0%

COMMENT: Except for 24th Div Arty, source does not give period from which above percentages are taken. (RESTRICTED)

M-37

The M-37 is extremely difficult to keep operational and there are insufficient replacement parts on hand. Further, it is not the proper equipment for a direct support battalion of an infantry division. The troop basis proposed by EUSAK to CINCPAC recommends reorganizing the 58th FA Bn into a 105-mm Howitzer Battalion (towed). (CONFIDENTIAL)

TRACK LAYING VEHICLES

1. Recommend that twelve (12) 2½ ton trucks be authorized in lieu of twelve (12) M4 vehicles utility, armored, for each self-propelled 105-mm and 155-mm unit. Conditions under which SP battalions operate in Korea make the 2½ ton truck a better vehicle for carrying ammunition. An important factor is the great distance to ASP's.
2. Recommend that the 1st FA Observation Battalion be authorized eight (8) four (4) ton cargo trucks in lieu of nineteen (19) M5 tractors. The 1st FA Observation Battalion has seven (7) radar sets and seven (7) generators. One 4 ton truck can be used in lieu of two (2) M5 tractors as the generator can be placed on the truck and the radar sets which are on trailers can be towed by the truck. The M5 tractor has proven unsatisfactory, and wheeled vehicles have proved more suitable over the terrain encountered in Korea.

3. Recommend 155-mm gun battalions SP, be authorized twenty-four (24) 8 1/2 ton trucks and twenty-four (24) M10 trailers in lieu of nineteen (19) M6 tractors. There are no M8 tractors available. These units are equipped with M4 tractors (authorized substitute for M6 tractors), which are unsatisfactory as ammunition resupply vehicles primarily because they will not stand up under the long hauls to ASP's over the poor Korean roads. (CONFIDENTIAL)

COMMUNICATIONS

In addition to the lack of trained radio operators and repairmen, the communication system has been continually hampered by the mountainous terrain and the tactical dispositions of the companies far beyond the capabilities of the presently authorized SCR 694. It is felt that in Korea, the SCR 694 should be replaced by the SCR 193 for the Engineer Combat Troops. (CONFIDENTIAL)

ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER

A fully covered armored personnel carrier is needed that can go anywhere with tanks. The lack of overhead protection on
the half tracks required the TF Commander to leave his dismounted elements behind since they were unable to run the gauntlet of enemy fire in open half tracks. Also, the need for armored infantry in Korea was once again clearly demonstrated. Deep penetrations and armored operations where organized enemy positions must be bypassed requires tanks, armored infantry, armored engineers and armored artillery. If any of the components of the team are unarmored, then armored results cannot be fully obtained. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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ARMOR TACTICS

This action also demonstrated the ability of armored forces, roving deep in the rear of established enemy defense lines, to surprise and terrorize the enemy. Such actions are favored by the fact that the enemy has very limited warning (communication) facilities. Every opportunity to employ armor, regardless of how small the scale, should be sought and exploited. Even platoon size employment of tanks achieves outstanding results. The enemy, in every engagement where armor has been employed according to doctrine, has been demoralized. (RESTRICTED)

DATE: February 1951

Keeping the combat teams vehicles moving over marginal roads (where one stalled vehicle means a blocked MSR) would be facilitated if a 1/2 ton wrecker were available in the regimental combat team. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - Hq 8th US Army Korea (EUSK)
DATE: May 1951

AMMUNITION SUPPLY

Ammunition situation remained critical. The 155-mm Howitzer ammunition (60,000 rounds) was being off-loaded at Pusan. The Gainesville Victory was not selectively loaded.

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Propellent charges were the first to be off-loaded. The projectiles were at the bottom of the ship and couldn't be off-loaded at the same time. As a result, the charges were sent forward to Taegu, to be held there until the projectiles were off-loaded. Then complete trains were made up and forwarded. This caused a rail tie-up which lasted for approximately fifteen (15) days. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - Hq 8th US Army Korea (EUSAK)
DATE: March 1951

ARTILLERY DEFENSE

Artillery battalions in Korea have proven to be a primary target for enemy troops. Present T/O&E's do not authorize sufficient automatic weapons for adequate defense. Therefore, it is recommended that twelve (12) machine guns and twelve (12) Browning Automatic Rifles be issued to each field artillery battalion above T/O&E allowances. (CONFIDENTIAL)

HIGH ANGLE FIRE

Carriages motor M7 and M37 are not capable of high angle fire. Maximum elevations that can be fired are 33 and 45 degrees respectively.

Because of the rugged terrain encountered in Korea, these weapons, with their limited maximum elevations, introduce considerable dead space in the close support role. This aggravates the already difficult problem of finding suitable gun positions.

It is recommended that a program for the modification of carriages motor M7 and M37, so as to permit high angle fire, be initiated at an early date and that this program be given a high priority. (RESTRICTED)
WITHDRAWAL TECHNIQUE

In this withdrawal, the artillery was first displaced to temporary positions from which they could support the withdrawal. A battalion of infantry was sent to secure these temporary positions. Under cover of artillery fire a second battalion of Infantry, regimental combat team headquarters and the separate company units were withdrawn from the line, leaving one battalion to hold. As this second group passed the artillery temporary positions, they were joined by the artillery battalion (-) and the battalion of infantry securing the positions. One battery was left to support the battalion still holding the line. When this last battalion withdrew, the battery of artillery supporting it pulled away with them to the newly established friendly lines. (CONFIDENTIAL)

NIGHT AIR SUPPORT

5th Cavalry Regiment: A previously arranged bombing mission, composed of one illumination plane and two (2) B-26 bombers, struck Check Points 50 and 51 at 0325 hours. These points received a total of eight (8) napalm and sixteen (16) 250 lb fragmentation bombs, in addition to strafing by .50 cal machine guns. Civilians interrogated from the area reported between 300 and 400 CCF troops killed or wounded as a result of the bombardment. (RESTRICTED)

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LATERAL COMMUNICATION

During the period the 2d Battalion, adjusting defensive fire on the flank, delivered mortar fire into the 1st Battalion which was still on the move. The firing had been cleared by the Battalion Commanders concerned. However, last minute
clearances were not obtained. The basic fault lay in insufficient lateral communication. Greater emphasis must be placed on lateral communication; radio in a moving situation and radio and wire when units halt for an appreciable time. (RESTRICTED)

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GASOLINE CONSUMPTION FACTOR

Close conformity to the consumption factor guide for Korea on POL consumption is being maintained. The consumption quantity for gasoline on the number of gallons per man per day for this Division was 1.22 gallons which conforms closely to the 1.25 gallons per man per day as indicated in the tables published by the Japan area Petroleum Office. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps
DATE: February 1951

VT FUZE FOR EIGHT INCH SHELLS

The use of VT (proximity) fuzes in 105-mm and 155-mm shells proved so successful that it was desired to use the fuzes in 8-inch shells and British 25-pound shells. However, the cavity in these shells would not accommodate the desired fuze. The task of providing tools to cavitize the 8-inch and 25-pound shells was given to the 538th Ordnance M/M Company. Although this was a new type of operation for the maintenance personnel, they manufactured an auger that would do the job. The operation was very successful on the 8-inch shell but the British 25-pounder did not react too well with the VT fuze. (SECRET)

SOURCE: Command Report - Section I - Part 4 EUSAK
DATE: March 1951

REPLACEMENTS

Matching the stepped-up quantity was an improvement in the quality of replacements. Reports from combat units indicated that those recently received from the Zone of the Interior were better trained and both physically and mentally better suited.
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for combat than the ones the Army had been supplied with in the latter part of 1950 and early 1951, when most of the incoming replacements had been brought directly out of the Enlisted Reserve Corps and basic training camps. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - Section I: Narrative
HQ 8th US Army Korea

DATE: June 1951

COMMUNICATIONS

It is recommended that the present T/O&E of an MP Battalion be reviewed to give consideration to authorizing a radio set AN/UGN-9 for each platoon. It is also recommended that each platoon be authorized a radio set SCR 609 for use at platoon level as net control station for vehicular sets in motor patrols. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - Section II: Supporting Documents
Book I: Office of the CG, EUSAK

DATE: June 1951

AIR SUPPORT PROCEDURES

1. I Corps Staff Officers complained that Air-Force-operated L-19 type Mosquitoes were not permitted to reconnoiter for suitable targets as the AT-6 type formerly did. This resulted in the L-19 Mosquito, on ground standby, missing several targets and, on occasion, arriving at previously located targets later than the jet planes it was supposed to direct. The members of I Corps Staff preferred the former method of mosquito operation, i.e., the Mosquito cruising the front looking for targets of opportunity and standing by (in the air) for targets to be pointed out to it. It was then immediately available to direct air strikes.

2. I Corps Staff agreed that the basing of the Mosquito pilots on strips in the operating area was a sound idea, but suggested that Army personnel, as well as Air Force personnel, were capable of controlling air strikes from L-19 planes. (RESTRICTED)
SOURCE: Command Report - 780th Fn. Bn
DATE: April 1951

VEHICLES

Maintenance of equipment has been excellent. One inherent failure of the torque converter radiator on the M4 Tractors has caused considerable maintenance difficulties and loss of use of the tractors. Delay in receiving 7½-ton ammunition trucks has hampered training of drivers and ammunition sections. Request is being made for special pintles for the 7½-ton trucks to enable them to be used as alternate prime movers for the Howitzer.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Present A-Frames and Hoists on the back of the 7½-ton truck are too slow and tiresome for loading and unloading 8-inch shells. Recommend that a study be made with a view of providing a quicker and more efficient method of loading large shells into and out of those trucks.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

Recommend that the T/O&E be changed to include one D-4 bulldozer per Howitzer battery, based on the fact that the size of the gun pit for an 8-inch Howitzer would make it difficult for one bulldozer to dig twelve (12) gun pits.

The present T/O&E does not authorize any bulldozers.

(RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 10th Fn. Bn
DATE: January 1951

UNIT PERSONNEL SECTIONS

At present, the personnel section is over two hundred (200) miles away from its parent unit. Administrative matter required in a normal day's operation is not available. Securing information of this nature entails a delay of from six (6) to seven (7)

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days. Some personnel problems cannot be solved at all, or only after placing a great burden on other individuals that normally would not have been involved. It is therefore recommended that unit personnel sections be placed with the service units of the commands concerned, and divorced from the rear echelon of division. (RESTRICTED)

MINES

A distinct need was shown in the defensive and counteroffensive action for a better system for disseminating present minefield doctrine. The principal arm concerned with friendly antipersonnel minefields is the infantry. It is recommended, therefore, that minefield doctrine be published in an infantry field manual of the "7" series. (RESTRICTED)

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SUPPLY OF MINES

In the defensive operation, considerable confusion resulted because of the prevalent opinion that the engineers, avowed specialists in the installation of activated antitank and antipersonnel mines, were also responsible for the supply of mines for all defensive installations of the division. (RESTRICTED)

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ARMOURED PERSONNEL CARRIERS

A need was shown for armoured personnel carriers to transport engineer personnel through enemy roadblocks of small arms and mortar fire in order to accompany friendly armor-infantry thrusts. The bulk of the casualties of the 2d Engineer Battalion occurred when engineer elements accompanying friendly armor-infantry thrusts in the counteroffensive were caught by enemy fire, on the road and in trucks. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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OCAFF Form No 7-
(Revised 15 Oct 51, )
USE OF SMOKE IN PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE

1. The use of chemical smoke as a passive defense measure is limited.

2. The use of smoke precludes utilization of antiaircraft automatic weapons in smoked areas, and decreases the efficiency of antiaircraft gun batteries. (RESTRICTED)

TOW BARS

It is recommended that two (2) each tow bars be issued each platoon of a tank unit equipped with M-16 type tanks, as this tank cannot be towed with cables when the engine fails. (RESTRICTED)

COMMUNICATIONS

The complete reliance upon telephones or AN/GRC-9 radios for contact between various units within the Division has proved inadequate. This, combined with the delay caused in receipt of messages through a central message center, is often a great hindrance. It is recommended that all General Staff sections be furnished vehicles in which radio set SCR 193 can be mounted, and that radio sets similar to those in an armored division be adopted. This would enable more positive control at all times, especially during movement, and would make for much greater flexibility in establishing advance command posts. (RESTRICTED)
VEHICLE EXCHANGE

Recommend that quotas for the direct exchange of new or reconditioned vehicles, between division ordnance units and army ordnance vehicular pools, be stepped up to reduce the heavy deadlines in the combat units caused by complete wear out. (RESTRICTED)

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WIRE LAYING VEHICLE

It is suggested that "Weasel-type" wire laying vehicles, issued on a basis of two (2) for each headquarters battery and one to each firing battery, would be of inestimable value in carrying out the complex wiring problem of artillery units. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 82d AAA AW Bn (SP)
DATE: May 1951

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That five (5) power telephones (TP-9) be issued over and above authorized T/O&E for utilization in battery CP's and operations sections.

2. That all M-16's be equipped with armor plate gunners' shields.

3. Searchlight companies used on battlefield illumination missions should be assigned to Corps Artillery.

4. That Mark IX Sight on M-16's be replaced by the Reflex Sight M-18.

5. That an antiaircraft ordnance company provide support for maintenance of remote control system of the M-19 and all sighting devices. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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