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TO: See distribution

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FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

W. H. Melhorn

1 Incl
Extracts from sources
250 thru 278

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291-292 Supt, USMA, West Point, NY
293-294 CG, TAC, Langley AFB
295-296 Chief, Army Advisory Gp, Air Comd & Staff Sch, Air Univ, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
297-298 Comdt, Marine Corps Sch, Quantico, Va
299-300 Comdt, USAF Air Ground Sch, Southern Pines, NC
301-302 Comdt, Counter Intelligence Corps Sch, Fort Holabird, Baltimore 19, Md
303-304 Comdt, The Provost Marshal General's School
PHYSICAL CONDITIONING

One of the most important items of junior officer training in Korea is physical conditioning. None are physically conditioned sufficiently, upon arrival, to enable them to perform forward observer duties without severe physical strain. (RESTRICTED)

PREPARATION OF SHELL REPORTS

Operations have demonstrated that the line units and attached FO have not properly exploited the intelligence and tactical importance of shell reports. It is believed that this is due, in part at least, to the shortage of adequately trained personnel and ignorance of the potential value of shell reports.

It is recommended that the FO parties assigned to infantry rifle companies be especially trained in the preparation of shell reports; that a school be conducted at Division level for the purpose of instructing key non-coms of the rifle companies in the importance and preparation of shell reports; that the courses of instruction at the infantry service schools in the States put greater emphasis on the tactical importance of shell reports and the procedures for obtaining them. (RESTRICTED)
DEPCIFENCIES IN TRAINING OF REPLACEMENTS

1. Combat formations.
2. Small unit tactics.
3. Familiarization with weapons other than their individual arms.
4. Training in camouflage discipline.
5. Physical conditioning.

Recommend additional training in subjects as listed above.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF (FEC)

27 September 1951 Source No 253

ENEMY ADEPTNESS AT CAMOUFLAGE

The Communist Forces have made excellent use of camouflage. Troop camouflage has been so effective that aircraft flying at tree top level over known troop concentration areas have difficulty in locating these troops. Armored vehicles, trucks and artillery pieces have also been very successfully camouflaged. They use all types of poorly camouflaged dummy matériel while the actual matériel, well camouflaged, has been undetected. The enemy has also attempted to conceal his river crossing points by camouflage and subterfuge. This has included moving entire bridge spans out during daylight hours and moving them back into place for night traffic.

COMMAND REPORT - HQ 8TH US ARMY KOREA (FUSAK)

June 1951 Source No 254

EFFECTIVENESS OF HAND GRENADES

Tests were conducted to determine the comparative effectiveness

OCAFF Form No 77
(Revised 15 Oct 51)
of all types fragmentation grenades known to be employed in Korea.

The following conclusions can be drawn:

a. The most effective hand grenades at 5 yards range are those of the US type.

b. The order of effectiveness, gauged by the average number of perforations at this range, is (1) US, (2) Russian and (3) Korean.

c. None of the stick grenades tested approached the US types for fragmentation effect.

d. The maximum effective bursting range is ten (10) yards. Effectiveness diminishes rapidly between five (5) and ten (10) yards.

(Restricted)

5-IN-1 RATION

The 5-in-1 ration is generally unacceptable for the following reasons:

1. Because of their tactical deployment, troops cannot assemble to eat.

2. Equal distribution of the ration is quite difficult under combat conditions.

3. Food must frequently be prepared in the mess gear, which is undesirable because washing facilities are not available to the individual soldier in contact with the enemy.

4. Transportation of the 5-in-1 presents a problem since the individual must carry his own food in combat.

5. There is a large percentage of waste because of the size of the food containers.

6. The ration is not palatable when eaten cold. (Restricted)
CLOSE ARTILLERY SUPPORT

It was observed on numerous occasions that frontline commanders hesitated to call for close artillery support.

It is important that constant attention be directed to the elimination of faulty range estimation and firing techniques. They can spell the difference between an easy victory and a costly defeat. (CONFIDENTIAL)

M-19 CARRIAGE

The firepower and maneuverability of the M-19 motor Carriage with twin 10-mm guns make it highly desirable for the type of warfare fought in this theatre. The M-16 motor Carriage with quadruple mounted .50 caliber machine guns has been issued as a substitute item. However, the advantages of the M-19, i.e., the full track, the added maneuverability and the fragmentation type projectile, make it more effective in combat than the M-16 halftrack motor carriage. (CONFIDENTIAL)

PLANNING OF MINE FIELDS

Additions were made in depth after all the front was initially covered with fortifications. The lack of adequate planning in the placing of mine fields was evident when it was found that reference points of some mine fields were in the midst of other mine fields. This presented a hazard to the unit which might later be required.
to remove the mine fields. The solution to the problem in such cases was advance planning of the mine fields by the Division Engineer and the interested Infantry commander. The engineer company which is to lay the mine field should be made fully aware of the locations of proposed mine fields before laying the first fields, so that reference points can be established well clear of sites selected for other fields and so that they can be reached safely at any time. (RESTRICTED)

**SOURCE:** Command Report - 3d Inf Div  
**DATE:** March 1951  
**Source No:** 259

**SEARCHLIGHTS**

Searchlights are used advantageously in illuminating patrol objectives while letting patrols move about in the shadows. They provide sufficient illumination for artillery adjustments. They have an adverse effect on enemy morale and tend to keep him in his foxhole. Using direct illumination, they will blind the enemy and aid in repulsing a night attack. (RESTRICTED)

**SOURCE:** Command Report - 2d Engr C En  
**DATE:** July 1951  
**Source No:** 260

**REPLACEMENTS**

Practically all the replacements received during this period were those who were new to the Army but had received both infantry and engineer basic training. This has proved to be good initial training for this theatre. (RESTRICTED)

**SOURCE:** Command Report - 64th Medium Tank Bn  
**DATE:** March 1951  
**Source No.:** 261

**TANK COMMUNICATIONS**

It is recommended that each tank company be assigned five

**UNCLASSIFIED.**
frequencies for the operation of their SCR 508-528 series radios. Each platoon would then have its own channel and each company channel would be cleared of sixteen stations. (RESTRICTED)

**********

OIL COOLER FAN FAILURE

Oil cooler fan failures still continued to be the major "bug." During the period 1 February to date, there has been a total of fifty-one (51) such failures. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - Hq 8th US Army Korea (BUSAK)
SOC II: Supp Doc, Sg 7: Armor
DATE: April 1951

TANK FIRE ON HIGH RIDGES

Tanks were used in the valleys, but had difficulty negotiating the many obstacles and in elevating their guns high enough to fire at the tops of the ridges. (CONFIDENTIAL)

**********

INFANTRY-TANK COMMUNICATIONS

Communication between the tanks and the infantry has been satisfactory when the SCR 300 was used in the command tank on the infantry frequency, or when a tank liaison party with a 500 series radio was attached to the infantry command column. The telephone on the rear of the tank is unsatisfactory. It is very difficult to get it out of the spring-loaded box in which it is housed, especially if dirt, mud, or ice have gotten into the springs. The cord on the telephone is so short that the infantryman using the phone cannot take cover, but must stand up or run along after the tank. The housing should be changed to eliminate moving parts, and should be moved down the tank hull so the infantryman can reach it from the prone position. It should be re-designed to provide cover from rain and snow. The cord should be longer so the infantryman can get back in his hole or in the ditch after he gets the phone. The head set should be re-designed to make it more rugged, so that when the infantryman releases it the tanker can pull it back to the tank without damage. (CONFIDENTIAL)

**********


### ELIMINATION OF REGT'L SVC CO IN SUPPLY CHANNEL FOR REGT'L TK CO

Recommend Ordnance study possibility of eliminating regimental service company channel for supply and evacuation of the regimental tank companies' armored vehicles. *(RESTRICTED)*

**SOURCE:** Command Report - 6th Medium Tank En  
**DATE:** April 1951  
**Source No:** 263

### RECOVERY VEHICLES

Evacuation of disabled vehicles became a major problem during the month due to the shortage of adequate towing equipment. It has been found that due to their lack of power, the E-32 recovery vehicles with radial engines are inadequate for towing M-46 tanks. The M-32 recovery vehicles with Ford engines perform admirably. *(CONFIDENTIAL)*

**SOURCE:** Command Report - 187th Abn RCT - 3M Parachute Maintenance Detachment  
**DATE:** 7 May 1951  
**Source No:** 264

### DEFECTS IN T-7 MAIN PARACHUTES

In the inspection of T-7 main parachutes it has been found that small holes, poor workmanship and various malfunctions exist in the new allotment of this type parachute received at this station. All parachutes of this type are in the process of being unpacked and inspected. *(CONFIDENTIAL)*

**SOURCE:** Command Report - 44th Engineer Const En  
**DATE:** April 1951  
**Source No:** 265

### HYDRAULIC JACKS

It is recommended that hydraulic jacks of up to 40 ton capacity be included in the T/O&E to facilitate bridge construction. *(RESTRICTED)*
The 62d Engineer Construction Battalion had been assigned to the speedy construction of a low level railway bridge. This project was completed three (3) days ahead of schedule, due largely to an innovation in the use of bearing plates. Drilling holes in I-beam flanges to correspond with holes in the bearing plates proved too slow for the operation, as immediate completion of the project was necessary to the logistical support of the Eighth Army advance. A plan to use double bearing plates and weld the I-beam to the top plate greatly increased the speed with which the assignment was completed. An entire forty-two-foot (42') bay could now be assembled with diaphragm (held in place by chain hoists), permitting the welding of diaphragm and bearing plates and the placing of crossties without reference to the center line. The entire unit could be jockeyed to the center with pinch bars. (RESTRICTED)
c. Impetus from the rear.

2. The effectiveness of the system has been reduced very considerably by two practices which have become prevalent in recent months.

a. Stationing of division service elements as far as 175 miles from regiments, thus making the rendering of proper divisional logistic support and maintenance difficult to impossible. This practice further renders Army direct logistic support and maintenance ineffectual by forcing Army support units to move to locations in rear of distant divisional elements.

b. Bypassing of Ord field depot companies by going direct to base depots to "scrounge" spare parts, major assemblies and other expendable items. This practice leads to hoarding and "false" shortages and has rendered ineffective the supply of Ord items through normal distribution channels.

3. The Army system is sound and battle-proven. It can and will be made to work in this command. Recommendations for remedial action with regard to weaknesses in Army direct logistic support and maintenance can not be properly made by me until our own errors are corrected.

4. The following policies are announced:

a. All elements of divisions (except Div Rear CP's) will be located in zone forward of division rear boundaries unless specifically authorized to be located elsewhere by this headquarters.

b. Prescribed channels of resupply and maintenance will be strictly adhered to (see EUSA SOP for Adm, 25 Oct 50 w/changes).

/s/ Bryant R. Moore
BRIG. G.摩ORE
Major General, United States Army
Commanding

(RESTRICTED)
T/O&E INFANTRY

It is recommended that the battle lessons learned, tactical applications used, as well as organizational innovations resorted to in pursuing the Korean War be carefully appraised in the light of probable future enemy capabilities and the unusual nature of current operations. In most ways the war in Korea is an anachronism. The common use of human bearers, the long and arduous mountain climbing maneuvers and the stripping down of units in order to negotiate difficult terrain is the result, not necessarily of the terrain, but primarily because of the paucity of troops. The force necessary to allow for a crushing offensive of envelopment and destruction is not available. There is, and has been, ample terrain of a suitable nature, and enemy situations capable of being exploited by an armored-infantry deep penetration and encirclement; followed by a mop-up by infantry units operating against isolated units in mountainous terrain. Many times in the last five (5) months there have been opportunities to encircle and crush enemy units from the size of a regiment to a corps. The lack of sufficient troops has forced the UN forces to attack frontally and slowly and maintain a defensive attitude even during the conduct of the attack. This war is in every respect a "Poor Man's War."

Therefore, any recommendations based on the current Korean campaigns with regard to basic changes in T/O&E and/or tactics should be scrutinized primarily in the light of the future, rather than with respect to the present or past campaigns in Korea. It is a tribute to the basic organization of the infantry regiment that the present structure has been flexible enough to meet the requirements of the Korean War. (SECRET)

* * * * * * * *

AT-LINE PLATOON

The present AT-line Platoon has proved to be versatile, dependable and flexible. Its primary use has been to augment, or many times to replace, engineer troops at the regimental level. The regimental defense against armored attack could be greatly improved if the AT-line Platoon had an active, as well as passive, means of antitank defense. If the 105-mm Recoilless Rifle mounted on the 1/4 ton truck
utilizing HEAT or "Squash-head" ammunition proves to be an acceptable antitank weapon, the inclusion of nine (9) to twelve (12) of such weapons, organic to the AT-Mine Platoon is recommended. This would require only twelve (12) additional men (driver-loaders), since the balance of the platoon could perform a dual mission. It is felt that the additional workload on Service Company Maintenance Section can be absorbed inside the present T/O&E structure. (CONFIDENTIAL)

**X-55 AA GOUNT**

It is recommended that a study be made of the practicality of introducing eight (8) X-55 (quadruple-mounted Cal .50 MG) mounted 2½ ton trucks into the Infantry Regiment. These weapons are capable of being fired either from the bed of the truck or from ground mounts. On the offensive these weapons could be used truck-mounted for close ground support or for antiaircraft protection of motor columns, CP's or supply installations. On the defense or in a static situation they could be ground mounted for the same purposes and the trucks could be used other than for their primary purpose. The 2½ ton truck is a rugged and suitable mount for the quad-fifty and eliminates the maintenance and trafficability problems inherent in the M-16 vehicle. The additional firepower and particularly the antiaircraft potential of this weapon would make it a valuable organic addition to the Infantry Regiment. (CONFIDENTIAL)

**Corps Vehicles Requirements**

Corps should never have less than four (4) truck companies in its support. Even though there are periods of little utilization, trucks must be "on tap" for tactical operations. Four (4) truck units constitute a bare minimum. (RESTRICTED)
AIR OBSERVERS

The T/O should be implemented to furnish one (1) air observer for each organic aircraft authorized by the T/O. Forward observers are being directed to this job when they are urgently needed to meet the requirements of troops on the ground. (RESTRICTED)

TRUCK OPERATION

1. Experience with truck operation in all corps areas in the last two (2) months has shown that more centralized control of all phases of truck operation in forward areas is necessary if most efficient utilization and maximum availability of vehicles is to be realized.

2. The present practice of putting transportation units or, in some cases, a given number of trucks, in direct support of an organization has the following results:

   a. A lack of flexibility - there are often periods of time when the unit supported does not need all the trucks, yet they are not available for other use.

   b. On days when the unit has heavy commitments, they have a tendency to "ram" the trucks - without regard to proper operating practice and good maintenance policies.

   c. A great deal of "deadheading" in one direction results, although cargo may be available and could be offered and hauled if there were centralized control. This applies particularly to back hauling of empty FOL drums and brass.

   d. When a heavy, unexpected, army-wide need for a large
truck concentration occurs, e.g. a large troop movement, it is very
difficult to collect the vehicles and control their movement, dis-
patch and operation.

e. Truck operation is removed from those who are trained
to handle it and often put in inexperienced hands, or people not
properly staffed to handle it.

f. Operations being split up into small units, truck
deadlines are not spread over a wide area, but are often concentrated.

g. Normal channels of command and administration are broken
down.

3. Several solutions are possible:

a. Put all vehicles under Army control and give support
missions, either continuing or temporary as needed.

b. Leave units in direct support, but only at Corps level,
avoiding any breakdowns beyond battalion, all support lower than
corps level to be by mission.

c. Use of transportation coordinator, machinery for which
already exists, by proper use of 351st Transportation Highway Trans-
port Group.

ii. Recommend that Transportation Officer, US&K be requested
to submit a study on truck operation as outlined herein, with his
recommendations. (RESTRICTED)

| SOURCE: Command Report - 425th Transportation Traffic Regulating Gp |
| DATE: March 1951 | Source No 272 |

PORT OPERATIONS

A bucket type conveyor should be built by engineers to speed up
discharge of coal from barges. At present, coal is discharged from
ship to barge by ship's gear, and removed from barges by laborers
wearing "A" frames. This results in tying up barges on coal
operations. (RESTRICTED)
PROVOST MARSHAL INVESTIGATION SECTIONS

During the month of June a Corps Investigation Section was organized, consisting of two (2) military police investigators from the 269th Military Police Company, to make preliminary investigations of crimes committed in the I Corps area. This section was set up because on numerous occasions when crimes were reported to the CID they were unable to dispatch a team of Agents immediately due to the overload of cases on hand, and in some instances witnesses disappeared and evidence was missing due to unavoidable delay. Under the present setup, as soon as a crime is reported to the military police or Provost Marshal, the KPI team is sent out to make an immediate investigation, and if sufficient leads, witnesses and suspects are located to show the probability that the alleged offense was committed and by whom, the case is turned over to the CID. When investigation reveals that the offense is of a minor nature or was committed through negligence with no criminal intent, a report of the preliminary investigation is sent to the commanding officer of the offender. The two (2) enlisted men who constitute the I Corps KPI team are both trained investigators, and in the one week in June in which they were organized they successfully solved several criminal cases that would very likely not have been solved prior to the setting up of the KPI team. It is believed that a team of trained investigators should be incorporated in the T/O&E of the Provost Marshal Sections of each division and corps operating in the field, to make preliminary investigation and take some of the workload off the CID. (RESTRICTED)

POWER FOR K-45 TURRET

1. Recommend that power for K-45 turret on K-16 mount be taken from vehicular power supply. Since vehicle operates on 12 volt system, power could be taken from vehicular battery to base of turret. Slip rings in base of turret could be used to transmit power to master switch of turret. This would eliminate the Power Charger,

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Briggs and Stratton, presently mounted on the rear of the X-45 turret and allow room for four (4) additional chests of ammunition. For auxiliary power in cases where vehicle is in static position, a PE-210 could be used to provide power to storage battery.

2. Recommend that a manual system of operation be designed for firing, traversing, and elevating the guns of the X-45 turret when electrical power is off. The present shortage of solenoids in this battalion has pointed out the need for some type of manual firing, especially in ground support roles. (CONFIDENTIAL)

USE OF CIC TEAMS

With the recommitment of the 2d Division to an active sector on 16 July 1951, CIC teams were sent out to each regiment in order that on-the-spot coverage might be affected. Results, as of this date, indicate that this is a more effective way of utilizing CIC personnel within the Division. This marks a change in the detachments operational policy inasmuch as during the past several months these teams had been based at detachment headquarters and sent out to the regiments on call. (RESTRICTED)

LACK OF TRAINING IN MINE WARFARE

When the 2d Division moved back into the Kansas Line in the middle of July, all units were warned to check their areas carefully for mines. There were, nevertheless, heavy casualties caused by friendly mines which had not been plotted when sown, or reported to the relieving units when the 2d Division took over. It is extremely important that units planting mine fields place them in patterns and prepare detailed and accurate maps of their locations. In addition to these precautions, the fields should be properly marked. All of these are basic safety precautions but they have not been followed in the Korean Theater. Many booby traps placed by individuals near their foxholes were not deactivated when units were moved and these, too, were the basic cause for many unnecessary casualties. (CONFIDENTIAL)
USE OF SUPPORTING WEAPONS IN ATTACK

All 75-mm recoilless rifles and .50 calibre machine guns in the 38th Infantry Regiment were formed in battery and supported the assaulting echelons. Heavy Mortar Company, 9th Infantry Regiment was attached to Heavy Mortar Company, 38th Infantry Regiment and together formed a twenty (20) gun battery in support of this operation. Tank Company, 23d Infantry, fired direct and indirect fire missions in the 38th Infantry sector to assist in the attack. (RESTRICTED)

DUG-IN POSITIONS

Training should emphasize the importance of well dug-in positions. It is reasonably certain that this battalion would have suffered numerous casualties had it not been so well dug-in while under hostile counterbattery fire. (RESTRICTED)

EFFECT OF ROUGH ROADS ON VEHICLES

Operation of vehicles over the rough roads predominant in Korea, points out a requirement for strengthening the mounting of the rear shock absorbers on 1/4 ton vehicles. The welds between the upper plates and the frames have often failed. (RESTRICTED)

CANISTER FOR 105-MM HOWITZER

Overall experience in light artillery units in Korea demonstrates the advisability of including Canister T18 as part of the basic ammunition load of each 105-mm howitzer section for employment against infiltrating ground troops at close range. Ten (10) rounds per piece would be sufficient. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Some means of night air observation should be provided in order to locate enemy artillery mortars. In the rugged terrain encountered in Korea, ground observation and location by flashes of enemy guns is often very difficult due to intervening ridges. Helicopters operating above friendly front lines might provide a solution to this problem. Orientation could be accomplished by properly emplaced searchlights or other visual beacons. (RESTRICTED)

105-mm Ammunition

All high explosive projectiles 105-mm should be issued with nose plugs, supplementary and charges not be ready fuzed. The reasons for this are as follows:

1. Manufacture, assembly, storage and resupply problems are greatly minimized by having a common HE projectile unfuzed. Balancing stocks in dumps, ASP's and even within batteries can be accomplished more readily by using a common unfuzed projectile and bulk issue of fuzes.

2. A greater degree of safety is attained when handling unfuzed projectiles as compared with handling the fuzed rounds.

3. Experience indicates that service of the piece is not slowed down by the use of unfuzed projectiles and in some cases is actually accelerated. In many instances difficulty has been encountered in removing fuzes which have been set-punched in place in order to install a different type. No such difficulty has been observed in removing nose plugs from projectiles.

4. During the Korean operations vast quantities of time fuzed shells have been used as point detonating when stocks of PD fuzed shell had been expended. This does not appear to be an economical practice and could be avoided. Time adjustments have been very infrequent and a small stock of time fuzes could be carried on hand in the event they were required.

5. In some instances of units relieving other units in place and taking over ammunition on hand in howitzer positions, ammunition has been repacked in the wrong containers and the markings on the packing as to type fuse did not coincide with the actual fuze contained therein, causing erroneous ammunition reporting and consequent additional labor in making physical inventories.
6. Ammunition status reports would be simplified by separating the fuze from the shell. (CONFIDENTIAL)

** * * * * * * * * * *

** ENEMY ARTILLERY **

The placement by the enemy of flat trajectory artillery on high ridges and hill tops has proven to be a thorn in our side. These positions are very difficult to hit and when our fires get close to the enemy piece he merely withdraws weapons and personnel into a previously prepared cave or dug-out (which is usually very cleverly camouflaged) until our fire is lifted. (RESTRICTED)

** * * * * * * * * * *

** ARTILLERY AMBUSHES**

Our recent employment of artillery ambushes has proven to be effective. Based on intelligence reports, daytime registrations have been made on points where night activity by the enemy has been observed. On signal from night patrols or other means, fire has been placed on these points and in one instance two (2) of four (4) trucks operating over one of these points were destroyed and numerous casualties were inflicted on enemy personnel and animals. (CONFIDENTIAL)

** SOURCE: ** Command Report - 2d Div Art

** DATE: ** July 1951

** COUNTERBATTERY-COUNTERARTILLERY ACTIVITY **

** COUNTERBATTERY **

A resourceful enemy who makes excellent use of the favorable terrain for hiding his pieces has made counterbattery an extremely difficult mission. The units of Division artillery have had only fair success but are redoubling their efforts to get better results. (RESTRICTED)
Lack of radar equipment continues to hamper the effectiveness of the countermortar program. Under present conditions a mortar must be seen or its flash observed before neutralization or destruction can be effected. (CONFIDENTIAL)

FLASH OBSERVATION POSTS

The use of surveyed ground observation posts, manned on a twenty-four (24) hour basis, has enabled the artillery to locate many enemy weapons. This observation has also proved valuable in verifying other reported information. (RESTRICTED)

EVALUATION

Aerial photo and visual methods of countermortar and counterbattery have been only partially effective. Sound ranging has been unsuccessful in the mountains due to echoes and lack of surveyed bases. Radar would help immeasurably. The Division Artillery has the trained personnel, but does not have the equipment. (CONFIDENTIAL)

RECOMMENDATIONS

That countermortar radar equipment be obtained for the light battalions of this division. (CONFIDENTIAL)

That much greater emphasis be placed on the submission of timely and accurate shell reports and other enemy information by battalion S-2's in intelligence training programs. (RESTRICTED)

****

LIMITATIONS ON AMMUNITION

An ammunition limitation of fifteen (15) rounds per day or two hundred forty (240) rounds per battalion per day, placed on the Division Artillery during July, proved too restrictive. Such an allowance does not afford proper protection of infantry patrols, does not allow for proper counterbattery fires, and generally restricts the Division to a passive defense. (RESTRICTED)

****

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Despite the five (5) weeks of training, it required approximately ten (10) days of combat to enable the units to reach a high degree of efficiency. This was particularly noticeable in the units which had rotated the majority of their experienced personnel to the zone of the interior, leaving a minimum of battle experienced personnel on hand. (CONFIDENTIAL)