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
OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES  
Fort Monroe, Virginia

ATTNG-64 350.05/48(DOCI)(C)(10 Jun 52)

10 June 1952

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

TO: See distribution



1. In accordance with SR 525-85-5, Processing of Combat Information, the inclosed EXTRACTS are forwarded to Department of the Army, Army Field Forces and the service schools for evaluation and necessary action. It may be appropriate, in certain cases, for these agencies to take action upon a single extracted item; in others, it may be desirable to develop a cross-section of accumulated extracts on a particular subject before initiating action; and often, the extracted item serves to reaffirm our doctrines and techniques.

2. Copies are furnished, with DA approval, to other military agencies to keep them informed concerning theater problems from the front line thru the logistical command.

3. These EXTRACTS are derived from reports which are classified SECRET. For the greater convenience of the user, this Office downgrades each extracted item to the lowest classification compatible with security. No effort is made to paraphrase or delete any portion of the extracted remarks, so that none of the original intent is lost.

4. Combat information EXTRACTS herein which are applicable to training at the company-battery level also appear in Army Field Forces TRAINING BULLETINS.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

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1 Incl  
Extracts from sources  
329 thru 375

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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES  
Fort Monroe, Virginia

EXTRACTS OF COMBAT INFORMATION

SOURCE: Command Report - 17th Inf Regt

DATE: February 1952

Source No 329

OPERATION "CLAM UP."

The purpose of this operation was to decoy the enemy into thinking we had made a withdrawal. All daylight activity ceased in areas under enemy observation. Each man was made fully aware of the primary mission: to hold fire and capture the enemy. If friendly positions became threatened, fire was to be controlled so as to kill a maximum number of the enemy.

The enemy was observed building up a large striking force in front of 3d Battalion positions. Not a friendly shot was fired until the leading enemy elements had cut a path through the tactical wire less than thirty (30) yards in front of 3d Battalion positions; then, at 0312 hours, the signal was given to open fire. The enemy attack was thrown into confusion.

At 0320 hours the second wave of enemy troops assaulted. Tank, mortar, and artillery fire was used, along with small arms, to repel this assault. At 0338 the enemy began to withdraw.

Two hundred twenty-six (226) enemy casualties were inflicted without sustaining a single friendly casualty. The sound judgement of the officers and the courage and discipline of the men, which enabled them to hold their fire until the last possible minute, was responsible for the success of the action.

(RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 31st FA Bn - 7th Inf Div

DATE: February 1952

Source No 330

M5 TRACTOR - OPERATION ON SNOW AND ICE.

The weather conditions existing in this theater of operations during the winter cause the ground and roads to freeze,

INCLOSURE

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in some cases to a depth of thirty (30) inches. After a snowfall, the snow gradually melts during periods of sunshine in the middle of the day, but the resulting slush and water freezes at night. The present thirteen (13) ton high-speed Tractor, M5, does not have adequate traction to negotiate on this frozen ground and ice.

Recommend that either a wider track be used on the M5 Tractor, or that some type of device be provided for use on the present tracks during periods when the ground is frozen or covered with ice. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:

Command Report - 15th AAA AW Bn (SP) - 7th Inf Div

DATE:

February 1952

Source No 331

POWER CHARGER FOR MOUNT, MULTIPLE GUN, CALIBER .50, M45D.

It is recommended that a larger type power charger be standard equipment for Mount, Multiple Gun, Caliber .50, M45D, employed by this unit. With the present power charger, it is sometimes necessary to deactivate tactical weapons as a result of constant breakdowns. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:

Command Report - 31st Inf - 7th Inf Div

DATE:

February 1952

Source No 332

RATING OF SERGEANT FOR CHAPLAINS' ASSISTANTS.

It is recommended that Chaplains' assistants have the rating of sergeant.

With only the rating of corporal to offer, Chaplains are severely handicapped in their efforts to obtain an assistant who must not only be a man of high moral character who can assist with religious services and aid in various human relation problems, but must be a jeep driver, maintenance man and typist also. At present there are many men who are jeep drivers and nothing else who possess the rating of corporal. (RESTRICTED)

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SOURCE:

Command Report - 9th Inf Regt

DATE:

February 1952

Source No 333

COMBAT TEST OF ARMORED VEST.

The first real proof of the value of wearing the armored vests came on 22 February when a man from George Company was wounded while wearing one. The Regimental Surgeon, Captain Williamson, said that upon examination the wounds were light considering the source was a hand grenade. The man's outer sweater had several holes in it, but he suffered no chest wounds. The uncovered portions of the arms received the fragments. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:

Command Report - 160th FA Bn

DATE:

February 1952

Source No 334

INEQUITY OF GRADE IN FDC.

Present T/O provides that the chart operators be corporals (E-4) while three (3) of the computers are sergeants (E-5). A mistake by an HCO in reading a deflection or range will cause error as widespread as a computer; a mistake by an HCO in plotting will cause error in three (3) firing batteries whereas a computer's error will affect only one. When more than one mission is processed simultaneously the VCO becomes an HCO, hence should have equivalent grade.

T/O should be changed to give two (2) chart operators grade equivalent to that of the three (3) computers. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:

Command Report - 179th Inf Regt - 45th Inf Div

DATE:

February 1952

Source No 335

VOLUNTEER RAIDER GROUPS

Because patrolling has assumed the role of a major activity in the present situation, much stress was devoted to patrols during the training period. Each battalion organized a special

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patrol group, utilizing Ranger personnel, to develop an organization capable of operating as a unit or by squads or smaller groups to make deep patrols and take prisoners, set ambushes or make raids in operations requiring training or ability beyond that of a normal rifle squad. These volunteer Raider Groups were housed and trained separately and treated in such a manner as to develop a high esprit de corps. Detailed organization of the Raider Groups was left to the battalion commanders with groups ranging between 12 and 24 men. (RESTRICTED)

**SOURCE:** Report - Army Field Forces Observer Team No 6  
FECOM

**DATE:** February - March 1952 Source No 336

SUPPLY ECONOMY.

Cost consciousness and supply economy is being emphasized by all echelons of command from GHQ down to small front line units. Front line units are engaged in battlefield recovery of weapons and equipment. Teams were observed recovering old tactical barbed wire. Definite programs for renovation of winter clothing have been established. The rebuild program of vehicles is saving millions of dollars. (RESTRICTED)

**SOURCE:** Command Report - 2d Inf Div

**DATE:** January 1952 Source No 337

DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING ENEMY PW'S.

The reconnaissance patrols were very successful in securing information pertaining to dispositions but the prisoner capturing effort was not too successful. The enemy displayed almost no desire to surrender as evidenced by the fact that only one prisoner out of five (5) taken was a deserter and one patrol leader reported seeing two (2) enemy shoot each other in what appeared to be a mutual suicide pact in order to avoid capture.

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This reluctance to surrender on the part of the enemy was suspected to be caused by closer political surveillance and increased propaganda concerning harsh treatment of PW's coupled with a practical fear of friendly artillery. There was also some indication that friendly troops were tending to open fire too early and at extreme ranges causing the enemy to become more wary. Night patrols and ambush points were hindered in their efficiency by the extreme cold. Bulky clothing makes stealth difficult and complete immobility for long periods is not possible with the present equipment. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - Kokura General Depot

DATE: February 1952

Source No 338

STACKING TELEPHONE POLES.

The Signal Supply Section devised a new method of stacking telephone poles as they came off the rail cars. Complete unloading and stacking of a car can now be accomplished in twenty (20) to thirty (30) minutes as compared with one hour using the old method. Previously the stack was built one tier with the poles parallel to the car, the next tier with the poles perpendicular to the car and so on. This required the turning around of the poles in every other tier by means of a crane. In the new system skids are placed against the car, and all tiers have the poles rolled into position parallel to the car. Skids are also used to raise the poles onto each successive tier. Posts are set in the ground at the back of the stack to keep the poles from rolling off and dunnage is used to steady and support each tier, and keep the stack uniform. When the stack becomes too high for manual rolling, a crane is employed to build up the remaining tiers. When loading a car from a stack the process is used in reverse. (RESTRICTED)

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SOURCE: Command Report - 10th FA Bn  
DATE: February 1952 Source No 339

CAVITIZED 105-MM HE AMMUNITION.

It is recommended that ultimately all 105-mm HE ammunition issued be of the cavitized type and issued unfuzed and that fuzes of various types be drawn by battalion ammunition officers as required. Such a procedure would obviate the necessity of registering with more than one type of ammunition and also save time and an appreciable amount of ammunition. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - X Corps Arty  
DATE: February 1952 Source No 340

8" HOWITZER (SELF-PROPELLED) IN DIRECT FIRE AGAINST FORTIFICATIONS.

The 8" Howitzer (self-propelled) of the 780th Field Artillery Battalion employed during January in the sector of the 7th US Infantry Division was moved to the 1st Marine Division Sector. During February a total of 368 rounds were expended with the following results reported: 34 bunkers destroyed, 5 bunkers damaged. On 24 February 1952, the gunner was wounded by small arms fire and evacuated. A shield was constructed by Ordnance and Flak vests supplied by the 11th Marine Regiment. An average of 9.4 rounds was required for the destruction of each bunker attacked. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 31st FA Bn - 7th Inf Div  
DATE: January 1952 Source No 341

TRAINING IN PRECISION MISSIONS.

The greater majority of the observed fire missions fired by this Battalion are precision fire missions against such targets as bunkers, artillery pieces, mortars, and houses. A

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great number of these precision missions are fired by air observation. The nature of the terrain and the lack of man-made features such as roads, buildings, etc, increase the difficulty of accurate map reading by the air observer. A continuing program of training is necessary to develop qualified air observers within the unit.

It is recommended that all officers receive more training in the conduct of precision missions and the duties of the air observer. All officers should be allowed to conduct a precision mission as an air observer. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:

Command Report - 8010th Army Unit  
Trans Military Railway Service

DATE:

February 1952

Source No 342

COST CONSCIOUSNESS-INDOCTRINATION.

In order to assure complete and thorough indoctrination of all military and civilian members of this organization in matters pertaining to the Cost Consciousness Program and supply discipline, a five (5) hour indoctrination course has been prepared in Cost Consciousness and Supply Economy. This course is designed to point out individual responsibilities; the effect on the national economy; proper care, maintenance and security of equipment; and loss through carelessness and waste. Training aids, charts, and films have been incorporated in the course to broaden the scope of instruction and to insure a thorough indoctrination in cost consciousness and a complete understanding of supply discipline. Instruction in this course will start during the month of March and will be mandatory for all military and civilian personnel. (RESTRICTED)

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SOURCE: Command Report - 8187th Army Unit  
Oppama Ordnance Shops

DATE: February 1952 Source No 343

SHEET METAL SALVAGE.

A program is in effect to recover the maximum quantity of sheet metal usable for manufacturing purposes from items that have been declared not economically repairable. Pneumatic chisels and power hammers are in operation in the Salvage Yard for this purpose. During the month of February, 20,000 pounds of sheet steel were shipped from salvage to the Manufacturing Division. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 72d Tank Battalion

DATE: February 1952 Source No 344

USE OF HIGH-CLEAT TRACK ON M4A3E8 TANKS AS ICE AND SNOW GROUSERS.

Our experimental use of the H-Cleat Track Block was unsatisfactory. An attempt was made to compare our welded-on-cleat to this expedient. We wished to ascertain how much performance was improved over the regular track.

Use of the H-Cleat track, one to every four (4) regular track blocks, was definitely an advantage over the regular track in making for sharper turns, steeper climbs, better traction, and firmer braking. With every fifth (5th) block having protruding cleats, it allowed us to have at least five (5) H-Cleat blocks on the ground at all times.

As a testing ground we used an unused mountain road where we found a very icy section. The tank with the modified track had no difficulties. We could not get the tank with the regular track up the road at all.

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COMMENT.

The use of the H-Cleat track as a grouser causes excessive vibration. Many parts and pieces of equipment on our tanks were shaken loose due to this vibration. The excessive vibration caused the deadline of many tanks and we were forced to discontinue use of this expedient.

Our welded-on-cleat gave approximately the same results without this vibration. There must be closer supervision of 1st Echelon Maintenance when the cleats are used. Crews must tighten nuts, bolts, and screws continually during operation of the tanks. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:

Command Report - 279th Inf Regt - 45th Inf Div

DATE:

February 1952

Source No 345

UNFAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR DAYLIGHT PATROLS.

Patrolling during daylight was very costly in that the enemy was well dug in and supported by registered fires from light and heavy mortars, artillery, and self-propelled guns. He practiced rigid fire control. Daylight patrols were discontinued on 25 January. It was felt that night patrols for the purpose of gaining contact with the enemy would be equally successful and less costly. (RESTRICTED)

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ORGANIZATION OF RAIDER PLATOON.

On 20 February a Raider Platoon was organized within the Regiment. The mission of this platoon is to carry out special patrols and assignments. The platoon draws rations and equipment from Headquarters Company and is armed with M2 carbines, .45 caliber pistols, and light machine guns. The platoon is a volunteer group, the men having been interviewed by the platoon leader and selected according to their ability. A majority of the men are former Rangers or members of Airborne units. The Raiders immediately began training -- the first phase of which was a course to improve their physical condition. Road marches, close order drills, and physical training helped make the Raiders a better organized unit. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:

Command Report - 3d Inf Div

DATE:

September 1951

Source No 346

USE OF DOGS IN COMBAT AREA.

On 26 September the 26th Infantry Scout Dog Detachment was relieved from attachment to the 3d Division and was transferred to the 24th Inf Division. The Scout Dogs were with the Division for about a fifteen (15) week period. During that time they were given various tactical missions including daytime and nighttime scouting and patrolling, sentry duty at patrol bases, duty with ambushes, and as scouts during night approach marches. Generally in all cases the performance of duty of the dogs was unsatisfactory. Their stamina was low and they could not climb hills and keep up with troops on foot. They were nervous and disclosed their positions by barking whenever contact was imminent. It is felt that they could be better used as sentry dogs at supply installations in rear areas to prevent pilfering. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:

Command Report - 45th Inf Div - Div Arty

DATE:

February 1952

Source No 347

LOCATING ARTILLERY TARGETS.

At 101800 February 1952 the 45th Division Artillery ceased all artillery fire missions for a period of approximately six (6) days which was in conjunction with a coordinated Army-wide program. The absence of artillery fire accomplished the mission of inducing the enemy to move more freely, especially during the daylight hours, thereby affording the observers an opportunity to report a more accurate picture of enemy activities. During this silent period both aerial and ground observers kept the enemy under constant surveillance and a list of targets of known enemy installations was compiled from their reports. At 160630 February 1952 the 45th Division Artillery broke the silent period by firing a ten (10) minute artillery barrage on targets selected from this list, although maximum effort was

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not received since it was necessary to fire this barrage without recent registered data. It would have been better to open fire using observed fires. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Logistical Command

DATE: January 1952 Source No 348

AWARDS BY COMMANDERS OF LOGISTICAL COMMANDS.

It is recommended that AR 600-45 be amended to the end that commanders of logistical commands (C) overseas who are in the grade of major general, or brigadier generals who occupy T/O&E vacancies of major generals, be authorized to award military decorations to members of their commands. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 23d Inf Regt - 2d Inf Div

DATE: January 1952 Source No 349

PATROL TECHNIQUE.

The 23d Infantry adopted the practice of sending out reconnaissance patrols daily and establishing at least two (2) ambushes within the regimental sector each night. During the latter part of the month these night ambushes were continuous from darkness to dawn. Since the extremely cold weather made it impractical to leave one ambush force in position throughout the entire night, each ambush was relieved after two (2) or three (3) hours and replaced by another group.

Several raiding patrols were dispatched during the hours of darkness in January in an attempt to bring in PW's. While none accomplished its mission, the regiment learned a valuable lesson -- that night raiding patrols must be small and that stealth is of prime importance. (RESTRICTED)

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3.5 ROCKET LAUNCHER ON PATROLS.

Recommend that a 3.5 rocket launcher be taken on raiding and daylight reconnaissance patrols. This weapon is effective for use against bunkered positions and may also be used for reconnaissance by fire. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - Hq EUSAK - Sec II - Book 1  
Office of the Chief of Staff  
DATE: August 1951 Source No 350

AMBUSH FOR ENEMY SMALL UNIT PROBING ATTACKS.

The Army commander stated that repulsing squad and platoon sized enemy probing attacks was wrong; that we should welcome them and seize the opportunity to ambush these small enemy units rather than drive them off with artillery, mortar, and long range automatic weapons fire. The Army commander also directed the Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to so instruct Corps G2's, and reiterated that the ability to ambush was an advantage of the defense which must be fully exploited. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - 21st AAA AW Bn (SP)  
DATE: January 1952 Source No 351

NCO REPLACEMENTS.

Not enough qualified NCO's are received. Therefore, squad leaders are being made not because they are qualified in leadership and technical ability, but because of necessity. (RESTRICTED)

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<b>SOURCE:</b>	Command Report - 25th Inf Div
<b>DATE:</b>	January 1952 <span style="float: right;">Source No 352</span>

SMALL UNIT TACTICAL TRAINING.

Experience has shown that, due to the predominantly mountainous and sharply irregular characteristics of the Korean battleground, as well as the Chinese tactical preference for hilltop defense, most engagements break up into platoon and even squad actions. Emphasis should therefore be placed upon small unit tactics and coordination of fire support at the lowest levels. (RESTRICTED)

<b>SOURCE:</b>	Command Report - 2d Logistical Command (C)
<b>DATE:</b>	November 1951 <span style="float: right;">Source No 353</span>

INSTRUCTION IN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.

It is recommended that service personnel alerted for oversea movement to theaters where indigenous employees are used in military installations be given adequate instruction in personnel management methods prior to arrival at oversea station. It is believed that particular attention in this respect should be paid to personnel of port and depot type service units to the end that they receive a minimum of ten (10) hours of management training. (RESTRICTED)

<b>SOURCE:</b>	Monthly Summary - G3 Aviation Hq IX Corps
<b>DATE:</b>	February 1952 <span style="float: right;">Source No 354</span>

L-19 CARBURETOR TROUBLE.

One of the most serious problems in maintenance of aircraft has been trouble with the L-19 carburetors. At one time four (4) of seven (7) L-19's assigned to Corps Headquarters were grounded because of malfunctioning carburetors.

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The Ordnance Light Aviation Maintenance Companies and the 79th Ordnance Battalion are making every effort to eliminate this difficulty, but so far they have not been able to determine the exact cause. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - 430th Engr C Bn

DATE: October 1951 Source No 355

ROAD MAINTENANCE.

During the month of October one (1) mile of Main Supply Route #24 was sprinkled daily with the 750 gallon water distributor. Maintenance requirements (grading, dragging, and surfacing) this test mile were decreased approximately fifty per cent (50%). Dust was greatly eliminated even under heavy traffic conditions, thus reducing the driving hazard and the excessive vehicular wear due to dust getting into moving parts. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Report of Opn BLACKBIRD

DATE: October 1951 Source No 356

HELICOPTER TRANSPORTATION.

Supplies can be built up at any suitable location at an extremely rapid rate provided casualties are not brought out. Using the cargo nets the helicopter is at the landing spot a maximum of 30 seconds which includes the approach and retirement. If casualties are to be evacuated some 3 or 4 minutes per helicopter are necessary for the landing of supplies and loading of the wounded. Extensive training and practice will eventually reduce this by 1 to 2 minutes. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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SOURCE:	Command Report - I US Corps - Part I
DATE:	August 1951 <span style="float: right;">Source No 357</span>

TANKER'S HELMET.

The present steel helmet, with a tanker's cut-away helmet liner as head gear for tank crews, is unsatisfactory. It is a bulky, awkward affair for men who fight from the inside of a tank and who relish what extra room they can have in their fighting vehicle. The World War II "Crash Helmet," football style, is still a great favorite with tank crews because of its design; however, it offers them little protection from shell fragments. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:	Command Report - 55th Trans Trk Bn
DATE:	July 1951 <span style="float: right;">Source No 358</span>

TRUCK DRIVER AUGMENTATION TEAMS.

During World War II as well as in this Korean action, it has been observed that truck units are invariably called upon to operate twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week during the "fighting" phase regardless of whether or not the truck companies have been augmented for round the clock operations. The demands made on the drivers in the truck companies without augmentation teams have frequently been unreasonable and resulted in serious driver fatigue. On some occasions this has been the direct cause of the death of soldiers and destruction of automotive equipment. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:	Command Report - 82d AAA AW Bn (SP)
DATE:	January 1952 <span style="float: right;">Source No 359</span>

AA INSTRUCTOR TEAMS TO FECOM.

It is recommended that AA Instructor Teams be detailed from the Continental United States to FECOM for the purpose of bringing AA units up to date on new firing techniques and employment and operation of AA material. (RESTRICTED)

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SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Chemical Mortar Bn  
DATE: October 1951 Source No 360

RECORDING LOT NUMBERS OF MORTAR AMMUNITION.

AMMUNITION  
Ammunition supply: On 26 September 1951, this organization initiated the practice of recording the lot numbers of each round fired from each mortar. This policy was announced in order that, should an accident be caused by faulty ammunition, the lot number of the round would be known immediately. Another reason for this policy is that ammunition from the same manufacturer's lot has the same weight rating. In order to get the most accurate results, ammunition containing identical weight ratings (marked on each shell) should be fired on each mission. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Chemical Mortar Bn  
DATE: November 1951 Source No 361

MISFIRES WITH 4.2" MORTAR AMMUNITION.

MISFIRES  
During November this organization had an increasing number of misfires due to the breaking of cartridge containers. This fact was reported to Ordnance and an investigation was made to determine the cause. This investigation reported four (4) possible causes for the breaking. First, a structural weakness in the metal itself. This fact is borne out by the crystallization at the break. Second, excessive pressure in the holder brought about by defective propellant powder. Third, excessive pressure in the holder brought about by using full charge which might block the flash holes between the igniter and the propellant. Fourth, firing the round at long ranges at low temperatures. (RESTRICTED)

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SOURCE:

Command Report - 60th Ord Gp

DATE:

November 1951

Source No 362

WELDED PISTOL PORTS ON M46 TANKS.

M46A1 Tanks are being received in this theater with pistol port hinges cut off and the pistol ports welded closed. This necessitates opening the leaders hatch for ventilation and to dispose of shell cases. Recommend action be taken to restore the hinges and locks on pistol ports as they can be used in combat. (RESTRICTED)

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INSPECTION PLATE MODIFICATION, M46 TANK.

Inspection plates on the bottom of M46 tank hulls are secured by nuts to three (3) studs welded to the hull. These studs and nuts protrude from the inspection plate and tend to break off when going through rocky creek beds due to the hull bottom scraping. Recommend this be corrected by the following:

- a. Drill and tap 1/2" holes in the hull bottom.
- b. Countersink the holes in the inspection plates and bevel the edges.
- c. Secure the plates by three 1/2" bolts. (RESTRICTED)

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ELEVATING SCREWS 4.2" MORTARS.

Elevating screws on 4.2" Mortars continue to break or bend, due to rocky terrain, even though the weapons are sandbagged during firing. Recommend a study be made to strengthen this elevating screw. In the interim, it is recommended that one spare be authorized each 4.2" Mortar as spare parts when issued. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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SOURCE:

Command Report - JLC

DATE:

December 1951

Source No 363

PACKAGING SMALL ARMS.

Reports from Korea of performance difficulties of small arms weapons during cold weather prompted experiments in packaging by the Tokyo Ordnance Depot. The bolt from the Carbine, caliber .30 M2 was removed, lubricated with MIL-L-644, and wrapped in grease-proof paper. The bolt was then strapped to the weapon from which it had been removed in order to insure correct functioning upon reassembly. The entire weapon was then dipped in cosmoline and permitted to dry.

Tests disclosed no evidence of cosmoline having penetrated the grease-proof wrapping, and thus the difficulty of cosmoline entering the bolt and preventing proper functioning is overcome.

Although this method requires no change in present packing boxes, it requires that all boxes containing these weapons be specially marked and stored to assure that weapons processed in this manner are issued as needed. The extra handling makes this method impractical unless it is adopted Army-wide. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:

Command Report - 96th Field Artillery Bn

DATE:

October 1951

Source No 364

DIGGING-IN GUNS AND AMMUNITION.

The strict compliance with the unit policy of digging in ammunition, as well as guns and personnel, has paid dividends. During a recent shelling of one of the battery positions, approximately 20 rounds of 76-mm shells landed with damage to only two tents. An ammo pit suffered a direct hit but proper cover of logs and sandbags dispersed the effect so that only one fuze was damaged. (RESTRICTED)

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SOURCE: Command Report - 38th FA Bn  
DATE: January 1952 Source No 365

LEADERSHIP TRAINING.

Noncommissioned Officers: Generally noncommissioned officers are well trained and qualified in their MOS, but approximately fifty per cent are not trained in leadership and their responsibilities of taking care of the men in their sections. It is very difficult and time consuming to conduct this training under combat conditions. It is recommended that more emphasis be placed on NCO Leadership Training in Continental United States. During Field Exercises and Maneuvers the practical aspects of the above training should be emphasized at all levels. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 17th Inf  
DATE: December 1951 Source No 366

DUG-IN TANKS.

Firing positions were dug in with the guns jutting out over the bunkers of the friendly rifle troops. The tanks were dug in four feet deep forward and a minimum of two feet deep along the sides. Defilade positions were prepared just back of the razor-line ridge, a matter of ten yards. There was hardly room to turn around, but after firing the tanks insured safety by the short distance into defilade. The area was given the added security of the antitank and mine platoon who had assisted in the preparation of the positions and remained in the area.

On the first day, the platoon demonstrated its tactical advantage by completely destroying 19 bunkers, damaging 52 others, and blowing up an ammunition dump. On the same day, the tanks accounted for an estimated 35 enemy killed and an estimated 75 wounded. (RESTRICTED)

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SOURCE: Command Report - Hq, EUSAK

DATE: December 1951

Source No 367

CCF AND NK ATTACK DOCTRINE.

The Communist attack doctrine, as observed in all major enemy attacks in Korea, is inflexible. Subordinate units were not permitted to make adjustments which terrain, friendly defenses, or other factors might have indicated as being desirable. Alternate or secondary missions were not assigned to assaulting units. Enemy patrols always utilized the shortest routes of approach and return. Enemy patrol formations were standard and made no allowance for differences in terrain or friendly disposition. Preparations for an attack followed an inflexible and unvarying pattern which soon became apparent to friendly forces. And finally, enemy insistence, due to inflexibility, on mass employment tactics proved costly in the face of United Nations air and artillery fire.

The enemy lacked sufficient logistical support to sustain an extended offensive.

The enemy lacked communications facilities. This hampered control of units in the attack, and may have been the basic cause for the inflexibility of enemy tactics.

Enemy units employed little flank support or security during a tactical march. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Letter - Hq 25th Inf Div

DATE: 5 December 1951

Source No 368

ELECTRIFIED BARBED WIRE FENCE:

The CO, 65th Engr C Bn, investigated feasibility of electrifying barbed wire fences so that any unprotected contact would be lethal.

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**Materials used:** standard barbed wire; 7.5 KW transformer; 3 KW 110 volt, single phase, gasoline driven generator; porcelain insulators, 3 inches in diameter.

Description of test set-up:

1. A four-strand cattle type fence 100 yards long was erected. Posts were lumber. Bottom strand was placed eight (8) inches from the ground. Remaining strands were approximately a foot apart. All strands were on insulators. Vertical wire strands (any medium size) were then used to electrically tie the horizontal barbed wire strands together. These vertical strands were 9 inches apart between the bottom two horizontal strands of barbed wire, and 18 inches apart between the other horizontal strands.

2. A lead was brought in to the high side of a 105/3600 volt transformer. The other lead of the transformer was well grounded to a wire buried 6 inches deep, two feet from the fence and running its length. The low side of the transformer was connected to the generator.

Results of the test:

1. The lethal effectiveness of the fence against a full-scale attack cannot be determined at this time, as the only CCF reaction so far has been to send a patrol which leaned a steel rod against it, then withdrew.

2. Dry and wet logs were thrown across the fence. Voltage readings were not appreciably changed.

3. Strands of the wire were cut. As long as one strand of wire remained intact, voltage readings remained substantially unchanged on both sides of the break.

4. Steel pickets leaned against the fence caused a drop of 10 per cent in voltage beyond the picket.

5. Voltage across the fence measured 3300 volts.  
(RESTRICTED)

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SOURCE:

Command Report - 37th FA Bn

DATE:

January 1952

Source No 369

20 POWER SPOTTING SCOPE FOR ARTILLERY USE.

The M-49, 20 power spotting scope has proved invaluable in locating new targets. Any battalion without this instrument is greatly handicapped, perhaps unknowingly. It should be authorized to each battery on the basis of two (2) each.  
(RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:

Command Report - XVI Corps

DATE:

December 1951

Source No 370

RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED SECURITY INFORMATION TO NEWS AGENCIES.

**PROBLEM:** Security training has been hampered by release to various public news media of information which is still classified security information to military personnel.

**EVALUATION:** This practice tends to nullify the security training given to troops. In addition, when the general public knows more about what is going to happen to the soldier than the soldier himself, it is viewed as a blow to his prestige and self-esteem with a resultant drop in morale.

**RECOMMENDATION:** It is strongly recommended that the same criteria for the classification of information be applied to the press and other news media as that which is applied to military dissemination of information, with particular effort being made to notify troops affected through military channels prior to the time that they may hear the same news through public sources. (RESTRICTED)

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SOURCE: Command Report - 76th AAA Auto Wpns Bn (SP)  
DATE: November 1951 Source No 371

NARCOTICS.

A recommendation has been made by men who have become narcotic addicts, that the Department of the Army prepare an educational film on the subject of narcotics. It is believed that this recommendation is worthy of immediate consideration and implementation. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 23d Inf  
DATE: December 1951 Source No 372

SCOUTING AND PATROLLING.

During past experiences, it is noted that replacements received are decidedly weak in Scouting and Patrolling. It is therefore recommended that prior to departing for overseas shipment, enlisted personnel should be well indoctrinated to the value and need of this subject. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - 15th FA Bn  
DATE: January 1952 Source No 373

CRATER ANALYSIS.

The 15th FA Bn has experienced difficulty in obtaining, from infantry sources, information based on crater analysis. The reason for this difficulty appears to be lack of knowledge of how to make crater analysis. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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SOURCE: Command Report - 31st FA Bn, 7th Inf Div

DATE: December 1951 Source No 374

REDUCED STRENGTH GUN CREWS.

Twenty-four hour operations demand that howitzer crews be divided into two groups. This means that each howitzer is operated by a 5 or 6 man crew. As a result, each cannoneer is required to perform the duties of two persons as outlined in FM 6-81, "Service of the Piece 155-mm Howitzer M1." This consolidation of duties has been worked out within the Battalion; however, it is believed that more study should be made of this problem. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 5th Regimental Combat Team

DATE: January 1952 Source No 375

SNOW CAMOUFLAGE.

The Regiment made extensive use of the white snow suit for purposes of camouflage over snow covered terrain. It is difficult to distinguish a man at even short ranges while he is wearing one of these suits. (RESTRICTED)

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