SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

TO: See distribution

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2. Copies are furnished to other military agencies to keep them informed concerning theater problems from the front line through the logistical command.

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4. Combat information EXTRACTS herein which are applicable to training at the company-battery level also appear in Army Field Forces TRAINING BULLETINS.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

[Signature]

W. H. MELHORN
Lt Col, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

EXTRACTS OF COMBAT INFORMATION

SOURCE: Command Report - 15th Inf Regt
DATE: February 1952

INTEEANTRY INDOCTRINATION TO VT FUZE.

(RESTRICTED) During this period the regiment continued to conduct VT fire by Division Artillery over friendly bunkers along the MLR. This operation was instigated to create confidence in the occupants of the bunkers regarding the protection their bunkers would afford them in the event their position was overrun making it necessary to bring friendly artillery on their position.

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INEFFICIENT NIGHT FIRING OF SMALL ARMS.

(RESTRICTED): 1. There has been a noticeable lack of proficiency in the firing of small arms at night. From the number of rounds expended during contact with the enemy, casualties are amazingly low. This regiment has been and is continuing to conduct a study of this problem.

2. To date it has been determined that:

   a. There is a tendency for the rifleman to shoot over the heads of the enemy.

   b. The muzzle blast of the Rifle Cal .30 M1 destroys the firer's night vision.

   c. The application of luminous paint on sights and along the barrel is of some value.

3. It is recommended that:

   a. Similar studies be conducted by other units to find methods of correcting this deficiency and this information interchanged.

INCLOSURE

Over
b. That a flash hider be provided for the Rifle Cal .30 M1.

c. That this be made a study by the Army Field Forces Board and that a course of instruction in night firing be included in the basic training of replacements prior to their arrival in this theater.

SOURCE: Command Report - 5th Regimental Combat Team

DATE: December 1951

Source No 377

AZIMUTH READING DEVICE FOR SHELL REPORTING:

(RESTRICTED) Although reports of enemy artillery for this period were light, shell reports continued to be turned in with errors in azimuth readings. A special Compass Board has been forwarded to each front line unit.

The board is a piece of soft pine 12" square by 1" in depth. Four long spikes are put at each corner to stake it to the ground. A photographed disc with highglaze content is placed on the board with a directional north arrow at the side. A wooden arrow is placed in the center of the board and can be made to pivot by hand.

To operate the board, all that is necessary is to point the wooden arrow in the direction of the sound or flash, read the numbers at this point and report them to the CP.

It is recommended that at least one board be made available to each company on the front line and that no detailed or technical explanation be made on the use of the board. A man should be taught three steps in the procedure: (1) Point the arrow in direction of sound or flash, (2) Read the numbers at the point and (3) Give the information to CP personnel.
USE OF KOREAN LABOR.

(CONFIDENTIAL) A total of one thousand three hundred seventy-four (1374) indigenous personnel are employed in various capacities within the regiment; one thousand seventy-seven (1077) of those are members of the Korean Service Corps, the remaining two hundred ninety-seven (297) are miscellaneous personnel who are procured through the Civil Affairs Officer. These Korean personnel perform an invaluable service to the Regiment by carrying ammunition, rations and other supplies to front line positions inaccessible to vehicle transport. Their utilization in other areas as KP's, etc., has relieved United States personnel for other and more important tasks.

* * * * * * * * * * *

LISTENING DEVICE.

(CONFIDENTIAL) The most outstanding development in the communication field for the month was the expanded use of listening devices by all line units. The listening device is composed of a microphone and receiving set. The microphone is placed in likely avenues of approach at a range greater than that of the Outpost Line of Resistance. Mortar concentrations are placed on the same spot and fired when sounds of approaching enemy are identified. The regiment has profited from the use of the device and plans to initiate training in its use in order to better exploit its warning capabilities.

* * * * * * * * * * *

TUBE EXPLOSIONS, 4.2" MORTAR

(CONFIDENTIAL) In the past two months there have been two instances in which rounds have exploded in the 4.2 inch mortar tubes. The Heavy Mortar Company developed a system of firing the piece which afforded maximum protection for the crew in the event of an explosion. The system incorporates firing by lanyard and a revetment behind which the crew remains until the round has safely left the tube.
DIVISION AVIATION COMPANY.

(RESTRICTED) The Division Light Air Section is in reality a composite air section with mess, supply, operations and housing operating from a common airstrip. The section functions much the same as a separate company, but does not have a T/O&E authorization. Overhead personnel requirements are accomplished by airplane mechanics, vehicle drivers or by special duty personnel. In this manner a separate mess is maintained to provide for messing of aviation personnel. Recommend that a T/O&E be authorized establishing a Division Aviation Company to include all Army Aviation functions of the Division.

REPLACEMENT PROBLEMS.

(CONFIDENTIAL) The greatest problem continues to be replacements, both officer and enlisted. In the former case officers are being received whose training and experience are at a direct variance with the needs of a combat regiment. It would appear that the assumption is being made that any officer wearing "crossed rifles" is a qualified 1542. In many cases, however, these officers have had a background with no command experience but instead as personnel officers, intelligence specialists, TI&E, etc.

Enlisted men are still arriving in a similar manner. Recently, for example, a man with a dry cleaning machine operator MOS and another with steam locomotive operator MOS were assigned. Many men with artillery and other branch specialities are similarly received. Every effort is being made to have these men reassigned so that the best ends of the service are being served not only in utilizing
trained manpower but by contributing to good morale by having men do the work they know.

The replacement problem is particularly pressing since Category IV commitments and the rotation program cause a high rate of attrition on key personnel.

In solving the problems, battlefield commissions are being made as often as suitable appointees are found. The 9th Infantry IRTC gives a refresher course which helps orient men who are not familiar with Inf methods.

SOURCE: Command Report - Headquarters IX Corps

DATE: January 1952

AERIAL TRAMWAYS.

(RESTRICTED) There are now in the Corps sector some 15 or 20 of these valuable time-savers designed to meet the supply and evacuation needs of infantry front-line units in mountainous terrain. The model of all later ones has been the 3d Engineer's Aerial Tramway 698. Construction on this was started as soon as the ridge of Hill 698, in the former 24th Division sector, was taken. It is a single-stage, double-track system tramway, powered by a 3/4-ton truck motor, with a wheel rim attached to the drive shaft as the driving drum for the haul cable. The straight-line distance of the tramway is approximately 1500 feet, the static load cables are 1820 feet long, the difference in elevation between the stations is 910 feet. In one period of 31 days Tramway 698 had hauled 187 tons of ammunition, rations, and other supplies to the top of the hill, and evacuated 24 casualties. During one 24-hour period it hauled 18 tons and evacuated four casualties. Through its example the erection and maintenance of aerial tramways has become a primary mission of the engineer battalions of divisions attached to the Corps.

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* Over 5
COLD WEATHER OPERATION OF M4 AND M5 TRACTORS.

(CONFIDENTIAL) It is recommended that an extended track wedge for tractors, high speed, M4 and M5, be designed and produced in order to insure traction during operation on frozen ground and ice. It is further recommended that such extended track wedges be included in "On Vehicle Material" in the quantity of 48 per vehicle.

Combat experience had indicated that M4 and M5 high-speed tractors do not have sufficient traction on frozen ground and ice to perform their mission as prime movers for towed artillery weapons. A field expedient of welding steel cleats two inches long by one inch thick to standard track wedges has given good results in the field. This expedient, however, makes large demands on both materials and time, and its success depends almost entirely upon the skill of the welder. Unless the welds are perfect, the cleats break off with usage. With the welded cleats in good condition, however, it has been found that 24 cleats per track give good traction even under icy conditions. It is believed that this number would be adequate for the extended wedges recommended.

SOURCE: Command Report - 64th Tank Bn (Medium)
DATE: January 1952

TANK TRACTION ON FROZEN GROUND.

(CONFIDENTIAL) A more suitable type track should be developed for winter operations on ground frozen solidly to a depth of more than two or three inches. Experience in Korea has shown that the present track, either steel or rubber, lacks traction and climbing ability on steep grades on frozen ground, even though the tank has sufficient power to make the pull. A type of steel cleat or grouser is needed that will break the surface sufficiently to give the tank the necessary additional traction and also focus the weight of the tank on fewer points. Experiments have been conducted by this unit wherein every fourth track block is a deep two-inch chevron block followed by three normal one-inch chevron blocks (or
normal rubber blocks). Although tests have not as yet been complicated by track failure, it is foreseen that the combination tracks being tested may over a period of time lead to track failure. The combination of the one two-inch chevron block followed by the three one-inch chevron blocks showed considerably improved climbing ability; but sufficient traction was still not obtained to utilize the maximum power output of the M46 or A1 tank.

As opposed to the above combination, the interspersion of normal rubber blocks with the two-inch grouser block proved unworthy of further test. Also, it was noted that neither the solid two-inch grouser track, the solid one-inch grouser track, nor the solid rubber track were able to climb the solidly frozen slopes as well as the combination steel track. Consequently, it is recommended that detailed study and tests be conducted in the Continental United States reference development of a track that will enhance the climbing ability of the future medium tank, without causing track failures, for winter operations under terrain conditions similar to those encountered in Korea.

MAINTENANCE SHELTERS.

(RESTRICTED) Action should be taken toward procurement of heated canvas shelters for tank maintenance operations during winter operations. Shelters should be of adequate size and height to enable removal of the power pack from the tank, using the wrecker boom, and to allow room for necessary repairs. Although field expedients have been used, the resulting shelters are not movable and are to some extent a safety hazard in high winds. It is believed that maintenance standards and deadline times during intense cold can be improved by providing proper working shelter, thereby eliminating clumsiness and the all-too-frequent, but necessary, trips to outside warming fires.
FIELD PROMOTION OF WARRANT OFFICERS.

(RESTRICTED) Field promotion of warrant officers should be made as simple and effective as that for commissioning of second lieutenants.

RANK AND JOB DISCREPANCIES.

(RESTRICTED) Though first lieutenants are filling captain vacancies in combat, promotions have not been forthcoming because of an overage of captains, Infantry, in this theater. Promotions to captain of combat company commanders is necessary to maintain proper morale and incentive for junior officers and is the proper reward for deserving commanders. Authority to promote combat company commanders to captains regardless of theater strength, branch and grade, should be forthcoming.

USE OF SOUND-LISTENING DEVICE:

(CONFIDENTIAL) The sound-listening device was first used by us this month. It appears profitable, easy to install and maintain. Use is recommended for outpost positions and close-in ambushes. Several times we detected enemy movement at ranges up to 200 yards. A Chinese interpreter greatly increased the value of the instrument by telling us just what was being said by the enemy detected.
DISCUSSION ON DOCTRINE AND TECHNIQUE.

(CONFIDENTIAL) It is not my purpose, within the limitations imposed by the current tactical situation and the scope of this report, to attempt a detailed discussion involving our basic doctrine and tactics. Instead I propose to make some general comments based on the experiences of this division while engaged in Operation COMMANDO during the period 3-28 October 1951. Before discussion the soundness of doctrine, it is my opinion that we should attempt to secure satisfactory results from its application. Until we do this we are hardly in a position to offer constructive criticism of any value. For this reason and others too numerous to mention, I plan to discuss only the fundamentals and stress their importance. Operations in October have, as always, revealed our weaknesses; I hope to candidly cover most of these. However, the subjects of this discussion, if complete, would be innumerable. Consequently, I have selected only the more important and broader topics for review in this report.

1. Attacks.

We work feverishly night and day for a protracted period preparing, in minute detail, plans of attack and plans for logistical support of an operation. At the conclusion of the planning phase, it is hoped that nothing has been overlooked. Considering ourselves ready on "D" Day and "H" Hour, we jump off; shortly thereafter we find our "steam" gone and still a long way from the objective. The plans are perfect, our support available, our supplies more than adequate. Wherein does the fault lie? Often, far too often, in my opinion, we fail to take advantage of our superiority of firepower, especially our organic weapons, depending instead on artillery and air to carry the load. ORGANIC WEAPONS, EVERY ONE OF THEM, MUST BE EMPLOYED TO THE MAXIMUM.

Too often we make the mistake of not using all available troops. If a company is sent out to take an objective, the entire company should be used. Every weapon should be
placed in operation at one time or another during the attack. Every trick, scheme, device of the human mind should be resorted to and incorporated into the plan. I regret that we don't always do this. A company is sent, one squad ends up taking the objective. This is wrong. DON'T SEND A BOY TO DO A MAN'S JOB! By so doing we have failed to apply the most basic of all principles: Maximum employment of the force, fire and maneuver.

Commanders quite frequently find it necessary to commit all of their unit, consequently are unable to push another group forward either through the newly won position to continue the attack or reinforce the unit on the objective. This is a common violation of basic doctrine which is necessitated by local conditions; consequently, we are often unable to maintain ready reserves in close proximity to attacking forces. Whenever possible, this practice must be avoided and a reserve unit made available.

We still fail to exploit and take advantage of weaknesses in the enemy's defenses. Plans must be flexible to the extent that we can exploit at all times and with the least possible delay whenever the situation permits.

Greater consideration must be given to the night attack. Our soldiers must be trained to conduct attacks during darkness. Officers and NCO's must learn to control units at night. This phase is probably our weakest, yet could be our strongest. Many an opportunity to exploit has been lost because of our failure to follow-up initial successes with aggressive night attacks. This we must learn thoroughly and rapidly. Regimental and battalion commanders should always be ready to exploit by night attacks, using a reserve company or by stopping one of the attacking companies early in the day, if necessary, to permit reorganization and preparation.

After successfully assaulting and seizing an objective, we too often stop there and relax. WE MUST LEARN TO CONSOLIDATE IMMEDIATELY AND PREPARE TO DEFEND OR CONTINUE THE ATTACK. This is an old criticism of American troops, and despite repeated emphasis on the subject in our service schools and training, we nevertheless
fail to properly organize a position. The results are inevitable: our forces are immediately counterattacked and valuable ground is lost. In my opinion, few subjects need greater stress in our training.

If it is to be held, immediate preparation and organization of strong defensive positions is absolutely essential upon seizing an objective. Consolidation and organization of a position can never be over-emphasized and because of our failures to follow through, we are repeatedly shoved off hills by an enemy who is aware of this weakness, who prepares for this moment with rapid counterattacks. If the supporting weapons and artillery fires are properly used -- artillery concentration laid on avenues of approach and assembly areas, organic weapons used to keep the enemy at a distance -- then the assaulting units can usually hold until reinforcements arrive.

Another important item to be emphasized in training is assault fire. If a unit has as an objective a hill or piece of terrain, then the best way to take it is to get on top of it -- and fast! To this end we employ our maximum supporting fires; however, in the final assault (the last rough forty or fifty yards when we mask our supporting fires) it is the attacking unit's own assault fire which must keep the enemy down until we can close with him. Unless our TROOPS MOVE FAST, AND FIRE WHEN THEY MOVE, no objective will be taken without great cost in lives.

Our soldiers, one and all, have a tendency to stop moving when they fire a weapon. This failing must be overcome. Infantry soldiers must be taught the advantage of assaulting a position by firing while rapidly moving. Training in loading and firing, while moving, must be emphasized and practiced.


The execution of Operation COMMANDO found us faced with the problem of reducing the heaviest fortified positions yet encountered in the Korean campaign. This should have presented no great problem, but it did. We reacted as if it were a completely new and untouched-on phase of offensive warfare. By our failure to use the vast amount of experience
I gained during the last war -- especially in the quite similar Pacific campaigns, and even during the over one year of this war -- we lost much valuable time and many lives.

Doctrines and suggested tactics on the ATTACK OF A FORTIFIED POSITION should no longer be treated as a specialty field. It should receive consideration in each and every offensive tactical training problem. Every answer, to even a hypothetical problem, should envision the reduction of mutually supporting bunkers. No longer should we think of certain weapons such as the flame thrower, demolitions of various types, etc, as being the exclusive property of specially trained assault squads whose only mission is to reduce one bunker which delays the advance of the regular rifle elements. It is important that each objective be considered another Siegfried Line and the basically sound doctrine applied in each case. This requires time and training and rehearsals prior to an attack but it is time that we must take. Once we have stopped the attack long enough to permit the enemy to build bunker type emplacements, such as those we have recently encountered, then the technique must be rehearsed over and over to insure success in our offense. TRAINING IN THE REDUCTION OF FORTIFIED POSITIONS SHOULD BE CONCURRENT IN ALL TACTICAL PROBLEMS.

3. Withdrawal.

It has been proved by costly experience that night withdrawals are disastrous, yet our commanders still attempt them. Certainly an intelligent commander always considers the possibility of a withdrawal by planning the routes, designating a covering force, etc. Due consideration should be given to the sometimes illusory emergency which requires such a move and, if well thought out, the position is usually not as untenable as first thought to be. By staying on position we can usually avert a catastrophe and at the same time hold hard won terrain. Naturally, this discussion is based on the premise that the force is on position with adequate strength to defend or delay until daylight.
Our troops must be instilled with the spirit, confidence, and determination to hold. If forced to withdraw, to do so only on order and under maximum control in planned phases. The final decision will normally rest with the local commander and should only be made after carefully estimating the situation.

4. Artillery.

During these operations we had excellent artillery support but I must admit that our commanders do not know how to use it to obtain maximum results. In my opinion we rely on artillery to bridge the gap between small arms fire without properly using the organic infantry weapons to full advantage. This gap is too wide for such wasteful use of artillery even under ideal conditions where the infantry follows well placed accurate rolling fire. Minimum safety clearance in the Korean hills prevents close-in support that is possible on flatter or rolling terrain. Since the movement of a unit up a steep slope is slow, continuous fire must be laid on the objective after the artillery has moved from the forward to the reverse slope or higher up the slope. Once our infantry is within assaulting range, artillery should then be shifted to avenues of approach and reverse slopes to prevent enemy reinforcements and counterattack. Instead, our men will order the fire lifted, then start the assault up a long steep slope. When we do this, the enemy has sufficient time to recover and emerge from the well prepared positions on reverse slopes ready to engage our troops. Thus unfortunately we are caught at the worst moment when we are tired from the long climb and assault and we have lost the shock effect of artillery.

Our people must be forcibly shown the value of well employed artillery fire. I feel that this can best be accomplished by training infantry behind rolling fire at the minimum safety clearance with infantry weapons firing at the objective simultaneously. In our practice problems there is always a lifting of fire before the infantry starts either moving or firing. This gives an erroneous impression which unfortunately is carried over into combat.

At times the artillery forward observer is in no position to adjust fire, yet artillery is needed. What can be done
in such a case? For one solution, the battalion liaison officer from an OP should be able to assist. Any number of methods can be worked out to keep continuous fire on an objective.

Artillery should seldom be fired by map coordinate unless no other means exist. This is an unsatisfactory method and is not accurate; it cannot be adjusted to give effective close support to the infantry in this type terrain.

The success of Operation COMMANDO was greatly affected by use of direct fire 155-mm, 8-inch guns and tank weapons. We should never hesitate to move these weapons up into the hills within range for DIRECT FIRE against bunkers.

All high velocity direct fire weapons are effective provided they can be positioned. Future operations against defensive positions should include, from the very start, these weapons which should move as close to the infantry as is practicable.

Massing of artillery fires is sometimes overlooked. It may be the best plan to concentrate 2/3 or 3/4 of all available artillery support on a battalion objective until it is secure. We can do this, without materially affecting the support of other infantry units that are reorganizing and making preparations for the continuation of the attack.

The important point which I wish to emphasize here is: TEACH THE INFANTRY THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPERLY USED ARTILLERY FIRE. It is never to be substituted for more accurate mortar fire, nor can it ever be used in place of organic infantry weapons. It is the combination of all these weapons, organic and supporting, which makes for a successful operation.

5. Training.

The subject of training being so closely related to the deficiencies herein before discussed and since most of our ills can be cured by realistic training in the fundamentals, I would like to mention some phases of individual training.
that are apparently not receiving sufficient emphasis in our replacement training centers.

Our men must have more UNIT TRAINING before reaching a combat division. It is apparent that even though they have been members of squads in training centers, they have not -- or possibly only once or twice -- engaged in a tactical problem under the leadership of an NCO who leads and directs them under simulated battlefield conditions where they actually apply the principles of fire and movement as a fighting team.

This much-neglected phase of basic training is left as the responsibility of a division engaged in combat while other less important subjects are covered over and over in training centers. No subject can possibly be as important to the combat soldier.

Troops need this constant training in basic tactics under the actual leadership of an officer or NCO who engages in the problem as their leader and not merely as a supervisor who critiques the action of a squad led by an acting squad leader.

In this division problems of platoon and company size are run with live ammunition at every available opportunity, but we never have the time required to turn out confident, well-trained soldiers.

Another, and perhaps more critical problem is the urgent need to afford our officers, of all grades, more time and practice in the actual command of troops. It is too often the case, when evaluating the background of the line officer replacement, to find that he has had little or no command duty for many years. If fortunate, he has had some recent branch service school training but in my view too much emphasis is currently placed on this type of preparation for command. Schools are excellent aids but NO SUBSTITUTE for actual duty with troops. When lives are involved the leader must KNOW from actual practical field experience -- book knowledge too often isn't remembered until too late!


To properly consider doctrines of defense in view of experience and conditions which have and do influence our
actions in Korea I feel, before going into a generalized description, we should cover these problems not for the purpose of excusing our actions and justifying our adoption of unorthodox methods, but so that the reader will be cognizant of them.

Bear in mind that normal organization of a division sector is extremely difficult in our present tactical situation. Some of the factors leading to this are:

a. The width of this division sector at present is over 26,000 yards; at times a company front has exceeded 2,000 yards.

b. No regimental tank companies are now nor have been assigned to this division.

c. Depth to the defensive position, because of wide frontages and limited troop strength, is obtained by supplementary blocking positions.

In the final analysis there simply have not been enough troops available to cover the ground. If you consider these factors, you possibly will understand why our commanders adopted what they thought were justified improvisations to meet the requirements, realizing that our doctrines are flexible and that the principles still apply under conditions here in Korea.

I think it best to briefly review the evolution of the defense since the start of the Korean war, as it principally concerns the company -- the inference being that if all companies properly organize so the division defense is correct.

Early in the war, with our troops in small numbers, the establishment of coordinated, mutually supporting positions was impossible. It was impossible simply because the troops were not available to cover all of the terrain. Small unit fronts and sectors of responsibility prevented either a tie-in physically or by fire. Units were then forced to adopt the perimeter system as the only means of defending the key terrain features in their assigned sectors. This system worked: the accomplishments are clear in the record.
Yet we developed nothing new and, even then, never were all important features in any given sector occupied.

As the number of our units increased and conditions generally improved in our favor we still, to an extent, continued to prepare our defensive positions as the troops on the Naktong did. True, the sector decreased and if we had continued to defend key terrain features as they of the "Perimeter" did, no reason for complaint would be available. But instead of occupying all of the key features in a sector, our unit commanders started to also decrease the area of occupation by forming close knit company perimeters on possibly one or two features. Even when defending on line, instead of sending platoons out or smaller units -- as they did previously -- to occupy and organize a piece of ground, the tendency by the company commander was to pull the elements of the company closer together until all surrounded him on the periphery of a circular position. Close-by features worthy of defending were ignored. Great gaps -- impossible to cover by fire -- continued to exist between companies, permitting the enemy to move at will around our positions and attack from any point.

Since the bad practices have become engrained and so long accepted as theory of defense, we must go back to the fundamentals of our basically sound defensive doctrines. The defense of key terrain in any unit sector must be stressed whether it is a squad, platoon, company or larger unit. No longer can the close companionship of troops -- the desire to stay close together in a tight perimeter -- influence our organization of sectors of responsibility. We must impress upon them that it is not necessary to organize a company with a physical tie-in between platoons or even squads, in some cases; that gaps will exist to permit us to prepare artillery and mortar concentrations, to cover the area by AW fire from more than one position, which eliminates the need for occupation and creates impact areas close-in. Our officers must be taught that no army can physically cover every inch of ground in its area of responsibility.

We must impress terrain analysis, even before laying out a hasty defensive position. A commander must walk the terrain. Planning a company defense position from a map is easy and saves physical energy, but is impracticable.
Our officers must study the terrain while walking over it, with the capabilities of their unit in mind, before making a decision. By knowing the strength of his unit, the weapons in possession of his men, the condition of his troops -- physical, mental, state of training -- the commander is able to plan his defense as he walks. You can't position automatic weapons from a map; you can't locate the dead space in front of positions. The selection of alternate and primary positions for automatic weapons must be made on the ground and the type of emplacement and its exact location can only be determined by looking carefully at the terrain.

Preparation of connecting trenches, at least between primary and alternate AW positions, must become routine even in hasty defenses. If time permits more elaborate positions must be prepared with communications trenches and overhead cover.

Upon occupying the position, the company and platoon supply routes must be selected; a recon made, if necessary, to determine the feasibility of using a certain route. Not always will the route over which the unit moved in the attack be the best for moving supplies -- a shorter route may exist, one over less arduous climbing terrain, a more accessible route to the position.

Avenues of enemy approach must be studied; our defenses planned to conform with the terrain and the demands of good tactical principles. These avenues can sometimes be interdicted by supporting fires and sealed as an entrance to our position.

Communication in every form must be planned: flares, wire, radio, runner, whistles. Prearranged signals should be SOP in every company and taught to replacements the minute they join a company. Signals between companies and battalion headquarters must be planned. We must never be without it.

Routes of withdrawal convenient for all elements to a company assembly area and from this point to the new position are a part of every defensive plan.
Fire plans must be prepared as soon after occupation as possible, and during daylight. Every man in the company should know the prepared concentrations and be able to call for them.

Little need be said about the perimeter type of defensive position. Generally our troops have been successful in setting up this defense and have been able to withstand heavy enemy assaults. The same principles in planning and preparing a line defense are usually applicable -- key terrain must be occupied. Sometimes it is best to close tight and occupy only the dominating terrain features. This, of course, depends on the size of the unit. But, usually in the case of a company, the defense should be close and tight as terrain never allows us the freedom of organization that we like. Our plans must conform with the terrain.

7. Logistics.

When attacking, a unit faces many numerous and difficult supply problems, but all have been studied and in most cases a remedy developed. Still we are unable to keep the supplies moving by the conveyor belt system to the forward units until trafficable roads can be built. At present during the attack, supply is usually accomplished by hand carrying parties made up of indigenous labor who carry from a rear supply base. This is not completely satisfactory, however. Even though at times we are able to truck supplies to the base of a position, hand carrying is still the only means of getting it to the top. By the use of M39's, if available for this purpose, many supply problems could very likely be lessened by decreasing the hand carrying distance. In many instances M39's can traverse steep slopes and even though not able to reach the top of a hill, can reach a position close to the unit. Often times tanks too are able to reach the tops of some hills to support the infantry. This being possible, supplies for the infantry should be loaded on for the ascent.

Much can be done to improve our present flame thrower if its use is to be practicable in mountain fighting. Resupply is such a problem that it can never be used as the efficient weapon that it is and to meet our needs. The development of a simpler
refueling system whereby fuel tanks can be refilled close to using units' positions should receive top priority. A lighter weight, longer burning period and greater range flame thrower is needed for mountain operations.

The positioning of tanks on hill tops with the infantry increases our logistic problems but it is an overwhelming argument in favor of using M39 personnel carriers for resupply. Once a tank is positioned on a hill, suitably dug in and with adequate targets, it should be left there as constant movement for resupply unnecessarily increases maintenance problems.

The possibility of using mules should not be overlooked; in fact a study and experiment may prove its possibility especially for the heavier defensive materials, such as: wire (concertina), pickets, mines, pioneer tools, etc. These are the items that are needed almost as desperately as ammunition by an assaulting unit preparing for a counter attack. They will usually be available if the logistic plans are so laid as to include the movement of a supply train a short distance behind the attacking echelon.

8. Communications.

Operation COMMANDO once again brought to light many glaring deficiencies in our employment of signal communication. The tendency on the part of unit commanders and subordinate leaders to rely almost completely on radio and VHF as media of communications, resulted in over-burdening these channels of communication. Also, when these electrical devices, through mechanical failure became inoperable, communication with and control of units was lost. In addition, many targets of opportunity, particularly those observed just after assault elements have taken their objective, were not immediately taken under artillery and mortar fire, thus allowing the enemy to assemble forces rapidly and counterattack.

It is imperative that the commander utilize every means of communication at his disposal. Land lines must be laid as rapidly as possible to forward positions, and wire must closely follow the assault echelon. Adequate usage was not made of pyrotechnics. This is an excellent means of communication that can be employed very effectively at night.
In regard to security, it must never be forgotten that the enemy possesses many of our type radios and has at time jammed our channels. It is also entirely possible that some of our moves were blunted because the enemy possessed prior knowledge of the particular move. To take full advantage of our excellent signal equipment, thorough training of operators, expert maintenance, and uninterrupted resupply of batteries and spare parts, are essential throughout all echelons right to the smallest units.


Air strikes should seldom be used against an objective when forward observer adjusted artillery and mortar fire is being placed and the infantry is positioned ready to move under cover of this fire. By placing an air strike on such a position, much time is lost in lifting artillery and again getting fire on the objective after the strike. At the same time the momentum of the attack is lost and the accurate pinpoint 4.2, 81-mm fire is sacrificed for the less accurate area coverage. In addition adjacent units, attacking, lose their supporting fire while aircraft is in the area.

This same aircraft can be used much more effectively by striking just beyond the objective, without lifting the supporting fire, to interdict assembly and build-up areas to prevent enemy reinforcement. 100- to 250-pound bombs equipped with VT fuzes should be used.

Prior preparation of defensive positions should include a softening up by air power using 500- and 1000-pound bombs. However, against heavily fortified positions and bunkers, this should be done before the attacking troops start the attack. For as previously stated, artillery fire should seldom be lifted once the infantry has started moving. To soften up the more heavily defended hills with larger personnel bunkers and weapons the heavy (1000-pound) bombs must be used.

Of course, napalm and rockets are to an extent effective but their effectiveness is greater against troops in open trenches. Area napalm bombing is difficult and costly in aircraft against the Korean hill positions. It is probable that the same number of aircraft could be more effectively employed against other targets in support of the ground operation.
Conclusion.

An attempt in the foregoing has been made to cover the problems encountered and some of the methods we have learned from experience here. There are, however, innumerable important subjects, as mentioned in the introduction, a discussion of which should be included but have not been for reasons of time and space.

There are many things that we can do to improve the efficiency of our operations. For certain, we can improve the leadership qualities of our company grade officers and I know of no better way than by proper training. Our communication system needs constant improvement; also I can't overemphasize the importance of accurate, timely casualty reporting and the passing on of information to the next higher headquarters.

Most of the problems encountered are old ones; everyone is aware of the simpler, supposedly common errors that soldiers and officers have always made. We must emphasize the fundamentals in a program which is filled with small unit tactics. Other less important subjects can be covered concurrently. Our soldiers must be made to realize that the mistakes made by failing to apply fundamental doctrines cost us lives and loss of valuable time. I am convinced that our doctrines are sound and battle proven -- it is in our application of these doctrines or rather in our failure to apply them to the situation that we have failed.