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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

ATTNG-26 350.05/54(DOCI)(C)(29 Jul 52) 29 July 1952

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

TO: See distribution

AUG 11 1952

1. The extract "Discussion on Doctrine and Technique," Source No 383, inclosure to letter, ATTNG-64 350.05/50(DOCI)(C)(30 Jun 52), OCAFF, 30 June 1952, subject as above, published under the classification of CONFIDENTIAL is regraded RESTRICTED.

2. In accordance with SR 525-8505, Processing of Combat Information, the inclosed EXTRACTS are forwarded to Department of the Army, Army Field Forces, and the service schools for evaluation and necessary action. It may be appropriate, in certain cases, for these agencies to take action upon a single extracted item; in others, it may be desirable to develop a cross-section of accumulated extracts on a particular subject before initiating action; and often, the extracted item serves to reaffirm our doctrines and techniques.

3. Copies are furnished to other military agencies to keep them informed concerning theater problems from the front line through the logistical command.

4. These EXTRACTS are derived from reports which are classified SECRET. For the greater convenience of the user, this Office downgrades each extracted item to the lowest classification compatible with security. No effort is made to paraphrase or delete any portion of the extracted remarks, so that none of the original intent is lost.
5. Combat information EXTRACTS herein which are applicable to training at the company-battery level also appear in Army Field Forces TRAINING BULLETINS.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

T. J. Smith

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SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

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Attn: Ground Forces Officer
OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

EXTRACTS OF COMBAT INFORMATION

SOURCE: Command Report - 25th Inf Div
DATE: March 1952

COUNTERMORTAR RADAR.

(CONFIDENTIAL) Two battalions of division artillery had countermortar radar sets AN/TPQ 3 in position during the month. Although these sets scanned shelling in the sectors every day, the 8th Field Artillery Battalion set produced plots on only 18 days, and the set in the 64th Field Artillery Battalion produced plots on only three days. Of 93 plots, only 22 corresponded to reported shellings. The sets were nonoperational during half the period because of maintenance difficulties. Indications are that the AN/TPQ 3, designed for antiaircraft warning sets in WW II, is not rugged or dependable enough for service in Korea.

It is recommended that the AN/TPQ 10 radar set be issued as soon as possible to artillery radar sections in Korea, and that every effort be made to develop a radar set that will meet requirements of countermortar and counterbattery artillery operation.

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BUNKER DESTRUCTION.

(RESTRICTED) Tanks of the 89th Tank Battalion, and AAA 90-mm guns mounted on 155-mm carriages, were emplaced along the division front to assist in destruction of enemy bunkers. The destruction of some 580 bunkers was a potent argument for continued employment of such direct fire weapons. Although the tanks drew fire, the enemy AT weapons were not heavy enough to halt the tanks' firing. The 90-mm guns fired from well-contructed fortifications and crews suffered no casualties during the period.

*************
ENEMY TACTICS.

(RESTRICTED) Each company across the division front stationed a night listening post in front of its position.

On the night of 1-2 March, in the west sector, the enemy placed a heavy barrage on positions several hundred yards west of a listening post manned by Company "I," 14th Infantry Regiment. While attention was diverted to the area of the shelling, an enemy force captured the three men on the listening post. All units were immediately alerted to this enemy tactic.

SOURCE: X US Corps Periodic Intelligence Report No 585
DATE: March 1952

REPORT ON THE ABOVE INCIDENT.

(RESTRICTED) Battalion received orders from regiment to plan a raid against a UN outpost on the night of 1 March to capture prisoners and equipment. Each member of the thirty-two man raiding party was armed with a SMG and two hand grenades; engineer personnel carried wire cutters. The patrol was divided into four teams of eight men each. Two of the teams were to furnish covering fire; and the other two teams were designated as assault groups. Approximately 800 rounds of mortar and artillery ammunition were allocated for the operation. Prior reconnaissance had been made of the objective. Control was to be exercised by flare signals from the regimental OP.

The patrol departed at 2100 hours, and arrived in front of the objective an hour later. At 2220 hours, following two white flare signals from the regimental OP, the supporting fire commenced. At 2225, the supporting fire was shifted to the south and continued until 2255, which was longer than originally scheduled. The supporting fire was finally lifted.
after receiving a flare signal from the regimental OP, and
the thirty-two men split into the previously designated groups. One
assault team advanced on the west flank, the other on the
cast. The covering teams supported the attacks. PW was
in charge of the west flank attackers when word was passed
that three UN soldiers, pinned down and cut off by the artillery
and mortar fire supporting the raid, had been discovered hiding
in a foxhole and captured. Since the mission had been ac-
accomplished, the platoon leader ordered the withdrawal of all
teams. PW stated that only light resistance was encountered
during the raid.

SOURCE: Command Report - 45th Inf Div Arty
DATE: March 1952 Source No 411

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ILLUMINATING SHELLS IN EXCESS OF BASIC LOAD.

(REstricted) Since the enemy primarily patrols at
night, and our night patrolling is taking on greater significance,
there is a decided need for additional artillery illuminating am-
munition. The basic load of 155-mm illuminating shell is 27
rounds. Two basic loads (54 rounds) are authorized to be on
hand. As many as 30 rounds have been fired in a single night's
operations, and it is believed that the authorized on-hand level
is too low. It is recommended that the allocation of illumina-
ting shell be increased 50% and the on-hand allowance be in-
creased to 150 rounds (approximately six basic loads).

SOURCE: Command Report - 82d AAA AW Bn (SP)
DATE: March 1952 Source No 412

AAA AW WEAPONS ON MLR.

(REstricted) The policy of placing firing vehicles on
the MLR under close enemy observation for long periods of
time is a needless hazard to the vehicle and its crew. It is
recommended that these vehicles be placed in defiladed positions
and firing positions be prepared for them. These firing positions would then be occupied when needed on order of the infantry commander. During the period, enemy infiltrators threw two hand grenades, inflicted two KIA in B Battery on a moonless night.

SOURCE: Command Report - 40th Inf Div
DATE: April 1952

TANK COMMUNICATION EXPEDIENT.

(RESTRICTED) A unique field expedient being utilized by tank crewmen is considered worthy of mention. A crew has rigged driver and bow gunner microphone switch buttons on the wobble stick steering mechanism of the M-46 tank in order to permit the driver or bow gunner to use the radio when driving buttoned up without removing his hand from the wobble stick while the other hand is being utilized to adjust his periscope.

SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Inf Div
DATE: February 1952

IMPROVISED CAL .50 SNIPER RIFLE.

(RESTRICTED) The weapon consists of a caliber .50 machine gun barrel, a Russian antitank rifle breech, a telescopic sight and a bipod rest.

DIVISION QM FILLING STATION.

(RESTRICTED) The Division Quartermaster opened a filling station type gasoline dispensing point, conveniently located on the MSR. Drivers can now be assured of a full tank before proceeding. This will reduce the amount of gasoline carried on hand in unit dumps, eliminate unnecessary
forward displacement, eliminate a portion of the rehandling of bulk gasoline in units and provide a convenient check point for Ordnance and other operation inspections.

** M-19 TRACK AND TURRET MAINTENANCE. **

(RESTRICTED) The need for technically trained personnel for M-19 track and turret maintenance still remains critical. It is recommended that Antiaircraft Instructor Teams be detailed to cover existing maintenance limitations as well as to instruct in new techniques of antiaircraft gunnery in the ground and antiaircraft role.

** SOURCE:** Command Report - 37th FA Bn
** DATE:** February 1952 Source No 415

** ENEMY TACTICS. **

(RESTRICTED) Radio activity on the part of the enemy was directed at us in an attempt to trick us into answering with friendly call signs. Radio silence was maintained by friendly forces and no answers were made. One instance occurred where the Chinese used our call sign on our Battalion "K" channel and the battalion relay station. These broadcasts usually requested communications checks. The voices spoke good English, but as one monitor put it, "they weren't speaking American since they were too polite."

** SOURCE:** Command Report - 2d Div Arty
** DATE:** March 1952 Source No 416

** COUNTERMORTAR ACTIVITIES. **

(RESTRICTED) During the period 1 through 31 March the enemy used his mortars to harass front line positions and
friendly patrols. Enemy mortar locations were found from sources as follows: Radar 29, Counterfire 37, Air OP 34, and Ground OP 29. Information of these locations was disseminated to units by means of hostile mortar lists published periodically by this section. Shelling and mortar reports were used throughout the period. Several classes in crater analysis and shell reporting were conducted for units of the division artillery and for infantry and tank units. Information gained from shelling reports was given to Air OP's as quickly as possible to aid in search for enemy artillery or mortar positions. Direction from sound or groove azimuths and the suspect locations were furnished for each search mission given to air observers.

* * * * * * * * *

SCARCITY OF JUNIOR ARTILLERY OFFICERS.

(RESTRICTED) Due to a scarcity of junior artillery officers, nine armor officers were assigned to this headquarters. These officers were given one week's training as forward observers and sent to the battalions where they are performing very satisfactorily.

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DESTRUCTION OF BUNKERS.

(CONFIDENTIAL) The "Bunker Busting Program" inaugurated in February was continued with excellent results. It was noticed that in many instances, a bunker which had been destroyed during the day would be rebuilt the following night. As a result of this information, a careful check would be kept on the location of these targets and sometime during the night a TOT fire would be placed on a bunker which had been destroyed previously. It is felt that these fires caused many casualties among enemy personnel engaged in rebuilding destroyed bunkers under the cover of darkness. An 8" howitzer and a 155-mm gun (SP) were used in the direct fire phase of this program. The period ended with 210 bunkers destroyed, 52 damaged and an unestimated number of enemy personnel killed or wounded as a result of "Bunker Busting" activities.
INCREASED PENETRATION OF 4.2 MORTAR SHELL.

(CONFIDENTIAL) Since the end of the fall offensive of 1X Corps it has become more and more apparent to this Battalion that our present shell, fused for super-quick only, cannot inflict any noticeable damage against the enemy's system of fortifications. The answer seemed to be in adapting an artillery fuse to our present HE shell which could be set for time or delay. After experimentation the following results were noted:

1. The artillery fuse PS M51 A4 will arm when adapted to the 4.2" mortar shell.

2. The penetration of the shell with the fuse set for 15 seconds delay was 24 inches. The penetration was made in frozen, rocky soil.

3. During this experiment it was impossible to get the booster in the fuse to detonate the booster in the shell. Work is continuing on this project.

It is felt by this Battalion that the penetration of this shell is sufficient to warrant further consideration of this experiment by the Ordnance Corps.

REPLACEMENT SYSTEM.

(RESTRICTED) In the case of noncommissioned officers, replacements received have been young soldiers recently out of basic training who do not have the experience and skills to replace rotated noncoms. While the virtues of promoting Over
within the unit and on-the-job training are well known, these methods do not solve the problem in the case of mass replacement of experienced NCO's with inexperienced and relatively green soldiers.

SOURCE: Command Report - 1343d Engr Combat Bn
DATE: February 1952 Source No 419

TRAINING OF REPLACEMENTS.

(RESTRICTED) The percentage of noncommissioned officers among the new replacements is very low. Due to this low percentage, the number of NCO's in the battalion has steadily declined. An intensive on-the-job and after-hours training program has been instituted. It takes from two to three months to train a good Corporal, an additional three months to qualify him for Sergeant and then another three months for Sergeant First Class. By this time, he is ready for rotation, and the cycle is repeated. I believe manpower could be saved if potential NCO's received NCO training prior to their arrival in Korea.

SOURCE: Command Report - 19th Engr C Group
DATE: February 1952 Source No 420

FAILURE OF M-4 TRACTOR.

(RESTRICTED) Operation RING NECK occurred during the period which resulted in extremely heavy traffic on most of our roads. The only difficulty that occurred arose from the inability of the M-4 tractor, prime-mover for medium artillery, to negotiate steep grades where the road surface was slightly slippery. This difficulty was overcome by using 4-ton and large trucks, with chains, to help pull the tractors up steep grades. The utter helplessness of the M-4 tractor, contrasted to trucks with chains, should be noted.
ENGINEER MAINTENANCE SUPPORT.

(RESTRICTED) One maintenance platoon of an engineer field maintenance company was moved forward to the vicinity of group headquarters during the month, and placed in direct support of the group. This proved to be a sound plan and an improvement in the engineer equipment maintenance system is beginning to show. Small teams from this platoon, with shop trucks, supported engineer combat battalions on projects having a concentration of equipment. Major repair jobs were accomplished on the site. The result was the elimination of time lost in evacuation to rear shops and in reducing the load on unit mechanics and facilities.

* * * * * * * * * *

ENGINEER TRAINING.

(RESTRICTED) It is most urgently recommended that engineer, especially equipment operations, specialist training be more complete. It is not sufficient to teach mechanical operation. Technique of using dozers, graders, and shovels must be taught. Basic principles of roadbuilding such as grading, ditching, and shaping should be included in the operators course so that he will at least be familiar with the capabilities of his equipment and have a working knowledge of how to use it intelligently. Training school courses that are limited in their scope and fail to teach when and how to use equipment, leaving that up to on-the-job training in a using unit which is fully committed, are an impractical solution.

USE OF TANKS ON THE MLR.

(RESTRICTED) In its sector, the 14th Infantry was faced by a very active enemy. Groups of enemy personnel
could be observed at any time of day, apparently having no fear of being fired upon. The enemy also manned a great many small emplacements near our position, from which they employed constant sniping and harassing fire with small arms. By employing direct 76-mm tank fire from positions on hills over 600 and 850 meters high, the enemy was soon forced to abandon many of his smaller emplacements for larger, more secure, shelters. In addition, tank firing on enemy personnel greatly hampered his movement during daylight hours. Although a great deal of enemy artillery and mortar fire is directed against these tanks, and the supply problem is a difficult one, it is felt that these weapons are an invaluable aid in our sector in their present role in static positions along the MLR.

**SOURCE:** Command Report - 15th FA Bn  
**DATE:** February 1952  
**SOURCE No:** 423

**ARTILLERY PROBLEMS.**

(RESTRICTED) On the basis of recent combat experiences in Korea, it is recommended:

1. That additional observation instruments, especially BC scopes, be made available to field artillery units. In a static situation it becomes necessary to maintain numerous OP's. At the present time, the 15th FA Bn is manning ten OP's, and observation could be greatly improved by furnishing enough optical instruments for all the OP's.

2. That twenty power telescopes be restored to the field artillery battalion T/O&E in sufficient quantities to equip at least four OP's. These telescopes would be invaluable in helping observers pick up enemy activity and installations.

3. That sufficient quantities of aerial photos be issued to light field artillery battalions to enable the battalion S2's to distribute them to forward observers. These photos, used in conjunction with maps and ground observation, would be excellent aids to forward observers in understanding the nature of the terrain in their zones of observation.
4. That, in view of the present situation in Korea where the nature of the terrain frequently requires the employment of high angle fire, more positive information concerning the technique of high angle fires and the massing of such fires be assembled and disseminated by The Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. In this connection, it is recommended that additional instruction on high angle fire be given at The Artillery School.

SOURCE: Command Report - 65th Engr Combat En
DATE: February 1952

USE OF CAMOUFLAGE OVER A ROAD.

(RESTRICTED) The 77th Engineer Combat Company assumed the responsibility of repair and installation of camouflage nets in the 14th Regiment area and the Turkish Brigade area. These camouflage nets are over the road in a front line sector, and constant shelling of this area required continual repair of the nets. Most important conclusion on month's operations: The nets placed over the road obscured it from enemy observation, and casualties resulting from mortar and artillery fire directed at this formerly exposed stretch of road were greatly reduced.

SOURCE: Command Report - 22d Signal Group
DATE: February 1952

NEED FOR LIGHT AIRCRAFT.

(RESTRICTED) During this report period the commanding officer and inspection teams logged approximately 2000 miles and consumed 680 man-hours making command inspections of widely dispersed subordinate units. Of the 680 man-hours expended upon these inspections, approximately 250 hours were spent in traveling between units. By supplementing T/O&E 11-22 to include light aircraft, a saving of one-third in man-hours expended can be made. This will
permit more efficient operations and also fall in line with the presently stressed manpower conservation program. In addition, the inclusion of light aircraft in the T/O&E would permit rapid supply of critical spare parts in case of emergency.

SOURCE: Command Report - 25th Inf Div, C/S, Bk 1
DATE: January 1952 Source No 426

INTEGRITY OF DIVISIONS.

(REstricted) While recognizing the immediate necessity for dismembering the division while in reserve to meet miscellaneous corps and Army requirements, viz, augmentation of a front line division, providing security for civilian mining operations, and guarding PW camps, it must nevertheless be noted that as a policy such dispersion cannot be recommended.

Divisions are rotated from line duty so as to afford an opportunity for rehabilitation or replacement of worn equipment, integration, and training replacements, both officers and men, and for accomplishment of the mass of administrative work which cannot easily be taken care of when in contact with the enemy.

However, if upon relief from line duty, the division's major units are hurried to distant parts of the theater on routine, but exacting missions, the normal renovating and unifying process is so inhibited that combat efficiency may actually suffer rather than improve.

In combat or out, a prime factor in restoring the aggressive and cohesive spirit of a battle weary unit is the presence of the commander. His personal leadership and supervision are indispensable. Deny him the opportunity for continuous personal contact with subordinate leaders and the men themselves, and an essential unifying force is dangerously weakened.
It is recommended that the integrity of divisions be preserved when in reserve and that all temptation to "make use of available combat troops" be resisted to the utmost.

SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Div Arty
DATE: February 1952

REDUCTION OF ENEMY BUNKERS.

(RESTRICTED) During the period 18 to 25 February 1952 a concentrated program of "Bunker Busting" was executed with one 8" howitzer, one 155-mm gun (SP), and three 90-mm guns (towed) with crews, attached from IX Corps Artillery. Targets were located by survey, and taken under fire, with 136 bunkers being destroyed, using direct and indirect methods, at the ranges from 1400 to 5000 yards.

SOURCE: Command Report - 7th Inf Div Arty
DATE: February 1952

ENEMY TACTICS.

(RESTRICTED) During the attack on friendly elements, the enemy employed a field piece, estimated to be 76-mm, that had been brought up to within fifty yards of the outpost being attacked. This was the initial report of such tactics in this sector.

SOURCE: Command Report - Tokyo Ordnance Depot, 8160th AU
DATE: January 1952

CONVERSION OF JAPANESE HEAVY MACHINE GUN (TYPE 92).

(RESTRICTED) The Small Arms Branch, Maintenance Division, completed conversion of this weapon and conducted test firing. The conversion can be completed in approximately three hours without requiring replacement parts, and utilizes

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the standard Japanese clip. Target patterns at 50 yards were well within the 3-1/2" diameter for both continuous fire and shot groupings of five each, indicating a very high degree of stability. Report of conversion, together with drawings and technical description, were referred to the Engineering and Inspection Division for further study, evaluation and submission of report.

**SOURCE:** Command Report - 10th AAA Group

**DATE:** March 1952

**ENEMY USES LIGHT AIRCRAFT IN NUISANCE RAIDS.**

(CONFIDENTIAL) The enemy has conducted several nuisance raids on our forward airfields using liaison type aircraft. The aircraft cannot be tracked by radar when operating at low altitudes and, therefore, cannot be fired on accurately during periods of darkness or poor visibility. The 68th AAA Gun Battalion is conducting test with 60" searchlight in an effort to overcome this limitation. The lights will be supplied with present position data by radar, which will allow immediate illumination of the target. Just prior to loss of the target in clutter on radar scope, lights will be placed in action. Firing on target and positioning of lights from this point on will be accomplished by visual means. Test conducted on 4 March resulted in successful illumination of target after radar had become ineffective.

**SOURCE:** Command Report - 48th FA Bn

**DATE:** March 1952

**LANGUAGE BARRIER IN ARTILLERY SUPPORT OF ROK UNITS.**

(RESTRICTED) Due to this battalion's experience in working with ROK units, we have trained seven ROK enlisted personnel in fire direction and observer procedure and use ROK
enlisted personnel in our battalion fire center to take fire
missions directly from ROK observers. This speeds up
the time necessary to fire a ROK observed mission by cut-
ting out the middleman interpreter. Experience of this
battalion indicates a saving of fifty percent in time with gen-
erally more satisfying results for all concerned.

**SOURCE:** Command Report - 31st FA Bn
**DATE:** March 1952
**SOURCE NO:** 432

**ARTILLERY REQUIREMENT FOR ENGINEER EQUIPMENT:**

(RESTRICTED) The nature of the existing road net as
well as the general topography of the terrain makes it nec-
essary for a field artillery unit to perform a great amount of
pioneer work. The T/O&E of a field artillery medium bat-
talion does not provide adequate equipment for such work.
Recommend that one of the 2-1/2-ton trucks in each battery be
equipped with a dump body and the battalion be authorized one
D-8 type bulldozer.

**SOURCE:** Command Report - 300th Armored FA Bn
**DATE:** January 1952
**SOURCE NO:** 433

**USE OF WOODEN BOXES FOR SHIPPING AMMUNITION:**

(RESTRICTED) It is strongly recommended that the
practice of shipping 105-mm rounds in wooden boxes be con-
tinued. The wood salvaged from these boxes has been used
in innumerable ways. Lumber from any other source is
practically nonexistent. This battalion cannot begin to sup-
ply the demand of other units for these ammunition boxes.
PREPARATION OF ARTILLERY POSITIONS.

(RESTRICTED) The continued demand on artillery units to occupy areas which are unsuitable to artillery because of poor flotation, steep slopes, and rocky or frozen subsoil has pointed up a twofold problem. First, the artillery battalion needs and should be issued, earth moving equipment larger than dozer D-4. Several of the ammunition trucks in service battery should be dump trucks, so that road-building and pioneer work in artillery positions can be expedited. Service battery should have a demolitions kit and trained demolitions personnel in T/O&E. Secondly, an additional issue of construction tools such as large saws, extra hammers, levels, and heavy carpentry tools are needed, inasmuch as all artillery positions are improved continually and the construction of housekeeping facilities and improvements to gun pits is a major consideration on moving into a new area.

MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS - L-17 AIRCRAFT.

(RESTRICTED) It has become increasingly difficult to maintain L-17 aircraft in flying condition. All of the L-17's now in Korea are 1947 or 1948 models with an average of about 1500 flying hours. These older aircraft require considerable maintenance and replacement and repair parts which are extremely difficult to obtain. Many are not available in this theater and must be requisitioned from the ZI. As a result, an L-17 is often grounded for a period of two weeks or longer for lack of a repair part. Less than 50% utilization of the three L-17's assigned to the corps is being achieved.
ROTATION BY UNIT.

(RESTRICTED) The combat efficiency of artillery units has been lowered seriously by rotation and the current policy of rotation by individual. Replacements, for the most part, have been only partially trained, and in some instances have received no training at all for the MOS they carry. In addition, difficulty has been experienced in getting replacements in critical MOS's. Very few school-trained specialists have been received. Many difficulties would be eliminated if replacements were effected by unit instead of by individual.

RECOMMEND: That replacements by unit instead of by individual be established in order to maintain integrity and effectiveness.

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COUNTERBATTERY FIRE.

(RESTRICTED) The 8" howitzer has proved to be much more effective in counterbattery fire than has the 155-mm gun, both because of the added weight of the projectile and because of the greater accuracy of the 8" howitzer. Replacement of 155-mm gun tubes by 8" howitzer tubes could be effected without an increase in manpower and would materially increase the effectiveness of corps artillery counterbattery fire.

RECOMMEND: That eight 155-mm gun tubes of the 937th FA Bn be replaced by 8" howitzer tubes.

ASSAULT FIRE.

(RESTRICTED) 1. Assault fire with 155-mm gun (SP. - From the limited experience obtained from firing the 155-mm
gun (SP) in assault positions, it can be concluded that assault fire is very effective if the following principles are followed:

a. A definite target area be set up not more than one or two thousand yards in area.

b. That the infantry and organic forward observer designate the targets in advance with a priority given to them.

c. The gun position be located so that the ranges are not more than two to three thousand yards. That the position be in as much defilade as possible; and if possible, escape route be provided for the gun.

d. A systematic method of taking targets under fire be established so that small shifts are made. This increases speed and accuracy of the fire. It is important to guard against the temptation of firing on distant targets of say, 5000 yards in range, as the vertical probable error at that range will prove it is not economically feasible for this type of adjustment.

e. Provision should be made to have counterbattery observers and countermortar observers available with prepared concentrations on suspected enemy positions in the area. These should be ready for immediate employment if the 155-mm gun is brought under enemy fire. It is well to shoot other artillery into the general area at the same time as the assault fire is being conducted to direct the attention of the enemy away from the assault gun.

2. Assault fire with 8" howitzer (towed) on enemy bunkers. - In this mode of firing the position area selected was 6000 to 7000 yards from the target area and in defilade. The minimum elevation to the mask was such that Charge VII was fired into the target areas as it has the least range and deflection dispersion.

An observation post was selected with an axial type firing problem existing. In this manner the assault type fire control was employed.
The results from the assault method of firing the 8" howitzer were gratifying and it is felt that there is a definite saving in ammunition if the operation is properly conducted. The principles and doctrines that were developed from our experience in this type of firing are:

a. Target selection, identification, size of the target area, and attack of targets remain the same as set out above in the 155-mm gun assault fire techniques.

b. The 8" howitzer (towed) positions must be in defilade because the howitzer cannot be moved rapidly if taken under fire by the enemy. In Korea, the terrain is such that defiladed positions have narrow sectors of fire which increase the importance of small definite target areas.

c. Ranges of assault method of fire should not be used above 6500 yards for Charge VII. If ranges are longer, standard conduct of fire should be used to prevent "circular adjustment." Firing tables prove that assault fire may be used with Charge VII and possibly with Charge VI on ranges shorter than 5000 yards.

d. If assault fire techniques are used, the observer must fire "axial missions." If he has an angle "T" of greater than 200 mils, experience has proven that he must revert to standard methods of conduct of fire. This is another reason why the target area taken under fire be small to prevent the angle "T" from being too large at various points in the target area.

SOURCE: Command Report - 49th FA Bn
DATE: March 1952

ARTILLERY LOCAL SECURITY PLAN

(RESTRICTED) An infantry type company was organized from personnel of the 49th Field Artillery Battalion to implement the local security plan. Major Washburn, battalion executive, was appointed company commander. Infantry
training was given to the men selected for assignment in the company. These men will continue their regular battery assignments, but will be ready in an emergency to fall out with the security company. Thus, the over-all security plan for the battalion was strengthened by having a well organized force that could go into action on short notice.

SOURCE: Command Report - 7th Inf Div
DATE: February 1952

NEED FOR WARRANT OFFICERS FOR COMPANY ADMINISTRATION.

(RESTRICTED) The need for warrant officers at company level for administrative duties is extremely pressing now that the infantry companies are made up largely of inexperienced replacements. The Company First Sergeant is usually the most experienced soldier in each company, and he should not be burdened with administrative tasks when his leadership is so valuable in combat operations and in training.

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STANDARDIZATION OF MOTOR GENERATOR SETS.

(RESTRICTED) It is recommended that plans for the standardization of motor generator sets be vigorously followed up and executed. An average of 25% of all generators within the division were inoperative throughout February due to a shortage of parts.

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NEED FOR LARGER AIR COMPRESSORS.

(RESTRICTED) It is recommended that 210CFM air compressors be authorized engineer combat battalions for operation in Korea in lieu of the presently authorized 105CFM compressor. The 105CFM compressor does not supply enough power for a sufficient number of pneumatic tools to be operated
in the same general area. In the narrow mountain passes in Korea it is often necessary to park the truck carrying the air compressor in such a position as to block the road entirely while the pneumatic drills are employed to drill dynamite holes in the steep mountainside. This often delays essential military traffic.

If a 210CFM compressor were authorized for the above situation, which is normal for Korea, twice the number of drills could be employed at the same time, making it possible to complete the drilling in half the time now needed, thus speeding up the flow of traffic on important MSR's.

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BUNKER DESTRUCTION.

(RESTRICTED) By request, the 7th Infantry Division submitted on 3 February, to X Corps, the following recommendations concerning hostile bunker destruction:

1. That more self-propelled 155-mm guns or 8" howitzers be made available for direct or assault fire.

2. That a shaped-charge projectile be developed for present standard weapons.

3. That the time lapse of the delay fuse for the 105-mm howitzer and the 4.2" mortar rounds be increased to enable increased penetration.