ATTNG-26 350.05/9(FOCI)(C)(31 Jul 53) 31 July 1953

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

TO: See distribution

1. In accordance with SR 525-85-5, Processing of Combat Information, the inclosed EXTRACTS are forwarded for evaluation and necessary action. It may be appropriate, in certain cases, to take action upon a single extracted item; in others, it may be desirable to develop a cross-section of accumulated extracts on a particular subject before initiating action; and often the extracted item serves to reaffirm our doctrines and techniques.

2. Copies are furnished to other military agencies to keep them informed concerning theater problems from the front line through the logistical command.

3. These EXTRACTS are derived from reports which are classified SECRET. For the greater convenience of the user, this Office assigns each extracted item the lowest classification compatible with security.

4. Combat information EXTRACTS which are applicable to training at the company-battery level appear in Army Field Forces TRAINING BULLETINS. Portions of EXTRACT Source No 790 portraying Infantry actions will appear in greater detail in an early Bulletin.

FOR THE ACTING CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

A. B. CHATHAM
Lt Col, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF 1976-70729 ON 1976

Extracts from sources 777 thru 790

DISTRIBUTION:

Copy 2 UNCLASSIFIED
### DISTRIBUTION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Copies</th>
<th>Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The Surgeon General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chief of Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>OCAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>ACOFS, G-1, DA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Adjutant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Chief of Chaplains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Chief Chemical Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Chief of Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chief of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chief of Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Judge Advocate General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Chief of Military History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Chief of National Guard Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The Chief of Ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Provost Marshal General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Quartermaster General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Chief Signal Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Copies furnished:

134 TAG (40 CG, US Army Forces, Far East (Main); 44 CINC, US Army, Europe; 10 ea CG's, other major overseas commands)...

CG's

- First Army
- Second Army
- Third Army
- Fourth Army
- Fifth Army
- Sixth Army
- Army AA Command
- Military District of Washington
- Tactical Air Command
- The Armored Center
- The Artillery Center
- The Infantry Center
- Mountain & Cold Weather Tng Command

1 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
1 Chief of Staff, Dept of the Army
1 Chief of Naval Operations, Dept of the Navy

(See next page)
Subject: Dissemination of Combat Information

31 July 1953

Copies furnished: (Cont)

2 Chief, Army Advisory Gp, Air Command and Staff School,
   Air University
1 AFF LNO, Army Cml Cen
2 Comdt of Cadets, US Military Academy
   Comdt
1 Armed Forces Staff College
2 Marine Corps School
2 USAF Air-Ground Operations School
2 Counter-Intelligence Corps School
2 The Provost Marshal General's School
2 Army War College
2 CGSC
2 Army General School
2 The Armored School
2 The Artillery School
2 The Infantry School
2 Army Aviation School
2 US Marine Corps
2 Asst Comdt, The Artillery School
   AA&GM Branch
2 Chief, Army Security Agency
1 Officer in Charge, Atlantic Fleet Intelligence Cen
   Attn: Ground Forces Officer
1 Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Secy of
   Defense, Attn: Col Train
   Pres
1 Bd No 1, OCAFF
1 Bd No 2, OCAFF
1 Bd No 3, OCAFF
1 Bd No 4, OCAFF
1 CO, Arctic Test Branch, OCAFF
   Chiefs
1 AFF HRU No 1
1 AFF HRU No 2
1 Dir of Special Weapons Developments, AFF
   OCAFF
1 DCOFS
2 Combat Developments
4 Combat Arms Advisory Gp
14 G3(26)
1 British Liaison Officer
1 AG Records
1 Canadian Liaison Officer
11 Extra Copies
(RESTRICTED)

RETRIEVING TANKS. - Combat operations are habitually forward of the MLR, and generally on soft, mushy ground found in rice paddies. Rapid recovery of disabled tanks under enemy fire necessitates utilization of other operative tanks for retrieving. Normally this mission is assigned to the M32 retriever in company and battalion maintenance sections. However, the M32 with the narrow track and 500 HP engine is not capable of handling an M46 tank except on good firm ground. Our policy is to have all tanks operating forward of the MLR equipped with two tow cables. In operations larger than two platoon size, a company is required to borrow cables from another company. It is not unusual to have to use three or four tanks in tandem to drag one immobile tank back to the MLR. The prompt recovery of a single M46 tank is far more valuable in terms of both combat efficiency and supply economy than the cost of the cables. It is practicable to include an additional cable in the OVM of the M46 tanks.

Recommend that SNL G-244 be changed so as to allow two S-C-482-100 cables, towing, S, diameter 1-1/8-in, length 20 ft, for each M46 tank instead of the one presently authorized.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

MALFUNCTIONING OF CARBINES. - The carbine is unsuitable for cold weather use by night patrols in Korea because of its excessive malfunction rate. In spite of cold weather precautions, test firing, and inspections, the malfunctioning rate remained at nearly 50% on cold nights. Action was taken to obtain submachine guns for use in night patrolling, but these weapons were not available.

(PATROLS. - During the month, the regiment conducted 77 night combat patrols, 63 night reconnaissance patrols, and 33 daylight reconnaissance patrols. The primary mission of all patrols was to capture
prisoners. Each battalion was directed to make a minimum of one patrol contact each night within the enemy's positions. All efforts to take prisoners were unsuccessful and friendly patrols came off second best in more than half of the engagements. This was attributed, in part, to the superiority of the "Burp Gun" over friendly armament in close-in fighting and the enemy's quicker reactions resulting from use of simple, pre-arranged tactics.

Lessons learned: A simple system of prearranged tactics should be taught night patrols operating in Korea to give them equality in reaction time to Chinese patrols which use such tactics extensively and with considerable success against our patrols.

A simple, reliable submachine gun is required for arming night patrols in Korea to give them fire power equality in close-in fighting with Chinese patrols armed with the "Burp Gun."

---

SOURCE: Command Report - 26th AAA AW Bn (SP)
DATE: January 1953 Source No 779

(RESTRICTED)

DEFECTS IN 1/4-TON TRUCKS, UTILITY, M38A1. - Fenders of 1/4-ton trucks, utility, M38A1, are splitting where they join the main body of the vehicle and engine hood. Of the vehicles issued new to this battalion approximately two months ago, about fifty per cent are affected in this manner. Too much stress is put on the metal where the fender joins the body at that point. The battalion maintenance section is removing fenders which show indication of cracking, and welding a reinforcing piece of 1/16-inch stock metal to the underside in the region of the cracked fender, and then replacing the fender.

SOURCE: Command Report - 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Bn
DATE: February 1953 Source No 780

(RESTRICTED)

TRANSPORTING A 105-MM HOWITZER IN AN LVT. - An experiment was conducted, with the cooperation of the 63d Field Artillery Battalion, in loading and transporting a 105-mm howitzer in an LVT. The
insufficient width of the well deck of the LVT necessitated the removal of the shield and substituting shorter wheel lugs before the howitzer could be loaded. The howitzer and fifteen men aboard the LVT caused a drop in the water line of about four inches. There was no noticeable change in speed.

\[OCAFF\text{ Comment: LVT's come in various models, and measurements should be made prior to any modification of the howitzer.}\]

**SOURCE:** Command Report - 64th Tank Bn (M)

**DATE:** January 1953

**ORGANIZATION OF TANK BATTALION, INFANTRY DIVISION.**

The organization of the medium tank battalion organic to the armored division is more desirable than that of the tank battalion organic to the infantry division, in that the former is organized with four letter tank companies of three platoons each while the latter has three tank companies of four platoons each. The undesirable feature of the tank battalion, infantry division, is the four platoon tank company.

The four platoon tank company places an unduly large burden on the company commander, both tactically and administratively. In a tactical situation, the control of four platoons is a difficult job for one individual, considering the area occupied by the unit in offense or defense, the length of the column when on the march, plus communications difficulties normally experienced. Administratively, the problems involved in the supervision, feeding, vehicular maintenance, and other command responsibilities for four platoons plus the company headquarters, are considered to be excessive. The battalion commander, with his adequate staff, is better equipped to handle four subordinate tactical units than is the company commander.

The four letter company tank battalion would be more suitable from the point of view of the infantry division commander, in that an additional tank company could be placed with each of the two committed regiments, and still leave the tank battalion headquarters with two letter companies available for use as division reserve, or to provide the nucleus of a combined arms team.

Recommend that the tank battalion organic to the infantry division be organized in the same manner as the tank battalion, armored division,
namely, with a Hq & Svc Co, Med Det, and four letter companies of
three platoons each.

SOURCE: Command Report - 3d Div Arty

DATE: January 1953

Source No 782

(RESTRICTED)

AN/MPQ-10 RADAR FOR DIRECT SUPPORT BATTALIONS. - Superiority of the Countermortar Radar Set (AN/MPQ-10) over its presently issued counterpart has been conclusively demonstrated.

The countermortar effort begins in the direct support artillery battalion. Here are both the most rapid communications and the most efficient weapons for dealing immediately with the active mortars within range of the supported infantry. Studies show that mortars are responsible for a very large percentage of the total infantry casualties.

(RESTRICTED)

DIFFICULTIES WITH COAXIAL CABLE (CORD, CG107/U). - The following difficulties have been experienced with the Coaxial Cable Cord (Cord, CG 107/U) which is a component of the Antenna Equipment (RC 292) issued with the 500 and 600 Series FM Radios.

a. In the mountainous terrain of Korea, antennas frequently must be placed at great distances from the radio set in which case the 68-foot length of cable is inadequate.

b. Under field conditions, the fittings of the cable are subject to rather frequent breakage.

c. Repair of broken or shorted cable is a tedious and exacting job requiring a highly skilled signal repairman frequently not available to artillery battalions and sometimes even divisional signal companies.
SNIPERSCOPE, M2 and M3. - Numerous opinions have been expressed concerning the relative merits of the sniperscope as an effective aid in night combat. Although the theoretical effectiveness of the sniperscope is unquestioned, it is not used extensively on the front lines. One reason for this lack of interest is the poor results obtained from the sniperscope when operated by untrained personnel. The full capabilities of the scope cannot be realized until operators and maintenance men are properly trained in its use and maintenance. An intensive training program in the operation of the scope is needed to obtain its maximum efficiency. Sufficient numbers of men should be trained in each rifle company to insure the presence of a trained operator on each outpost and patrol forward of the main line of resistance. Regiments have found that trained operators are very enthusiastic over the employment of the scope on patrols and outposts.

There are two models of sniperscopes, the M2 and M3. The M2 is relatively ineffective under combat conditions. It has a range of only 25 yards, while the M3 has a range of 100 to 200 yards. The infantry battalion is authorized 29 M3 sniperscopes; however, few battalions have even half of the number authorized them due to a failure to replace the M2 sniperscope with the authorized M3.

The difficulty in obtaining replacement parts for the scope causes a serious maintenance problem. The BB241/U is the battery originally designed to operate the scope. It is small, has a nonspillable feature to prevent the sulphuric acid from leaking and holds a charge from 6 to 10 hours when in good operating condition. The average life of this battery is about 50 recharges. The BB241/U is unobtainable as a replacement item, and the BB54/U is often issued in lieu of the BB241/U, which is not an adequate substitute. It is too large to fit into the standard battery case of the sniperscope, the sulphuric acid leaks out when carried on the back of the sniperscope operator, its power life is only about 2 to 4 hours, and it is a two-volt battery. Three batteries must be fastened together to gain the required six volts, which results in a cumbersome and unsatisfactory battery pack.
Considerable trouble was encountered during the winter months with the freezing of the wet cell batteries. The men in this regiment have effectively overcome this obstacle by warming the batteries with PX pocket warmers and wrapping the battery case with blankets.

Although the sniperscope M3 is a highly perfected item of equipment, its effectiveness is restricted by the above-mentioned factors. To bring about an improvement in its operation, recommend the following:

a. Intensify training in the use of the sniperscope in the ZI.

OCAFF Comment: The issue of the sniperscope to CONUS GR units as authorized in SR 310-30-55, 15 December 1952, and contemplated changes to ATP 7-300 will provide sniperscope training in units of this type during advance individual and basic unit training. In addition, CONUS arms schools and The Engineer School offer courses to officers and enlisted personnel which include mechanical training, firing and/or maintenance of sniperscopes. Sniperscope training is not covered in ATP's for replacements as it is specialized.

b. Accelerate the replacement of all M2 sniperscopes with the newer M3 so that full benefit can be obtained from the primary purpose of the scope - to detect the enemy at night.

c. Make the authorized battery, BB241/U, and other replacement parts for the sniperscope more readily available to the units in Korea.

OCAFF Comment: A disposable type, one-time use battery (copper chloride) is being developed to replace the above mentioned unsatisfactory batteries.

SOURCE: Command Report - 10th Engr Combat Bn
DATE: February 1953

NAPALM ARTILLERY AND MORTAR SHELLS - There are essentially three types of rock in this area: very hard basaltic formation, granite in various stages of decomposition, and fractured limestone and sandstone. Defensive works dug in basaltic formations require no timber support because of the hardness of the rock. However, defensive works built in decomposed granite and most sandstone and limestone formations
will require timber supports. From the air it is possible to pick out the type of formations that the defensive works are constructed in, and where the enemy has conducted logging operations. This is important, because some of the higher peaks have the softer formations on northern slopes where the enemy has extensive works and the most vulnerable point of these works is the timber as it is more combustible than the heavy dimensional timbers available to the UN forces.

Napalm has been used on defensive positions in air strikes with varying degrees of success. White phosphorus is used by artillery but it lacks the physical properties that enable it to flow into openings and spread fire since it is a solid and lacks the ability to produce the intensity of heat that napalm has.

It is important to ignite overhead timbers used by the enemy to cover the trenches leading to caves which are the vital part of the defense works. All underground living bunkers, ammunition bunkers and gun positions have natural ventilation which will spread fire quickly in the same manner fire spreads in a mine.

If artillery and mortars had napalm-filled shells that could be fired in concentrations on a defensive network, enough of the napalm would reach the vital parts to start the burning of the supporting timbers. There are few points on the defensive works facing the Division that artillery cannot reach. A steady pounding would soon burn them out of the bulk of their defense works. Air strikes are few and dependent on weather as well as availability of aircraft.

SOURCE: Command Report - 49th FA Bn
DATE: February 1953

(RESTRICTED)

USE OF FO'S ON PATROLS. - Since the principal activity of the infantry in the present situation is patrolling, particularly at night, emphasis must be placed on providing close artillery support by furnishing artillery FO's to accompany combat patrols. Patrol contact with the enemy is frequent and virtually every patrol (three per night in each regimental sector) requires an artillery FO. It is not feasible, however, to put a commissioned FO with each patrol, because that strips the MLR of necessary qualified observers and too frequent patrolling by one individual places an undue physical strain on him, by limiting the amount of rest he receives.
The solution is to alternate reconnaissance sergeants with commissioned FO's on patrol duty. However, the majority of reconnaissance sergeants are inexperienced men usually in the grade of PFC or corporal who must be trained on the job.

Recommend that more emphasis be placed on the training of artillery enlisted men in the adjustment of artillery fire.

OCAFF Comment: Another solution is the training and use of infantrymen to adjust and use artillery as outlined in FM 6-135, "Adjustment of Artillery Fire by the Combat Soldier."

UNIT ROTATION. - The system of individual rotation to CONUS presents a continuing training problem. Very few replacements received are trained for key MOS positions, whereas individual rotatees are in most cases in key positions, though not necessarily fully qualified. The positions must be filled by recently arrived personnel who have had only basic training and a small amount of on-the-job training. As soon as the individual has reached his own peak of efficiency, which is not necessarily the desired standard, he becomes eligible for rotation. If the Korean conflict continues indefinitely, consideration should be given to a system of unit rotation to provide practical experience for previously trained units.

Recommend that consideration be given to a unit system of rotation to replace the present system.

OCAFF Comment: The need for providing practical experience for replacements is recognized. Initially, steps are being taken to provide unit training for infantry junior officers and enlisted replacements as well as provision for shipment of small infantry packets overseas.

SOURCE: Command Report - Eighth Army

DATE: December 1952

(RESTRICTED)

MEDICAL SERVICE RECOMMENDATIONS. - a. That military medical technical intelligence teams be organized and assigned to field armies on the basis of one per corps and one per army.
b. That additional mobile medical units be prepared to move to and support Eighth Army on very short notice.

c. That preventive medicine companies be included in plans for medical troop lists on the basis of one per corps and one per army.

d. That a small medical research headquarters, headed by a technical research specialist, be organized and stationed in Eighth Army area. This research headquarters could act as an advisory group to the Army Surgeon, and at the same time, evaluate and coordinate the activities of the several research teams constantly in the army area.

e. That an investigation be made concerning the possibility of securing outstanding personnel to serve as chiefs of service in Army hospitals for short tours of six months to one year. These individuals should be carefully selected, marked for particular jobs, and placed on active duty at the latest possible time to fill the positions, thus reducing the time spent in a casual status.

f. That the question of utilization of electrocardiograph machines in mobile units be decided; if these machines are required, one should be developed which is sufficiently sturdy to withstand rugged mobile use.

[OCAFF Comment: A requirement for an electrocardiograph machine in mobile units exists; the development of a suitable machine for field use has been in progress for some time and should be ready for procurement in the near future.]

g. That air pillows be furnished to medical units since such action will cause a considerable reduction in the number of blankets now used for that purpose.

h. That packaging of intravenous solutions be improved to prevent the present 20 to 25 per cent breakage encountered.

i. That a more suitable mobile X-ray unit be developed.

(RESTRICTED)

IDENTIFICATION OF LIGHT AIRCRAFT. - The number of hostile or unidentified light aircraft reported over the MLR has recently increased; several unsubstantiated reports have claimed sightings of aircraft similar in design or with markings resembling those of UN liaison planes at approximately the same time enemy propaganda leaflets were dropped. These reports in themselves do not offer cause for alarm. However, it
is conceivable that the enemy may adjust artillery from air OP's, and such action would be of definite concern. Since many Army liaison type aircraft operate in forward areas under conditions which preclude positive identification, action to institute countermeasures against reported hostile aircraft is delayed and often ineffective, due to the extreme caution required to assure the safety of friendly aircraft.

The possibility of enemy utilization of light aircraft has brought out the weakness of the present identification system, and indicates that a study should be initiated to determine a means of devising a positive identification system.

Fifth Air Force has suggested that a system of distinctive markings such as wing or fuselage stripes, which could be changed periodically, be considered. This suggestion was not considered feasible because of the large number of man hours that would be required in painting and removing paint from over 400 aircraft with the frequency necessary to provide adequate security. This system of identification should not be considered unless there were substantiated instances of the enemy using US Army type aircraft and all other means of identification had failed.

The Air Force has used electronic IFF equipment for over nine years successfully, and it is probable that only a limited amount of additional research would be necessary to adopt this equipment for Army aircraft use.

Recommend that a study be made by Army Field Forces covering the requirement for a positive means of aircraft identification. Further recommend that a study be conducted to determine countermeasures which would be effective against usage of aircraft resembling US light planes by hostile forces.

OCAFF Comment: A study is being prepared on requirements for air traffic control of Army aircraft, which will recommend procedures for identification of Army aircraft. IFF equipment is being developed which will be suitable for use in Army aircraft. The procedures and equipment being developed should provide a positive means of Army aircraft identification.
DIVISIONAL ARMY AVIATION ORGANIZATION. - A comparison of the various Army aviation organizational structures currently established in the US Divisions in Korea follows: At present the 25th and 7th Infantry Divisions operate a division headquarters section and a division artillery section; the 3d Infantry Division has centralized control under the division artillery; the 2d and 45th Infantry Divisions have centralized control under the division headquarters; and the 40th Infantry Division is operating with a provisional aviation company. The 2d and 45th Aviation Sections are planning to reorganize in the near future as provisional aviation companies. The consensus was that a single organization with its resultant centralized control gives the maximum efficiency of operation and economy with no sacrifice to the support given to any of the subordinate units of the division.

Recommend that steps be taken at Army Field Forces level to incorporate the centralization of Army Aviation, with a sound command structure, into T/O&E's.

OCAFF Comment: Studies prepared on this subject in the past have not established that centralized Army aviation in the division meets the requirements in all types of operations. Recommendations of Eighth Army will be considered in a review of organization of Army aviation within divisions, corps, and armies, to be prepared by this Office during June, July, and August 1953.

ARMY AVIATION AIR DROP TEST. - Prior to completing an SOP for emergency air lift using the cargo carrying capabilities of the L-20 type aircraft, a test was conducted to obtain detailed load and time factors. The test consisted of free fall delivery, without special packaging, of essential Class I, III, IV, and V combat items. The supplies were accurately delivered at a minimum flying speed (approximately 55 knots) from altitudes of approximately 25 to 35 feet. A total of 1800 pounds of supplies were tested with 800 pounds on a hard surface area and 1000 pounds on plowed area. Results follow:

a. QM - Class I and III. Material was 100% usable. Combat rations, even though reinforced only by banding, were undamaged. Five-gallon cans though slightly bent could be opened. None were ruptured.
b. Ordnance - Class V. Material estimated 95% usable. Some small arms ammunition clips were slightly damaged. 81-mm mortar ammunition was 100% usable.

c. Medical - Class IV. The material dropped which ranged from blankets to blood was 80% usable. After the test, Medical officers stated that simple proper packing would result in 100% usability of dropped items.

d. Chemical - Class IV. Gas masks were 100% usable even though dropped on a hard surface in individual containers.

SOURCE: Command Report - Eighth Army
DATE: September 1952

(RESTRICTED)

TOWING PINTLE FOR TANKS. - There have been a number of reported cases of sheered towing pintle assemblies (Part number 7070476 of group 1503) for tanks, medium, M46. This towing pintle is designed for use in towing trailers rather than other vehicles.

The problem of sheered towing pintle assemblies for M46 tanks can be avoided if, when it is necessary to use one tank to tow another, towing cables attached to towing hooks or shackles are used in lieu of a towing bar.

Three pintles, towing assembly, G150-7714878, were broken on M32 tank recovery vehicles while towing M46 tanks. On one occasion, a pintle broke while an M46 tank was being towed up a hill. The tank rolled approximately 600 yards down a 40° slope; no casualties or damage to the tank resulted. The weak point of the pintle assembly is the shaft.

SOURCE: Command Report - Eighth Army
DATE: August 1952

(RESTRICTED)

NEW CHINESE FUZE FOR 120-MM MORTAR. - The old type No 10 mortar round has a right-hand thread in the fuze well. This new fuze has a left-hand thread. The fuze body is aluminum with a brass ring which
holds the striker. The fuze is point-detonating with a bore-safe arming pin. It is used in the 120-mm short-type No 10 mortar.

The components are: aluminum striker head, striker anti-creeper spring, striker retaining pin, striker, safety wire, collar retaining pin, bore riding pin spring, bore riding pin, primer (US Cal .30), and detonator.

To arm the fuze the safety pin is first removed. The nose piece is unscrewed in a clockwise direction until the bore safety pin is free. The loader's hand is held over the bore riding pin until the round is dropped into the tube. When the round leaves the tube the bore riding pin flies out of the fuze due to spring action. The anticreeper spring keeps the striker in place. Upon impact the striker head moves inward forcing the striker into the primer cap. The primer ignites and sets off the detonator.

(RESTRICTED)

NEW TYPE ENEMY 82-MM MORTAR ROUND. - Several of the new type 82-mm mortar rounds have been found along the front. These rounds differ from those previously found in several respects:

a. The HE filler for the round is flaked TNT instead of cast TNT.

b. The round uses the Chinese universal fuze although there are no Chinese markings on the shell. The markings on the can are the same as on the shell.

c. The method of packing the round is much improved. One complete round with the fuze and ignition cartridge assembled is vacuum packed in a metal can along with 6 increment bags and firing tables. Three cans, which are opened by a winding key, are packed three to a wooden box. The can is 13-9/16-inches long and 3-1/2-inches in diameter. It has a fiber liner on the inside and felt pads at each end. The round is painted green with yellow markings, and has a light coat of oil.

(RESTRICTED)

STAFF STATUS OF EIGHTH ARMY AVIATION SECTION. - A study has been initiated to determine whether this section should be continued as a special staff section or be established as a section under the G-3 as outlined in T/O&E 51-1A, April 1952. Arguments in favor of the aviation section being retained as a special staff section are:

a. The widespread functions of the aviation section fall within the coordinating responsibilities of all general staff sections and not one specific general staff section.
b. The aviation section can be retained as a special staff section within the same troop strength authorized an aviation section under the G-3 section (provisions T/O&E 51-1A, April 1952).

c. The aviation section can accomplish its mission more effectively and efficiently as a special staff section than as a section under G-3 since doctrine as outlined in FM 20-100 states that the aviation officer is responsible directly to the commander.

d. The continuance of a special Army aviation staff section becomes more essential to the efficient operation of Army aviation in Eighth Army as Army aviation activities continue to expand.

SOURCE: Command Report - 7th Inf Div
DATE: January 1953

(Restricted)

Air-Ground Operation. - The purpose of the operation was to improve air-ground coordination and capture prisoners. An infantry company was to execute a raid using one rifle platoon as the assault element, the other two rifle platoons to be used only if necessary. The objective was a hill of the T-Bone complex, just north of Hill 200 (see sketch).

The Air Plan was designed to soften the objective area and neutralize enemy artillery positions. Air Plan "A" called for a flight of 24 fighter-bombers on request of the Division Commander on D-Day. Plan "B" included a flight of 8 aircraft on JOC strip alert; they would come under the control of the Division Tactical Air Control Party after reporting in the target area. Four fighter-bombers on air alert to engage targets of opportunity was Plan "C." In addition, two elements of 4 aircraft each were to make smoke runs just prior to the raid.

Artillery supporting the action prepared two schedules to be fired on call of the Infantry Battalion Commander; one was to be utilized if the air support went according to plan and the other if the air strikes were unsuccessful. A total of 78 light tubes and 32 medium tubes for support and 36 mixed medium and heavy tubes of corps artillery for counterbattery were available.
Armor plans included direct and diversionary support by eight Platoons of tanks. Diversionary efforts by armored elements were scheduled to begin 30 minutes prior to H-Hour for the infantry.

Nine rehearsals were held by the infantry assault element, and briefings were conducted for air and ground force personnel to round out preparations for the operation.

A ten-day artillery destruction program expending 5039 mixed rounds was fired prior to the raid. Air preparation consisted of 16 radar sorties in the immediate objective area from D-2 to D-Day and a total of 99 fighter-bomber sorties flown on D-1.

The Action:

At 0920 hours on D-Day, the first prebriefed flight of Plan "A" aircraft were placed on a target north of the objective. The strip alert flight of Plan "B" arrived on station at the requested time, 1050 hours, and hit its target -- also north of the objective. At 1250 hours, a prebriefed flight of 8 aircraft attacked the objective with 1000-pound general purpose bombs and napalm; no general purpose bombs and only one napalm bomb hit the objective. The Infantry Battalion Commander called for the first flight of Plan "C" aircraft when he realized the objective had not been hit. The request was made to the Mosquito TAC but did not reach either TAC or the G-3 Air. At that time the request could not have been filled as the flight was not due until 1330 hours. The smoke aircraft made their runs, but due to a strong wind and a slightly premature release by the second 4-plane element, the smoke covered only a small part of the western portion of the crossbar of T-Bone Hill.

Two diversionary tank efforts of one platoon each were launched with the mission of drawing fire at approximately 1230 hours, one hour before H-Hour for the infantry.

At 1330 the assault rifle platoon (2d Platoon) on M39 personnel carriers moved out. The other two rifle Platoons were held ready for use if needed. Led by one platoon of tanks, the 2d Rifle Platoon crossed the line of departure as the artillery, tank and mortar preparatory fires covered the objective; artillery smoke rounds were reinforcing the aircraft-laid smoke screen.

Upon arrival at the off-carrier position, the irrigation ditch at the base of the objective, the assault force had received no artillery, mortar
or automatic weapons fire. While organizing for the assault in the irrigation ditch, two members of the force were wounded by enemy automatic weapons fire which was placed on the raiders from south of the objective. The remaining members of the platoon took up their assault formation quickly and began to advance up the barren, artillery-battered objective. Artillery, mortars, and tank fire then lifted from the objective and shifted to the north in order to neutralize enemy fire and prevent observation from this area. Tanks deployed at the base of the objective continued their fire on enemy positions on and near the objective.

Two rifle squads as skirmishers led; the remaining two squads followed in column at the flanks. One of the two latter squads had the mission of capturing prisoners and the other was the weapons squad.

Moving rapidly up the slopes, the platoon encountered only sporadic harassing automatic weapons fire from Hill 200.

On reaching a point just below the military crest of the objective, the two leading squads were suddenly met by a heavy volume of hand grenades from a trench at the top of the hill; this caused the force to seek cover just below the crest where they were defiladed from enemy automatic weapons fire from Hill 200 and from a position north of the objective.

Urged forward by the platoon leader and platoon sergeant of the 2d Platoon, one of the flamethrower teams crept forward under the hail of grenades and fired a long burst into the trench. While the flame was spraying the trench the enemy hand grenade fire ceased completely. Members of the assault element had been rehearsed to follow the flamethrower operator and storm the objective. The numerous casualties inflicted by the intense Chinese hand grenade fire blunted the attack of the friendly forces and they failed to reach the trench.

A green smoke grenade, the prearranged signal for "friendly troops at this location" was thrown at this time. The Chinese, apparently observing the green smoke, tossed a red grenade to the vicinity of the prone assault force. This colored smoke happened to be the friendly prearranged signal for "tank fire at this location." Because of panels, prominently displayed on the backs of the assaulting force, the tankers could see the friendly troops at that point and did not fire.

Two more unsuccessful assaults were made and the grenade fire fight continued. At 1430 the 1st Platoon, waiting in support, was committed with orders to pass through the 2d Platoon and seize the objective. They
crossed the irrigation ditch under enemy fire and moved to the vicinity of the 2d Platoon. The Chinese grenades coming over the crest were still the principal concern of friendly elements. The 1st Platoon leader, the platoon sergeant and the assistant platoon sergeant were wounded by grenade fragments in attempts to encourage an assault. The only flamethrower with the platoon was knocked out by enemy grenades. The 4th squad leader took command and re-formed the platoon for another attempt to move through the continuous hail of grenades; this assault was also repulsed.

Meanwhile, the 3d Platoon moved to the base of the objective to reinforce. The platoon leader preceded his platoon to reconnoiter and was wounded. The platoon sergeant took command. The 3d Platoon's assault attempt was unsuccessful because of the continuous rain of grenades from the enemy strongpoint and the harassing automatic weapons fire from both flanks. The remaining elements of all three Platoons surged forward slightly in two additional attempts to storm across the objective, but these efforts were disorganized and unsuccessful.

The Company Commander reported at 1710 hours that his company was unable to take the objective; therefore the Regimental Commander gave the order to withdraw with all casualties. Preplanned supporting fires covered the withdrawal. The company closed the MLR at 1755 hours; tanks closed at 1845.

Over 80% of friendly casualties as a result of the operation were caused by grenade fragments or concussion.

7th Inf Div Comments:

Artillery -- Air

Artillery and air preparations were not effective on the objective. The enemy took cover in his well prepared trenches, caves and "cat holes," and returned to his battle positions when preparatory fires lifted. The frozen ground strengthened the enemy positions. Heavier ordnance and delay fuzes would have been effective.

Dispersion of effort and insufficient number of sorties reduced air effectiveness on the objective. Aircraft available on air alert could have struck the objective when the prebriefed flight failed.
Infantry

This action underscored the necessity of applying well known basic principles.

a. Fire and maneuver and striking the enemy from more than one direction while he is under continuous fire reduces his defensive capability.

b. Leaders must train their units so that they need not unnecessarily expose themselves. Only in exceptional cases are new leaders discovered on the battlefield in time to lead the unit to success.

c. The need for maximum use of organic supporting weapons was emphasized. Close support fire from 60-mm mortars, 57-mm recoilless rifles, 3.5-inch rocket launchers, and machine guns fills the gap from the time the artillery and tank fires lift to the time the infantry closes on the objective.

Counterbattery -- Countermortar

Comprehensive counterfire programs resulted in almost no enemy mortar or artillery fire on the infantry until friendly suppressive fires ceased.

Above all, this action demonstrates the necessity for continuous training of all arms in the planning and execution of combined and joint operations.

Critique by Participants (From Historical Manuscript, Military History Det, AFFE):

The TACP observed that the coordination between the artillery and the Air Force was excellent. WP shells used for target designation were easily seen by the fighter-bomber pilots. The artillery flak suppression fires greatly facilitated low altitude bombing.

The Tank Company Commander mentioned that in all operations incorporating armored units alternate routes should be planned, especially when passage of streams or roads is involved.

An infantryman brought out that each time a pyrotechnic grenade was activated to indicate a target to the tankers in the valley, the grenade rolled down the steep slope to below the lead element of the assault platoon.
When this happened, the tanks fired on the spot where the grenade came to rest. The platoon leader of one of the tank platoons, asserted, that at no time did his platoon ever fire on such a target if they could observe panels ahead of the smoke.

Prior to the action every tank had been assigned a specific target area with point targets within the area. Because of the large amount of smoke and dust which enveloped the area, it was virtually impossible to locate the enemy positions after the action got underway.

The Infantry Battalion Commander stated that the ineffectiveness of the supporting arms was definitely an important cause of the failure of the infantry unit. Also, the infantry bunched up as the hill came to a point. An aggressive attack on a wider front would have entertained more possibility for success. Although the company had a good reputation for combat effectiveness, the men who participated in this action were for the most part green; for some it was their first taste of battle. The men needed continuous "aggressive leadership." The success of this operation was doomed when the platoon leaders and sergeants were wounded early in the action.

An analytical study of the battle casualties revealed that the small arms and automatic weapons fire emanating from the flanks of the objective was harassing rather than destructive fire. The number of wounds suffered from gunshots was negligible compared to those from grenade fragments. Although the small arms fire from the adjacent hills was harassing rather than destructive, it precluded the dispersion of the men on the objective and channelized the attack within the defiladed area between the two fingers.

Members of the support platoons revealed that they had but a vague idea of the route, scheme of maneuver, and mission of their unit. This situation contributed substantially to the failure of the reinforcing elements to move through the stalled platoons and take the objective.

Although the original assault platoon was thoroughly oriented and rehearsed for the operation, the reserve platoons were neither briefed nor rehearsed adequately. This is evidenced by the fact that it was necessary for the 3d Platoon Commander to reconnoiter the objective area before his platoon was committed.

Several members of the assault platoon felt that they had too many rehearsals and that an excessive number of rehearsals caused a rigidity
of action and a reduction of initiative. Their role in the operation had been so well inscribed in their minds that any deviation from the rehearsed plan did not occur or seem feasible to them.

The transferring of key men to the assault platoon from other platoons added a great deal of confusion during the attack and caused a feeling of dejection among some of the men. Members of a combat unit feel a certain comradeship among themselves. Because of this change in personnel, many of the men in the platoons were unable to recognize some of their superiors and subordinates readily.

In summary, the Regimental Commander reiterated that in the use of air power, at least 50% of the strikes should be used on the infantry objective.

\[ \text{OCAFF Comment: Air strikes were executed too far in advance of the infantry assault and were too dispersed to produce effective results.} \]

Effective means of controlling air strikes and correcting errors in ordnance delivery were not provided.

Reliable communications were not available between the infantry unit and the tactical air coordinator.

Request for additional air support was not forwarded through the air-ground operations system.

Piecemeal commitment of the three platoons over the same route resulted in defeat in detail.

Means to improve training in attack technique are continually under study.

a. In February 1953, OCAFF distributed a guidance letter eliminating the use of hip and crouch firing with the rifle during assault firing and prescribing aimed shots from the shoulder during this vital phase of the attack.

b. OCAFF TM No 1, 22 January 1953 states that training with the use of supporting weapons will be stressed to the maximum.

c. DA TC No 14, 1952, "Battle Indoctrination" is being revised to better prepare the soldier for combat by stressing increased teamwork, confidence and competency in the use of weapons for close combat.
d. OCAFF TB No 2, 21 March 1953, is a guide to assist commanders in the preparation and conduct of tactical drill exercises to improve the standard of individual and unit performance in infantry squad, platoon and company tactical training.

e. It must be continually stressed in all attack exercises that the attacker follow closely behind his supporting fires and that when such fires are lifted, that he aggressively and rapidly continue his forward movement, utilizing his individual and crew-served weapons to the maximum.