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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

ATTNG-26 350.05/12(DOCI)(C)(1 Oct 53) 1 October 1953

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

TO: See distribution

1. In accordance with SR 525-85-5, Processing of Combat Information, the inclosed EXTRACTS are forwarded for evaluation and necessary action. It may be appropriate, in certain cases, to take action upon a single extracted item; in others, it may be desirable to develop a cross-section of accumulated extracts on a particular subject before initiating action; and, often the extracted item serves to reaffirm our doctrines and techniques.

2. Copies are furnished to other military agencies to keep them informed concerning theater problems from the front line through the logistical command.

3. These EXTRACTS are derived from reports which are classified SECRET. For the greater convenience of the user, this Office assigns each extracted item the lowest classification compatible with security. No effort is made to paraphrase or delete any portion of the extracted remarks, so that none of the original intent is lost.

4. Combat information EXTRACTS which are applicable to training at the company/battery level appear in Army Field Forces TRAINING BULLETINS.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

1 Incl
Extracts, Items
No 61 thru 94

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Subject: Dissemination of Combat Information

1 October 1953

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COUNTERFIRE EXPERIMENT. - An experiment was made using the direct support artillery battalion FDC plotting center as a master counterfire plotting center. The infantry counterfire platoon plotting center remained in the regimental FSCC and forwarded its information to the direct support artillery plotting center. The artillery plotting center then combined this information with information sources such as countermortar radar, and forwarded it directly to the artillery firing batteries and to the heavy mortar FDC. The system has these advantages:

a. Avoids maintaining two co-equal plotting centers, one infantry and one artillery, and eliminates the need for time-consuming exchange of information.

b. Retains infantry control of the counterfire platoon, and insures direct access of regimental S2 to shell fire intelligence, by retaining the infantry counterfire plotting center in the infantry regimental FSCC.

c. Simplifies forwarding of counterfire information to heavy mortars. (Command Report - 32d Inf Regt - Feb 53)

\[\text{OCAFF Comment: FM states that the artillery commander coordinates countermortar activities; however, he does not coordinate infantry counterfire operations against direct fire weapons. While the system used undoubtedly had value in this particular situation, the overall adoption of such a system is not deemed desirable.}\]

EMPLOYMENT OF COUNTERFIRE PLATOON IN STATIC DEFENSE. - Experience indicated the locating of the counterfire plotting center in the regimental FSCC is sound. It improved control of counterfire operations, exploited available FSCC communications, and provided rapid reporting of shell fire directly to the regimental S2. Direct lines are required to each OP in spite of lateral communications between OP's; direct lines were laid to the remaining three counterfire OP's.

Study of the location of sound OP's during the period indicated that six sets of sound equipment allocated by T/O&E of a counterfire platoon are inadequate to efficiently cover a 10,000 yard regimental front. To avoid leaving large areas of the front uncovered, the machines were placed 1,000 or more yards apart making it impossible to operate them in pairs.
in the manner for which they are designed. To overcome this difficulty, the counterfire platoon employed nine teams, including three attached teams from the reserve regiment. Comparison of the results of February’s operations (nine OP’s) with January’s operations (six OP’s, none paired) follows:

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Trials were made with paired machines and with three machines working together. Results indicated that, in terrain favorable for this employment, the three machine employment is more efficient than the paired employment. The operator of the center machine was used as the control operator. (Command Report - 32d Inf Regt - Jan & Feb 53)

(PATROLLING PRINCIPLES. - The present conflict is fought almost entirely forward of the MLR by relatively small groups of men in brief but savage patrol clashes. Lessons learned follow:

Higher commanders must impress the riflemen with the vital importance and necessity of accomplishing the patrol mission by visiting patrols during rehearsals, inspections and briefings.

The patrol must be provided with every possible support and facility in its accomplishment of the mission to include:

a. Aerial reconnaissance.

b. Recent aerial photographs and special maps of routes, objectives and surrounding terrain.

c. Fire support to include illumination and close support by aircraft if desired.

d. Special equipment such as sniperscopes, flame throwers, mine detectors, shaped charges, communications devices, and items of special clothing.

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c. Intelligence briefings by "experts" on weather, terrain and enemy.

It is absolutely paramount that the patrol leader and assistant be aggressive, intelligent, forceful and thoroughly briefed.

In this type of warfare where static defense lines are surrounded by minefields, patrol patterns are easily established. To avoid this, gaps in minefields must be frequently closed and others opened to prevent the enemy from locating the routes of exit and entrance into our positions.

A ground reconnaissance, from a ground OP as a minimum requirement, must be conducted by each member of the patrol.

A thorough rehearsal of the entire patrol, over similar terrain, at a corresponding time of the day is a definite requirement. Since the vast majority of patrols operate during the hours of darkness most of them should be rehearsed both during the day and at night.

Special measures must be undertaken to camouflage the radio and its operator. The Chinese attempt to neutralize this group immediately. Generally speaking, if communication is lost the patrol should not continue on its mission until communication has been re-established.

Each patrol should have as an adjunct the following elements:

a. A support group of approximately the same size as the patrol which will remain within supporting distance (50-200 yards) to assist the patrol when contact is made with the enemy. This support will be briefed and rehearsed with the patrol proper.

b. An alert force must be designated to be ready for immediate dispatch to assist a patrol if in trouble, or to sweep the area of contact for prisoners and friendly casualties. This alert force should be of considerable size and led by an officer. The leaders of these groups must be exceptionally strong. They must push their patrols through enemy diversionary groups and areas of heavy shelling to reinforce the engaged patrol.

c. Check points must be established where the patrol renders a report to the company OP. In this manner the exact whereabouts of the patrol can be determined, and if a firefight develops, even though communications may be lost, fire support can be effectively supplied, and the alert group accurately dispatched.
d. Trained personnel must be provided, including interpreters for the KATUSA, for immediate debriefings.

After an enemy contact an immediate sweep of the battlefield must be initiated. If the patrol is unable to accomplish the sweep, then the support or alert group must perform this essential task. This is one of the best ways to obtain prisoners of war and must be done to prevent friendly MIA's. Enemy dead must be searched for identification, documents, and equipment.

The use of volunteers for patrolling should not be encouraged, although they should be accepted for special tasks if truly voluntary in nature. The use of volunteer units and the continual employment of individual volunteers tends to emphasize patrolling as a specialty, rather than a primary task of every infantryman.

Each battalion and higher commander should charge his operations officer with the over-all supervision and control of the patrolling activities of his unit. Intelligence officers should be consulted frequently for details in planning for patrols, selecting objectives, and in briefing and debriefing patrols. The intelligence officers should not be charged with controlling or coordinating patrols as operations.

Outguards in critical areas must receive specialized training comparable to that of a patrol. The extensive use of barbed wire and trip flares must be emphasized to eliminate the possibility of surprise. All personnel must be impressed with the wisdom of employing rifle flares in appropriate combat situations.

Recommend that all infantry training, whether it be basic or advanced in CONUS, emphasize strongly the subject of patrolling. Particular stress should be placed on all phases of night patrolling. The aspects of aggressiveness, stealth, and teamwork must be stressed repeatedly. The confidence of the individual soldier can be enhanced if he is made to realize the tremendous support he has from the infantry, artillery, tanks and Air Force. Continuous effort must be directed to instill the will to close with the enemy and kill or capture him. Our patrols inevitably emerge victorious when aggressive, close-in contact is initiated. (Command Report - 2d Inf Div - Feb 53)

OCAFF Comment: Additional training is being prescribed in current revisions of ATP's which emphasizes patrolling and fighting at night.
INFANTRY MORTAR BATTALION EMPLOYMENT. - Whenever the tactical situation permits, this battalion operates intact and the firing companies remain under the control of battalion headquarters.

Each company operates its own FDC while the battalion headquarters acts as a coordinating agency for the companies. The battalion is normally in general support of the infantry division and under operational control of the division artillery. This method of employment and control is far superior to that of dividing the battalion into smaller units and attaching piecemeal throughout the division. Under operational control of division artillery, the fire power of the battalion is used effectively and is coordinated with that of the artillery which prevents a duplication of effort and indiscriminate waste of ammunition. The fires of the battalion can be massed and placed where the need is the greatest without the restriction of being limited to one narrow sector. Such control does not limit the fires of the mortars to a small sector but allows full utilization of all capabilities. (Command Report - 461st Inf Bn (Hv Mortar) - Mar 53.)

OCAFF Comment: The use of the heavy mortar battalion as a unit under operational control of division artillery permits full advantage to be gained from use of the battalion or regimental FSCC as outlined in DA TC No 9, 1953, "Coordination of Fire Support."  

INFANTRY BATTALION FSCC COMMUNICATION. - The infantry battalion FSCC's had no radio communication with the infantry heavy weapons. Since the artillery liaison officer is the fire support coordinator for the infantry battalion, coordination of infantry weapons is virtually impossible if infantry wire goes out.

The FSCC at the infantry battalion level should be provided with radio communication to infantry heavy weapons, and adequate infantry personnel to assist the artillery liaison officer should also be provided. (Command Report - 49th FA Bn - Mar 53.)

OCAFF Comment: Though the artillery liaison officer is the fire support coordinator for the infantry battalion, the battalion is to furnish personnel and equipment to implement establishment of an FSCC. Radios for communication with infantry heavy weapons units should be provided by those units to the FSCC, together with a representative as prescribed in DA TC No 9, 1953, subject: "Coordination of Fire Support."
SNIPERSCOPES. - Most patrol leaders insist on taking a sniper-scope with each patrol. The more vulnerable outguard positions are also equipped with scopes when available. Extensive experimentation has been done with the scopes. They are now being used both for searching and signalling.

Recommend that:

a. Instruction presented in CONUS include sufficient practical work to convince each man that he can operate the equipment and to teach him the capabilities and limitations of the equipment.

\[OCAFF\] Comment: The issue of the sniperscope to CONUS GR units as authorized in SR 310-30-55, 15 December 1952, and contemplated changes to ATP 7-300 will provide sniperscope training in units of this type during advance individual and basic unit training. In addition, CONUS arms schools and The Engineer School offer courses to officers and enlisted personnel which include mechanical training, firing and/or maintenance of sniperscopes.

b. Two men be added to each infantry battalion headquarters company to maintain and instruct in the operation and maintenance of infrared equipment.

\[OCAFF\] Comment: Should a requirement for additional maintenance personnel develop, such personnel should be included in the regimental service company, not at battalion level.

c. A division maintenance section under the division Engineer be established to provide rapid repair facilities (similar to the Signal Corps repair system for signal items).

\[OCAFF\] Comment: Two mechanics are currently included in the Engineer battalion for the repair of sniperscopes.

d. A throw-away battery, with an enclosed cable, and a more durable scope be developed. A throw-away battery would eliminate much time and equipment necessary to recharge batteries. (Command Report - 31st Inf Regt - May 53.)

\[OCAFF\] Comment: A disposable type, one-time use battery (copper chloride) is being developed to replace the battery now in use.
MECHANICAL FAILURES OF M-46 TANKS. - M-46 tanks in positions on the MLR are confronted with many unusual maintenance problems. The steep mountains and poor roads also contribute to mechanical failures. Unfortunately the lack of space in tank positions prevents proper exercising of tanks. Most failures show up on road marches performed after tanks have been in position for long periods. Common mechanical failures are final drives, oil lines and oil cooler fans. Few road marches are made without one of these items causing a breakdown. The quality of replacement parts for the items listed is often unsatisfactory. It is not unusual for replacement items to break down or fail to perform soon after installation.

Recommend that oil lines, final drives and cooler fans be fabricated from stronger materials. (Command Report - 140th Tank Bn - May 53.)

GAS TANK DRAINAGE OF M-46 TANKS. - Another problem is encountered when draining gas tanks of the M-46 and 46A1. As the drain plug is unscrewed, gasoline hits the man's hand and is deflected into the tank. When the sediment bowl is removed gasoline is easily spilled on the floor of the engine compartment. Such conditions contribute to a dangerous fire hazard. However, it is necessary to drain gas tanks at frequent intervals as a great deal of condensation and dirt accumulate in the tanks and must be removed; otherwise gasoline lines become clogged and cause fuel stoppages.

Recommend that a more efficient drain be developed for gas tanks. (Command Report - 140th Tank Bn - May 53.)

ONE-WAY REVERSIBLE REMOTE CIRCUIT. - The provisions for a one-way reversible remote control circuit for the radio set AN/GRC-26A used in the FSCC Air Request Net was made by locating the radio set approximately one mile from the FSCC operations building. The system provides for remote control by means of a locally built control unit as the equipment installation, two telephone pairs extending between the installation and the operations building, and one double-throw "transmit-receive" switch at the FSCC operations building with red and green lights to indicate the switch position. One teletypewriter may be used for both transmitting and receiving. (Command Report - 50th Sig Bn - Mar 53.)
OCAFF Comment: A signal modification work order is being processed which will equip the AN/GRC-26A with remote control facilities. In other models of the AN/GRC-26, the remote control facility is an integral part of the radio set.

ITEM NO 70
CABLE SPLICER’S TENT LC-37. - The cable splicer’s tent LC-37, although designed to be used aerially, frequently is required for ground operation. When the wind is blowing, a problem exists in keeping the side walls anchored. An improvised framework has been designed to eliminate the necessity for anchoring the side walls and provide a sturdy supporting structure which can be used on aerial projects as well as for ground operations. The framework designed as an addition to the tent LC-37 is of light construction, is collapsible, and can be moved at will by merely loosening four wing nuts. (Command Report - 50th Sig Bn - Mar 53.)

ITEM NO 71
IMPROVISED CABLE LAYING TRAILER. - A cable laying trailer capable of laying as many as 12 pair of WD-1/TT wire in the form of cable was developed. The device consists of 3 axles placed across the width of a 1/4-ton trailer. On these are placed wire reels DR-4. The lines are passed through a gathering ring where they are grouped and wound spirally with one metallic pair from a dispenser MX 306 A/G mounted on the gathering frame. The trailer can install cable at a rate of 4 to 5 miles per hour and requires only 2 wiremen to operate; consequently the balance of the wire team is available for policing the cable off the ground. All materials used are available locally. (Command Report - 159th FA Bn - Mar 53.)

ITEM NO 72
LAYING WIRE USING ROCKET LAUNCHER. - Tests were conducted laying wire from dispensers by using a launcher, rocket 3.5 inch (bazooka) as described in FM 24-20. Results of these tests indicate that this method of wire laying is dependable for distances up to 300 yards for WD-1/TT in dispenser MX 306 A/G. It was also determined that 1/2 inch rope coiled to pay out freely could be thrust at least 100 yards using this method. The rope used in these tests was new and consequently stiff. Considerably more than 100 yards could be reached with a more limber rope. (Command Report - 3d Sig Co - May 53.)
ITEM NO 73

ARTILLERY COMMUNICATIONS. - Radios, AN/PRC-6 are being employed to supplement existing means of communication between the computers in battalion FSCC and the firing battery executive posts; also as lateral means of communication between OP's. In order to speed up the warning to aircraft in the impact area where VT fused rounds are to be fired, a plan has been developed that permits a single radio operator to transmit simultaneously the warning on the two division artillery fire direction channels over two separate radio sets. This cuts in half the time required to make this transmission, thus reducing the time necessary to deliver fire on a given target. The base set radio and telephone switchboard installations in battalion FSCC are in alcoves, thereby saving floorspace and effectively reducing interference between radio and switchboard operators. (Command Report - 158th FA Bn - May 53.)

ITEM NO 74

OPERATION OF RADIO SET AN/PRC-6 UNDER COMBAT CONDITIONS. - AN/PRC-6 radio set has proved to be eminently suited to the operations of an infantry battalion under a wide variety of difficult conditions. In range of transmission, frequency and in durability, it has proved superior to all available transceivers.

The flexible antenna AN/PRC-6 has proved most unsatisfactory under field conditions. The bottom section of the antenna splits even though extreme care is exercised. Heavy taping of this section prevents splitting but destroys flexibility. The push-to-talk button does not stand up under heavy use. The case is not waterproof. (Command Report - 224th Inf Regt - May 53.)

OCAFF Comment: TB Sig 213, July 1953, provides for modification of sets now in production to correct deficiencies outlined above.

Section V, TB Sig 555-5, June 1953, prescribes the expedient of taping of antenna to correct this deficiency in sets now in use.

ITEM NO 75

COMPOSITE SIGNAL PLATOON. - In order to effect a closer coordination between related communication facilities and attain a higher degree of operational efficiency, inter-transfer of the radio relay platoon and the teletypewriter section was made between R & M Company and T & T Company. The Radio Relay Platoon was combined to form a composite platoon with the Carrier Platoon, and the Teletypewriter
Section was combined to form a composite platoon with the Message Center Platoon. Normal field operations dictate just such combinations for communications efficiency and job proficiency. (Command Report - 50th Sig Bn - Mar 53.)

OCAFF Comment: Essentially the same organization is included in the latest revision to the T/O&E for the Corps Signal Battalion.

(Restricted) ITEM NO 76
PACKAGE WEIGHT FOR HAND CARRY. - The package weight of all construction materials should be reduced to a maximum of 40 to 50 pounds. A specific case is that of rolls of barbed wire, which at present weigh approximately 100 pounds. Extended hand carry of weights in excess of 45 to 50 pounds is not efficiently accomplished. (Command Report - 35th Inf Regt - Mar 53.)

(Restricted) ITEM NO 77
GFT FOR 105-MM HOWITZER ILLUMINATING SHELL. - Recommend that a GFT be devised for 105-mm howitzer illuminating shell. At present, due to the calculations necessary when using the tabular firing tables, fire with illuminating shell cannot be delivered as rapidly as fire with HE shell. A GFT for illuminating shell would facilitate the delivery of timely fire, which is a necessity when illuminating shell is called for on a night attack. (Command Report - 58th FA Bn - May 53.)

(Restricted) ITEM NO 78
ARTILLERY DELIVERED ILLUMINATION. - Illumination has become a requirement for immediate close-in fires just as pressing as the barrage during hours of darkness. Noises at night assume major proportions which tend to magnify the size of an enemy believed to be in front of friendly positions. Without immediate illumination, heavy volumes of fire have been placed in the darkness against relatively unimportant targets. By encouraging the use of illumination to permit observation and evaluation of the target, all aspects of operations after dark are improved.

An illumination platoon is designated in each battery and receives all rounds of illuminating shell in the battery. Based on enemy activity during the day and other intelligence factors, illumination is planned for the areas of most likely enemy activity. The remaining two platoons in each battery are sufficient to develop and sustain an intense rate of fire on the normal barrage. (Command Report - 49th FA Bn - May 53.)
ITEM NO 79

**EMPLOYMENT OF SEARCHLIGHTS.** - Illumination should not be constant, since a fixed beam is generally avoidable by the enemy, and the continuous diffused light on rear slopes is of considerable aid to enemy work parties and supply details.

Artillery fire frequently delivered concurrent with the shifting of illumination induces enemy association of the two and thus enhances the harassing value of the lights when used alone.

"Fire planning" for "on-call" searchlight missions proves valuable in a variety of defensive and offensive operations. One such mission is in conjunction with night reconnaissance; for example, a patrol moves to concealed positions, and then calls for illumination of the area to be observed.

The demand for coordination is again stressed, to include clearance with adjacent units as well as a careful review of subordinate patrol activity scheduled in areas to be illuminated. (Eighth Army Arty Info Bulletin No 6 - June 53.)

ITEM NO 80

**USE OF SEARCHLIGHTS IN AAA ROLE.** - Searchlights were used against enemy aircraft attacking the island. One enemy plane crashed into the channel just east of the island during the engagement. Enemy aircraft conducting these attacks are of the PO-2 type which approach at low altitude and slow speed to avoid detection by sound and radar. The use of searchlights against this type of attack is proving to be exceptionally effective. It allows aimed automatic weapons fire to be delivered at night. Searchlights have a deterring effect on enemy pilots and cause enemy aircraft to take evasive action immediately upon being illuminated. (Command Report - 933d AAA AW Bn. (Mbl) - May 53.)

ITEM NO 81

**DETONATING X-200 NAPALM LAND MINES.** - Tests were conducted to determine the best means of detonating X-200 land mines. Electrical means of detonation had proven undependable due to frequent cutting of electrical lead wires by enemy personnel and incoming artillery and mortar rounds. Following methods are recommended for use:
a. Electrical-firing using multiple blasting caps and lead wires.

b. Pull-type firing devices using multiple trip wires and/or lanyards.

c. Pull-release type firing devices wired to function even though trip wires may be cut by enemy personnel.

Following points are stressed:

a. When electrical means of detonation are used insure that the source of electric current is sufficiently strong to activate all electric blasting caps in the circuit.

b. Test the source of electricity frequently.

c. Connect relatively few mines in series thus reducing the electricity requirements and insuring that the entire field will not be rendered ineffective by one break in the wiring system.

d. Use multiple blasting caps, lead wires or lanyards. (Command Report - 40th Inf Div - Apr 53.)

(RESTRICTED) ITEM NO 82

TEST OF X-200 NAPALM LAND MINE. - One X-200 napalm land mine prepared and left in outdoor storage since November 1952 was detonated in March 1953. This mine had been exposed to rain, snow, mud, temperature ranges from -10°F to 65°F, and transported over great distances in trucks. There was no evidence of deterioration; no rusting of the metal container had occurred, no leakage was apparent, seams were intact, the carrying handle was secure, and the threaded filler cap was easily removed. The napalm filling gave no evidence of breakdown. The punch-out hole in the filling cap had been covered with adhesive tape throughout the storage period, thus assuring the exclusion of moisture from the burster and the napalm filling.

Lessons Learned: Punch-out holes on all X-200 land mines assembled and emplaced for tactical use should be sealed with tape. (Command Report - 40th Inf Div - Mar 53.)

\(\text{OCAFF Comment: See item, "Period of Effectiveness of the X-200 Land Mine" published under Source No 751, 1tr ATTNG-26 350.05/7(DOCI)(C)(3 Jun 53), OCAFF, 3 June 1953, subject: "Dissemination of Combat Information."}\)
MINIATURE FOUGASSE. - Work was completed on the "Fireball," a device essentially a miniature Fougasse. Basically it is composed of a five-gallon oil can filled with napalm, one WP grenade with the fuse removed, a 1/4-pound block of TNT, and an electric blasting cap (see sketch). Each "Fireball" will effectively cover an area up to 100 yards long by some 20 to 30 yards wide. In principle the container is crushed by the exploding TNT and hurled through the air dropping ignited napalm en route. The WP grenade, shattered by the explosion, provides the necessary ignition. Aside from the casualty producing effect, the psychological effect is tremendous. This device can be used to good advantage in strengthening defensive positions. (Command Report - 25th Inf Div - Jan 53.)

FLAK SUPPRESSION FOR ARMY AIRCRAFT. - Effective flak suppression, especially in areas where the enemy is sensitive, is rapidly becoming a must if Army aircraft are to remain directly over the target area in the performance of their mission. At present there is need for standardization of flak suppression in the major units. (Command Report - Eighth Army - Dec 52.)

NEED FOR TWO-PLACE TACTICAL ARMY AIRCRAFT. - In recent years the emphasis on fixed wing aircraft development at DA level has been placed on multiplace aircraft. Since the Army now has two suitable types of multiplace aircraft in the L-20 and the L-23, the emphasis on research and development, aside from helicopters, should be shifted to the two-place tactical aircraft.

Although the L-19 aircraft has performed well in Korea, increased enemy flak has proved its weakness in two aspects -- need for self-protective armament and emergency get-away speed. The basic importance of Army aircraft still remains a tactical one -- providing observation and reconnaissance, preferably over the target area. Constant improvement in the current tactical aircraft and far-reaching research and development is desirable and must be strived for. (Command Report - Eighth Army - Dec 52.)

OCAFF Comment: Requirement for armament and speed in Army observation type aircraft is currently under study at this Office.
"FIREBALL" Tamped Earth

WP Grenade and TNT Centered on Bottom of Can. Sand Bags may be used in place of Tamped Earth on Top of Can.

5 Gallon Oil Can Filled with Napalm

Cap Lead Wires

Line of Excavation

WP Grenade on end, Fuze Removed.

1/2-pound TNT

Electric Blasting Cap
ITEM NO 86

REQUIREMENT FOR 30KW DIESEL GENERATOR. - The operation of the bakery equipment for 24 hours each day puts a strain on the 25KW gasoline generators used to operate the bakery equipment.

Recommend that the 25KW gasoline generators be replaced with 30KW diesel generators. These generators could handle the load without the operational strain now incurred by the 25KW units. (Command Report - 470th QM Bakery Co - Jun 53.)

OCAFF Comment: 30KW gasoline generators are now authorized in lieu of the 25KW generators as part of the mobile bakery equipment for this type unit. Diesel generators are considered impracticable because of their weight and increased fuel supply problem.

ITEM NO 87

UTILIZATION OF 55-GALLON DRUM FOR BURNER, OIL, STOVE, TENT, M-1941. - Experience in Korea has indicated that organizations and units supplied with the Stove, tent, M-1941, equipped with the Burner, oil, stove, tent, M-1941, have been modifying the Adapter, gravity feed, 5-gallon can in order to have a larger fuel supply. This modification consists of withdrawing the breather tube from the adapter, closing the breather hole into the fuel can top, and utilizing the complete adapter assembly with a 55-gallon drum placed on a cradle. The modification provides the stove with a much greater fuel supply and eliminates the constant refilling of the 5-gallon can.

Recommend that the Office of the Quartermaster General conduct a research and development study to provide a modification for the Adapter, gravity feed, which can be utilized with a 55-gallon drum. (Command Report - 55th QM Base Depot - June 53.)

ITEM NO 88

CHANGES TO ENGINEER TOPOGRAPHIC CO (CORPS). - There is a weakness in the T/O&E of this unit (T/O&E 5-167). The authorized Fire Control Instrument Repairman (MOS 3922) is trained in maintenance of equipment pertaining to armament and ordnance items but is generally not qualified to repair survey equipment of the type used by this company. Recommend that this MOS be eliminated from the T/O&E and in its place authorize a Non-electrical Equipment Repairman (MOS 3098). The training and qualifications of this MOS fit closely the requirements for a unit.
of this type. This change along with change of Electrician (MOS 3078) for a Field Radio Mechanic (MOS 3648) would provide necessary personnel to maintain the many delicate items of equipment authorized this unit. (Command Report - 62d Engr Topographic Co - May 53.)

OCAFF Comment: Recommendation appears to have merit and consideration will be given to changing subject MOS's when table is revised.

ITEM NO 89

ENEMY 3.5 ROCKETS. - Five enemy spin stabilized 3.5 rocket rounds were found in the Yokok-Chon river valley approximately 500 yards from the route tanks were using to enter the valley. Following results were noted: maximum effective range 547 yards, maximum penetration 3-1/2 inches at a 90 degree angle. The rocket is point detonating. (Command Report - 73d Tank Bn (M) - Mar 53.)

ITEM NO 90

AUTHORIZATION OF TELEPHONE EE-105 IN T/O&E 11-500. - General Maintenance teams are authorized by T/O&E 11-500 four each, telephones, EE-8 to perform maintenance on open wire systems. However, the telephone EE-8 cannot be used on open wire systems which have carrier termination without disrupting communications on all channels. All open wire systems maintained by this organization utilize carrier equipment.

Recommend that GM teams be authorized by T/O&E 11-500, telephone EE-105 which is designed for maintenance of open wire with carrier systems in lieu of the telephone EE-8. (Command Report - 59th Sig Support Co - June 53.)

ITEM NO 91

HELICOPTER FOR SIGNAL CO (T/O&E 11-117). - Supplying and maintaining the VHF sites by air-ground liaison teams presents great travel problems in Korea. Due to their inaccessibility by road these sites may be off the air for many hours. Some sites are at the tops of mountains and even upon arriving at the base of the mountain it takes over 1-1/2 hours to reach them.

Open wire maintenance is a difficult task over Korean terrain. Most of the lines run through passes and mountains; thus, they are
impossible to reach by road. This presents great problems in locating trouble and maintaining the lines.

Recommend that a signal company of this type be authorized one helicopter. (Command Report - 57th Sig Support Co - June 53.)

OCAFF Comment: There is not sufficient justification to authorize a helicopter for the following reason: Some of the difficulties encountered in supplying and maintaining VHF sites are unique to Korea. It should be possible for the unit to obtain the use of a helicopter from one of the other Signal Units in the Army Signal Group or from Transportation Helicopter Companies.

ITEM NO 92
SIGNAL CORPS AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHERS. - Recommend steps be taken to assure Signal Corps aerial photographers prompt flight status and incentive flying pay in combat zones.

Tactical light aviation photography has been considerably impaired by existing regulations which require DA approval for Signal enlisted personnel engaging in these hazardous missions. Inasmuch as these Signal camera-men undertake the same risks as the pilots who fly them over enemy terrain, recommend they receive the same recognition for flight pay commensurate with grade. (Command Report - 3d Sig Co - May 53.)

ITEM NO 93
NEW TYPE SIGNAL LINE TRUCKS AND EARTH BORERS. - Recommend that the new type Signal line trucks and earth borers (V-17 & V-18) be equipped with dual tires to obtain greater stability. These vehicles are top heavy, especially when traveling over the rugged terrain in Korea. (Command Report - 26th Sig Const Bn - May 53.)

ITEM NO 94
PROTECTING PRISONERS. - The frigid Korean winter has had its effect in reducing the number of prisoners taken. Enemy troops are not as active during cold weather as they are in milder temperatures. Consequently, enemy movement is so restricted in front of their MLR that captures by raiding parties and ambushes are particularly difficult to accomplish. Cold weather adds to the problem even further since wounded prisoners often do not survive shock and cold until they can be evacuated through friendly lines. Rather unusual measures have been
adopted to surmount this difficulty. The ROK 6th Infantry Division has made it a practice to carry extra blankets on patrol for the express purpose of wrapping wounded prisoners. On several occasions, 7th Infantry Division patrols have carried a wounded PW between two litters in order to secure as well as protect him. The ultimate in protection of PW's seems to have been reached when a soldier of the ROK 1st Infantry Division, taking part in a raid on BIG NORI, put both his helmet and armored vest on a captured Chinese soldier to ensure his safe return to friendly positions. (Command Report - Eighth Army - Jan 53.)