1st Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division, FMF,
In the Field, Korea

7 October, 1950

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

Maps: Map of Korea, 1:50,000, AMS L571.

Sketches: 1. Inchon Landing
2. Battalion Operations South of Han River
3. Attack of Hill 105
4. Battalion Operations North of Han River

1. INTRODUCTION:

This report is submitted in accordance with a directive received from the Commanding Officer, 5th Marines and paragraph 11401.2A, Marine Corps Manual. The purpose of this report is to provide a concise, complete record of the actions in which this unit participated during the period 30 August to 7 October, 1950. Missions assigned this battalion were issued by the next higher echelon, The 5th Marines.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION:

BLT 1/5 37 Officers, 1026 Enlisted LtCol G. R. NEWTON

H&S Company Capt W. E. GODENIUS
TACP 1stLt J. W. SMITH
FGF Liaison Lt. C. O. GREVE, USN
Arty Liaison 1st Lt. J. J. SNYDER

"A" Company Capt. J. R. STEVENS
"B" Company Capt. F. I. FENTON, Jr.
"C" Company 1st Lt P. F. PEDERSEN
Weapons Company Maj J. W. RUSSELL
Korean National Police Plt. SSgt J. L. WILLIS

At various times, as noted in paragraph 7, elements of the following units were attached, depending on whether the Battalion was in assault or reserve:

75MM Recoilless Gun Company, 5th Marines
3. **PRELIMINARY PLANNING**:

The schedule, as set forth by higher headquarters, required this Battalion to be ready in all respects to embark aboard ship at Pusan, Korea on 11 September, 1950. All organizational equipment was prepared and vehicles loaded for an amphibious landing. The preliminary planning of the Battalion consisted of reorganization and resupply. The reorganization consisted of joining a rifle company and additional sections of Weapons Company. These units were newly arrived from the United States. The rifle company was designated as "C" Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

Military maps of the landing area were received by this Battalion on the afternoon of 10 September, 1950. These maps were not used for preliminary planning prior to this Battalion's embarkation aboard ship at 1400, 11 September, 1950, inasmuch as an operation order had not as yet been received. The Battalion supply train carried sufficient water, rations and ammunition to last for a period of one day.

4. **TRAINING AND REHEARSAL**:

Training aboard ship consisted of physical drill, instruction on amphibious techniques, briefings of the landing operation to take place at Inchon, estimate of the enemy situation, review of technique of combat in built up areas, debarkation drill and the use of scaling ladders and cargo nets as it was planned that the first five boat waves were to land shortly after the tide began to rise and the scaling ladders and cargo nets would be needed as an aid in reaching the top of the sea wall from the LCVP's held "bow on" to the sea wall.

5. **LOADING AND EMBARKATION**:

Upon arrival at Pusan, Korea on 6 September, 1950, BLT 1/5 commenced combat loading of the USS HENRICO. (APA 45) continuing on a 24 hour schedule, until loading was completed on the morning of 11 September, 1950. The first element of the Battalion to go aboard ship was the Battalion cooks who embarked on 6 September, 1950, followed by the messman on 7 September, 1950. The main body of the Battalion commenced embarkation at 1400, 11 September, 1950. Embarkation was completed at 1600, 11 September, 1950.
6. **MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA:**

   The USS HENRICO (APA 45) sailed from Pusan, at 1450, 12 September, 1950, and was underway for a period of three days, arriving at the transport area off the port of Inchon at approximately 1300, 15 September, 1950. Troops began disembarking at 1530, with the first assault wave hitting Red Beach I at 1733.

7. **DETAILED COMBAT NARRATIVE:**

   On 30 August, 1950, while in 8th Army Reserve, 3 miles west of Changwon, Korea the Battalion Commander was summoned to the Regimental Command Post and given information as to the general scheme of maneuver for the proposed landing at Inchon. After a short briefing, orders were received to return at 0800 the next morning for further planning and conferences. At 0800 on 31 August, the Battalion Commander returned to the 5th Marines Command Post, only to receive orders that the 1st Battalion would be prepared to move by 1200 to Miryang for operations against the enemy in the Youngsan sector. The single map of Inchon was turned in and no further planning was possible until the Battalion was returned to Pusan, Korea on 6 September after three days of continuous fighting in the Naktong river Bulge in the vicinity of Youngsan. The Battalion casualties during the period amounted to 11 KIA, 84 WIA.

   The lead elements of BLT 1/5 arrived at Pusan, Korea at 1810, 6 September, 1950 with the last element arriving at the assembly area at 2130. Upon arrival at Pusan, a directive was received stating that at 0001, 13 September, 1950 the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade would be deactivated and would be absorbed by the 1st Marine Division, FMF, under the command of Major General Oliver P. Smith, USMC.

   During the period 7 September through 11 September, 1950, while waiting to board its assigned ship, the USS HENRICO (APA 45), the Battalion was reorganized and resupplied. Although billeted in a warehouse on the dock at Pusan, the men of the Battalion were fed aboard the USS HENRICO. The Commanding Officer of the USS HENRICO (APA 45), Captain Fradd, also allowed the Battalion the use of the ship's showering facilities. A limited amount of training, consisting of small arms firing for the Battalion and a conditioning hike for the newly arrived "C" Company was accomplished. The Battalion also furnished a detail of 25 instructors to train the Republic of Korea Marines in the firing of rockets and mortars. The USS HENRICO was being combat loaded and readied for embarkation of BLT 1/5 at this time.

   On the night of 10 September, 1950 all companies were alerted to make preparations to board ship on order because of an approaching typhoon. Actual embarkation of the Battalion commenced at 1400, 11 September, 1950. After embarkation was completed at 1600 that date,
the ship remained tied to the dock at Pusan until 1450, 12 September, 1950 when it got underway with BLT 1/5 and H&S Company, 5th Marines as the major units embarked. Also aboard were a group of war correspondents from the leading American and British newspapers.

On 13 September, 1950 all units were informed of the overall mission of the 1st Marine Division and the specific mission of BLT 1/5. A series of briefings on the plan of operation of BLT 1/5 and on the estimate of the enemy situation were conducted regularly while enroute to the Objective area.

On 14 September, 1950 the Battalion supply sections issued ammunition and rations to the companies for further distribution to the troops. Upon debarkation, each man was to carry a basic load of ammunition, one days C-4 ration, and two canteens of water. During the afternoon of the 14th a debarkation drill was held for all embarked troops and all boat teams of the first five waves were briefed in the use of the scaling ladders and cargo nets to be employed in clearing the sea wall at the landing beach.

On the morning of 15 September, 1950, all units completed last minute preparations and the Battalion stood by to disembark on order. For graphic picture of the Inchon landing see sketch No. 1. As the ship neared the transport area, all troops were ordered to their compartments. At 1530, the assault wave began disembarking from the USS HENRICO into landing craft and proceeded to the rendezvous area. At this time, word was received that H-hour had been postponed for 30 minutes. During the approach of the landing craft to the beach, an intense naval and air bombardment of the landing area took place. Immediately prior to the arrival of the assault wave at the beach, LSM(R)'s fired a 2,000 round rocket concentration on the landing area. An air strike was called on Observatory Hill by the 1st Battalion FAC, 1stLt J. W. Smith, as he was enroute to the beach, using portable equipment in the landing craft. At 1733 the first wave arrived at the sea wall on Red Beach I and disembarked the troops through the use of scaling ladders. Three of the initial landing craft utilized holes blasted in the sea wall to unload their troops. The first three waves, consisting of 14 boats, carried "A" Company, commanded by Captain J. R. Stevens. "A" Company, with the mission of taking Battalion objective No. 1 and their portion of the O-A line, landed amid heavy small arms fire and intermittent mortar fire coming from trenches and bunkers on the beach, from the exposed left flank, and from Battalion objective 1 (Cemetery Hill). The left flank of Red Beach I was strongly defended, in contrast to a fairly weak defense of the right flank. "A" Company assaulted objective I. Captain Stevens, at 1755, fired an amber star cluster signifying the seizure
of objective I. "A" Company completed their assigned mission of securing their portion of the O-A line at 2240. The casualties suffered by "A" Company and attachments during this period amounted to 1 officer and 7 enlisted KIA, 28 enlisted WIA.

The 4th and 5th waves, composed of "C" Company, commanded by First Lieutenant P. F. Pedersen, landed at H+20 with a five minute interval between waves. Due to motor failure of an LCVP in the Company Commander's boat wave at the rendezvous area, the entire wave was delayed by order of the boat wave commander, and Lt Pedersen did not land with his boat team until the 6th wave had landed. The organization of "C" Company on the beach was delayed because units of BLT 2/5 were overlapping into the 1st Battalion's zone of action. It should be noted at this time that there was great deal of confusion on Red Beach from H-hour to H+180 due to the inability of coxswains to land in their assigned areas units were intermingled and commandes had difficulty in organizing their commands. Added confusion was caused when a beached LST fired its 40MM and 20MM cannon's over the heads of the troops on the beach, and on objective I and ABLE while they were being occupied by our forces. The second platoon, under the command of Second Lieutenant B. L. Magness, with the 60MM mortar section commanded by Second Lieutenant M. A. Merritt attained Regimental Objective ABLE at 1845, but do to lack of communication facilities or the proper signal flare equipment, they were unable to notify the Battalion Commander that the objective had been taken. This lack of communication with the Battalion Commander resulted in friendly fire being delivered on Objective ABLE while it was being occupied by elements of "C" Company. Due to the difficulty "C" Company was experiencing in reorganizing, and inasmuch as the units of "C" Company on objective ABLE were unable to inform the Battalion Commander or the Company Commander of their presence on the objective, the Battalion Commander deemed it necessary to order "B" Company, which had landed in support of the Battalion and was intact, to seize and occupy Regimental Objective ABLE. The rapid approach of darkness also influenced the Battalion Commander's decision to have "B" Company seize and defend objective ABLE. During this time Lt Pedersen reported to the Battalion Commander that he was reorganizing his company on the beach. The Battalion Commander orders "C" Company upon completion of reorganization to assume the mission of Battalion Reserve.

"B" Company upon attaining objective ABLE discovered that the 2nd Platoon of "C" Company was occupying the right flank of the objective and had visual contact with "F" Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines. "B" Company Commander, Captain Francis I. Fenton, Jr., contacted the Battalion Commander and notified him of the presence of the 2nd Platoon of
"C" Company. The Battalion Commander, ordered "B" Company Commander to leave this platoon in position and to occupy and defend the left portion of objective ABLE and to tie in with the right flank of "A" Company. This was accomplished at approximately 2330. The remainder of "C" Company reorganized, and as ordered took up positions to the rear of objective ABLE, and assumed the mission of Battalion Reserve for the night. At 2240 on 15 September, the Battalion Commander reported to RCT-5 that objective ABLE was secured and by 2345 all units had made contact with adjacent units and had organized for the night. Casualties suffered by "B" Company during this period were 6 WIA, "C" Company suffered 5 WIA.

Weapons Company, which had landed after "B" Company, was placed with "C" Company in support of the Battalion to the rear of objective ABLE. The Command Post established ashore at 1755 and initially located at TA 8950-R-2 displaced at 0230, 16 September, 1950 to TA 8949-E-1.

As scaling ladders were used for the first time by Marine units in the landing, inquiries were made as to their practicability. Captain J. R. Stevens, "A" Company Commander had the following comments to make:

"Boat 1-4 used aluminum ladders equipped with large hooks which were used to hook over the sea wall. These ladders proved extremely effective. The wall was estimated to have been at least 10 feet high and all reports are that unloading would have been very difficult if not impossible without the use of these ladders. In debarking it was estimated that each boat was unloaded in less than two minutes with a minimum of casualties.

The hooks on the wooden ladders proved ineffective. However, the ladders were placed vertically against the sea wall and the troops were able to disembark rapidly."

For graphic picture of BLT 1/5's operations south of the Han River see sketch No. 2.

At 0400, 16 September, 1950, a verbal order was received by the Battalion to move to an assembly area and to assume the mission of Regimental Reserve. At 0630, an operation order was received from RCT-5 confirming the warning order received earlier. At 0910 BLT 1/5 began movement to the designated assembly area. while on the move, additional orders were
received directing the unit to proceed to a more forward assembly area. Orders were once again received to move to a third assembly area still further advanced. At 1930, the Battalion moved into an assembly area at TA 9750-X-2.

The Battalion Commander at 1900 attended a Regimental Conference at which time plans for the following days operation were issued. At 2300, an operation order was received directing this Battalion to move out behind BLT 2/5 at 0700, 17 September, 1950.

BLT 1/5, was unable to get underway until 1125, 17 September, 1950 because BLT 2/5 had been held up. At 1125, this Battalion moved out in trace of the 2nd Battalion. Movement continued very rapidly throughout the afternoon. No enemy resistance was encountered. During the late afternoon BLT 2/5 swung to the left to capture Kimpo Airfield. BLT 1/5 continued forward and at 1900, objective EASY was seized and occupied by "A" Company, which was later strengthened by the addition of "B" Company. After seizure of objective EASY, the Battalion set up in defense positions for the night. The Battalion Command Post was located at TA 0655-W-4.

At dawn on 18 September, 1950, "B" Company Commander reported to the Battalion Commander that there were enemy troops to his left flank advancing in direction of Kimpo Airfield, attacking 2nd Battalion, the Battalion Commander immediately called for artillery and mortar fire to be added to the fire "B" Company was already bringing down on the flank and rear of the enemy. At the same time he ordered "C" Company to attack in order to cut off their retreat.

The coordinated fire of the 1st and 2nd Battalion, plus the attack to the rear and flank by "C" Company caused confusion in the enemy ranks, which forced him to make a hasty and disorganized withdrawal, suffering heavy casualties. Enemy resistance was light as they fled to objective FOX. The retreating enemy were again brought under artillery fire called for by units of BLT 1/5 and BLT 2/5. "C" Company, who had halted for the second artillery barrage were ordered to continue the attack and seize objective FOX, which was accomplished against light opposition at 0930. During this time the remaining elements of the Battalion remained in position. The remainder of the day was spent with all units conducting patrols, capturing 31 enemy, and various types of equipment, which included a large quantity of medical supplies found in an abandoned enemy aid station to the rear of objective FOX. At 1600, BLT 1/5 displaced the Command Post to TA 0656-S-4. At 2110, the Battalion was ordered to send out a
patrol of one platoon to locate and enemy radio team, believed to be located at TA 0959-B-2. 
"C" Company Commander was ordered to dispatch the patrol immediately. The patrol, led by Lt 
Magness, departed at 2130, encountered no enemy opposition enroute to the designated area. 
The patrol was engaged in minor fire fight, with an undetermined number of enemy on the return 
trip, but suffered no casualties. The patrol had no success in locating the enemy radio team, and 
returned to the Battalion Area at approximately 0200, 19 September, 1950.

At 2200, 18 September, 1950, BLT 1/5 was ordered to prepare to move out in the attack 
to seize Hills 80 and 85 at 0700, 19 September, 1950. At 0615, "C" Company began to receive 
heavy small arms fire and sporadic mortar fire from Hill 118. The Battalion commander 
immediately called for artillery, mortar fire and an air strike on this position.

At dawn, groups of enemy, ten to fifteen per group, were observed advancing a long the 
road toward the air field on the left of "C" Company's other groups were moving across the rice 
paddies to the front of "C" Company's position. The advance of these groups was covered by 
heavy small arms and mortar fire. The enemy was taken under fire by 81MM and 60MM 
mortars located on the reverse slope of objective FOX. The "C" Company machine guns on the 
left flank played a major part in stopping and containing the attack. As the enemy were being 
held by "C" Company, "B" Company was ordered to attack and envelope Hill 118, which was 
directly in front of objective FOX. Proceeding the attack a heavy artillery barrage and an air 
strike were delivered. "B" Company quickly moving in under this preparation succeeded in 
taking its objective which resulted in the surrounding and destroying of 100 enemy troops with 
no casualties to "B" Company. This move also enabled "C" Company to move forward and take 
the ridge to the left front with light casualties. Hill 118 was secured at 1055.

Approximately 500 enemy were involved in the attack on "C" Company's position. It 
was estimated that the enemy suffered 80% casualties, with 56 enemy prisoners being taken. 
The casualties suffered by our forces were as follows: "B" Company, 1 KIA; "C" Company, 2 
KIA, 6 WIA. "B" company's casualty occurred in defense of Hill 118. At 1310, the Battalion 
Command Post displaced forward and at 1325 was located at TA 0957-M-1. "B" Company and 
"C" Company consolidated their positions on Hill 118 while waiting the arrival of tanks to assist 
in the attack on Hills 80 and 85. A large number of enemy troops were observed on Hill 80 by 
"B" Company. Due to the Battalion FAC not being able to observe from the Battalion CP, 
Captain Fenton called for and directed an air strike on that position causing many casualties and 
succeeded in routing the enemy from Hill 80. At 1430, the 3rd Platoon of "C" Company,
commanded by Lt Dawe moved southwest along the highway, covered by company machine
guns and mortar fire directed at Hill 80 and 85. This platoon seized and occupied Hill 80 at
1545. The 1st platoon commanded by Lt Corbet, supported by a platoon of tanks moved in
column behind the 3rd platoon at an interval of approximately 500 yards, seized and occupied
Hill 85 at 1650. The platoon of tanks remained to the rear of Hill 85 as a covering force. The
2nd platoon leading the company supply train moved to the rear of Hills 80 and 85. The 2nd
platoon reinforced by Korean National Police was assigned the task of clearing the villages to the
rear of Hills 80 and 85.

Upon occupation of Hills 80 and 85, "C" Company was subjected to artillery, mortar, and
small arms fire. This enemy fire continued until night fell. A perimeter defense was set in on
the reverse slope of Hills 80 and 85, with the company making all preparations to defend the
position for the night. "A" Company remained in the position occupied the previous night. "B"
Company was set up in their position on Hill 118. The Battalion Command Post was located at
TA 0957-M-1 with H&S Company. Weapons Company occupied positions behind "B"
Company on the reverse slope of Hill 118.

At approximately 1600, 19 September, 1950, the Battalion Commander was summoned
to the Regimental Command Post. At this time, the Battalion Commander was informed that
BLT 1/5 would withdraw to an assembly area at Kimpo Airfield when relieved by BLT 1/1. At
2030, BLT 1/1 began relief of BLT 1/5. Upon relief, units of BLT 1/5 proceeded independently,
by foot, to the airfield. At 0130, 20 September, the last elements of this Battalion arrived at the
assembly area. The Battalion Command Post was located at TA 055-I-2.

For graphic sketch of BLT 1/5's operations North of the Han River see sketch No. 4.

At 0145, 20 September, the Battalion Commander received a operation order from RCT-
5 directing BLT 1/5 to cross the Han River on order, and after crossing to assume the mission of
Regimental Reserve. The Battalion remained in its assembly area at Kimpo Airfield throughout
the morning. At 1330, units of this Battalion began embarkation aboard the LVT's in which they
would cross the Han River. At 1355, the first LVT's left the assembly area and arrived at the
Han at 1455. Crossing of the river was begun immediately. No enemy encountered. When the
river crossing had been completed the Battalion disembarked and began a route march to the
tactical assembly area located at TA 1063-F-4, arriving there at 1700.
At 1830, orders were received from RCT-5 to dispatch one company to objective ABLE (Hill 125) for flank security of the river crossing area and to clear out snipers which were harassing personnel in the vicinity of the Han River crossing. "C" Company was assigned this mission and completed occupation of objective ABLE at 2130.

At 0730, 21 September, 1950, the battalion started in route march to objective DOG, "C" Company brought up the rear of the column after leaving its position on objective ABLE.

The battalion proceeded in route march along the railroad tracks toward the city of Seoul. At 1050, the battalion established the Command Post at TA 1361-J-3. At this time "A" and "B" Companies were ordered to attack and seize Hill 96. "A" Company jumped off in the assault of the hill located just to the right of Hill 96, this position to be used as the intermediate objective in the assault of Hill 96. At 1200, an air strike was put on the objective. The air strike was immediately followed by an artillery barrage. As the artillery barrage lifted, "A" Company jumped off in the attack supported by fire from tanks located along the railroad tracks, and at 1315 they had seized and occupied Hill 96. "C" Company, following in trace of "A" Company, swept through the rice paddies and then moved around to the left flank of "A" Company to take over the assault for the seizure of Hill 68. "B" Company moving on the Battalion left flank, continued the attack and at 1355 seized and occupied its objective, Hill 40. Throughout the attack, the assault companies were under moderate small arms fire the rear elements of the Battalion were being harassed by sniper fire. All enemy fire was coming from the direction of Hills 96 and 68. With the support of machine guns and mortars of "B" and "C" Companies, "C" Company swept the ridge and occupied Hill 68. Occupation of Hill 68 was completed at 1730. After Hills 40 and 68 were occupied by "B" and "C" Companies, "A" Company occupied the ridge between Hills 40 and 68. During the days operation, the following casualties were incurred: "A" Company, 5 WIA including 1stLt Eubanks, Company Executive Officer, "B" Company, 1 KIA, 1 WIA; "C" Company 1 KIA, 1 WIA. At 1600 the battalion Command Post displace and set up at TA 1559-R-1. At 1730, all companies had attained their objective, consolidated their positions and were dug in for the night. Throughout the night, the Battalion positions was subjected to intermittent artillery and mortar fire.

For graphic sketch of action of Hill 105 see sketch No. 3.

At 0730, 22 September, 1950, the Battalion Commander ordered an attack on Hill 105. The scheme of maneuver was that "B" Company attack along the railroad tracks supported by a
platoon of tanks and fire from "C" Company. This attack was to be coordinated with an attack launched by the ROK Marines on the high ground to the front of Hill 104 in their zone of action. The railroad tracks was to be the boundary line between the 1st Battalion and the ROK Marines. The tanks which were to support "B" Company were committed to the aid of the ROK Marines who were having difficulty in launching their attack. The initial plan call for an attack with companies in column.

At 0745, this plan was changed in that "A" Company, would pass through "C" Company and advance to the base of Hill 105, at which time "C" Company would envelope the objective from the right. "B" Company was to remain in position and deliver fire support from these positions on Hill 40. At 1030, "A" Company moved out with the 1st platoon, in command of TSgt McMullon leading, and secured the high ground around the radio station. Captain Stevens passed the 2nd and 3rd Platoons through the 1st platoon to set up a base of fire from which he could support the attack on Hill 105. As the platoons were moving into position they received heavy enemy automatic and small arms fire from the front and left front of Hill 105. This fire pinned "A" Company down. During this fire Lt Mann, Platoon Leader of the 2nd Platoon was killed and LT Schimmenti, Platoon Leader, 3rd Platoon was severely wounded.

During "A" Company's move, "C" Company had moved to the extreme right of the Battalion zone of action sweeping the rice paddies as it moved, and arrived at the low ground to the right flank of hill 105.

"B" Company who had remained in their original positions were ordered by the Battalion Commander to send a two platoon patrol back to the vicinity of Hill 68, to investigate a reported 400 enemy soldiers in that area. This patrol was lead by 1stLt J. Hancock, Executive Officer of "B" Company. This patrol departed at 1235. The remaining platoon commanded by Lt Schryver returned to the Battalion Command Post as a security force. "B" Company's patrol returned to the Battalion Command Post at 1500, with a negative report.

At 1500, "C" Company with the 1st and 3rd platoons supported by a section of machine guns attacked Hill 105. The 1st Platoon commanded by Lt Corbet, was immediately pinned down by heavy enemy machine gun and small arms fire, from his front and right flank. At this time the 2nd Platoon commanded by Lt Magness swung to the right rear of the company's zone of action and both the 2nd and 3rd Platoons awaited the coordinated attack which was ordered with "B" Company.
At 1545, the Battalion Commander ordered "B" Company to pass through "A" Company and attack the west portion of Hill 105, in their zone of action. At 1720, after an intense mortar, artillery and air preparation, "B" and "C" Companies assaulted Hill 105, supported by fire from "A" Company. "B" Company, attack with the 2nd and 3rd Platoons seized the west portion of Hill 105, with the 1st Platoon taking the low ridge to the rear of Hill 105. "C" Company enveloping from the right with the 2nd and 3rd Platoons seized the east portion of Hill 105. The objective was secured at 1735.

During the attack on Hill 105, "A" Company, machine guns and "C" Company mortars delivered supporting fires. Excellent supporting fire was delivered by the 81MM Mortar Platoon of Weapons Company. This platoon was commanded by Lt Alderman, and had their fire directed by Lt Tuley the Battalion F.O.

After reaching the crest of Hill 105, "B" and "C" Companies consolidated their positions despite heavy small arms fire and sporadic artillery and mortar fire. Due to the fact that "B" company occupied the larger portion of the objective and that their 1st Platoon was occupying low ground to the north of Hill 105, which was under heavy fire, the 3rd Platoon of "C" Company was attached to "B" Company for filling the line. As soon as was practical, the 1st Platoon of "B" Company was withdrawn from the low ground and placed on Hill 105 for support. At 1800, Hill 105 was secured and a perimeter defense established for the night. The casualties suffered by the attacking companies in the taking of Hill 105 were: "B" Company, 1 KIA, 6 WIA; "C" Company, 9 KIA, 17 WIA; "A" Company, 2 KIA, 8 WIA.

During the attack of Hill 105 supplies were being rushed to the assault companies by jeep. Many mines were encountered on the roads. One jeep struck a land mine, injuring the driver, killing the rider and destroying the jeep. At 1030, 22 September, mortar and artillery fire fell in the Weapons company area causing 1 dead and 15 wounded. At 1705, that afternoon a concentration of artillery shells fell in the Battalion Command Post and supply area, killing 5 and wounding 18.

At 0200, on 23 September, 1950, a counter attack of approximately 50 enemy came up the east side of Hill 105 penetrating the 3rd Platoon of "C" Company, overrunning a machine gun, killing the gunner and the assistant gunner. The penetration was sealed off and the enemy repulsed.
Throughout the following day "B" and "C" Companies remained on Hill 105 and were subjected to intense small arms fire, sporadic mortar and constant fire from several high velocity flat trajectory weapons on the forward slope and either side of the hill. Movement was impossible during daylight hours. Water, rations and ammunition was supplied those positions only after darkness, at which time the small arms fire subsided. The Battalion's position remained unchanged on the night of the 23rd.

At 0450, 24 September, 1950, the enemy approximately 50 in strength, again counter attacked in the same area as they had the night before. The counter attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy.

At 0700, 24 September, 1950, "C" Company was ordered to send one platoon to the right rear of Hill 105 on the Han River to secure a portion of the river bank for the landing of elements of the 1st Marines and to guide these elements into positions on the right flank of Hill 105.

At 0900, the patrol returned to its position on Hill 105 after accomplishing the mission. At 1010, orders were received for the Battalion to move to Hills 216 and 296 and effect relief of BLT 3/5 and assume that battalion's mission of protecting the left flank of RCT-5.

At 1230, "A" Company began movement to the rear followed by "C" Company less the 3rd platoon, which remained with "B" Company on Hill 105. At 1400, elements of the 1st Marines moved around the right flank of 105 and moved towards the high ground to the front, thereby allowing "B" Company with the 3rd platoon of "C" Company to withdraw at 1630 when ordered by Battalion Commanding Officer. The number of casualties suffered by the Battalion while seizing and occupying Hill 105 were: 27 KIA, 72 WIA.

At 2000 all units of BLT 1/5 had effected relief of BLT 3/5, "L" Company was placed in Battalion support. The Command Post was located at TA 1760-V-2.

At 0100, 25 September, 1950, "A" Company in its positions on Hill 296 repulsed a minor counter attack. At 0300 an operation order was received directing the Battalion to move out, on order, in trace of the 3rd Battalion, with BLT 1/5 in reserve. The Battalion's positions would be occupied by elements of the 1st Reconnaissance Company.
At 1830, the Battalion was relieved in position by the 1st Reconnaissance Company and this Battalion moved out in route column to a new assembly area in the vicinity of TA 1850-V-2, arriving there at approximately 1900. At 2300, orders were received from the Commanding Officer of RCT-5 to move out immediately in trace of BLT 3/5. This Battalion moved out and contacted BLT 3/5 at 0100, 26 September, 1950, but inasmuch as BLT 3/5 did not continue the attack this Battalion remained in position at TA 1959, in the vicinity of "Chosen University". The Battalion set up a perimeter defense in this area and remained there until 1100, 27 September, 1950.

At 0200, 27 September, 1950, BLT 1/5 received orders directing the Battalion to move out on order following BLT 3/5 in trace to Middle School. Upon reaching Middle School, the Battalion made a left wheeling movement and seized Hill 338. At approximately 1045, orders were received to move out, and at 1100 the Battalion moved out in route column with "A" Company leading, followed by "B", "C", and Weapons Companies. At 1300 "A" Company had reached Middle School, turned to the left and taken up positions on Observatory Hill in preparation for the assault of Hill 338. They were supported from this position by a section of 75MM Recoilless rifle Platoon, one platoon of machine guns and the 81MM Mortar platoon from Weapons Company. "C" Company moved on through the city to the Government Buildings and there, with the support of a platoon of tanks, they moved up that portion of the city that lies between Hill 338 and the Palace grounds, moving in the direction of Hill 342. "B" company, with Weapons Company, took up reserve and support positions around Observatory Hill with the Command Post being located at TA 2059-S-3. At 1300, following an air strike and heavy artillery and mortar preparation fires, "A" Company launched the attack against Hill 338. Just prior to the attack, a squad of Korean National Police was sent to clear the section of city between Observatory Hill and Hill 338.

As soon as the Korean National Police had accomplished their mission of clearing the section of the city in the path of "A" Company, the 1st Platoon, commanded by Lt. Trapnell, was assigned the mission of seizing the high ground to the front. This was accomplished against moderate resistance. The 2nd platoon, commanded by Lt Collins, was then committed to the left of the ancient wall that runs along the slope of Hill 338, and abreast of the 1st platoon, their mission being to seize the portion of Hill 171 in their zone of action. As the attack continued, the 1st and 2nd platoons came under heavy mortar fire and small arms fire. While being held up, an air strike was called on the right portion of Hill 171. After the air strike lifted the 2nd platoon was still subjected to severe small arms fire and could not advance. The 1st platoon,
supported by fire from 81MM mortars and 60MM mortars, "A" Company and Weapons Company machine guns, attacked and over ran the enemy on Hill 171. This action enabled the 2nd Platoon to move forward and secure their objective. The 3rd Platoon, commanded by TSgt Bolkow was passed through the 1st Platoon with orders to attack Hill 225 in line with the 2nd Platoon, upon taking its portion of Hill 225, was ordered to attack to Hill 338, which was accomplished with light resistance. Hill 338 was secured at 1850. "A" Company set in defense positions on Hills 225 and 338.

During "A" Company's attack, "C" Company had progressed through their zone of action and proceeded up the slope between Hills 342 and 338, swinging to the left along the ancient wall moved up Hill 338 to tie in with "A" Company. Casualties for the day were: "A" Company 4 KIA, 7 WIA. BLT 1/5 remained in position for the night with no enemy activity. The Command Post was located in Middle School, at TA 6059-S-3.

At 0700, 28 September, 1950, BLT 1/5 was directed to give fire support to the 7th Marines on Hill 342, but was unable to do so, as information as to their front lines was not available. At this time "A", "B", and "C" Companies were assigned sectors of the Battalion zone of action in which to patrol. The mission was to seek and destroy all remaining enemy and to confiscate all enemy material. At 0800 all patrols had departed from company positions. No enemy resistance was encountered, although there were many prisoners taken and large quantities of all types of enemy material was found and reported. At 1800, orders were issued for all units to proceed independently to the Battalion Assembly Area at Middle School, leaving one platoon of "A" Company on Hill 338. At 1600, all units of the Battalion were in the Assembly Area. "B" and "C" Companies were ordered to dispatch one platoon each to assigned areas in the Battalion Zone as outposts. The Battalion established local security and remained in the Assembly Area during the night.

On 29 September, 1950, the Battalion utilized the building of Middle School for offices and barracks. At 1200, all outposts were recalled to the Assembly Area and an interior and security guard was established on a 24 hour basis. At 1700, the Battalion received 57 new replacements which were distributed to the companies. The period spent at Middle School was utilized for reorganization and administrative details.

At 1115, 30 September, 1950, the Commanding Officer of BLT 1/1 ordered "C" Company to be prepared to entruck at 1300 and report to the Commanding Officer of BLT 2/5 at
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TA 0865-A-3 for further orders. At 1300, "C" Company departed Battalion Assembly area and at 1700 reported to the Commanding Officer of BLT 2/5 for further orders. At 1350, the Korean National Police, attached to BLT 1/5 were ordered to send out three patrols of one squad each to investigate reports that North Korean Soldiers were located in the northern sector of the Battalion Zone. At 1600, these patrols departed from the Battalion Assembly Area, and remained over night, returning the following morning at 0700, 1 October, 1950, with 21 prisoners, both civilian and military.

At 1930, 30 September, 1950, BLT 1/5 received a one hour standby order to move out. BLT 1/5 remained in this status until 1430, 1 October, 1950, at which time word was received to begin movement to an assembly area at TA 1764. At 1530, BLT 1/5, less "C" Company, began route march, arriving at designated assembly area at 1730, with the Command Post being established at TA 1764-M-3. The Battalion dug in and established local security. At 1945 orders were received from RCT-5 that the Battalion, on the following morning would send out two patrols to assigned sectors and also to provide a security detail for BLT 3/5's supply train. At 2040, "C" Company rejoined the Battalion. There was no enemy activity during the night. At 0830, 2 October, 1950, BLT 1/5 Patrols 1 and 2, which were supplied by "A" Company departed from the Battalion Assembly Area. The patrols covered their assigned routes meeting negative resistance. Mine fields were located by both patrols. Information gathered from civilian sources indicated that are 11 groups of enemy were raiding the villages. At 1900, the patrol returned to the Battalion Assembly Area. At 1940, the security guard for BLT 3/5 supply train departed BLT 1/5 Assembly Area. While enroute a truck overturned on a soft shoulder in the road slightly injuring three men of the security guard. The S-4 of BLT 3/5 supplied two jeeps and trailers to reload the supplies from the damaged truck and to deliver them to BLT 3/5. The security guard returned to the Battalion Assembly Area at 0800, 3 October, 1950.

At 0745, 3 October, 1950, Patrol 1 and 2 formed from "C" Company departed the Battalion Assembly Area. Patrol 1 returned at 1500 and reported engaging in a slight fire fight with an undetermined number of enemy. One member of the patrol was wounded in the hand. At 1640, Patrol 2 returned to Battalion Assembly Area. Patrol reports indicated that the groups of enemy reported by the previous patrols had been withdrawn to the northwest.

At 0930, "B" Company provided a security guard to accompany a supply train to BLT 3/5. This security guard returned at 1345, reporting that no enemy had been encountered.
During the night of 3 October, 1950, BLT 1/5 remained in the Assembly Area. At 2040, the Battalion received orders that on the following morning they would send a strong patrol in the area covered by patrol 1 of that day. At 2236, orders were received that the Battalion would provide one rifle platoon (reinforced) with 2 sections of "A" Battery, 50 AAA (U.S.A.), as security element of BLT 3/5 supply train. Weapons Company was assigned this mission.

At 0745, 4 October, 1950, "B" Company (reinforced) with 1 squad of "B" Company, 1st Engineer Battalion, and one section of 81MM mortar platoon, departed from the Assembly Area to patrol to the northwest to the Village of Sadok, to destroy enemy that had been reported in that area. "B" Company (reinforced) patrolled to the village of Sadok and returned with no enemy contact. Four mine fields were found along route of the patrol and were destroyed by the detachment of engineers. A total of 82 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines were destroyed.

At 0830, the supply train departed BLT 1/5 Assembly Area with security elements attached and returned at 1600, reporting no activity while enroute to and from destination. The Battalion remained in Assembly Area and no enemy activity was encountered.

At 1130, 5 October, 1950, the Battalion, upon order of RCT-5, entrucked in preparation for movement to 1st Marine Division Assembly Area at Inchon, Korea. At 1245, the 1st serial was underway and by 1600 the last serial had arrived at the new assembly area. The Battalion was billeted in buildings of the Jinsin Electrical Works.

On 6 and 7 October, 1950, BLT 1/5 remained in the assembly area began reorganization and resupply.

8. ENEMY TACTICS, ORGANIZATION, STRENGTH:

a. ENEMY TACTICS

On 15 September 1950, when this battalion landed at INCHON, KOREA, and estimated 2200 enemy troops of the SEOUL Defense Garrison were defending. Due to the intensity of out attack the enemy withdrew under the cover of darkness to high ground along the Seoul-Inchon Highway and fought a delaying action until 22 September 1950, when the main defense positions on the outskirts of Seoul were attained by the Battalion. This delaying action consisted of small groups tactically dug in and concealed on ridge lines overlooking the routes of approach to Seoul. Armed with rifles and automatic weapons, the tactics employed by these
groups was to open fire on our advancing elements at long range, delaying our advance until such time as our artillery, mortar or air were directed on these positions. The enemy forces would then retreat, sometimes in a disorganized manner, and at other times using orderly methods. During our advance to Seoul, the enemy reinforced the delaying forces with elements of the Seoul Defense. This action was due to the high losses of the enemy through causalities and prisoners and his need to delay our rapid advance to gain time to prepare defensive positions in Seoul and reinforce the Seoul defenders.

On 22 September, 1950, the enemies main defense of Seoul were met by this Battalion at Hill 105, overlooking the city. At this time the enemy employed a deliberate defense. From well entrenched positions along the base of the ridge and forward slope of the ridge the defenders concentrated heavy automatic rifle fire on the advancing elements. These weapons commenced firing at long range, continuing their fire throughout the attack. Though heavily hit by mortar and artillery fire, the enemy held their ground until killed or driven from their positions by our infantry. Upon attaining the crest of the ridge, the assaulting forces were met by fire from defense positions on the reverse slope of the ridge.

From the period 2 to 5 October, 1950, the Battalion was bivouacked at TA 1764 M (KYONGSONG Sheet 65261, 1:50,000). During this time extensive patrolling was conducted. The nature and tactics of the enemy encountered at this time was a defeated and confused attitude. Groups of 2 to 50 were encountered and reported hiding in the hills throughout the patrol areas. Upon contact the enemy fled without attempting to hold the ground he occupied. During the night the enemy resorted to guerilla tactics against villages, robbing the native of rice and animals for food, murdering and kidnaping natives. At no time were defenses attempted by enemy units. The patrol discovered numerous mine fields along the road networks leading north from Seoul. These mines were crudely buried without pattern and were easily distinguished during daylight. Anti-tank mines were of a Russian wooden (non-magnetic) type and in most cases were bobby trapped. Ant-personnel mines employed a pull type fuse, and were emplaced to cover the ant-tank mine field.

At 0600, 18 September, 1950, approximately 300 enemy were in position on the ridge line between "B" Company and "C" Company, having moved there during the night in preparation for an attack on Kimpo Airfield in BLT 2/5 zone of action. From the position of the enemy it was ascertained that no prior knowledge of our position was in the hands of the enemy; indicating a lack of reconnaissance patrolling by the enemy units, plus a lack of communication
between retreating forces and the attacking force. When this attacking force was fired on by 2/5 from the front and this Battalion from the flank, it completely disrupted the enemy attack, causing the force to retreat in panic, individually and in small groups.

At 0530, 19 September, 1950, 0200 23 September, 1950, and 0430, 24 September, 1950, elements of the Battalion were counterattacked by enemy units. These were approximately of platoon strength. The attacks were directed at the highest point of the ground occupied by our forces, and at machine gun emplacements. During the attack on 23 September, the enemy was successful in overrunning a machine gun emplacement, capturing the gun and withdrawing down the ridge. The attacking enemy used rifles, submachine guns and grenades in the attempts to over-run our positions. The attack on the 24 September, was well organized in that a base of fire was employed from a small ridge, firing automatic weapons onto our positions, while the assaulting force moved in to hand grenade range, and grenades thrown by our men proved the most effective in these three attacks, and the enemy was reluctant to continue the attack through a barrage of hand grenades.

During the advance from Inchon to Seoul the enemy used artillery and mortar fire mostly against rear command posts and supply trains. At times their fire appeared to be of a "hit or miss" nature, with many rounds falling harmlessly in rice paddies and on unoccupied ridges. At other times the mortar and artillery fire was accurately placed on our rear area positions and definitely indicated observed fire. Most of their firing was done in early evening after our planes were off station and not yet dark enough to observe their positions by flashes. Enemy barrages were never encountered to any extent; a six round barrage being the heaviest fired on any one position at one time it was sporadic fire. Only limited artillery and mortar was placed on our front line positions. However high velocity 45MM ant-tank and 85MM T34 tank cannons were fired quite extensively against our front line positions, utilizing a traversing system of fire. This fire was not very effective against our entrenched positions, as it was a blast effect into the side of the hills from low ground, rather than shrapnel falling into positions from above.

The use of brush and scrub pine for extensive camouflage from air and ground observation was found throughout this campaign.

The use of napalm on enemy positions by air was very effective in breaking the enemy position; causing the defenders to become disrupted and flee in panic.

b. ORGANIZATION
During the naval gun fire and air bombardment preceding the landing at INCHON, many of the defending enemy were either killed or driven to the rear. The remaining enemy organized into small pockets, the largest group defending Observatory Hill. This group employed many automatic weapons which delivered a large volume of fire on the landing beach. During the drive to Seoul the enemy was organized in groups of 50 to 150 men, these troops defended the high ground in squad strong points, covering avenues of approach and critical positions. The enemy in the Seoul area fought a weak but more organized delaying action, conducted in the above manner, until we contacted their main line of resistance. This was the most organized force met. The enemy numbered about 600 to 900. The enemy had a large number of automatic weapons and was supported by mortar fire. He also utilized high velocity anti-tank weapons against personnel. After the MLR was broken the enemy became disorganized, defending in small pockets of 15 to 50 throughout Seoul. Beyond the city the enemy became completely disorganized, hiding in hills in the day time and proceeding north during the night. POW's reported Communist civilians in those small groups with the soldiers. The POW's also reported that they had small arms and automatic weapons. POW's reported that the enemy sent from North Korea did not, in several cases, have weapons. It was reported that although there was a shortage of individual weapons plenty of ammunition was available.

c. STRENGTH

The approximate enemy strength defending INCHON was 2200. An estimated 150 enemy were killed and 51 POWs were captured. During the drive to Seoul contact was made against approximately 600 to 900 enemy; of these 150 to 250 were killed and 186 prisoners were taken. In the Seoul area this Battalion came into contact with approximately 900 to 1200 enemy and destroyed 300 and captured 154 prisoners.

d. DEPLOYMENT

When this Battalion landed the enemy was deployed along the high ground overlooking the landing beaches. Entrenched emplacements were found on this high ground. The enemy also utilized buildings for firing positions. From the outskirts of Inchon to the edge of Seoul, the enemy was deployed in small groups on the high ground along the rout of advance. These positions afforded him commanding observation and long range fire. When driven from these positions they would retreat over the ridge line to low ground for rapid movement to the
next defensive position. In the defense of Seoul, the enemy was found to be entrenched at the base of the forward slope, on the military crest of the forward slope, and on the reverse slope. Their individual fox holes were approximately 20 feet apart. In many cases the defense positions were a series of trenches. The enemy attempted to hold these positions, giving ground only when driven from the positions. During our patrolling actions north of Seoul, the deployment of the enemy was in groups of 2 to 50, hiding in the high, irregular, mountainous terrain, running when contact was made with our patrols, and having no apparent order of withdrawal.

In many instances during our advance from Inchon small groups and individual North Korean soldiers would hide in caves, rice paddies, houses, etc., and allow our advancing forces to pass by; then they would resort to sniping from the rear.

c. PROBABLE ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

1. The enemy encountered on 15 September were elements of the Seoul Defense Garrison, approximately 2200 in strength. The enemy was well equipped with machine guns and small arms, with some mortars.

2. On the 16th of September POWs taken said they were from the 1st Battalion. Documents were found in Inchon belonging to the 3rd Company, 1st Battalion.

3. On 17 September the Battalion moved to Ojang-Mian (0655, Kyongsong sheet 65261, 1:50,000), stragglers were picked up who stated they were from 548th Medical Unit. This POW stated 5,000 enemy were in Seoul. One POW stated about 8,000 enemy in Seoul. Other units encountered or reported in this area were: 5469 Unit, 1st Bn, 43rd Tank Regt; Vehicle Bn 31st Regt. (500 in the Regiment); 340 Unit, 43rd Regt.

4. On 18 September this Battalion captured a prisoner from the 1st Bn, 24th Air Regt, and from the 3rd Bn, 2nd Regt (1200 in the Regt). This POW stated there were about 20 122MM AAA pieces in Seoul. Three POWs from the 1st Plat, 1st Engr Co, 3rd Bn, 77th Unit were captured (700 men in the unit). One POW was captured from the 1st Co, Engr Bn, 1st Air Div, Unit 885, stationed at Kimpo Airfield. This POW stated that approximately 300 enemy were defending the airfield.
5. On 19 September this Battalion encountered the 25th Brigade. Elements of other units which this battalion encountered or captured POWs were:

- 2nd Co, Engr Bn, Air Division.
- 1st Co, 1st Bn, Air Div.
- 2nd Co, 1st Bn, Air Div.
- 2nd Co, 1st Bn, 1st Regt, 3rd Div.
- 3rd Co, 1st Engr Bn.
- 2nd Co, 2nd Bn, 2nd Regt, 18th Div.
- 1st Co, 2nd Bn, 18th Regt (Seoul Regt).
- 2nd Bn, 2nd Regt.
- 2nd Bn, Seoul Regt.
- Unit 351, 2nd Bn, Seoul Regt.
- 1st Bn, 2nd Regt.
- 42nd Regt.
- 1st Co, 1st Engr Bn, Air Div.
- 1st Co, 2nd Bn, 3rd Div.
- Unit 506, 2nd Bn.

6. On 22 September enemy artillery was observed being moved into position at 1858R (Kohgsong sheet, 6526 I, 1:50,000). Took two prisoners who stated they were members of Heavy Weapons Company.

7. On 25 September, two prisoners from the 3rd Battalion, 25th Brigade, stated 700 enemy would oppose our front. One prisoner captured from Artillery Company, 78th Regiment.

8. On 27 September, one POW was taken from 8th Co, 3rd Bn, 1st Regt, 563 Unit, which came from Seoul four days before.

9. On 28 September, one prisoner was captured who stated he was from the 18th Division.

10. The enemy units, or elements thereof, either encountered or from whom we obtained prisoners from 15 September to 28 September were as listed below:
15 September: Seoul Defense Garrison
16 September: 1st Bn, Seoul Defense Garrison
17 September: 548th Medical Unit, 5469 Unit, 1st Bn 31st Regt (500 in Regt), 340 Unit 43 Regt, 42 Regt, 269 Unit
18 September: 1st Bn 24th Regt, 3rd Bn 2nd Regt, 1st Plat, 1st Engr Co 3rd Bn 77 Unit (700 in Unit), 1st & 3rd Co 1st Bn Air Div
19 September: 25th Brigade, 2nd Co Engr Bn Air Div, 1st Co 1st Bn, 1st Co 1st Engr Bn, 2nd Co 1st Bn, 2nd Co 1st Bn 1st Regt 3rd Div, 3rd Co 1st Engr Bn, 2nd Co 2nd Bn 2nd Regt 18th Div, 1st Co 2nd Bn Seoul Regt, 18th Regt, Unit 351 2nd Bn Seoul Regt, 1st Bn 2nd Regt, 2nd Co 2nd Bn 3rd Div,
22 September: Heavy Weapons Co
25 September: Artillery Regt 78th Regt
27 September: 8th Co 3rd Bn 1st Regt 653 Unit
28 September: 18th Div

f. EQUIPMENT

The individual NKPA infantryman was equipped with either the manually operated, bolt action, Russian long rifle (HOM.-7.62mm, "MOSSIN HAGAHT" M1891/30) with bayonet, or the manually operated carbine (HOM.-7.62mm "MOSSIN HAGAHT" M1924/27), or the automatic submachine gun (HOM.-7.62mm "SHPAGIN PPSH" M1941). The riflemen carries on bandolier of ammunition contains approximately 100 rounds in 5 round clips. The automatic submachine gun men with one or two drums, holding 71 rounds each. Each had a minimum of hand grenades.

Other weapons and equipment found to be used against this Battalion were:

7.62mm "DEGTYAREV" DP Light Machine Gun.
7.62mm "MAXIM" M1910 Heavy Machine Gun. (the use of this machine gun was not as extensive as on southern front, and was not fired at all until the Battalion reached Seoul.)
45mm Anti-Tank gun M1942
76mm Field gun M1942 "ZIS 3"
122mm Howitzer M1938
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82mm M1937 Battalion Mortar
120mm M1938 Regimental Mortar
Medium Tank T-34 w/85mm gun
Anti-tank mines Russian made, wooden non-magnetic. These mines were booby trapped in most cases.
Anti-personnel mines, fragmentation (Russian made).

Equipment captured by this Battalion:

Three (3) 37mm anti-aircraft guns M1939
Two (2) 45mm anti-tank guns M1942
Two (2) 82mm battalion mortars 1937
Four (4) 120mm mortars
Ten (10) 6X6 trucks
  Six (6) Russian made
  Four (4) U. S. Army trucks
Two (2) Jeeps U. S. Army
One (1) 1949 Chevrolet Panel Truck
Sixty (60) cases 7.62mm small arms ammunition
Two-hundred (200) cases of dynamite
Communications equipment (including wire tapping equipment).
Engineer equipment (including picks, shovels, and two (2) generators).
Medical equipment (including two (2) cases of narcotics).
One-hundred fifty five (155) drums (55gal each) of gasoline.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF THE OPERATION

a. The landing at Beach Red at Inchon with seizure of objective paved the way for the seizure of Inchon, and high ground south of the town of Ascom the following day. The landing at Inchon was apparently a surprise to the enemy in that he apparently had not organized his defense in depth in the area.

b. The next period of time found this Battalion attacking and seizing the high ground southeast of Kimpo Airfield. The seizure of this high ground split the enemy forces east and
west of Yongdengpo-ri, and allowed the Battalion to place effective supporting fire on enemy troop movements and installations.

c. The following two day period found the Battalion attacking and seizing the high ground east of Kimpo Airfield, and south west of Seoul on the south bank of the Han River. The seizure of this high ground secured the right flank of the 5th Marines for the subsequent crossing of the Han River.

d. After crossing the Han River, the 1st Battalion attacking alongside the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines seized successive objectives on the right flank of the 5th Marines zone of action with the Battalion right flank resting on the Han River. The seizure of Hill 105 on the outskirts of Seoul permitted the landing on the right flank of the 5th Marines by the 1st Marines and their rapid entry into Seoul.

e. The seizure of Hill 338 on the Northwestern edge of Seoul by the Battalion denied close observation into the city of Seoul from this direction and placed the Pyongyan-Seoul Road under observation.

f. Patrol action carried out by the Battalion five miles north-west of Seoul uncovered mine fields, both anti-tank and anti-personnel, and destroyed and dispersed small bands of enemy who had retreated from Seoul in confusion. This action aided in keeping clear the routes of communication for following friendly elements.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMANDER

a. The 3.5 Rocket has proven to be an excellent weapon against tanks and other targets when emergency required. It is recommended that rockets with Ingerge grenade principle be designed to further increase effectiveness, and that white phosphorous rockets be manufactured similar to that presently available for the 2.36" rocket launcher.

b. It is recommended that the TACP liaison team be increased to include a front line FO team consisting three men with SCR 300 radio communications to the TACP liaison officer for the purpose of controlling air strikes forward of company front lines. It is not always possible with present TACP liaison party for the Battalion Commander to effectively control strikes forward of the front lines and maintain control of TACP as is desired unless the Battalion Observation Post is set up near or with observation of the front lines.
c. It is recommended that a simple foolproof system for night control of aircraft by TACP liaison officer be devised.

d. It is recommended that the amount of illuminating shell in the UF be increased for defense against an enemy such as the North Koreans, who apparently prefer to attack at night rather than in daylight, especially so when the air superiority by our forces is unchallenged.

e. The present bipod legs of the BAR are too long and heavy. In order for a man to fire the weapon, with the bipod legs on the ground, he will make a large silhouette and a better target. Experience in this Battalion has proven that men carrying BARs are prone to remove and dispose of the bipods after their initial engagements.

f. Present C-4 rations have three wet, three dry, and two fruit components. In the attack in Korea experience of this battalion shows that the men carry one wet, two dry, and two fruit components. Usually one and sometimes two of the wet components are consumed. It is recommended that the fruit component be increased, and one wet component of the present C type ration be replaced by wholly candy or a sweet component. Heat tablets should be included in the ration itself to make the wet components more palatable, especially on cold and wet days.

g. Motor Transport presently assigned an Infantry Battalion is not sufficient. Motor Transport assigned to augment Battalion Motor Transport is easily taken away by higher authority which places the Battalion in a critical condition for Motor Transport. It is recommended that six 2½ ton 6X6 or equivalent be added to current T/E’s for Infantry Battalion and T/O’s be increased by six drivers.

h. It is recommended that a galley trailer(s) be assigned with appropriate prime mover instead of present type of equipment. Too much time and effort is spent setting up present galleys instead of utilizing such time for preparation and distribution of food. The tastiness of food could be improved if ½ the time presently spent in the man handling stoves and ovens off and on trucks be spent in food preparation.

i. The landing plan at Inchon had two BLT's landing in assault on Beach Red. The schedule waves of each BLT at corresponding times and utilized identical boat numbers. This resulted in confusion in the rendezvous area. It is recommended that boat teams in the same
wave be assigned different numbers, for example in the first wave with each BLT using 7 LCVPs, BLT 1/5 use numbers 1-1 thru 1-7 and BLT 2/5 use numbers 1-8 thru 1-14.

j. During the planning for an amphibious beach assault, it is recommended that the BLT commander be consulted regarding air and naval gunfire support to be placed on the respective BLT's landing beach and that recommended targets be included in the air and naval gunfire plans, if possible.

k. The present state of air-ground training permits the use of support aircraft against targets within 150 yards, and with a calculated risk, with 100 yards of front lines. However; numerous occasions have risen where control by the FAC has been difficult and accomplished only by relay of information from the company commanders to the FAC over the Battalion Tactical Net.

A need exists for an additional FAC with each battalion, who can be sent forward with light portable equipment to control air strikes on targets which can be seen only from front line positions.

l. All close Air support received by this Battalion has been excellent, indicating the high state of air-ground coordination achieved by past training. Briefing of pilots at target areas is comparatively easy and accomplished with a minimum of time. It is to be noted that additional aircraft could have been utilized on numerous occasions if they had been available. All types of aircraft armament have been used effectively against enemy positions, but it is recommended that a higher percentage of Napalm, 500 and 1,000 pound bombs be used against enemy strong points.

m. The personnel evacuation system from front lines has not proven adequate, and has been accomplished only by the utilization of headquarters and service personnel organic to the Battalion. This has necessitated the use of supply, motor transport, cooks, communication and staff sections personnel to achieve the desired evacuation result. It is recommended that an evacuation company be made part of a Medical Battalion to accomplish evacuation of personnel.

n. The carbine in its present form with its light construction and automatic characteristics does not operate satisfactorily under conditions where moisture and sand are plentiful. A lighter version of the M-1 is recommended. It is also recommended that a sub-machine gun replace the
pistol. More time in the Marine Corps should be spent on instruction and use of grenades. It is recommended that an impact detonation grenade be used by our infantry.

11. **RECOMMENDATIONS OF STAFF SECTIONS:**

   a. Annex ABLE - Artillery Liaison Party and Forward Observer

   b. Annex BAKER - Battalion Communications

   c. Annex CHARLIE - Tactical Air Control Party

**ANNEX ABLE**

**ARTILLERY LIAISON PARTY AND FORWARD OBSERVER**

1. Comments and recommendations for artillery liaison section and forward observer sections.
2. The present T/O of the artillery Forward Observer Team calls for four (4) wireman, including a wire team chief, out of the total of eight (8) personnel. It is the policy of the Liaison F.O. sections of "A" Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, to lay all forward observer lines from the Liaison switchboard to the individual F.O. teams. In view, therefore, of numerous displacements made by each team in comparison with the fewer number of liaison team movements, an considering the ensuing physical demands on the personnel of the F.O. teams, it is recommended that all wiremen be organic to and remain with the liaison section at the infantry battalion command post. The advantage of this method are as follows:

   a. During periods when the F.O. teams are displacing rapidly and are operating solely on radio, wire personnel may be getting much needed rest at the C.P. and will be able to initiate wire lines rapidly, once the F.O. Team have halted and call for wire.

   b. Having wire personnel at the infantry battalion command post places them closer to the source of re-supply of wire and necessary accessories.

   c. It is desirable that each F.O. team have absolute minimum of personnel when operating under fire. It is the opinion of the undersigned that this need be more than the forward,
his scout sergeant, and the radio operator. The driver, then would remain with the wireman at the infantry battalion command post.

d. The total number of wire personnel could be cut down yo one (1) wire chief for the entire liaison observer group, plus a minimum of two (2) wiremen per operating forward observer section, making a total of seven (7) wire personnel. It is further recommended that the rank of the liaison officer’s scout sergeant be not less than that of technical sergeant in order to achieve seniority over the staff sergeants of the F.O. teams.

3. The use of the truck mounted (¼ton) SCR-608 by the liaison officer, supplemented by an SCR-619 equipped with a cargo jeep mount and battery charger, has been found quite satisfactory. The additional radio for the Liaison Officer, with the added feature of its being adaptable for a battery operated back pack, is desirable particularly in amphibious where the radio truck is not available to the Liaison Officer for several hours after he has landed with the infantry battalion headquarters.

A much lighter, simpler, and stronger radio for the forward observer teams is needed. The presently used SCR-610, although it breaks down to a two man load, is still far to bulky and heavy for an F.O. team which does not normally have access to vehicle transportation.

The use of a primary channel for each battery’s three F.O. teams and liaison section, plus the artillery battalion common fire direction frequency, is satisfactory, in theory, but the choice of frequencies made to date, with the resultant difference of more than 0.2 megacycles, is not all practical, by reason of the accompanying interference.

The use of the Emergency Switchboard (BD-18/GT) at the liaison officer's post has proved highly satisfactory.

4. It is strongly recommended that the present allowance of one (1) ¼ton, 4X4 truck and one (1) ¼ton, 2 wheel trailer per F.O. team and liaison section be changed to one 3/4ton, 4X4 truck per F. O. section and liaison section. It is also recommended that each of these 3/4ton trucks be equipped with a battery charges PE-219 mounted at the forward end of the bed of the truck.

5. The continued use of an F.O. Team per rifle company is recommended. At times, however, it has been the practice of the Battalion Commander to employ an F.O. team with him on the
battalion observation post. This practice has its advantages (where observation of the whole battalion front is particularly good) and when used, should make use of the F. O. team from the reserve rifle company. Normally, it is not recommended that the liaison officer and his section occupy the battalion OP with the Battalion Commander, inasmuch as the artillery liaison officer's sources of information and the links with infantry staff section activities are effected best at the infantry command post. Certainly, the actual control of fire missions should solely left to the forward observers; the liaison Officer should not fire missions unless called upon to replace an F. O. casualty.

The practice of keeping one F. O. team in position to observe and direct fires and cover the advance of another team with the assault rifle company until that second F. O. team obtains a good OP further along the route of advance has proven highly satisfactory.

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ANNEX BAKER

COMMUNICATIONS

1. The below listed are the more important difficulties and their suggestions found during the recent combat period.

   a. Experience has shown that the SCR-536 in inadequate for Marine Corps companies due to its range. A more powerful battery operated trans-receivers is needed that will have less weight and bulk than the SCR-300 but will approximate its range characteristics.

   b. A lighter, more durable type wire is needed to replace the W/130 class. Current alloys, having better electrical characteristics and much higher tensile strengths are available to withstand the terrific punishment given an assault company's wire line.

   c. A larger type dispenser, of duraluminum, is suggested to replace the CE-11 carrier. The present DR-8 weighs too much in comparison to the amount of wire it carries.
d. A lighter, less elaborate switchboard is needed at the battalion level. Elimination of all but one of the phantom circuits and the night alarm circuits plus a shock proof light metal case would account for a great decrease in weight.

e. The present BA-70, battery, used in the SCR-300, is a very good battery when one can be found that has nor become discharged due to an extended period of "Shelf life." In the present combat period, slightly less than half of all BA-70’s received by this battalion have expired on the shelf. A less durable battery of certain shelf life specifications would be more acceptable.

2. Personnel authorized by T/O are found to be sufficient. However, it is suggested that one additional radio operator 2531, be added to the list to take care of the functional Intelligence Net.

ANNEX CHARLIE

TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY

1. The system of controlling close air support is generally satisfactory except in instances where hill masses masked the FAC from observing positions beyond friendly front lines. This was overcome by having forward observers or company commanders spot for the FAC via the battalion tactical net or by wire. The aircraft remained under control of the FAC. Although somewhat inconvenient and tying up the Battalion Tactical Net, this system accomplished the mission satisfactorily and with a minimum loss of time.

2. Alternatives to this system would be to: (1) have an air spot officer equipped with an SCR-300 or telephone accompany the company commander at the most advantageous observing position as the NGF spotter is now employed. The FAC of course would be similarly equipped to receive spot information from the observer and relay to the aircraft. Disadvantages: addition of another officer in an already crowded company C.P. (2) Have the FAC himself and his team accompany the company holding the most advantageous piece of terrain and maintain contact with battalion commander for liaison purposes through the battalion tactical net. Disadvantages: crowding the company C.P., depriving the battalion commander of personal liaison, and loss of coordination among artillery, NGF and mortar liaison officers. This system is recommended only when a company is advancing far in front of the battalion headquarters and should have the benefit of supporting arms without the threat of communication difficulties, and when the FAC can operate his aircraft at his own discretion. This was done once during this operation when the FAC accompanied a company strength combat patrol five miles in advance of the battalion C.P. It is therefore recommended that artillery F.’s be trained as air spotters, and assist when
required. Minimum training would be necessary, since the actual control would remain in the hand of the FAC.

3. Method of mission request is too long and unnecessary delay is caused between the initiating of the strike request and the actual mission being flown. In all missions where the FAC stated he will observe and control, he should be required to furnish only the following information in his request to the TADC:

   a. Whether mission is ordinary, priority or search and attack.
   b. Target area designation.
   c. Type of loading desired.
   d. Direction of attack.
   e. Time the mission is requested.

   The aircraft should be turned over immediately to the FAC by the TADC without briefing, since experience has shown that the pilots have to be re-briefed by the FAC prior to running the strike. It should be the responsibility of the regimental air party to inform TADC of front lines, since this shackled transmission in the tactical air request takes about five minutes before heard correctly. Front lines should be given, however, in the request if the situation dictates.

4. Marking of targets was done effectively by using 81MM mortar white phosphorous shells. This was done quickly and accurately and since the mortar liaison was alongside the FAC on the OP, the best and most rapid coordination was accomplished. This is recommended as SOP for future operations. The 81MM mortar has sufficient range to reach and distance beyond the front lines that is normally referred to as close air support.

5. Radio and Vehicular equipment of the TACP with few exceptions is unsatisfactory. During this operation, many failures occurred in both the VRC-1 jeep and the portable radios, AN/GRC-9 and MAW, largely due to the rough terrain over which equipment was moved. Details as follows:

   a. VRC-1 Radio jeep is top heavy, overweight and underpowered; thereby unable to carry additional equipment or tow a trailer. The above makes it restricted to follow at least secondary roads.
   b. SCR-312 and SCR-191 MHF/HF radios are excellent, and can take the worst kind of punishment.
   c. SCR-542 VHF radio, although an excellent transmitter and receiver, is not sturdy enough for extensive operation in the field. The rough terrain and roads over which this radio was carried during the operation caused this radio to drift off frequency, thus requiring realignment at frequent intervals. This maintenance requires a technician and test equipment.
d. Recommendations:

(1) That the VRC radios be mounted on a sturdier and more powerful vehicle, such as a small weapons carrier.

(2) That the SCR-542 be further shock mounted or replaced with a sturdier set.

(3) That the TACP be assigned a cargo jeep and trailer to carry spare parts, water cans, gas cans, batteries, wire, sandbags, etc., that are now required to be carried on the VRC-1 jeep.

e. The AN/GRC-9 radio, while an adequate piece of equipment, is not sturdy enough for long operations in the field. The transmitter on this set failed twice during the operation due to being carried over rough terrain. The transmitter is not powerful enough at great distance when using the whip antenna to prevent other stations from blocking transmissions. As hand pack equipment, all bags should be designed to be carried on the back, rather than being shoulder slung. For example, the generator although small and not heavy, is a most cumbersome piece of equipment to carry up a hill. This team obtained a small bag for carrying spare microphones, handsets, and spare batteries, thus eliminating the large accessory bag.

f. MAW VHF radio is absolutely no good for field operations. The BB 54 wet cell battery leaks, has too short a life (averaging less than four hours), requires more than twenty hours for recharging, and does retain a charge for more than a day. The radio itself has too many channels, is too delicate for field operations, is too big and heavy to be carried long distances. It is recommended that this radio be thrown out and an entirely new set be designed having two crystal controlled channels, powered by dry cell batteries. The elimination of eight channels should eliminate at least some of the weight and most of the size. This unit used automobile storage batteries, which were much more satisfactory, to replace the 3B54. However this latter is a heavy and difficult load to hand pack.

g. This team used the RM 53 and 53 remotes with W-110 wire, remoting from the VRC-1. Excellent results were obtained in both transmitting and receiving for the maximum distance used of 800 yards.

6. Organization of the team as now established in the T/O is satisfactory except as noted above. However, it is recommended that the TACP be made an organic section in the infantry battalion headquarters. The training, supplying and coordinating would be simplified. Maintenance can be conducted with in the battalion communications section, with a technician trained to repair equipment peculiar to the TACP attached to the regimental communication section.
7. Air operations and pilot technique were generally excellent. The following notes and recommendations are submitted:

   a. Pilots releasing HVAR 5" at too high altitude, causing them to fall short. From ground observation, it is recommended that rockets be released at not more than 2500 feet slant range from target.

   b. Runs with napalm bombs should be low, flat, and at maximum speed to get maximum dispersion of the flames. Dive or glide runs tend to localize the dispersion.

   c. It is recommended that maximum effort be exercised in developing techniques for controlling close support missions at night. The effect of aircraft over the front lines in neutralizing enemy artillery and mortars is outstanding, but due to lack of controlling with a maximum safety factor limited the actual striking of those emplacements unless visibility was excellent, and the target was beyond a thousand yards of the front lines. In addition it is recommended that night fighters be on station sufficient to cover the entire front at all times during hours of darkness.

8. Aviation ordnance recommendations are as follows:

   a. That the F4U aircraft be replaced with the AD type aircraft for the Marine Corps as the close support weapon, since the payload and inherent accuracy of the aircraft is much greater.

   b. That the .50 caliber aircraft machine guns replace the 20mm cannon in close support aircraft, which will more than double the strafing ammunition capacity.

   c. Since it is understood that the number of napalm bombs is limited by the storage space required by external tanks, it is recommended that a napalm tank be especially designed that can be assembled aboard ship or in the field just prior to use, thus eliminating the large area now required for the tank. In addition, these tanks should be lightly constructed to insure complete breakage upon dropping. It was noted that many duds occurred during the operation when tanks did not break or only broke partially. Napalm has proven the most terrifying and effective weapon dropped on troops protected in trenches and fox holes.

9. Miscellaneous recommendations:

   a. That flight loaders at least be equipped with binoculars to aid them in locating well concealed and small targets.

   b. Eliminate the grid lines on the plastic map case. They do not seem to conform to any map scale and tend to clutter the map enclosed.
c. Issue a set of binoculars of a smaller size. Present models are too large and cumbersome to handle.

d. Equip members of the TACP with revolvers or automatic pistols rather than the carbines. The carbine is difficult to carry when handpacking radio and associated equipment.

e. Issue a small bag of a light canvas construction with a plastic lining, which can be shoulder slung. Such a bag about the size of a map and dispatch case would be used to carry toilet articles, thus eliminating the marching pack, which is difficult carrying with back pack radio equipment.

12. UNIT STATION LIST, 30 August - 7 October 1950

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DAVIS, Warren  CWO  042207  3010  30Aug-4Oct  Bn Supply Officer (5-6Oct SKE)  
H&S Co

GODENIUS, Walter  Capt  027175  4960  Commanding Officer

PETER, William  1stLt  033632  2502  Bn Comm Off

SMITH, James  1stLt  037073  7302  30Aug-26Sep TACP; 26 Sep Tr to 1st Sig Bn

ALLEN, Morlo  2ndLt  049793  0302  30Aug-26Sep NGF Spot Off 3-8Sep Bn S-4; 26Sep Tr to 1st Sig Bn

GREWE, Carl  LtUSN  202155  30Aug-26Sep NGLO 26 Sep Tr to 1st Sig Bn

O’TOOLE, Daniel  Lt jg  503776  USNR  Battalion Med Off

LUHR, John  Lt jg  245658  USNR  23Sep-6Oct  Asst Bn Med Off

FIJAH, Kenneth  Lt jg  191243  USNR  30Aug-14Sep  Asst Bn Med Off (15Sep SKE)

"A" Co

STEVENS, John  Capt  014231  0302  Commanding Officer

EUBANKS, Fred  1stLt  036407  0302  30Aug-21Sep XO

CHAMBERS, Franklin  1stLt  046413  0301  22Sep-6Oct XO

BLANK, Edward  2ndLt  043444  0302  60MM Mort Sec Ldr

TRAPNELL, Nicholas  2ndLt  049663  0302  24Sep-6Oct 1st Plt Ldr

MUETZEL, Francis  2ndLt  049792  0302  30Aug-17Sep 2nd Plt Ldr (17Sep WIA & Evac)

MAHN, Nathaniel  1stLt  039194  0302  17-22Sep 2nd Plt Ldr (22Sep KIA)

COLLINS, Edward  2ndLt  049743  0301  23Sep-6Oct 2nd Plt Ldr

LOPEZ, Baldemore  1stLt  049344  0302  8-15Sep 3rd Plt Ldr (15Sep KIA)

SCHIMMENTI, Joseph  1stLt  049106  0302  17-22Sep 3rd Plt Ldr (22Sep WIA & Evac)

"B" Co

FENTON, Francis  Capt  015170  0302  Commanding Officer

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Paragraph 8 through 12 were copied from the Special action report furnished by Gunther Dohse.

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Copied by Leo Tucker started on 13 July finished 10 August 1991.