

**Headquarters, 1st Battalion  
5th Marines, 1st Marine Division  
Fleet Marine Force, c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California**

9 January 1951

Annex ABLE to 5th Marines Special Action Report

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

8 October - 15 December 1950

Maps:

Map of Korea, 1:250,000, AMS L551, sheets J-52-B, E-52-T  
Map of Korea, :50,000, AMS L751, sheets 6635 III, 6635 II, 6634 I, 6634 II, 6634 III,  
6633 IV, 6632 IV, 6633 I, 6633 III, 6633 IV

- Sketches:
1. Graphic sketch of reconnaissance in force to HUKSU-RI on 7, 8, 9, November 1950.
  2. Topographic sketch of "C" Company patrol action on 10 November 1950.
  3. Topographic sketch of assembly area at YUDAM-NI and action until 1400 28 November 1950.
  4. Topographic sketch of defense of YUDAM-NI.
  5. Topographic sketch of withdrawal from YUDAM-NI and subsequent defense positions.
  6. Topographic sketch of the defense of HAGARU-RI.
  7. Overlay of enemy situation for period 27 November to 11 December 1950.

1. INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the period, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines was in an assembly area at INCHON, KOREA. From this location the battalion embarked aboard the USS BAYFIELD (APA-33) which was subsequently combat loaded for an assault landing at WONSAN, KOREA, but a change in the general tactical situation permitted an administrative landing to be conducted. After landing, the battalion occupied successive tactical areas in or near the following places: WONSAN, YONGHUNG, CHIGYONG, MAJON-DONG and SINHUNG-RI (east side of the CHOSIN Reservoir) with the mission of patrolling to locate and capture or

destroy the enemy and protect the MSR in the respective zones. Elements of the Battalion also were used as security for X Corps Headquarters and YONPO Airfield.

At YUDAM-NI, the battalion engaged in combat operations in the rugged mountainous northern part of KOREA in snow and sub-zero temperatures against Chinese Communist Forces and participated in the 1st Marine Division retrograde movement from the CHOSIN Reservoir area to HAMHUNG.

Missions assigned this battalion were issued by the next higher echelon, the 5th Marines and the 1st Marine Division, during the period this battalion was under Division operational control.

## 2. TASK ORGANIZATION

The Battalion was organized according to Table of Organization Number K-1038.

CO, 1/5	8Oct-17Nov	LtCol G.R. NEWTON
	18Nov-15Dec	LtCol J.W. STEVENS II
H&S Company	8Oct-15Dec	Capt W.E.G. GODENIUS
TACP	8Oct-29Nov	1stLt J.W. SMITH
NGF Liaison	8Oct-26Oct	Lt C.O. GREWE, USN
Arty Liaison	8Oct-22Nov	1stLt J.J. SNYDER
	23Nov-29Nov	1stLt J.C. KELLETT
	30Nov-15Dec	
"A" Company	8Oct-17Nov	Capt J.R. STEVENS
	18Nov-15Dec	Capt J.R. HEATER
"B" Company	8Oct-13Oct	Capt F.I. FENTON Jr
	14Oct-15Dec	1stLt J.R. HANCOCK
"C" Company	8Oct-6Nov	1stLt P.F. PEDERSEN
	7Nov-15Dec	Capt J.R. JONES
Wpns Company	8Oct-15Dec	Maj J.W. RUSSELL
KNP Platoon	8Oct-15Dec	SSgt J.L. WILLIS

At various times, as noted in paragraph seven (7), the following units were attached:

"A" Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines -	Capt J.D. JORDAN
75mm Recoilless Gun Section, 5th Marines -	TSgt L.C. WROBLEWSKI
Provisional Platoon, AT Company, 5th Marines -	1stLt A.S. BAILEY
Provisional Platoon, H&S Company, 5th Marines -	1stLt W.G. CROCKER
Provisional Platoon, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines -	1stLt M.A. RAINER

Provisional Platoon, 4TH Battalion, 11th Marines - 1stLt T. MULRIENAIN  
Detachment, 1st Signal Battalion  
Detachment, MP Company  
Elements of "A" Company, 1st Engineer Battalion furnished engineer support as directed.

### 3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

This battalion was billeted in the Jinsen Electrical Works, INCHON, KOREA as the period for the report began. Preliminary planning for combat loading for the USS BAYFIELD (APA-33) began and loading commenced on 9 October. On 14 October preliminary planning of the WONSAN landing began. On 15 October, 5th Marines Operation Plan 35-50 was received and formal planning for the WONSAN landing commenced. Plans were formulated and Battalion Operation Plan 4-50 was distributed for the forthcoming landing operation. After arriving at WONSAN and finding the harbor area mined, the landing was delayed. When the mines were cleared the landing was changed to an administrative landing as the area had already been cleared by UN Forces. Once ashore the battalion generally received verbal warning orders which were followed by a written order. Several times the action required was completed prior to the arrival of the written order. Extended period of planning were impossible. Variable time between receipt of order and completion of action required, lack of proper material and inadequate facilities made it impossible to issue written orders. Fragmentary or complete verbal orders were given by the Battalion Commander to those concerned and the required planning carried out. Patrols were planned twenty-four (24) prior to departure.

Planning of motorized patrols, movement of supplies, equipment and personnel had to be very flexible because required transportation was not always available. Advance parties always proceeded the movement of the main body of the battalion.

When this battalion embarked on the USS GENERAL RANDALL no advance planning was possible or done by this battalion other than sending a billeting party aboard a few hours prior to the arrival of the main body.

### 4. TRAINING

Training aboard ship consisted of physical drill (daily), abandon ship drill, inspection of weapons, and lectures were conducted on wearing of life jackets, net technique, boat technique, wearing of packs during landing, combat in built up areas and individual protection against cold weather with special emphasis on care of the feet. Debarkation drill was held on 18 and 23 October with each wave of the boat teams moving to position on the ship's superstructure when

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secured. This allowed the next wave to move into their assigned areas with the least amount of confusion. Instruction on Scouting and Patrolling was conducted while the battalion was in tactical areas protecting the MSR. Cold weather indoctrination lectures were given when the battalion was at MAJON-DONG. Weapons were test fired during the near zero and sub-zero weather while the battalion was located on the east side of CHOSIN Reservoir.

#### 5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

On 8 October, while in an assembly area at INCHON, loading plans were formulated for the combat loading of the USS BAYFIELD (APA-33). The task of loading was particularly difficult due to erratic tidal conditions in the area. Due to these tidal conditions the ship was to be loaded while it was anchored in the stream four (4) to (5) miles from the staging area. All vehicles were waterproofed prior to being loaded. This battalion commenced combat loading on 9 October. Personnel were completely embarked by 11 October and at 0100, 17 October combat loading of the USS BAYFIELD was completed.

at 1315, 12 December this battalion while at HUNGNAM struck camp and prepared to carry out orders to embark on the USS GENERAL RANDALL. At 1845 the battalion embarked LVT's in the battalion assembly area for movement to GREEN beach and arrived there at 2015. At 2150 the battalion embarked aboard two (2) LSU's and was transported to the USS GENERAL RANDALL. Loading was completed at 2330. The battalion motor transport and supply train moved to GREEN beach and were loaded aboard an APA.

#### 6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

The USS BAYFIELD (APA-33) got underway for WONSAN at 0600, 17 October and was at sea for a period of seven (7) days. At 1500 on 25 October the USS BAYFIELD anchored off WONSAN, KOREA. Unloading commenced on 26 October with selected vehicles being off loaded first. At 073, 27 October, the advance party for the battalion debarked and the remainder of the vehicles sent ashore. The battalion supply section debarked on 28 October and the remainder of the battalion debarked at 0930, 29 October. At 1130 movement by truck commenced to an assembly area located about seven (7) miles from the landing beach.

Upon completion of loading at HUNGNAM, the USS RANDALL got underway at 1430, 13 December and arrived at the port of PUSAN AT 1230, 14 December. A battalion quartering party departed at 0930, 15 December for new assembly area. The battalion disembarked from the USS GENERAL RANDALL at 1630. At 1830 all personnel from the 1st Battalion boarded LST-Q009 for movement to MASAN.

## 7. DETAILED COMBAT NARRATIVE

On 8 October this battalion was in an assembly area at INCHON, KOREA, and was billeted in the Jinsin Electrical Works buildings. Resupply and reorganization following the INCHON-SEOUL Operation was continued and preparation for loading and embarkation of the USS BAYFIELD (APA-33) commenced. At 2200, 8 October 1950 an advance party consisting of the billeting officer with billeting NCO's and ship's platoon composed of "B" Company's mortar platoon embarked aboard USS BAYFIELD. On 9 October embarkation continued with the remainder of "B" Company embarking at 1335 followed by Weapons Company at 1500. "C" and "A" Companies and a skeleton Command Group with the Battalion Executive Officer in charge followed that evening completing embarkation at 2245. Personnel were embarked over ship's gangway as the ship was anchored in the stream. On 10 October all attached units, less Shore Party, embarked at 1100. H&S Company, 5th Marines and H&S Company, 1st Battalion, less their Command Groups, were aboard by 1445. The Command Group of the 1st Battalion embarked at 1820. The Commanding Officer 1st Battalion was Commanding Officer of troops on the USS BAYFIELD.

Loading of vehicles commenced on 11 October. During the period from 12 October to 17 October the USS BAYFIELD (APA-33) remained in port of INCHON and combat loading was continued. The Shore Party detachment embarked at 1800 on the 12th. Preliminary planning for the landing at WONSAN was begun and inoculation for small-pox was given to all embarked personnel.

RCT-5 Operation Plan 35-50 was received on 15 October and planning for the proposed landing continued.

At 0100, 17 October the USS BAYFIELD was completely loaded and got underway at approximately 0600 that morning. Operation Plan 4-50 for the forthcoming landing at WONSAN, KOREA was completed and distributed. Physical drill was held daily. A training

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schedule was set up, which covered training in small unit tactics, cold weather operations, debarkation and abandon ship drill, basic amphibious indoctrination and combat in built up areas. The ship was underway for a period of seven (7) days and at 1500, 25 October, the USS BAYFIELD anchored off WONSAN, KOREA.

On the morning of 26 October the unloading of the USS BAYFIELD commenced with selected vehicles being off loaded first. The Naval Gunfire Liaison Group was detached from BLT 1/5 task organization and debarked. At 0730, 27 October the advance party consisting of a quartering party and one (1) platoon of "B" Company debarked. The quartering party moved to an assembly area north of WONSAN, KOREA at TA 5983-H-2. One (1) platoon of "B" Company accompanied the quartering party as a security force.

On 28 October supply personnel debarked to handle and guard battalion organic supplies and equipment on the beach. By 1200 on 29 October all units were debarked and movement to the assembly area by trucks commenced. At 1745 all units, less a ship's platoon which consisted of one (1) rifle platoon from "C" Company arrived at the assembly area and set up a defense perimeter for the night. Orders were received during the evening for the battalion to move by truck convoy the next day to the vicinity of YONGHUNG with the mission of protecting that portion of the main supply route to HAMHUNG. "A" Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines was attached.

At 0930, 30 October, the battalion embarked aboard trucks and began a tactical motor march to the designated assembly area at YONGHUNG. At 1315 the battalion CP was opened at TA 4973-P-3. Sufficient trucks were made available to move the entire battalion in one echelon. No enemy contact was made during the motor march. Upon arriving at YONGHUNG the battalion found that this area was occupied by five hundred (500) ROK Army troops. The battalion established liaison with the ROK Army unit and disposed the companies as to provide security for the MSR. Approximately two hundred (200) graves were located in an orchard to the rear of the CP and civilians stated that POW's killed by NKPA were buried there. On 31 October, active patrolling was conducted with negative enemy contact. At 1605 a warning order was received that the battalion was to be prepared for movement to new positions at CHIGYONG, KOREA with the mission of protecting the MSR in that vicinity.

The battalion departed on 1 November from YONGHUNG for an assembly area at CHIGYONG. The main body moved via train from YONGHUNG to CHIGYONG while an

advance party proceeded ahead with the vehicle train. The new CP was opened at TA 6412-F-1 at 1430. Blocking positions were established by 2030 as follows; "A" and "B" Companies TA 6211-H-2 to 6213-A-1; Weapons and H&S Companies in position at TA 6412-F. "C" Company less one platoon which remained to guard the CHIGYONG railhead departed on orders received en route, for YONPO airfield as a security force. Patrols were outlined for the following day.

On 2 November a patrol of platoon strength from "B" Company searched its designated area with negative enemy contact. A warning order was received at 1345 from Regimental Headquarters to be prepared to move on 3 November to an area twelve (12) miles northwest of CHIGYONG. The official map for all operations and reporting thereof to higher echelons was changed to KOREA AMS L551, scale 1:250,000. For intra battalion operations and reporting it was decided to continue use of the 1:50,000.

On 3 November movement to a new defense area was begun at 0845 with "A" and "B" Companies leading. Due to insufficient transportation a truck shuttle to the defense area was utilized. The shuttle was over a one way mountain road with the turn around at the top of the mountain pass. Trucks were dispatched by the 5th Marines to move "C" Company from the airfield to the new defense area. The supply dump was established at the CHIGYONG railhead and communications over the twelve (12) miles was maintained by SCR-300 radios. The new CP opened at 1430 at TA 3541-G-4. All units were in position by 1630. The battalion was set in defense positions astraddle the mountain pass, with road blocks being established. Liaison was effected with a ROK unit of company strength which was located to the front of the battalion defense area. The terrain was very mountainous and wooded.

On 4 November patrols from the battalion departed to designated areas. All convoys and motorized patrols were ordered to carry radios capable of contacting the battalion net whenever such radios were available for this use. The battalion was ordered to operational control of the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division at 1240. At 2040 a truck load of ROK soldier were challenged by our road block and upon failure to halt were fired upon. One (1) informer, North Korean, was killed and after identification of personnel was made, the truck was allowed to proceed. All patrols returned prior to darkness with negative enemy contact.

At 0800, 6 November patrol #1 departed for TA 4628, patrol #2 departed to the village of HUNG DONG-NI and patrol #3 to TA 5001. At 1645, the Battalion Commander returned from a conference at the Division Command Post with orders to make a reconnaissance in force with

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two (2) companies to the vicinity of the village of HUKSU-RI (CV-3641). Planning was started immediately and all units notified. All patrols returned by 1855 with a report of negative enemy contact.

For a graphic picture of the HUKSU-RI reconnaissance in force see sketch #1.

On 7 November a three (3) day patrol left at 0900 for HUKSU-RI to make a reconnaissance in force. The patrol consisted of two (2) rifle companies ("A" and "B"), one (1) 81mm Mortar section and representatives of the battalion CP. The patrol leader was Major Olsen, the Battalion Executive Officer. Aircraft were to be on station during daylight hours. An insufficient number of trucks required the patrol to move out in two (2) echelons. "B" Company with the Command Group, moved out at 0900 and was followed by "A" Company on the second echelon of the truck convoy at 1330. At 1120 the point of the 1st echelon encountered approximately ten (10) North Korean along the road and were fired upon. At this point "B" Company detrucked to dispose of the enemy group in the area and then discovered that the vehicles had almost arrived at a burned out bridge which could not be crossed by the 2½ ton, 6x6 trucks. From this point "B" Company and the Command Group proceeded on foot to the vicinity of TOKHUNG-NI, where a night defense position was established with the vehicles inside of the perimeter. A destroyed bridge at TA 4231-V prohibited passage or bypassage of the stream for any vehicles thus preventing the establishment of the defense perimeter further forward. At 1530, "A" Company arrived and was disposed inside the perimeter so they would be afforded as much rest as possible for their twelve (12) mile push to HUKSU-RI the following day. Local patrols were sent out by "B" Company until dark. The 60mm and 81mm mortars were registered prior to darkness. The patrol had no communication with battalion as neither the TCS or TEX could contact the battalion area. During the night there was no enemy activity.

AT 0715, 8 November, "A" Company, with a forward air controller and an AT section, moved out in an approach march northward toward HUKSU-RI. At 0800, two (2) rifle platoons of "B" Company, in command of the Company Commander, moved out in trace of "A" Company as a reserve force. At 0830, "A" Company observed eight (8) to ten (10) North Koreans in the valley to their right front, apparently a foraging party. This party was taken under long range small arms fire with unknown results. At this time, one (1) North Korean straggler was picked up along the road. At 0900, Korean National Police attached to the patrol returned to the assembly area with four (4) North Korean prisoners. At 0945, an outpost to the rear of the assembly area fired on three (3) North Koreans, two (2) of them were armed, and the outpost

succeeded in capturing the unarmed North Korean. The other two (2) made their way back into the hills. At 1020, observer aircraft on station reported an enemy concentration which appeared to be of company strength at KOMSAN-HYONG and in position at the top of the pass straddling the road leading to HUKSU-RI. An air strike was immediately called for and "A" Company notified of the enemy's position. "A" Company proceeded to scout up to the road to a point abreast of Hill 1347 at which time they swung left and secured the top of the hill. From this point "A" Company was above and to the right flank of the enemy. At 1220 four (4) Marine Aircraft conducted an air strike on the enemy's position using napalm and strafing runs causing the enemy to flee from their positions to the northwest. This air strike was uncontrolled as air-ground radio contact by FAC with "A" Company could not be made at this time. The observer aircraft led the aircraft into the target and marked it with a red smoke grenade. At 1340, "A" Company deployed with two (2) platoons forward and one (1) back, swept down the right flank of the enemy's position and secured these positions at 1415 with no enemy opposition. At this time "A" Company discovered that it was possible to reach the 1st Battalion Commanding Officer by SCR-300 radio on the Battalion Tactical Net although his radio was located twenty-three (23) miles away. The patrol leader ordered that a radio relay station be established at this location. From this point "A" Company could observe a group of twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) enemy retreating down the road to HUKSU-RI which they immediately took under long range small arms fire. As the right platoon of "A" Company swung down the ridge they surprised and succeeded in capturing one (1) North Korean Lieutenant and two (2) men. On the road south of the enemy's positions now occupied by "A" Company, were a series of road blocks, consisting of burned bridges, stone blocks and destroyed culverts. During this period "B" Company's two (2) platoons had set up positions and sent out local patrols in their area. "B" Company was to remain in this position as a reserve for "A" Company in its advance from KOMSAN-HYONG. From "A" Company's position groups of enemy were observed both by air and our advance elements, moving north and northwest into the direction of CHUNGHUNG-NI "A" Company moved forward with one (1) platoon deployed on each side of the road and continued the attack northwest through the village of YONG-NIH. Just north of this village "A" Company began to receive automatic and small arms fire from the hill mass directly to their front and from the right flank of the road. As "A" took up firing positions to deliver fire on the objective to the front, they began receiving heavy automatic fire from the hill mass to their left front. Both enemy positions were taken under fire by "A" Company mortars, machine guns, and small arms with an air strike immediately being requested. Shortly after 1700 just at dusk, this air strike was conducted with the aircraft being controlled by the forward air controller with "A" Company. The enemy strength was estimated at one (1) battalion such estimation being based on the count

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of machine guns and automatic weapons: at least seventeen (17) machine guns on the hill to the left front and at least five (5) on the hill to the right front. "A" Company remained in these positions engaging the enemy in a fire fight until after dark which time, they were ordered to return to the patrol assembly area. "B" Company was also ordered to the rear after "A" Company had disengaged itself from the enemy and had started its return to the assembly area. At truck convoy which had been dispatched by the battalion was waiting in the patrol assembly area. The presence of the truck convoy at this location was made possible because of the work done by an engineer platoon, which had been sent out by battalion, in repairing the burned out and destroyed bridges, enabling the truck convoy to reach the assembly area. "B" Company's two (2) rifle platoons arrived at the assembly area at 1930. At 2045, 9 November, "A" Company arrived at the assembly area having employed rear guards during its return march. All units entrucked at 0315 and arrived at the battalion area at 0600. During the hours of darkness, one (1) truck overturned, slightly injuring three (3) men. "A" Company upon its return assumed its former defense position. "B" Company upon arriving at the Battalion Assembly Area was ordered to the railhead at CHIGYONG as security for the supply dump. This movement was ordered because of an attack made on the railway supply train on 8 November, five (5) miles south of CHIGYONG. "C" Company which had assumed the defense positions of both "A" and "B" Company during their reconnaissance in force to HUKSU-RI now moved into the defense positions that "B" Company had formerly occupied.

At 1030, 9 November Patrol #1 from "C" Company, departed the battalion area for HONGANP-YONG and was followed by Patrol #2 from "C" Company, at 1045 to TA 4528-W. at 1205, Patrol #1 reported they were receiving small arms fire with the estimated enemy strength being thirty (30) to fifty (50) with one (1) .50 caliber machine gun. At 1215, Patrol #2 reported being in a fire fight with forty (40) to fifty (50) enemy. At 1220, Patrol #1 reported the enemy had dispersed. At 1530, Patrol #1 returned with one (1) WIA. Patrol #2 returned at 1815 with casualties of two (2) KIA and three (3) WIA. Estimated casualties suffered by the enemy were twenty-four (24) KIA and two (2) POW.

For graphic picture of "C" Company Patrol #1 on 10 November see sketch #2.

At 0730, 10 November, Patrol #2 from "A" Company's departed followed by Patrol #1 from "C" Company at 0830. At 1130 from "A" Company's forward OP (position #2) Patrol #1 reported observing approximately fifty (50) to seventy (70) enemy troops at TA 5117-X (position #3). Effective artillery fire was immediately placed on the enemy. At 1315 an FO

team on the forward slope of hill 487 reported approximately one (1) platoon of enemy troops on hill 500 to the rear of the village of TONGCHON and requested artillery fire on the enemy positions. This fire was delivered at 1330. From position four (4), one (1) squad was dispatched to the high ground northeast of TONGCHON (position #5). The patrol proceeded towards the village and while at position six (6) dispatched another squad to the high ground southeast (position #7) of the village (position #8). At 1420, small groups of enemy were observed moving south towards the village. At 1630 while in position eight (8), artillery fire was called to neutralize the enemy positions on the slope south and southwest (positions 9, 10, 11) of TONGCHON.

Approximately at 1700 an estimated platoon of enemy attacked the patrol from the high ground northeast of TONGCHON. The patrol became engaged in a strong fire fight and was ordered to return to the battalion perimeter. The platoon reported it was pinned down by intense enemy fire and had a number of casualties. Artillery support was requested to assist the patrol to withdraw up hill 487. The artillery was called for by one of the artillery FO team's wireman since the artillery FO had been wounded. The wireman called the fire mission verbally thirty-five (35) yards to the patrol leader of Patrol #1 who relayed approximately three (3) miles to "C" Company Executive Officer who relayed approximately one (1) mile to the Battalion S-3 where the Artillery Liaison Officer monitored the radio and relayed verbally to his Liaison Section Chief who then called the fire mission by direct wire communications to "A" Battery, 11th Marines. More casualties resulted from enemy fire and the patrol was having difficulty in withdrawing to the rear due to heavy fire from three (3) sides. Patrol #2 from "A" Company, returning to the battalion perimeter, was diverted to the relief of Patrol #1 but failed to make contact before darkness and was ordered to return.

At 1745 enemy of unknown strength moving down from the high ground (position #13) south of TONGCHON attempted to close the route of withdrawal to a previously designated assembly area. The patrol moved to its assembly area and at 1850 enemy of unknown strength moving from the direction of hill 500 attempted to cut off a portion of the patrol. The patrol disengaged from the enemy under cover of darkness.

At 2035 six (6) men of the patrol came through "A" Company's lines to report that a large number of the patrol were working their way towards the battalion perimeter up the heavily wooded slopes. During this action an order was received for movement of the battalion to MAJON-DONG the next day following their relief by the 3rd Battalion, 26th Regiment (Korean

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Army), elements of which had arrived at 1525 and had begun moving into position in preparation for relief of the battalion. At 2045 permission was granted by the 1st Marine Division for this battalion to conduct an attack on TONGCHON for relief of the patrol thus delaying the movement to MAJON-DONG. Plans were formulated and verbal order issued for the attack on TONGCHON. At this time "B" Company was ordered to return from the CHIGYONG railhead to the battalion position the following morning utilizing trucks of "A" Battery, 11th Marines. At 2140 nine (9) more men of the patrol reported into the lines one (1) being wounded. At 2200 two (2) platoons of ROK's left the battalion area to scout out the area on the left flank of the battalion perimeter and returned at 2400 with negative enemy contact.

At 0030, 11 November two (2) more men of the patrol came through the lines. At 0730 the battalion began an attack to the southwest toward the village of TONGCHON and at 0840 "A" and "C" Companies seized the high ground overlooking the village. At this time an air strike was delivered on the western slope of hill 463, with the aircraft using napalm, bombs and strafing runs. During the time the companies were advancing toward the village they encountered two groups of the patrol, that had been cut off the previous afternoon, making their way back to the battalion perimeter. These two groups numbered ten (10) and twenty-one (21). "A" and "C" Companies swept the slopes and valley floor to the village making no enemy contact. At 0940 an air strike was delivered on hill 500 using bombs, rockets and strafing runs. Artillery fires were delivered throughout the morning on the high ground to the south, southwest and west of TONGCHON. One (1) man who was reported MIA from the patrol from the patrol of the previous day reported upon his return to the battalion that he was in position on the high ground where the artillery and air strike was concentrated and could observe the large number of enemy casualties that were inflicted upon the North Koreans still in the vicinity. As "A" and "C" Companies swept the slopes and village they picked up all the wounded and dead of the patrol and recovered all known equipment. After clearing the village the companies returned to the perimeter, again scouting the slopes and ridges in search of any wounded or dead Marines that may have been by-passed. Casualties were four (4) KIA, including one (1) Korean National Police and ten (10) WIA.

At 1345 movement was started to an assembly area at CHIGYONG to await transportation to MAJON-DONG. due to an insufficient number of vehicles available, trucks shuttled supplies and personnel to CHIGYONG over the one way mountain road. At 1930 the last elements arrived in CHIGYONG and at 2130 movement commenced to the new positions. The battalion moved in one truck convoy and arrived at MAJON-DONG at approximately 2400.

"C" Company was dropped off and detached at HAMHUNG to provide headquarters security for the X Corps Headquarters.

On 12 November upon arrival at MAJON-DONG the battalion reverted to control of the 5th Marines. During the day, four (4) local and two (2) motorized patrols were conducted with no enemy contact. Five (5) outposts were established around the battalion perimeter.

At 0745, 13 November local patrols were dispatched from the battalion area in accordance with Regimental order. All patrols with the exception of one motorized patrol from "B" Company, patrolled their assigned areas and returned with negative contact. The motorized patrol from "B" Company, consisting of six (6) jeeps and twenty (20) men, departed the battalion area with orders to make a reconnaissance patrol west to the village of SINPING-NI. The patrol departed at 0745 and proceeded to the village of UNBONG-NI, establishing a radio relay station on hill 688. One (1) prisoner was taken at this village who stated there were enemy in the vicinity. The patrol, less two (2) jeeps which remained at the radio relay station, proceeded on to the village of SINPING-NI. As the approached the village the men in the lead jeeps disembarked and proceeded on foot. The patrol leader, with an interpreter, moved up a hill on the right to make a reconnaissance. At this time the enemy, estimated to be between fifty (50) and one hundred fifty (150), opened fire on the patrol from three (3) sides. The patrol leader evidently realizing that the enemy had the advantage of surprise and superiority of numbers and fire power tried to disengage the patrol from the enemy. This enemy contact was first reported to the battalion by an observer aircraft which was on station in that area. Later a few men who had succeeded in returning to the radio relay station reported the action to battalion headquarters. At 1200 a reinforced platoon from "B" Company was dispatched to the relief of the patrol. Upon reaching the area they discovered the enemy had withdrawn. They recovered all personnel casualties, three (3) jeeps and one (1) SCR-300 and some of the weapons. At 1810 the relief platoon returned to the battalion area. Patrol casualties were seven (7) KIA, five (5) WIA, and one (1) MIA.

On 14 November local and motorized patrols were conducted with negative enemy contact. A patrol to SINPING-NI recovered the man who was missing from the patrol the day before. He was suffering from exposure, but otherwise in good condition.

During the period 15 November to 20 November local and motorized patrols were conducted with negative enemy contact. The Commanding Officer, First Battalion, 5th Marines

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was detached on 17 November and LtCol J. W. Stevens II assumed command on 18 November. At 0730 on 18 November a reconnaissance party from the command group departed for HAGARU-RI, but returned at 0930 because the mountain pass road northward was blocked. At 1640, "C" Company was detached from X Corps as a security force and rejoined the battalion, having traveled via truck convoy from their position at HAMHUNG to MAJON-DONG. The reconnaissance party from the command group departed for HAGARU-RI and SYNHUNG-NI at 0815 on the morning of 20 November. They reconnoitered the area into which the battalion would move the next day and the reconnaissance party was quartered for the night with 2/5 in their area about three (3) miles south of SINHUNG-NI. Cold weather indoctrination was given this date by representatives from X Corps to selected personnel of the battalion.

The battalion at 0830, 21 November departed via truck convoy to a new position at SINHUNG-NI on the east side of CHOSIN RESERVOIR. the convoy traveled up the one-way mountain pass which had to be cleared by 1200 to permit travel downward. The convoy arrived at the new area at 1300 and was guided into defense positions by members of the reconnaissance party of the previous day. One (1) road block was established and approximately twenty (20) enemy were encountered at 0200 the next morning. Fire was exchanged with no known enemy casualties. During the periods 22 November to 27 November this battalion conducted local patrols each day to the northeast, and east, with light enemy contact generally of squad strength. Four (4) outposts were established on the 22nd of November, on (1) being a combat outpost of platoon strength. Thanksgiving Day, 23 November, was a definite boost to the morale of the officers and men of 1/5 as a hot meal of turkey with all the trimmings was served in the field. "C" Company (reinforced) with Captain J. R. Jones commanding, departed at 0700 the 25th on a reconnaissance patrol to a village about ten (10) miles to the northeast of the battalion area. This patrol encountered enemy of approximately squad strength and returned at 1600 with no other contact. At 1700 contact was made with the 1st Battalion, 32nd Regiment, 7th Army Division which was to effect relief of the 5th Marines. A reconnaissance party departed 1000 on 26 November for a new assembly area at YUDAM-NI and after reconnoitering the area returned to the battalion CP. At 1800 orders were received from the 5th Marines to be prepared to move on 27 November to YUDAM-NI. This battalion was to commence movement at 1300 and would provide one (1) company as a covering force for the 3rd Battalion's movement from their position the following morning to YUDAM-NI.

"A" Company departed the battalion area at 0630, 27 November for the 3rd Battalion's position to provide a covering force for their movement that commence at 0800. An advance

party consisting of the S-3, S-1 and an officer from each company departed at 0800 for YUDAM-NI and arrived there at 1200. The battalion, less forward elements, commenced movement to YUDAM-NI at 1210 and arrived there after dark. Personnel from the advance party guided the battalion into Regimental reserve assembly area and local security was established. This assembly area was located in the flat ground to the right of the road in the village of YUDAM-NI; 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines was on the high ground to the west and northwest; "D" and "E" Companies, 7th marines were on the high ground to the north and northwest. "D" and "E" Companies, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines were under operational control of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines at this time. "E" Company, 7th marines occupied defense positions on the ridge leading from hill 1282 west and on the ridge leading south-southeast from hill 1282. These two (2) ridges were almost at right angles to each other with hill 1282 their origin. "D" Company, 7th Marines occupied defense positions on the southern sector of hill 1240. The top of this hill actually had two (2) high points of ground with a slight saddle of about two hundred (200) yards between the north sector and south sector.

For graphic picture of initial assembly area and action until 1400 on 28 November 1950 see sketch #3.

The defense sectors of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines and "D" and "E" Companies, 7th Marines were subjected to a heavy attack at approximately 2300 and 1/5 was alerted for possible enemy infiltration. At 0300, "C" Company was ordered to the rear of 3/5's position to be prepared to counter a possible enemy break through from the direction of 3/5's CP area.

At 0100, 28 November, the 1st Platoon of "A" was ordered to reinforce "E" Company, 7th Marines and shortly there after the 3rd Platoon of "A" was given the same mission. The 1st Platoon with Lt. Trapnell tied in with "E" Company, 7th Marines' right flank while the 3rd Platoon with Lt. Snyder was integrated with elements of "E" Company, 7th Marines. The 1st Platoon went into position under heavy enemy fire, and after close in fighting, with grenades being used extensively, the enemy managed to penetrate the line between "E" Company, 7th Marines and the 1st Platoon. About the same time an enemy envelopment of the 1st Platoon's right flank began, forcing them to withdraw to higher ground to their immediate rear. There again the platoon tied in with "E" Company, and held the line against continuous enemy pressure that eased only after daylight. The 3rd Platoon, integrated with elements of "E" Company, 7th Marines, was engaged in heavy grenade fighting and repeated attacks by the enemy which resulted in many casualties. Lt. Snyder, the surviving officer in that sector, assisted in the control of personnel of "E" Company. The enemy increased their efforts and the combined

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Marine force was driven from its position on the ridge high ground where the two ridges met. Lt. Snyder rallied the forces at his command and held the west ridge of the hill although not in possession of the high ground on his right flank. They remained in these positions until daylight.

The 3rd Platoon of "C" Company was placed at 0400 under operational control of the 7th Marines and ordered to reinforce "D" Company, 7th Marines on hill 1240. Upon the platoon's arrival on the hill they found a confused and disorganized situation. The platoon commander Lt. Dawe, could not make contact with "D" Company, 7th Marines, at this time. Lt. Dawe advanced his platoon to a northerly forward position on hill 1240 which was approximately one hundred and fifty (150) yards forward of "D" Company's positions and was immediately brought under heavy enemy fire where he assumed a defense position. During the remainder of the day a continuous fire fight ensued as "D" Company, 7th Marines and 3rd Platoon, "C" Company, 1/5, attempted to defend and reorganize the south sector of hill 1240. The 3rd Platoon commander estimated that there were two (2) battalions to a regiment of enemy attacking on hill 1240. The 3rd platoon casualties were four (4) KIA, one (1) MIA and seventeen (17) WIA.

At 0400, 28 November, "C" Company, (less one platoon), was ordered under operational control of the 7th Marines with the mission to reinforce "E" Company, 7th Marines and elements of "A" Company. The Commanding Officer of 1/5 realizing the seriousness of the situation on the ridge immediately above and to his right, also ordered the remainder of "A" Company to follow in trace of "C" Company, having been previously alerted, immediately moved up the draw directly towards hill 1282. "C" Company upon reaching a point about one hundred (100) yards from the enemy on hill 1282 was subjected to intense enemy small arms, mortar, rocket, and rifle grenade fire. Capt. Jones, "C" Company Commander, immediately deployed his two (2) platoons and assaulted the high ground. This assault regained the high ground and defense positions were taken up. No officers of "E" Company, 7th Marines were to be found on the hill and Capt. Jones assumed control of all units in that sector. Evacuation of approximately two hundred (200) casualties was commenced with the aid of almost one hundred (100) men of H&S Company, 1/5. The men evacuated were dead and wounded of "C" and "A" Companies, 1/5 and "E" Company, 7th Marines. Reorganization of the ground was completed between 0730-0830 after hill 1282 was secured. "C" Company, 1/5 occupied a frontage of about one hundred fifty (150) yards on the high ground of hill 1282. "E" Company was on the left flank of "C" Company and occupied a frontage of about seventy-five (75) yards. A squad from "C" Company was used to outpost and secure the left flank of the ridge leading west off of hill 1282. "A" Company was tied in on the right flank of "C" Company with a frontage of one hundred fifty

(150) yards which extended down the ridge southeast of hill 1282. Lt. Lichtenberger of "A" Company, 1/5 was ordered by Capt. Jones to command the remnants of "E" Company, 7th Marines. Lt. Bye of the 7th Marines arrived on hill 1282 about 1200 and assumed command of "E" Company. Throughout the day the entire line was engaged in a continuous fire fight with the enemy to hold the positions on hill 1282. Capt. Jones could make no radio contact with the 7th Marines therefore the reports of the situation were made to 1/5. The units of 1/5 that were assigned to the 7th marines for operational control never were committed as such but remained under 1/5 control. At 1600, "A" Company, "C" Company, (less one platoon), and "E" Company, 7th Marines were relieved by "I" Company, 3/5. "A" and "C" Companies returned to the battalion assembly area. Casualties for the period: "A" Company, five (5) KIA and thirty-seven (37) WIA; "C" Company, (less one platoon), ten (10) KIA and thirty (30) WIA. It is estimated that the enemy encountered numbered about two (2) regiments. Capt. Jones estimated the enemy dead to the immediate front of his sector to be between two hundred fifty (250) and five hundred (500).

For the following action see sketch #4.

At 1400, 28 November, "B" Company began relief of "D" Company, 7th Marines and the 3rd Platoon of "C" Company 1/5 in their positions on hill 1240. "B" Company commanded made a reconnaissance of the positions of "D" Company and the 3rd Platoon of "C" Company. "B" Company, with a machine gun platoon from Weapons Company attached, then began to effect the relief. The 1st Platoon moving into position was unable to contact any friendly troops on its and was drawing enemy small arms fire from its front and left flank. The platoon leader was ordered to continue to attempt to occupy his assigned sector. The 2nd Platoon was in position and the 3rd Platoon attacked to seize its sector, the high ground around hill 1240. At this time several casualties were inflicted by a mortar barrage on "B" Company CP area. It soon became evident that the 1st and 3rd Platoons could not occupy their assigned sector by dark because of continuous strong enemy resistance. "B" Company requested an air strike on the area directly to the front of their 3rd Platoon. The air strike was delivered successfully just at twilight but failed to dislodge the enemy and the 3rd Platoon withdrew to positions along the top of the southern sector of hill 1240. 81mm mortar fire was also placed with effect on the enemy positions. "B" Company partially covered the saddle to their left flank by fire and physically occupied positions on the left slope of the hill. This position extended along the top of the hill and down the right shoulder and attempted to tie in by fire with the reported elements of the 7th Marines on the high ground to the right flank. The 81mm mortar platoon of Weapons Company in support of "B" Company was in position at the base of hill 1240 occupied by "B" Company.

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"B" Company's artillery FO could not register artillery to their front because the position occupied by "B" Company masked the fire.

By 1800 The Commanding Officer of 1/5 had prepared and received approval of counterattack plans. The Commanding Officer of "A" and "C" Company were briefed on the plans. At 1900 the 3rd Platoon of "C" Company rejoined "C" Company after release by CO, 7th Marines and relief by "B" Company, 1/5.

At 0110, 29 November a warning order was received from the 5th Marines for one (1) company to be detached and report to 1/7 CP for operational control. "A" Company was detached at 0915 for this mission and upon reporting to 1/7 CP was attached to the Provisional Battalion, 7th Marines. This Provisional Battalion immediately moved out to effect a relief of "F" Company, 7th Marines. The mission was canceled soon after and "A" Company moved into a blocking position above the airstrip which was under construction in the valley south of YUDAM-NI.

"C" Company upon being relieved on hill 1282 by "I" Company, 3/5, had returned to the battalion assembly area and occupied a sector in 1/5 defense perimeter. Two (2) provisional platoons of one (1) officer and twenty-four (24) men from the 11th Marines and one (1) officer and twenty-two (22) men from H&S Company, 5th Marines were attached to "C" Company. At 0900 one (1) platoon (rein) of "C" Company was ordered to take up defense positions on the ridge running south of hill 1282 and cover by fire, the draw between this ridge and "B" Company 1/5's position on hill 1240. The 1st Platoon occupied positions on the ridge of "I" Company right flank and tied in by fire with "I" Company on the left and "B" Company, 1/5 on hill 1240 to its right flank.

At 0900 The 3rd Platoon of "B" Company was ordered to take the north sector of hill 1240 and recover the one (1) dead of the previous day. This action was successful in the recovery of the one (1) dead but the platoon was driven back by heavy frontal and flanking small arms fires and grenades. The 3rd Platoon was ordered to withdraw to its former position. The North sector of hill 1240 was then subjected to 81mm mortar fire and several air strikes were run. Early in the afternoon of 29 November a provisional platoon of one (1) officer and eighteen (18) men from the AT Company, 5th Marines was placed under control of "B" Company and positioned to cover the draw to "B" Company's left flank and the 1st Platoon, "C" Company right flank. At 1300, "B" Company called for 81mm mortar fire on thirty (30) to forty (40) enemy to

their front causing them to disperse. At 1500 enemy troops were reported coming down a slope in the direction of "B" Company's left flank. "B" Company requested and received 4.2" mortar support and at 1530 an air strike was requested which succeeded in breaking up the attack. A direct napalm hit on the enemy OP coupled with excellent strafing runs forced the attacking enemy to disperse.

At 1530 the 1st Platoon, "B" Company with Lt. A. C. Jensen commanding was ordered by "B" Company commander to move two (2) squads into position to assault the northern portion of hill 1240. The assault was to be carried out while being covered by small arms and machine guns from the 3rd Platoon. The 1st Platoon moved to within ten (10) to fifteen (15) yards of the high ground on the northern portion of hill 1240 without receiving any enemy fire. At this point intense machine gun and small arms fire was received from its front and left flank. Many grenades were thrown down upon the attacking platoon by the enemy from their positions on the high ground which arose abruptly to a height of seventy-five (75) feet in a short distance in front of the attacking platoon. "B" Company Commander, upon viewing the situation, ordered the 1st Platoon to withdraw to its former position. The 1st Platoon suffered ten (10) casualties, six (6) WIA who were evacuated and four (4) KIA including the platoon commander.

Very little enemy fire was received the night of 29 November. In the early dawn, night fighters dumped their ordnance very effectively on the reverse slope of hill 1240 while "B" Company used illuminating hand grenades to mark the Company lines.

At 0700, 30 November, "B" Company observed enemy grouping to their front; mortar fire was called down and the enemy dispersed. At 0825 one (1) 75mm recoilless section from the AT Company, 5th Marines was attached to "B" Company and at 1000 reported scoring hits on three (3) enemy bunkers at TA 4182-I-2 on the northern sector of hill 1240. An AT Assault section of Weapons Company, 1/5 also scored hits with 3.5" rockets on the bunkers from the 3rd Platoon's sector. Lt. Hancock, "B" Company Commander, estimated the enemy dead at eight hundred (800) on hill 1240 for the period 28 November to 30 November.

The night of 29-30 November, "C" Company, (less one platoon), occupied a sector in 1/5 defense perimeter. At 100, 30 November it was ordered to relieve elements of the 11th Marines on hill 1167 to the right of "B" Company position. This relief was effected by 1330 and "C" Company was in position with its right flank anchored on the CHOSIN Reservoir and its left

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flank tied in by fire with "B" Company on hill 1240. No enemy contact was made during the night.

This battalion began preparation at 1200, on 30 November for movement of the CP to the southeast where the battalion was to withdraw the next day to its sector of a smaller and bi-regimental perimeter. A reconnaissance of the new area was made and at 1530 movement was started to the new CP location at TA 4179-S. Equipment and supplies were moved by trucks and jeeps with trailers. The greater part of H&S Company moved in route column to the new CP location. A combat CP was opened directly behind "B" Company's position on hill 1240 to command the rear guard composed of "B" and "C" Companies while other units of the regiment withdrew to the new bi-regimental perimeter. Weapons Company Headquarters, AT Platoon and the 1st and 2nd sections of the mortar platoon supporting "B" Company moved to the new area and occupied a position on the lower left slope of the high ground to the southeast of CHOSIN Reservoir (see sketch #5). The new Battalion CP was opened at 1630.

For the following action see sketch #5.

On 1 December at 0920, "B" Company ran an air strike in front of their position and at this time "C" Company started their withdrawal to pre-determined positions on the high ground to the southeast of CHOSIN Reservoir. "C" Company with one (1) provisional platoon attached, occupied a defense sector of 1,000 extending along the high ground generally running east. /from these positions "C" Company supported by fire "B" Company's withdrawal from hill 1240. The 1st Platoon, "C" Company after withdrawal from hill 1282 rejoined "C" Company in its defense sector.

"B" Company began withdrawal from hill 1240 as soon as "C" Company was in position and at 1050 had effected withdrawal to the base of hill 1240. An artillery concentration shift to "B" Company's old position on hill 1240 was requested to fall at 1050. The artillery forward observer's radio was not operating and due to his distance from "B" Company Commander and air strike could not be called in lieu of the artillery concentration. The rapid displacement of machine gun sections in leap frog fashion provided "B" Company with covering fire to its withdrawal across the flat ground between hill 1240 and its new defense position between the road and CHOSIN Reservoir. "B" Company, in its withdrawal, was subjected to heavy fire from its previous positions on hill 1240 now occupied by the enemy. Bobby traps were placed by "B" Company prior to withdrawal and were successful in inflicting several casualties on the enemy

closely following the company's withdrawal. As the last elements of "B" Company crossed the first bridge on the road from YUDAM-NI to HAGARU-RI that bridge was destroyed by Weapons Company 1/5.

"B" Company occupied a defense position which extended from the road across the level ground and tied in with the left flank of "C" Company. At 1700, "B" Company was relieved by "D" Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines and then moved into an assembly area on the west slope of the high ground to the rear of "C" Company's position.

Following the withdrawal of "B" Company a dispatch was received ordering the battalion to be prepared to move to HAGARU-RI on order. All equipment and supplies that could not be carried would be destroyed. The battalion less the motor convoy was to attack overland and move in the direction of HAGARU-RI. All organic vehicles were loaded and where possible trailer and truck loads were leveled off for carrying stretcher casualties and all other spaces were utilized for other casualties. All loaded vehicles were placed in an assembly area ready to move out on order.

"A" Company still in a defense position on the high ground to the right of the road and south of "C" Company's position was released by the 7th Marines and reverted to battalion control remaining in its defense position.

Between 2300 1 December and 0300, 2 December many attempts at infiltration were made on the left front of "C" Company's position. Enemy troops in the approximate strength of one (1) squad infiltrated the perimeter but were annihilated. the enemy infiltration attempts then shifted to the center of "C" Company's position on the high ground and immediately thereafter the enemy attacked the position in force. A platoon from "B" Company was sent to reinforce "C" Company on the high ground. The attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. Shortly thereafter seventy-five (75) to one hundred twenty-five (125) enemy were observed crossing the ice on the reservoir to the right front of "C" Company. Mortar and artillery fire were placed on the enemy troops resulting in many casualties and causing the remainder to move back. Attempts at infiltration continued until daylight. It is estimated that an enemy force of one (1) regiment was attacking "C" Company perimeter. The following morning a force of approximately 375 were observed to the right flank of the battalion sector evidently having crossed during the night. Estimated enemy killed two hundred (200). Fifty-one dead were

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counted in front of one machine gun, "C" Company had four (4) KIA and six (6) WIA, attached Weapons Company units had one (1) KIA and 2nd Platoon of "B" Company one (1) WIA.

The morning of 2 December a verbal order was received to cancel and burn the order for the battalion to move overland to HAGARU-RI. The battalion was to proceed on order to HAGARU-RI along the road with two (2) companies acting as flank covering force. All supplies and equipment that could not be carried were prepared for burning and destruction. At 1100 this destruction was ordered and the battalion began withdrawing to HAGARU-RI. "A" Company was detached to operational control of 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, the rear guard unit. Order of march was: H&S Company, supply train and Weapons Company. "B" and "C" Companies were deployed on the high ground to the left of the road as a flank covering force. At 1600, "B" and "C" Companies approached hill 1520 with "C" Company as the point, enemy small arms fire from the hill forced "C" Company to deploy. At this time the road block had been broken and the Commanding Officer of 1/5 ordered "B" and "C" Companies to return to the road. Before "C" Company could disengage from the enemy and move down hill 1520 it received one (1) KIA and one (1) WIA. "C" and "B" Companies returned to the road at 2400 and rejoined the battalion column at 0400. The rest of the battalion remained on the road until daylight under adverse weather conditions with the column moving only slightly. During the morning of 3 December, the battalion continued along the road in its position with other regimental elements. The column was halted several times by defended road blocks which were cleared. This battalion continued to move until 1530 at which time "B" and "C" Companies were set in position at TA 4478 to cover the withdrawal of division elements. H&S Company, Supply train and Weapons Company proceeded on to HAGARU-RI arriving there at 2100 and going into an assembly area at TA 5171-T-4.

At 0230, 4 December, "B" and "C" Companies moved from their defense positions to the road and had the mission of rear guard. Later the two companies were released as a rear guard and ordered to move forward in the column ahead of 3/7.

At 1240, "B" Company arrived at the assembly area and "C" Company arrived at 1300. At 1335, "A" Company rejoined the battalion from operational control of 2/5. At 1530 all of 1/5 attached units returned to parent organizations. While at HAGARU-RI the battalion was provided some tentage and war-up facilities by the 1st Service Battalion, 1st Ordnance Battalion, Headquarters Battalion, and 1st Motor Transport Battalion. The 1st Service battalion also assisted in providing hot food for the battalion, as all galley equipment had been destroyed. Clothing and equipment were also issued to men of the battalion.

The battalion rested in this assembly area until 0900, 5 December at which time it was assigned a sector of the defense perimeter of HAGARU-RI. By 1600 the battalion had completely occupied its portion of the defense perimeter with a combat CP established to the rear of "A" Company's position. (see sketch #6). For the remainder of the day and night no enemy contact was made.

During the day of 6 December remained in defense positions, strengthening them and being resupplied with equipment that was destroyed at YUDAM-NI. The battalion was alerted for movement the following day to KOTO-RI.

For the following action see sketch #6.

At 2100 the enemy launched a heavy attack on "C" Company's right flank where it tied in with "E" Company, 2/5. The attack was repulsed and it then moved to the right in the direction of "E" Company while small groups of the enemy continued exerting pressure on "C" Company's left front. 81mm and 60mm mortar fire and "C" Company's rockets were used with maximum effectiveness on the enemy troop concentrations. One (1) USA M-24 tank was used effectively during the late phases of the attack. The attack except for several attempts at infiltration by small groups along "C" Company's left front ended about 2330.

At 2330, 6 December light enemy activity occurred along the entire battalion front. Activity increased before "A" Company's position and at approximately 0100 the enemy struck heavily on "A" Company's right front. The attack was stopped. Immediately the enemy main effort shifted to the left front and the position was penetrated lightly but the enemy was immediately counterattacked by the 2nd Platoon forcing the enemy to fall back.

The enemy continued to press the attack more vigorously. The main enemy pressure began to develop quickly against "A" Company's right flank forcing it back off the low ground to the high ground to its rear. Company 60mm mortars were used to their maximum.

At 0215, 7 December "B" Company in battalion reserve was ordered to reinforce "A" Company. The 3rd Platoon, "B" Company was placed in position to effectively block by fire and enemy envelopment across the river flat. The 1st Platoon, "B" Company, was integrated with "A" Company on the right sector of the hill. The 2nd Platoon, "B" Company was sent to

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reinforce "A" Company's left flank. "B" Company's mortars received missions from "A" Company. A bitter grenade and small arms fire fight went on for the remainder of the night.

At dawn the enemy attack decreased in intensity. Supporting arms with better visibility became very effective, aircraft made several close air support runs and the enemy stopped completely. The enemy became demoralized and fled. "A" Company casualties were twenty-six (26) WIA and seven (7) KIA. "B" Company casualties were seven (7) WIA and three (3) KIA.

While the heavy attack was under way against "A" Company, another attack at 0200 struck "C" Company front lines. With the aid and effective supporting arms the attack was quickly repulsed. A USA M-24 Tank gave support on the left flank. Infiltration by small groups of enemy was attempted throughout the remainder of the night. Two hundred sixty (260) dead were counted within two hundred (200) yards in front of the company perimeter the next morning. "C" Company casualties for the night's action were ten (10) WIA.

The battalion remained in defense position until 1100 at which time it withdrew from the perimeter and departed HAGARU-RI for KOTO-RI. "B" Company was employed as a left flank guard. The order of march was "A" Company, H&S Company, Supply Train, Weapons Company and "C" Company. The battalion made the march during the day with negative enemy action. During the early hours of darkness great difficulty was encountered by the moving column. Where bridges had been destroyed, the by-passes were difficult to cross because of water and icy stream bed and banks.

The battalion arrived in KOTO-RI at 2000 and went into assembly area at TA 5639-B. Men slept in the open in the snow for the most part. The battalion remained in this assembly area during the night of 7 December.

At 1100, 8 December, 1/5 departed from KOTO-RI. All equipment and supplies were carried in organic transportation. Troops moved on foot along the road. Division elements moving southward along the road were held up by enemy road blocks. Approximately 2,500 yards south of KOTO-RI at TA 5457-S the battalion less "B" and "C" companies, set up defense perimeter, straddle the road where it remained during the night of 8 December. No enemy contact was made on the perimeter.

Prior to the battalion setting up this defense perimeter, "B" and "C" companies were ordered to seize and occupy objective DOG (Hill 1457). "B" and "C" companies had moved out with "B" Company shortly thereafter occupying the high ground immediately to the northeast of objective DOG to cover the advance of "C" Company to the objective. After "C" Company had passed through "B" Company lines, its lead platoon contacted an Army patrol of platoon strength from the 32nd Infantry Battalion. Soon after this contact the Army patrol received fire from an estimated enemy force of one hundred fifty (150) Chinese troops to their direct front. The enemy positions were assaulted by the 2nd Platoon of "C" Company together with the Army patrol and forced the enemy to withdraw. The enemy immediately counterattacked to regain its former position but was driven off by small arms and machine gun fire. An estimated fifty (50) enemy were killed. At 1700 the Army patrol and "B" and "C" Companies were set up in a defense perimeter for the night on the high ground which was west and northwest of Objective DOG. Marine casualties for the days activity was one (1) KIA and one (1) WIA while the Army patrol suffered one (1) KIA and two (2) WIA.

At 0800, 9 December, "B" and "C" Companies patrolled south and east for 1,000 yards from their positions without enemy contact and set up outpost on Objective DOG. One (1) platoon of enemy troops were detected moving toward Objective DOG. Long range fire resulted in ten (10) casualties to the enemy and they withdrew. During the afternoon of 9 December, the patrol of the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry withdrew from the high ground and "C" Company occupied their portion of the perimeter. The "C" Company outpost on Objective DOG was pulled back into "B" and "C" Company perimeter for the night.

At 1515 Regimental Order 44-50 was received with instructions for the withdrawal down the mountain pass to HUMHUNG. At 2015 a message was received that elements of the 1st Marines would relieve "B" and "C" Companies on order. The battalion remained in its positions during the night of 9 December. No enemy contact was made.

During the day of 10 December the battalion made preparations for the withdrawal down the mountain pass to MAJON-DONG. At 1600, 1/5, (Less "B" and "C" Companies), displaced for movement to MAJON-DONG. Order of march was to be "A" Company, H&S Company, Supply Train and Weapons Company. "B" and "C" Companies were to rejoin the battalion at the top of the pass. At 1900 "B" and "C" Companies were relieved in position by "D" and "E" Companies 2/1. "B" and "C" Companies moved to the road and joined the battalion on the road just below the summit of the pass. Shortly thereafter the battalion commenced a night march

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south to MAJON-DONG. at 0400 the column halted approximately three (3) miles north of SUDONG because of a reported enemy road block. At daylight the block was reported broken and the column moved southward. At 0800, 11 December, just south of SUDONG, the column received long range small arms fire which caused two (2) casualties. At 1130, 1/5 arrived at MAJON-DONG. Selected CP personnel and the battalion supply train continued to HAMHUNG by motor vehicle. The remainder of the battalion embarked aboard a train for movement to HAMHUNG. When the train arrived at 1415 at HAMHUNG, troops were disembarked, placed aboard Army trucks for movement to the Regimental Bivouac Area, YONPO Airfield, and arrived there at 1530. All personnel were billeted in the bivouac area already set up by "A" Company 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion with tents, stoves, galley with hot food, water and a security guard. The remainder of the day and the morning following day personnel of the battalion spent the time resting, reading mail and making preparations for going aboard ship.

At 1315, 12 December this battalion struck camp and prepared to carry out orders to embark on the USS GENERAL RANDALL. The battalion embarked aboard LVT's in the battalion assembly area at 1845 for movement to GREEN Beach and arrived there at 2015. At 2130 the battalion embarked aboard two (2) LSU's and was transported to the USS GENERAL RANDALL. The battalion office was set up in the passenger lounge. The GENERAL RANDALL was overloaded with military personnel troops spaces were very crowded and many slept on weather decks as other space was not available for them. Food was served continually from 0600 to 2130 in order to feed all personnel. Loading was completed at 2330. Battalion motor transport and supply train moved to GREEN Beach and loaded aboard an AKA.

The USS GENERAL RANDALL got underway at 1430, 13 December and arrived at the port of PUSAN at 1230, 14 December. A battalion quartering party departed at 0930, 15 December for new assembly area. The battalion disembarked from the USS GENERAL RANDALL at 1630. At 1830 1/5 boarded LST-Q009 for movement to MASAN.

## 8. ENEMY TACTICS, ORGANIZATION, STRENGTH

### a. Enemy Tactics

The NKPA troops contacted by this battalion between 8 October and 27 November, 1950 consisted primarily of stragglers or groups of straggler who were moving north to rejoin their forces, evading the advancing UN troops, wherever possible. Those troops were usually dressed

in civilian clothes and rarely carried field equipment of any sort other than a weapon. Many of these soldiers were nor even armed, consequently it was often impossible to distinguish between an enemy soldier and friendly civilian. The NKPA troops seemed to have three requirements before they would engage in a fire fight with our troops, those being tactical superiority, numerical superiority and the element of surprise. On one occasion a tactically deployed, numerically superior force of the NKPA launched an assault against one of our patrols while utilizing supporting fire from their flanks.

While this battalion was patrolling out of the SINGHUNG-NI area during the period 21 November to 27 November, we frequently contacted daylight and night reconnaissance patrols of the CCF. These patrols displayed a marked disinclination to become engaged in a fire fight and quickly withdrew after the first burst of fire from our troops.

Most of the attacks launched against this battalion in the YUDAM-NI and HAGARU-RI areas followed a set pattern. Whether by a large force or a small one, they shifted their main efforts up and down the defense lines, apparently in an effort to "feel out" our positions, locate our flanks and determine a weak point which might be penetrated. On several occasions the enemy managed to infiltrate a few troops by this method but failed to follow upon the penetration in force. This may have been due to their lack of adequate communications. Communications employed by the CCF consisted mainly of bugle calls, whistle signals of a prearranged nature, flags, flares, and colored smoke. These methods appeared to be fairly effective for the control of small units, but not adequate for the control of units of a company size or larger.

Enemy attacks were nearly always supported by accurate machine gun fire. Mortars used in support were frequently fired by the "direct lay" method, however, they seldom fired for effect and their fire was usually lacking in accuracy. The CCF used a 76mm high velocity weapon against this battalion at YUDAM-NI, but again this piece was not fired for effect and the fire proved to be inaccurate. Probably the most effective supporting weapon used by the enemy was the rifle grenade, some of which were the U.S. type. These were employed as anti-personnel weapons and were fired into our lines and behind them with considerable accuracy and effect. The enemy frequently fired the rifle grenades from defilade positions which were out of hand grenade range of our troops (75-100 yards), consequently mortar or artillery fire was required to knock them out.

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Actual assaults on our positions were led by enemy grenadiers who were armed only with a large supply of concussion type hand grenades. These grenades were of light construction and potato-masher design which enabled even the weak armed Chinese to throw them considerable distances. On several occasions those grenadiers carried pole charges with them and appeared to be advancing toward our automatic weapons positions however, these enemy soldiers were repulsed or killed before reaching such positions, consequently the effectiveness of the pole charge remains undetermined. The individual grenadier often moved toward our positions standing straight up or crouching only slightly. He was usually supported by intense sub-machine gun fire from other CCF troops which moved up directly behind the grenadiers.

The enemy employed numerous observers who were not always situated on the highest and most obvious points. They were often able to determine our flanks and locate our mortars positions. The enemy frequently shifted the location of their own mortar in an effect to avoid air strike and counter battery fire.

The CCF were not especially adept at night fighting, but appeared to be forced to resort to it due to our excellent air support and air observation during daylight hours. The enemy also took advantage of the darkness to reconstruct pillboxes and other emplacements and to reinforce their lines.

The key to the success attained by CCF troops observed by this unit were superior mass and strongly disciplined troops.

#### b. Enemy Strength and Casualties

The strength of the enemy contacted by this battalion between 8 October and 28 November varied from isolated stragglers as groups of stragglers to a battalion or remnants of regiments. On the reconnaissance in force to HUKSU-RI, it is estimated that contact was eventually made with an organized battalion. At CHYGYONG a patrol from this battalion contacted an enemy force of approximately two hundred (200) to three hundred (300) and engaged them in a fire fight, but patrol contact with forces of this size were not usual. It is estimated that fifty-two (52) enemy soldiers were killed by this battalion during the above mentioned periods, and that one hundred eighty (180) individuals were classed as POW's, however, it should be noted that a percentage of these prisoners were possibly only strong communist sympathizers. About fifty percent (50%) of the total POW's voluntarily surrendered.

Between 28 November and 12 December, 1950 the battalion was in contact with CCF units which ranged in size from a platoon to two (2) regiments or possibly a division at any one time. The battalion took only eight (8) POW's during this period, which coupled with the fact that enemy attacks frequently hit on boundaries with adjacent units and that the enemy efforts frequently shifted back and forth along our lines makes enemy strength estimates extremely difficult. POW reports and information that was received from higher echelons, it is estimated that the battalion was in contact at one time or another with approximately eight (8) to ten (10) thousand CCF troops during the above mentioned period.

It is difficult to accurately estimate the number of enemy killed in action, the reasons being four fold: (1) freezing weather and enemies lack of adequate medical equipment undoubtedly caused many wounded Chinese to later die from exposure and the lack of proper medical attention; (2) our outstanding air support killed and wounded great numbers of the enemy that were unobserved by the ground forces; (3) the enemy was very aggressive in evacuating their wounded and dead as soon as possible; (4) our units seldom physically occupied the ground over which the enemy attack, consequently we were seldom able to make actual counts of enemy dead. Despite the above consideration, this unit believes the absolute minimum estimate of enemy killed in action by this battalion should be placed at one thousand (1,000). Estimates selected from personnel in this organization varied considerably with some placing enemy casualties as high as four thousand (4,000).

### c. Organization

Between 8 October and 27 November, 1950 the enemy contact by this battalion usually were loosely organized guerilla bands or stragglers from units of the NKPA. On 10 November, however, a patrol from this battalion engaged the advance elements of the 11th Regiment, 5th NKPA Division in a fire fight. Reports (which were later confirmed by higher echelons) revealed that the 11th Regiment was followed by the 12th and 10th Regiments of the Division group respectively. All of these units were moving north at that time to regroup, attempting to avoid contact with advancing UN forces. CCF contacts made prior to 28 November were in the form of small well organized patrols as they refused to become involved in a fire fight with our troops.

Shortly after the battalion arrived at YUDAM-NI, on 27 November, the enemy launched a well organized and coordinated attack. POW reports indicate that the battalion was in contact with elements of the following enemy organizations: 2nd Battalion, 180th Regiment, 60th

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Division; the 266th and 267 Regiments; and 58th, 59th and 89th Divisions all of which are part of the 20th Corps, 9th CCF Army.

Again at HAGARU-RI, the battalion was under attack by a well organized enemy. POW reports tend to prove that two separate CCF regiments attacked the battalion defense sector. These were the 26th Regiment, 76th Division and the 29th Regiment, 77th Division both of the 26th Corps, 9th CCF Army.

Other POW's taken by the battalion during the withdrawal from YUDAM-NI to MAJON-DONG claimed to be members of the following CCF units:

2nd Battalion, 59th Regiment, 48th Division

4th Regiment, 2nd Division

54th Regiment

101st Regiment

175 Regiment

176 Regiment

177th Regiment

619th Regiment, 47th Division

d. Equipment

(1) The NKPA soldier

The majority of NKPA Soldiers contacted during this period were members of guerilla bands or small groups that were attempting to move north to avoid the advancing UN forces or rejoin their organizations. As a rule they were poorly equipped. They seldom were in uniform of any sort, and only about half of them were armed. Very few had such

field equipment as canteens, entrenching tools, etc. Those NKPA troops that were armed carried weapons of the following descriptions:

7.62mm "Mossin-Nagant" M1891/30 Bolt Action Russian Long Range Rifle and Bayonet

7.62mm "Mossin-Nagant" M1924/27 Bolt Action Russian Carbine

7.62mm "Shpagin" PPSH M1941 Automatic Sub-Machine Gun (burp gun)

7.62mm "Degtyarev" DP Russian light Machine Gun

Russian hand Grenades

In addition, these armed NKPA troops carried one or two bandoliers of ammunition, occasionally an unarmed comrade carried additional ammunition. There was no uniformity on the number of hand grenades carried.

## (2) The CCF Soldier

Equipment carried by the CCF soldier was far superior to that carried by the NKPA soldier. Most of the troops carried a bolt action rifle and two bandoliers of ammunition containing ten five round clips. Most NCO's and officers carried U.S. Thompson Sub-Machine Guns, Caliber .45, M1928 A2 or A4. Ammunition for the "Tommy Guns" were carried in pouches which held five magazines containing either 20 or 30 rounds each. Nearly every rifleman and many NCO's and officers, carried a large supply of hand grenades in belt or vest type carriers. The number of grenades varied from two (2) to twenty (20), however, the troops carrying twenty (20) grenades were called "grenadiers" and were not armed with a rifle. Weapons with which the CCF soldier were armed included the following:

U.S. Rifle Caliber .30 M1903 (Springfield) Bolt Action

U.S. Rifle Caliber .30 M1917 (Eddystone) Bolt Action

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British Enfield Bolt Action

Belgium Mauser Bolt Action

U.S. Carbine .30 MI gas operated

Japanese Caliber .25 Carbine Bolt Action

7.62mm "Mossin-Nagant" M1891/30 Russian Long Rifl Bolt Action

7.62mm "Mossin-Nagant" M1924/27 Russian Carbine Bolt Action

7.62mm "Shpagin" PPSH M1941 Automatic Sub-Machine Gun (burp gun)

U.S. Thompson Sub-Machine Gun M1928 A2 or A4

U.S. Colt Automatic Pistol Caliber .45 M1911

Belgium Mauser Machine Pistol Full Automatic (stock employed as holster by fitting into dove-tail handle of pistol)

Concussion and fragmentation type hand grenades

In some cases the riflemen and grenadiers carried an offensive grenade of the potato-masher type which had what appeared to be a booster charge wrapped in cloth and tied around the grenade. The booster charge seemed to be picric acid or sulphur, or a combination of both.

Crew served weapons that were used against this battalion included the following:

U.S. Browning Light Machine Gun Caliber .30 M1919 A4 HB ground

Japanese Nambu light machine Gun

U.S. Mortar 60mm

U.S. Mortar 81mm

U.S. Rocket Launcher 2.36

Russian Mortar 50mm M1938

Russian Mortar 82mm M1936 Battalion Mortar

Russian 76mm Field Gun M1942 "Zis"

Anti-personnel mines, some of which were merely armed hand grenades, placed in ditches and along the sides of roads.

Equipment captured by this battalion includes:

1 - U.S. Browning Light Machine Gun Caliber .30 HB ground

1 - Japanese Nambu Light Machine Gun

1 - U.S. Rocket Launcher 2.36

1 - Japanese Mortar 48mm (knee)

3 - Rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition

38 - rounds of U.S. Rockets 2.36 ammunition

All captured equipment was either utilized or destroyed.

Generally speaking, the uniform worn by the CCF was not adequate for cold weather fighting. The clothing fit too tightly in the legs and ankles which tended to cut off the circulation to the feet. There was a great shortage of gloves, mittens, and hats. The uniform was not waterproof nor water repellent, rather it was inclined to absorb moisture making it heavier

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and causing the wearer to become frost bitten more easily. The clothing proved to be extremely flammable. In some cases our tracer bullets were reported to have set fire to the clothing of their victims. The articles of clothing worn by the CCF troops varied considerably; these listed below were actually noted by members of this battalion:

- a. Brown rayon-cotton cap similar in style to those issued by the U.S. Army.
- b. High necked sweater type undershirt.
- c. Two heavy shirts.
- d. Two pairs cotton trousers fitting tight at the ankle.
- e. One pair outer trousers, reversible type, cotton quilted fitting tight at the ankle.
- f. Reversible cotton quilted (or padded) jacket of wrist length.
- g. Wide (approximately 2½") leather belt.
- h. Socks of thin cotton (worn by approximately half of the CCF).
- i. Shoes were three distinct types: (1) tennis shoes of ankle height; (2) canvas topped shoes with fleece lining and leather soles; (3) leather shoes with either hob-nailed or smooth bottoms. Many of the CCF troops carried an extra pair of shoes different from the ones worn.
- j. Gloves (when worn) were of three types: (1) woolen gloves with five fingers; (2) woolen mittens with trigger finger; (3) cotton fleeced lined mittens with trigger finger and wrist extension that covered the forearm half way to the elbow.

Outer garment were reversible to blend with the background. One side was dusty brown in color, the other side being an off-white or ivory shade.

## 9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF THE OPERATION

Following the administrative landing at WONSAN, the battalion was given the mission of protecting various portions of the MSR to HAMHUNG, with orders to seek out and destroy any enemy in assigned zones of action. Enemy contacts was almost negative until several days after occupation of defense positions astraddle a mountain pass, twelve (12) miles northwest of CHIGYONG. At this location the battalion was directly under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division. On 7, 8, and 9 November a two company reconnaissance in force was conducted to the vicinity of HUKSU-RI, a village approximately thirty (30) miles to the northwest, where contact was made with an organized force of least battalion strength disposed on the high ground south of the village. Several days later contact was made with elements of the 5th NKPA Division, which was attempting to move northward to escape UN forces and presumably regroup. Our active patrolling undoubtedly acted as a deterrent to their movement and dispersed certain of their organized elements on several occasions.

Subsequently to and to and patrolling of the MAJON-DONG area accomplished the mission of protecting a portion of the MSR from HAMHUNG to the CHOSIN Reservoir area.

At YUDAM-NI the battalion was committed initially to the defense of the b-regimental perimeter and participated for three (3) days in bitter fighting to repel concentrated enemy attacks. When ordered to commence the retrograde movement to HAGARU-RI a well executed disengagement and short withdrawal was accomplished and a new defense position established from which a serious attack was thrown back with disproportionate losses to the enemy. For the remainder of the movement to HAGARU-RI, elements of 1/5 acted occasionally as rear guard and as flank guards.

During the last two (2) days at HAGARU-RI, the battalion occupied a sector of the defense perimeter. On the night of 6, 7 December, an attack against this unit's defense sector by two (2) enemy regiments was repulsed, again with heavy enemy losses.

Movement to KOTO-RI was uneventful although elements of the battalion act as flank security for the motor and troop column. Upon departure from KOTO-RI, two (2) companies seized and held objective DOG, securing the east flank of the pass, until all division elements had passed through.

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To estimate the results of the operation in a battalion level is indeed difficult; suffice to say that a numerically superior enemy suffered heavy and disproportionate to losses in their futile attempt to surround and destroy the 1st Marine Division.

#### 10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMANDER

1. Relative to cold weather operations, it is believed that the most important lesson demonstrated during this period was that unless a unit is fully equipped and trained to operate in sub-zero cold it must be ordered into it with caution. It is feared that this lesson might have been obscured by the heroic and dramatic withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division from YUDAM-NI sector to HUNGHAM. It is contended that if this unit had remained in the YUDAM-NI sector, employing the available equipment and supplies, without any enemy contact, the non-battle casualties would have been alarmingly high. The Commanding Officer of this unit found himself deceived in that upon assigning a subordinate echelon an objective, it was taken; the immediate casualties were normal. Another objective might be assigned; it was taken; but there will come a time when the entire battalion will be suddenly struck with frost bite and the unit decimated before the impact can be determined. Therein lies the danger; extreme cold to an organization not fully trained and equipped is such an insidious enemy it may not be recognized in sufficient time. This is further accentuated by the fact that due to the nature of normal deployment of troops, the higher command echelon, the better individual members of the echelon can take care of themselves against the extreme cold, which serves to deceive the commander.

2. It is strongly recommended when operating in an area in which language and customs are so diverse from ours, that intelligence agents be employed with lower command levels. Although Korean interpreters were made available to battalions they do not have the training or capabilities necessary to provide adequate local security from subversives or local guerrillas. A great percentage of this battalion's patrol mission were to check reported enemy concentrations. Most of them proved to be groundless. It is believed that many times one agent, or the questioning of proper local civilians would have obviated these missions. It is felt that enemy reports were fed to us in an effort to deceive us and cover actual movement elsewhere. On the other hand patrols were sometimes struck from ambush where no enemy had been reported, and agents under our control, may have served to prevent this.

3. Air support continued to be a most demoralizing and efficacious supporting arm. In extreme cold weather where soil is frozen deeply all supporting arms have difficulty in

destroying ground emplacements. Air support provides two (2) most effective means of complimenting normal shells. They are: (1) Napalm which produces casualties and by its very nature is terrifying and (2) the ability to rapidly pursue a moving enemy by strafing.

At present forward air controllers are handicapped by the communications equipment which they ply their trade. They do not possess a suitable hand-packed set. These controllers must be able to move rapidly over terrain as rugged as that covered by the infantry. Any radio that hampers this movement to a great degree; and is not completely dependable, is not satisfactory. Too often air support was obtained by "jury-rig" communications and the ingenuity of the forward air controller. The MAV radio used for this mission is satisfactory with the exception of the power supply source. The jeep mounted radio set, commonly employed at the Command Post, (AH/VRC-1) also presents problems in that it is too large and heavy for a jeep, causing many vehicular break downs. The solution may be in a lighter, smaller radio, or mounting the radio on a larger vehicle.

It was our observation that the AD type aircraft are more desirable than the Martin F4U. The two major considerations being, (1) larger, more diversified load and (2) longer duration on station. All further developments in close support should incorporate these features.

This battalion had some night air support and it was quite effective, however, we were not able to indicate close in targets successfully. Perhaps with present or proposed equipment this is not possible, but it is suggested that a night support control SOP can be worked out with great benefits.

4. During this period we were handicapped by inadequate equipment. (See section B, paragraph 11, Comments and Recommendations of S-4). The infantryman when dressed for minimum protection against the elements was too heavily loaded to fight efficiently. Lack of proper motor vehicle lubricants, batteries, and ant-freeze, further taxed organic motor transport which was insufficient for the type combat in which we were engaged. It is noted here, however, that even under the arduous conditions encountered, we were never without rations, fuel or those items available through the normal chain. Though often our ammunition supply was low, we always received enough, in time.

5. Patrols - It was found during this period that our training in patrol activity was a shortcoming. Emphasis must be placed on this phase of combat prior to arrival in the combat

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zone. This pertained to every one from patrol leaders down to the individual rifleman. Training at appropriate center should emphasize:

a. Composition of the patrol (use of artillery FO's and forward air controllers should be included).

b. Terrain appreciation.

c. Patrol reporting.

d. The use of air reconnaissance (helicopter) for control of patrols, and as a substitute for the foot patrol to determine road trafficability.

6. Personnel administration - The present personnel systems employed by the Marine Corps does not lend themselves to infantry units in combat. (See Section A, paragraph 11, Comments and recommendation of S-1). Throughout operations in KOREA, this commander has objected to the loss of control regarding the personnel and work of administrative rear echelons. Whenever practicable, the administration section of a unit should remain with their organization. During actual commitment, however, the separation is expected and necessary.

The new officer fitness report NAVMC 652 PD (Revised 7-50) does not properly reflect the performance of a combat unit leader. It is recommended that special fitness report be devised to improve and expedite combat efficiency markings for both officers and non-commissioned officers. Fitness report forms currently employed by the Marine Corps do not cover important personnel traits which should be reported for the benefit of the individual and the Corps. It is further recommended that the combat fitness report be of a distinguishing color and concise in content.

Two additional comments considered pertinent are: First, that Commanding Officers of units in combat be given wide latitude and more authority to promote than presently exists under the MOS system, seemed that a maximum number of infantry commander be consulted in an effort to achieve a simplification of the overall personnel system.

7. The present form for the special action report was apparently designed for reporting an amphibious operation. Consideration should be given to the modification of the form by substituting paragraph topic more applicable to land warfare, as experienced in KOREA. Under the present system of Special Action Report and Historical Diary submission, dual reporting

results which covers the same period of time, causing an additional administrative workload. It is, therefore, suggested that period of time or operations covered by the Special Action Report be eliminated from the Historical Diary.

8. It is deemed pertinent to mention several small unit fundamentals which companies and platoons continually need to emphasize. First, small unit leaders often prefer to defend the highest point of a terrain feature rather than the forward slope. Second, inexperienced or fresh troops have a marked tendency when in the defense to fire to their front rather than interlock their fires with adjacent individuals, positions or units. Third, although the fire discipline throughout this unit has been exemplary, constant supervision by officers and NCO's must be given to prevent premature firing and the firing of prolonged bursts by automatic weapons. Fourth, experience has borne out the fact that when an extensive frontage is assigned a unit, it can be defended best, if not only, by the use of tactical strong points. Fifth, while under arduous and adverse conditions in the field only constant supervision by unit leaders of all echelons can insure that men have necessary requirements of ammunition needed. The tendency to discard and lighten their load is always present with the individual, especially if they are inexperienced or if there is no foreseeable utilization for a particular piece of equipment.

9. Although the necessity for including the patrol leaders in on planning of patrols is apparent, it is often omitted for the sake of expediency. This is a grave error and commanders and staffs should be cautious in ordering patrols conducted without proper planning. The assignment of patrol missions should correspond to the patrols capabilities. Failure to do this results in ineffective missions or possible ambush.

10. It is noteworthy that in our experience with the NKPA during this period they would attack only when they had three elements in their favor: (1) Surprise; (2) Numerical superiority, and (3) Tactical advantage.

11. Traffic control in a retrograde movement is a primary consideration. Not only must vehicular discipline be rigidly controlled but movement must be constantly expedited. Failure of preceding units to provide guides for night movements and failure to make bypasses cost this battalion several unnecessary delays.

12. Battalion facilities and headquarters personnel are taxed to the utmost to evacuate and resupply heavily engaged battalion elements. Only by outstanding initiative and unhesitating

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participation on the part of headquarters personnel have these functions been accomplished. In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that reduction of personnel in the Headquarters and Service Company be considered with caution.

11. RECOMMENDATION OF STAFF SECTIONS

A. S-1 Section

B. S-4 Section

C. Communication Section

D. Artillery Liaison Party and Forward Observer

E. Medical Section

A. S-1 Section

1. Strength of 1st Battalion as of 1600, 8 October, 1950

UNIT

OFF

ENL

ATTACHED UNITS

OFF

ENL

H&S Co

18

40

158

1st Sig Bn

1

10

"A" Co

7

174

Korean Police

1

31

"B" Co

7

191

ROK Army

1

0

41

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"C" Co

7

184

11th Mar

2

25

Wpns Co

6

166

4.2" Mort Co

0

4

Total

45

873

Total

42

During the period of this operation the following recapitulation sets forth the Battalion personnel changes experienced.

UNIT

KIA

WIA

MIA

SKE(evac)

Return Duty

Replace

H&S Co

0-0

1-16

1-32

"A" Co

0-13

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1-64

0-1

2-94

"B" Co

1-22

0-55

1-70

"C" Co

0-23

2-79

0-1

2-86

Wpns Co

0-9

1-24

0-58

Total

1-67

5-238

0-2

6-340\*

3-75

6-292

\*Majority frostbite

Four (4) officers transferred during period

Strength of 1st Battalion as of 1600, 15 December, 1950

UNIT

OFF

ENL

ATTACHED UNITS

OFF

ENL

H&S Co

15

146

Korean Police

5

18

"A" Co

6

106

ROK Army

1

"B" Co

6

107

"C" Co

4

107

Wpns Co

7

127

Total

38

593

Total

47

2. Causality Reporting: Causality reporting must be considered an integral part of overall personnel accounting procedures, but because of personnel directives in effect during the period covered by this report, the present system was found to be cumbersome for the following reasons.

a. The Personnel Daily Summary is based on estimated casualties for the twenty-four (24) hour period ending at 1600. By assuming one platoon's estimate of casualties to be incorrect by just two (2) men, and multiplying that small margin of error by each unit organic to a company, battalion and regiment, the magnitude of error on regimental reports to high echelons is quit obvious. For that reason it is strongly recommended that PDS figures be based on actual known casualties.

b. Casualty card from the battalion are submitted to regiment for the twenty-four period ending at 2400. The PDS is submitted for the twenty-four period ending at 1600. As a result, regiment is supplied with two sets of figure which seldom agree. It is recommended that the battalion casualty card and the PDS for any twenty-four (24) hour of accounting be submitted together.

c. Some tactical combat situations do not permit companies to stop operations and initiate the casualty reporting system. This system has been partially met in this battalion by those responsible for personnel accounting keeping a close check on all aid stations in the area and submitting only actual known figures of company strengths as a result of their findings.

d. Because of terrain features or combat situations, evacuation of wounded is sometimes more feasible through other than normal channels. When this occurs, companies cannot be relied upon to report their evacuations as casualties. It is recommended that all aid stations personnel be impressed with the necessity of logging all casualties regardless of their unit or existing combat situation.

e. Personnel believed to be MIA must be reported as such within four (4) days together with statements from anyone having direct knowledge to substantiate such belief. Because of the short times allowed for possible "clearing" information to be received, persons occasionally are needless reported MIA. It is recommended that a longer period of time be allowed for the reporting of MIS's and further, that supporting statements be submitted to Division "in the rough" and held as such by Division until all sources of information have been exhausted. When such is the case, it is recommended that Division prepare the necessary report "in the smooth" and return it to the battalion concerned for signatures.

f. It is recommended that MOS data be deleted from the casualty report card as it serves no worthwhile purpose and easily be in error.

### 3. Service Record Books and Individual Record Cards:

a. During the last operation, this organization had two rear echelons. One, consisting of one officer and ten enlisted, traveling with regimental rear echelon; the other consisting of three enlisted, remained with division rear echelon. This system is unsatisfactory. many instances occurred where, had it been possible to double check with SRB's, a great deal of valuable time could have been saved. As it was, the SRB's and the IRC's were split, were split between the battalion's two rear echelons. In all cases it is believed that these two personnel records remain together and that the unit dairy unit should be located with the division rear echelon.

b. In only a few cases did this battalion ever receive its IRC copy along with replacements joined within this accounting jurisdiction. IRC copied can only be prepared completely from information contained in the individual's SRB. This limits the battalion to a skeleton IRC which serves no more purpose than would a 3" X 5" index card. It

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is recommended that in all cases the IRC accompany the SRB on transfer of personnel whether the individual joins from within or out of the jurisdiction of the MRI.

c. The transfer marking required on pages 3 and 4 of the SRB has been a source of much trouble. It has been impracticable to either send the SRB forward or arrange for the rating senior to come to the rear for the purpose of marking the necessary markings. Conversely, it is important to the individual that these marks reflect as accurately as possible his conduct and proficiency in combat. It is recommended that a field message-type book be made in the field and sent to the rear for entering in the SRB's.

d. As it is currently constituted, the SRB is both bulky and vulnerable to wear. It is not easily transported and wears out quickly due to the fact that its pages must be removed and replace for each entry. It is recommended that proper receptacles be provided each battalion for the filing, storage, and transportation of SRB's. Much of the wear experienced in the use of the SRB could be alleviated by the granting of permission by proper authority for entries to be made in ink by printing.

e. It is further recommended that the training record page, page 7, of the SRB be eliminated while in combat with no entries thereon being required.

f. All administrative details, such as allotments and emergency data page, page 15, of the SRB, should be accomplished prior to departure of the unit from the United States.

4. Officers Qualification Record: There is currently no place in the Officers Qualification Jacket for entering of such data as rifle qualification, combat service, or wounds and awards received. It is recommended that page be devised for recording of such information. It is suggested that the page be patterned along the line of NAVMC form 118(9).

5. Embarkation Rosters: Existing directives require the religion of all embarking personnel to be shown on the embarkation rosters. It is believed that the use and value of the information is negligible and should be dispensed with. It should be noted that an individual's

religion is only voluntary given upon enlistment. Also, the original submission and all subsequent changes thereto of embarkation rosters should be the responsibility of the embarking units. The Commanding Officer of Troops should be held responsible only for the submission of the final and corrected embarkation roster and the proper distribution thereof.

6. Replacements: Although combat necessities will govern, it is recommended that replacements be channeled through the battalion's rear echelon when ever possible for the purpose of accomplishing such important administrative details as insurance, allotments and emergency data sheet (refer to para 3f). The issuance of clothing and equipment might also be accomplished at this point to ease assimilation of replacements by front-line units.

7. Burials and Grave Registration: this organization has, on several occasions, been directed to deliver bodied to a rear echelon unit or to the grave registration section. This does not conform to SOP and places and additional burden on the battalion's overworked organic transportation. As the presence of bodies in the battalion area has a deadening effect on morale, high echelons should take action as soon as possible following notification to effect immediate pick-up.

8. Postal: A portion of the mail received by front-line units is for evacuated personnel. In most cases, forward units have no information regarding the location of its evacuations. Casualties are seldom held at either battalion or regimental aid stations, but do remain at the division hospital for longer periods of time. It is believed that mail for evacuated personnel would reach it destination much faster and with more efficiency if the battalion mail orderly was located with the battalion's rear echelon whenever combat conditions allow. The rear echelon id the center of all transfer information received by the battalion. During this operation, all front line units were burdened by mail, previously sent to regiment marked "evacuated," being returned to them because transfer of the evacuated personnel had not yet been made. All mail for evacuated personnel could easily be worked by the mail orderly if he were attached to rear echelon. The location of the mail orderly should be dependent upon the amount of evacuation mail to be worked. In the mail orderly's absence from the battalion, distribution of incoming and collection of outgoing mail could be the responsibility of company mail orderlies.

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9. Awards: The submission of awards was hampered during this period by several changes in the award system. All directives notwithstanding, the present system necessitates considerable administrative work on part of the battalion in the ultimate submission of a complete and correct citation. It is strongly recommended that the highest coordination echelon prepare an SOP to establish a definite and detailed system for all awards, including the Letter of Commendation. This is needed to prevent disparity in award recommendations by subordinate units. It should be noted here that the form for a time in recommending Bronze Star and Letter of Commendation awards proved highly satisfactory in expediting the submission of such recommendations. This form was mimeographed and provided all personnel information required concerning his act, summary of essential facts, witnesses, and action taken on the recommendation. The use of this form eliminated the necessity of attaching witness statements.

10. Post Exchange: During much of this operation, this Battalion was dependent upon the post exchange field ration for its PX supplies. This ration was found inadequate for front line units in the supply of such essentials and universally desired items as stationary, soap, toilet articles, and toilet tissue. It is recommended that the field ration be revised to include more of these necessities for which no substitution can be obtained. It is further recommended that a mobile post exchange service be made more readily available for the purchase of less essential but highly significant morale supplies as candy, tobacco, gum, etc.

11 Personnel Procedures - Classification: During combat situations, classification cannot receive the consideration it otherwise would. Re-training is required for those MOS's foreign to an infantry battalion and individual preferences of duty cannot be considered. Assignment: Throughout this operation, this battalion received many personnel who had MOS's foreign to an infantry battalion. Although this cannot be avoided, it is recommended that units be allowed to change these foreign MOS's on joining to basic MOS's employed by infantry units. Promotions: Under the T/O system of promotion, qualified men in infantry units with foreign MOS's who have been doing an excellent combat work and who are considered by their officers to be well qualified in their assigned billet, cannot receive

promotion. To alleviate this condition, it is recommended that a system of promotion be established which will include foreign MOS's

## 12 Miscellaneous:

a. POW Evacuations: One of the responsibilities of the S-1 Section is the guarding and evacuation of POW's until such time as they can be delivered to higher echelon. Because of the limited personnel allowed the section, this function proved impracticable during this operation. It is recommended that a detail of MP's be attached to each regiment for the express purpose of evacuating POW's from the front line units. This detail could also be utilized to designate the MSR when such route is not clear.

b. Money Order Service: While allotments adequately solve most money problems, there are individuals who must make payments on debts for which allotments are not authorized, such as property or automobiles. It is recommended that money order service be made available automatically at each pay-call to satisfy personal problems such as these listed above.

c. Office Van: It is recommended that a study be given to the possibility of furnishing each battalion with an office van. Rear echelon units could then be brought forward as battle conditions allow, or left in the rear as required. The van would conceivably contain the required files, supplies, records, and equipment necessary. It is believed that administrative details would receive faster and more efficient attention as a result.

d. Rear Echelon Liaison: Better liaison between forward elements of the battalion and its rear echelon is definitely needed. Some type of message center service must be established whereby important information can be efficiently pass forward and rearward. The poor liaison which existed during those operation was due to a great extent, by terrain and distance. This difficulty was especially felt in the preparation of unit diary entries and the changing of basic MOS's to basic MOS's of duty assignments.

e. Fitness Reports: The new officers fitness reports poses no problems as long as company commanders and the S-1 follow all changes of duty closely. Much time

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is lost due to the requirement that both the officer and NCO forms must be typed. It is recommended that all fitness report forms be acceptable at HQMC with only the name, rank and service number of the individual being reported on typewritten thereon. Permission should be granted for all remaining entries to be printed in ink. This would eliminate the necessity of forms shuttling back and forth several times for personnel information, typing, marking, and submission.

f. Battalion Orders: Battalion orders are prepared by rear echelon from information received from the S-1 Section, and higher echelon correspondence which is channelled through rear echelon prior to reaching the Commanding Officer. An unavoidable delay is experienced in assigning replacements to companies on paper as assignments can only practically be made by the front line S-1 Section. This delay also slows unit diary reporting. It is believed that there will always be this delay but that with better liaison between the battalion's forward and rear elements, the delay can be greatly reduced.

#### B. S-4 Section

##### 1. Logistics

a. Supply general - During the period covered by this report supply in general was considered good. Certain critical items were not available or worse were not available for sustained periods. The problem of supply was aggravated by poor roads, length of supply lines and weather conditions.

##### b. Class I

(1) Water - Water points were in most cases readily accessible and critical shortages of water existed only when the tactical situation was such as to prevent the construction of water points. The severe weather encountered offered the problem of keeping water from freezing in daylight hours as well as the hours of darkness. The following observations on this subject are considered pertinent:

(a) Immersion heater in water trailers would prevent water from freezing solid in trailers, however, it was noted that the spigots and the area immediately surrounding them would freeze. Considerable thawing was required to make the water accessible. The only solution found was to allow the spigots to drip at all times allow the circulation of warm water.

(b) Canteens would freeze and break if filled over fifty percent (50%) of capacity.

(c) It was noted that upon thawing five (5) gallon water cans that the inside coating would break off into the water. In this regard it is recommended that water cans not be coated on the inside for use in cold weather.

(2) Rations - A supply of "B" and "C" rations were always available. There was no noted spoilage of rations or was the taste of the ration affected by the weather. Heat tablets or cookers were not available and the problem of thawing rations could not be solved for units on the front lines. A substitute ration for use under extremely cold weather conditions is desired and required.

#### c. Class II

(1) Clothing - The overall supply of clothing was not considered adequate. Shortages in such items as shoes, socks, utility clothing and underwear were particularly noted.

(2) 782 Equipment - There were no critical shortages of 782 equipment.

(3) Miscellaneous - There were many critical shortages of other items of general supply; particularly in the items listed below:

##### (a) Galley Equipment

1 Immersion burner

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2 Cans, galvanized

3 Repair kits for ranges

4 Cleaning gear

(b) Illumination equipment

1 Lanterns

2 Expendable supplies

3 Candles

(c) Tentage and appendages

1 Wooden pins were not suitable  
for use in frozen ground.

d. Class III

(1) Fuels - There was no critical shortages of fuel for use in transportation and galleys. However, fuel was not readily available for use in stoves for heating. Unleaded 60 Octane gasoline was not available.

(2) Lubricants - Automotive lubricants were available as required and proved satisfactory under the conditions encountered.

e. Class IV

(1) The supply of cold weather clothing in most cases was considered adequate. The following comments on certain item of clothing and equipment are made for informational value.

(a) Sleeping Bag wool - This bag did not prove adequate for combat in any temperatures encountered during this operation.

(b) Sleeping bag mountain - This bag was adequate and proved to be invaluable for the preservation of life in extreme cold.

(c) Parka - The Parka was an invaluable piece of clothing, however, the weight should be greatly reduced if it is to be issued as a standard item of equipment for combat troops in cold weather.

(d) Shoe Pac - The shoe pac did not prove successful in anyway for use by combat troops. It was found that troops on the move or on the front lines did not have time to change their socks and felt liners and as a result the perspiration in the liners and socks would freeze which in turn caused the feet to freeze. In cases where infantry was on the move, ice would form in the shoe pacs in less than two hours and even had the opportunity existed for the changing socks and liners, there is not sufficient time drying of the extra pair using body heat as a drying agent. The other noticeable defect is the lack of an arch support.

#### f. Class V

(1) The supply of ammunition was adequate with the exception of pyrotechnics and illuminating shell for the 81mm mortar. The illuminating shell for the 60mm was very unsatisfactory in performance. It is estimated that 80% of the shells fired failed to illuminate. (Lot #WES 274). It is recommended that two (2) range cards be placed in every case of WP.

#### g. Miscellaneous.

(1) Motor Transport - The motor transport of the battalion functioned extremely well considering the climatic conditions and the time available for maintenance. The maintenance performed by the motor transport section of the battalion was

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considered outstanding. There was noticeable shortage of spare parts and accessories. Fuel pumps and gasoline lines would freeze unless the vehicles were started hourly. Transportation available was inadequate for the operation. The following suggestions are made to improve the motor transport section of the infantry battalion.

(a) That vehicle drivers be armed with a Thompson Sub-machine gun. The M1 rifle is too awkward to handle in the cab of a vehicle.

(b) That the present allowances of spare parts be doubled. The present allowance is not sufficient to properly maintain vehicles under constant use in the field and no allowances is made for vehicles of attached units.

(c) That the Table of Equipment be modified for Weapons Company to include four (4) 3/4 ton Dodge trucks and two (2) 1/4ton 4X4 trucks. The 1/4ton, 4X4 truck is not adequate for carrying the ammunition and weapons required by a Weapons Company. The two (2) 1/4ton 4X4 trucks would be retained for the purpose of patrols and general utility.

(d) That the Table of Equipment be modified for rifle companies to include one (1) 3/4 ton Dodge truck and one (1) 1/4ton 4X4 trucks. The 1/4ton trailer is not adequate for carrying the load required by a rifle company and therefore a heavier vehicle is required. The one (1) 1/4ton 4X4 truck should be retained for the purpose of patrols and general utility.

(e) That the Table of Equipment be modified for H&S Company, Infantry Battalion to include one (1) 3/4 ton Dodge truck with twelve (12) volt electrical system in lieu of the Weasel presently assigned. The Weasel was very unsatisfactory from the maintenance viewpoint particularly insofar as the tracks are concerned. The recommended change above would place the radio in a vehicle capable of carrying supplies and also allow room for repairman to work and make two (2) jeeps available for laying wire.

## 2. Ordnance

Considerable difficulty was encountered in operating small arms in the below zero temperatures. The results of actual usage and experiments made with various weapons and supplies are notes herewith.

a. If weapons were left dry, moisture would form and cause the working parts to freeze and often break.

b. If weapons were placed in sleeping bags or other warm places, moisture would form on the entire weapon and would freeze on exposure.

c. Ordinary lubricants would gum and freeze causing faulty operation.

d. After much experimenting, TSgt Frank T. VERSAGE, Jr. 290354, Ordnance Chief of the battalion produces a satisfactory lubricant for use in cold weather. The mixture consisted of the following: One (1) pound of graphite, five (5) gallons of gasoline, four (4) gallons of #10 weight oil and ten (10) gallons of diesel oil.

The 3.5" rocket operated satisfactorily in most occasions. In one incident, four (4) out of twelve (12) rounds failed to explode on contact. The flashback seemed much greater in extreme cold weather and gunner's faces were badly burned in some instances. Face masks would eliminate the burns, however none were available.

The 1919 A6 machine gun assigned this battalion proved highly proficient during all phases of this operation and it is highly recommended that it replace the 1919 A4 machine gun in the rifle companies. The reasons for this recommendation are as follows:

a. The men carrying the mount M2 are unnecessary.

b. The bipod enables the gunner to put the gun in action in less time that required by the 1919 A4.

c. The volume of fire is greater.

d. The gun is lighter than the 1919 A4 and is easier to maneuver in mountains.

e. Offers a smaller silhouette to the enemy.

f. Does away with the constant repaired on the elevating and traversing mechanism.

C. Communication Section:

The following comments and recommendations are offered from experience gained during the action covered by this report. Comments and recommendations made in two previous Special Action Reports remain applicable.

1. Wire communications was used as the primary means whenever possible. Reliance upon radio communications was often necessary when units of the battalion were extended over considerable range and during operational movements. In these instances the SCR-536 was not found to be satisfactory for use in the rifle companies due to its limited range in the mountainous terrain. It was noted also that considerable battalion maintenance was needed to keep the SCR-536 radio sets in operation.

The SCR-388 was found to be very reliable and satisfactory set. On one particular occasion - during a patrol of "A" and "B" Companies on 8 November, 1950 - satisfactory communication between the patrol and the battalion CP, 23 miles distant, was established and maintained with the SCR-300 on the battalion tactical net. This of course was a freak condition and not to be normally expected but proved valuable since the terrain was such as to have block communication over the TCS-TBX net.

The use of SCR-300 radio was sometimes possible within the rifle companies. Because the terrain was unfavorable for SCR-536 operation, this practice was frequently necessary and favored by the infantry unit leader. However additional trained

communication personnel are required to adequately operate and maintain the equipment, more resupplies are necessary, and enough frequencies are not normally available to operate over similar terrain, the T/E be modified to allow additional SCR-300 radios and personnel. If a battery operated trans-receiver set that retains the mobility of the SCR-536, but and increased range would be designed it adaption as standard equipment would solve the problem.

A tendency of the rifle companies to rely upon battalion communications personnel for maintenance and operation of company sound-powered wire nets was noticed. This tendency naturally developed as company personnel initially responsible for these function were lost or replaced. The solution found for this problem was to use battalion communication personnel in training new company personnel during periods available and the cooperation of the company commanders in designating personnel to receive this training.

Weather conditions, which included sub-freezing temperatures ranging down to -20-F, imposed particular strain upon most items of communications equipment, however performance of personnel was outstanding and of equipment generally very good. It was found necessary to wipe jacks and plug frequently and employ cloth covers for mikes and handsets to prevent moisture from freezing up the equipment. The life of batteries was considerably shortened during the extreme cold weather. The life of the BA-70, used in the SCR-300 averaged 20-24 hours. This caused considerable supply difficulty, especially during periods such as the movement from YUDAM-NI to HAGARU-RI when reliance upon radio communication was very great.

The tent, S6-19, provided in the T/E was not found adequate as a switchboard cover during cold weather operations. The CP blackout tent was more adaptable for such use.

Supply of most items was found adequate, shortage of air-ground panels and more availability of mike covers having been the main exceptions.

It was found helpful to the staff section and infantry units for the message center to provide daily a single extract of the succeeding day's shackle cipher code, and displays and passwords.

D. Artillery Liaison Party and Forward Observer:

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1. Commendation and recommendation remain the same as those contained in Annex Able to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Special Action Report for 30 August - 7 October, 1950 except as noted below.

## 2. Cold - Weather Operation

a. The dry-cell batteries which powered the SCR-610 must be protected against below freezing temperatures if they are to operate for a reasonable period of time. It is recommended that during extended period of non-operation, the BA-39 and BA-40 be removed from the battery box and placed in the radio operators sleeping bag or in some other container which will keep them relatively warm. It was noted that in spite of such protective measures, the lives of both the BA-39 and BA-40 were drastically shortened by the sub-freezing temperatures.

b. Microphones of all types should be protected as is suggested in the previous paragraph. Microphones had a tendency towards malfunction brought about by the freezing of one's breath on the diaphragm.

c. Observers must show caution in the use of white phosphorus shells as adjusting rounds in snowy terrain, since the burst will be nearly invisible against the white background. It is recommended that a greater use be made of air burst in adjust fire. Time fire (air bursts) also becomes increasingly valuable in snow terrain against troops in the open or in non-overhead emplacements, since the bursting effect of impact fused HE shells and delay fused HE shell is materially reduced by snow. The importance of obtaining a good time registration, therefore, cannot be stressed too much.

## E. Medical Section

1. Evacuation problems were not encountered for the first ten (10) days of movement northward following the landing at WONSAN, 29 October 1950. It was only when the battalion was ordered to an area twelve (12) miles west of CHIGYONG that

certain difficulties were encountered. The main problem was that of distance over difficult terrain, thirty (30) mile or more to the medical companies of the division hospital, over roads that necessitated low speeds cautious driving and took two and half (2½) to three (3) hours each way. With the battalion medical vehicles, three (3) in number, the ordinary number of expected evacuations could be handled without difficulty, but non-emergency casualation, e.g. dental or orthopedic problems had to be held to a minimum. At this area a pyramidal tent was provided which enabled the medical section to have six to ten (6-10) patients with non-acute ailments for twenty-four to seventy-two (24-72) hour periods. On 10 November 1950 battle casualties were received at the Battalion Aid Station. It was then that evacuation to the rear was delayed, not however, to a critical degree. Two (2) serious casualties were removed by air from the "A" Battery, 11th Marines area, located about six (6) miles to the rear. During this period the chain of evacuation was directly to "C" Medical Company at HAMHUNG.

A battalion aid station was setup in a school house at MAJONDONG. Evacuations were made directly to Regimental Aid, about seven (7) miles to the rear. Several battle casualties were received during the period spent at this area and removal to the rear was accomplished rapidly.

On 21 November 1950 the battalion moved to SYMHUNG-NI on the east side of the CHOSEN Reservoir. The less serious patients were treated as in-patients in the battalion aid station for twenty-four to ninety-six (24-96) hours and the more serious cases were evacuated to HAGARU-RI to "C" Medical Company.

The battalion moved to YUDAM-NI on 27 November 1950. Early on the morning of the 28th a heavy engagement with the enemy began. The first casualties were received at about 0530 and continued to come in throughout the day, reaching a total of one hundred-eighty (180) in twelve (12) hours. Evacuations were made directly to regimental aid during the 28th until regimental aid, unable to move the patients further to the rear reached and surpassed its operating capacity. Casualties were henceforth kept in the battalion aid station tents with the exception of those who were deemed serious enough to fly out. The total number received and retained totaled sixty-six (66). On 1 December 1950, the battalion aid station was withdrawn about three (3) miles and set up next to the 5th and 7th Regimental Aid Stations. Several casualties were evacuated by air that evening. The next morning all patients were loaded on vehicles and the convoy moved out toward HAGARU-RI.

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No further evacuations were made from that time until three (3) nights later when HAGARU-RI was reached. Casualties on the march were loaded aboard vehicles after first aid was given.

At HAGARU-RI, the C-47 strip was just completed the night of our arrival. The medical companies were prepared to receive, treat a few, and evacuate all casualties. The battalion stayed here four (4) nights in the defense perimeter. One hundred twenty-seven (127) frostbite cases were seen, treated simply with Tincture of Benzene and all but the most serious were returned to duty by division order. Air evacuation functioned well throughout this period. On 7 December 1950, as the convoy was moving towards KOTO-RI twenty (20) battle casualties from "A" Company, 1/5 were received and sixteen (16) were sent out immediately by air. To this point, corpsman casualties, battle and other wise, were twelve (12).

KOTO-RI was reached by nightfall without receiving any wounded. The battalion carried several casualties on organic vehicles and these were taken to "D" Medical Company on arrival at KOTO-RI.

The battalion moved out towards the head of the pass the following morning, but H&S Company stopped two (2) miles south of KOTO-RI. The Division convoy was moving through the pass. Several casualties were received from other battalions, treated and placed aboard convoy vehicles; similarly several of our own battle evacuees were placed on vehicles.

The trip down the pass began on the afternoon of 10 December 1950 and was completed with but one casualty, a gunshot wound of the leg.

## 2. Medical Supplies and Equipment.

Resupply of medicinals presented no problem from 9 October until  
3 November 1950 when the battalion was detached and sent twelve (12) miles north

west of CHIGYONG. Resupply from the supporting Medical Company was refused and a trip by the Medical Officer to Division Hospital for supplies was necessitated.

At SINGHUNG-NI, the supporting Medical Company was not ready to issue for five to seven (5-7) days after its arrival at HAGARU-RI, and the necessary supplies were obtain only after repeated and persistent requests for them. The battalion aid station was only fully stocked the day before the battalion moved to YUDAM-NI.

The order to burn all excess gear at HAGARU-RI was motivated by necessity and only medicals for frostbite, diarrhea, the ant-biotics, opiates and battle dressings were carried.

### 3. Recommendations.

a. Consultations at the Division Hospital have not always been satisfactory, due at times, perhaps, to the lack of equipment. The battalion aid station should be informed of the facilities available for consultation at the hospital. Several cases have been returned to the battalion aid station with a recommendation for light duty job within the battalion.

b. Dental care has been available only on a emergency basis. Both the Regimental and Medical Company dentists have proven more than helpful in this regard. More adequate field dental facilities should be provided.

c. Plasma administration was generally futile during this period. Either the water was frozen or if not frozen, the powdered plasma dissolved so poorly that the tubing clogged. A warming box might be the answer to this problem. It was noted however that very few if any of the patients seen from 28 November to 11 December 1950 required plasma therapy.

d. The cold weather parkas issued were unsatisfactory in certain respects. Lack of fullness across the shoulders caused noticeable number of upper and middle backaches and otherwise uncomfortable and sometimes debilitating to the wearer.

e. The shoe pacs issued would be satisfactory for cold weather if the following were possible: removal and drying of socks and every 12 hours, daily changes of

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inner soles and soles. However, being waterproof, sweating of the feet will occur while evaporation of sweat will not occur. Unless proper foot care is possible, the moisture in the boot will freeze when the wearer is not moving about.

f. In cases where a battalion has an evacuation route of twenty (20) difficult mile or more, more ambulances would be desirable. Jeep ambulances, in the main, proved unsatisfactory for evacuation to the rear. Enclosed ambulances would be more satisfactory for the evacuation to the rear with Jeep ambulance used for front line to battalion aid station work.

12. UNIT STATION LIST 8 OCTOBER - 15 DECEMBER 1950

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SER NO</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>DUTIES</u>
NEWTON, George R	LtCol	05785	0302	8Oct-17Nov Bn CO (trans 17 Nov)
STEVENS, John W. II	Lt Col	06180	0302	18 Nov Bn CO
OLSON, Merlin O.	Maj	08163	0302	Bn ExEc Off
		<u>S-1</u>		
RABE, Leroy D	2ndLt	032059	0105	8Oct-15Dec Bn Pers & Class Off, NO, Bn Adj; 8Oct-17Nov S-1; 18Nov- 15Dec AstS-1

WEIDAW, Robert A	1stLt	046289	0302	8Oct-17Nov AstS-1; 18Nov-15Dec Bn S-1 & AstAdj; 13 Nov-15Dec CAO; 5Dec-15Dec Postal Off
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S-2

SCHRYVER, Hugh C.	2ndLt	049849	0302	Bn S-2
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S-3

CRONIN, James T	1stLt	035789	0302	8-13Oct Asst S-3; 14Oct- 15Dec "B" Co Exec OFF
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HARTMAN, A	Major	09624	0302	13Oct15Dec Bn S-3
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SCHENNING, Richard	1stLt	042275	0302	8-12Oct Bn S-3; 13 Oct- 15Dec AstS-3
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JACK, Harold L	1stLt	048103	0302	15Nov-15Dec AstS-3
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S-4

PARSONS, Harold L	1stLt	047913	0302	Bn S-4
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JUPEC, Frank Jr	CWO	033109	3010	Bn Supply Off
MEERS, Frank J.	1stLt	047898	0301	15Nov-15Dec Ast S-4
HOLLIGHUS, John	1stLt	047858	0301	Ast S-4

H&S Company

GODENIUS, Walter E	Capt	027175	4960	CO
PETER, William J	1stLt	033632	2502	8Oct-27Nov Bn Comm Off (WIA 28Nov & Evac)
KLEEM, Robert W	1stLt	036840	2502	30Nov-15Dec Bn Comm Off
LUHR, John P	Lt(jg)	245658	USNR	Bn Med OFF
O'TOOLE, Daniel M	Lt(jg)	503776	USNR	Asst Bn Med OFF
KERRIGAN, William	1stLt	046501	0301	Bn Spec Serv Off
RHENAN, George A	Capt	017742	5805	14Oct-15Dec Bn Ln Off

CHRISTOLOS, John	2ndLt	049920	0302	8Oct-4Dec Bn Ln Off; 5-15Dec Asst 81mm Mort Plat Comdr, Wpns Co
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A Company

STEVENS, John R	Capt	014231	0302	8Oct-17Nov CO; (Trans 17Nov)
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HEATER, James B	Capt	015208	5810	18Nov-15Dec CO
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CHAMBERS, Franklin	1stLt	046413	0302	8Oct-29Nov Exec Off
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SHELTON, Orrin H	1stLt	032473	0302	8Oct-29Nov MG Plt Ldr; 30Nov-15Dec Exec Off
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BLANK, Howard G	2ndLt	042444	0302	60mm Mort Sec Ldr
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TRAPNELL, Nicholas	2ndLt	049664	0302	1st Plt Ldr
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COLLINS, Edward E	2ndLt	049743	1801	2nd Plt Ldr
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SNYDER, Robert E	2ndLt	044848	0302	3rd Plt Ldr (WIA 28Nov & Evac, Trans 2Dec)
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LICHTENBERGER, J	1stLt	044764	0302	15-29Nov Asst 60mm Mort Sec Ldr; 30Nov-15Dec MG Plt Ldr
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B Company

FENTON, Francis I	Capt	015170	0302	8-13Oct CO; (trans 14Oct)
HANCOCK, John R	1stLt	039554	0302	8-13Oct Exec Off; 14Oct-15Dec CO
CLEMENT, Ribert A	WO	048589	0310	60mm Sec Ldr
JENSEN, Austin C	2ndLt	049968	0302	8Oct-28Nov 1st Plt Ldr; (KIA 29Nov)
KOHLER, Louis L	1stLt	045566	0302	2nd Plt Ldr
MORRIS, Edward C	2ndLt	050033	0302	3rd Plt Ldr
PALATAS, Michael V	1stLt	043532	0302	15Nov-15Dec MG Plt Ldr

C Company

PEDERSEN, Poul F	1stLt	035849	0302	8Oct-6Nov CO; 4-22Nov SKE; 23Nov-15 Dec Asst Exec Off Wpns Co
JONES, Jack R	Capt	018117	0302	7Nov-15Dec CO
SMITH, Loren r	1stLt	040624	0302	Exec Off

CORBET, Robert H	2ndLt	050384	0302	8Oct-27Nov 1st Plt Ldr; 28Nov-6Dec SKE; 15Dec 2nd Plt Ldr
MAGNESS, Byron L	2ndLt	050330	0302	8Oct-6Dec 2nd Plt Ldr; 10Dec SKE
DAWE, Harold L	2ndLt	050372	0302	8Oct-6Dec 3rd Plt Ldr; 10Dec SKE
MERRITT, Max A	2ndLt	050410	0302	8Oct-27Nov 60mm Sec Ldr; (WIA 28Nov evac trans 4 Dec)
RICHTER, Robert J	1stLt	044434	0302	8Oct-27Nov MG Plt Ldr; 28Nov-15Dec 1st Plt Ldr

Weapons Company

RUSSELL, John W	Major	07098	0302	CO
SOLLOM, Almond H	Capt	24382	0302	Exec Off
ALDERMAN, Harry L	2ndLt	049788	0302	81mm Plt Ldr
TULEY, Ralph H	2nd Lt	049907	0302	8Oct-28Nov Asst 81mm Plt Ldr; (WIA 29 Nov trans 4Dec)
BROWN, Dale L	2ndLt	050020	0302	AT AssLt Plt Ldr

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McDONALD, Francis E

2ndLt

049462

0302

MG Plt Ldr

Attached Units

TACP

SMITH, James W	1stLt	037073	7302	8Oct-4Dec
HOLDBRIDGE, Forrest	2ndLt	037947	7302	15Oct-12Dec

Naval Gun Fire

GREWE, Carl O	Lt	202125	USN	8Oct-26Oct NGLO
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"A" Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines

SNYDER, Joris J	1stLt	048875	0802	8Oct-22Nov Ln O; 23-29Nov FO; 30Nov-12Dec Ln O
KELLETT, Joseph C	1stLt	039925	0802	23-29Nov Ln O
KING, Phillip H	1stLt	042394	0801	12-22Nov FO
RODGERS, Howard R	1stLt	039656	0801	21Nov-12Dec FO
KIERHAN, Robert R	2ndLt	026663	0802	8Oct-10Nov FO
PACUILLY, Cole C	2ndLt	049634	0802	13Nov-12Dec FO

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*A photo copy of the original document was obtained from Historical Section, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. This was copied without any changes except for some formatting, such as the adding of a header. None of the maps or sketches mentioned on the first page of this document were included with the material received from Headquarters, Marine Corps. As I am not a expert typist I do apologize for any errors found.*