May 13, 1952 to February 14, 1954

Less than 24 hours after President Truman ordered American troops to Korea, leaflets were being dropped informing South Koreans of the decision of the United States and the United Nations. In less than another 24 hours, radio broadcasts were beamed towards South Korea. Theoretically, the first defense in Korea was psychological warfare.

BRIEF BACKGROUND

Truth has been and still is one of the most effective weapons that man has found, and Psywar makes use of the truth as its principal weapon to fight the enemy and reduce his will to fight. At first, Psywar in the Far East consisted of a six-man planning group in Toyko, Japan. During the first 125 days of the Korean War, over 100 million leaflets were dropped or fired in artillery shells by our forces.

The Korean War brought Psywar to the forefront. The infantry has the mission of meeting and destroying the enemy. The artillery is dedicated to supporting the infantry by fire. And the mission of Psywar is to support the infantry by reducing enemy combat efficiency. Psywar seeks to change enemy attitude and opinion by means of the spoken or written word. The weapon is truth and it is one of the oldest, most effective weapons upon which man has stumbled. The broad mission of Psywar is to hurt the enemy and depress the morale of the enemy by spreading the "true" battle picture and of the U.N. aims of peace, unification, and reconstruction. The only operational Psywar unit in the Army was at Fort Riley, Kansas. This unit was sent to Korea as the 1^st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company. The 1^st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company arrived in South Korea on November 4^th, 1950, and served until February 21, 1955. (Another psywar unit—the 1^st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Company--arrived in Japan in the summer of 1951.)

The 1^st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company in Korea earned credit for participating in eight campaigns during the Korean War and was awarded two meritorious unit commendations and a Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation (ROKPUC). The 1^st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company served as the Army’s Tactical Psychological Warfare unit until the end of the Korean War. This unit was the first of its kind to serve in a combat zone, with loudspeakers on vehicles and aircraft, and which also disseminated propaganda from the aircraft. Some of the leaflets promised medical treatment for frostbite, undermined faith in their officers, and similarly instilled fear for soldiers’ safety. Another theme told of the mounting enemy dead.

OPERATION MOOLAH

A leaflet drop is worthwhile if it causes significant decline in the combat efficiency of the enemy. One big instance of this was Operation Moolah. This was a Psywar effort to entice Communist pilots to fly a Mig 15 fighter to an allied airfield for a reward of $100,000. Over one million leaflets were dropped near the Yalu River on April 26, and another one half million were dropped near Sinuiju and Uiju airfields near the Yalu border on May 10 and May 18. The Migs had been elusive in 1953, and it was difficult to get them to come up and challenge the F-86 Sabre jets of the United States Air Force.

The result of this operation was the grounding of the Mig jets for eight days. It could have been the weather, or perhaps the Communists were checking on pilots that might defect. In the 60 days before Moolah, the allies shot down 53 Migs. In the 60 days after Moolah, the allies shot down 107 Migs. In the entire period after Moolah, the allies shot down 165 Migs at a cost of losing only three allied aircraft—a 55 to 1 ratio.

We eventually got a Mig on September 21, 1953. North Korea had just opened the air base repair shop at Pyongyang, and the pilot decided to make the 13-minute flight to freedom. Was this Moolah operation a success? Yes, because it caused a flight to freedom and mass confusion among our enemies and destruction of his aircraft. We dominated the skies afterward and I believe we can call that a success.

KNOW YOUR ENEMY

Psychological warfare is simply learning everything about your target enemy, their beliefs, likes and dislikes, strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. How do you get to know your enemy target? By intelligence reports, area studies, country research, defectors, and visiting prisoners of war.

Psychological warfare is a war of the mind, and your weapons are sight and sound. For your operations to be effective, you must carefully plan your propaganda. Psywar operations are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to audiences to influence their emotion, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of the organizations, groups, and individuals. Used in war, it is a powerful weapon whose effectiveness is limited only by the ingenuity of the commander using it.

The success of Psywar starts with knowing its capabilities. To be successful, Psywar operations must be planned, synchronized, and executed successfully. Failure in one results in failure in the whole plan.

During the Korean War, it was a no no for enemy soldiers to have a leaflet on their person. If found on them, they were shot. Consequently, smaller leaflets were used so that they could be hidden more easily and read at a later date. Some leaflets were printed as money so the enemy soldiers could hide the leaflets between the real money he had. It was normal practice to send the enemy leaflets that he recognized, news that he missed, and things he knew about. One leaflet that exceeded all others in production was the Safe Conduct Pass. It had to be sincere and standardized.

THE LOUDSPEAKER

Tactical Psywar was employed for surrender instructions, to discourage and disrupt enemy operations, control civilians, warn of potential bombings of enemy targets, etc. Psywar soldiers used several types of media, audio, visual and print, but during most combat operations, Loudspeaker Systems were used for face-to-face communications. Loudspeaker Teams in Korea consisted of a US soldier, normally a sergeant who was in charge; one Korean soldier who could speak English and Korean; and a Korean soldier who could speak Korean and Chinese.

The Loudspeaker was a major weapon in Korea. Ground loudspeakers were used on the radio-less North Korean front. Loudspeakers were also used from aircraft to stimulate or control enemy movements. The best example of this was a case where a Loudspeaker plane saw a northbound column of Communist trucks that were warned to turn around and head for U.N. lines or they would be shot at by the fighter planes that were circling overhead.

On occasion, the voice and leaflet planes were damaged by Communist Anti-aircraft Artillery, and planes were lost. A good number of ground loudspeakers were destroyed by intense enemy counter fire to halt broadcasts. There was this time we sent a few thousand leaflets up to the front to our loudspeaker team, which was going to use them. But before the team could use them or destroy them, the hill was overrun by the enemy and the leaflets were confiscated by the enemy. A couple of days later the enemy flew over Seoul in their Bed Check Charlie planes and dropped those leaflets on our compound. They knew exactly where we were located. Their intelligence was just as good as ours.

LEAFLETS

Leaflets are the work-horse of Psywar. After the North Koreans crossed the 38^th parallel on June 25, 1950, enough leaflets were used in Korea to provide one for every person on earth. Leaflets were dropped by leaflet bombs and timed fused bundles. They were shot across the lines by leaflet shells, and carried and distributed by infantry patrols.

The standard size of a leaflet used in Korea was 5 ½ x 8 ½. These leaflets could be retained and passed on from person to person without distortion. The leaflet could be hidden and read later in privacy.

A properly developed and designed message can have a deep and lasting effect on the target audience. The heading of the leaflet is the most important part because it is what your eyes see first. It has to be forceful and short, gain the interest of the target audience, and contain actual facts and details. Color on a leaflet should contrast sharply with the predominant color of the terrain over which the leaflet will be used. It has to stand out so that the individual would want to pick it up. Through intelligence you can learn the favorable colors of the target audience.

Pictures on leaflets showing bombed enemy cities are proof to the soldier that their homeland is subject to air raids. During the Korean War, the leaflet themes centered around the happy POW, good soldiers, bad leaders, surrender, you will be treated well, and nostalgia for home, family, and woman.

There are some disadvantages to leaflets. A high illiteracy rate can reduce the effectiveness of the message. They require special extensive and continuing logistic support. The enemy can collect and destroy them or prohibit the possession of them by death.

The leaflet development and design requires trained and knowledgeable personnel. They must know the situation at the moment the leaflet is to be used. Leaflets were developed for standard uses, as special situations, safe conduct passes, and news of what is happening. Only positive appeals can wear down the barrier the enemy has erected against the Psywar writer. The work of a Psy warrior was top notch.

LEAFLETS FROM THE AIR/BOMBS

Leaflets dropped by air usually follow the effects of air current and there were drops when the air stream would change and our UN troops would receive them.

The leaflets dropped by leaflet bombs weighed 225 pounds fully loaded with 30,000 5 ½ x 8 ½ fliers. Before the leaflets were placed in the bomb, the fuse was placed in the seam between the two halves. It functioned at a predetermined time, denoting the primer cord, separating the two body sections, detaching the fins and releasing the leaflets.

THE VICTORY OF PSYWAR

There is little likelihood of learning the total effect of Psywar in Korea. Today’s Psy Warriors are soldiers first and radiopersons, printers, or psychologists second. Our unit always considered that if one person surrendered with a leaflet, that was one soldier not shooting at United Nations troops. By the end of the Korean War, 2.5 billion leaflets had been dropped over enemy troops and civilians in North Korea. About one million individual leaflets could be distributed by a single B-29 Superfortress. The reliance of C-47 Transport Aircraft as a way of disseminating leaflets and the use of Voice Planes at the tactical level were uncomplicated by enemy air or anti-craft action.

The most stunning victory for the United Nations was the refusal of 33,000 POWs to return to their homelands, and in contrast only 21 UN military personnel refused repatriation.

In 1957, the term Psychological Warfare was replaced by Psychological Operation, in recognition of the fact that such operations did not require a state of war and they could be directed toward civilians.

NEWS ARTICLE
Name of publication unknown; Date unknown
(written sometime during the Korean War)
Submitted to the Korean War Educator by
Paul Wolfgeher, Independence, MO

PSYWAR HITS KOREAN ENEMY
RIGHT WHERE IT HURTS THE MOST

WITH THE EIGHTH ARMY, Korea - The strenuous nightly climb to work was made a little easier for Mr. Kim on this rainy night as three searchlights on the next ridge cast an eerie light. Mr. Kim could barely distinguish the last few footholds, but as he gained the top of the mountain he could see more clearly. He started to set up for the night's work.
First the generator. Good, he thought, as it started without difficulty. He checked the dial to insure that there was enough power, then connected the "mike," placed a harmonica to his lips and began the first broadcast of the evening. From a loudspeaker unit, some 300 yards in front of the MLR, came the strains of the soulful harmonica solo, followed with a resume of the current news in flawless Chinese for the news starved Communists. Thus, an obscure bunker on an isolated hill once again became the final link in the PSYWAR chain.

PSYCHOLOGICAL Warfare (PSYWAR), a weapon as old as history itself, is waged in Korea through the combined efforts of approximately 350 Americans and Koreans. They use propaganda and related measures which are designed to decrease the effectiveness of the enemy in this "hot and cold" war. Standing as the "Heart of PSYWAR" in Korea is the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Co., commanded by Capt. Oliver W. Rodman. The 1st L&L, which arrived in Korea in the early autumn of 1950 as a Tactical Information Detachment, is the first unit of its kind in this or any other theater, and is the only one to serve in combat.
In preparing each new program which will strike at the morale of the Communist forces, the Intelligence Branch of the Eighth Army Psychological Warfare Division first evaluates the psychological vulnerability of the enemy. This information is passed along to the Projects Branch, whose artists and writers design the propaganda leaflets.
After materials are fused in a finished product, translated and approved, they are sent to the 1st L&L Co., where the leaflets are reproduced. Meanwhile, speaker teams are writing scripts which will elaborate the theme of the leaflets. When reproduction is completed, Capt. Rodman calls in the section leaders, who will conduct the operation, and explains the objective of the program. The section leaders return to their headquarters and brief the team chiefs who have written scripts for the coming attack.

ON THE appointed date, the operation swings into action. Although the Operations Branch of PSYWAR has many ways of disseminating its material, the usual methods are stationary loudspeakers and leaflets dropped from airplanes. In the case of a fluid front, speakers are mounted on tanks, while loudspeakers rigged to airplanes is another method used in Korea. The use of airplanes is ideal in cases where the civilian population is the object of the message. Planes are seldom used against ground forces, because they would be too easy to shoot down.
The use of artillery shells permits the section leaders to pinpoint a target, while leaflets dropped from airplanes cover a general area.

AS THE hour of the proposed operation approaches, the team chiefs move out to their respective units and brief their men on the night's program. In a team there are usually two other members, one who broadcasts and one who can interpret English, Chinese and Korean.
At advanced airbases, planes are loaded with leaflets that will be dropped to coincide with the broadcasts. If necessary, artillery pieces will send shells into enemy territory with the same message. The success of the campaign now depends on the intellectual and emotional make-up of the enemy. Will the ancient folk tunes of his country cause him to stop and think about his home? Can the leaflets make him believe that he is the pawn of a foreign government?
Reports from Communist prisoners indicate they listen to broadcasts and read the leaflets even though they are subject to punishment for doing so.