We hope and pray that this is the last battle of the Korean conflict. If we can successfully establish the principle of non-forceful repatriation, it is our opinion that the enemy cannot afford to unleash another aggressive war in which he must depend upon the loyalty of slave soldiers to secure his aims. Consider the fact that of more than 20,000 Chinese prisoners of war, 15,000 have declared that they will forcibly resist repatriation. Three fourths of the so-called Chinese Peoples' Volunteers have elected to remain on the side of the free world. We regard the choice of these prisoners as being indicative of the attitude of the entire Chinese people.

The essence of our endeavor will be to see that all of the men involved, on both sides, if they do reverse the stands they have taken, do so freely, with no duress, coercion, fear or intimidation. Our representatives will be alert to prevent any attempts on the part of the communist "explainers" to use unfair tactics, threats of reprisals on families, or any of the devices which are barred under the terms of the Armistice. Our own "explainers" representing the several UN nations involved in the Korean conflict have been instructed to conduct their explanations within the spirit and letter of the agreement.

In the event these prisoners remain loyal to the cause of the free world through the period of explanations by the communists, we feel that we will have won the psychological battle of our time. Such a victory for the free world would be an effective deterrent to the initiation of future aggressive wars by the communists.

A. L. HAMBLEN
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
Brigadier General A. L. Hamblen assumed command of the newly formed United Nations Command Repatriation Group on 1 September 1953. He assumed this duty in addition to his duties as Deputy Commanding General of the Korean Communications Zone.

He was born in Maine and is a graduate of the University of Maine. He was commissioned a Second Lieutenant upon his entry into the Army in 1916.

General Hamblen has attended the Infantry School Advance Course, the Command and General Staff School and the Army War College.

Among the decorations held by General Hamblen are the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, the Commendation Ribbon, War Cross of Brazil, War Cross of Italy, the Crown of Italy, Legion of Honor, the Croix de Guerre of France and Commander British Empire.

Colonel Ward S. Ryan, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of UNCMG, was born in Montana. He entered the United States Military Academy at West Point in June, 1934, and was graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree on 13 June, 1938.

Since then he has also attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, the Command and General Staff School and the Armed Forces Staff College.

Colonel Ryan has been awarded the Silver Star, the Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster and the Commendation Ribbon.

Before his assignment to UNCMG he was the Commanding Officer of the United Nations Command IV Camp #2 near Pusan.
BACKGROUND TO UNCREG STORY

The truce talks at Panmunjon broke down in 1951 over the point of forced repatriation. The UN insisted that every prisoner be allowed to decide freely whether or not he was to return to his homeland.

After seemingly endless bickering and disappointment, on 27 July 1953, both sides finally agreed to a method of handling those prisoners who did not want to return to their homeland. The agreement was set forth in an annex to the Armistice Agreement called the Terms of Reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC). In this agreement each FW was guaranteed the right to elect his final disposition: he may decide to return to his original side, or he shall be aided in reaching a nation of his own selection.

The Terms of Reference provided for a commission composed of the representatives of five nations to examine the prisoners not being directly repatriated. The neutral nations chosen to form the commission were Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India. The representative from India was to be chairman and executive agent for the NNRC. India was also to provide a brigade of troops to guard the prisoners while they were being held in compounds within the Demilitarized Zone near Panmunjon.

Because of the refusal of the Republic of Korea to permit the Indian custodian troops to set foot on South Korean soil, the UNC carried the entire brigade to the Demilitarized Zone in one of the largest helicopter operations in military history. The Indian Custodian Force camp was named "Shanti Nagar" meaning "Indian City" and the camp which housed the NNRC delegation was named "Shanti Nagar" meaning "City of Peace."

As set forth in the Armistice agreement, all prisoners who indicated that they wanted to return to their homeland were to be repatriated within sixty days after the effective date of the Armistice. All prisoners who refused repatriation were then to be handed over to the custody of the UNRRC. There, the nations to which the FWs belonged would have freedom to send representatives to explain their rights to the prisoners.


Specifically, the mission of UNCREG was to insure that all FWs have an opportunity to exercise full freedom of choice, to insure that the efforts of the Communist exponents be not coercive, and to explain to the non-repatriate UNC prisoners their rights and their freedom of choice.

Representatives of the five member Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission are shown in session at Shanti Nagar (Peace Village). The five nations are Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India.

A view of the CFI Camp
"THE UNREG STORY"

The United Nations Command Repatriation Group was organized to perform one of the most vital tasks still left undone in implementing the Armistice Agreement. After completion of the exchange of those prisoners who desired repatriation, explanations to 22,951 non-repatriate prisoners was the major remaining task to be accomplished. There were no textbooks or precedents to guide the UN in this task.

On 21 September, the Custodian Forces, India, (CFI) completed taking custody of the non-repatriates when it received in its North Camp the 359 UN non-repatriates from the Communist command. Two days earlier the United Nations Command completed its delivery of 7,890 North Korean and 14,702 Chinese prisoners to the South CFI camp.

Meanwhile, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) was preparing rules for the conduct of explanations at both camps in the Demilitarized Zone.

Although the NNRC assumed custody of the prisoners of war on 21 September, explanations were not initiated until 15 October. This unexpected delay in the start of explanations came as a result of a last minute protest by the Communists that the explanation sites built by the UN engineers at the South Camp were inadequate and did not meet their specifications.

Members of the Observer-Interpreter-Representative teams receive instruction and counsel on the methods and procedure to be employed by the UN teams at the explanations to anti-Communist PWs at the "South Camp" in the Demilitarised Zone.

The Communists insisted that these specifications be met before any explanations would be made by their side. After several changes in NNRC construction requirements, the thirty-two new explanation points were rushed to completion and ready for explanations by midnight, 13 October.

While the hurried construction was being completed, the CFI was encountering trouble from the supposedly docile prisoners in the South Camp. The HWS, uncertain as to their ultimate fate, still lacked confidence in their Indian custodians. Due to the presence of Communist observers in the South Camp, the Chinese and North Korean non-repatriates demonstrated. These demonstrations created a number of touchy and difficult situations for the CFI. On two occasions the Indian guards fired into groups of demonstrating prisoners.

Lieutenant General K. S. Mathaya, the chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, held his first press conference on 6 October with press representatives from both the UN and the Communist camps. Facing an imposing battery of cameras, microphones, movie and TV equipment and correspondents, General Mathaya conducted a creeded conference with competence, tact and assurance.

Pipers and drummers of the Custodian Forces India stand in full dress review at the South CFI Camp in the Demilitarised Zone.
The Communists had already begun their tirade of unreasonable demands and accusations that were to continue throughout the entire operation. While the explanation sites were being constructed, they demanded that the 90-day explanation period be counted from the first day that the prisoners and the Communist explainers actually met in the tents at the explanation area. The NURC steadfastly objected any extension of the explanation period beyond the termination date of 23 December as dictated by the Terms of Reference.

With three weeks already lost, time became an important factor for the Communists if they intended to persuade the thousands of anti-Communist prisoners to return to Communism. On the morning of 14 October, the Communist command requested that the NURC deliver one thousand Chinese prisoners to the explanation sites for explanations on 15 October.

The prisoners, however, did not come out for explanations until they were assured by General Thimayya that they would not be segregated. Then 491 violent, rebellious prisoners received persuasion talks from the Communist explainers that first day. And more important, only ten of the total returned to Communist control. This small percentage of defectors, which was to set the pattern throughout the entire explanation period, must have come as a crushing blow to the Communists' hopes of luring home their former troops.

The colorful "Freedom Gate" stands menacingly on the Communist side of the Demilitarized Zone. A long line of Chinese prisoners is lined up at the gate. The colorful "Freedom Gate" is the only gate through which the prisoners can escape to their homeland.

The next day the Communists were again able to stall explanations by requesting 1,000 Koreans instead of the Chinese who were willing to come to the explanation sessions. The Indian guards could find no means to get the prisoners to come out of their compounds, short of physical force and violence.

The third day, 17 October, was much the same as the first day. Although the Communists asked for 1,000 Chinese prisoners, they explained to only 130 of whom ten were repatriated. Again the Chinese prisoners were vocal in their condemnation of the communist explainers.

One of the major controversies of the explanation operations—should physical force be used to bring the prisoners to the explanation sessions—came as a result of these first three days of activity explanations. The Communists demanded that the prisoners be dragged to the tents and forced to listen to extended sessions of intense grilling. The United Nations and Communist foreign correspondents at the first open press conference held at the NURC Headquarters in the Demilitarized Zone.

Lieutenant General K. S. Thimayya, Indian Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, calmly answers questions put to him by United Nations and Communist foreign correspondents at the first open press conference held at the NURC Headquarters in the Demilitarized Zone.
Monday, 19 October, proved to be a repetition of the second day, as 1,000 Koreans were requested but couldn’t be induced to come out of their compounds. Although the Chinese non-repatriates actually expressed a desire to attend the explanations, the Communists persisted for Korean prisoners who would not leave their compounds.

By these tactics the Communists hoped to cause the NNRC to use force on the prisoners, which would create strife and bloodshed, and would possibly cause the Republic of Korea to take action against the Indians.

During this two-week lull in explanations, the NNRC was divided over the issue of forcing the prisoners to attend explanations. The Polish and Czech members demanded the use of force. The Swiss and Swede members were equally adamantly in their stand opposing the use of force. So it was left to the Indian chairman to decide the issue, and he voted to support the Swede and Swiss view of "no force."

On the afternoon of 21 October, UNCRE received Corporal Edward S. Dickerson, the only American prisoner to change his mind during the explanation period. He was validated and returned to the UN at the exchange point near the NNRC headquarters at Pannmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone.

During the ninety-day period, a total of seven ROC prisoners voluntarily were repatriated. One of these defectors was a woman, the wife of another prisoner who also was repatriated. Husband, wife and their two small children returned to the UN on 16 November.

The first mail from home for the Americans in the North Camp was delivered on 24 October to the CFI, to be distributed to the individual prisoners.

Spokesmen for the American non-repatriates complained that some of the letters were political and coercive in nature and requested that the NNRC censor their mail. The NNRC, thereafter, censored all mail before distributing it to the Pows.

Just when it appeared that the NNRC was hopelessly deadlocked over the issue of the use of force to make the non-repatriates attend explanations, General Thimaiyia announced that he had finally persuaded the Korean non-repatriates to come voluntarily to explanations.

When explanations were resumed on 31 October, the North Korean explainers had but little more success than their Chinese comrades. They were able to persuade only 21 of 459 to return to Communism. And they were even less successful on the following day when they regained only 19 of 483. It was now apparent that the Communists were "losing face" by continuing the explanations. Observers wondered what their next move would be.

The next day the Communists requested Chinese non-repatriates and immediately started a series of delaying tactics. They prolonged each explanation session as long as the individual Indian chairman would permit. Some sessions lasted as long as four hours. But in spite of these "brain washing" tactics, they were able to lure back only 2 Chinese out of 205 on 4 Nov., and 2 out of 136 on the following day.

A conference in the Demilitarized Zone between (L to R) Lt Gen E S Thimaiyia, Chairman NNRC; Gen Maxwell D Taylor, CG Eighth Army; Brig Gen A L Hemblen, CG UNCRO; Gen John E Hull, CINCUNC; Gen Maxwell B Ridgway, Chief of Staff US Army; and Maj Gen Julius E Lacey, USAF, Senior Member UNCMAC.

The first mail from home for the 22 American POWs in the North Camp is delivered to a CFI officer by First Lieutenant Robert D Harbert, APO 72 Postal Officer.
The CFI did not separate prisoners who had already received explanations from those remaining in their compound. Realizing that the CFI would, therefore, be unable to determine which of the PWs in the compound had already received explanations, the Communists were again able to bring explanations to a complete standstill on 6 November by demanding the remainder of the compound to which they had been explaining the previous day.

The Communists persisted in this demand until 16 November at which time they asked for Korean non-repatriates. But when they were able to persuade only six out of 227 to return, they immediately brought explanations to a halt by again demanding to explain to the remainder of the compound on the following day. In this way they succeeded in bringing explanations in the South Camp to a standstill until 21 December.

It was on 2 December that the long awaited UNC explanations in the North Camp began with five Republic of Korea officers explaining to 30 South Korean non-repatriates. In decided contrast to the Communist sessions, the ROK "come home" talks were brief, dignified and to the point. From the first day it was apparent that the ROKs were hand-picked by their Communist captors, and were well versed in the doctrines of Communism.

Explanations to the South Koreans continued on a daily basis until 11 December at which time the ROKs announced that they would no longer attend explanations. Surprisingly, their main complaint was that the explanation sessions were too short in that they were not given time to question the explainers on immaterial subjects or to make preparatory speeches.

With a week and a half still remaining of the 90-day period, the UNC asked to start explanations to the American Prisoners on 11 December. But the Americans too, refused to come out of their compounds until the demands of the Korean non-repatriates were met. Thereafter, the UNC made a daily request for the prisoners to come forward. Americans, British or Koreans.

When it became apparent that the non-repatriate leaders in the North Camp would never permit any more of their number to face explainers, UNC/REG turned to other means to present the UNC position to the prisoners. Mimeographed statements of the free choice principle were submitted for approval by the MNC for distribution to non-repatriates. When the MNC ruled that the statements would have to be submitted to the prisoners under the conditions and procedures of a regular explanation session, spokesmen for the PWs refused to accept them.

Meanwhile, in the South Camp the Communists again started explanations. During the last three days of the 90-day period, they explained to 742 Chinese prisoners but were able to persuade only 69 of them to return to Communism.

On 23 December—the very last day of the 90-day explanation period—the American, British and Korean non-repatriates still persisted in their refusal to attend explanation sessions. UNC/REG, therefore, resorted to still another means to fulfill its obligation to present the UNC free choice principle to the prisoners. By means of a loudspeaker, an American, British and Korean explainers each presented a brief statement to the non-repatriates assembled in the North Camp compound... the prisoners replied by singing the Communist "Internationale."
Throughout the entire 90-day period the Communists used every propaganda device at their disposal to present their endless tirade of protests, accusations and deceits. But they were able to come back to Communism only a little more than one percent (1.12%) of the 22,604 prisoners in the South Camp. The overwhelming majority of the prisoners expressed their desire to go to South Korea or Formosa. A few asked to go to one of the neutral countries. At the same time over two percent (2.23%) of the supposedly hard-core Communists in the North Camp voluntarily returned to the United Nations side.

In his letter of appreciation to Brigadier General Hambolt on the successful completion of "Operation Repatriate," General John R. Hull, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, wrote:

"...it has been the major responsibility of the United Nations Command Repatriation Group to guide this critical undertaking in wisdom, restraint and discretion. On behalf of the entire United Nations Command, I wish to express my personal appreciation to you and your personnel for the manner in which your organization has fulfilled its mission. I am fully aware of the many difficulties which you have successfully overcome and it has been a source of deep satisfaction to me to observe the able, enthusiastic devotion to duty which has marked the performance of your group."
Long before the September birth of the United Nations Command Repatriation Group, thorough and far reaching plans were being initiated to meet the Command's complex makeup and critical need of qualified men.

Officers and enlisted men were selected by their military and civilian experience to fill duty positions in the various sections of UNCRGS. Other qualified personnel were recruited from civilian and military sources throughout the Far East and the United States for critical vacancies in the sections.

The uniqueness of the mission of UNCRGS required the formation of functional sections that had never existed before in Army history—Observer, Exploiter and Representatives. Every section was organized to be highly flexible and adaptable to all situations that might occur.

At top strength, UNCRGS's personnel totaled almost 500, and was the largest command in Korea composed entirely of U.N. personnel. Men came from the Korean Communications Zone, Prisoners of War Command, Eighth Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine units throughout Korea. Members representing the other United Nations were from the Republic of Korea, Great Britain, Australia, France, Canada, Greece, Belgium, Ethiopia, and Colombia. UNCRGS was logistically supported by Headquarters Support Group, UNCHAC, 8020th AU.

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

The nerve center of the United Nations Command Repatriation Group was the Office of the Commanding General. It was here that Frigidier General A. L. Hamblen, with his Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, Colonel Ward S. Ryan, formulated the policies and decisions directing the UNCRFG operations.

Front row: Maj Louis Williams, Brig Gen A L Hamblen, Col Ward S Ryan, Capt Roger L Panck, 2d Lt Robert R Puggiero
2d row: SFC B E Worford, Cpl Alfonso Lucero, FFC Richard A Cleck, FFC Daniel J DiPrince, FFC Floyd D Poland
GI SECTION

The G-1 Section served as an advisor to the Commanding General on all matters concerning management and assignment of UNRREG personnel.

ADJUTANT GENERAL SECTION

The Adjutant General Section performed the administrative functions for the command.

It maintained all officers' and enlisted men's records and submitted varied reports and personnel data upon official request. All UNRREG bulletins were published under AG supervision.

Because of the nature of its functions, a night staff was maintained to provide round-the-clock service on administrative matters.

This booklet was prepared by the following personnel:

Major  David Burman, Sig C
Captain  David Fuhl, USAF
2nd Lt  Allen Wilhelm, Arty
2nd Lt  Thomas Carroll, QMC
Cpl  Ivan Thompson
Cpl  R. J. Crispeno
Cpl  T. Akmenskis
Cpl  W. R. Manusce
PFC  William Ladyka

Front row: M/Sgt Pebble V Roberts, PFC Robert V George, Major Charles Cornett, Cpl John R Falk, PFC James T Quinn
2nd row: Pvt Marvin R Wolber, PFC Jerald G Haley, PFC James C Riley, PFC Robert A Carr

Front row: PFC Stanley M Magda, PFC Joseph Defeters, Pvt Clifford Grabowski, Pvt William D Gibson
2nd row: PFC Fred C Marchbank, PFC Ted W Pothakis, PFC Kenneth O McCormick, PFC Robert L Fenta
3rd row: PFC John Moravec, Cpl Francis L Donevue, Jr, M/Sgt Darre A Johnson, Sgt Adrian S LaRose, PFC Saul Rosen
4th row: Lt Francis C Miles, Capt Paul Kolank, 1st Lt William J Burgett
PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION

The PIO Section served as the advisor to the Commanding General and his staff on all matters pertaining to public information and relations. The PIO acted as the official spokesman for the Commanding General UNCESO.

It maintained a five-man escort team which accompanied convoys of UN correspondents into the Demilitarized Zone. Facilities for radio and TV broadcasts as well as teletype accommodations were made available to the news media who were on hand to cover explanations to prisoners of war in the North and South Camps. The section began its operations on 7 September when Lt. Col. Ralph E. Pearson arrived from the Incheon Press Center to take over the duties of UNCESO's Public Information Officer.

G4 SECTION

Essential to any military unit is the supply section, whose responsibility is the procurement and distribution of necessary equipment and supplies.

Such items as food, clothing, office supplies, transportation, billets, etc., were the major concern of the men working in the G4 CESO G4 Section.
HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

The Headquarters Commandant Section supported many of the operations of the other sections of the command.

In its charge were the post security, messing facilities, billeting, post supply, clothing issue for all UNCSEG troops and other miscellaneous UNCSEG functions.

MILITARY HISTORY
SECTION

The mission of the Military History Section was the preparation of a systematic, objective and balanced account of the UNCSEG operation.

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT

The base unit of the enlisted men of UNCSEG was the Headquarters Detachment.

In addition to normal administrative matters, the Headquarters Detachment was responsible for the handling and delivery of mail to members of the command. With the exception of FTO personnel, all enlisted men of the command were billeted in the detachment area.
The Observer-Representative-Interpreter teams of UNCREG were present at all explanation sessions to Chinese and North Korean non-repatriates conducted by the Communist Command. Each team was composed of three men—an observer, a representative and an interpreter. In accordance with the Terms of Reference and the Rules of Procedure, one team attended each individual explanation session.

The duty of the observer was to insure that the explainer on the other side performed his functions in accord with the Terms of Reference and the Rules of Procedure, and to observe the general conduct of the explanations.

The representative functioned, in effect, as a defense counsel for the prisoner of war. He dealt with the Indian chairman of the NHRG subcommittee to ensure that the Communist explainers did not coerce the prisoner, and to insure that the prisoner’s rights and interests were protected.

The interpreter translated the “persuasion talks” from Chinese or Korean to English for the presiding board of NHRG members.

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HEADQUARTERS OBSERVERS

Front row: 2d Lt James L Anderson, Col Willard B Carlock, Col Howard L Eresee, Maj D L Ryan, Capt Tafesse Lemma

2d row: MSgt Foster M Berry, DAC Roy C Kim, DAC Robert H Chee, DAC Chan Yih

3d row: Pvt David L Stephens, PFC Joseph J Milewski, PFC William M Stelter, PFC Gerald Slotnick

Last row: SFC Lawson E Archer, PFC Jesse Parker, MSgt Raymond B Petrovski, 1st Lt Harry M Flower

OBSERVERS SECTION, CHINESE, TEAMS 1-8

Front row: Lt Col Ben M Faribault, Lt Col V F Mealing, Maj Carret F W Keesbergen, Cdr Carl Klein, Maj C K Wong

2d row: DAC Chung Yean Kao, DAC Yuan Chang, Lt Col Phillip H Hall, DAC Chau Teh Ho, DAC Joe Yuen Jeong

3rd row: PFC Ngoc N Tran, DAC Norman L Lyon, Maj Mario G Dimaseng, Maj Gabriel S Calingo

4th row: Capt William B Carpenter, DAC Chih Wang, PFC Way S Lee, DAC Chung En Huang, PFC Calvin S K Wong

Last row: Maj Charles H Fogg, 1st Lt Robert E Kelly
OBSERVERS SECTION, CHINESE, TEAMS 9-16

Front row: Capt David F Pihl, Major William Fox, Lt Col Guy B Wilder, Major John Kiernan Jr, Major George V Lane.
2d row: 1st Lt Robert S Monroe, DAC Robert Yang, Capt Donald J McDevitt, DAC Eugene Chang, DAC Ching Chong Hsi.

OBSERVERS SECTION, CHINESE, TEAMS 17-24

Front row: 1st Lt Richard J Jordan, Lt Col Albert T Seeger, Capt Charles S Jackson, 2d Lt David G Rosenberg, DAC David Tan.
3d row: DAC Yang Chao, DAC Chun King Ying, Capt Wendell W Long, DAC Hung Fu, Capt Linda Hancock.
4th row: DAC Kwang Tuan Wei, DAC Ching Fung Kwang, DAC Raymond B May, DAC Wilfred Goo.
5th row: Capt Howard A Gagnon, Cpl James S Fard, DAC Shih Chun Feng, Pvt Phillip Hen.

OBSERVERS SECTION, CHINESE, TEAMS 25-32

5th row: 1st Lt Barry Flower, 2d Lt Glen Cannon.
OBSERVERS SECTION, CHINESE, 33-40

Front row: Capt F J Hagerty, Capt Carl Smith, Capt Robert D Greer, 2d Lt Kurt Weinke, 2d Lt James L Anderson
2d row: FFC Charles Sung, FFC Ken H Yee, Pvt James Jowick, FFC Yowe F Hum, Pvt James M Yee
3rd row: CMS Jee Chong Sup, Pvt William Leong, Pvt Chong D Koo, Pvt Ching Yuk, Cpl David C Leong
4th row: Pvt Victor Ng, Pvt Ken Ping Hon, Pvt Raymond Now, FFC Tong Tze Yuen, 1st Lt Joseph T Cooke
5th row: Pvt James H Chiao, FFC Jacob Young, DAC Lee Chin Chuan, FFC David T Wu, Cpl Wing Fong
6th row: S/Sgt David D Cortez, 1st Lt Patrick C Shere, FFC Louis C Moon, A/Cpl Noel L Mann, 2d Lt Harry H Leong

OBSERVERS SECTION, KOREAN, TEAMS 1-8

Front row: Lt Col William R Robinette, Lt Col Joseph L McSulka, Major Kenneth Hicks Jr, Major Duane C Tsay
2d row: CMS Yun Tae Yung, CMS Lee Hoon Il, DAC Yoon Tae Kang, Capt Ko Chung Ky, 1st Lt Kim Ke Hoon
3rd row: 1st Lt Jong Hae Hon, 1st Lt Kim Yong Ho, 1st Lt Koh Kyong Shik, 1st Lt Lee Duk Woo, Capt Jeung Dong Sah
4th row: Capt Bartley J Greenwood Jr, 1st Lt William J Alexander, 2d Lt Leonard Osakins, Capt Hugh S McChesney
5th row: 1st Lt Woo Doo Jae, CMS Sin Hyon Hak, CMS Lee Tong Soo, Capt Choi Yong Chun, 1st Lt Choi Byung Hak

OBSERVERS SECTION, KOREAN, TEAMS 9-16

Front row: Major Duane C Tsay, Capt Lee Chang Hee, Major Clarence W Ellis Jr, 1st Lt Kwon Sung Jin, 1st Lt Chang Won Yong
2d row: Capt Angelo L Caro, 1st Lt Sung Jik Chih, Capt Yang W Jeon, 1st Lt Seo Kwang Wook
3rd row: CMS II Hae Iong, CMS Tong Il Chang, Capt Dong Young Kim, CMS Con Ki Pak
4th row: 1st Lt Cho Yang Hwi, Capt Lee Yoon Oh, Capt Robert E Whitney, DAC Chong S Yeun
5th row: Capt Harry A Diehl, Capt Robert R Scott, Capt Alfred Phillips, 1st Lt Kim Dol Sik, Capt Alfred L Elor
OBSERVERS SECTION, KOREAN, TEAMS 25-32

Front row: Maj D L Jordan, Lt Col Schiller, Shore, Lt Col Raymond F Klein, Capt Andrew Hjelmstrom, Capt Robert B Mill
2d row: 1st Lt Ji Kyung Duk, Capt Chung Dae Shick, 1st Lt Lee Woo Yun, 1st Lt Lee Hong Woo
3rd row: 1st Lt Kim Kyung Hwan, 1st Lt Choi Chung Cheol, CMS Song Han Kyung, 1st Lt Koo Ji Wook
4th row: DaC Choi Chang Ho, DaC Kim Sang Dong, 1st Lt Kim Ki Yoon, 1st Lt Kim Suk Soo
5th row: 1st Lt George W Sears, 2d Lt Arthur Culberson, Jr, 1st Lt Albert L Kimball, CMS Cheng De Fu

OBSERVERS SECTION, KOREAN, TEAMS 33-40

Front row: 2d Lt James T Gordon, Capt Eugene B Legaspi, Capt Peter D Bacco, 2d Lt John J Vallette, DaC Roy Oi Kim
2d row: 1st Lt Kim Hyung Doo, 1st Lt Lee En Han, 1st Lt Lim Han Soon, 1st Lt Lee Yong Heon
3rd row: DaC Kim Young Chin, 1st Lt Kwon Yong Koo, 1st Lt Kim Joo Soong, 1st Lt Lee Tong Ho
4th row: 1st Lt Kim Eyo Sik, 1st Lt Jeung Ki Chang, CMS Kim Se Chun, 1st Lt Sun Jae Ho
5th row: CMS Lim Chang Kook, CMS Kang Yun Kyung, 1st Lt Ha Jae Rim, 1st Lt Moon Kun Sung, 1st Lt Lee Byung Hak
6th row: 1st Lt Geum Bong, 1st Lt Lee Jung Run, 1st Lt Park
7th row: CMS Lee Byung Seng
ZONE OF REPATRIATION OPERATIONS

FROM ____________________________

TO ____________________________